Niall Ferguson -Historian HARDtalk


Niall Ferguson -Historian

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why particles have mass. Now on BBC News, it is time for

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HARDtalk. The British Government has promised

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action to deal with the scandal at Barclays. The bank has been fined

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for trying to fix the interest rate at which banks lend to each other.

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Yet again it is the lack of regulation that is being blamed for

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a financial problem. My guess today argues that the world is responding

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in the wrong way to the global financial crisis. He is Professor

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Niall Ferguson, and he thinks the economic chaos was caused by too

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much regulation, not too little. Welcome to HARDtalk. When you see

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what Barclays was up to, trying to manipulate the interbank rate,

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surely the answer do that is more regulation. I am quite interested

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to know what kind of regulation could be devised to ball into the

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minds of traders, at all the banks, in the City of London, subject them

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to some kind of lie detection test, and make sure that when

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representatives of the Bank meet to set LIBOR rent -- lending rates,

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they told the truth, the whole truth. It would be pretty hard to

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come up with that regulation. It is highly desirable that they tell the

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truth, and the fact that they did not is to be condemned, but I think

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the point that I made in my lectures, is that imagine if you

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can solve problems like that, with complex regulations, it is an

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illusion. We will come up to the arguments that you made. On the

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question of what happened at Barclay's, and from what we

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understand has probably happened at other banks, the FSA find Barclays.

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But it did not feel it had the power to prosecute. That is

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something the Chancellor says will be changing. It is far from clear

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that what happened could testify a criminal prosecution under the law

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that existed. So a new law is needed to deal with that. That is

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not to say that there was not a regulation of the interbank lending

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market, it there was. The issue is highly technical, which we need to

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take some time to discuss. The London interbank rate is set, in

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this case, representatives of 16 banks, who then say when they meet,

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that what they think their bank would be able to borrow money at,

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from another bank, on the day in question. They then take these

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estimates... you have to understand how complex this is, they take the

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16 estimates, they cut off the top ones and the bottom ones, and they

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take the average of the middle ones. That is the rate that appears. That

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is what the Barclay's representatives were trying to fix.

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The impact of police more sheets in the rate is the issue. -- pretty

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small shifts. Because it is used as the basis for a lot of contracts,

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it has an impact. But it is not a market rate. It is set in effect by

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a committee. Given what we know by what happened at Barclays, they

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were doing it to make money, and then it was to hide the fact they

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appeared to be under financial stress. What we do know is they

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have been fined, a lot of people look at this and say that is

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bordering on criminal, what is going on. They should be prosecuted.

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The intention is to introduce, whether it is legislation or not,

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to change the rules so that in future, somebody could be

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prosecuted. Is that something that you would welcome? We want to see

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the truth told. As I said to you earlier, I am not entirely sure how

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any regulation is going to ensure that. But if you know there is a

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heavy penalty at the end of the process... there was a heavy

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penalty already. The chief executive officer is gone, the

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chairman has gone, the chief operating officer is gone. The

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penalty in terms of their careers was already Severe. Whether there

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is a criminal case to be made is not clear. Let's follow it through.

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What is extremely hard to imagine is a regulation that can enforce

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truth-telling when those representatives meet. The only

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reason we know that they were not telling the whole truth is that

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there were e-mails between traders. These emails were never be written

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again. And that is because of what happened. You seem to be suggesting

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that things were working OK. I do not think that is OK. The point I

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am making is that you cannot devise a regulation that ensures that. Let

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me try to pursue this point. It is a really important point. The

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mistake we are making on dealing with the financial crisis, is that

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imagining you can devise enormously detailed statutory provisions, or

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what will emerge from the John Vickers report, which will prevent

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the things that happened in the run-up to the crisis. That is not

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realistic. These are highly unlikely to be prevented by a

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regulation, no long -- no matter how long all wordy it is. What

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happens in the next financial crisis will be quite different to

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this one. We have to be realistic about what you can achieve that.

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You have argued that less regulation, but enforceable

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regulation, and this case seems to illustrate, we have seen the chief

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executive lose his job, and the chief operating officer resigned,

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but nobody has been prosecuted. This has only just come to light.

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They may more walk away with huge sums. If you are to create a

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penalty that acts as a deterrent, even in a very simple system, but

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you put forward, surely cases like this need to be dealt with more

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severely. What are you going to do? Are you going to pass an act

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against telling fibs? What are you proposing? One of the things that

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you have to learn about the financial system is that the crisis

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we just saw happen in a relatively regulated market, which is the US

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mortgage market, and the transatlantic banking system. There

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was a whole host of regulatory bodies supposed to represent

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malfeasance in those markets. The less regulated sectors, such as

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hedge funds, were not the problem. Regulation itself does not prevent

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financial crisis. Accept that. I am trying to move on to the penalties.

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Let's be clear. Creating a more complex regulation, passing more

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rules to deal with things that happen in the past were not

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prevented the next financial crisis. We are making the next financial

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crisis more likely by creating ever more complex regulatory frameworks.

