0:00:02 > 0:00:07This programme contains some strong language and scenes which some viewers may find upsetting.
0:00:08 > 0:00:13Some time after sunset, a group of men gathered together in Kandahar
0:00:13 > 0:00:16to savour the moment they made history.
0:00:19 > 0:00:22Televisions had been banned in Afghanistan,
0:00:22 > 0:00:25but these men were honoured guests.
0:00:25 > 0:00:30Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda faithful were there to watch
0:00:30 > 0:00:32the horror of 9/11 unfold.
0:00:35 > 0:00:38What al-Qaeda call "The Manhattan Raid".
0:00:42 > 0:00:45So the West invaded Afghanistan.
0:00:45 > 0:00:50There was a belief it could be done quickly, with a very light footprint,
0:00:50 > 0:00:53we could be in and we could be out again,
0:00:53 > 0:00:56and we ended up doing neither one thing nor the other.
0:00:56 > 0:01:01Instead 47 nations - America and Britain especially -
0:01:01 > 0:01:05have been sucked ever deeper into a quagmire.
0:01:05 > 0:01:07I used to ask myself every time I went to Afghanistan,
0:01:07 > 0:01:08"What are we doing here?"
0:01:13 > 0:01:15In the first of three programmes
0:01:15 > 0:01:19marking ten years of war in Afghanistan, I've been examining
0:01:19 > 0:01:22some of the key decisions that have shaped the conflict.
0:01:22 > 0:01:27A conflict that's cost many thousands of lives,
0:01:27 > 0:01:32including more than 370 British servicemen and women.
0:01:35 > 0:01:39With the right attention, the right strategy and the right resources,
0:01:39 > 0:01:43the war would be over and most of our boys would be home,
0:01:43 > 0:01:44but we didn't do it.
0:01:44 > 0:01:47It's important to give people a clear idea
0:01:47 > 0:01:49that there is an end to this.
0:01:51 > 0:01:56So will the death of Osama Bin Laden, who started the Afghan war,
0:01:56 > 0:01:58bring us any closer to an end?
0:02:21 > 0:02:26Two years before 9/11, Afghanistan's UN envoy arrived in New York.
0:02:26 > 0:02:29There he handed in his resignation.
0:02:32 > 0:02:34I went to the Security Council and said,
0:02:34 > 0:02:36"Look, I have done everything I know
0:02:36 > 0:02:38"and it has got us nowhere.
0:02:38 > 0:02:41"I haven't got anywhere, because you are not supporting me,
0:02:41 > 0:02:44"you are not interested in Afghanistan.
0:02:44 > 0:02:45"But you are wrong."
0:02:45 > 0:02:49Afghanistan had become a pariah state.
0:02:49 > 0:02:52The Taliban government had allowed al-Qaeda
0:02:52 > 0:02:54to establish its base there.
0:02:54 > 0:03:01From where Osama bin Laden declared a holy war on Jews and Christians.
0:03:01 > 0:03:07The Taliban shared with al-Qaeda its medieval version of Islam.
0:03:07 > 0:03:10The United Nations had been trying to persuade the Taliban
0:03:10 > 0:03:11to kick out al-Qaeda.
0:03:11 > 0:03:16Their envoy had a rare meeting with the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar,
0:03:16 > 0:03:21a veteran of the war against the Russian invaders of the 1980s.
0:03:21 > 0:03:28Very shy man, you know he had lost an eye and he was,
0:03:28 > 0:03:29he was very much aware of that.
0:03:29 > 0:03:35So he kept, you know, always playing with his hand like this.
0:03:35 > 0:03:38Very, very soft spoken.
0:03:38 > 0:03:41I told him, look, this group have an agenda that has nothing to do
0:03:41 > 0:03:46with Afghanistan, and that will create a lot of problems for you.
0:03:46 > 0:03:51He said, "Osama bin Laden, he's our guest."
0:03:54 > 0:03:57In Afghanistan, Bin Laden was more than a guest.
0:03:57 > 0:04:02As a wealthy Saudi, he helped bankroll the Taliban regime.
0:04:02 > 0:04:07Mullah Omar refused to disown his friend and benefactor.
0:04:07 > 0:04:10Lakhdar Brahimi's mission had failed.
