0:00:02 > 0:00:09This programme contains very strong language
0:00:09 > 0:00:12We was massively stretched at the time.
0:00:12 > 0:00:15Massively hard pushed.
0:00:19 > 0:00:22We were meeting force for force, small arms, rockets.
0:00:27 > 0:00:29BULLETS RICOCHET
0:00:29 > 0:00:31He knew he was dying.
0:00:31 > 0:00:36He's one of the bravest blokes I've ever had the pleasure of working with.
0:00:36 > 0:00:38We'd hit them again and again and again.
0:00:38 > 0:00:42We killed 24 guys that day.
0:00:42 > 0:00:45The battle for Helmand has cost thousands of Afghan
0:00:45 > 0:00:48and hundreds of British lives.
0:00:53 > 0:00:57There are ghosts of them all over the place.
0:00:57 > 0:01:00You never really forget them. You can't possibly forget them.
0:01:00 > 0:01:03I don't think a day goes by when I don't think of them.
0:01:03 > 0:01:07We've just had some incoming fire from that side...
0:01:07 > 0:01:10'I've been reporting from Afghanistan for more than 20 years.
0:01:10 > 0:01:13'In this film, I'm going to look behind the headlines
0:01:13 > 0:01:17'of Britain's bloody five-year campaign in Helmand.'
0:01:17 > 0:01:20But did it really have to be this tough?
0:01:20 > 0:01:25Were the objectives set by the generals and politicians realistic?
0:01:29 > 0:01:35The gap between policy-making and its subsequent implementation was far too wide.
0:01:35 > 0:01:38We've muddled through.
0:01:38 > 0:01:45This is the story of how Britain "muddled" from one plan to another.
0:01:45 > 0:01:47Yes, it was a stretch, a risk.
0:01:47 > 0:01:50But we're paratroopers, we're British soldiers, that's what we do.
0:01:50 > 0:01:57The story of how the nation was not prepared to pay the price for success.
0:01:57 > 0:01:58Shit!
0:01:58 > 0:02:03I asked on a daily, weekly, basis for more troops, more helicopters.
0:02:03 > 0:02:11We could not cede pieces of ground to the insurgent the way we had done there.
0:02:11 > 0:02:14The British force in Helmand was under-resourced.
0:02:14 > 0:02:17But most of all, it's the story of those
0:02:17 > 0:02:21who had to face the consequences of a war
0:02:21 > 0:02:24that others had not thought through.
0:02:24 > 0:02:29Roughly a hundred men holding a defensive position
0:02:29 > 0:02:36in the most hostile town, in the most hostile country in the world.
0:02:53 > 0:02:58We came in via Chinooks with some intense manoeuvring, which was quite good.
0:03:06 > 0:03:10We de-bussed off the Chinook and it was then we came under contact.
0:03:10 > 0:03:12RAPID GUNFURE
0:03:17 > 0:03:21Helmand - the summer of 2006.
0:03:24 > 0:03:2816 Air Assault Brigade is in action.
0:03:28 > 0:03:30The intensity of the fighting took us by surprise,
0:03:30 > 0:03:33not least because the intelligence told us
0:03:33 > 0:03:35there wouldn't be Taliban when we arrived.
0:03:39 > 0:03:41We took a major weight of fire.
0:03:41 > 0:03:46Being my first experience, I thought it was a lot of fire!
0:03:46 > 0:03:51They were throwing grenades over the wall, which were landing within metres of us.
0:03:56 > 0:03:59It was an absolute miracle not one of us even got hit.
0:03:59 > 0:04:03Heavy firepower was often needed to support the troops.
0:04:05 > 0:04:09- Fucking hell! - Fucking hell, boys!- RPG!
0:04:09 > 0:04:12We was in a compound with a small archway,
0:04:12 > 0:04:14which was no more than three feet high,
0:04:14 > 0:04:18and now there was fire coming through the archway.
0:04:18 > 0:04:20We were sending fire back through.
0:04:20 > 0:04:22At my command!
0:04:22 > 0:04:27The commander said, "If you haven't got a wife or children, follow me."
0:04:27 > 0:04:30Looking back, it's just a funny thing.
0:04:31 > 0:04:34To move a step further would have been suicidal.
0:04:34 > 0:04:40We literally dived on the floor and crawled back through the hole.
0:04:40 > 0:04:46They usually found themselves overstretched and outnumbered.
0:04:46 > 0:04:50We didn't want to retreat, so we just...we carried on fighting.
0:04:50 > 0:04:55And in the end, a couple of Apaches came and an A10 Thunderbolt.
0:04:55 > 0:04:56INDISTINCT SPEECH
0:05:00 > 0:05:03That pretty much obliterated what was left of the enemy
0:05:03 > 0:05:06and now we were able, in the end, to withdraw
0:05:06 > 0:05:11in absolute silence, under no enemy contact.
0:05:15 > 0:05:19The primary mission was meant to be reconstruction.
0:05:22 > 0:05:24So how did Britain end up at war?
0:05:24 > 0:05:27INDISTINCT
0:05:27 > 0:05:33Things looked very different when going to Afghanistan was first considered.
0:05:33 > 0:05:35If you look at the situation at the end of 2004,
0:05:35 > 0:05:38when the decision to deploy south-east was taken,
0:05:38 > 0:05:40things were pretty good.
0:05:40 > 0:05:43There was virtually no violence in Helmand.
0:05:45 > 0:05:48By then, Britain had been at war in Iraq for more than 18 months.
0:05:48 > 0:05:51The public didn't like it.
0:05:51 > 0:05:55And when the government suggested sending even more troops to Iraq,
0:05:55 > 0:05:59the generals pushed their own alternative.
0:05:59 > 0:06:01What I can say,
0:06:01 > 0:06:04remembering conversations with those people at the time,
0:06:04 > 0:06:10is that they defined this mission in opposition to Iraq.
0:06:10 > 0:06:16They saw this place, by contrast, as a chance to involve those forces
0:06:16 > 0:06:19in a different, new and exciting mission.
0:06:22 > 0:06:25The generals got their way.
0:06:25 > 0:06:29The British Government announced a mission to develop Helmand,
0:06:29 > 0:06:33saying it would only fight if it absolutely had to.
0:06:35 > 0:06:38We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years' time
0:06:38 > 0:06:41without firing one shot,
0:06:41 > 0:06:45because our mission is to protect the reconstruction.
0:06:47 > 0:06:51In one of the poorest parts of the world,
0:06:51 > 0:06:53people could certainly use the help,
0:06:53 > 0:06:57and it was hoped the Afghans would welcome it.
0:06:59 > 0:07:03I think there was a naivety on a sort of corporate level
0:07:03 > 0:07:06that people felt we were going to go into Afghanistan
0:07:06 > 0:07:07and hand out bread and milk
0:07:07 > 0:07:10and deliver development and reconstruction.
0:07:10 > 0:07:16Brigadier Butler had already commanded the Special Air Service in Afghanistan
0:07:16 > 0:07:20and would now lead the 1st Brigade into Helmand.
0:07:20 > 0:07:24He points to intelligence failures.
