Sir Nigel Sheinwald - UK Ambassador to the US, 2007 - 2012 HARDtalk


Sir Nigel Sheinwald - UK Ambassador to the US, 2007 - 2012

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That's it from me. Now it is time for HARDtalk Mac.

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In or out? For the next five years, Britain's future in the European

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Union could be shrouded in uncertainty. This is thanks to

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David Cameron's commitment to a referendum. He believes his

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dramatic gamble will pay off, not just at home, but in Europe,

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allowing him to be calibrate Britain's relationship with

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Brussels. But will it work? Might yesterday, Nigel Sheriwald, was the

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UK's top diplomat at EU, top foreign adviser to Tony Blair and

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ambassador to Washington. Is the gambit in Britain's national

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Nigel Sheriwald, welcome to HARDtalk. In the recent past you

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have been foreign policy adviser to the British Prime Minister. Not

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David Cameron, Tony Blair. It had David Cameron had you next to him

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as foreign policy adviser and he said to you, Nigel, I am going to

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go for this in/out referendum, what would you have said to him? Of as a

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professional adviser I would have said that I could see the

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attractions in some way if Britain emerges from this more committed to

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the European Union and with a more settled position within it. I would

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have also said that it is a long way to go and a difficult road that

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you have chosen. There are fundamental problems of negotiable

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Mitie and of uncertainty. That is associated with the move that he

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made. A do you accept the contention that David Cameron makes,

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the context he puts to this, that in his view the public disillusion

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with the EU is at an all-time high and that consent for membership of

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the European Union is, in his words, wafer-thin. He is certainly right.

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Public disillusion with the European Union is higher than it

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has been. But is it only about the European Union? Is it more to do

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with the general state of politics and the economy? After all, the

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measures announced here have nothing to do with the European

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Union or Brussels. Measures that our government have enacted. So you

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think the public have got it wrong? I am not implying they have got it

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wrong. There is a tangle of issues. He to accept the contention that

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disillusion with the EU in Britain is at an all-time high, is it not a

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terrible indictment of policy makers, the people at the centre of

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the policy-making establishment who for years have conducted Britain's

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foreign policy towards the EU without consulting the British

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public? And I would include you and those who faces indictment. I do

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not think that is fair. At every stage of our involvement in Europe,

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our Parliament, how ministers have been involved. We had a referendum

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in 1975. A referendum that nobody under the age of 50 something can

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possibly remember. There are very few major public policy issues in

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which we have a running referendum in this country. Whether it is

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about economy, international relations, moral and social issues

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of our time. That is not how we do it in this country. Those are

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reserved for special moments were a fundamental change is being

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considered. It gets down to this key question of Britain's

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constitutional place in Europe. Let us not forget that your former boss,

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the man you advised for years, Tony Blair, did say he was willing to

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contemplate a referendum as Europe look to create a new constitution.

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It became very complicated. We ended up with the Lisbon Treaty.

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Britain and the British people never had that vote. A but the

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argument for that, and we can go over the past history... Was it a

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mistake? I would not have advised him to do what. That is not the

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issue. He felt it was necessary. There was a constitutional leap

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forward. That necessitated a further consultation of the British

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people. The issue is whether that is going to be the case. If David

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Cameron achieves his objectives, then in fact there would be a

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transfer back to Britain of powers. It would not be an increase of

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further European power against us. That was the rationale for doing it.

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The problem is that when you and other people who are pro-European

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and deeply committed to Britain's place in Europe, when you talk of

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the dangers of a referendum and how unwise it might prove to be it, you

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sound as though if you are running scared of this basic consultation

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with the British voters will stop I have not said so far, but I am

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against a referendum. You stressed to me how difficult and unwise it

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might be. What I said is that depressed issue is about

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negotiating what the UK gets to do. That is what needs to be considered

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first of all. Whether David Cameron can achieve the goals he set out.

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The significant new settlement of transfer of powers back to the UK,

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a fundamental reform, of our role in Europe, whether that is

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achievable. With your experience for Brussels politics, is it

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achievable? He was very wise not to give us a warned realist. Of

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everything he wanted. To reserve that for later when he knows the

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context. It is going to be very difficult. Why? The rest of the

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European Union has to play as well. When you're in a negotiation of 27,

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everyone has got a gun in the room. We are not the only ones with

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domestic politics. You have to respect the position of what

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emerges that has to be in the general interest of the parties.

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They have to assent to what we ones just as we have to listen to what

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they want. How does the balance of power sit within that negotiation?

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It seems to me that when you say how difficult it is going to be

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that you are assuming the cards are held predominantly by the other

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member states of the EU rather than Britain. It seems to me Britain

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holds cards as well. We do. We start from the position that all

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their partners, and that includes the most important, France, Germany

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and the other nations, I start from the position that they want us to

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stay in and will go somewhere to meet our concerns. A Angela Merkel

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has already said. She is looking for a compromise. She is not in any

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sense at all sounding negative about what David Cameron has said.

