Aberfan: The Fight for Justice

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0:00:02 > 0:00:04This is BBC One. We are now returning to the newsroom.

0:00:04 > 0:00:07Disaster struck suddenly this morning

0:00:07 > 0:00:09at the small Welsh coal-mining village of Aberfan

0:00:09 > 0:00:11near Merthyr Tydfil.

0:00:12 > 0:00:17On the morning of the 21st October, 1966, in the village of Aberfan

0:00:17 > 0:00:22in South Wales, 116 children and 28 adults lost their lives.

0:00:24 > 0:00:26At 20 minutes past nine this morning,

0:00:26 > 0:00:31a huge coal tip bearing some 40-odd thousand tonnes of coal moved.

0:00:31 > 0:00:33Thousands upon thousands of tonnes of piled up coal waste,

0:00:33 > 0:00:36soaked by rain, suddenly slumped down in an oozing mass

0:00:36 > 0:00:39on the Pantglas Junior School and a row of nearby houses.

0:00:39 > 0:00:41Several classrooms were completely buried

0:00:41 > 0:00:44under a mound of rubble 50-60 feet high.

0:00:45 > 0:00:50The mix of rage and grief brought demands for urgent answers.

0:00:50 > 0:00:51How did it happen?

0:00:51 > 0:00:53And who was to blame?

0:00:56 > 0:00:57Within a few weeks,

0:00:57 > 0:01:00as people struggled to take in the enormity of what had happened,

0:01:00 > 0:01:04an official inquiry was established and started to take evidence.

0:01:06 > 0:01:08But would the truth emerge?

0:01:08 > 0:01:12Would the families of Aberfan get the answers they sought?

0:01:12 > 0:01:15Would this shattered community get the justice it deserved?

0:01:16 > 0:01:20The justice we did not have,

0:01:20 > 0:01:23and, for everything that came to us after that was good,

0:01:23 > 0:01:26we had to fight for.

0:01:26 > 0:01:28What would a child make of it?

0:01:29 > 0:01:33What happened here at Aberfan was one of the biggest disasters

0:01:33 > 0:01:37in the modern history of Wales and, indeed, the United Kingdom.

0:01:37 > 0:01:41For 76 days, the tribunal questioned and challenged

0:01:41 > 0:01:46and investigated and, within months, had presented its conclusions.

0:01:46 > 0:01:51It was just the start of a long, angry, bitter campaign,

0:01:51 > 0:01:52a fight for justice.

0:02:02 > 0:02:05Aberfan, a small village in the valleys of South Wales,

0:02:05 > 0:02:07is surrounded by green hills today,

0:02:07 > 0:02:10as it was in the days before coal-mining came

0:02:10 > 0:02:13and changed everything in the 19th century.

0:02:13 > 0:02:1650 years ago, the landscape was very different.

0:02:16 > 0:02:19There were dark mountains of coal waste,

0:02:19 > 0:02:23in seven enormous tips that towered over the village.

0:02:23 > 0:02:28On 21st of October, 1966, the history of Aberfan changed forever

0:02:28 > 0:02:30when one of those tips came crashing down.

0:02:32 > 0:02:36In five decades of remembrance, the focus, quite rightly,

0:02:36 > 0:02:39has been on the immense loss that was suffered on that day,

0:02:39 > 0:02:42and the lasting pain that it caused.

0:02:42 > 0:02:46But 50 years on, the people of Aberfan are surely entitled

0:02:46 > 0:02:50to revisit some of the toughest questions of all.

0:02:50 > 0:02:53Could this disaster have been prevented?

0:02:53 > 0:02:55Who was principally to blame?

0:02:55 > 0:02:59And why did it take so long to get at the truth,

0:02:59 > 0:03:01and to get a sense of justice?

0:03:04 > 0:03:07The disaster brought an army of rescuers and reporters

0:03:07 > 0:03:10to the village, but one man was notably absent.

0:03:10 > 0:03:13Lord Robens, Alf Robens,

0:03:13 > 0:03:16the chairman of the National Coal Board, the NCB.

0:03:16 > 0:03:20That was the state-owned body which ran the coal industry.

0:03:20 > 0:03:22He was nowhere to be seen.

0:03:24 > 0:03:26Within minutes of the disaster,

0:03:26 > 0:03:30there were hundreds of local miners and workers on the scene.

0:03:30 > 0:03:32The tips above Aberfan contained waste

0:03:32 > 0:03:34from the local colliery Merthyr Vale,

0:03:34 > 0:03:37one of over 1,000 mines taken into public ownership

0:03:37 > 0:03:41when the National Coal Board had been created in 1947.

0:03:43 > 0:03:47The NCB's boss, Lord Robens, was due to be installed

0:03:47 > 0:03:51as Chancellor of the University of Surrey on the day of the disaster.

0:03:51 > 0:03:54And he would not be diverted from travelling to Guildford

0:03:54 > 0:03:57to perform his duties in cap and gown.

0:03:57 > 0:03:59I am not an engineer.

0:03:59 > 0:04:02I am not a person who could take charge of rescue operations,

0:04:02 > 0:04:06so I dispatched the best man in my industry,

0:04:06 > 0:04:08that is the chief mining engineer,

0:04:08 > 0:04:12to ensure that everything possible is done in a physical way

0:04:12 > 0:04:14to rescue people.

0:04:14 > 0:04:18In fact, it would take Lord Robens the best part of two days

0:04:18 > 0:04:22to make the journey to Aberfan to see the chaos with his own eyes.

0:04:22 > 0:04:27When he arrived in Aberfan, and the rescue operation was turning into

0:04:27 > 0:04:31an operation to recover bodies, Lord Robens was busy giving interviews

0:04:31 > 0:04:35to the press and media, and he was asked a very direct question.

0:04:35 > 0:04:39Was it possible to know that the tip had been dangerous

0:04:39 > 0:04:41before the disaster? His answer was very clear.

0:04:41 > 0:04:43He said it was impossible to know

0:04:43 > 0:04:46that there was a spring in the heart of this tip,

0:04:46 > 0:04:50"turning the mountain to slush" - his words.

0:04:50 > 0:04:53And that was the broad answer that he gave to lots of journalists.

0:04:53 > 0:04:57What has happened here is that there has been an underground spring,

0:04:57 > 0:05:00which has now been uncovered.

0:05:00 > 0:05:05We have our normal procedures for ensuring that pits are safe,

0:05:05 > 0:05:08but I'm bound to say that we have no procedure that tells us

0:05:08 > 0:05:10that there is a spring deep down under a mountain,

0:05:10 > 0:05:14because that spring must've been covered up 30, 40, or 50 years ago

0:05:14 > 0:05:16when the first debris was put upon it.

0:05:17 > 0:05:20That claim, that no-one knew about the springs on the mountain,

0:05:20 > 0:05:24was met with utter disbelief among many local people.

0:05:24 > 0:05:26Mr Owens, yesterday, it was announced that these springs

0:05:26 > 0:05:29- had just been discovered. Is this news to you?- No.

0:05:29 > 0:05:31No, there have always been springs.

0:05:31 > 0:05:36I've jumped over them all my life up... Well, I'm 56 years old now.

0:05:43 > 0:05:46There were lots of claims that the disaster at Aberfan

0:05:46 > 0:05:49was unforeseeable - there had been no warning signs.

0:05:49 > 0:05:52Well, let's be polite and say that that wasn't true.

0:05:52 > 0:05:54Let's take one example, one of several.

0:05:54 > 0:05:59In January of 1965, two mothers of children at Pantglas School

0:05:59 > 0:06:02presented a petition to the headmistress. Why?

0:06:02 > 0:06:04Well, they were fed up with the flooding.

0:06:04 > 0:06:08This area that we see today was flooded frequently.

0:06:08 > 0:06:11They'd bring the children down this road, across the way,

0:06:11 > 0:06:13and up to the school,

0:06:13 > 0:06:16which was just beyond where the community centre is today.

0:06:16 > 0:06:20The drains were frequently blocked by the slurry that kept coming

0:06:20 > 0:06:23down the mountainside from that Number 7 Tip.

0:06:23 > 0:06:25Those mothers knew there was a problem.

0:06:25 > 0:06:28It wasn't just inconvenient, it was dangerous.

0:06:28 > 0:06:31Tragically, no-one listened to them.

0:06:34 > 0:06:38Quite a lot of people were complaining to the headmistress

0:06:38 > 0:06:40and there was one lady in Aberfan Road,

0:06:40 > 0:06:43who was a teacher for years, and she was always telling

0:06:43 > 0:06:48the council that something was going to happen one day, but...

0:06:48 > 0:06:50her warnings were ignored.

0:06:50 > 0:06:54What we were concerned with was the water coming down from the tip

0:06:54 > 0:06:56that was flooding the main road.

0:06:56 > 0:07:00It was that which prompted us to protest about it.

0:07:02 > 0:07:04So what happened to that petition?

0:07:04 > 0:07:06Well, within days, it was presented by the headmistress

0:07:06 > 0:07:09to the local authority, and then nothing happened.

0:07:09 > 0:07:13Both mothers would go on to lose a child in the disaster.

0:07:13 > 0:07:16The headmistress lost her life in the disaster.

0:07:16 > 0:07:19And, in many ways, the image of the three women

0:07:19 > 0:07:23is a powerful symbol of the missed opportunities at Aberfan.

0:07:25 > 0:07:26There was another.