0:07:24 > 0:07:28I think in some ways there was simply insufficient information
0:07:28 > 0:07:31to develop a long-term strategy for Afghanistan
0:07:31 > 0:07:34based on the knowledge which we had in 2005.
0:07:39 > 0:07:41Helmand Province.
0:07:41 > 0:07:4623,000 square miles of mountains, desert and farmland.
0:07:46 > 0:07:49It's half the size of England.
0:07:54 > 0:07:58The province was well known only for opium poppies,
0:07:58 > 0:08:01supplying 40% of the world's heroin.
0:08:03 > 0:08:07There was a whole series of people who just simply did not want us there.
0:08:07 > 0:08:10The warlords from the former regime,
0:08:10 > 0:08:14the narco criminals who were making hundreds of millions of pounds
0:08:14 > 0:08:17out of the opiate industry, and then the Taliban themselves.
0:08:17 > 0:08:24So those three very powerful groups were always going to react to our presence.
0:08:25 > 0:08:31So in April 2006 the initial elements of 16 Air Assault Brigade
0:08:31 > 0:08:34began arriving here at Camp Tombstone,
0:08:34 > 0:08:39which at the time was a rather lonely outpost of the US Special Forces
0:08:39 > 0:08:41in the desert in Helmand Province.
0:08:41 > 0:08:45For the first couple of months we were patrolling in soft hats
0:08:45 > 0:08:47a fairly sort of unaggressive posture
0:08:47 > 0:08:52and the real aim was just to get in to the local town and the surrounding areas,
0:08:52 > 0:08:58speak to the locals and identify tasks that could be fulfilled by aid agencies, NGO's for reconstruction.
0:09:00 > 0:09:04Of the nearly 3,800 personnel first sent,
0:09:04 > 0:09:07the majority were engineers and support troops.
0:09:07 > 0:09:11They were there to build the Camp Bastion base
0:09:11 > 0:09:16and develop the main centres, Lashkar Gar and Gereshk.
0:09:16 > 0:09:21Only about a quarter of the people who went out on that initial deployment
0:09:21 > 0:09:24were the three Para Battle Group, the combat infantry
0:09:24 > 0:09:27but very soon after they got here
0:09:27 > 0:09:30they realised they were walking into a maelstrom.
0:09:32 > 0:09:35The trouble started in the northern valleys,
0:09:35 > 0:09:37volatile opium country
0:09:37 > 0:09:41where armed groups of the drug lords, insurgents
0:09:41 > 0:09:44and tribesmen went on the offensive.
0:09:44 > 0:09:49These attacks in Now Zad, Mushakala and Sangin
0:09:49 > 0:09:53were challenging our very authority and reason for being there.
0:09:55 > 0:09:57The Paras started to fight back.
0:09:57 > 0:10:02But that exposed the reality that Butler faced competing missions
0:10:02 > 0:10:08fighting the insurgents versus bolstering the Afghan Government through good deeds.
0:10:20 > 0:10:26By mid-June the crisis had focused at a place where opium trading,
0:10:26 > 0:10:29insurgency, and hatred of outsiders
0:10:29 > 0:10:32came together in their most violent form.
0:10:32 > 0:10:37The northern district, Sangin.
0:10:40 > 0:10:45Tribesmen killed dozens of the district governor's supporters and the police.
0:10:47 > 0:10:52And so Helmand's Governor demanded the British do something.
0:10:52 > 0:10:56Their mission was to maintain security in Helmand.
0:10:56 > 0:11:01if they were not deploying their troops to those districts
0:11:01 > 0:11:06to the north we may lost those districts.
0:11:06 > 0:11:10Both he and President Karzai said if you're not prepared to fight
0:11:10 > 0:11:13and if you're not prepared to protect our flag
0:11:13 > 0:11:15and protect our people, why are you here?
0:11:16 > 0:11:20The British now faced a critical decision.
0:11:20 > 0:11:23keeping the Afghan government flag flying
0:11:23 > 0:11:28meant defending Sangin with British troops.
0:11:28 > 0:11:33Everyone was involved, from me to my brigade commander,
0:11:33 > 0:11:37to especially the Afghan Governor at the time
0:11:37 > 0:11:39and certainly the UK government.
0:11:40 > 0:11:44Implementing the decision to act rested with Colonel Tootal.
0:11:47 > 0:11:51Although we never really had the resources to do it in the way that I would have wanted to,
0:11:51 > 0:11:55then the logic was sound and we'd been asked to do something.
0:11:55 > 0:12:00After 20 minutes of deliberation, he agreed to do it.
0:12:00 > 0:12:03Yes, it was a stretch, yes, it was a risk,
0:12:03 > 0:12:06but, we're paratroopers, we're British soldiers, that's what we do,
0:12:06 > 0:12:08and that's exactly what we did.
0:12:11 > 0:12:14They were equipped only for a brief mission north.
0:12:14 > 0:12:18Our kit was packed for exactly that - three to four days.
0:12:18 > 0:12:22Really, really minimal stuff.
0:12:22 > 0:12:27As soon as they arrived they tried to fortify the local government HQ or District Centre.
0:12:28 > 0:12:33We were filling cardboard boxes with rubble and building up defences
0:12:33 > 0:12:35just basically out of anything you could.
0:12:35 > 0:12:37Filling up 24-hour ration boxes.
0:12:37 > 0:12:40we just made do with what was there, which wasn't a lot.
0:12:48 > 0:12:51- What do you want us firing into? - Same place, mate!
0:12:51 > 0:12:53It started off maybe
0:12:53 > 0:12:57a couple of times a day and then it sort of increased to,
0:12:57 > 0:13:00you know, seven, eight times a day into the night as well.
0:13:05 > 0:13:09It was just constant contacts of three, four, five times a day
0:13:09 > 0:13:14they were trying to hit us either by small arms, rockets or mortars.
0:13:14 > 0:13:19We had a couple of times when we they had actually tried to storm the place.
0:13:21 > 0:13:24They had the idea that they were going to try and take the camp,
0:13:24 > 0:13:26which was never going to happen.
0:13:26 > 0:13:29It was pretty much a shootout.
0:13:29 > 0:13:31So they learnt a harsh lesson that night.
0:13:31 > 0:13:34We were meeting force with force.
0:13:34 > 0:13:37So if they come at us with small arms, rockets, whatever,
0:13:37 > 0:13:39we'll meet them with that.
0:13:41 > 0:13:42But we're better.
0:13:48 > 0:13:52They fired a rocket, killing a couple of guys from the signals unit.
0:13:54 > 0:13:56And an Afghan interpreter.
0:13:56 > 0:14:00These were the first casualties. It sort of hit home to everyone
0:14:00 > 0:14:03you know this isn't a joke, this is real.
0:14:06 > 0:14:10They were cut off in the Sangin District Centre.
0:14:10 > 0:14:13There's a building. A double door, red door.
0:14:13 > 0:14:17To the left of that you've got an open doorway. In there.
0:14:17 > 0:14:21The deal was that we would go there for 96 hours.
0:14:21 > 0:14:25We actually spent a total of 95 days there fighting every day.
