10/02/2017 Select Committees


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10/02/2017

Recorded coverage of the Transport Committee's session on Vauxhall vehicle fires, with evidence from GM Quality Europe, from Monday 6 February.


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Welcome to the transport Select Committee. Could we have your name

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and organisations, please. Good afternoon. I am director for global

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safety Anfield investigation and certification for General Motors,

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Europe. Good afternoon, I am the vice-president for GM quality in

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Europe. Good afternoon. Helen Ford head of Government relations and

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public policy for general moaters in the UK. Thank you very much.

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How many fires in the Zafira model B are you aware of, who can tell me,

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how many? Let me check. Maybe I can take this. There are

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about 287 fires associated to heating and ventilation systems. How

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many fires in total are you aware of? For ZafiraB? We just wanted to

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confirm which model you were referring to? I think it's a pretty

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obvious question to start with, isn't it? This is the reason that

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you are here today. The first simple question is how many fires are you

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aware of in ZafiraB? Well, we are aware of the 287 fires that have

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brought to our attention. 276 fires. Right. -- -- 287. How many of these

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have been fully investigated by our engineers? Well, we have

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investigated a large number by the engineers. How many? I have to come

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back on this one, please. You know, it's a little odd, you have come

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here to talk about this subject and this is pretty straightforward

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information, isn't it? How many fires, how many have been

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investigated by your engineers, you don't know? Well, actually there is

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59 cases I know that have been investigated. So 59 out of, what did

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you say, 28... 287. Doesn't sound a lot, does it, what's happened to the

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others? Maybe what we can say on that one, before the media attention

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we were only informed about very few of these cases and after the media

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we got within, I don't know, four to six weeks, we got aware of more than

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100 additional cases which we have not had a chance to inspect on. That

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was sometime ago, wasn't it? The media attention was sometime ago. So

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how many have you investigated? Can no one tell me how many have been

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investigated by your engineers? The recalls were older vehicles and they

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had been scratched before we could investigate them. The figure that

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was referred to, the 49, the 59 vehicles of the 59 vehicles that we

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have investigated. We have been able to see ourselves. What's happened to

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the others? 59 you have investigated and what is that over 200 you

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haven't investigated. So what's happened to those? Several of those

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vehicles, number one we couldn't get access to. A lot of the vehicles are

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even scrapped before we can get there. So, for instance, I know

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about one case where we sent out our fire investigation team but actually

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the vehicle was scrapped before we could get access and really do the

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detailed analysis. When you said you couldn't get access to them, what

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does that mean exactly? In what way couldn't you get access to them?

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First of all, if there is a fire case and the customer needs to ask

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their insurance company and permission for them, for us to do

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the inspections, without that permission we can not do the

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inspection. Did you seek permission? Yes. Was it refused? In some cases

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it is refused, that's right, yes. Who was it refused by? Sometimes by

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the customers, sometimes if we approach the insurance companies,

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the vehicles are already scrapped and especially in the Zafira cases a

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lot of cases were old cases which were brought to the attention later

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on there could be no physical inspection realised any longer. So

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how big a problem is this that you weren't able to get access, how many

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cars did you try to get access to? Well, I think... We should really

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think about the cars we want to get access to. How many did you try to?

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The recall and to really get the repair. It's very important for us

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to truly reach out to our customers. I am asking how many cars did you

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try to get access to? I didn't give you that figure. It's strange that

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you have come here to answer questions on this topic and you

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can't tell me how many cars you tried to get access to. I think it's

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very important that now that we have identified a final fix for our

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vehicles that we reach out to the customers. It's all right talking

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about reaching out, I am asking you a direct question, not reaching out.

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I am asking what you have done and you can't tell me how many cars you

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tried to get access to after these fires have occurred? As soon as we

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get aware of fire cases we actually reach out to the customers and ask

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them for permission in order to inspect those vehicles. A lot of

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those cases actually were historical ones which happened over, not just

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in 2016, and we have sent out our team to inspect wherever we could

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get access to those vehicles. But it's a bit odd you can't tell me how

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many you tried to get access to and failed to, it's very, very odd.

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You talked about 59 out of 287. You have said that you didn't have

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access to all of those, how do you know those 287 have indeed had fires

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that were related to the heating and you described some other fault, if

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you haven't got them how do you know it's 287 that you referenced a

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specific reason why they went up in fire if you have not had access to

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vehicles? There is descriptions which we get from our customer,

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contact centres which have been talking to our customers on how the

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fire evolved. I think we have a clear indication that this is a very

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strong part. To confirm you have never seen those cars with the

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exception of 59. So you are going on someone else's say so? What we are

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saying is that after the media response we got a lot of calls in

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our call centres and they informed us later on they also had to... They

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were no longer available, this is where the number is coming from.

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Again, perhaps you can help, you said it was 287 where there were

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fires caused in the heating or something else. Heating or

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ventilation system. Right. That's quite specific. You yourself haven't

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been able to acertain that's really where the fire started. How can you

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rely on that data? It's specific to expect the customers... This is the

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problem with the data reliability and this is what we are shooting

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for, we need better data for us and for the whole industry to rely on.

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Often we just get not aware of it, if a vehicle fire occurs and the

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customer is approaching insurance and the insurance is paying him out

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and in most of the cases we never get any information about that one.

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Therefore, we need a better data source where all this information is

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collected so there are data collection in the fire services, in

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the insurance companies. When you came before us last time we went

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through this. Have you had any fires since this committee met with the

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team that you sent? After the second part of the recall we did not have

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any additional fire in these vehicles. Any since we last met up,

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which I think was last July? I would have thought after that you would

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have moved heaven and earth to get hold of those vehicles and strip

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them apart, have you done that because the impression you are

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giving is you doesn't know, doesn't feel like anything's changed?

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Actually what we have been doing is, from the first recall we had parts

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sent back to us in the technical centre and we had about 1,000 parts

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from the first recall which we then actually did investigate and I think

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we have seen first indication for recourse but we have also seen that

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there is a second part of a root cause which is the effective use and

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that's why we have initialiated the second recall on the 8th August,

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2016. A quick question before I come back,

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chair. Could I ask each of the panel

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members just to very quickly tell me of the 287 customers who have been

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affected with the fires how many have you personally met with? Each

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of you, if you could tell me. I haven't met with any of those

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customers affected, it's not the line of job I am employed. Actually

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there are colleagues who have personally met them, I have not a

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chance to meet them. Same as with me. So none of the panel have met

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any of the families whose cars went on fire. We have not had the

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opportunity. Not had the opportunity? It's been quite a

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while. Some of our colleagues have done. And the customer care team and

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their responsibility... I am looking at the biographies. We have the

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vice-President of GM Quality Europe, the director of global safety

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Anfield investigations and the head of Government relations and public

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policy, that makes up the panel before us. None of you have thought

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to take half a day to meet any of the people who have been affected by

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it? Just a couple of hours? OK. Thank you, chair. I will probably

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want to come on to suggestions about how we better have a data management

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later in this session, but I am confused at the minute, of the 200

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and so fires you are aware of, I understand that some of them you

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wanted to investigate but couldn't because they had already been

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scrapped, the insurer had written them off. I would - if I was an

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insurance company and I started seeing a pattern that there was a

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fire in a particular model of car, I would want to be starting to ask

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some questions. So, in all the cases that you are aware of has the

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insurer just said it's been on fire, we are going to write it off, issue

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a cheque to the owner, or what steps did they take that you are aware of

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to acertain the cause of the fire in the first place? I think you are

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bringing up a very good point. First of all, there are multiple numbers

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of fire cases in the UK. Last time I think we came to see you we had a

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figure of about 18,000. Now there is data which goes up to 100,000.

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Whatever data source we believe I think it would be really beneficial

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if insurance companies would share their data with us if Fire Brigades

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would share their data with us and I totally agree that it will be much

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more beneficial for us to have that data so we could send our people to

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really investigate those cars at the point where that fire is going to

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take place and not maybe two or three years later where it comes to

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our at this answerings and that is I think one of the key proposals that

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we would like to make, not just for the benefit of us, but for the

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benefit of the industry and I think ultimately also for the customer.

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I appreciate that is what we might want to look at going forward but

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I'm still not clear in my mind, I've had a car, it's gone on fire, I

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reported to my insurance company. What steps do they take to ascertain

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the cause of that? That may put it another way. How many other fires

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are you aware of in your vehicles that are not related to the

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particular heating control the fact we are aware of? Do you mean in

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other cars? Yes, I'm trying to get the picture in my mind, if I was an

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insurance company, how many fires in Vauxhall cars would I expect a year?

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I think fires are involved in all of the car lines from us and our

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competitors. As we mentioned, in this one source, they are saying

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100,000 vehicle fires in the UK only and 65% of these cards are because

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of criminal intent and a lot of other fires are because of poor

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maintenance. And also our portion, what the side-effects are, we don't

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want to play that output for us is difficult to identify if a fire is

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related to a design defect or it is other purposes. This is also white

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forensic investigation is difficult because the fire itself often

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destroys the trace the origin of the fire and therefore it is very

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difficult for us, just from the number to identify if there is a

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root cause behind or not full so what would help us, if there was a

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consolidated data source that we can at least see a trend on that. This

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is what we don't have. Forgive me for pressing. Do the insurance

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companies make that effort to find out the cause of the fire or is it

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that they just recorded as a fire? Is it a day to release issue or do

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these insurance companies need to take steps themselves to find out

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the source? The Biglia fire happens, the customer notifies the insurance

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company -- typically. They might choose to send a settlement agent

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that will look at the car but those are typically no forensic fire

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investigators. They look at the car and take the first assessment and

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they decide on the settlement of the case. Unfortunately, there is no

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direct link back to us which then would be able to probably go deeper

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in order to truly understand the nature of the fire.

:16:43.:16:46.

