Robert Gates - US Defence Secretary, 2006 - 2011 HARDtalk

Time for HARDtalk. A warm welcome to a special edition of HARDtalk from

New York City. My guest is this form are US Defence Secretary Robert

Gates who has published his memoirs which are remarkably candid. He

gives us the inside story on tensions and arguments inside the

Obama White House. Especially on Afghanistan. He calls his book Duty.

Are some of his revelations an act of disloyalty?

Robert Gates, welcome to HARDtalk. Before we get into questions,

because you're wearing a neck brace, I have to ask a while? I wish I

could say it playing while playing rugby, but I fell in my home. It was

a New Year's Day. They broke the first vertebrae, so I have to be in

this instrument, this collar, for a total of 12 weeks. I get on with

life. Unfortunate timing because you are at the centre of so much

political strategic discussion in the United States right now as a

result of the publication of your memoirs. You have called it Duty. I

wonder what your sense of duty and public surface squares with what you

have done, which is, reveal inside stories from the Obama White House,

some of which are embarrassing, when he is in office. I think the basic

narrative of the book, if you will, was hijacked by some of the early

press accounts of the book. I think the people who read the whole book

will see that it is not hostile or negative to President Obama at all.

It is a book that I wrote for our troops. A book dedicated to the men

and women of the armed forces. I wrote it for them and their families

in America who sent them to war for 11 or 12 years. To give them a

flavour of the internal deliberations in Washington on these

wars. In both ironic and Afghanistan. We will talk a lot

about the book. You talk about going behind-the-scenes, and they come

back to this point about the way in which you have decided to publish.

Barack Obama sits there with 40,000 troops still in Afghanistan, and you

are revealing confidential inside stories about the relationship

between him and the military. You characterise it as a very

problematic relationship at times. Are you not challenging the notion

of collective responsibility inside the US government? No. One of the

features of the book is that I am as critical of myself and the role they

played in certain instances as I am of anyone else. Most of the personal

conversations, in fact bought most of them, show them in a positive

light in terms of pushing back and asking tough questions. They were

willing to challenge their commanders and assumptions. It is

reassuring to people that presidents are not just doing what the generals

think should be done. You categorise the Obama White House as being full

of people who are deeply political and bring that political sense to

all of the military discussions. You describe a vice president who is

central to discussions and who has been wrong in every stance he has

taken on Security affairs in his career. He describe a president who

quote, didn't trust his commander on Afghanistan. Couldn't stand the

president of Afghanistan. Didn't believe his own strategy. Didn't

believe the war to be his. That is profoundly damaging. I don't think

it is damaging. I also don't think it is a surprise. These conclusions

have been widely publicised. Having me say it, it does lend some

credibility and authority to it. US Defence Secretary you sat in a room

with him. You felt his advisers were wrong on most of the issues. The

President himself didn't have the courage of his own convictions. No.

They make it clear that except for Afghanistan, the Obama national

security team, at least until the decision on how to deal with the

Arab spring in Egypt's, was remarkably unified. On Afghanistan,

there was a debate, but it was a civil debate. There was a debate in

which personal relationships remained cordial. There was a lot of

tension on those. What a mate clear in the book is that I agreed with

the President on every decision in Afghanistan. I have continued to

agree with his policy. What a neck clear is that what troubles me above

all was the suspicion in the White House on the motives of some of the

senior generals and their recommendations for the Afghan

troops. We are talking about a time where Obama over many months had to

make a decision about whether or not to sanction a surge of 30,000

troops. Eventually he did, but it took nine months before he made the

final decision. You describe a dysfunctional relationship between

the President and his military commanders. At one point you quote

in the same of his commanders, do they resent that I never served in

the military? Do they think that because I am young I don't see what

they're doing? He did not trust Petraeus and the others. With

respect to the Afghan surge, he thought that the senior military

leaders were trying to box him in and force them to add significant

numbers of troops in Afghanistan. I tracked to convince him it was never

an orchestrated plan or plot to try and force him to do that, but he

series of unrelated events. That there was no plot. I was

unsuccessful in that. He did not enjoy many of these meetings. You

describe them as making you boil and having to sit on your hands so you

would not have to lose your temper. I think one word used was detesting

elements of the job. If you detested the job, was because that times, to

be frank about it, you did not have faith in the people you are working

with and for? No. The people I was working with, I enjoyed and

respected them. I say that in the book. I liked and respected

virtually everybody I worked with including the Vice President.