0:14:25 > 0:14:29Being besieged in Sangin was bad enough.
0:14:29 > 0:14:31but Colonel Tootal's remaining combat troops
0:14:31 > 0:14:36were also sent to garrison other northern centres -
0:14:36 > 0:14:39Now Zad and Musa Qala.
0:14:45 > 0:14:49Having established what were soon called Platoon Houses
0:14:49 > 0:14:52across a broad expanse of the province,
0:14:52 > 0:14:56the British realised how hard it would be to defend them all.
0:14:56 > 0:15:00We were pretty much surrounded by the Taliban at the time
0:15:00 > 0:15:03we was running low on food and water.
0:15:03 > 0:15:07So we pretty much had to ration everything - including ammunition.
0:15:11 > 0:15:16Each of these bases had just a few score Paras, Royal Irish Rangers or Ghurkhas.
0:15:16 > 0:15:19As they fought off attacks day and night.
0:15:19 > 0:15:23this struggle obliterated the bigger picture.
0:15:23 > 0:15:27Leave it there, get the missile!
0:15:27 > 0:15:31We didn't appreciate that they would focus around the district centres.
0:15:31 > 0:15:33They were acting as breakwaters.
0:15:35 > 0:15:40Reacting to a series of crises had become a strategy.
0:15:40 > 0:15:43So what happened in many of these places was that
0:15:43 > 0:15:47only a very small area could come under the influence of the troops
0:15:47 > 0:15:52that were up here, while all around them, the insurgents moved.
0:15:54 > 0:15:58The soldiers nicknamed their enemy Terry Taliban.
0:15:58 > 0:16:02But they faced a mixture of gunmen hired by the drug lords,
0:16:02 > 0:16:07hardcore jihadists and local farmers.
0:16:07 > 0:16:09The regular Taliban were employing
0:16:09 > 0:16:11what we termed as the ten dollar Taliban.
0:16:11 > 0:16:15They pay them ten dollars, give them a weapon to come and hit us with
0:16:15 > 0:16:18and I think a lot of them were on drugs as well
0:16:18 > 0:16:20cos when they did get hit a lot of them didn't fall.
0:16:20 > 0:16:21They just kept firing.
0:16:21 > 0:16:25We poked the hornet's nest and they came out biting.
0:16:25 > 0:16:27We didn't have enough people on the ground.
0:16:27 > 0:16:30We was massively stretched at the time.
0:16:30 > 0:16:35There was one battle group to pretty much cover the whole of Helmand.
0:16:35 > 0:16:37I asked on a daily, weekly basis
0:16:37 > 0:16:42for more troops, more capability, more helicopters.
0:16:42 > 0:16:45I remember saying to the Chief of Defence Staff in 2006 on one of
0:16:45 > 0:16:49his visits that we needed probably a division size -
0:16:49 > 0:16:5310,000 troops to achieve what we'd set out to do.
0:16:53 > 0:16:56We increased the size of our deployed forces in Afghanistan
0:16:56 > 0:17:00as rapidly as we could given the fact that we were trying to balance
0:17:00 > 0:17:04Afghanistan, Iraq and the overall pressure on the British military.
0:17:07 > 0:17:10Some small scale reinforcements were sent,
0:17:10 > 0:17:15but they were trying to hold an area half the size of England
0:17:15 > 0:17:19with little over 1,000 combat soldiers.
0:17:19 > 0:17:23Now you've got some 30,000 NATO troops
0:17:23 > 0:17:25holding a roughly similar area,
0:17:25 > 0:17:28but it shows the scarcity of resources
0:17:28 > 0:17:34and the stretch that we faced, that we held that ground with about 1,200 men.
0:17:51 > 0:17:54Horribly outnumbered, they could only hold on
0:17:54 > 0:17:58by calling in air power and artillery.
0:17:58 > 0:18:01The insurgents needled the British
0:18:01 > 0:18:05into laying waste to areas they'd been sent to protect.
0:18:09 > 0:18:13We acknowledged that there was more destruction than construction
0:18:13 > 0:18:15going on in the places we were trying to help.
0:18:15 > 0:18:18build and bring security in governance.
0:18:20 > 0:18:24Some of his men even question what good it all did.
0:18:24 > 0:18:27Ah, fucking zero.
0:18:27 > 0:18:28Zero.
0:18:28 > 0:18:31We demonstrated to the insurgents that we weren't going to take
0:18:31 > 0:18:35a beating. We certainly weren't going to withdraw from that area.
0:18:35 > 0:18:41but in terms of bringing bringing reconstruction and development to the area,
0:18:41 > 0:18:43clearly not a huge amount was achieved,
0:18:43 > 0:18:48simply because of the efforts of the insurgents to thwart that.
0:18:50 > 0:18:55The Kajaki Dam and power plant was one of the most important places in Helmand.
0:18:57 > 0:19:01It was here that deep flaws in Britain's operation would be exposed.
0:19:03 > 0:19:05Despite its value,
0:19:05 > 0:19:09Colonel Tootal only had a few dozen men to secure the dam.
0:19:12 > 0:19:16On the morning of September 6th they launched an operation.
0:19:20 > 0:19:24The idea was to send out a sniper team to intercept
0:19:24 > 0:19:27some insurgents who were manning an illegal check point
0:19:27 > 0:19:32and they came down the slope and through the valley there down below.
0:19:35 > 0:19:37I heard the explosion, I mean...
0:19:39 > 0:19:42..so I knew, I knew straightaway that that was a mine.
0:19:44 > 0:19:49Sgt Pearson's team had wandered into an old Russian minefield,
0:19:49 > 0:19:53and he went to rescue them in the minefield.
0:19:55 > 0:19:57Almost as soon as the incident had started,
0:19:57 > 0:20:00the troops on the ground quite rightly identified
0:20:00 > 0:20:04the need for a winch-equipped Black Hawk helicopter.
0:20:04 > 0:20:07However we were then told that wasn't available.
0:20:07 > 0:20:10The British didn't have any in the inventory.
0:20:10 > 0:20:14Took my foot, slipped off, whatever, off a rock and
0:20:14 > 0:20:18put it in the sand and stood straight on a mine.
0:20:18 > 0:20:24and my left leg was gone straight away. I knew exactly what I'd done
0:20:24 > 0:20:28and I got blown up a bit, spun round,
0:20:28 > 0:20:31landed and lifted my leg to see what was gone,
0:20:31 > 0:20:33and see that was gone at roughly boot height,
0:20:33 > 0:20:36cos my top lace was still attached to my leg -
0:20:36 > 0:20:38Well, the remainder of my leg.
0:20:38 > 0:20:42A third mine detonated just beside myself
0:20:42 > 0:20:45and Mark Wright caught a lot of that.
0:20:47 > 0:20:50Mark would keep moral up - he'd be shouting at us
0:20:50 > 0:20:54and then we'd be having a laugh and a joke, and one of the lads,
0:20:54 > 0:20:57Dave Prosser, it turned out it was his birthday,
0:20:57 > 0:21:00so we managed to sing Happy Birthday for him.