Thank you, chair. I should declare that I am an owner of the Zafira but

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not one of the models effected. What happens in the rest of Europe? Is it

:16:58.:17:03.

only in the UK where they have had car fires? The Opel badge? What do

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they have with the rest of Europe and reporting mechanisms? Does

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another country have a system of reporting fires? This specific case

:17:15.:17:22.

is related to the UK vehicles, or let me say to the right hand driven

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vehicles. And of course there are other countries affected, like

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Malta, which is on the same road, but we do not seek fire cases on

:17:34.:17:38.

that relation. But we cover this in our recall activities as well. So it

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is a different component in the left-hand drive vehicles? The

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location is different and if you drive on the other side of the road,

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it is different, what is the middle of the and in one country is the

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left side and the other the right side. So you are not seeing Zafira

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fires in other European countries? No. And I think you also touched on

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one aspect, if we have another country is a better system of data

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feedback. I think probably UK could set a standard in introducing such a

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system and other European countries could absolutely learn from that.

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Maybe I can add in addition we are in close contact with the DVSA here

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and also thinking to get the field action as soon as possible done to

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get very high fulfilment rate. For example in other countries we have a

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system where we write three comes to the customers and after that the

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customers will Dignitas from the authorities if they do not react on

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that recall request, vehicles will be ground. And this helps to speed

:19:03.:19:06.

up these regal measurements for us and the industry and in addition,

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what we think about is also the MOT, you have a yearly MOT system here in

:19:13.:19:20.

the UK, and if there would be a requirement to check if there is an

:19:21.:19:23.

outstanding recall on these vehicles, this would help us and a

:19:24.:19:29.

whole industry a lot as well here. How have you dug with customers who

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have not responded? What efforts have you made to contact them? After

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now the written up to 1.2 million letters to customers. There are

:19:41.:19:44.

customers out there who have received up to seven letters

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inviting them to actually seek assistance and repair for their

:19:51.:19:57.

vehicle and also dealers. In addition, where we have data from

:19:58.:20:01.

the customers, we have given them a call we have them an e-mail and

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really reached out to try for them to get in contact. I think up to

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date and then say that we managed repair now 165,000 of the Zafira Bs

:20:14.:20:23.

in order to get the final fix implemented. Our dealers have put up

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additional hours during the week but also have devoted a lot of time

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during the weekend in order to execute the recall. People from our

:20:31.:20:35.

plants who have been trained and support our dealers in order to do

:20:36.:20:41.

so and in order to make the waiting time for each customer very short we

:20:42.:20:46.

also have now directed that two technicians are working on one car

:20:47.:20:52.

so we can do that rather rapidly so the customer doesn't have to wait

:20:53.:20:55.

very long. We have also added resources when it comes to the

:20:56.:21:00.

customer contact centres that are the centres who make the

:21:01.:21:03.

appointments. We try to make sure that we can maximise the

:21:04.:21:08.

opportunities for customers to come and seek the support of the dealers.

:21:09.:21:15.

As you have truly stated, we really have to get access to our customers

:21:16.:21:21.

and convince them to come and get their car being fixed. There was a

:21:22.:21:27.

delay at the start of the second recall, wasn't there, because you

:21:28.:21:30.

didn't have parts? Why did that happen? Actually there wasn't really

:21:31.:21:38.

a delay of the recall. We have very rapidly worked with our suppliers in

:21:39.:21:43.

order to make sure we have parts. I think I can really state that today

:21:44.:21:50.

we have the capacity as well as the parts and we could theoretically

:21:51.:21:53.

finish the whole recall in the next month, if customers come and see us

:21:54.:21:59.

and would actually make an appointment together with us. Maybe

:22:00.:22:04.

one additional comment. What also is missing is the data accuracy. We

:22:05.:22:11.

have a lot of data from vehicles which may no longer on the road, and

:22:12.:22:15.

we're not talking about a few hundred, we're talking about 16,000

:22:16.:22:20.

or something like that, where we are not sure, together with the dealers

:22:21.:22:24.

and the DVLA, if they are still on the roads. This is also some point,

:22:25.:22:30.

if we would get a better help to understand which vehicle really are

:22:31.:22:33.

out and not scrapped or whatever, that would help us as well. You said

:22:34.:22:39.

the problem was really unauthorised repairs. Why did you say that when

:22:40.:22:44.

you never identified who had been doing the alleged unauthorised

:22:45.:22:50.

repairs? When we got aware of the fire cases, we did a field survey

:22:51.:22:59.

and asked our dealers, please return back, I think more than a thousand

:23:00.:23:05.

resistors to us and we did a check on them and found 2.7% of these were

:23:06.:23:16.

manipulative. 2.7% of what? Of the resisters we got returned out of the

:23:17.:23:20.

field. Did you name the people you're done these unauthorised

:23:21.:23:26.

repairs? No. So if you blame the problem on unauthorised repairs, why

:23:27.:23:29.

didn't you take more trouble to identify those people? It is very

:23:30.:23:35.

difficult to identify those because, at a certain point of time,

:23:36.:23:42.

customers do not come to authorised repairers. Instead of blaming who

:23:43.:23:49.

has done these authorised repairs we have taken at the first indication

:23:50.:23:56.

that this was one of the two root causes, we're taking action and

:23:57.:24:02.

initiated the first recall. However, although we haven't really done

:24:03.:24:10.

those false repairs, we have taken responsibility for that and have

:24:11.:24:14.

taken action. We also continued the root cause analysis and we did

:24:15.:24:22.

identify a second part of root cause which wasn't actually a false repair

:24:23.:24:27.

but which was, according to the design of this fuse. Therefore we

:24:28.:24:33.

have initiated the second recall which actually has been exchanging

:24:34.:24:39.

and bringing the car back to the original stage which was the first

:24:40.:24:43.

recall, but taking a different technical path and using a fuse

:24:44.:24:51.

which is much more reliable and resistant in that configurations

:24:52.:25:00.

versus the potential of causing any problem. How many cars caught fire

:25:01.:25:09.

after the first recall? I think what I can say, directly after the first

:25:10.:25:15.

fire after the first recall, that was a vehicle which was prepared and

:25:16.:25:20.

caught fire and that was for us again the trigger... How many? I

:25:21.:25:30.

don't have the figure. Why don't you know? You knew you were coming here

:25:31.:25:36.

today to answer these questions and that is another fairly basic

:25:37.:25:43.

question. We did not get the questions before. You just don't

:25:44.:25:48.

know. If you're asking for specific figures, of course we can deliver. I

:25:49.:25:55.

am asking for those figures but I'm also is pressing surprise that you

:25:56.:25:58.

have come here to answer questions about this very unsatisfactory

:25:59.:26:00.

situation and you haven't got the basic information on it. There is a

:26:01.:26:04.

pricing and not very good. In terms of those who drive these

:26:05.:26:19.

cars, it is traditionally a family car used for school trips, holidays,

:26:20.:26:28.

trips to hospital and all the rest of it and think it's probably fair

:26:29.:26:33.

to say that your customers, in the UK at least, are very loyal to your

:26:34.:26:38.

brand. They have been for many years. I hosted some of your

:26:39.:26:46.

customers who had been effected by this in Parliament just before

:26:47.:26:50.

Christmas, in this corridor actually, the group came in, and

:26:51.:26:54.

they have sent some notes to me about the recall process and also

:26:55.:27:01.

how they feel your company has handled the whole process since it

:27:02.:27:07.

began and I just want to read some of this out to you. The notes say,

:27:08.:27:13.

some customers were made to feel like a nuisance. When they go

:27:14.:27:18.

through the recall process, the attitude from dealerships have been

:27:19.:27:24.

met with disgust. They say that vehicles are often returned to them

:27:25.:27:27.

with further problems, with the heating and ventilation system. It

:27:28.:27:33.

can sometimes take up to two or three new motors to find one that

:27:34.:27:44.

works. And the impact here says that customers are made to feel like

:27:45.:27:47.

second-class citizens. Do you recognise any of this? We apologise

:27:48.:27:56.

if customers from the recall was to fix the problem and our dealers were

:27:57.:28:01.

trying to make the process as smooth and easy for our customers and we

:28:02.:28:06.

understand that might be the case the whole time. We for the

:28:07.:28:10.

additional inconvenience. There are specific cases, we can follow that

:28:11.:28:17.

up afterwards. You must be aware of some of these cases. We are aware

:28:18.:28:21.

and we have instructed our retailers and also given out additional

:28:22.:28:27.

guidance to them to ensure and to remind the middle is to make sure

:28:28.:28:30.

that the heating and ventilation system is in good working condition

:28:31.:28:35.

before the vehicle is passed back. That's not happening. We recognise

:28:36.:28:38.

it's fitted that I have been mistakes. If you have any specific

:28:39.:28:43.

examples of any of that, please let us know and we can follow it up

:28:44.:28:46.

directly with the customers and retailers.

:28:47.:28:49.

Would either of you like to add anything to that? No. Nothing to say

:28:50.:29:01.

to - you know, I think your customers have been treated pretty

:29:02.:29:03.

shoddily and they are being bandied around from pillar to post. I cannot

:29:04.:29:07.

think of another probably duct in the United Kingdom at the moment,

:29:08.:29:11.

where people have set up a campaign group to come to Parliament to try

:29:12.:29:16.

to get MPs to resolve it. -- another product. Some are sat behind in the

:29:17.:29:21.

audience listening to you. I would have thought you would have

:29:22.:29:24.

something more to add for the experience. Some of these people's

:29:25.:29:31.

children don't want to go in a car again and some people have had their

:29:32.:29:37.

homes damage as a result of this. Well, what I would personally like

:29:38.:29:45.

to say is that I'm very sorry for the evening frightening subpoenas

:29:46.:29:49.

our customers have gone through and there was probably nothing we can do

:29:50.:29:53.

to make it unhappen and what we can do and I think it has been pointed

:29:54.:29:59.

out, we would really like to make any experience coming to see us and

:30:00.:30:05.

getting their vehicle fixed, as positive and as straightforward as

:30:06.:30:09.

possible and that is where we have put a lot of effort in. In addition,

:30:10.:30:14.

those customers who have gone through a fire, they probably have

:30:15.:30:20.

also had personal losses, like, you know, personal belongings, things

:30:21.:30:24.

they really felt important about which are not insured, so we have

:30:25.:30:29.

now been reaching out to those customers, in order to make sure

:30:30.:30:35.

that we understand those cases and situations and that we can find a

:30:36.:30:39.

settlement, together with them, to compensate them, not just for the

:30:40.:30:44.

insured losses but also for the ininsured losses. Of the 287 that

:30:45.:30:51.

you say where people have losses, insured or otherwise, of the 287, in

:30:52.:30:56.

terms of reaching that et islement, how many are outstanding -- reaching

:30:57.:31:02.

that settlement? We have been reaching out to 160 so far where we

:31:03.:31:08.

are currently in the discussion and trying to seek a settlement and we

:31:09.:31:14.

will, of course, step-by-step approach all outstanding cases.