0:04:10 > 0:04:14He warned the Security Council that by ignoring Afghanistan,
0:04:14 > 0:04:16they were storing up trouble.
0:04:20 > 0:04:23You are wrong to think that, you know, this is a small country,
0:04:23 > 0:04:27far away country, that what happens there is irrelevant.
0:04:27 > 0:04:30It will blow in our faces.
0:04:35 > 0:04:37Holy shit!
0:04:45 > 0:04:48The impact of 9/11 cannot be understated.
0:04:48 > 0:04:50It was the deadliest attack
0:04:50 > 0:04:53against America in its history.
0:04:53 > 0:04:56With nearly 3,000 dead,
0:04:56 > 0:05:00it was inevitable that America would strike back.
0:05:00 > 0:05:04The people who knocked these buildings down
0:05:04 > 0:05:06will hear all of us soon.
0:05:06 > 0:05:09Prompting America to invade Afghanistan
0:05:09 > 0:05:14was exactly what Osama bin Laden was hoping for on September 11th.
0:05:14 > 0:05:16His son has told us,
0:05:16 > 0:05:18in retrospect, my father's dream
0:05:18 > 0:05:22was to get America to invade Afghanistan.
0:05:24 > 0:05:26To me, it's just common sense,
0:05:26 > 0:05:28obviously you just got to go get the guy.
0:05:28 > 0:05:32America gave the Taliban every chance to avoid war.
0:05:32 > 0:05:36All they had to do was hand over Bin Laden.
0:05:36 > 0:05:38If Bin Laden's the guy we want,
0:05:38 > 0:05:41send the assassination team out and get him.
0:05:41 > 0:05:45There was a serious effort to persuade the Taliban
0:05:45 > 0:05:47you do not want to go down with al-Qaeda.
0:05:47 > 0:05:49If you'll hand these guys over,
0:05:49 > 0:05:51our war isn't with you.
0:05:51 > 0:05:56The Taliban response was that their ancient hospitality code
0:05:56 > 0:05:59trumped all other considerations.
0:05:59 > 0:06:02It was a no, that we're not going to separate ourselves
0:06:02 > 0:06:05from traditional hospitality, welcoming of guests.
0:06:05 > 0:06:08It's hard for us to understand that when you're dealing
0:06:08 > 0:06:09with a man like Osama Bin Laden.
0:06:09 > 0:06:12It happens, it happens like that.
0:06:12 > 0:06:17Yes. The life of the guest is protected by the lives of the hosts.
0:06:18 > 0:06:23Nearly four weeks after 9/11 America's patience ran out.
0:06:28 > 0:06:33The President told his generals to unleash "Holy Hell".
0:06:33 > 0:06:39On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against
0:06:39 > 0:06:41al-Qaeda terrorist training camps
0:06:41 > 0:06:45and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
0:06:47 > 0:06:52America was determined not to get bogged down in Afghanistan.
0:06:52 > 0:06:56So there was no large ground invasion, no heavy armour.
0:06:56 > 0:07:01Instead, America relied on CIA operatives, precision, speed,
0:07:01 > 0:07:06just 1,800 troops, and buying up Afghan militias.
0:07:06 > 0:07:09Its plan was "war-lite".
0:07:10 > 0:07:16We sent in 20 or 30 CIA officers with several million dollars
0:07:16 > 0:07:18in walking-around money
0:07:18 > 0:07:23and bought the Northern Alliance over to our side.
0:07:23 > 0:07:27The Northern Alliance was a coalition of warlords
0:07:27 > 0:07:30which had once ruled much of Afghanistan.
0:07:30 > 0:07:31They were a rag tag militia
0:07:31 > 0:07:36now aligned to the world's most sophisticated fighting force.
0:07:42 > 0:07:45In the 1990s, the Northern Alliance had lost to the Taliban
0:07:45 > 0:07:49in a civil war costing tens of thousands of lives.
0:07:49 > 0:07:52The tables were now turning.
0:08:05 > 0:08:11On 13th November 2001, just five weeks after the invasion,
0:08:11 > 0:08:14the Northern Alliance captured the capital Kabul.
0:08:14 > 0:08:17It looked like the war was over.
0:08:17 > 0:08:22That's not what Osama bin Laden thought was going to happen,
0:08:22 > 0:08:25he thought it would be a long, protracted, guerrilla struggle.