0:21:00 > 0:21:04But while the search for a suitable helicopter went on,
0:21:04 > 0:21:06men were bleeding to death.
0:21:06 > 0:21:10Eventually we got the two Black Hawk helicopters.
0:21:10 > 0:21:14Three, almost three-and-a-half hours after we'd asked for them.
0:21:14 > 0:21:17And did exactly what we needed them to do,
0:21:17 > 0:21:23they air lifted the casualties out by winching some very brave American paramedics into the minefield.
0:21:23 > 0:21:25And then Mark shouted to me,
0:21:25 > 0:21:28"If I die, tell Gillian, my uncle, my family that I love them."
0:21:28 > 0:21:31And I just shouted back, "Shut up Mark,
0:21:31 > 0:21:34"this time next week we're going to be back in the pub!"
0:21:34 > 0:21:37Cos you don't want to hear something like that.
0:21:37 > 0:21:40When I eventually got winched up, it was after Mark,
0:21:40 > 0:21:45and I looked beside me and Mark was there and I was like,
0:21:45 > 0:21:47thank Christ that's over.
0:21:47 > 0:21:51Mark Wright died of his wounds on the way to Bastion.
0:21:54 > 0:21:59He's definitely one of the, if not THE bravest bloke I've ever had the pleasure of working with.
0:21:59 > 0:22:03The one thing that was the most emotional thing in a very emotional tour,
0:22:03 > 0:22:08that stood out for me was as we filed out of the make-shift chaplain tent,
0:22:08 > 0:22:13Mark's best friend, Corporal Lee Parker, stopped and ruffled his hair.
0:22:13 > 0:22:18We always rip each other. My best mate, Peter he came to visit me.
0:22:18 > 0:22:21I'd just been moved out of intensive care,
0:22:21 > 0:22:24he visited me, gave me a parrot and an eye-patch
0:22:24 > 0:22:29and a copy of Runners Weekly which I thought was a touch.
0:22:31 > 0:22:37Later that evening, attacks on Sangin and then Musa Qala led to even more casualties.
0:22:37 > 0:22:42Their only hope of survival was evacuation by helicopter.
0:22:47 > 0:22:50But every time they went in to pick up the wounded
0:22:50 > 0:22:53they ran the very real risk of being shot down.
0:23:06 > 0:23:11During that day the Para Battle Group lost three soldiers killed
0:23:11 > 0:23:14and suffered 18 wounded.
0:23:14 > 0:23:17But because of what they went through that day,
0:23:17 > 0:23:20commanders increasingly asked themselves about whether
0:23:20 > 0:23:24the risks of losing one of those helicopters, could still be run.
0:23:24 > 0:23:28My biggest concern was losing
0:23:28 > 0:23:31one of the very few Chinook troop carrying helicopters,
0:23:31 > 0:23:35particularly if it had 50 or 60 soldiers as well as the crew
0:23:35 > 0:23:37and they could have been lost in a heartbeat.
0:23:42 > 0:23:47Losing a helicopter would put the whole Helmand operation at risk.
0:23:47 > 0:23:50The Paras simply couldn't hold on everywhere.
0:23:50 > 0:23:57and as is now revealed, London felt the risks in Musa Qala were too high.
0:23:57 > 0:24:01So while in London you don't interfere with commanders on the ground,
0:24:01 > 0:24:04in this particular case I certainly did intervene
0:24:04 > 0:24:07and I certainly did say, you've got to get us out of Musa Qala.
0:24:09 > 0:24:11The British made a face-saving deal.
0:24:11 > 0:24:17they agreed to withdraw if the local leaders promised to keep the Taliban
0:24:17 > 0:24:19out of Musa Qala.
0:24:19 > 0:24:21The local commander was unhappy,
0:24:21 > 0:24:24Karzai was unhappy, everybody was unhappy, save for the insurgents.
0:24:24 > 0:24:28it was an unfortunate deal.
0:24:28 > 0:24:31They withdrew in civilian trucks.
0:24:31 > 0:24:34They weren't armoured.
0:24:34 > 0:24:38Although we trusted the elders, we didn't trust the Taliban.
0:24:38 > 0:24:41The guys found it quite stressful for them.
0:24:41 > 0:24:44Some of the younger guys couldn't understand the situation.
0:24:44 > 0:24:47We lost three people
0:24:47 > 0:24:49and loads injured.
0:24:49 > 0:24:52But it certainly didn't sit well with some of the guys.
0:24:55 > 0:24:58The deal held for a few months but in February 2007
0:24:58 > 0:25:05the Taliban had returned and set up a shadow Helmand government in Musa Qala.
0:25:05 > 0:25:11We could not cede pieces of ground to the insurgent the way we had done there.
0:25:11 > 0:25:15It was a bold move to stick those platoons out
0:25:15 > 0:25:19but it was, in retrospect, not the smartest of tactics,
0:25:19 > 0:25:22simply because you didn't have the force to back it up.
0:25:22 > 0:25:25But sustaining a deployment that was not
0:25:25 > 0:25:29in the long term operational interests of the mission,
0:25:29 > 0:25:33just because you didn't want to get a bit of egg on your face would have been insane.
0:25:33 > 0:25:36But a chorus of armchair criticisms started too
0:25:36 > 0:25:39and we heard some of that.
0:25:39 > 0:25:41Had they dealt out too much destruction?
0:25:41 > 0:25:47Had they seriously alienated the very people that Britain was trying to win over?
0:25:53 > 0:25:57Towards the end of 2006, The Royal Marines replaced the Paras.
0:25:57 > 0:26:01That was where the fire was coming from.
0:26:01 > 0:26:07The Government did send 700 additional infantry and a few more helicopters.
0:26:07 > 0:26:13Adopting their own new tactic, the commandos formed mobile groups.
0:26:13 > 0:26:18to seek out guerrilla bands before they could attack the district centres.
0:26:27 > 0:26:30They went where they knew the enemy were waiting.
0:26:30 > 0:26:33a tactic they called "advancing to ambush".
0:26:33 > 0:26:35Halfway between the large tree!
0:26:36 > 0:26:39Many of them loved it,
0:26:39 > 0:26:42because the Afghans would give them a stand up fight.
0:26:44 > 0:26:51The commandos' tour finished with fresh claims of hundreds of Taliban killed.
0:26:53 > 0:26:56It was unclear if they'd regained the initiative.
0:26:56 > 0:27:01and their successors certainly thought they had a better solution.
0:27:04 > 0:27:07The British used six-month tours so twice every year
0:27:07 > 0:27:13new commanders adopted new tactics for THEIR new mission in Helmand.
0:27:15 > 0:27:18It meant that the policy meandered around,
0:27:18 > 0:27:21so when three Commando Brigade arrived, leaving behind their dagger,
0:27:21 > 0:27:25they wanted to get moving again. They felt the paratroopers were
0:27:25 > 0:27:27too fixed in those platoon houses and district centres.
0:27:27 > 0:27:3212 Brigade then arrived and they were moving all right, up and down the province,
0:27:32 > 0:27:37but their own commander described the effects as being like mowing the grass.