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That is what I would expect. says there has to be a compromise.

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That is what I would expect from the other parties. They will judge

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this according to their national interest and the national economic

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interest. That is bound up with the survival of the euro. They do not

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want to do anything that undermines the recovery of the eurozone or

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unravels the core of the single market that we are talking about.

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David Cameron wants to strengthen the single market. That is what he

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faces British membership in the European Union. The issue for

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others is how you can do that and at the same time bringing back the

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to the UK have powers that a number of the parties would say are

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inextricably connected to the functioning. Opponents seem to

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believe it would be terribly difficult to negotiate powers back.

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Let me quote you something that the Europe minister of Finland, who has

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written a PhD on the variety of different relationships members

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have with Brussels, this is what he said after David Cameron spoke. He

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said that we need Britain in Europe. Cameron's move clarifies the debate.

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He said that to be quite honest there is a lot of differentiation

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inside the EU. Look at defence arrangements. We need to stick to

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the bulk of EU integration, but we can take a few raisins out of the

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ball. That is what he wants, isn't it? Is it? There is no doubt that

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we have a certain accommodation from the parties. Absolutely right.

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We were able to opt out from the economic and monetary union. We

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have an opt-out on trading. We have an opt-out on justice. We can

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decide what we want to do. Our partners have recognised that

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Britain, because of its legal system, because of its history, is

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a different position. We have a massive amount of flexibility. The

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question is whether you can carry on chipping away at that forward to

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your starting to reach the Daragh Byrne of what is at the core of the

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single market. -- Daragh Byrne. It is reasonable to put forward

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proposals and we can get something out of it. Surely it concentrates

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the minds of all those in the run much more effectively to say that

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if we do not get what we want, there is the option for Britain to

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leave the union. No other serious leader of the European Union wants

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to see that happen. I wonder about the psychology. For some that might

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work in our favour. For others, if they see a part to the sleeving,

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they will wonder what is the incentive for them to try and work

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with us. Some of them will be irritated by having a gun pointed

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at their heads. You very carefully avoided absolutely saying to me

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that to believe it is at stake. Many have said that. They say there

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is now going to be up to five years of massive uncertainty in the

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relationship between Britain and Europe. The fact is that the

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uncertainty is there any way because of all the factors we have

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already discussed about the state of British public opinion. What

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Hamann is promising to do is give a finite end to the uncertainty. --

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Cameron. The can put it that way. Five years is a long time. The

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economy is going to be... It is probably better than open and it

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will stop. There could have been a different time. We could have

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waited until after the election. We have extended the time. There is

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nothing we can do about that now. But I do not think you can deny it

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will create an uncertainty in relations with Investment to the UK

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and about our position in Europe. That is why the rest of the world

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is watching intently. They are not indifferent. Indeed. But the other

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argument that you make, because you are now involved in a lobby group

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that promotes business in Europe, the other argument is that

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investors might be overcome by this uncertainty and Britain will lose

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investment because of the political uncertainty. How do you explain

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that 55 of the most senior businessmen in the UK have written

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a letter to the newspapers saying that is categorically not true and

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what Cameron has done all ended up being good for British business

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because it focuses minds on making the EU more open, more competitive

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and more business-friendly? Everyone agrees with that. All the

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business organisations want to see less red tape and a greater focus

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on the single market. That goes without saying. Hang on a minute.

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You said in meetings for years in Brussels were you signed up to more

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and more red tape. We did not. come we are members of the union

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that we now say is dysfunctional and was people like to agree to the

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measures that are currently in place? Elected governments like

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ours agreeing to things which bring advantage to the UK. That you say

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are dysfunctional. I do not think it is dysfunctional. It has got a

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series of problems. It is not just David Cameron who wants a

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referendum. Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg to not want it but they also

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say the EU needs fundamental reform. It leaves the question in my mind

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with diplomats like you signed up to all the arrangements that we now

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see in the first place. Governments Did you make some mistakes? I do

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not know if I make mistakes or not. Do you think it is dysfunctional?

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Not overall. I think it requires reform. Overall, it continues to

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bring advantage to the UK. The EU we have created of the past 20

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years in relation to the euro has not worked out. But the UK has an

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opt-out for that. The single market has advanced, we have achieved an

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objective of widening the EU, these are huge advantages for Britain.

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Not to be disregarded or regarded as trivial. My opinion does not

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matter. The opinion of business people matters. One private equity

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specialist says, from his analysis, far from creating jobs, the EU with

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all of its red Tate destroys jobs. There are a couple of models for

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countries close with the EU but not inside it. Norway and Switzerland.