:31:15.:31:21.

I want to come back to the point on insurance, in your interaction. Have

:31:22.:31:26.

you contacted all of the main insurers in the market to make the

:31:27.:31:29.

pointed that - we would actually like to see all of the cars that

:31:30.:31:36.

you've had claims registered against, particularly in the class

:31:37.:31:42.

of Safira, Corsa, so you can get better access to the car wrnchts we

:31:43.:31:46.

work with the insurance company, and where we are aware of the fire and

:31:47.:31:53.

had permission. We have worked with the insurance company to inspect

:31:54.:31:55.

vehicles that were available. When we talk about having better access

:31:56.:32:01.

to data, this is an industry issue and so with our trade body, working

:32:02.:32:06.

with the asAssociation of British Insurers and looking at an

:32:07.:32:08.

industry-to-industry solution to this problem. Do you think insurers

:32:09.:32:13.

are taking it seriously enough? On the one hand it is your reputation,

:32:14.:32:20.

your brand, but you if you can't get control, you can't get hold of the

:32:21.:32:25.

asset. And also with the insurance, if they don't have t they cannot pay

:32:26.:32:29.

out. Have you seen an uptick in the number of cars being delivered back

:32:30.:32:33.

to you, that have been involved in fires? With Zafira a unique

:32:34.:32:40.

situation, it was an older vehicle, and some of the fires happened years

:32:41.:32:45.

ago, so they weren't scrapped. But we have a working industry with the

:32:46.:32:51.

insurance industry and with the trade body, this is an area where

:32:52.:32:56.

they are keen to work on, ongoing. Do you think something is required

:32:57.:33:01.

compulsory, along the lines of, if a vehicle is damaged by fire, from its

:33:02.:33:04.

engine or any component there, should be a requirement, before an

:33:05.:33:09.

insurer pays out, for that car to be expected so that the market knows

:33:10.:33:15.

what the issue is? Absolutely but obviously a customer unfore-Tube

:33:16.:33:19.

ately with a fire is having compensation -- unfortunately. What

:33:20.:33:22.

we would like to see is the availability for us to investigate

:33:23.:33:25.

as soon as possible, we don't want to hold up the process of customers

:33:26.:33:34.

being reimbursed from an insurance company, for example, but we would

:33:35.:33:39.

like to have better access, and data and better checks. Can I just check,

:33:40.:33:44.

other motor manufacturers, so this fault could be common to other motor

:33:45.:33:49.

manufacturers, did you contact other motor manufacturers to let them know

:33:50.:33:52.

you are aware of something and perhaps share information in case

:33:53.:33:55.

they had the same issue with their vehicles as well? What I can say on

:33:56.:34:08.

this one, of course we inform the authorities on this one and there is

:34:09.:34:13.

a European system where all the customers and other authorities are

:34:14.:34:16.

informed about. We cannot get, for example, if we have a

:34:17.:34:20.

supplier-caused issue or part of a supplier part is in question, we

:34:21.:34:25.

will not get the data from our competitors because of the antitrust

:34:26.:34:29.

law but what he doing, when in contct with the authorities, we name

:34:30.:34:32.

them, the supplier we are working with and they approach the supplier

:34:33.:34:37.

and they are asking the question which other manufacturers are using

:34:38.:34:42.

the same component. I remember six months ago, when your team game

:34:43.:34:45.

before us, Chair, and I asked the que, and the answer was no, which I

:34:46.:34:50.

think we all thought was a bit of a poor show. So I received an

:34:51.:34:53.

assurance that afternoon that other manufacturers would be contacted. I

:34:54.:34:57.

didn't expect it to be that afternoon, but I would have thought

:34:58.:35:02.

that GM would have putted a call into other motor manufacturers,

:35:03.:35:05.

rather than leaving it to regulators and what have you. Not least because

:35:06.:35:09.

you assured me that you would. But, also, it is common sense, isn't it?

:35:10.:35:16.

Well, we have been working with our supplier and that supplier exactly

:35:17.:35:22.

knows in which - who are their other customers. What we, however, need to

:35:23.:35:31.

say is that most, you know, this very specific same part, most

:35:32.:35:35.

probably, is not being used in the very same configuration in any other

:35:36.:35:41.

system. However, we have advised our suppliers about any findings that we

:35:42.:35:47.

had and also the risks that we see, with regard to our very specific

:35:48.:35:52.

component and you know, they know exactly who their customers are. I

:35:53.:35:57.

find that a bit of an unsatisfactory answer. Six months ago we were

:35:58.:36:02.

assured something would happen. Actually your team suggested. It

:36:03.:36:07.

struck me as common sense to do that and it hasn't been done. I find that

:36:08.:36:14.

pretty extraordinary. Sorry, as has been explained we are prohibited to

:36:15.:36:17.

a certain extent with competition law and so there are processes in

:36:18.:36:21.

place that we explained in a follow-up letter afterwards to the

:36:22.:36:24.

committee, after our evidence in July. I will be amazed if

:36:25.:36:29.

competition law stopped you from health and safety perspective to

:36:30.:36:32.

contact on the most general of terms, other motor manufacturers to

:36:33.:36:36.

say - we have an issue specific to these parts, you may well want to

:36:37.:36:42.

check you have these parts as well, we are putting you on notice. I

:36:43.:36:46.

understand the question. The supplier reached out to its

:36:47.:36:49.

customers, we would not know the competition or supplier's customers.

:36:50.:36:53.

It is always a question back from the authorities, where you do the

:36:54.:36:57.

notification to, which partsome affected and which supplier and then

:36:58.:37:00.

we give the name of the supplier to the authority and they approach the

:37:01.:37:04.

supplier to get this information from them.

:37:05.:37:08.

It is really really very convincing, it is not clear if you have not done

:37:09.:37:13.

anything, if you don't want it tell us about it.

:37:14.:37:20.

Are Zafira owners and drivers still at risk?

:37:21.:37:32.

W we have advised our Zafira drivers to operate their vehicle under a

:37:33.:37:37.

blower motor condition of oat 0 or 4. At that point of time there is no

:37:38.:37:44.

risk for the Zafira drivers but I would strongly recommend that the

:37:45.:37:49.

Zafira drivers are coming to seek us so we can finalise the recall and

:37:50.:37:54.

their vehicles can be operated under any conditions. Are you absolutely

:37:55.:38:02.

satisfied that you, as a company, have done everything possible to

:38:03.:38:08.

eliminate the risk as best you can? Well, we have been reaching out

:38:09.:38:15.

several tierges even before any recall was issued, so that we advise

:38:16.:38:22.

our customers how they can actually avoid the risk... So are you

:38:23.:38:26.

satisfied that they are safe, that's what Mr Vicars is asking you. We

:38:27.:38:32.

keep being told you reach out but Mr Vickers is asking, are the drivers

:38:33.:38:37.

safe and the occupants of the cars? Well, let me put it this way, with

:38:38.:38:43.

every safety recall it is a serious situation and I personally cannot be

:38:44.:38:47.

satisfied to have safety recall but I am very confident that we have

:38:48.:38:52.

done what is right in order to mitigate the situation and now offer

:38:53.:38:58.

the customer a quick fix for their vehicle so that we eliminate any...

:38:59.:39:04.

But are they safe, Mr Vickers is something you, are they safe?

:39:05.:39:10.

If the question s if the fix has been done, then yes, we say the

:39:11.:39:14.

vehicle is safe to drive, if this is the question. For the remaining

:39:15.:39:20.

ones, which are not in our garages for the fix, we suggest they come in

:39:21.:39:26.

as soon as possible to get this done and to operate their vehicle safely.

:39:27.:39:34.

So there are still vehicles out on the road where there is there is

:39:35.:39:37.

still risk. Following on from that, are you

:39:38.:39:40.

satisfied that your dealers have done everything, through their

:39:41.:39:44.

network to contact drivers? You have written to something like 1.2

:39:45.:39:48.

million people. Letters go astray. Letters get put behind the clock on

:39:49.:39:54.

the mantelpiece and forgotten. What repeated actions have you taken as a

:39:55.:40:00.

company and dealer network to make contact with people? Where we have

:40:01.:40:05.

data and can validate it, we are using other data point like phones

:40:06.:40:09.

and e-mail to directly contact customers who have not come in yet.

:40:10.:40:14.