0:08:25 > 0:08:26He was surprised.
0:08:34 > 0:08:36The celebrations in Kabul
0:08:36 > 0:08:42concealed a mass of underlying tribal and sectarian tensions.
0:08:42 > 0:08:46The Northern Alliance represented ethnic groups in the North.
0:08:46 > 0:08:52The Taliban were drawn from the majority Pashtun of the South.
0:08:52 > 0:08:55To avoid another inter-ethnic civil war, Afghanistan
0:08:55 > 0:09:00needed a leader acceptable to both.
0:09:06 > 0:09:11That leader was a Pashtun who teamed up with US Special Forces
0:09:11 > 0:09:14at a secret air base near the Pakistan border.
0:09:14 > 0:09:17His name was Hamid Karzai.
0:09:17 > 0:09:22In 2001 my mission was to link up with Hamid Karzai.
0:09:22 > 0:09:24I liked him immediately.
0:09:24 > 0:09:28I can't say I've worked with many Afghan warlords before,
0:09:28 > 0:09:30so maybe they're all equally personable.
0:09:30 > 0:09:36But Karzai was a very modest man. Very polite.
0:09:37 > 0:09:40Captain Amerine's mission was to help Karzai
0:09:40 > 0:09:42raise an army against the Taliban.
0:09:42 > 0:09:44The Taliban had retreated south
0:09:44 > 0:09:50and were regrouping for a last stand in their spiritual home in Kandahar.
0:10:01 > 0:10:05During a chaotic day of fighting, Karzai and Amerine learnt
0:10:05 > 0:10:10that hundreds of Taliban fighters were closing in on them.
0:10:10 > 0:10:13Basically as all hell was breaking loose and we were waiting
0:10:13 > 0:10:16for the Taliban to overrun our location and kill everybody,
0:10:16 > 0:10:20Karzai was standing out there in the street calmly directing people
0:10:20 > 0:10:24and trying to gather up guerrillas to fight with us.
0:10:24 > 0:10:26He was definitely cool under pressure.
0:10:34 > 0:10:36We received a phone call late at night.
0:10:36 > 0:10:39Everybody was asleep except me and Karzai.
0:10:39 > 0:10:43After he hung up, it was like, you know, "Who was that?"
0:10:45 > 0:10:48And he says to me, "Oh, that was an intermediary for Mullah Omar."
0:10:50 > 0:10:51And I kind of did a double take.
0:10:51 > 0:10:54I'm like, "What did Mullah Omar want?"
0:10:56 > 0:11:00The Taliban leader wanted to explore the terms of a surrender.
0:11:00 > 0:11:04Provided the Taliban returned peacefully to their homes,
0:11:04 > 0:11:05the war would be over.
0:11:05 > 0:11:12At least, that's what the Taliban say Hamid Karzai promised Mullah Omar.
0:11:12 > 0:11:16He promised to him that this is your country, to live in
0:11:16 > 0:11:22your country peacefully with all your natural rights and the human rights.
0:11:22 > 0:11:25But they were not allowed to live peacefully in this country.
0:11:25 > 0:11:29Washington rejected a deal with the Taliban.
0:11:29 > 0:11:33Their Afghan mission was "Kill or Capture"
0:11:33 > 0:11:38and they made no distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
0:11:38 > 0:11:40Get your BLEEPing head down.
0:11:40 > 0:11:42- Do you think that was a mistake? - I do.
0:11:42 > 0:11:45Certainly below the level of Mullah Omar,
0:11:45 > 0:11:48to have considered a political approach
0:11:48 > 0:11:50which would have offered the Taliban
0:11:50 > 0:11:54possibilities for them to participate in the political process,
0:11:54 > 0:11:58provided that they would cut their ties with international terrorism.
0:11:58 > 0:12:02I think history will judge that as a missed opportunity.
0:12:07 > 0:12:10Because Washington wanted to get in and out of Afghanistan swiftly,
0:12:10 > 0:12:16there were few US troops to chase the fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.
0:12:16 > 0:12:21The hunt for Osama bin Laden took special forces
0:12:21 > 0:12:25to a network of caves close to the Pakistan border.
0:12:25 > 0:12:26This top hill.
0:12:27 > 0:12:31Very top up there. That's supposedly where Bin Laden's hanging out.