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That is happening not only in this country but in the US, but if you

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look at Basle, where the next rating is happening, there is a new

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set of complex regulations. What I'm not clear is what you are

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therefore proposing should happen. It is hard, if you are talking

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about the seating successful criminal prosecutions, it is

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extremely hard to achieve this. The Serious Fraud Office has had a

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terrible time trying to get convictions. In most recent events,

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the things that lead up to and produce to the crisis, we did not

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see a huge amount of fraudulent activity. Bernie Madoff is the

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exception. What we saw was a very reckless activity, mismanagement of

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banks such as Leman brothers... interruption is the BBC will, but

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let meet the dish. -- let me finish. There is not some kind of magical

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mechanism that you can create a day, that would create criminal offences

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that do not currently exist, that will prevent the next financial

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crisis. I understand why people feel enraged, I feel angry as well,

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I explicitly said that there need to be some people sent to jail if

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we are to have confidence in London and New York restored. But the

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reality is that it is extremely hard to do. Most of the things that

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produced the crisis were not fraud. What is your answer? I am accepting

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your argument, no more layers, we are creating the next problem, so

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if Professor Ferguson was devising the rules, if you were scaling back

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what already exists, what would the regime look like and how could you

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enforce it? In dividing the system between the Bank of England, the

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financial regulator, and other smaller regulators, it has not

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worked out well. The tripartite system that Gordon Brown introduced

:10:30.:10:40.
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as Chancellor has been a failure. What is happening that I approve of

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his two -- is a division in the banking system, as used to be the

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case. If you go back 100 years, for the person who wrote the book on

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central banking, the Bank of England should be all-powerful, and

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this is the Boyd that is always forgotten, the rules should not be

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completely clear, they should not be spelled out. The discretion of

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the government is the key source of discipline. I think that he's a

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really important point. If we we run these events, let's go back to

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2005, the Governor of the Bank of England had been able to haul him

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Marcus Agius and Bob Diamond and say, we understand that some of you

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chaps are not complete the playing by the rules, you need to do

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something about that. It is that combination of power and discretion

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which produces a good red glittery system, not 2000 pages of

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legislation. SMAC Regula Torry system. What if they do not follow

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through. Then the central bank should have the power to act.

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is where it is so difficult. This is an all-powerful figure.

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cannot operate if the bank decides to revoke your licence. That is the

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power of the Bank of England. how do you prove that the trader

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has transgressed at the boundaries. You need incredibly good evidence

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if you are going to pursue criminal charges. That is not the object of

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the exercise, much as we enjoy to imagine people behind bars. And the

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financial market should operate in a way that is not unfair, does not

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benefit insiders at the expense of outsiders, and this is really

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important, the whole world should think that London is a place where

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honour, the rule of law, are fundamental. In the days are bought

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a badger, you were not dealing with global financial markets. London

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was an international financial sector, like it was today. It was

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an international financial sector precisely because the rest of the

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world knew it was the best. Do you seriously envisage a world where

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the Governor of the Bank of England is calling somebody in and say, I

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he will mark there is a bit of dodgy dealing, and raises his

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eyebrows at him, and that is going to work in today's world. I did not

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see how else we are going to make the markets work. You cannot solve

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the problem we are discussing with enormously complex regulation, and

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criminal cases with the Serious Fraud Office desperately trying to

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claim there was a fraud. You have to NPower be authority in such a

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way that it way that itse discipline on the players. -- to NPower. These

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things happen because the bank had been essentially rendered impotent

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by losing supervisory power. Without the power, it was extremely

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hard for anybody to bring discipline to the City of London.

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The reputation of the City is the answer -- is the key issue. It

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extended be on the market and beyond the British banks. We will

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:14:23.:14:24.

see revelations to that effect. We have been talking about the

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arguments he put forward in a series of lectures which you have

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just given and have been broadcast. One of the are other arguments in

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:14:45.:14:47.

make Borrie series of arguments is that a whole generation has broken

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its deal with subsequent generations. It is in danger and

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threatening to run just society because it is loaded debt. The

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older generation now have basically spend too much and have mortgaged

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the lives of future generations. Eddie have set out of the mind-

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boggling figures which we have heard many times. It is

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unsustainable. You paint a fairly bleak picture of the lack of a

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route out of this. Maddy you see us getting out of this whole? It is

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extremely difficult. If you add together the public and private

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debt of the UK, it comes to around 500 % of gross domestic product.

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There is only one society in history with a higher level of debt

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to income. Japan. We are up there with Japan in terms of being the

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most indebted country ever. A lot of that was generated by pants but

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the other big part was government and household. -- generated by

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banks. We sought to live beyond our means. Most people argue about this

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debt in narrowly economic terms. This completely misses the point.

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The real story is the huge liability that is being passed on

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by our generation to the next. People who don't get to vote yet.

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Kits and the unborn. This enormous debt burden will guarantee that

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most Western economies grow very slowly and youth unemployment stays

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very high. This is the shocking thing about the last two decades.