0:07:26 > 0:07:31In January of 1964, local councillor Gwyneth Williams had warned

0:07:31 > 0:07:34that, if the tip moved, the entire school would be threatened.

0:07:34 > 0:07:36Another warning ignored.

0:07:41 > 0:07:46She brought it up at every meeting she went to, as any other business.

0:07:48 > 0:07:50But she would bring it up.

0:07:50 > 0:07:54And there was very little notice taken of it,

0:07:54 > 0:07:56of her complaint.

0:07:59 > 0:08:00A few days after the disaster,

0:08:00 > 0:08:04there was growing public unease about these disregarded warnings.

0:08:04 > 0:08:08But the government of the day did take some prompt action.

0:08:08 > 0:08:12The weekend after the disaster, the Labour government

0:08:12 > 0:08:15under Harold Wilson announced an official inquiry.

0:08:15 > 0:08:16Now, the choice of chairman

0:08:16 > 0:08:19would be crucial to the credibility of the inquiry.

0:08:19 > 0:08:22There were people here already wondering

0:08:22 > 0:08:24whether the full truth would come out.

0:08:24 > 0:08:27The choice of chairman was a very interesting one.

0:08:27 > 0:08:29A senior judge, a Welsh man,

0:08:29 > 0:08:32and someone who knew this area very well.

0:08:33 > 0:08:36Well, I should hate to think that anybody would connect me

0:08:36 > 0:08:39with any whitewashing exercise.

0:08:39 > 0:08:44I should decline to have anything to do with an inquiry

0:08:44 > 0:08:48which was motivated by considerations of whitewashing.

0:08:49 > 0:08:52You have to visit this school in Mountain Ash,

0:08:52 > 0:08:55which is just across the mountain from Aberfan,

0:08:55 > 0:08:59to get a real sense of the presence and the strength of character

0:08:59 > 0:09:02of this man - Edmund Davies.

0:09:02 > 0:09:04This is the bronze bust that he unveiled

0:09:04 > 0:09:06while he was working on the inquiry.

0:09:06 > 0:09:10Yes, he was one of the most famous judges of the time.

0:09:10 > 0:09:14He handed down those tough sentences to the Great Train Robbers.

0:09:14 > 0:09:17But he was also a son of the valleys.

0:09:17 > 0:09:20He knew these mining communities intimately.

0:09:20 > 0:09:21And, for all of those reasons,

0:09:21 > 0:09:24he was the perfect choice to chair the tribunal.

0:09:26 > 0:09:30Edmund Davies was only too aware of the intense emotions at Aberfan.

0:09:30 > 0:09:34There had been an eruption of anger at the Coroner's Court

0:09:34 > 0:09:37before the inquiry had started, with shouts of "murderers",

0:09:37 > 0:09:40and a demand from one father that the words,

0:09:40 > 0:09:43"Buried alive by the National Coal Board"

0:09:43 > 0:09:46be written on his child's death certificate.

0:09:46 > 0:09:47All the parents were traumatised,

0:09:47 > 0:09:51but at least we knew something was going on to find out

0:09:51 > 0:09:55what caused the disaster, and that's all we were concerned about -

0:09:55 > 0:09:58that they would find out the cause.

0:09:59 > 0:10:02The families were concerned that it was going to be

0:10:02 > 0:10:03a fight to get the whole truth.

0:10:03 > 0:10:06A fight against the National Coal Board,

0:10:06 > 0:10:08one of the biggest employers in South Wales,

0:10:08 > 0:10:11which also did business with many Welsh lawyers.

0:10:11 > 0:10:14So the families of Aberfan looked beyond Wales

0:10:14 > 0:10:18for a barrister with no links to the National Coal Board.

0:10:18 > 0:10:22Desmond Ackner, at that time, was one of the leading,

0:10:22 > 0:10:25if not THE leading, common law silk in the country,

0:10:25 > 0:10:27and he had a particular reputation

0:10:27 > 0:10:32as an extremely able and fearless cross-examiner.

0:10:32 > 0:10:38Ackner has said that he regarded his whole task as an attempt

0:10:38 > 0:10:40to push the blame up,

0:10:40 > 0:10:44while the National Coal Board was attempting to push it down.

0:10:44 > 0:10:45He was quite clear that

0:10:45 > 0:10:49the strategy of the Coal Board was to blame - the guys who were

0:10:49 > 0:10:52actually tipping the slurry on top of Tip Number 7.

0:10:52 > 0:10:55Ackner wanted to do, of course, the exact reverse,

0:10:55 > 0:11:01and to ensure that blame lay no lower than the middle management,

0:11:01 > 0:11:05and, ideally, that it should be pushed up as high as possible.

0:11:05 > 0:11:09The tribunal employed Tasker Watkins QC to be its counsel.

0:11:09 > 0:11:12He would be the one calling and questioning witnesses.

0:11:12 > 0:11:16The inquiry's task was daunting in scale, and fraught with difficulty.

0:11:16 > 0:11:19The main suspect was the Coal Board.

0:11:19 > 0:11:22Many of those giving evidence were tip and colliery workers

0:11:22 > 0:11:24who lived locally.

0:11:25 > 0:11:28The inquiry took evidence, not in Aberfan,

0:11:28 > 0:11:30but here in Merthyr Tydfil, at the technical college.

0:11:30 > 0:11:33The building's changed a bit today.

0:11:33 > 0:11:36And it was a remarkable achievement, because the inquiry got underway

0:11:36 > 0:11:39just over a month after the disaster happened.

0:11:39 > 0:11:44And, in those early stages, the media scrutiny was intense,

0:11:44 > 0:11:47and no wonder, because the name of Aberfan

0:11:47 > 0:11:50was resonating throughout the world.

0:11:50 > 0:11:53There were four points which the inquiry would be looking into.

0:11:53 > 0:11:56First of all, what happened at Aberfan?

0:11:56 > 0:11:59Why did it happen? Need it have happened?

0:11:59 > 0:12:00Was it a calamity

0:12:00 > 0:12:03which no reasonable foresight could have presented,

0:12:03 > 0:12:05or was it caused by blameworthy conduct

0:12:05 > 0:12:08on the part of some person or organisation?

0:12:08 > 0:12:13Over five months, the tribunal would hear 2½ million words of evidence.

0:12:13 > 0:12:17There were no cameras allowed inside to record what went on,

0:12:17 > 0:12:19so, for the first time in half a century,

0:12:19 > 0:12:22the words of key witnesses have been brought to life.

0:12:23 > 0:12:25On the opening day,

0:12:25 > 0:12:28the tribunal heard a terrible catalogue of failure.

0:12:28 > 0:12:31The natural springs on the mountain were to be seen clearly on maps,

0:12:31 > 0:12:35and the many disregarded warnings were listed.

0:12:35 > 0:12:39It seemed to be an open-and-shut case.

0:12:39 > 0:12:43But when the counsel for the Coal Board got to his feet, Philip Wien,

0:12:43 > 0:12:47it soon became apparent that this wasn't going to be straightforward.

0:12:47 > 0:12:48May it please Your Lordship,

0:12:48 > 0:12:51the National Coal Board is gravely anxious,

0:12:51 > 0:12:53and certainly as anxious as anyone,

0:12:53 > 0:12:56to establish beyond question the cause of the disaster,

0:12:56 > 0:12:59and to learn the lessons that can be learned

0:12:59 > 0:13:01from what happened at Aberfan.

0:13:02 > 0:13:05The board's view is that the disaster was due

0:13:05 > 0:13:08to a coincidence of a set of geological factors,

0:13:08 > 0:13:12each of which in itself is not exceptional, but which

0:13:12 > 0:13:16collectively created a particular critical geological environment.

0:13:16 > 0:13:21The prime cause of the disaster is therefore geological.

0:13:24 > 0:13:27At the very beginning, the Coal Board's case repeated the claim made

0:13:27 > 0:13:31by Lord Robens, that the disaster could not have been foreseen.

0:13:31 > 0:13:33But their case then changed.

0:13:33 > 0:13:35Their new argument was that

0:13:35 > 0:13:37the special geology of Aberfan had been to blame.

0:13:37 > 0:13:41There was a growing unease that the National Coal Board

0:13:41 > 0:13:43was doing its best to hide the truth.

0:13:43 > 0:13:47The early days of the inquiry were taken up hearing evidence

0:13:47 > 0:13:50from eyewitnesses, describing what had happened on the day itself.

0:13:50 > 0:13:54But then they moved on to question some of those who had been working

0:13:54 > 0:13:57on Tip Number 7 in the years before the disaster.

0:13:57 > 0:14:02And the most senior of them was the charge hand, Leslie Davies,

0:14:02 > 0:14:06and he was questioned by the counsel to the inquiry, Tasker Watkins,

0:14:06 > 0:14:11who wanted to know how much of a focus there'd been on tip safety.

0:14:11 > 0:14:15Has anybody in the last nine years, Mr Davies,

0:14:15 > 0:14:18ever asked you for your views about the safety of Tip Number 7?

0:14:18 > 0:14:19Nobody, sir.

0:14:20 > 0:14:23Has anybody ever asked you to make a report

0:14:23 > 0:14:24on the safety of Tip Number 7?

0:14:24 > 0:14:26No, sir.

0:14:26 > 0:14:31Can you remember if the tip went over streams or springs?

0:14:31 > 0:14:32Yes, sir.