0:27:40 > 0:27:42They'd cut down the enemy and move on
0:27:42 > 0:27:46so the insurgents would just return, as nobody stayed to stop them.
0:27:46 > 0:27:53Then six months later, a new brigade arrived with its own ideas and aims.
0:27:56 > 0:28:01General McNeill, commanduing all NATO forces in Afghanistan,
0:28:01 > 0:28:05found the year long US Army tours more effective.
0:28:06 > 0:28:11I thought the six-months tour did not work in the favour
0:28:11 > 0:28:14of the operational concepts and tactical concepts
0:28:14 > 0:28:17that the British military had in Helmand. I stand by that.
0:28:19 > 0:28:22The commandos were followed by 12 Brigade,
0:28:22 > 0:28:26among them the Queen's Company, Grenadier Guards
0:28:30 > 0:28:34Sergeant Major Glen Snazle was filmed in 2007
0:28:34 > 0:28:38when they were deployed to knock the Afghan Army into shape.
0:28:38 > 0:28:43He soon discovered some Afghan soldiers or ANA,
0:28:43 > 0:28:47when given a gun, were more of a threat to their own side, than the enemy.
0:28:47 > 0:28:51Going out on a morning patrol, one of the ANA soldiers
0:28:51 > 0:28:53shot himself through the foot
0:28:53 > 0:28:55which subsequently shot a dog
0:28:55 > 0:28:58ricocheted off the wall and nearly shot some of our guys.
0:28:58 > 0:29:01And that's what we were up to on a daily basis with the ANA.
0:29:03 > 0:29:08The Grenadiers pushed the Afghan Army in the toughest classroom - combat.
0:29:08 > 0:29:12And they adopted another new approach,
0:29:12 > 0:29:15challenging the insurgents where most of them lived -
0:29:15 > 0:29:21in the lush, irrigated, land, the so called "green zone".
0:29:21 > 0:29:26When you go in the green zone there's a feeling of vulnerability.
0:29:26 > 0:29:29There was a lot of vegetation a lot of cover from view.
0:29:29 > 0:29:33It was just a myriad of irrigation ditches
0:29:33 > 0:29:37and a lot of compounds were dotted around the area.
0:29:37 > 0:29:42You almost feel like the enemy have got eyes on you but you haven't got eyes on them.
0:29:43 > 0:29:46That's enemy fire above us.
0:29:51 > 0:29:53We came under contact.
0:29:53 > 0:29:57It was heavy contact and it it went on through the day.
0:29:57 > 0:30:00Two more casualties! Two more!
0:30:00 > 0:30:03If you've never been in a contact before the first time
0:30:03 > 0:30:05you come under contact it really is exhilarating.
0:30:07 > 0:30:13Just the fact that you're within inches at times
0:30:13 > 0:30:16of losing your life...
0:30:16 > 0:30:20ertainly puts it in perspective.
0:30:24 > 0:30:26Get out of that back blast!
0:30:31 > 0:30:34We've got enemy in the hedge line 100 metres forward there...
0:30:34 > 0:30:39You don't see the Taliban. They're very clever, they box clever.
0:30:39 > 0:30:42They're hard to locate. They were very cunning.
0:30:44 > 0:30:48We'd been in contact for about 12 hours and one of the Afghan soldiers
0:30:48 > 0:30:53stood completely in the open. A round struck the base of his magazine.
0:30:56 > 0:30:59..just missing him and missing the rest of the guys in the area
0:30:59 > 0:31:00and he just looked at us and laughed.
0:31:00 > 0:31:04We haven't got enough ammunition to fire bursts like that.
0:31:04 > 0:31:06The ANA in the field were very different.
0:31:06 > 0:31:10Some were very good, some were very poor,
0:31:10 > 0:31:15some were regular drug users, some weren't.
0:31:17 > 0:31:22We need to start bringing in new supplies of water, food and especially ammunition.
0:31:22 > 0:31:25Get them all up and tight in on this line.
0:31:25 > 0:31:27OK, that's the contact.
0:31:30 > 0:31:32GUNFIRE
0:31:35 > 0:31:40Someone's fired an RPG about 200m to our front.
0:31:40 > 0:31:43We're a bit pinned down for the moment.
0:31:43 > 0:31:46We kept progressing trying to clear compounds.
0:31:46 > 0:31:48We had to bring in mortars we had to bring in artillery
0:31:48 > 0:31:51and we bought in attack helicopters.
0:31:51 > 0:31:53We bought in fast air as well.
0:32:05 > 0:32:07The busiest day I've had.
0:32:07 > 0:32:11Probably the biggest day I've had in my career since I've been in it -
0:32:11 > 0:32:13in terms of contacts.
0:32:13 > 0:32:16They don't know how many they've killed,
0:32:16 > 0:32:20but joke that the insurgents almost seem to embrace death.
0:32:20 > 0:32:25They're the kind of people that believe when they die they're going to wake up with 27 virgins.
0:32:25 > 0:32:29You know? So how can you fight against someone like that who doesn't give a shit?
0:32:31 > 0:32:35It's like as soon as I die I'd be going back to Tottenham, I'd run at the bullets!
0:32:35 > 0:32:39Casualties almost become part and parcel of the operation.
0:32:39 > 0:32:43The memories never go away and the hardest thing about it, I think,
0:32:43 > 0:32:47is seeing subsequent troops suffering the same casualties
0:32:47 > 0:32:52and the same statistics and loss of limbs and deaths.
0:32:52 > 0:32:56They was on a patrol and he got shot through the neck.
0:32:56 > 0:33:02I was looking forward to coming back but I didn't want to come back to my friend's funeral.
0:33:02 > 0:33:08Guardsman Daryl Hickey was killed at the age of 27.
0:33:08 > 0:33:12Britain's death toll now reached 73.
0:33:14 > 0:33:18I've been with Icky since I joined the Queen's Company,
0:33:18 > 0:33:224½ years ago but he always helped us...
0:33:22 > 0:33:28He was a really nice person, got on well. It's not going to be nice going home without him.
0:33:33 > 0:33:38Throughout 2007 attempts were made to get back on the front foot,
0:33:38 > 0:33:41to take the war to the enemy.
0:33:41 > 0:33:44but doing that spread the pain to more and more people.
0:33:48 > 0:33:56Up near the Kajaki Dam, war had turned a thriving bazaar into a ghost town.
0:33:56 > 0:33:58The people went and they've still not come back,
0:33:58 > 0:34:04which is very hard to reconcile with the aim of waging a campaign
0:34:04 > 0:34:06to benefit people here.
0:34:06 > 0:34:10Official UN figures are almost certainly an underestimation
0:34:10 > 0:34:17but even they indicate nearly 9,000 Afghan civilians have been killed nationwide since 2007,
0:34:17 > 0:34:21the vast majority at the hands of insurgents.
0:34:25 > 0:34:29But British forces have been responsible for some.
0:34:30 > 0:34:36In May 2008 British mortars fired smoke to protect a patrol
0:34:36 > 0:34:40that was about to be ambushed in the Kajaki hills.