Where we don't have the that detail we have gone to the RAC and AA it

:40:15.:40:19.

validate information with them and using their contact details to again

:40:20.:40:22.

address those customers. Now there are still customers out there, that

:40:23.:40:27.

we know have received the letter and haven't had the recall work done,

:40:28.:40:30.

they are the registered owners N those circumstances, what we are

:40:31.:40:37.

proposing to do, we ask the DVSA if we can do a joint letter with that

:40:38.:40:41.

customer's insurance company to remind them to have a completed

:40:42.:40:46.

safety recall, and without that it could invalidate the customer's

:40:47.:40:50.

insurance. We are asking the DVSA for permission to undertake that

:40:51.:40:57.

step as well. With some of the outstanding figures, as Thomaz

:40:58.:41:02.

highlighted, there are around 13,000 of the outstanding Zafira's that no

:41:03.:41:06.

v no registered keeper. They are what is known as sold to trade. They

:41:07.:41:11.

have been sold to trade between six months and up to three years. We are

:41:12.:41:16.

working with the DVSA to validate that because there is no registered

:41:17.:41:21.

keeper, what wrird to do is to notify the previous registered

:41:22.:41:24.

keeper where we have an address but we are aware they are not the owner

:41:25.:41:27.

of that vehicle because they've passed them on to trade. So that's

:41:28.:41:32.

an area where we can keen to work with the DVSA on, going forward in

:41:33.:41:37.

how we can eliminate that. I want to return to the point about

:41:38.:41:41.

the insurance companies. What is the situation, if a vehicle is found to

:41:42.:41:46.

have a faulty part and it burns to the ground, does the insurance

:41:47.:41:49.

company bear the ultimate cost of paying out on that, or does that

:41:50.:41:55.

come back to the manufacture? I think in the cases we have seen,

:41:56.:42:01.

where - I couldn't say with any confidence exactly what happened,

:42:02.:42:04.

our understanding, my understanding is that insurance companies have

:42:05.:42:10.

compensated companies have compensated the owner and then we

:42:11.:42:15.

have compensated the insurer. So if you are compensating the insurer,

:42:16.:42:19.

but any manufacturer who had a similar problem is compensating the

:42:20.:42:23.

insurer, does that not give you an ownership right to the vehicle. So,

:42:24.:42:30.

f heaven forbid my Zafira goes up into flames and I go to my insurance

:42:31.:42:35.

company and they pay out, the insurance company is going to GM and

:42:36.:42:38.

say - it has gone up in flames because of this fault, therefore you

:42:39.:42:42.

need to put the insurance company back in fupds so the insurance

:42:43.:42:47.

company is not at a loss, so effectively then you own my Zafira.

:42:48.:42:52.

The insurance company would not necessarily do the forensic

:42:53.:42:57.

investigations to pinpoint the root cause and fires are destructive by

:42:58.:43:01.

nature so establishing the cause is very difficult. So the insurance

:43:02.:43:05.

company will do an initial assessment, as joy understand it and

:43:06.:43:09.

part of that is pretty much to rule out criminal be intent of activity

:43:10.:43:13.

and then there is a settlement. We are then, where we are aware of t we

:43:14.:43:18.

are then able to inspect that vehicle afterwards. I know you are

:43:19.:43:23.

asking about whether or not weather then we own T I don't have that

:43:24.:43:25.

information. We can come back. On what basis do Manufacturer 's

:43:26.:43:35.

like GM paid insurance companies? Do you say, for example, for every

:43:36.:43:41.

thousand cars that are insured, if there is a claim on those you pay

:43:42.:43:47.

out 10%? How does it work? We do the compensation in the case that we

:43:48.:43:55.

understand and we see that we have a design or Manufacturing related

:43:56.:43:57.

issue and have issued a safety recall. That is not the common

:43:58.:44:02.

practice, the common practice is the insurer sends an inspector to see

:44:03.:44:11.

the car and does the first judgment and understand the settlement and

:44:12.:44:15.

that is how the insurer pays out the customer. In this case we have said,

:44:16.:44:23.

because of the safety recall, we will actually compensate for the

:44:24.:44:27.

insurer for the same amount of settlement that he has done those of

:44:28.:44:33.

their customer. I understand that, but in terms of generally,

:44:34.:44:39.

run-of-the-mill, somebody has a problem with their Insignia and it

:44:40.:44:48.

is shown to be Manufacturing problem, do you not routinely

:44:49.:44:53.

compensate the insurance company? Well, I would say it is very hard

:44:54.:44:58.

for the Inspector of the insurance company to find out whether there is

:44:59.:45:05.

a manufacturing related issue. That is why we would seek to have that

:45:06.:45:09.

short cut of information coming towards us in order to get the

:45:10.:45:15.

opportunity to do a detailed investigation. However, as we have

:45:16.:45:20.

been pointing out before, data shows that about 65% of all of the fire

:45:21.:45:29.

cases are due to arson and often this is very obvious. The next piece

:45:30.:45:36.

of occurrence is weak maintenance and some of that can also be very

:45:37.:45:41.

obvious. Then there is the remainder which is very difficult to find out

:45:42.:45:48.

and there are really detailed investigation is necessary in order

:45:49.:45:53.

to find out. And sometimes evidence will never be able to be found

:45:54.:45:59.

because the fire destroyed that key criteria of evidence. And if we get

:46:00.:46:08.

the chance of a very early Nick Hurd -- notification of the fire and we

:46:09.:46:11.

get in contact with the insurance company to investigate, we do it

:46:12.:46:15.

together. That is the best situation for us. Do you not think it is

:46:16.:46:21.

strange that the insurance company has a vested interest in finding out

:46:22.:46:25.

who is really responsible, that they don't bother, presumably because we

:46:26.:46:29.

will pay the premiums at an increased level? There is quite an

:46:30.:46:34.

onus on the insurance company that they have an opportunity here to

:46:35.:46:38.

hold accountable those who should be held accountable and they are not

:46:39.:46:42.

bothering. I think they have started to react to our requests in a

:46:43.:46:47.

cacique if we can find a joint database where not just insurers but

:46:48.:46:53.

also by brigades, who often will be called in case of a fire, in all of

:46:54.:46:59.

those data would come together in one place so that not just us but

:47:00.:47:08.

all manner factors could have access to it, that would be very helpful.

:47:09.:47:13.

It also increases the data points we can use to see if there is a trend

:47:14.:47:19.

and can take action much faster. There are now fires in Corsa B

:47:20.:47:27.

models now. What is the problem in that -- coarser D.

:47:28.:47:30.

This is about a safety recall we issued in April 2015. It is on the

:47:31.:47:39.

pump relate box that is supporting the braking system. We have about

:47:40.:47:45.

4000 vehicles affected in the UK, it is a 1.4 turbo engine, out of a

:47:46.:47:52.

fleet of 700,000 vehicles and we already reworked 3000 of them. We

:47:53.:47:57.

had one fire case when we started the investigation and data on a

:47:58.:48:04.

second one. These are the two known cases we have. After the media

:48:05.:48:11.

response, there is one potential additional one but these are the

:48:12.:48:14.

three cases we are aware of. What is the reason for those fires? It is

:48:15.:48:21.

water ingress into the Relay box and that can be a short circuit. Can I

:48:22.:48:30.

ask if Vauxhall have ever refused to investigate a fire when it's been

:48:31.:48:38.

reported to them by a customer? Going back before the media

:48:39.:48:42.

attention and all the rest of it, have you ever refused to investigate

:48:43.:48:48.

customer claims fire? I don't have that information but I can certainly

:48:49.:48:52.

go back to the team and look back and get back to you. We do expect to

:48:53.:49:00.

have refused? -- would you have. To my knowledge, we have fire is that

:49:01.:49:05.

work with us so we have the resources and I couldn't see a

:49:06.:49:09.

reason why we wouldn't do that but I can't say with any certainty. If I

:49:10.:49:14.

can take that back to the wider team in the office and get back to you.

:49:15.:49:17.

You would be interested to know of any cases that have been brought to

:49:18.:49:20.

our attention where customers have said they had reported fires and

:49:21.:49:26.

they were essentially palmed off. If you have that information, please

:49:27.:49:29.

let us know and we can go through and trace that and come back to you

:49:30.:49:34.

specifically. It just so happens that there are people with those

:49:35.:49:36.

exact cases here in Parliament this afternoon. Could I ask each one view

:49:37.:49:43.

to take the time to have a chat with them at the end of the session?

:49:44.:49:47.

Certainly, I would do that. That would be very helpful also briefly,

:49:48.:49:52.

chair, going back to the communication with customers. You

:49:53.:49:58.

have been writing a lot of letters and sending a lot of e-mails and you

:49:59.:50:05.

set up a Facebook ad to raise awareness of the issue. How

:50:06.:50:10.

successful do you judge that to I don't have those figures

:50:11.:50:13.

specifically... You don't seem to have an awful lot with you. There

:50:14.:50:19.

were a wide variety of areas on those themes as to what we would be

:50:20.:50:25.

discussing today. We felt we were the right people to answer those

:50:26.:50:29.

questions. That this the vast amount of work that goes on across the

:50:30.:50:34.

whole business so I might not have all that information but I don't, I

:50:35.:50:37.

can get back to you. There is a Facebook group which has about

:50:38.:50:43.

16,500 people on it who are owners of the models affected. We are aware

:50:44.:50:50.

of the existence of the group, it is a closed group. Have you tried to

:50:51.:50:54.

reach out to them specifically? Yes, I believe our customer care director

:50:55.:50:57.

is in contact with the team and they are in discussions with them as we

:50:58.:51:03.

speak. Good. And the more general question, and perhaps it would be

:51:04.:51:10.

one for you guys to answer. You have this problem with the Zafira models

:51:11.:51:18.

and with Corsas but thinking of the industry more widely, there is the

:51:19.:51:24.

Volkswagen emissions scandal, there is problems with just about every

:51:25.:51:29.

manufacturer, Renault, Peugeot. I would go so far as to say that the

:51:30.:51:33.

reputation of the industry is probably at the lowest point it has

:51:34.:51:39.

ever been. How do you see the industry gaining back public trust,

:51:40.:51:46.

given all these scandals that exist in different manufacturers including

:51:47.:51:50.

yourselves? And how are you going to get public trust back?

:51:51.:51:58.

Every recall and every safety recall is a very severe issue so giving it

:51:59.:52:12.

a lot of attention in order to get it fixed is a very important point.

:52:13.:52:17.