0:14:32 > 0:14:35Did you actually notice a spring a spring upon the land over

0:14:35 > 0:14:39- which the tip spread?- Yes, sir.- Was that where the children had a pond?

0:14:39 > 0:14:41Yes, sir. They had a pond there.

0:14:41 > 0:14:46And did small children bathe and paddle in the pond?

0:14:46 > 0:14:48Yes, sir.

0:14:48 > 0:14:52Had anybody ever warned you that it was dangerous to tip over a spring?

0:14:52 > 0:14:56Nobody ever warned me, sir. My own experience, I knew

0:14:56 > 0:15:00it was dangerous to tip over any water. That's common sense, sir.

0:15:00 > 0:15:04Then I must ask you why you went on tipping over streams and a spring?

0:15:04 > 0:15:08That had nothing at all to do with me, sir. I just take orders.

0:15:08 > 0:15:11I'm just a working charge hand, I'm not an official at the colliery.

0:15:14 > 0:15:19On Merthyr mountain today, there is very little evidence

0:15:19 > 0:15:23of what was here 50 years ago, apart from this kind of landscaping

0:15:23 > 0:15:26that took place when they cleared the tips.

0:15:26 > 0:15:29Half a century ago, it was dangerous to be up here.

0:15:29 > 0:15:32Indeed, three years before the disaster of '66,

0:15:32 > 0:15:35there was another slide above Aberfan.

0:15:35 > 0:15:37It didn't quite reach the village,

0:15:37 > 0:15:40but Desmond Ackner wanted to know what action had been taken them.

0:15:40 > 0:15:46Despite the slip in 1963, there have been no changes in the instructions

0:15:46 > 0:15:49- which you were expected to carry out?- No, sir.

0:15:49 > 0:15:53Did anyone ever tell you you should stop tipping at Tip Number 7

0:15:53 > 0:15:55after the 1963 slide?

0:15:55 > 0:16:00- No, sir.- You continued to carry out your daily work of superintending

0:16:00 > 0:16:04- and assisting with the tipping at the top of tip seven?- Yes, sir.

0:16:04 > 0:16:08Filling up the hole which had emptied itself out into the valley?

0:16:08 > 0:16:13- Yes, sir.- Tipping on the same face as had itself failed?

0:16:14 > 0:16:16Yes, sir.

0:16:17 > 0:16:19In his second day of evidence,

0:16:19 > 0:16:22a National Coal Board charge hand, Leslie Davies,

0:16:22 > 0:16:26said that he and other workmen covered up, with Tip Number 7,

0:16:26 > 0:16:28streams and a mountain spring.

0:16:28 > 0:16:30In the three months before the disaster,

0:16:30 > 0:16:34Tip Number 7 had sunk more than at any time in his experience.

0:16:34 > 0:16:36The on-the-ground people thought,

0:16:36 > 0:16:38"Oh, well, it's dropped a bit.

0:16:38 > 0:16:41"That means there's more space at the top to continue

0:16:41 > 0:16:45"to tip colliery rubbish, and so it's a blessing in disguise."

0:16:45 > 0:16:49They completely failed to see the correct signs, and then,

0:16:49 > 0:16:52as part of the Coal Board cover-up at the tribunal, um,

0:16:52 > 0:16:57witnesses spent time denying that the 1963 slide had even happened.

0:16:57 > 0:17:01Two days later, and after some more devastating evidence

0:17:01 > 0:17:04from members of the tip gang about the existence of a stream

0:17:04 > 0:17:09or spring on the mountain, the chairman, Edmund Davies, intervened.

0:17:11 > 0:17:13With such overwhelming evidence that the existence of water

0:17:13 > 0:17:16was common knowledge among the mining community,

0:17:16 > 0:17:19Philip Wien was asked a direct question.

0:17:19 > 0:17:24I'm going to get this quite clear before this tribunal continues.

0:17:24 > 0:17:29Is it, or is it not accepted by the National Coal Board,

0:17:29 > 0:17:32that the land upon which material was tipped in the course of

0:17:32 > 0:17:37forming Tip Number 7 was land which, to the eye of the beholder,

0:17:37 > 0:17:41contained active watercourses, or an active watercourse?

0:17:41 > 0:17:44May I say that it is not my position

0:17:44 > 0:17:48for the Coal Board to concede anything before a tribunal which is

0:17:48 > 0:17:52enquiring into these matters. We seek to elicit the truth.

0:17:52 > 0:17:55And this tribunal, as I understand it,

0:17:55 > 0:17:59does not approach matters on the basis of concessions by anybody.

0:17:59 > 0:18:01There are no admissions that can be made,

0:18:01 > 0:18:03and no concessions can be made.

0:18:07 > 0:18:11The Coal Board's clear statement that they were not going to admit

0:18:11 > 0:18:13any kind of responsibility for the disaster

0:18:13 > 0:18:15infuriated many of the families.

0:18:16 > 0:18:18We will adjourn now.

0:18:20 > 0:18:23The Christmas break brought one chapter to an end

0:18:23 > 0:18:26and, in the New Year, the Coal Board's middle and senior management

0:18:26 > 0:18:30would be cross examined, but in that winter of 1966,

0:18:30 > 0:18:34the board managed to create MORE tension with the local community.

0:18:35 > 0:18:39So what happened to all those people who'd lost their homes?

0:18:39 > 0:18:44Well, some of them were settled in this field just below me here.

0:18:44 > 0:18:49The National Coal Board installed 37 caravans down there. And guess what?

0:18:49 > 0:18:53Within weeks, they'd presented the local authority with

0:18:53 > 0:18:56a bill for the rental of those caravans.

0:18:56 > 0:19:00And on top of that, they insisted that the caravans be insured

0:19:00 > 0:19:03and that they be returned in the original condition.

0:19:03 > 0:19:07In other words, another financial burden for the local authority,

0:19:07 > 0:19:09which was already overstretched.

0:19:09 > 0:19:13One local councillor said it proved that the NCB was

0:19:13 > 0:19:16a hard and heartless organisation.

0:19:16 > 0:19:18The decision was eventually overturned,

0:19:18 > 0:19:21but once again, people were questioning

0:19:21 > 0:19:24whether the Coal Board was behaving in an honourable way.

0:19:27 > 0:19:29Mrs Davies, what's your first reaction

0:19:29 > 0:19:31on moving into the caravans here?

0:19:31 > 0:19:35It's wet, you know, the rain must be coming in and, er...

0:19:35 > 0:19:39we're just finding nothing, nothing to, er, to use.

0:19:46 > 0:19:50After the Christmas break, the tribunal reconvened and started

0:19:50 > 0:19:54to take evidence from more senior workers at the National Coal Board,

0:19:54 > 0:19:56not just the men working on the tips.

0:19:56 > 0:20:00And the first of those was Vivian Thomas.

0:20:00 > 0:20:03He was the mechanical engineer at Merthyr Vale colliery.

0:20:03 > 0:20:05He was responsible for the coal tips

0:20:05 > 0:20:07and, questioned by the Coal Board Council,

0:20:07 > 0:20:11would he maintain the NCB claim that no water was visible

0:20:11 > 0:20:14when the location for Tip Number 7 was chosen?

0:20:14 > 0:20:18At that time, what was the water that you were aware of?

0:20:18 > 0:20:21As far as I can recollect, sir, there was water coming out of

0:20:21 > 0:20:26the end of Tip 2 and water coming out of the slide of Tip 4,

0:20:26 > 0:20:30just lower down, where we were going to tip, opposite Number 2.

0:20:30 > 0:20:31Was that water, at the time,

0:20:31 > 0:20:35in the way of anything that was proposed to tip on Tip 7?

0:20:35 > 0:20:40- No, sir.- How can you answer that question? How can you say that?

0:20:40 > 0:20:43Earlier, you told us there had been no decision

0:20:43 > 0:20:48as to how far the tipping of Tip Number 7 was to go.

0:20:48 > 0:20:51Well, as far as I was concerned, Tip 7 could go to the boundary.

0:20:51 > 0:20:54- COULD go to the boundary?- Yes, sir.

0:20:54 > 0:20:57Yes, and suppose it went to the boundary, are you saying that

0:20:57 > 0:21:01- it would go over none of the water of which you are speaking?- No.

0:21:01 > 0:21:03I don't think so, sir.

0:21:06 > 0:21:09Thomas's evidence was vital to the NCB's claim

0:21:09 > 0:21:13that the disaster had been unforeseeable.

0:21:13 > 0:21:16But it contradicted earlier evidence about the presence of water

0:21:16 > 0:21:18where Tip Number 7 was created.

0:21:18 > 0:21:22Deciding the truth of this matter was one of the biggest challenges

0:21:22 > 0:21:25for the tribunal, and Thomas faced days of questioning.

0:21:26 > 0:21:29The office occupied by Vivian Thomas was based here.

0:21:29 > 0:21:33This is the site of the old Merthyr Vale colliery.

0:21:33 > 0:21:35We're at the bottom end of the Taff Valley.

0:21:35 > 0:21:37Now, there was a tram system,

0:21:37 > 0:21:39which took the coal waste away from the colliery,

0:21:39 > 0:21:43over the river and then high onto the mountainsides opposite,

0:21:43 > 0:21:46and the tips would then tower over the valley.

0:21:46 > 0:21:49In many ways, the tips themselves seemed rather distant

0:21:49 > 0:21:52from the day-to-day life of the colliery itself.