0:34:45 > 0:34:48A young girl called Shabia who was young,
0:34:48 > 0:34:51seven, seven years of age, who was accidentally killed by...
0:34:51 > 0:34:55by a mortar round which was fired, by a British mortar.
0:34:55 > 0:34:59Um, you know it was absolutely tragic, it was not fired haphazardly
0:34:59 > 0:35:02it was fired in defence of other British soldiers.
0:35:06 > 0:35:09I'm still affected by it now because the last thing
0:35:09 > 0:35:13I want anybody to think is that I'm going to come here to this country and,
0:35:13 > 0:35:17and my legacy will be the destruction of the country or the people here.
0:35:17 > 0:35:21It was an awful day, truly awful day.
0:35:25 > 0:35:30The reality of what is euphemistically called "collateral damage"
0:35:30 > 0:35:33became more and more apparent at the highest levels.
0:35:35 > 0:35:42In Autumn 2007, Brigadier Mackay, the new British commander, arrived.
0:35:42 > 0:35:47He was highly dubious of his predecessors' focus on bombs, bullets and bodies.
0:35:49 > 0:35:54Killing the enemy in large numbers as satisfying as it might be
0:35:54 > 0:35:58is not necessarily gonna allow you to win through and succeed.
0:35:58 > 0:36:03Any focus on body count is a sort of corrupt measure of effectiveness.
0:36:06 > 0:36:10What it really meant was putting the prime emphasis
0:36:10 > 0:36:14on winning people over and subordinating everything you did
0:36:14 > 0:36:19to the aim of securing and influencing the population.
0:36:19 > 0:36:25And meeting Brigadier Mackay here in this garden in early 2008,
0:36:25 > 0:36:27he was quite evangelical about it.
0:36:29 > 0:36:32We were pretty clear from the outset that
0:36:32 > 0:36:35the population was gonna be the prize and everything that we did
0:36:35 > 0:36:38was going to be in support of that population.
0:36:40 > 0:36:45First impressions were that we as an army
0:36:45 > 0:36:51hadn't evolved its thinking, either intellectually or conceptually.
0:36:51 > 0:36:57So he approached General Petraeus, author of a new US counter insurgency manual,
0:36:57 > 0:37:01an approach credited with pulling Iraq back from the brink.
0:37:03 > 0:37:07It was coherent it was up to date, it was full of ideas.
0:37:07 > 0:37:11I just thought it was a very, very good document for its time
0:37:11 > 0:37:15and so we used that as the basis for our counter insurgency doctrine.
0:37:20 > 0:37:25The new approach put winning the population at the centre of everything.
0:37:25 > 0:37:29But the insurgents had to be defeated before civilian lives
0:37:29 > 0:37:33could be improved, which meant going on the offensive.
0:37:33 > 0:37:37It was summarised as - Clear, Hold, Build.
0:37:37 > 0:37:42For too long, the British had done just the "clear" part of that.
0:37:45 > 0:37:47I wasn't going to be drawn into clearing
0:37:47 > 0:37:49unless I could definitely hold
0:37:49 > 0:37:53and I wasn't gonna clear and hold unless I could definitely build.
0:37:53 > 0:37:58These American ideas shaped Brigadier Mackay's planning for a big operation
0:37:58 > 0:38:03to restore British pride and re-take Musa Qala.
0:38:03 > 0:38:06I was pretty insistent that we wouldn't...
0:38:06 > 0:38:12bomb any part of Musa Qala, we didn't put any artillery rounds into Musa Qala.
0:38:12 > 0:38:17Because I wanted a town that was up and running as soon as we'd got into it.
0:38:20 > 0:38:23Brigadier Mackay deployed overwhelming force -
0:38:23 > 0:38:31thousands of British troops secured the town, an American Airborne battalion fought their way in,
0:38:31 > 0:38:35before allowing Afghan troops the symbolic finale.
0:38:35 > 0:38:41Those scenes we had where, em, an Afghan Soldier climbed the tower
0:38:41 > 0:38:44in the middle of Musa Qala to remove the Taliban flag
0:38:44 > 0:38:48and plant the Afghan flag were hugely important.
0:38:50 > 0:38:54Mackay's population focused tactics had worked -
0:38:54 > 0:39:00the locals voted with their feet and returned to a town that was largely intact.
0:39:07 > 0:39:12But the insurgent tactics evolved as well as the British ones.
0:39:12 > 0:39:18Their weapon of choice was the deadly IED or Improvised Explosive Device -
0:39:18 > 0:39:22a homemade bomb, often packed with shrapnel.
0:39:24 > 0:39:28They were a constant hazard to every patrol,
0:39:28 > 0:39:33where any suspicious hole or rock in the road might hide explosives
0:39:33 > 0:39:37forcing a dangerous process of investigation and disposal.
0:39:42 > 0:39:46IEDs killed 80 British troops in 2009 -
0:39:46 > 0:39:50three-quarters of the total fatalities.
0:40:00 > 0:40:08Sangin was IED central, accounting for half the incidents in Helmand.
0:40:10 > 0:40:11In the summer of 2009
0:40:11 > 0:40:17part of the garrison was 9 Platoon, C Company 2 Rifles.
0:40:19 > 0:40:24Corporal Jonathan Horne was the father of two children.
0:40:24 > 0:40:29Rifleman Daniel Simpson had an eight-month old son.
0:40:29 > 0:40:33They were joined by Riflemen James Backhouse and Joe Murphy.
0:40:35 > 0:40:40On 10th July, they went on a dawn patrol in Sangin.
0:40:40 > 0:40:43Once we'd headed down the alleyway I was in the back section...
0:40:46 > 0:40:50..and I heard the dreaded sound of a large blast.
0:40:53 > 0:40:57We're starting to see the bodies of riflemen.
0:40:57 > 0:41:02Rifleman James Backhouse had been killed outright.
0:41:02 > 0:41:07At this stage we also realised that we were coming under small arms fire from the enemy.
0:41:09 > 0:41:17A secondary device went off, which was larger, and louder than the first one.
0:41:17 > 0:41:21At this stage three more people died instantly -
0:41:21 > 0:41:24Corporal Jonathan Horne,
0:41:24 > 0:41:27Rifleman Daniel Simpson
0:41:27 > 0:41:30and Rifleman Murphy.
0:41:30 > 0:41:33We identified them through what they were wearing.
0:41:33 > 0:41:37Rifleman William Aldridge died later of his wounds,
0:41:37 > 0:41:40making him the fifth fatality.
0:41:43 > 0:41:47Three other British soldiers perished within 24 hours,
0:41:47 > 0:41:51a total of eight making it the worst day in the campaign.
0:41:51 > 0:41:57Was Britain still trying to hold too much ground with too few soldiers?
0:41:59 > 0:42:02And that really opened up the whole issue once more
0:42:02 > 0:42:09about just how many troops was GB willing and able to commit to securing Helmand?
0:42:09 > 0:42:13We had got to about the limit of our sustainable deployed force.
0:42:13 > 0:42:17It wasn't sufficient even for Helmand let alone more widely across the south.