Unfortunately we cannot turn the clock backwards. However, the

:52:18.:52:22.

question is how we learn quickly and make sure that any new project we

:52:23.:52:28.

bring out, any new car we bring out, we'll get all of the learnings from

:52:29.:52:36.

the history. But making sure, in case there was any risk associated,

:52:37.:52:43.

and we get the first incident of any risk, we quickly take very diligent

:52:44.:52:51.

actions, we quickly investigate the situation and we take actions in

:52:52.:52:55.

order to correct in case there is an issue out there. And of course you

:52:56.:53:01.

might debate how much is quickly and how much emphasis we put on the bike

:53:02.:53:09.

can assure you that safety is absolutely our first priority in our

:53:10.:53:17.

company -- I can assure you. We had picked at the top, beat the safety

:53:18.:53:21.

of our customers, our employees, but our business partners -- be it the

:53:22.:53:28.

safety. Each board meeting we had been putting safety on top of our

:53:29.:53:32.

agenda and we are starting each one of those. That gives us the

:53:33.:53:37.

opportunity to raise issues, take decisions quickly and really

:53:38.:53:42.

execute. Do you have anything to add to that on what you should do

:53:43.:53:46.

differently now? That is absolutely right what Elvira is saying and in

:53:47.:53:54.

addition now culture, we introduced in the safety by month, every

:53:55.:54:00.

employee can raise up a safety issue to a specific board so this is

:54:01.:54:04.

documented and will be followed up in the safety arena. What about the

:54:05.:54:08.

problem you are facing? You have two models with fires where drivers and

:54:09.:54:14.

passengers are fighting. Should you be doing anything different now to

:54:15.:54:18.

restore confidence? -- are frightened. What we're doing when

:54:19.:54:23.

Woody at taking position on recalls, we do not necessarily wait until we

:54:24.:54:29.

have the root cause -- when we are taking. If we can minimise the risk

:54:30.:54:35.

to the customer we go out already to start the recall and go back in a

:54:36.:54:39.

second wave to fix the problem finally. Of course this causes

:54:40.:54:44.

inconvenience to the customers but this is what we're doing to protect

:54:45.:54:49.

them as much as possible. We must close this session now, we will be

:54:50.:54:53.

writing to you with further information that we require so thank

:54:54.:54:54.

you for coming in. Could I have your name and positions

:54:55.:55:10.

please? Pete Ahern, operations director. Gareth Llewellyn, chief

:55:11.:55:18.

Executive of DVSA. Andy King, head of enforcement. We were told last

:55:19.:55:24.

and that you were surprised at the length of time timetabled for

:55:25.:55:29.

Vauxhall for the Zafira recall. Have you done anything about making that

:55:30.:55:34.

action quicker and more effective? What have you been doing about the

:55:35.:55:43.

problem? Mr Llewellyn. We went through about 75,000 vehicle

:55:44.:55:45.

identification numbers and matched up against the MOT register for

:55:46.:55:51.

Vauxhall and we concluded there were about 12,500 Zafira cars which were

:55:52.:55:56.

outside the MOT, they don't have a valid MOT. Some only just but some

:55:57.:56:00.

by a very long wait also we have identified another 5500 where they

:56:01.:56:06.

have no MOT history, maybe because they have been taken abroad when

:56:07.:56:09.

they were first registered. We tried to slim down the number when we

:56:10.:56:13.

believe there are active models on the road at the moment to enable

:56:14.:56:18.

Vauxhall to be able to focus their marketing campaign. We are a little

:56:19.:56:21.

concerned in that space because a number of the letters originally

:56:22.:56:25.

sent out have been referred back to DVLA, and DVLA were not part of the

:56:26.:56:31.

original process and what has come from that is we believe the mail

:56:32.:56:35.

merge undertaken by Vauxhall was not done successfully on some occasions

:56:36.:56:40.

and the letters did not end up with the right people so we are talking

:56:41.:56:43.

to them about how to rectify that position to make sure the right

:56:44.:56:46.

owners get the letters suggesting that models should be recalled.

:56:47.:56:48.

Kristen Stewart? -- Mr Stewart. In the previous

:56:49.:56:57.

session I try to get some detail as to what an insurance company would

:56:58.:57:04.

examine when it gets a claim for a car that has caught fire. I still

:57:05.:57:10.

haven't got a proper answer as to what checks they would do to

:57:11.:57:17.

identify what is causing the fire and, if so, how that might be

:57:18.:57:22.

relayed to yourselves or to the manufacturers, that there is a

:57:23.:57:27.

pattern developing that needs to be investigated and rectified. What is

:57:28.:57:33.

your position on that? We have applied to the Association of

:57:34.:57:37.

British insurers for access to the mode industry and theft register

:57:38.:57:42.

because we don't understand quite what is involved in that the moment

:57:43.:57:45.

and it might give us a better insight into the sort of information

:57:46.:57:49.

the industry holds and the sorts of things they are looking for and we

:57:50.:57:52.

can then map that onto where we think certain safety recalls are to

:57:53.:57:55.

answer this question if there should be some sort of Central register of

:57:56.:57:59.

issues effecting vehicles. Until we have sight of that register, it is

:58:00.:58:02.

rather difficult to comment on that at the moment. My question is, is

:58:03.:58:08.

that investigatory work done at all and enjoys are not racing -- not

:58:09.:58:14.

releasing it, or do they need to put in place a better system for

:58:15.:58:18.

following up? I find it quite strange that they would just write

:58:19.:58:22.

off checks to their policyholders without properly investigating the

:58:23.:58:29.

cause. And if there is a pattern developing, that should be

:58:30.:58:34.

translated to yourselves and a fatuous are you aware that that work

:58:35.:58:37.

is done and it is just they are withholding it or do they need to be

:58:38.:58:40.

taking additional steps to investigate?

:58:41.:58:43.

I can't comment on the level of investigation insurers go to but I

:58:44.:58:49.

would hope that information is on the register, which is why we have

:58:50.:58:52.

asked for a companiy. Once evaluaited I can probably answer in

:58:53.:58:56.

more detail Are the insurers giving you any reasons why they are not

:58:57.:59:01.

sharing that with you currently? No, our sister organisation in the DVLA

:59:02.:59:06.

have access already, so it is a matter of process. Have you had an

:59:07.:59:11.

indication of when you might get access? I haven't. If you are asking

:59:12.:59:16.

whether there are any roadblocks to it, I don't think there are.

:59:17.:59:20.

Thank you, Chair. A number of different points, if I may,

:59:21.:59:25.

obviously that pick data base will be useful, but, also, the Fire And

:59:26.:59:33.

Rescue Services, I understand that a number of them use a fairly basic

:59:34.:59:38.

system, incident recording system which doesn't have the capacity to

:59:39.:59:43.

ask any additional information. A number use their own in-house

:59:44.:59:50.

systems but a number also use 3 TC software I understand which can get

:59:51.:59:53.

more information on the reason for fires, whether they are arson

:59:54.:59:57.

attacks, whether there is a criminality element or whether it

:59:58.:00:02.

seems to be some problem with the vehicle itself. Have you had any

:00:03.:00:06.

conversations with the Home Office, about Fire And Rescue Services,

:00:07.:00:09.

being able to have a data base they use properly to record this

:00:10.:00:12.

information that gets fed through to yourselves? To my knowledge, swrent

:00:13.:00:15.

had those conversations with the Home Office. I think what this is

:00:16.:00:19.

highlight something that there are a number of databases around and

:00:20.:00:22.

general coordination would be a good thing, in terms of of trying to

:00:23.:00:28.

identify what the true root cause is and also to provide greater

:00:29.:00:31.

information to the public. I should stress my slight worry is we are not

:00:32.:00:36.

getting to the true root cause here. The failure of a resister is the

:00:37.:00:40.

initial cause. If you twrak back, why it failed so why did somebody

:00:41.:00:44.

have to manipulate in the first place? Because the resister was

:00:45.:00:49.

failing, it was failing because the blower motor wasn't blowing enough

:00:50.:00:53.

air and that was you failing because it was corroded and the true cause

:00:54.:00:58.

is water ingross. So you have to work out what to solve in the first

:00:59.:01:03.

place. If you don't actually see the, well, depends which way you

:01:04.:01:06.

look at t the start or end of the process in terms of the fire and

:01:07.:01:11.

work backwards, if you have no way into that problem, then you have no

:01:12.:01:15.

way into that problem? There isin is the problem. Yet there are processes

:01:16.:01:20.

at least in they are I why, already in place that could be brought

:01:21.:01:23.

together and data that could be gathered to ensure that no further

:01:24.:01:26.

families ever have to have the appalling intags with their car and

:01:27.:01:32.

claims around them. The data is either out and not being captured or

:01:33.:01:35.

they are out there and is being captured and nobody is doing

:01:36.:01:39.

anything with it. There is probably something with we

:01:40.:01:45.

can do to coral resources to find out the initial problems with this.

:01:46.:01:49.

Can I may tackle another question. In terms of an owner of whether it

:01:50.:01:56.

is a Zafira, Corsa or I indeed any other model of car subject to

:01:57.:01:59.

recall. If the owner says, it is oar safety recall but I'm not going to

:02:00.:02:04.

bother, there is actually nothing in place s that correct, to require

:02:05.:02:08.

them to do that work, so even if if it is a safety-critical issue, that

:02:09.:02:14.

could either cause loss of life at one end of the scale or snarl up a

:02:15.:02:18.

motorway with a fire that causes the carriageway to be blocked for hours

:02:19.:02:24.

on end. Unpleasant through to life ending, there is nothing actually to

:02:25.:02:27.

stop somebody doing that, is there? There is no process within the MoT

:02:28.:02:31.

system to say fl has been a safety recall on this model of car, have

:02:32.:02:35.

you had it done, no you haven't, you can't are have your MoT? I think you

:02:36.:02:39.

have put your finger on a flaw in the test accept at the moment. It is

:02:40.:02:43.

something we are going to solve in the very near future. By the end of

:02:44.:02:48.

the financial year we'll launch our MoT reminder service. All people who

:02:49.:02:51.

will have cars, will be reminded when this is due. An attach will be

:02:52.:02:56.

a reminder - please talk to your carriage about whether there are

:02:57.:02:58.

outstanding safety recalls on your vehicle, that will hopefully get to

:02:59.:03:03.

those people where maybe we've lost the correct in the system as it

:03:04.:03:06.

where they are located, transfer of ownership, etc, then the second

:03:07.:03:09.

phase in the revamp of the MoT system is a view if you haven't had

:03:10.:03:15.

a safety recall completed on something that's very

:03:16.:03:16.

safety-critical, then you will not be given an MoT. Presumably to

:03:17.:03:21.

actually do, that apart from possible legislative changes that

:03:22.:03:23.

might be required it is simple because you book in through the

:03:24.:03:28.

computerised system, that would be fairly straightforward, to come with

:03:29.:03:31.

and say - these are the recalls that have been associated with this type

:03:32.:03:37.

of car. It would be on different databases but an automatic process

:03:38.:03:41.

that wouldn't allow interinvestigation by an individual.

