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year-old Cuban revolutionary leader. Two years from now, the last NATO | :00:14. | :00:20. | |
combat troops in Afghanistan will be preparing to leave. Is that | :00:20. | :00:23. | |
something Afghans look forward to with confidence or a sense of | :00:23. | :00:26. | |
dread? The challenge isn't just about security, but the country's | :00:26. | :00:29. | |
political and economic future is also at stake. My guest today is | :00:29. | :00:33. | |
the Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Jawed Ludin. Does his | :00:33. | :00:36. | |
government have a coherent strategy for delivering a stable, peaceful | :00:36. | :00:46. | |
:00:46. | :01:07. | ||
Jawed Ludin, welcome to HARDtalk. Thank you. It's a pleasure to be | :01:07. | :01:13. | |
with you. Are you aware of the intensity of the apprehension in | :01:13. | :01:19. | |
Western capitals, as policy makers consider what is going to happen in | :01:19. | :01:24. | |
your country as the transition continues and the NATO combat | :01:24. | :01:29. | |
mission in Afghanistan comes to an end in 2014? Are you feeling that | :01:29. | :01:35. | |
level of apprehension? absolutely do. It is as the deputy | :01:35. | :01:40. | |
-- as the deputy Foreign Minister, it is part of my job to see what is | :01:40. | :01:44. | |
happening and how people perceive Afghanistan. I travel quite a lot. | :01:44. | :01:51. | |
What I can say on that account is that the transition is not in any | :01:51. | :01:55. | |
way negative. The fact we are taking responsibility, that | :01:55. | :01:58. | |
international troops will leave Afghanistan, is essentially the | :01:59. | :02:03. | |
biggest strategic success we have achieved in the last ten years. The | :02:03. | :02:07. | |
important things those people in the Western capitals should note is | :02:07. | :02:11. | |
that so much has been achieved in the last ten years, including the | :02:11. | :02:15. | |
fact that today there is a transition that is possible and | :02:15. | :02:19. | |
Afghan security forces will take responsibility and that will allow | :02:19. | :02:28. | |
international forces to lead. Continuation of this effort is | :02:28. | :02:33. | |
important. -- forces to leave. Just by being responsible for defence | :02:33. | :02:37. | |
and security of our country does not mean Afghanistan will not need | :02:37. | :02:42. | |
continued support and partnership from the rest of the world. | :02:42. | :02:46. | |
talk about the positives of the transition. I wonder, in the last | :02:46. | :02:51. | |
few days, had he made time to read the International Crisis Group's | :02:51. | :02:56. | |
report? They call it the long hard road to the 2014 transition. They | :02:56. | :03:02. | |
say after 2014, there is, I am quoting, the real risk the regime | :03:02. | :03:07. | |
in Kabul could collapse. I am quite unhappy about that report. I | :03:07. | :03:11. | |
respect them quite a lot and they have done good work in the past but | :03:11. | :03:17. | |
they have also done some very superficial, uninformed and perhaps | :03:17. | :03:26. | |
ill-informed work. This particular report is one of those | :03:26. | :03:31. | |
unfortunately low quality work. It does not really understand the | :03:31. | :03:38. | |
depth of the transition. And it draws the absolutely worst possible | :03:38. | :03:42. | |
conclusions. One could always speculate about all the things that | :03:42. | :03:47. | |
could go wrong, rather than all of the things that are going in the | :03:47. | :03:52. | |
right direction and could go better than expected. But in respect, it | :03:52. | :03:58. | |
is not just one report. I could point U2 others. I suspect you read | :03:58. | :04:04. | |
-- you read this one as well. One very highly respected decision- | :04:04. | :04:10. | |
maker, one Republican, one Democrat. They are looking at the future of | :04:10. | :04:14. | |
the country and they say the Afghan government is deeply flawed and | :04:14. | :04:19. | |
should the world stop compensate him for its deficiencies it is in | :04:19. | :04:26. | |
danger of imploding. Again, everybody who comes here can draw a | :04:26. | :04:31. | |
conclusion and is totally entitled to that. I am not going to draw | :04:31. | :04:37. | |
that conclusion and I will stick to my conclusion, to say that I, as an | :04:37. | :04:41. | |
Afghan, have got this historical opportunity that did not exist ten | :04:41. | :04:46. | |
years ago. We have made, in the last ten years, progress that has | :04:46. | :04:51. | |
never been made in the history of Afghanistan before. These people, | :04:51. | :04:56. | |