0:21:54 > 0:21:58Vivian Thomas had little knowledge of the workings of the tips,

0:21:58 > 0:22:02and it would seem he had very little contact or guidance from local

0:22:02 > 0:22:04and National Coal Board managers.

0:22:04 > 0:22:06Did anyone have a discussion with you

0:22:06 > 0:22:09about your responsibility for these tips?

0:22:09 > 0:22:12Not as far as the tips, sir, but as far as the mechanical side,

0:22:12 > 0:22:16- it was my responsibility. - Yes, but did anyone come -

0:22:16 > 0:22:20The manager? The group mechanical engineer? -

0:22:20 > 0:22:22come to you and explain your duties

0:22:22 > 0:22:27- in relation to the responsibilities for the tips?- No, sir.

0:22:27 > 0:22:29Were you provided, in that office,

0:22:29 > 0:22:33- with any ordnance survey map of the mountain?- No, sir.

0:22:33 > 0:22:36Until this inquiry began, had you ever studied

0:22:36 > 0:22:39- an ordnance survey map of the mountain?- No, sir.

0:22:39 > 0:22:43Do you think it would have been any good had you had one?

0:22:43 > 0:22:46I think I can read an ordnance survey map.

0:22:46 > 0:22:50- It tell things to you, does it?- Yes, sir.

0:22:50 > 0:22:53So that, if you HAD been provided with one, for instance, you could've

0:22:53 > 0:22:58identified from that the situation of streams upon the mountain?

0:22:58 > 0:23:00Yes, sir.

0:23:01 > 0:23:03The evidence was conclusive -

0:23:03 > 0:23:07Vivian Thomas had received no guidance from senior management

0:23:07 > 0:23:11and the warnings from previous tip slides had been ignored.

0:23:11 > 0:23:14One event in 1939, only a few miles from Aberfan,

0:23:14 > 0:23:18proved that these slides were not isolated incidents.

0:23:20 > 0:23:22At one time, these valleys of South Wales

0:23:22 > 0:23:25were dotted with towering coal tips.

0:23:25 > 0:23:28And the one behind me, on the outskirts of Cilfynydd,

0:23:28 > 0:23:33in December, '39, slid 400 metres into the valley below.

0:23:33 > 0:23:36It caused huge damage. It's still difficult to believe

0:23:36 > 0:23:38that no-one was killed or injured when it happened.

0:23:38 > 0:23:43180,000 tonnes of waste thundering down into the valley below.

0:23:43 > 0:23:47It even changed the course of the River Taff.

0:23:47 > 0:23:49Damage on a huge scale!

0:23:49 > 0:23:51And the mine owners,

0:23:51 > 0:23:54because the mines were privately owned then, were terrified.

0:23:54 > 0:23:58So they issued new guidelines for tipping safely.

0:23:58 > 0:24:01And they included those guidelines in a memo.

0:24:01 > 0:24:04And that memo was called the Powell Memo.

0:24:04 > 0:24:07And, when the National Coal Board came into existence in 1947,

0:24:07 > 0:24:09that memo was passed on to them.

0:24:09 > 0:24:13If the advice in the Powell Memo had been carried out by the Coal Board

0:24:13 > 0:24:17when it was created, then Aberfan would never have happened.

0:24:17 > 0:24:20The memo laid down strict rules about not tipping over water,

0:24:20 > 0:24:24the dangers of tipping on steep hillsides and even gave

0:24:24 > 0:24:28maximum heights for tips on land such as that found in Aberfan.

0:24:29 > 0:24:34The Powell Memo now took centrestage at the Aberfan Tribunal.

0:24:34 > 0:24:38A senior NCB official in the local area, David Lewis Roberts,

0:24:38 > 0:24:42had responsibility for the tips at Aberfan and the neighbouring mines.

0:24:42 > 0:24:46Roberts knew of the Powell Memo and the dangers of tip slides,

0:24:46 > 0:24:49after seeing the damage at Cilfynydd with his own eyes.

0:24:49 > 0:24:52You could see, without any difficulty, could you,

0:24:52 > 0:24:56that the colliery waste had gone from the tip

0:24:56 > 0:24:58a very considerable distance, right across the road,

0:24:58 > 0:25:01through the canal, down into the River Taff,

0:25:01 > 0:25:05where it destroyed the course of the river at that point?

0:25:05 > 0:25:06Yes, sir, that's correct.

0:25:06 > 0:25:11From that time onwards, Mr Roberts, you needed no instruction

0:25:11 > 0:25:15in the effect of a slide from a colliery tip, did you?

0:25:15 > 0:25:16No, sir.

0:25:18 > 0:25:21Roberts had not only witnessed the Cilfynydd slide,

0:25:21 > 0:25:24but he was also aware of a far more recent incident.

0:25:25 > 0:25:27We're a few miles from Cilfynydd.

0:25:27 > 0:25:30We're on the road that leads up to the Rhondda valleys

0:25:30 > 0:25:34and we have one of the last pit wheels in South Wales.

0:25:34 > 0:25:40This is Ty Mawr and this is where, on 29th of March 1965,

0:25:40 > 0:25:43some 18 months before the Aberfan disaster,

0:25:43 > 0:25:47that there was another incident which rang alarm bells.

0:25:47 > 0:25:50A load of waste came off the coal tip, causing a lot of damage

0:25:50 > 0:25:53on the railway line, on the road, on the river.

0:25:53 > 0:25:55Had it happened at a different time of day,

0:25:55 > 0:25:58people would've been killed and there was also the alarming prospect

0:25:58 > 0:26:01that the slurry could've gone down the mine shaft.

0:26:01 > 0:26:05So, the divisional chief engineer decided to react,

0:26:05 > 0:26:09and he remembered that a memo had been written some years ago,

0:26:09 > 0:26:14after the Cilfynydd incident, and he went in search of the Powell Memo.

0:26:22 > 0:26:25So, what happened to that document?

0:26:25 > 0:26:28Well, it was sent out to all the engineers in the area,

0:26:28 > 0:26:31with an instruction that the senior coal board engineers should

0:26:31 > 0:26:35cooperate with their colleagues, check on the safety of the tips

0:26:35 > 0:26:38and then report back as soon as possible.

0:26:38 > 0:26:41In Aberfan, that work fell to David Lewis Roberts

0:26:41 > 0:26:44and his civil engineer colleague, Robert Exley.

0:26:44 > 0:26:48The trouble is that neither man followed the instructions.

0:26:48 > 0:26:52Roberts produced a very superficial report.

0:26:52 > 0:26:55Exley did even less. They didn't cooperate with each other.

0:26:55 > 0:26:59It was, to put it very mildly, an inadequate response.

0:27:00 > 0:27:03Tasker Watkins, counsel for the tribunal,

0:27:03 > 0:27:07questioned Roberts about the way he'd reacted to the Powell Memo.

0:27:07 > 0:27:09Will you look at Bundle 4, please?

0:27:09 > 0:27:13Where Mr Powell, the divisional chief engineer stated,

0:27:13 > 0:27:15"I should be pleased, therefore,

0:27:15 > 0:27:17"if you would arrange with your colleagues

0:27:17 > 0:27:20"for a detailed examination of every tip."

0:27:21 > 0:27:23"With your colleagues."

0:27:25 > 0:27:28Why did you not carry out the terms of that letter?

0:27:30 > 0:27:32In as much as Mr Exley had a copy of this letter,

0:27:32 > 0:27:35I understood that he would do a separate and independent report,

0:27:35 > 0:27:37as well as I would.

0:27:37 > 0:27:39Why did you not get in touch with him

0:27:39 > 0:27:41and say, "Here is the Powell letter.

0:27:41 > 0:27:44"We have got to get together"? Why did you not?

0:27:44 > 0:27:45I took it the other way round,

0:27:45 > 0:27:48that he would make an independent report and Mr Powell would have

0:27:48 > 0:27:50two reports - one from me and one from him.

0:27:50 > 0:27:55Mr Tasker Watkins, with a civil engineer and a mechanical engineer,

0:27:55 > 0:27:57unless you're going to have joint report

0:27:57 > 0:28:02or have some joint discussion, how are you going to avoid

0:28:02 > 0:28:06the possibility of returning two different types of report?

0:28:06 > 0:28:09You follow what My Lord has said, do you not, Mr Roberts?

0:28:10 > 0:28:14Two different reports might have gone into Mr Powell,

0:28:14 > 0:28:16had you not got together about it.

0:28:16 > 0:28:21That would be thoroughly undesirable, would it not?

0:28:21 > 0:28:23I don't know.

0:28:23 > 0:28:25I don't know what was at the back of Mr Powell's mind,

0:28:25 > 0:28:28whether he would want it that way or not.

0:28:28 > 0:28:31Mr Tasker Watkins, again, you will return to the phrase,

0:28:31 > 0:28:34"If you would arrange with your colleagues."

0:28:34 > 0:28:35Yes, My lord.

0:28:35 > 0:28:42What arrangements had you made with your colleagues, Mr Roberts?

0:28:43 > 0:28:44None, sir.

0:28:45 > 0:28:47Then do you now agree that

0:28:47 > 0:28:50you ignored one of the most important parts of that letter?

0:28:53 > 0:28:56I ignored a part of the letter, yes, sir.

0:28:57 > 0:29:01Roberts had written his brief report without consulting his colleague.

0:29:01 > 0:29:05Exley, on the other hand, hadn't produced a report at all.