0:42:17 > 0:42:22We may well have had to withdraw. We would certainly have had to take a different approach.
0:42:23 > 0:42:27In four years of campaigning the British had more than doubled their force -
0:42:27 > 0:42:30it was approaching ten thousand -
0:42:30 > 0:42:33and spent billions.
0:42:33 > 0:42:40But the governor of Helmand since 2008 feels positive results have been distinctly limited.
0:43:11 > 0:43:14General Petraeus was the author of the counterinsurgency strategy
0:43:14 > 0:43:18and had switched his attentions to Afghanistan.
0:43:18 > 0:43:22Let's make no mistake about it - The Taliban had the momentum,
0:43:22 > 0:43:28broadly speaking, in Afghanistan until probably sometime last fall.
0:43:28 > 0:43:31The British force in Helmand was under-resourced, make no mistake
0:43:31 > 0:43:34but I will leave that to the British leadership,
0:43:34 > 0:43:37both military and civilian to decide how much it was under-resourced.
0:43:40 > 0:43:47American generals decided a major reinforcement was needed in Helmand, putting the Brits in the back seat.
0:43:47 > 0:43:50Some had been saying it for years.
0:43:50 > 0:43:53It actually began with me.
0:43:53 > 0:43:58I began to express to the leadership of the USA that this was an under resourced force
0:43:58 > 0:44:02in manoeuvre forces, flying machines and intelligence.
0:44:02 > 0:44:08That did not change until, I'd say...2010.
0:44:13 > 0:44:18The American decision to surge was part of a broader strategy.
0:44:18 > 0:44:25They wanted to turn back the insurgency, stand up a larger Afghan army and then leave.
0:44:25 > 0:44:28In order to do that they were sending in many more troops,
0:44:28 > 0:44:3120,000 in Helmand alone.
0:44:33 > 0:44:37It would lead to a radical reorganisation on the ground.
0:44:41 > 0:44:46What we wanted to do in Helmand was literally just clean up the battlefield geometry.
0:44:46 > 0:44:50British forces up here, British forces here, marines over here...
0:44:50 > 0:44:52I didn't get a sense of coherence.
0:44:52 > 0:45:00We're going to clean it up in what I think is a much more coherent and sensible deployment of the forces.
0:45:00 > 0:45:04For the British this meant a painful process -
0:45:04 > 0:45:06handing over Garmsir
0:45:06 > 0:45:11and the northern towns they had fought, bled and died to hold since 2006.
0:45:17 > 0:45:21One place above all others symbolised that sacrifice -
0:45:21 > 0:45:28Sangin, where 124 British troops have now given their lives.
0:45:29 > 0:45:33No soldier likes to back away from a tough fight, no question about it.
0:45:33 > 0:45:37There was a lot of blood and treasure invested in there
0:45:37 > 0:45:41and I think that is why the UK forces wanted to see it through to the end.
0:45:41 > 0:45:45But I made a decision to move UK forces from Sangin.
0:45:45 > 0:45:50So on 22nd Sept 2010
0:45:50 > 0:45:55the Royal Marines handed it over to the US Marines...
0:45:55 > 0:45:58Who went on the offensive.
0:46:05 > 0:46:07EXPLOSIONS
0:46:07 > 0:46:11Yeah! Sucks for you, you motherfucker!
0:46:11 > 0:46:14It was a decision we made to take the fight to the enemy.
0:46:14 > 0:46:19And that's why we're pressing him and pressuring him everywhere that we can.
0:46:24 > 0:46:28They followed the new counterinsurgency tactics.
0:46:30 > 0:46:34Stage one was the clear - removing the insurgents
0:46:34 > 0:46:36to allow the hold and then the build
0:46:36 > 0:46:39but the clearance phase was often violent.
0:46:43 > 0:46:45Jesus came down and punched the earth.
0:46:45 > 0:46:48This is life in Afghanistan.
0:46:59 > 0:47:02This is how the US Marines dealt with Sangin's Pharmacy Road
0:47:02 > 0:47:07where IEDs killed five British riflemen in one day.
0:47:16 > 0:47:18That was a mosque.
0:47:25 > 0:47:28To protect themselves from the IED threat
0:47:28 > 0:47:33the US Marines had levelled 100 yards on either side of the Pharmacy Road.
0:47:33 > 0:47:42The destruction of civilian property has to weighed against the threat that you're facing.
0:47:42 > 0:47:48They are trained properly to look at all options, to consider the ones that will protect the force,
0:47:48 > 0:47:51while at the same time, doing the least amount of damage
0:47:51 > 0:47:56and only if that damage is absolutely military necessary.
0:47:59 > 0:48:05What we wanted to ensure our soldiers did was first protect the population.
0:48:05 > 0:48:10That's our core mission here, is to take care of those civilians,
0:48:10 > 0:48:14not to do harm to them but also to protect our own forces
0:48:14 > 0:48:16and you have to find that right balance there.
0:48:18 > 0:48:24The Sangin handover meant all the British troops were now concentrated in the populated centre.
0:48:24 > 0:48:28Exactly what they were meant to do in 2006.
0:48:29 > 0:48:34Three years on, the surge meant the returning Grenadier Guards
0:48:34 > 0:48:40could now focus more than 1,000 troops on just one district, Nad-e Ali.
0:48:41 > 0:48:45And they tried to push out facing all sorts of difficulties
0:48:45 > 0:48:50in this close country and establish new bases, clear roads
0:48:50 > 0:48:53and they did it in a series of operations or pulses.
0:48:57 > 0:49:01But before the Guards could hold and build in Nad-e Ali...
0:49:03 > 0:49:06..they had to clear the insurgents out.
0:49:06 > 0:49:08And that meant a fight.
0:49:12 > 0:49:13What the fuck was that?!
0:49:13 > 0:49:17We arrived to, quite literally, a hail of rounds coming in
0:49:17 > 0:49:21and a lot of rounds going back out from the vehicles.
0:49:21 > 0:49:24And the base was just like something you'd seen in training.
0:49:24 > 0:49:30Every guy stood tall on the walls firing off every weapon system they'd pretty much got.
0:49:32 > 0:49:34And what's your sniper call sign?
0:49:34 > 0:49:41What's his estimation on how far he'll be able to see in the next two hours with increased visibility?
0:49:41 > 0:49:47Captain Young led the Grenadiers' recce platoon in one of the clearance operations.
0:49:47 > 0:49:51We'd see them pick up their weapons and from there
0:49:51 > 0:49:54we'd watch them go to the firing point.
0:49:54 > 0:49:58When they got to a point where we wanted to hit them and we thought it was safe
0:49:58 > 0:50:01and that the population weren't going to have any ricochet any hazards,
0:50:01 > 0:50:03then we kill that individual.
0:50:03 > 0:50:08We'll identify them picking up their weapons and using snipers we'd hit them.
0:50:08 > 0:50:10We extracted 24 hours later.
0:50:12 > 0:50:18Though numbers are always vulgar, we killed a large number of guys that day.
0:50:18 > 0:50:22Two commanders and we killed 24 guys.
0:50:22 > 0:50:25But it was never numbers - it never is in Afghanistan.