Certainly the President. What a detested about the job, I would use

the loan, anyone who enjoys this job should be asked to step down. I was

secretary of defence for a four years. We were taught every day in

two places. Every day, I had to send men and women in harm 's way. I

visited them in hospitals, went to funerals. It was that part of the

job that I detested. But talk about Afghanistan today. The US is in

negotiations still with the government trying to persuade him to

allow up to 8000 troops to remain, but all combat troops out. That

agreement has not been done. How important you believe it to be for

the United States to have a significant military residence in

Afghanistan beyond 2014? I believe it is critically important. The more

allies, the better. Again, I commend the administration. They have

negotiated this with the Afghans. We sat to get them to sign the

agreement that has been negotiated. Does it help that you have revealed

that Obama cannot stand him? That is then used to anybody. Right? It has

been an amply reported. This isn't breaking new ground. Hamid Karzai

has been difficult to deal with four to American presidents and countless

other foreign leaders. We will get the deal done, but what we cannot do

it is repeat what we did after the Soviets left Afghanistan, which is

to turn our backs on the country. Martin Dempsey has said that he is

worried that if there is no deal on the troops, that by 2017, any gains

made in the war Afghanistan will fade. That the Taliban forces will

again have control over significant parts of the country. If that is

true, what has the massive US military commitment which you were

so closely involved with, achieved? I would say that the chances of

keeping the Caliban at bay is in a security problem has been improved

by the actions we have taken in our own efforts to diminish their

military capability, but also in our efforts to train an Afghan army,

that is performing better than I think is being reported. I think our

enduring presence in Afghanistan, and that message of support, is

important to long-term success. Whether it's absence will lead to

everything going back to the way it was, I think people can't know. The

Afghan people now have a stake in a non- Caliban government that they

did not have before. Millions of kids including girls are now going

to school. Women are treated in a different way. I'm not sure they

would want to go back to the way it was when the Taliban were in charge.

They have the highest respect for general Dempsey. I'm not prepared to

say that in the absence of a continuing presence this will all

fall apart. But I believe the continuing presence will give

successor better chance. In this context, it seems relevant to talk

about Iraq. In a ruck there was no deal to keep forces stationed in the

country after the fall back. What we see today it is Al Qaeda taking

significant towns and Territory including Fallujah. Al Qaeda and our

dominance for the moment. Again, it raises the question, what on earth

has the United States achieved in a ruck? I think that end 2008 and

2009, we handed the Iraqis a different kind of future on a silver

platter. A country that was stable with the security situation under

control, and where they were the foundations of a democracy. A

multi-ethnic democracy. Two things have happened subsequently. In the

last couple of years, the Prime Minister has been as antagonistic to

the sunnis in Iraq as he can be. He has tracked to arrest his senior

vice president and other senior officials. A lot think, what is in

us for a us to this government. Let me continue. The question is whether

what has happened in Fallujah has served as a wake-up call for him.

There are signs it is beginning to do this, and we will have to our

fingers crossed. The other factor has been the civil war in Syria, and

the spillover of that conflict into a ruck. And into western Iraq. He

can do much about that, but I think these two things have created the

circumstances. We are not yet seen a re-emergence of extreme militia.

Should the US government now be providing a Maliki with hellfire

missiles, groans, and the scale of military support that he says he

needs to vanquish Al Qaeda? I think yes, but it needs to be conditioned

on Maliki reaching out to the Sunni Muslims and trying much harder to

make them and integral part of the Iraqi government and Iraqi society.

You think the reaction to the Arab Spring in his early days was wrong,

and now we see it with Syria in absolute chaos, not just one war in

Syria, but several wars. Many of the fighters in the conflict are extreme

Jihadi Islamists, which runs counter to the US. What does it say about

the strategy followed by Barack Obama, from yours years in office

and beyond, that US influence and ability to shape events in the

Middle East seems at a lower bed now than it has been in living memory? I

think a big part of that is that it is simply the fact that after 12

years of war in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that American political