with absolute respect, I invite them to meet with the after a neat | :04:56. | :05:02. | |
young people that I hear. 75% of this country is now under 25. Those | :05:03. | :05:07. | |
people are not prepared to go back and will not allow it to slip back. | :05:07. | :05:15. | |
We need some help. As I said, I tremendously respect this work but | :05:15. | :05:22. | |
there is so much else that I could 0.2 and I think other people... I | :05:22. | :05:28. | |
suggest you will other speak to. They would point to the good things | :05:28. | :05:33. | |
happening. And these scenarios are the negative ones. We will get to | :05:33. | :05:38. | |
the detail of what is going on in a minute. But it is just a question | :05:38. | :05:41. | |
of being honest about what is actually happening in Afghanistan | :05:41. | :05:46. | |
today. Your government relief to statement after the International | :05:46. | :05:51. | |
crisis report, describing it as garbage and nonsense. One of your | :05:51. | :05:55. | |
Independent Newspapers had an editorial a few days ago, saying | :05:55. | :06:00. | |
the report actually gets much right. The government's denial, you'll | :06:00. | :06:05. | |
government's denial, of the report is ridiculous and an embarrassment. | :06:05. | :06:10. | |
Even Afghans themselves are sympathetic to the idea that there | :06:10. | :06:14. | |
is right now in your country a fundamental question about whether, | :06:14. | :06:18. | |
when NATO combat forces to withdraw, the country can hang together and | :06:18. | :06:24. | |
can be stable. Wide and I hasten to say something, to recognise that | :06:24. | :06:29. | |
challenges exist. A lot of the substance these people, the reports, | :06:29. | :06:36. | |
0.2 do exist. They are factual. Basically, I am disputing their | :06:36. | :06:42. | |
analysis. -- point to. They exist alongside other facts. And they are | :06:42. | :06:46. | |
not necessarily negative. 2014 is a difficult and challenging time and | :06:46. | :06:51. | |
we need to be prepared and have a strategy, and we do. The problem | :06:51. | :06:55. | |
with the strategy is not that there is not a strategy but there are | :06:56. | :07:01. | |
some elements of the strategy that are unknown. Whether the | :07:01. | :07:04. | |
international community's commitment will remain strong, | :07:04. | :07:08. | |
whether we will be able to get a peace process working with help | :07:08. | :07:14. | |
from Pakistan, that is a big unknown. Whether some of the other | :07:14. | :07:19. | |
elements will come together. But those elements could really go... | :07:19. | :07:24. | |
These people suggest they will go in a negative direction but I think | :07:24. | :07:27. | |
they will go in a positive direction. We have also seen some | :07:27. | :07:33. | |
positives. Leads an picket theme by theme, issue by issue, challenge by | :07:33. | :07:41. | |
a challenge. -- led us and pick it. Starting with security. When NATO | :07:41. | :07:45. | |
troops complete the transition, 350,000 members of your own | :07:45. | :07:49. | |
security forces will alter that we'd be responsible for ensuring | :07:49. | :07:54. | |
the security of the citizens of your country. -- ultimately be | :07:54. | :07:59. | |
responsible. It does not engender much confidence, when we see the | :07:59. | :08:04. | |
dramatic rise, this year for example, in the so-called Green on | :08:04. | :08:09. | |
blue attacks. The lack of a reliable, a disciplined, armed | :08:09. | :08:16. | |
force which has led to the killings of so many NATO troops by your own | :08:16. | :08:19. | |
forces. That has undermined confidence in the West, no doubt | :08:20. | :08:29. | |
:08:30. | :08:32. | ||
about it. Security... Security has actually, in some respects, | :08:32. | :08:36. | |
deteriorated... Apart from the green on blue that he referred to, | :08:36. | :08:40. | |
there are some other deeply discomforting friends we are seeing. | :08:40. | :08:47. | |
An increase in suicide bombing in the last couple of years. The use | :08:47. | :08:53. | |
of other tactics that target urban environments and basically grab a | :08:53. | :08:59. | |
lot of media attention. That is another tactic. But fundamentally, | :08:59. | :09:03. | |
the facts have not gone badly. They have gone in the right direction. | :09:03. | :09:09. | |
In the south of Afghanistan, before the surge of the US forces took | :09:09. | :09:15. | |
place, there were large strongholds of the Taliban. In Helmand province, | :09:15. | :09:20. | |
where British troops still operate, most of that area was inaccessible | :09:20. | :09:26. | |
to us, as Afghan officials. Today, Helmand province is moving on. | :09:26. | :09:31. | |