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It is the breach of the social contract between generations. The

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biggest challenge facing politicians now is to figure out

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how to restore that before we end up with a completely alienated and

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disillusioned and the generation who come into an inheritance of

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debt. What will be the effect of that? I think they may revolt in a

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way we have not seen before. Most of people assume they should be on

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the left and are attracted to things like the occupied more --

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Occupy movement. But what they may find they have to do is move to the

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right and support those people who favour of radical reform of

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entitlement systems, welfare systems and other systems that have

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brought about this explosion in public debt. We may see in the next

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ten years a shift of the young a wave the positions that were

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typical of the young from the 1960s to about now. The young will say,

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why on earth do we have to finance these astonishingly generous

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pension schemes that have been created for our retiring parents or

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grandparents? You said it can Americans knew what was good for

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them, they would all be in the Tea Party? But that is not what is

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happening now. They are on the left. That is not quite true. The young

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do not exclusively break to the left. I'm struck by the fact that

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the students I teach art somewhat to the right of the professors. The

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shift is already happening and it will become more of an issue. It is

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no coincidence that many of the politicians to most argue for

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fiscal reform are relatively young politicians. Their argument for

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austerity comes from and the politicians than it does from all

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the politicians. I think a shift is happening. But the government did

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not have the support. It had to be in coalition to be in power. That

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may not be the case in a few years. The parties up pointing opposite

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ways. D think it is not called to be right wing and that is the

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problem? It may not be cool but it is better to be right than cooler.

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But is it all the money better to win the argument? I wonder if you

:19:24.:19:34.
:19:34.:19:37.

think that the Tea Party should be focused on rebranding. The argument

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has been one. President Obama had to abandon his position on fiscal

:19:42.:19:45.

policy and accept there would need to be reform. That is why the car

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may have the US moving rapidly towards drastic changes in fiscal

:19:48.:19:55.

policy at the end of this year. He argued there was no problem. The

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budgets the White House produced were completely fictional. Paul

:19:58.:20:05.

Ryan called him out on this and he finally came around last year. He

:20:05.:20:12.

did not have the nerve to endorse a programme for fiscal reform.

:20:12.:20:15.

argument is not overran France or Greece. It is every Greece and it

:20:15.:20:19.

will be over in France in a few weeks. You can't carry on borrowing.

:20:19.:20:26.

It is over. That age of debt has come to an end. It ended in Greece

:20:26.:20:33.

first. There was the talk of some kind of default. But it was not

:20:33.:20:38.

credible. Francois: Came in promising credible things like

:20:38.:20:41.

Lobbe retirement ages and an increase in public provision for

:20:41.:20:45.

teaching. This will be gone in a matter of weeks because it is not

:20:45.:20:50.

viable. Governments have borrowed to the max. They have reached the

:20:50.:20:54.

point many households have reached Obama administration start their

:20:54.:21:01.

credit cards. But you have made another argument that there is no

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impetus for change because look at the politics and governments which

:21:07.:21:16.

are supporting people. People will not get rid of the government.

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point I tried to make is that given it is not sustainable, either we

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try to reform our broken system of public finance with strong

:21:26.:21:31.

leadership, or it will be reformed forcibly by our inability to raise

:21:31.:21:37.

money to finance our deficits. That is essentially what happened in

:21:37.:21:43.

southern Europe over the last two years. But you can't borrow any

:21:43.:21:47.

more, it -- reforms tend to be imposed at the worst possible time

:21:47.:21:52.

and with the most about of pain. It is better to get ahead of the curve.

:21:52.:21:57.

I think this government has been trying to do that in this country.

:21:57.:22:01.

He did not smart at the suggestion of the right wing but you do hate

:22:01.:22:11.

labels. But you are economically right wing, T you accept that?

:22:11.:22:15.

being against the nationalisation of industry, against subsidies,

:22:15.:22:19.

bloated public sector, protection, if all of these things make me

:22:19.:22:24.

Conservative, so be it. But in the British media, it is a term of

:22:24.:22:29.

abuse designed to undermine an argument. The arguments I'm making

:22:29.:22:34.

are not arguments for fat-cats. Something more has to be done to

:22:34.:22:38.

discipline the bankers. The arguments are for the young who are

:22:38.:22:46.

currently being screwed to use a technical term. If you really

:22:46.:22:51.

believe in a young people and people from low income families and

:22:51.:22:55.

what to see them had a chance of employment and social mobility, you

:22:55.:22:59.

may find yourself having to believe some things that you previously

:22:59.:23:03.

thought the right wing and conservative. You say that right

:23:03.:23:08.

wing is a term of abuse here. You have moved to the US and are

:23:08.:23:14.

clearly happier there and in the UK. You have said that excessive the

:23:14.:23:19.

immense is your greatest weakness. The English hate that but at the

:23:19.:23:29.
:23:29.:23:31.

Americans love that. That's true. The British hate that? The English

:23:31.:23:37.

don't like it? The English don't like to the Scotsman. That is a

:23:37.:23:44.

reality that goes back to James the 6th. It is so depressing that you

:23:44.:23:47.

can't make an academic argument will feel that you can be heard in

:23:47.:23:51.

the UK. I can be heard but the question is whether I could have

:23:51.:23:58.

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