0:29:05 > 0:29:09'Most people who were brought to the stand seemed to...'

0:29:09 > 0:29:11think it was somebody else's fault.

0:29:13 > 0:29:14Not theirs at all.

0:29:14 > 0:29:18'But the judge, thank goodness, did not believe them.'

0:29:18 > 0:29:21On the third day of Roberts' evidence,

0:29:21 > 0:29:25it still wasn't clear why he hadn't approached his colleague,

0:29:25 > 0:29:29Robert Exley, a trained civil engineer with a superior knowledge

0:29:29 > 0:29:32of soil mechanics and all the technicalities involved.

0:29:32 > 0:29:36Why hadn't he asked him to work with him on the tip inspection?

0:29:36 > 0:29:39Once again, Edmund Davies, the tribunal chair,

0:29:39 > 0:29:41was forced to intervene.

0:29:41 > 0:29:45You and Mr Exley were on quite good times, were you?

0:29:46 > 0:29:50- Reasonably good terms, I'd say, My Lord.- We must not mince matters.

0:29:50 > 0:29:54When you say "reasonable", why do you qualify it in that way?

0:29:54 > 0:29:57We would talk together, but we'd fall out quite a lot

0:29:57 > 0:29:59on various jobs that were being done.

0:29:59 > 0:30:02Yes, each member of the tribunal

0:30:02 > 0:30:06has had that in the back of his mind in the past two days.

0:30:06 > 0:30:11There was some kind of estranged relations between you and Mr Exley?

0:30:11 > 0:30:15I wouldn't like to emphasise too much on that, but...

0:30:15 > 0:30:17I would say yes, My Lord.

0:30:17 > 0:30:19OK, thank you.

0:30:21 > 0:30:23A clash of personalities was responsible

0:30:23 > 0:30:27for a completely inadequate response to the Powell Memo,

0:30:27 > 0:30:31and another missed opportunity to spot the menace at Aberfan.

0:30:31 > 0:30:33'I went to the tribunal,'

0:30:33 > 0:30:35and it just happened to be Sharon's birthday,

0:30:35 > 0:30:38the little girl that I lost in the disaster.

0:30:38 > 0:30:43And what I heard there was very difficult for me to accept.

0:30:43 > 0:30:45One of the engineers,

0:30:45 > 0:30:50he didn't seem to realise his dreadful part in this.

0:30:50 > 0:30:53And when I heard what he had to say...

0:30:54 > 0:30:56..it made me feel sick.

0:30:58 > 0:31:04There was this man who had caused so much damage to people in Aberfan.

0:31:04 > 0:31:06It takes a man to admit when he's wrong...

0:31:08 > 0:31:10..and I thought he was less of a man.

0:31:13 > 0:31:15There is another revealing dimensional

0:31:15 > 0:31:19to David Roberts' involvement in the story of Aberfan

0:31:19 > 0:31:21and, to find out more, you need to come here,

0:31:21 > 0:31:25to the public library at Dowlais on the outskirts of Merthyr Tydfil.

0:31:28 > 0:31:32Now, this is a collection of letters handed over to the inquiry

0:31:32 > 0:31:36and I have to say that reading them is a rather sobering experience.

0:31:36 > 0:31:38The title of the collection says it all.

0:31:38 > 0:31:41"Danger From Coal Slurry Being Tipped

0:31:41 > 0:31:43"At The Rear Of The Pantglas Schools."

0:31:43 > 0:31:47It's a long list of concerns from council officials sent

0:31:47 > 0:31:49to the National Coal Board.

0:31:49 > 0:31:52The man there responsible, as we know, was David Roberts.

0:31:52 > 0:31:55He clearly didn't take much of this seriously.

0:31:55 > 0:31:57He didn't forward these letters to his superiors.

0:31:57 > 0:32:02So, listen to this one line from the borough engineer at Merthyr Tydfil.

0:32:02 > 0:32:05"You are no doubt well aware," he says to David Roberts,

0:32:05 > 0:32:09"that the tips at Merthyr Vale tower above the Pantglas Area,

0:32:09 > 0:32:16"and, if they were to move, a very serious position would accrue."

0:32:16 > 0:32:19Well, David Roberts' response to all of this was to say

0:32:19 > 0:32:21everything was under control.

0:32:21 > 0:32:24He thought that people like the borough engineers of Merthyr,

0:32:24 > 0:32:27who had raised the complaint, or the elected councillors who had

0:32:27 > 0:32:29raised a complaint, or pit workers,

0:32:29 > 0:32:32that these people did not know what they were doing and that he did.

0:32:32 > 0:32:35That attitude might have been fine if he had actually

0:32:35 > 0:32:38done the inspections which he was required to do

0:32:38 > 0:32:41and/or if he'd actually reported the results up the line.

0:32:41 > 0:32:44But sadly, neither of those things happened.

0:32:44 > 0:32:46Mr Exley, you have been giving evidence...

0:32:46 > 0:32:48At the tribunal, David Roberts' colleague,

0:32:48 > 0:32:52the civil engineer Robert Exley, was asked what would have happened

0:32:52 > 0:32:55if he'd followed the instructions to inspect the tips

0:32:55 > 0:32:58and examine them in accordance with the Powell Memo.

0:32:59 > 0:33:03If you had carried out a detailed examination of Tip Number 7,

0:33:03 > 0:33:06on the basis of what was stated in the memorandum,

0:33:06 > 0:33:09you'd have been obliged to condemn it out of hand.

0:33:09 > 0:33:12- Is that a question, sir? - It certainly is.

0:33:12 > 0:33:15I do not think that necessarily follows, sir.

0:33:15 > 0:33:16Just have the memorandum before you,

0:33:16 > 0:33:20and see if you can find one thing to be said in the favour of

0:33:20 > 0:33:24the continued existence of this tip, if the memorandum's applied to it.

0:33:24 > 0:33:27Every precaution in relation to Tip Number 7

0:33:27 > 0:33:30you now know is lacking, is it not?

0:33:30 > 0:33:33I do not think that anyone would've thought at that time

0:33:33 > 0:33:37that there was a possibility of the tip sliding as far as it did.

0:33:37 > 0:33:41If you had carried out a detailed examination, you would've been able

0:33:41 > 0:33:44to have established quite simply that the precautions were lacking.

0:33:44 > 0:33:48- Probably, yes, sir. - CERTAINLY, Mr Exley.

0:33:48 > 0:33:50Do yourself some justice and bear in mind the length

0:33:50 > 0:33:54of your qualifications, and the extent of your professional skill.

0:33:54 > 0:33:56With certainty, would you not?

0:33:56 > 0:34:01Yes, I think so, with some investigation.

0:34:01 > 0:34:04The clear failure of both Exley and Roberts was damning enough,

0:34:04 > 0:34:07but the coal board continued to argue that disaster

0:34:07 > 0:34:09could not have been foreseen.

0:34:10 > 0:34:13On St David's Day, 1967,

0:34:13 > 0:34:16the most senior NCB official appeared at the tribunal.

0:34:16 > 0:34:18He was William Sheppard,

0:34:18 > 0:34:19the director of production,

0:34:19 > 0:34:22and, very soon, the defence was crumbling.

0:34:23 > 0:34:26Looking back, was there anything to prevent

0:34:26 > 0:34:30a reasonable person from envisaging the slide going down

0:34:30 > 0:34:34that one-in-four gradient for a substantial distance?

0:34:34 > 0:34:38- In London, my lord, at headquarters?- Yes.

0:34:40 > 0:34:47- We had not the information of Abercynon, Cilfynydd or Tip 4.- No.

0:34:47 > 0:34:51Let me be quite clear about what the question you're being asked is.

0:34:51 > 0:34:58There was, surely, sufficient known about the potential of tips

0:34:58 > 0:35:02on inclined surfaces to slide, was there not?

0:35:02 > 0:35:04Not as far as I'm concerned, My Lord.

0:35:07 > 0:35:11Sheppard denied all knowledge of the past incidents in Wales.

0:35:11 > 0:35:13The lack of any notion, at a senior level,

0:35:13 > 0:35:16about the dangers of tips was startling.

0:35:16 > 0:35:19'I regard Mr Sheppard's evidence as'

0:35:19 > 0:35:22showing that he is actually more blameworthy

0:35:22 > 0:35:25than, down the line, Mr Roberts or Mr Exley, because, um,

0:35:25 > 0:35:27here is the person in charge of the ship

0:35:27 > 0:35:30who has not the slightest idea of what is going on,

0:35:30 > 0:35:33but nevertheless, we know from other documents that Mr Sheppard

0:35:33 > 0:35:37was an active part of deciding what the coal board's line would be.

0:35:37 > 0:35:41While the tribunal continued its work, the families in Aberfan were

0:35:41 > 0:35:44still living in the shadow of the coal tips

0:35:44 > 0:35:47that had killed 144 people.

0:35:47 > 0:35:50Their removal was something the community demanded,

0:35:50 > 0:35:52and it was at this point in 1967

0:35:52 > 0:35:55that Lord Robens returned to the village.

0:35:55 > 0:35:56In the days after the disaster,

0:35:56 > 0:36:01there was some talk of removing the entire tip complex.

0:36:01 > 0:36:06And, then, as time went on, the talk turned to landscaping, not removing.

0:36:06 > 0:36:08The reason, of course, was cost.

0:36:08 > 0:36:12So, the mothers of Aberfan decided to demand a face-to-face meeting

0:36:12 > 0:36:16with Lord Robens, the chairman of the National Coal Board.