There are some challenges but it has changed totally beyond | :09:31. | :09:38. | |
recognition. The same has happened in Kandahar. But the green on Blue | :09:38. | :09:42. | |
is also another mutation of the terrorist tactics. It's a rather | :09:42. | :09:46. | |
sinister one and a difficult one. We totally recognise this could | :09:46. | :09:49. | |
even be at the heart of this partnership between the Afghan | :09:49. | :09:55. | |
security forces and NATO allies. That is why we have tried to | :09:55. | :09:59. | |
address it aggressively and we are working together. You might have | :09:59. | :10:04. | |
heard in recent weeks that there is some progress in terms of the | :10:04. | :10:08. | |
measures we both have taken and hopefully these will be tackled. | :10:08. | :10:14. | |
But this is not, as some have suggested, representing an | :10:14. | :10:23. | |
unbridgeable cultural divide that people put this down to. Hang on. I | :10:23. | :10:27. | |
appreciate the front this with which you say that in some ways the | :10:27. | :10:31. | |
security situation is deteriorating. I wonder, as you make the | :10:31. | :10:37. | |
preparations for 2014, how on earth you can convince your own Afghan | :10:37. | :10:41. | |
citizens that their security is going to be in safe hands? For | :10:41. | :10:44. | |
example, if one looks at the equipment your armed forces have, | :10:44. | :10:49. | |
the lack of logistics, the lack of air transport, the lack of | :10:49. | :10:54. | |
firepower, frankly, to safeguard your borders, giving you allege | :10:55. | :10:58. | |
continued terrorist infiltration from the Pakistani border, given | :10:58. | :11:04. | |
that this is all going to be your responsibility in 2014, how can you | :11:04. | :11:10. | |
convince the people that Afghanistan will be secured? | :11:10. | :11:14. | |
will need continued help to build these institutions further. But | :11:14. | :11:21. | |
what I can tell you is that what we have today, in terms of our army | :11:21. | :11:26. | |
and our police, and if you look at the nature of the threat that | :11:27. | :11:34. | |
exists against Afghanistan, I can say for sure of that there will be | :11:34. | :11:38. | |
able to take responsibility and the Afghan forces will secured the | :11:39. | :11:44. | |
country. -- that we will be able to. The forces will do one important | :11:44. | :11:49. | |
thing, that is to give a very deep sense of responsibility to the | :11:49. | :11:53. | |
Afghan government and Afghan forces. The threat we have in this region, | :11:54. | :12:03. | |
we do not face a frontal war with - - that these people can't tackle. | :12:03. | :12:08. | |
We face the threat of infiltration. One thing we are doing to make | :12:08. | :12:11. | |
transition sustainable is we are working to Pakistan's -- working | :12:11. | :12:17. | |
with Pakistan to see if we can bring the Taliban to a peace | :12:17. | :12:21. | |
process. Sorry to interrupt but let me be due upon that immediately. | :12:21. | :12:26. | |
Are you talking to the Taliban right now? Is the Afghan government | :12:26. | :12:33. | |
in negotiation with the Taliban? have contacts. But there is not a | :12:33. | :12:40. | |
coherent process that involves direct negotiation about | :12:40. | :12:45. | |
Afghanistan's future and the Taliban's political involvement in | :12:45. | :12:49. | |
the peace process. That is yet to come. Pursuing this, there is a | :12:49. | :12:53. | |
fundamental problem. Taliban leaders have made a claim not least | :12:53. | :12:57. | |
to academics from a think tank who they spoke to in the summer, they | :12:57. | :13:01. | |
said they would not conduct direct negotiations with the government | :13:01. | :13:06. | |
led by Hamid Karzai. They describe him as utterly corrupt and week. | :13:06. | :13:10. | |
They will talk to Afghan officials but they will not talk direct to | :13:10. | :13:16. | |
Hamid Karzai and his government. That is a fundamental problem? | :13:16. | :13:21. | |
can tell you that there are people who talk to us. The problem is that | :13:21. | :13:29. | |
those people face a very sinister type of challenge, that is that | :13:29. | :13:34. | |
they do not feel comfortable. They do not fill that a safe environment | :13:34. | :13:38. | |
exists in places like Pakistan, where the leadership of the Taliban | :13:38. | :13:42. | |
is based, where they could come out and basically be very open about | :13:42. | :13:50. | |
the fact they are talking to us. Look, this peace process is not | :13:50. | :13:54. | |
just government. That is why Hamid Karzai in dealing with this process | :13:54. | :13:59. | |
has given responsibility to a group of very senior respectable Afghans | :13:59. | :14:04. | |