:03:42.:03:49.

Final oi be that point, if I may, Chair, I guess there is also the

:03:50.:03:55.

issue of where a resister in this case... Can by pass, whatever it may

:03:56.:04:02.

be, pass the DVLA thought about a process, whereby the owner of a

:04:03.:04:05.

vehicle is required to tell the MoT inspector that there has been a

:04:06.:04:11.

repair done on a part of the car, so they may have got it do done, I put

:04:12.:04:16.

my hands up, I don't tend to use dealer networks because they are

:04:17.:04:19.

damn expensive but I like to think the mechanic I go to is a very

:04:20.:04:24.

competent mechanic. So if you have either done the work yourself or

:04:25.:04:30.

gone to a mechanic, should there be requirement on the MoT system to

:04:31.:04:37.

Sehwag there is work done, whatever, part of the MoT system, actually it

:04:38.:04:42.

there should be a requirement to have that piece inspected, even if

:04:43.:04:47.

it isn't parting of the MoT certification prose.s The system we

:04:48.:04:51.

have at the moment is based around the existing MoT process. There is

:04:52.:04:56.

so much potential for it to be used for passing information back out to

:04:57.:05:00.

customers, to keep the vehicle safe and also collect information from

:05:01.:05:04.

the garage network about things they are finding on the cars, which will

:05:05.:05:07.

note unusual situations or emerging recall situations. So the next phase

:05:08.:05:11.

of the MoT development that's what we are trying to do, to provide more

:05:12.:05:15.

information to customers and also be able to gather information on the

:05:16.:05:19.

overall safety of the network. When is the time frame on that work sth

:05:20.:05:26.

when can we expect to have an all-singing all--dancing system?

:05:27.:05:30.

With we have come out of phase B, a couple of years, and we are about to

:05:31.:05:36.

approach phase C but it is a three-year period. So 2020, we might

:05:37.:05:40.

hopefully see If it is pryer advertised last, but hopefully if it

:05:41.:05:44.

is pryer advertised earlier, it'll be there earlier. Thank you.

:05:45.:05:50.

One briefp point following on, before I ask the question I want to

:05:51.:05:56.

ask. At the moment you are the vehicle tax internet system works,

:05:57.:05:59.

such if you don't have an MoT you can't get tax. Does that mean in

:06:00.:06:07.

this context, if you haven't got your vehicle detail sorted out you

:06:08.:06:12.

won't get your tax? There is a data base that wouldling in and it would

:06:13.:06:15.

automatically process that without any intervention from the test T

:06:16.:06:18.

wouldn't be up to the tester to make a decircumstances it could all be

:06:19.:06:21.

automated. It links into the question I want to ask. From

:06:22.:06:24.

listening to the previous panel where they seem to be suggesting

:06:25.:06:32.

answers could perhaps lie with the insurers doing more, and they

:06:33.:06:34.

couldn't see any circumstances where it wouldn't give the manufacturers

:06:35.:06:37.

access to the vehicle, if they asked, it seems to me that there has

:06:38.:06:42.

been a bit of ballparking in here. Do you work on the basis that if

:06:43.:06:47.

there was more regulation involved in this, then there could be some

:06:48.:06:52.

way of, if you like, forcing the insurers to make sure the vehicle is

:06:53.:06:54.

made available for the manufacturers? They are forcing, if

:06:55.:06:59.

you like, the vehicle owner to take action, if they are not in the

:07:00.:07:04.

recall, as we have just discussed. And then, ultimately, putting the

:07:05.:07:08.

matter back to the manufacturers? It just seems at the moment it is a bit

:07:09.:07:14.

lax? It is true to say that our code of practice at the moment lacks a

:07:15.:07:17.

little bit of teeth. The vast majority of manufacturers we deal

:07:18.:07:20.

with in safety recalls and we deal with about 330 a year, the vast

:07:21.:07:25.

majority 69 safety recalls go under the radar and are an imagined well

:07:26.:07:29.

by the manufacturers and work gets done and cars go back on the road

:07:30.:07:32.

safety. There are a few outliars, some of which we are dealing with at

:07:33.:07:36.

the moment but there are plenty of opportunities in there for a level

:07:37.:07:39.

of regulation which encourages manufacturers to do a better job. If

:07:40.:07:43.

you compare us with some of our peers in Europe n Germany, for

:07:44.:07:46.

example, I think it was mentioned earlier, after three letters, the

:07:47.:07:50.

regulator goes in, takes the registration number off the car and

:07:51.:07:57.

you cannot drive T if you look at Netherlands, for administrative

:07:58.:08:02.

failures the fine is 800,000 euros, a potential one-year cessation of

:08:03.:08:05.

trading, or two-years in prison, we don't have any of that. Do you think

:08:06.:08:12.

there is also a role for giving the DVSA more teeth in this area as

:08:13.:08:21.

well? I know Nissan cars have been on the front pages of the paper,

:08:22.:08:27.

splitting in two and Toyota Prius and we've heard about Vauxhall. We

:08:28.:08:32.

seem to be hearing more and it is down to manufacturers which action

:08:33.:08:37.

they want table. I understand it the DVSA there is a requirement for

:08:38.:08:41.

manufacturers to contact you. Should you be in a position to invoke the

:08:42.:08:46.

recall on a reasonable suspension? I think we also welcome a voluntary

:08:47.:08:51.

approach with manufacturers but I think there's some teeth there

:08:52.:08:53.

lacking, some compulsion we may want to look at in the future in temples

:08:54.:08:58.

when we don't get the response or we are not satisfied about being able

:08:59.:09:02.

to take further action and expedite some road safety risk. Has your view

:09:03.:09:06.

changed in light of the incidents I just mentioned? I mean, it feels as

:09:07.:09:11.

if there is a bit of a space right now for somebody to be able to take

:09:12.:09:20.

action, so that the ball can't continuously be passed. If you know

:09:21.:09:25.

the general product safety regulation is around failures in

:09:26.:09:29.

design and construction of a vehicle, we control it is corrosion

:09:30.:09:34.

over peered of time and the chassis status would be picked up in the MoT

:09:35.:09:39.

process. -- over a period of time. There is a question of whether the

:09:40.:09:43.

models have had MoTs but that's the space for that type of an issue.

:09:44.:09:47.

Unless we get evidence that it is a design failure, in which case it

:09:48.:09:50.

comes back into the code of practice, I think in terms of what

:09:51.:09:53.

we can do nerks there are probably three levels. We have learnt a lot

:09:54.:09:58.

from this -- we can do next, there are three levels. We have learned a

:09:59.:10:04.

lot, so the MoT involvement is a good process, we'll proposed to kick

:10:05.:10:07.

that off shortly. Second sand what regulatory powers do we have in the

:10:08.:10:11.

context of the code of practice. At the moment we don't have any. That

:10:12.:10:15.

needs to be improved to be able it chivy along some manufacturers that

:10:16.:10:18.

are not getting to where we need to. Ultimately our goal is making sure

:10:19.:10:21.

there are no unsafe vehicles on the road. The final bit of us corks is

:10:22.:10:25.

whilst we are an enforcement authority in many areas, we are not

:10:26.:10:31.

an enforcement agency as far as general product safety regulations

:10:32.:10:34.

themselves are concerned so that final ability it take an

:10:35.:10:36.

organisation to court is not there at the moment. Thank you, I will

:10:37.:10:40.

stop there. -- to take. So what are the most important

:10:41.:10:44.

powers you would like to have, that you don't have now? If you look at

:10:45.:10:47.

the code of practice at the moment, it is a little bit siement on time

:10:48.:10:52.

scales. If our focus son making sure that the safety remedy is compo

:10:53.:10:55.

indicted as fast as possible so, people are not put at risk, being

:10:56.:10:59.

able to ensure that manufacturers speed up the safety recall process

:11:00.:11:02.

is a clear one, making sure the administration around that is as

:11:03.:11:05.

robust as possible, so it doesn't create problems as we have seen on

:11:06.:11:09.

this particular issue and clearly, if there is a lack of willingness to

:11:10.:11:13.

solve the problem, we need it take it one step further, and as I said

:11:14.:11:18.

-- to take T and our colleagues Netherlands have greater powers than

:11:19.:11:22.

we do. What greater powers do they have that you would like? They can

:11:23.:11:26.

compel a manufacturer to seize trading. There is a two-year prison

:11:27.:11:31.

sentence for some components and for administrative fines, it is up to

:11:32.:11:34.