0:36:16 > 0:36:20And that meeting took place here at the Aberfan Hotel.

0:36:21 > 0:36:24The topic to be discussed is whether or not the coal board is prepared

0:36:24 > 0:36:27to completely remove the remaining seven tips here at Aberfan.

0:36:27 > 0:36:30It isn't a question of logic,

0:36:30 > 0:36:32of convincing people that the pit heap is safe.

0:36:32 > 0:36:34People who have suffered,

0:36:34 > 0:36:36as the womenfolk have suffered particularly,

0:36:36 > 0:36:38just do not accept this as a fact

0:36:38 > 0:36:42and, therefore, no amount of argument will convince anybody.

0:36:42 > 0:36:45A petition was drawn up in the village,

0:36:45 > 0:36:49and presented to the Welsh Office in Cardiff, with 1,500 signatures,

0:36:49 > 0:36:53demanding the removal of all the tips at Aberfan.

0:36:53 > 0:36:56It was the first stage in a prolonged battle

0:36:56 > 0:36:57that would last for years.

0:37:01 > 0:37:02Throughout the inquiry,

0:37:02 > 0:37:05Desmond Ackner had been reminding the tribunal

0:37:05 > 0:37:09of that rather odd statement made by Lord Robens at the outset

0:37:09 > 0:37:14about the unknown, mystery spring under Tip Number 7.

0:37:14 > 0:37:17Not a single NCB official

0:37:17 > 0:37:20had been able to support or explain that theory.

0:37:20 > 0:37:24In his closing speech to the Inquiry, Desmond Ackner was

0:37:24 > 0:37:28brutally effective, criticising the coal board's original statement,

0:37:28 > 0:37:32and Lord Robens for not coming to the tribunal to explain himself.

0:37:32 > 0:37:37No explanation has been proffered by or on behalf of Lord Robens,

0:37:37 > 0:37:40and his absence from the tribunal, therefore,

0:37:40 > 0:37:43and in this regard, has been conspicuous.

0:37:45 > 0:37:49In a dramatic and unexpected move, a matter of days before the tribunal

0:37:49 > 0:37:53was to end, Lord Robens offered to come and give evidence.

0:37:53 > 0:37:57So, would he now stand by his early claim that the disaster

0:37:57 > 0:37:59could not have been foreseen?

0:37:59 > 0:38:02When did you first learn that the causes of this disaster

0:38:02 > 0:38:04were reasonably foreseeable?

0:38:04 > 0:38:06Before the inquiry took place?

0:38:06 > 0:38:10I would say that I knew that the disaster would have been foreseeable

0:38:10 > 0:38:13at that moment in time when I was on

0:38:13 > 0:38:15the mountainside and realised...

0:38:16 > 0:38:19Am I not answering the question to your satisfaction?

0:38:19 > 0:38:22You were on the mountainside two days after the disaster.

0:38:22 > 0:38:23The day after.

0:38:25 > 0:38:29- Two days after. - What I'm asking you is this -

0:38:29 > 0:38:34when did you first realise that the cause or causes of the disaster

0:38:34 > 0:38:38- were reasonably foreseeable? - I must repeat.

0:38:38 > 0:38:40Only you were shaking your head,

0:38:40 > 0:38:44and I felt I was not giving the right answer to your question.

0:38:44 > 0:38:46When I was on the mountainside,

0:38:46 > 0:38:49and I saw the work that was being done to turn that water away

0:38:49 > 0:38:53from the tip and to channel it, it was clear to me that,

0:38:53 > 0:38:56had there been experts about, to recognise that, on a mountainside,

0:38:56 > 0:38:59where there is always a lot of water,

0:38:59 > 0:39:01that this might have been a possibility.

0:39:02 > 0:39:07It came to me at that moment in time that, if we had in fact got this

0:39:07 > 0:39:10in operation, this could be said to have been foreseeable.

0:39:13 > 0:39:16Finally, after relentless cross-examination,

0:39:16 > 0:39:19the head of the coal board had been forced to admit

0:39:19 > 0:39:21that the disaster had been foreseeable.

0:39:21 > 0:39:25The National Coal Board's long-held public stance had now changed.

0:39:27 > 0:39:31Had we realised that Lord Robens was saying something quite different,

0:39:31 > 0:39:35namely that it was indeed quite possible to know,

0:39:35 > 0:39:37by the use of available measures,

0:39:37 > 0:39:40that this disaster was impending and preventable,

0:39:40 > 0:39:45then Lord Robens would've been asked to make a statement many weeks ago.

0:39:45 > 0:39:48And I venture to think that weeks, if not months,

0:39:48 > 0:39:51of this inquiry would have been rendered unnecessary.

0:39:55 > 0:39:58The 76 days of tribunal could've been avoided if the coal board,

0:39:58 > 0:40:02on day one, had fessed up and said, "We made a mistake

0:40:02 > 0:40:05"and we are very, very sorry, and it won't happen again,

0:40:05 > 0:40:08"and we will pay fair compensation to all of those affected."

0:40:08 > 0:40:11Then almost the whole tribunal could have been saved.

0:40:12 > 0:40:15Until Lord Robens' appearance at the tribunal,

0:40:15 > 0:40:18the board's lawyers had privately been refusing to agree

0:40:18 > 0:40:22to any claims for compensation from the people of Aberfan.

0:40:22 > 0:40:25Now that the chairman had finally admitted liability,

0:40:25 > 0:40:28those lawyers quietly changed their stance

0:40:28 > 0:40:33and agreed to pay the legal minimum of just £500 for every child lost.

0:40:35 > 0:40:39Later, on the 70th day of the Inquiry, Desmond Ackner completed

0:40:39 > 0:40:42his closing statement on behalf of the people of Aberfan

0:40:42 > 0:40:45and, with his considerable power of argument,

0:40:45 > 0:40:49he demanded the undivided attention of everyone present.

0:40:49 > 0:40:52I merely wish to add this in conclusion.

0:40:53 > 0:40:57Those who died in this disaster lost their lives,

0:40:57 > 0:40:59not because of the occupational hazards

0:40:59 > 0:41:02which are ever-present in these mining valleys -

0:41:02 > 0:41:05there was no sudden collapse of an underground working,

0:41:05 > 0:41:08no unforeseeable or unforeseen explosion.

0:41:11 > 0:41:16This was a slow-growing, man-made menace,

0:41:16 > 0:41:18fed by the indifference of those

0:41:18 > 0:41:20who should never have permitted its existence.

0:41:21 > 0:41:24That is the horror of this disaster.

0:41:26 > 0:41:30There can be no more bitter reminder of the truth and wisdom

0:41:30 > 0:41:32of Bernard Shaw's condemnation.

0:41:34 > 0:41:37"The worst sin towards our fellows is not to hate them..."

0:41:39 > 0:41:42"..it is to be indifferent to them.

0:41:42 > 0:41:46"For that is the essence... of inhumanity."

0:41:49 > 0:41:51Thank you, Mr Ackner.

0:42:02 > 0:42:05The people of Aberfan would have to wait another four months

0:42:05 > 0:42:08for the official findings of the tribunal.

0:42:09 > 0:42:11On the 3rd of August, 1967,

0:42:11 > 0:42:15this little square in the middle of Aberfan was a hive of activity.

0:42:15 > 0:42:20It was publication day, and this is where the final tribunal report

0:42:20 > 0:42:22was distributed to the villagers.

0:42:22 > 0:42:24And, for nine employees and former employees

0:42:24 > 0:42:26of the National Coal Board,

0:42:26 > 0:42:29the conclusions of this report would be rather challenging.

0:42:31 > 0:42:34This was the moment the community hoped to get justice,

0:42:34 > 0:42:37that the true cause of the disaster be found,

0:42:37 > 0:42:41and those responsible be called to account.

0:42:41 > 0:42:42The conduct of the National Coal Board

0:42:42 > 0:42:45throughout this process, was severely criticised,

0:42:45 > 0:42:47and the board was found to be

0:42:47 > 0:42:50entirely responsible for the disaster.

0:42:50 > 0:42:53The main fault was judged to be a lack of clear guidance.

0:42:55 > 0:42:57Nine individuals were also singled out for criticism,

0:42:57 > 0:43:00and these included key witnesses at the tribunal -

0:43:00 > 0:43:02Vivian Thomas,

0:43:02 > 0:43:04Robert Exley

0:43:04 > 0:43:07and David Roberts.

0:43:07 > 0:43:10But no-one holding a senior position at the National Coal Board

0:43:10 > 0:43:12was included in that list.

0:43:13 > 0:43:17The conclusions of this report are sometimes precise,

0:43:17 > 0:43:19sometimes less precise.

0:43:19 > 0:43:22So, for example, the National Coal Board is held to be responsible

0:43:22 > 0:43:28for what happened, but no individual is directly blamed for the disaster.

0:43:28 > 0:43:31Let me share some of the words with you, because they are instructive.

0:43:31 > 0:43:34"The Aberfan disaster is a terrifying tale

0:43:34 > 0:43:38"of bungling ineptitude by many men charged with tasks

0:43:38 > 0:43:41"for which they were totally unfitted,

0:43:41 > 0:43:43"of failure to heed clear warnings,

0:43:43 > 0:43:45"and of total lack of direction from above.