who are making this Peace Council. The high Peace Council is leading | :14:04. | :14:09. | |
the peace process on behalf of Afghanistan. But at the end of this, | :14:09. | :14:14. | |
there is going to be a political understanding and the Taliban could | :14:14. | :14:18. | |
be transformed from a military force into a political force. We | :14:18. | :14:25. | |
need to talk, all of us, and it is not bad compared to a couple of | :14:25. | :14:29. | |
years ago. We are engaging Pakistan extremely closely. There are other | :14:29. | :14:33. | |
countries in the region helping us. What we really need is to continue | :14:33. | :14:38. | |
this process and get that bit more help from countries in the region, | :14:38. | :14:42. | |
in order to enable this direct face to face contact. This is the only | :14:42. | :14:47. | |
thing that has not yet happened. When this comes, it will be a huge | :14:47. | :14:52. | |
breakthrough. What you also need is to undermine the Taliban's central | :14:52. | :14:56. | |
critique of your government, being that it is utterly corrupt and | :14:56. | :15:01. | |
dishonest, by proving that you can operate with integrity? I wonder if, | :15:01. | :15:07. | |
in that context, whether Hamid Karzai as President is helpful all | :15:07. | :15:12. | |
part of the problem? If he will that the record of Hamid Karzai and | :15:12. | :15:16. | |
the key people around him over the last decade, it is one of | :15:16. | :15:20. | |
consistently and completely failing to stamp out the rampant corruption | :15:20. | :15:30. | |
:15:30. | :15:31. | ||
I will be grateful if you do not give the Taliban the credit for | :15:31. | :15:40. | |
something... A legitimate critique... The current government | :15:40. | :15:50. | |
:15:50. | :15:50. | ||
has challengeds, no question about it. -- challenges. Corruption is a | :15:50. | :15:57. | |
huge issue. The government is partly to blame for that. The | :15:57. | :16:03. | |
Taliban has their own record to show to the Afghan people. It would | :16:04. | :16:07. | |
be wrong to look at it in that sense, that corruption will stop | :16:07. | :16:14. | |
them from coming in. What stops them from coming in is the fact | :16:14. | :16:20. | |
that they are enmeshed in a regional and Ivan international | :16:20. | :16:27. | |
infrastructure that supports extremism and terrorism. -- and | :16:27. | :16:34. | |
even. The Taliban do not have an independent view of their own. | :16:34. | :16:39. | |
Those who do have a view of their own are in contact with us. As a | :16:39. | :16:45. | |
group, as a movement, as a political or military entity, it | :16:45. | :16:55. | |
:16:55. | :16:57. | ||
does not have to claim credit... On the question of corruption, | :16:57. | :17:03. | |
corruption has been a challenge from day one. We have to discuss | :17:03. | :17:09. | |
why it happened. In a country like Afghanistan, absolutely no | :17:09. | :17:18. | |
governing institutions to perform their duties... Suddenly gets | :17:18. | :17:22. | |
flooded with international assistance and all that. There are | :17:22. | :17:28. | |
things that go wrong. We have done a lot of work. The recent | :17:28. | :17:32. | |
conference focused on this question. We have taken it extremely | :17:32. | :17:40. | |
seriously. There has been a degree focusing on corruption and | :17:40. | :17:47. | |
reforming the government. He has issued such decrees before, he has | :17:47. | :17:57. | |
:17:57. | :17:57. | ||
made comments about zero Cologne's for corruption. -- 0 Torrance. He | :17:57. | :18:07. | |
:18:07. | :18:09. | ||
is going to be questioned again by the international community about | :18:09. | :18:15. | |
his commitment to free and fair elections and democracy. -- zero | :18:15. | :18:22. | |
tolerance. Can you tell me that Hamid Karzai will step down in the | :18:22. | :18:25. | |
spring of 2014, there is no question at all he will try and | :18:25. | :18:30. | |
extend his mandate? He will be gone? There will be free and fair | :18:30. | :18:37. | |
elections then? Hamid Karzai will be tested, the government will be | :18:37. | :18:42. | |
tested, but it will be tested by the Afghan people. It is an | :18:42. | :18:48. | |
obligation we owed to them rather than others. To defend the | :18:48. | :18:51. | |
international community, it is supporting this transformation of | :18:51. | :18:57. | |
Afghanistan. We owe this to them as well. We need to say this is not | :18:57. | :19:02. | |
just a transaction between Afghanistan in the international | :19:02. | :19:09. | |
community. There is a whole area of Sheri... We do not have much time. | :19:09. | :19:14. | |