800,000 euros. They are quite stringent. And in Germany, if

:11:35.:11:37.

removal of the registration plate. If you go down an avenue of trying

:11:38.:11:42.

to correct this and people don't take notice, you remove that road

:11:43.:11:47.

safety risk by stopping the vehicle being licensed and registered. So

:11:48.:11:51.

all those powers, are you seeking? It would make the system more robust

:11:52.:11:57.

but bear nibbed the vast majority of -- but bear in mind the vast

:11:58.:12:00.

majority of safety recall are dealt with. One of the issue, as well s I

:12:01.:12:05.

suspect, almost everybody in this room will have come across really

:12:06.:12:08.

good mechanics and some, perhaps, questionable ones. Would you like

:12:09.:12:13.

any powers at all to be able to, if you are able to identify mechanics

:12:14.:12:17.

who are really, perhaps, should not be touching cars to be anywhere near

:12:18.:12:23.

them, perhaps having power that is would cease somebody from trading in

:12:24.:12:26.

that way? We already have those powers. OK We already remove testers

:12:27.:12:33.

and examiners from garages under the MoT system and we publish that

:12:34.:12:37.

information. That's somebody doing the test but if you have somebody in

:12:38.:12:41.

a lock of-up garage, tucked away in London, fixing cars for a few quid

:12:42.:12:46.

and what they are doing is dangerous, the member of the public

:12:47.:12:50.

who goes to them and hands over the money in good faith thinks they are

:12:51.:12:55.

cheap and maybe won't ask why. ... Often they have things in place,

:12:56.:13:00.

the gas industry is a good example. You have to be registered and have a

:13:01.:13:10.

certain level of education and understanding and pass

:13:11.:13:11.

qualifications to get to that level. There is clearly a road safety risk

:13:12.:13:15.

in a mechanic not doing what he is doing and not repairing the vehicle

:13:16.:13:22.

to a safe standard. At the moment you don't have that power.

:13:23.:13:28.

Would that be useful in the future? That would give the public more

:13:29.:13:35.

confidence that they know the mechanic has achieved a certain

:13:36.:13:42.

level of status. How many vehicle recall saya handling at the moment?

:13:43.:13:50.

333 in the last year involving 1.7 million vehicles. We get on average

:13:51.:13:56.

one or two a day. It is quite a considerable workload. How many

:13:57.:14:01.

involve fires? Over the last ten years I think we have had about 1.1

:14:02.:14:05.

million vehicles recalled because of fire issues more generally, engine

:14:06.:14:10.

fires, electrical fires and other causes. How many of the recalls now

:14:11.:14:21.

are to do with fires? I do not know the exact number. With Vauxhall

:14:22.:14:26.

you're dealing with fires and five models at the moment. Five? Yes.

:14:27.:14:42.

Different cars. -- models. It is unusual for one manufacturer.

:14:43.:14:47.

Multiple recall is on the same model. Last year we had seven

:14:48.:14:58.

recallrecalls. Some unusual characteristics about this

:14:59.:15:01.

particular incident. Would you like to add to that? No. On both of those

:15:02.:15:08.

recalls they have been recalled twice. With different corrective

:15:09.:15:23.

action taken. For four, Chrysler and the third one has disappeared out of

:15:24.:15:28.

my mind, forgive me. When it pops back in... Yes. I am alarmed about

:15:29.:15:40.

the volume of recalls. Each individual recall will be down to a

:15:41.:15:45.

specific component design but is there a wider issue about the

:15:46.:15:50.

quality and design of cars that is leading to this large increase in

:15:51.:15:58.

the volume of recalls? Our manufacturers cutting corners to

:15:59.:16:02.

keep costs down? Is there a wider issue we should be looking at? I

:16:03.:16:08.

cannot give you a definitive answer. The code of practice, there is a big

:16:09.:16:12.

component around early notification and we get a large number of

:16:13.:16:16.

manufacturers who tell us very early about things that are emerging and

:16:17.:16:20.

that they want to get on top of quickly and salt and that is one

:16:21.:16:25.

reason why the vast majority of recall iss -- recalls go under the

:16:26.:16:36.

radar. I would not see it is now so thoroughly always down to worsening

:16:37.:16:41.

standards. Sometimes we are getting more information early on. Land

:16:42.:16:49.

Rover was the other manufacturer. I am quite shocked by some of what you

:16:50.:16:59.

have just said. Thinking of the Zafira models, I understand it was

:17:00.:17:03.

not the manufacturer who informed you, it was customers themselves who

:17:04.:17:08.

informed you. Do you have any power... That does not seem right...

:17:09.:17:12.

Do you have any power to stop manufacturers doing that? Surely

:17:13.:17:17.

they should have to tell you and you should not have to find out from

:17:18.:17:22.

customers? Yes. We are discussing with Vauxhall a number of reports

:17:23.:17:26.

that have come to us on the 13th of January with the ECC Zafira model, a

:17:27.:17:32.

couple of reports from them and a report from the public and we are

:17:33.:17:38.

pressing Vauxhall for more details into the cause of those fires. We

:17:39.:17:42.

press the manufacturers for that information. I rate in saying you

:17:43.:17:46.

found out about this from a member of the public first? Yes. How much

:17:47.:17:53.

time had passed between that report coming from a member of the public

:17:54.:17:57.

to Vauxhall getting in touch with you? Have they told you why they did

:17:58.:18:05.

not contacted? I think it was about four or five days after we sent them

:18:06.:18:08.

the information we had a notification of four fires on

:18:09.:18:17.

Zafiras in 2016. We have had conversations throughout about when

:18:18.:18:20.

they knew certain aspects. We are trying to resolve those. It is about

:18:21.:18:26.

what is early notification in the minds of some manufacturers compared

:18:27.:18:33.

to others. 20% of the information comes from third parties and market

:18:34.:18:37.

intelligence. Ideally the sooner we know them or we can solve. Do you

:18:38.:18:42.

judge they did not come to your early enough? Is your interpretation

:18:43.:18:48.

it was not early enough? Yes. If we find out through a third party it is

:18:49.:18:56.

never early enough. I agree. We continue to press Vauxhall on this

:18:57.:18:59.

and one of the issues emerging is that some of the decision-making in

:19:00.:19:03.

terms of Vauxhall classifying issues as a safety defect comes from

:19:04.:19:07.

Germany and Vauxhall in the UK have said that the decision that sets

:19:08.:19:13.

elsewhere. Is that unusual? Think of other manufacturers around the

:19:14.:19:18.

world. The structure between the UK and Europe is not necessarily in

:19:19.:19:23.

itself unusual. What is of concern potentially is how quickly that

:19:24.:19:26.

information comes from the manufacturer or producer and

:19:27.:19:30.

distributor. It is clear in the code of practice that if you have the

:19:31.:19:34.

parent company you are to tell them of the early notification system in

:19:35.:19:47.

the UK. Very clear. Of course. You may have heard earlier, when I

:19:48.:19:51.

mentioned to the previous witnesses examples of people telling Vauxhall

:19:52.:19:56.

about this, and they were effectively told it was not an issue

:19:57.:20:02.

and to go away, what would you say any case like that? Do you have any

:20:03.:20:06.

power to take that up with Vauxhall and impose anything on them? Every

:20:07.:20:11.

occasion where that is reported we would take that up with the

:20:12.:20:14.

manufacturer. Where that is proven to be the case can you do anything

:20:15.:20:19.

or is there another agency that can do anything? In terms of our ability

:20:20.:20:27.

to take enforcement action we have very limited powers. We can provide

:20:28.:20:31.

information to Trading Standards bodies for them to take action. We

:20:32.:20:37.

pass all this information on with very strict guidance to the

:20:38.:20:39.

manufacturer about what they should do about it. We had a report that a

:20:40.:20:44.

car had been sold at a particular garage after the recall had been

:20:45.:20:50.

launched, with an invoice that said there were no outstanding recalls

:20:51.:20:55.

and that was not true, so our staff visited the garage and pass the

:20:56.:20:58.

information back to Vauxhall to make sure the change was made quickly.

:20:59.:21:05.

What would you say in terms of the way Vauxhall have handled this month

:21:06.:21:09.

from your point of view, what would be the top things you would want

:21:10.:21:13.

them to take away and never do again? Probably the most important

:21:14.:21:20.

is the early notification because we are not going to take regulatory

:21:21.:21:24.

action if an organisation comes to us and says we think we have a

:21:25.:21:28.

safety risk, we are trying to get on top of it as quickly as possible,

:21:29.:21:34.

work with us. Of course. That has not happened here. It does with most

:21:35.:21:39.

manufacturers. The second thing is to be open. As understanding about

:21:40.:21:44.

why something has failed, changes, tell us. Every time we have a fix it

:21:45.:21:50.

appears to be the final fix. If they have said we cannot fix it

:21:51.:21:53.

permanently but we are going to remove some of the risk why we build

:21:54.:21:57.

up a stock of parts to do the whole fix that would have been a different

:21:58.:22:04.

story. There were some other examples mentioned about issues with

:22:05.:22:10.

different manufacturers having different safety problems.

:22:11.:22:16.