0:43:45 > 0:43:48"Not villains, but decent men,

0:43:48 > 0:43:51"led astray by foolishness or by ignorance,

0:43:51 > 0:43:53"or by both in combination,

0:43:53 > 0:43:56"are responsible for what happened at Aberfan."

0:43:57 > 0:43:59And you may be wondering what happened

0:43:59 > 0:44:03to the nine men who are named. Well, the answer is not much.

0:44:03 > 0:44:06They weren't disciplined, they weren't demoted,

0:44:06 > 0:44:08and they certainly weren't sacked.

0:44:08 > 0:44:11I think they should be instantly dismissed.

0:44:11 > 0:44:15I think they shouldn't be allowed to work for the coal board

0:44:15 > 0:44:18under any circumstances at any job.

0:44:18 > 0:44:21Do you agree that it was simply bungling ineptitude...

0:44:21 > 0:44:24- No.- ..or a little more than this? - No, I think a little more than that.

0:44:24 > 0:44:30As I say, I think it was absolute neglect...throughout.

0:44:30 > 0:44:32And, if it wasn't for neglect,

0:44:32 > 0:44:34I would have my little girl with me today.

0:44:34 > 0:44:38What would a child make of it?

0:44:40 > 0:44:43That, although they were condemned,

0:44:43 > 0:44:45they were not punished.

0:44:47 > 0:44:51The tribunal report made a range of recommendations on how to ensure

0:44:51 > 0:44:55the safety of coal tips, including the need for new legislation.

0:44:55 > 0:44:58And, soon, work began on the physical transformation

0:44:58 > 0:45:02of the South Wales valleys, and other coal mining areas.

0:45:04 > 0:45:08But what of Lord Robens, the man who led the National Coal Board?

0:45:08 > 0:45:09Would he offer to resign?

0:45:09 > 0:45:12And, if so, should his resignation be accepted?

0:45:12 > 0:45:15Lord Robens shouldn't be left the courtesy of resigning.

0:45:15 > 0:45:17I feel he should be sacked.

0:45:17 > 0:45:20Surely he knew all about these tips

0:45:20 > 0:45:23and what was going on with the collieries.

0:45:23 > 0:45:26Other than that, he was accepting money under false pretences.

0:45:26 > 0:45:29You must've had a number of offers from industry, Lord Robens?

0:45:29 > 0:45:33Yes, indeed. Yes, yes, that's perfectly true.

0:45:33 > 0:45:36There's no difficulty about getting another job,

0:45:36 > 0:45:39and indeed getting another job at two or three times the money

0:45:39 > 0:45:42that they pay me at the Coal Board, but money isn't important.

0:45:42 > 0:45:44He stormed into government offices and said,

0:45:44 > 0:45:47"I demand to see this report in advance."

0:45:47 > 0:45:50He then did a tour of the coalfields,

0:45:50 > 0:45:53and this was quite clearly in an effort to make sure that the union,

0:45:53 > 0:45:56the National Union of Mineworkers, was on his side.

0:45:57 > 0:46:00Robens portrayed himself, rather deftly,

0:46:00 > 0:46:02as the defender of the coal industry

0:46:02 > 0:46:06in an age when nuclear power was gaining popularity.

0:46:06 > 0:46:09Robens received countless letters and telegrams of support from

0:46:09 > 0:46:13across Britain, including the mining communities.

0:46:13 > 0:46:15He went to sell British coal in the United States,

0:46:15 > 0:46:17sailing on the Queen Mary.

0:46:17 > 0:46:19So that meant that, for ten days, nobody could get hold of him.

0:46:19 > 0:46:23And that was where Lord Robens presented not only his letter

0:46:23 > 0:46:26of supposed resignation, but also the reply,

0:46:26 > 0:46:30which he wanted the minister, Richard Marsh, to make.

0:46:30 > 0:46:34With this kind of manoeuvring and powerful friends in the press,

0:46:34 > 0:46:36Robens was a difficult man to dislodge.

0:46:36 > 0:46:39The Labour government decided he could stay in the job,

0:46:39 > 0:46:42which he did, for several years.

0:46:42 > 0:46:46After which, his career took another rather surprising turn.

0:46:46 > 0:46:49The man who chaired the National Coal Board,

0:46:49 > 0:46:52the organisation responsible for 144 deaths here,

0:46:52 > 0:46:57went on to lead a review into health and safety at work.

0:46:57 > 0:46:58Yes, really.

0:47:02 > 0:47:07Still present above Aberfan was a dark reminder of the disaster,

0:47:07 > 0:47:10and the sight of the tips caused endless anxiety.

0:47:10 > 0:47:14The Government claimed the tips were in a safe condition

0:47:14 > 0:47:17and, behind-the-scenes, Lord Robens had made clear that the NCB

0:47:17 > 0:47:20would not be paying for the tips to be cleared.

0:47:20 > 0:47:22But the villagers had other ideas,

0:47:22 > 0:47:26and they held a series of meetings to plan their campaign.

0:47:26 > 0:47:29There was no possibility of moving forward,

0:47:29 > 0:47:34of building a new future, unless those coal tips were removed.

0:47:34 > 0:47:37And so, throughout 1967 and 1968,

0:47:37 > 0:47:41the Tip Removal Committee worked hard to try to get results.

0:47:41 > 0:47:42But it didn't work.

0:47:42 > 0:47:44And this is the truth for you -

0:47:44 > 0:47:48despite the appalling experience of Aberfan,

0:47:48 > 0:47:52there was very little sympathy in the heart of government for

0:47:52 > 0:47:55the demands that were being made.

0:47:55 > 0:47:58We weren't interested in landscaping,

0:47:58 > 0:48:02we were interested in making the children feel safe again.

0:48:02 > 0:48:07And as long as the tips were there, they wouldn't feel safe.

0:48:07 > 0:48:10Why should they? We felt afraid.

0:48:10 > 0:48:13This is the Aberfan Tip Removal Committee.

0:48:13 > 0:48:15Do not forget the meeting tonight.

0:48:15 > 0:48:18The Secretary of State for Wales was invited to attend,

0:48:18 > 0:48:20but has declined to accept.

0:48:20 > 0:48:22He has already gone on record as saying that the tips cannot

0:48:22 > 0:48:25be completely removed for three reasons.

0:48:25 > 0:48:28A, it would take too long, B, it would cost too much,

0:48:28 > 0:48:32and C, two of the tips above the village are already on fire.

0:48:32 > 0:48:36By June of 1968, the members of the Tip Removal Committee

0:48:36 > 0:48:38were at the end of their tether.

0:48:38 > 0:48:41So they sent a letter here to what was then the Welsh Office,

0:48:41 > 0:48:44the base of the most powerful politician in Wales,

0:48:44 > 0:48:46the Secretary of State,

0:48:46 > 0:48:49George Thomas, who was himself a proud son of the mining valleys.

0:48:49 > 0:48:53And they warned him very clearly that, if those coal tips

0:48:53 > 0:48:56were not moved, they would take further action.

0:48:56 > 0:48:58We feel that it's time now for militant action.

0:48:58 > 0:49:03We can carry these tips manually to Cardiff, London or elsewhere

0:49:03 > 0:49:04and dump them on their doorsteps.

0:49:04 > 0:49:07On the 20th of July, 1968,

0:49:07 > 0:49:10a very important meeting took place here

0:49:10 > 0:49:13at the Welsh Office in Cardiff.

0:49:13 > 0:49:15It was a kind of showdown between George Thomas,

0:49:15 > 0:49:19the Welsh Secretary, and the community leaders of Aberfan

0:49:19 > 0:49:23and they were backed up by a big crowd of villagers gathered outside.

0:49:23 > 0:49:27They were all hopeful of a positive outcome.

0:49:27 > 0:49:31But when news came through that George Thomas wouldn't budge,

0:49:31 > 0:49:33the mood changed.

0:49:33 > 0:49:36We'd like them to come and live in Aberfan for a month,

0:49:36 > 0:49:40and hope that it would rain every day that they were there.

0:49:40 > 0:49:44'Without any planning, we just went in through the door

0:49:44 > 0:49:46'and up the stairs.'

0:49:46 > 0:49:51And people were saying, "Oh, don't come in here, don't, don't, DON'T."

0:49:51 > 0:49:52We just did it.

0:49:53 > 0:49:57The villagers rushed into this building, they came up these stairs,

0:49:57 > 0:50:01and they brought with them a big bag of slurry, or waste,

0:50:01 > 0:50:02from the coal tips of Aberfan.

0:50:02 > 0:50:04They threw some on the floor,

0:50:04 > 0:50:06they threw some on a conference table.

0:50:06 > 0:50:09They were demanding to see George Thomas,

0:50:09 > 0:50:12but George Thomas was nowhere to be seen.

0:50:12 > 0:50:14He was hiding somewhere in this building.

0:50:14 > 0:50:18The protesters refused to leave and, gradually,

0:50:18 > 0:50:22George Thomas realised that he wouldn't be able to avoid them.

0:50:22 > 0:50:25'He was told off in English and in Welsh

0:50:25 > 0:50:28'and I said, "We'll remove it ourselves'

0:50:28 > 0:50:34"bit by bit and send it to all you people."

0:50:34 > 0:50:36But after the showdown in this building,

0:50:36 > 0:50:38George Thomas, quite possibly,

0:50:38 > 0:50:42was shamed into changing his mind and he announced a U-turn.