leaders, not just the President, and the American people, are tired of

armed conflict. They are tired of war. So, the odds of American

military force being introduced in combat in any of those countries, I

think is the likelihood -- the likelihood of that is at an

extremely low level. So, there is no possibility of US military

intervention, whether it be in Syria, or even Iran. That is off the

table? In Iran, it would depend on the outcome of these negotiations,

but I think the likelihood of military intervention in Syria is

very low. Because of that, are you saying that Americans simply can't

be the influence than it used to be. Is it so that the US no longer

has the willingness, the resources and capability, to intervene? We do

have the capability. We still have a significant military presence,

particularly navy and air force, but I think what has been lacking is a

broader strategy to deal with the broader conflict in the Middle East,

because there are several going on across the region. Sony versus Shia,

authoritarians versus... Then there is the issue whether states like

Libya, Iran, and Syria, can be held together without adversaries. We

have touched upon Iran, and talked about US influence in the region.

Right now, the US is at the forefront of efforts to negotiate a

deal with Iran which would curb its nuclear programme in return for

reduced sanctions. There are powerful voices in the US Senate who

want to impose new punitive sanctions on Iran right now. If they

win that argument, if they do it, is that in the US interest? I think to

impose additional sanctions right now would be a serious mistake. I

believe that to enact additional sanctions that would become a fact

is at the end of the six months if the negotiations fail, actually

would strengthen the President's hand in the negotiations. -- become

effective. It is not just about producing the status quo, but it

would lead to conditions in Iran becoming more difficult. I would

attributed with the failure of the negotiations. How close during your

time at the Pentagon to the US come to making a decision to strike Iran?

I don't think and President Bush for President Obama we were close to

that decision. Dick Cheney believed the US would need to make and

military intervention, or would a list want to support Israel in a

military strike. I think Dick Cheney was an outlier in the defence team.

So you do not foresee intervention in Iran, even if the negotiation

fails? I don't see any military action while the negotiations going

on, but if the negotiations were to fail, I think all options have to

remain the table. I want to speak briefly about Naples. I was in

Brussels will valedictory speech when you are leading, leaving --

when you were leaving the defence department. You said, there will be

eight dwindling appetite to expend precious funds on behalf of nations

that are willing to devote the necessary resources in their own

defence. You are saying NATO is passed. I am saying that if most of

the nations are willing to spend any money... Many of those nations just

don't have money. On defence, then NATO is no longer a secure military

alliance. Maybe it becomes a political alliance of some sort, but

the basis for creating the alliance is essentially underlined. Do you

think Europeans get that? That America is no longer interested in

providing all the resources and doing all of the spadework was back

I worry that other nations. I worry that other nations will assume that

the US will always be there. I am the last official who remembers the

role of NATO in the Cold War. There will be a new generation of

politicians in America who are going to ask the question that you quoted.

Which is, why are we doing this? Why is it worth it? You are already

hearing significant voices in the US Congress calling for the withdrawal

of the US military presence in Europe. Tell me, look ahead. Will

NATO as a military alliance effectively be dead? Well, I gave up

my crystal ball when I left the CIA in 1983. All I will say is that I

hope it is. Hope it is alive? And an effective military alliance.

Suggesting that you think it may not be. It may not be. You, in the book,

in a very candid way, talk about the ugliness of congressional politics

in the US. You talk about the over bureaucratic, dysfunctional at times

Pentagon operation. You talk about eight disaffected American public,

tired, weary, and cynical after so many years of warfare. Given all of

that. Do you believe that America has lost its ability to project

power in the way it used to? Well, it is an interesting ad in the way

it used to. It has been doing that ever since the 1950s, and of -- as

other nations have become stronger, China has become stronger, and other

countries emerge from the war, as our global GDP has reduced as other

countries have become stronger. This way that we have had over the rest

of the world is clearly in the past. Why do you insist that America is

still in your view the world's indispensable nation? Because, I

have yet to see a major international problem that can be

dealt with effectively without American involvement, if not

American leadership. The point is, America is looking at the Middle

East and is not doing anything to re-engage and end the chaos. This is

an international problem, not just an American problem. I do think we

need to be in a leadership role, but I think the Geneva talks in respect

to Syria, the talks in respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, we

have just seen people trying to get greater co-ordination, and they

think the US is involved in these issues, but they are very big and

very difficult issues. They are not going to be solved overnight. We

have two end there, but thank you for being on HARDtalk. -- we have

to. It looks like the weather is going

to stay unsettled for the next few days. Today looked like