Please address my main point. There is a clear and absolute commitment | :19:14. | :19:18. | |
for Hamid Karzai stepping down and making sure the election is free | :19:18. | :19:23. | |
and fair. It would be good to listen to what Hamid Karzai has | :19:23. | :19:29. | |
said. He has said that he is not standing. There is no factual, | :19:29. | :19:36. | |
concrete evidence showing that is not the case. If there is, let's | :19:36. | :19:42. | |
see it. Let's take it as it is. We can give him the benefit of the | :19:42. | :19:51. | |
doubt. On the elections, in the last couple of months we have seen | :19:51. | :19:56. | |
some real concrete steps. The election commission announced the | :19:56. | :20:06. | |
:20:06. | :20:10. | ||
date of the elections. This is the time frame, 1.5 years, it will | :20:10. | :20:17. | |
happen. Do you think it is acceptable that the members of the | :20:17. | :20:19. | |
supposedly independent Electoral Commission are appointed by the | :20:19. | :20:24. | |
President himself? It is a constitutional thing. The | :20:25. | :20:34. | |
:20:35. | :20:35. | ||
constitution and -- says so. I do not think an individual could | :20:35. | :20:38. | |
single-handedly be blamed for something published in the | :20:38. | :20:43. | |
constitution. This gets to the very heart of the argument I'm having | :20:43. | :20:48. | |
with you. Whether Hamid Karzai is the right guy to make sure the | :20:48. | :20:54. | |
transition works effectively. Hamid Karzai, within his grasp he has the | :20:54. | :20:59. | |
power to appoint all of the ministers, all of the judges, all | :20:59. | :21:03. | |
of the governors, all of the commissioners on the Human Rights | :21:03. | :21:07. | |
Commission, all of the members of the human rights commission, all of | :21:07. | :21:12. | |
the powers are with him. There are many Afghans who fear that if he | :21:12. | :21:17. | |
does not actually decide to put the election that he will ensure, to | :21:17. | :21:24. | |
coin the phrase, that he manipulates the deck of cards to | :21:24. | :21:27. | |
ensure that one of his favoured candidates gets the job. Possibly | :21:27. | :21:33. | |
his brother. Are you sure that is not going to happen? We are talking | :21:33. | :21:39. | |
about a hypothesis. Hamid Karzai has said one thing, all the | :21:39. | :21:43. | |
questions you are asking our general questions, but why not? | :21:43. | :21:50. | |
Hamid Karzai could argue that he has been in Afghanistan for the | :21:50. | :21:54. | |
last 11 years and he has brought it... There are definitely | :21:54. | :22:01. | |
shortcomings but there are also successes. He says having a | :22:01. | :22:07. | |
transparent, inclusive, free and fair elections is his last legacy. | :22:07. | :22:12. | |
If you put yourself in his shoes, you can see the longer term | :22:12. | :22:18. | |
prospects in delivering a good election. A general election. | :22:18. | :22:22. | |
Especially learning lessons from the past and thinking about the | :22:23. | :22:32. | |
country's long-term interest. I think these issues are being a bit | :22:32. | :22:40. | |
negative... I do not need to be pessimistic, but I do need to be | :22:40. | :22:44. | |
realistic. This is my last realistic question. Just imagine | :22:44. | :22:48. | |
the next two years the transition does not go as well as you thought | :22:48. | :22:54. | |
it would. We have talked about the Taliban, corruption, the security | :22:54. | :22:59. | |
situation, the Hamid Karzai factor. If things do not go as well as you | :22:59. | :23:04. | |
hope they do, do you believe the US, UK and other NATO forces me to | :23:04. | :23:09. | |
reconsider their commitment to pull out combat troops if the context is | :23:09. | :23:15. | |
one of deep instability, even chaos? Should that be a non | :23:15. | :23:20. | |
negotiable pull-out? May it have to be rethought? I think the end of | :23:20. | :23:25. | |
the current mission is a good thing. I do not think in every scenario | :23:25. | :23:29. | |
you consider that it would be advisable for this existing mission, | :23:29. | :23:39. | |
:23:39. | :23:39. | ||
the presence of NATO and US troops will be advisable to continue. I | :23:39. | :23:47. | |
think if we implement the building up of the Afghans over the next two | :23:47. | :23:52. | |
years, more political weight behind the peace process, those two will | :23:52. | :24:01. | |
ensure stability. One thing is the continued military presence of the | :24:01. | :24:07. | |
US and perhaps others is a good thing in the capacity of training. | :24:07. | :24:12. | |
That is why we are going to begin negotiations with the US about | :24:12. | :24:21. |