0:50:42 > 0:50:46There was jubilation in Aberfan, but what they hadn't realised was

0:50:46 > 0:50:48that George had a trick up his sleeve.

0:50:50 > 0:50:54In the days following the disaster, a charitable fund was established

0:50:54 > 0:50:57using donations that came in from around the world.

0:50:57 > 0:51:01It stood at £1.75 million, and this mountain of cash

0:51:01 > 0:51:05was to prove too much of a temptation to the Labour government.

0:51:05 > 0:51:09Here was the Coal Board blankly refusing to pay,

0:51:09 > 0:51:12so the money had to come from somewhere else.

0:51:12 > 0:51:15Well, there was only one somewhere else.

0:51:15 > 0:51:18And then this kicked in to some feelings, which were clearly around

0:51:18 > 0:51:22at the time, that the Disaster Fund was unmanageably vast,

0:51:22 > 0:51:25it wasn't going to bring back the children,

0:51:25 > 0:51:30so it was perfectly OK to use it for removing tips.

0:51:32 > 0:51:34So let's be clear,

0:51:34 > 0:51:37because this is still difficult to understand, even today -

0:51:37 > 0:51:41the Government wanted to take a quarter of a million pounds

0:51:41 > 0:51:46from the Aberfan charity fund to help pay for the tip clearance.

0:51:46 > 0:51:49Later on, they reduced that to £150,000,

0:51:49 > 0:51:52which was still a huge sum at that time.

0:51:52 > 0:51:55The people of Aberfan complained to the Prime Minister,

0:51:55 > 0:51:58and they told him that they were being forced to choose

0:51:58 > 0:52:02between clearing the past and building the future.

0:52:02 > 0:52:05And let's not forget, at the same time,

0:52:05 > 0:52:08the Government was happy to spend millions of pounds

0:52:08 > 0:52:12redeveloping old industrial sites right across Wales.

0:52:12 > 0:52:15Those communities didn't have to pay

0:52:15 > 0:52:19and they hadn't suffered like the people of Aberfan.

0:52:19 > 0:52:22What happened next was increasing political pressure

0:52:22 > 0:52:24on the charity trustees.

0:52:24 > 0:52:27They're going to consider what they pay.

0:52:27 > 0:52:31Of course, they will pay what they can afford,

0:52:31 > 0:52:35but the scheme will depend on what they pay.

0:52:36 > 0:52:39The lawyers representing the families were convinced

0:52:39 > 0:52:43it simply wasn't legal to use the money to clear the tips,

0:52:43 > 0:52:45but the trustees felt they had no choice.

0:52:45 > 0:52:46The question is,

0:52:46 > 0:52:51why did the trustees hand over £150,000 to the government

0:52:51 > 0:52:55when they'd already been advised that that request was unlawful?

0:52:55 > 0:52:58Because, for us today, it doesn't make any sense.

0:52:58 > 0:53:00But there were several things going on.

0:53:00 > 0:53:04Those trustees felt under immense pressure to make a decision.

0:53:04 > 0:53:07The Charity Commission, which should have been helping them

0:53:07 > 0:53:10and supporting them, was nothing but trouble.

0:53:10 > 0:53:12And then, maybe more important than anything,

0:53:12 > 0:53:16the trustees felt that, if they didn't hand over the money, well,

0:53:16 > 0:53:18the tips might never be cleared

0:53:18 > 0:53:21and, in that sense, they felt they had no choice.

0:53:21 > 0:53:27We decided it was better to pay than leave them there.

0:53:27 > 0:53:29We didn't have a choice.

0:53:29 > 0:53:31We did not have a choice.

0:53:31 > 0:53:33We had to...

0:53:34 > 0:53:38..agree to it for the sake of the village.

0:53:38 > 0:53:42The work to clear the tip started in 1969.

0:53:42 > 0:53:461.8 million cubic metres of waste was moved from the mountain

0:53:46 > 0:53:48at a cost of £850,000 -

0:53:48 > 0:53:51paid for by the government, the National Coal Board,

0:53:51 > 0:53:54and with money from the Disaster Fund.

0:53:56 > 0:53:59Despite the disappearance of a significant sum,

0:53:59 > 0:54:01the Disaster Fund was still used on other projects.

0:54:01 > 0:54:05A memorial garden was built on the Pantglas site.

0:54:05 > 0:54:09There was an education fund and plans to invest in the community.

0:54:11 > 0:54:15If you want visible evidence of the way Aberfan recovered gradually

0:54:15 > 0:54:18after the disaster, well, this is it.

0:54:18 > 0:54:23This is the community centre which opened in March of 1973,

0:54:23 > 0:54:26with the big hall for conferences and concerts

0:54:26 > 0:54:30and a network of other rooms for sports and social events.

0:54:32 > 0:54:35But there was one piece of unfinished business -

0:54:35 > 0:54:40that £150,000 missing from the charity fund,

0:54:40 > 0:54:42and that was the government's fault.

0:54:42 > 0:54:44Not only was it completely unjust,

0:54:44 > 0:54:49it was also creating practical problems, not least for this place.

0:54:49 > 0:54:51And by the end of the 1980s,

0:54:51 > 0:54:55the community no longer had the funds to keep this place going.

0:54:55 > 0:54:58So they had to hand over control to the local council.

0:55:00 > 0:55:03Over time, the missing £150,000

0:55:03 > 0:55:06became a growing source of bitterness and resentment.

0:55:06 > 0:55:09Aberfan's community leaders and political representatives

0:55:09 > 0:55:12continued to argue for the return of the money,

0:55:12 > 0:55:16not least because funds were running out to care for the memorial garden

0:55:16 > 0:55:18and the children's gravestones.

0:55:20 > 0:55:23In fact, it took three decades for change to come.

0:55:23 > 0:55:28In 1997, a New Labour government was elected with a very big majority.

0:55:28 > 0:55:31There was a new Welsh Secretary in residence in this building

0:55:31 > 0:55:35and he was determined to right the wrongs of the past and,

0:55:35 > 0:55:39at the same time, some previously secret government documents

0:55:39 > 0:55:41had been released in the public domain

0:55:41 > 0:55:45and they shed new light on the conduct of Lord Robens,

0:55:45 > 0:55:49the Charity Commission and indeed several Labour politicians

0:55:49 > 0:55:53who'd had very little thought for the people of Aberfan.

0:55:53 > 0:55:57For me, it wasn't only returning the money, but it was a public apology

0:55:57 > 0:56:02from the most senior politician that there was at a Welsh level.

0:56:02 > 0:56:05There was a public apology, and I was apologising for the actions

0:56:05 > 0:56:08of one of my predecessors. I was saying, "That was wrong."

0:56:08 > 0:56:12The return of the £150,000 to the Aberfan fund

0:56:12 > 0:56:14was a very public statement

0:56:14 > 0:56:17that this community had been badly treated.

0:56:17 > 0:56:20And then, a decade later, it was the Welsh government

0:56:20 > 0:56:23that repaid a sum of money approaching the real value

0:56:23 > 0:56:27of what had been taken from these people back in 1968.

0:56:28 > 0:56:30In 2007, it was decided that,

0:56:30 > 0:56:33taking interest and inflation into account,

0:56:33 > 0:56:36some £2 million should be repaid.

0:56:36 > 0:56:38An injustice had been done.

0:56:38 > 0:56:41Here we were now in a Welsh Assembly,

0:56:41 > 0:56:46the people of Wales who had elected us, they would expect us to

0:56:46 > 0:56:50look seriously at how to remedy that historic injustice.

0:56:50 > 0:56:54So that this sort of stain on what had happened in the history

0:56:54 > 0:56:57of Wales, really, could be put to one side

0:56:57 > 0:56:59and a clear start could be made

0:56:59 > 0:57:02in restoring the functions of the charities.

0:57:02 > 0:57:05So the charity could now pursue its original aims,

0:57:05 > 0:57:09with no concerns about the condition of the garden or the gravestones.

0:57:09 > 0:57:14When the money was returned properly, it felt to us...

0:57:16 > 0:57:18..that justice had been served.

0:57:18 > 0:57:20But it did take a long time.

0:57:22 > 0:57:24And if we hadn't...

0:57:24 > 0:57:26pressed for it...

0:57:27 > 0:57:30..I don't think we would have had it.

0:57:30 > 0:57:33Decades of campaigning were at an end

0:57:33 > 0:57:36and the victims of Aberfan - children and adults alike -

0:57:36 > 0:57:40had finally been treated with the respect they deserved.

0:57:40 > 0:57:44The garden of remembrance here on the site of the old Pantglas School

0:57:44 > 0:57:47is a haven of tranquillity today -

0:57:47 > 0:57:51a place to reflect on the terrible events of 50 years ago.

0:57:51 > 0:57:54But also to reflect on the support given by

0:57:54 > 0:57:57so many people to the local community.

0:57:57 > 0:58:01And I'm sitting on a bench dedicated to the memory of one of them -

0:58:01 > 0:58:03Desmond Ackner, the barrister -

0:58:03 > 0:58:08the man considered by many local families to be their great defender.

0:58:08 > 0:58:13And this garden is a powerful symbol to the entire world of a community

0:58:13 > 0:58:19shattered in terrible circumstances, which slowly, bravely rebuilt itself,

0:58:19 > 0:58:21often against the odds,

0:58:21 > 0:58:24but never give up on the fight for truth and for justice.

0:58:24 > 0:58:30And that, on this 50th anniversary, is the lasting message of Aberfan.