Generally, how can the DVS saying help the industry salvage itself

:22:17.:22:24.

from what seems to be crisis after crisis? How can you help save the

:22:25.:22:31.

industry from itself? What is your role in that more widely? Early

:22:32.:22:37.

dialogue is critical, to get that confidence back. You need more

:22:38.:22:42.

teeth. I am not blaming you guys. There are areas where we could put

:22:43.:22:47.

some teeth into this. Important is it you get those extra powers? Why

:22:48.:22:53.

might we are on the code of practice is the code of practice has not

:22:54.:22:57.

changed and we have to review that but we are being more rigorous and

:22:58.:23:02.

how we tackle some of the issues. Some of that has been interpreted by

:23:03.:23:06.

certain parts of industry as changing the code of practice but we

:23:07.:23:10.

are just being more rigorous in how we implement it. Most safety recalls

:23:11.:23:17.

gets dealt with easily. Those powers will be essential to make sure it

:23:18.:23:22.

does not happen again. A minute automatic or you said most

:23:23.:23:32.

manufacturers are cooperative which implied that Vauxhall not just in

:23:33.:23:35.

this case but generally are not. Would that be fair? There is no

:23:36.:23:41.

doubt we have had to chase a lot of information we believe exists to

:23:42.:23:46.

understand how big the risk is. On the Zafiras with the electronic line

:23:47.:23:51.

control, we know there are a number of fires out there and have asked

:23:52.:23:57.

for information about what Vauxhall's understanding as and they

:23:58.:24:00.

are waiting to complete a formal investigation but there is still

:24:01.:24:05.

risk out there so the earlier we have that information the better. We

:24:06.:24:09.

are chasing to understand what the total risk is to work with them to

:24:10.:24:13.

remove that risk. The fact to said there is still risk out their

:24:14.:24:17.

answers the question I put to the previous panel that there are people

:24:18.:24:26.

driving in Zafiras that are at risk. Are you wholly satisfied that the

:24:27.:24:29.

company are cooperating and doing their best to ensure that those

:24:30.:24:36.

vehicles are identified? The fact we are still asking questions says I am

:24:37.:24:41.

not confident. What we have heard over the last year has put us in

:24:42.:24:46.

that space. We are constantly pushing for cancers to our questions

:24:47.:24:49.

to understand how big the remaining risk is. You said that most recalls

:24:50.:25:01.

went below the radar. Nobody noticed they were happening. Is that because

:25:02.:25:04.

there were a small number of vehicles affected or because, as

:25:05.:25:14.

seems to be the case, I have not seen evidence, some manufacturers,

:25:15.:25:17.

perhaps premium manufacturers, offering a free service and they are

:25:18.:25:24.

doing the recall so that nobody, particularly the customer, finds out

:25:25.:25:27.

it has been part of a safety call? Is that what you had in mind or

:25:28.:25:30.

something different? What is going on? I will give you the short

:25:31.:25:38.

answer. The vast majority of safety recalls take place within the

:25:39.:25:42.

warranty period before a car gets to MOT. You take your car to a

:25:43.:25:46.

franchised dealer and the dealer will know from its owner that it has

:25:47.:25:49.

a problem and you will be going with that as part of the normal course

:25:50.:25:53.

and you will not see it because it will be dealt with very quickly. In

:25:54.:25:57.

the case of the Zafira the vast majority of models were outside

:25:58.:26:01.

warranty and outside the period for which you do not need an MOT. The

:26:02.:26:08.

situation is different. So, yes, there are sorts of different ways

:26:09.:26:12.

that manufacturers are getting safety recalls done by the customer

:26:13.:26:28.

may never know. Yes. The previous panel, in answer to a question I

:26:29.:26:32.

posed about whether they contacted other manufacturers, they seemed to

:26:33.:26:37.

tell me that they had. Is there some common issue that manufacturers tend

:26:38.:26:41.

to liaise with you but do not allow other manufacturers that it might be

:26:42.:26:46.

an issue? Is that something you think is acceptable? We would use a

:26:47.:26:55.

system to make sure this gets out to a wider audience across Europe and

:26:56.:26:58.

the bull understand what it is about. And people can take a

:26:59.:27:05.

judgment about its effect. Is it enough? Making sure there is

:27:06.:27:14.

confidence in the system, you would think they would find some way that

:27:15.:27:18.

their senior engineers, there would be somebody to discuss these matters

:27:19.:27:24.

or have an outlook for dialogue. If they're not that culture within the

:27:25.:27:28.

manufacturing industry and therefore they reference you and they have

:27:29.:27:37.

done their job? There seems to be a lot of concern about competitiveness

:27:38.:27:41.

and sharing secrets in that wild and sometimes that gets in the way. That

:27:42.:27:47.

is very difficult for us without understanding the components to

:27:48.:27:51.

contact somebody when you do not know that person exists. You have to

:27:52.:27:56.

go through the manufacturer and speak through whatever channel is

:27:57.:27:59.

possible with whoever is making the components of that is the issue.

:28:00.:28:03.

On the one hand I can see the issue about sharing intellectual property

:28:04.:28:12.

but another way you can looking at it is bearing bad news. When it

:28:13.:28:16.

comes to something as fundamental as safety, I am he a taken aback that

:28:17.:28:21.

the industry is not nor collaborative, and it doesn't give

:28:22.:28:25.

me confidence that they can sort their own issues out if they cannot

:28:26.:28:31.

discuss it, by saying - we found this issue, you might want it check

:28:32.:28:37.

it out. I find it worrying, and I also find it worrying that they

:28:38.:28:42.

didn't do what they said six months ago. Again, they seem it make it up

:28:43.:28:51.

as they go along. We expect to remove the road safety issue risk as

:28:52.:28:55.

soon as possible. We don't want it to continue any longer than

:28:56.:29:01.

necessary. Thank you. Do you share your concern wts D kr. - VCA is that

:29:02.:29:11.

faulty or dangerous dep sign can belinged to vehicle certification?

:29:12.:29:15.

Yes we have a close working relationship with DCA. We're in the

:29:16.:29:25.

process of setting up an area to target the Volkswagen swachlingts we

:29:26.:29:28.

know they value our information and feedback for type testing for

:29:29.:29:30.

vehicles before they come on to the market. Are there any further

:29:31.:29:33.

questions? No. Well, Mr MacDonald, and Mr

:29:34.:29:40.

Sellerings. One brief, point, Chair, thank you.

:29:41.:29:44.

We talk about the powers you guys don't have, rather than the ones you

:29:45.:29:51.

do V I wonder if you can talk to us, just briefly, about resources. There

:29:52.:29:54.

seemed to be some concern, previously when you were at

:29:55.:29:57.

committee about the resources you have, the cash resources and what

:29:58.:30:00.

you can do with that. I wonder if you could give us perhaps an update?

:30:01.:30:06.

So, as you know, DVSA is a trading fund. The vast majority of our

:30:07.:30:10.

income does not come from the Government. This area is funded by

:30:11.:30:14.

what we all the single enforcement budge eted. Probably one of the only

:30:15.:30:18.

areas that the Department for Transport actually funds in this

:30:19.:30:20.

space. We are about to publish our five-year strategy. Part of that

:30:21.:30:24.

strategy is to become self-financing, so we are talking to

:30:25.:30:26.

the department at the moment about how we do that and, therefore, what

:30:27.:30:31.

changes may need to be made to penalties, fees and charges, etc to

:30:32.:30:35.

enable us to do that. Because, I come from a world where the polluter

:30:36.:30:40.

pays in the environmental space. I think it is just as relevant here.

:30:41.:30:43.

We are trying to work through that with the department at the moment. I

:30:44.:30:47.

haven't got any over worries about financial resources at the moment.

:30:48.:30:50.

The people resources are always a challenge. I'm immensely proud of

:30:51.:30:56.

the people that work for DVSA. They do difficult jobs in difficult

:30:57.:30:59.

circumstances. How many people would be working on the recalls? It is

:31:00.:31:04.

administered by a team of seven but they sit within our enforcement arm

:31:05.:31:07.

which has 1,000 people. We have taken the enforcement arm out of the

:31:08.:31:13.

corps operations. Ho -- it reports to me. The organisation has changed

:31:14.:31:18.

and it can get more resources if required and more opportunity to

:31:19.:31:22.

expand that if necessary Seven seems a tiny amount of the recalls you

:31:23.:31:27.

mentioned earlier. We're evaluating that in terms of what more resource

:31:28.:31:31.

we may need to ensure we can drive compliance in the way we want to and

:31:32.:31:36.

to ensure, as we look to deal with some of the issues emerging from

:31:37.:31:40.

this particular issue with vauks Whitehall, that we have adequate

:31:41.:31:44.

resource. -- with Vauxhall. Some MPs have more than seven MPs of staff.

:31:45.:31:52.

Well I don't know who they are. Not me. Well, can I talk about the last

:31:53.:32:01.

answer, I welcome the polluter pays-type approach and particularly

:32:02.:32:06.

when it comes to heavy goods vehicles, for example, where the

:32:07.:32:10.

wholly inadequate fining system for somebody that has poor brakes that

:32:11.:32:13.

don't work on a trailer and only gets ?100 fine is appalling. So good

:32:14.:32:18.

luck with that one and it'll be nice to see the draft, perhaps of your

:32:19.:32:22.

document at some stage but my question actually is the types of

:32:23.:32:26.

vehicles are now changing. We are looking more and more of electric

:32:27.:32:32.

vehicles and I'm already hearing of recovery operators going to repair a

:32:33.:32:38.

vehicle, going to load a voke and being faced with a potential 50,000

:32:39.:32:42.

volt shock from an electric vehicle. What work is being done looking at

:32:43.:32:46.

that both for now and for the future in terms of the unique aspects of

:32:47.:32:51.

risk around electric vehicles and how that is likely to shape up in

:32:52.:32:55.

the future? Well we have a variety of people across the Department for

:32:56.:32:57.

Transport and with colleagues, people like in the VCA to try to

:32:58.:33:01.

understand this. Every vehicle that comes on to the road, three years

:33:02.:33:05.

later has to be MoT tested, so we have to be ahead of that. We are

:33:06.:33:09.

zoontly looking ahead. We have only been looking last week at autonomous

:33:10.:33:12.

vehicles. Things are going to change at some point remove the driver, so

:33:13.:33:17.

how does that work and how will that interact in our whole world? We are

:33:18.:33:20.

constantly reviewing that and looking at that. We have to plan

:33:21.:33:24.

ahead because we have a network of testing station that is will have to

:33:25.:33:29.

test the vehicles at some point so they'll need to integrate that into

:33:30.:33:35.

the test. So early work and progress?

:33:36.:33:39.

Perhaps a topic for another inquiry. Thank you very much. Order, order.

:33:40.:33:52.

I six Prime Ministers, six very different styles of leadership but

:33:53.:33:59.

what did those leadership styles say about how they ran their party or

:34:00.:34:08.

their Governments? Join me, for Six Unscripted, straight to camera talks

:34:09.:34:11.

on how these very different leaders interpreted their role as Prime

:34:12.:34:15.

Minister. That's Leadership Reflections, this Sunday to Friday,

:34:16.:34:18.

8.00pm on BBC Parliament.

:34:19.:34:24.

Recorded coverage of the Transport Committee's session on Vauxhall vehicle fires, with evidence from GM Quality Europe and the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, from Monday 6 February.