0:50:25 > 0:50:28You could kill one you could kill 1000 - it doesn't mean anything.
0:50:28 > 0:50:31It's all about the psychological aspect, that sowing the seed
0:50:31 > 0:50:35of doubt or fear so that they will spread stories about you.
0:50:37 > 0:50:39Following these deadly clearance operations,
0:50:39 > 0:50:46the Guards now had so many troops in Nad-e Ali that they could set out to hold and then build effectively.
0:50:48 > 0:50:55Throughout 2010, a series of operations swamped the district,
0:50:55 > 0:51:02pushing the insurgents further out but never removing them completely.
0:51:02 > 0:51:03Get down! Get down!
0:51:03 > 0:51:04Fucker!
0:51:10 > 0:51:15We've stopped our call sign firing. It seems the engagement has ceased.
0:51:15 > 0:51:18I think this will be looked on in hindsight
0:51:18 > 0:51:22as one of the defining moves in the campaign.
0:51:22 > 0:51:25It released a lot of the pressure
0:51:25 > 0:51:28on Nad-e Ali because we were able to displace the insurgents.
0:51:30 > 0:51:36Now a year later, we went to see if the forces have been able to hold the district.
0:51:36 > 0:51:39British troops still say they're making good progress
0:51:39 > 0:51:44in the area of central Helmand which they now control.
0:51:44 > 0:51:49And to all intents and purposes, they are smothering the insurgency here.
0:51:50 > 0:51:53But have they been able to build
0:51:53 > 0:51:58and bring any real benefit to the ordinary Afghans?
0:51:59 > 0:52:04It seems peaceful enough in the bazaar but is this normality just superficial?
0:52:06 > 0:52:09Quite a few of the people I've greeted with as-salamu alaykum
0:52:09 > 0:52:15have not replied to me and generally I take that as a bad sign.
0:52:15 > 0:52:19Either they don't wish to be seen interacting with westerners
0:52:19 > 0:52:22or they may actually be actively hostile.
0:52:26 > 0:52:29But there are changes.
0:52:29 > 0:52:32Two years ago, this was an army base
0:52:32 > 0:52:35but now it's gone back to being a school.
0:52:40 > 0:52:44While Afghan women now have a clinic to visit -
0:52:44 > 0:52:47something unheard of under the Taliban.
0:52:55 > 0:53:01Last year, the British government announced that its combat operations would end by 2015.
0:53:08 > 0:53:15When the British troops leave, the areas they hold will be taken over by the Afghans.
0:53:15 > 0:53:24We've joined this joint operation between the Royal Irish Rangers and Afghan security forces
0:53:24 > 0:53:28as their mission continues to clear more areas.
0:53:31 > 0:53:36Their objective - to push in to one of the last Taliban-influenced sections of Nad-e Ali.
0:53:37 > 0:53:41This is the biggest air assault operation this battle group has conducted so far.
0:53:41 > 0:53:45People are keen for it. They're really, really up for it.
0:53:46 > 0:53:51We're going to start from south to north and try and clear out as much Taliban as we can from that area.
0:53:55 > 0:53:59We're going out on an operation with hundreds of Afghan and British troops
0:53:59 > 0:54:04to try and grow the area under their control even further.
0:54:21 > 0:54:27British and American helicopters are used to carry the assault in.
0:54:27 > 0:54:34Twice as many for this one operation as the British had for the whole province in 2006.
0:54:39 > 0:54:42Flooding the area led to no resistance or casualties.
0:54:42 > 0:54:49And if casualties are the criterion of success, this brigade returned home in April this year
0:54:49 > 0:54:54with around half the losses of the one in Helmand the year before.
0:54:54 > 0:54:57We're going to have a shifty round the compounds around us.
0:54:59 > 0:55:05Can one of you please tie the dog up? And put all the women into one room?
0:55:13 > 0:55:18Britain came here in 2006 to develop Helmand.
0:55:23 > 0:55:31But for every pound spent on reconstruction, UK PLC has spent 12 pounds on the war.
0:55:31 > 0:55:34Nine billion in all.
0:55:34 > 0:55:38Having set out to tame a province half the size of England,
0:55:38 > 0:55:44Britain's footprint has now been reduced to an area the size of Kent.
0:55:46 > 0:55:54And for all the killing, solutions will require non-military answers to Afghan's insurgency.
0:55:55 > 0:55:58Anybody who believes we can kill them all,
0:55:58 > 0:55:59that's simply not going to happen.
0:55:59 > 0:56:05What we have to do is push and kill enough of them, do enough reconstruction
0:56:05 > 0:56:08that it ignites developmental fires within the Afghans,
0:56:08 > 0:56:12create enough space that the Afghan army and police can develop.
0:56:16 > 0:56:21Afghan forces will take over from the British in 2015.
0:56:21 > 0:56:26One of the hardest things for those who've sacrificed so much in Helmand
0:56:26 > 0:56:33is the knowledge that the judgement about whether it was all worth it, will now hinge upon the Afghans.
0:56:33 > 0:56:38It really requires the Afghans to deliver a much better performance,
0:56:38 > 0:56:42whether that's in policing or the way they govern these districts,
0:56:42 > 0:56:45than they've shown at any time up to now.
0:56:45 > 0:56:48Otherwise these gains could easily be squandered.
0:56:50 > 0:56:57So what do those who've fought during the five years of combat,
0:56:57 > 0:56:59when hundreds of British lives have been lost,
0:56:59 > 0:57:02now think about the battle for Helmand?
0:57:05 > 0:57:12I don't really see that us being out there is keeping terrorism off the streets of Britain, to be honest.
0:57:12 > 0:57:15I think if anything it's stirring up a hornets' nest
0:57:15 > 0:57:19and it'll actually bring terrorism to the streets of Britain.
0:57:20 > 0:57:27The tour has had such a profound impact on me, my personality
0:57:27 > 0:57:33because you lose close friends and a lot of guys got injured, physically and mentally.
0:57:33 > 0:57:36A couple of times I've forgotten that I've actually lost my leg
0:57:36 > 0:57:40but there's other days where I can't get the leg on.
0:57:40 > 0:57:42I was just wheelchair bound.
0:57:42 > 0:57:44So each day's different.
0:57:44 > 0:57:47If you look at the situation on the ground today
0:57:47 > 0:57:50compared to what it was in 2006 when I was there,
0:57:50 > 0:57:53it's just a staggering improvement.
0:57:53 > 0:57:56It looks to me as if we can be cautiously optimistic.
0:57:56 > 0:57:59I do think it's worth us being there.
0:57:59 > 0:58:04Equally, I think it's worth doing it better than we do.
0:58:05 > 0:58:12The gap between policy-making and its subsequent implementation was far too wide.
0:58:12 > 0:58:14We've muddled through.
0:58:16 > 0:58:22Next week, Lyse Doucet takes a journey away from the battlefield
0:58:22 > 0:58:28to show a more surprising side of Afghanistan - the country she's grown to love.
0:58:32 > 0:58:35Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd
0:58:35 > 0:58:38E-mail subtitling@bbc.co.uk