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They do not have any say on the regulations they have to take in

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order to be part of the single market. Is that what we want for

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the UK? I do not think we want that. Staying in is very important. That

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is what the Prime Minister is after after all. Are you saying you can

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imagine no circumstances in which you might conclude it would be

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better for Britain to leave than stay in? I would see for myself, I

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can see no circumstances in which it would be to our overall

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advantage to be out. I can see that the path way the Prime Minister has

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set out could later that. If that happens Britain's negotiators would

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do their best. If we decide to stay out, the prospects are not terribly

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good. A final point on this debate. Some are opposed of the -- to the

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idea of a referendum. You talk of Britain heading to the exit by

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accident. Somehow accidentally voting for an exit. That sounds

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like a very patronising opinion of the UK's ability to make sense of

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his argument. That is not what I said. I said the debate should be a

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full one. The more people know about the European Union the More

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Group EU they will be. The last set of polls looking at the in- out

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debate suggest that a majority may be there to stay in. That is what I

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have been saying. Why be so cautious about the notion... Five

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years of uncertainty. Five years of questioning where we will end up in

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the end. There is a possibility we will not stay in. We will have to

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see. It depends how the government of the day gets on in negotiations.

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I do not think it will be a cakewalk. Just on the final detail

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the point about that. Given your recent knowledge of European

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diplomacy, who would be the main obstacle, the main blocking voices

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to David Cameron getting what he wants? It seems to me the Germans,

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Scandinavians, they are up for it. Who will be the biggest hurdle?

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Quite a few of them would be concerned about anything that UN

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picks the single market in any way. We want another great leap of

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integration, we want to change the fundamental treaties of the EU, we

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want major reform that provides the platform for the UK to put forward

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a larger package. Say they do not do that. Say they make small

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measures without changing the fundamentals of the eve. In that

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circumstance we will look rather high and dry with a big package of

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our own. It depends on the context in Europe. I want to change the

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context a little bit and talk about the United States. We surprised

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that Philip Gordon came to London and made it very plain that the US

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regarded it as an important national interest to the US that

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Britain remained inside the EU? That referendums have often turned

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countries inward. I was not surprised he said US interests that

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Britain should be an active and influential member of the year.

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That has been the position of America for a long time. -- the EU.

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What were you surprised about? reason he made that intervention

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now is because the US was worried about the trend of debate here.

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About that extreme set of circumstances I was talking about

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before which we might find ourselves out despite the best

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wishes of the Prime Minister and others in his party. Do you think

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it is helpful that that sort of signal is sent so publicly? It

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rubbed some get all the wrong way. It reminds people of the big

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picture. It reminds people that diplomatically we are in America's

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bucket. The truth is, as the Prime Minister ended his speech, the more

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influential that Britain is in Brussels, the more influential it

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is in Washington, Beijing and Delhi. And vice-versa. Before we end I

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want to ask you more about President Obama. You have been very

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frank about President Obama. And in I was linked in which you talked

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about his high intelligence and his star quality, but also his

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aloofness and his ability to be insensitive. Now we are going to

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see his second term, how has he handled foreign policy-making?

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foreign policy-making has been successful both in America...

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asking you as a foreign policy profession of. For example, Israel-

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Palestine. -- professional. I think he tried very hard in his first

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year but he came up against an absolute block in the shape of the

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Israeli Prime Minister. He was not able to get the movement on

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settlements. It was a showdown. You saw President Obama and Binyamin

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Netanyahu go head-to-head on this question of settlement building,

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Obama bling to first. Was that a mistake? The Israelis have to agree,

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they did not. I hope they continue trying in this administration. I

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think they will. You think he will use political capital in trying to

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bring Israel... I do nothing he will ignore that. I think his

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Secretary of State will want to continue that effort as well. I

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think they are handling the issue with caution and care. And trying

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to put the brakes on his rare. not think there is a direct link

:22:37.:22:47.
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between the two. -- Israel. You made a big point of saying we had

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to go into Libya because attacks were going to be made on Benghazi.

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60,000 people, many of them civilian have been killed in Syria.

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Do you not see the same urgent need for military intervention in Syria?

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I think the moral case is exactly the same. It is not greater. When

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we went into Libya there was a smaller number of deaths than in

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Syria. It goes back to what our Prime Minister and what others said

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it when we went into Libya, because we were able to do something in

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Libya does not mean we are able to do everything else where.

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Humanitarian intervention is not a universal principle? It is a

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universal principle but it can only be applied in a feasible way. Syria

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was always going to be very difficult from that point of view

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for a number of reasons. In Libya you hadn't enclave which we could

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protect. That was not the case in Syria. Principally because Syria

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has and still has the protection from Iran and Russia which prevents

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