0:12:31 > 0:12:35The Americans had deployed less than 100 troops
0:12:35 > 0:12:40with which to seal all routes out of these vast mountains.
0:12:40 > 0:12:44Bin Laden slipped away, as did the Taliban leaders.
0:12:44 > 0:12:46We took our eye off the ball
0:12:46 > 0:12:51and gave Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar a remarkable second chance.
0:12:51 > 0:12:56And in one of the most brilliant military comebacks of modern times,
0:12:56 > 0:12:59the Taliban went from the ashes of defeat
0:12:59 > 0:13:04to being on the outskirts of Kabul in a matter of less than a decade.
0:13:08 > 0:13:11Any hope that the Afghan war would be brief
0:13:11 > 0:13:16vanished when Bin Laden and Mullah Omar slipped across the border
0:13:16 > 0:13:19into Pakistan's Pashtun tribal lands.
0:13:21 > 0:13:25Greeting the fugitives were not only friends and family,
0:13:25 > 0:13:29but also elements of Pakistan's military intelligence
0:13:29 > 0:13:33sympathetic to al-Qaeda and who'd also helped the Taliban
0:13:33 > 0:13:37win the Afghan civil war in the 1990s.
0:13:37 > 0:13:39They wanted a government in Kabul
0:13:39 > 0:13:43that was under their influence and control.
0:13:43 > 0:13:45And which was not under the influence of India.
0:13:45 > 0:13:50They'd given them their first batch of serious weaponry,
0:13:50 > 0:13:52ammunition, money.
0:13:54 > 0:13:56There were Pakistani military officers
0:13:56 > 0:13:59who were working and serving with the Taliban.
0:14:01 > 0:14:05After 9/11, Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf,
0:14:05 > 0:14:07bowed to American pressure
0:14:07 > 0:14:10and promised to cut his government's ties to the Taliban.
0:14:14 > 0:14:17The Bush administration was ecstatic
0:14:17 > 0:14:23when Musharraf agreed to switch sides, after September 11th.
0:14:23 > 0:14:27President Bush is a man who believes very strongly
0:14:27 > 0:14:29in personal relationships
0:14:29 > 0:14:32and he believed that he and General Musharraf
0:14:32 > 0:14:34had developed a strong bond between them.
0:14:34 > 0:14:38Many al-Qaeda members were arrested.
0:14:39 > 0:14:43Not so the Taliban high command.
0:14:43 > 0:14:46Mullah Omar and his fellow fugitive leaders
0:14:46 > 0:14:51were reported to be living openly in the border city of Quetta.
0:14:51 > 0:14:53Right on the outskirts of Quetta
0:14:53 > 0:14:56there is the biggest refugee camp, about 100,000 people.
0:14:56 > 0:14:59Now, this is the centre of everything
0:14:59 > 0:15:03- and control... - The centre of the Taliban?
0:15:03 > 0:15:07- Yes, centre of any terrorist coming and going.- Any jihadi group?
0:15:07 > 0:15:09Yeah, anyone could come there and go.
0:15:09 > 0:15:12Can you differentiate between a Taliban or a refugee?
0:15:12 > 0:15:15No, sir, you cannot.
0:15:15 > 0:15:20They have the same beards, carrying weapons, so it's the same people.
0:15:22 > 0:15:26In Kabul, the Afghan Intelligence Service did not accept
0:15:26 > 0:15:31there was an innocent explanation to Mullah Omar's presence.
0:15:31 > 0:15:34From the outset, there was deep distrust of Pakistan's motives.
0:15:34 > 0:15:38The Taliban leadership were hibernating in Pakistan.
0:15:38 > 0:15:41They were not defeated or killed.
0:15:41 > 0:15:46The Americans received verbal assurances from President Musharraf
0:15:46 > 0:15:48that Pakistan will cooperate.
0:15:48 > 0:15:53But they kept the Taliban intact. I mean the leadership of the Taliban.
0:15:53 > 0:15:56I learnt over time in dealing with President Musharraf
0:15:56 > 0:16:01that he would literally tell me truth.
0:16:01 > 0:16:05I had an occasion where I asked him to dismantle a certain terrorist camp
0:16:05 > 0:16:07that was directed towards Kashmir.
0:16:07 > 0:16:12And after we wrangled a bit about it, he agreed.
0:16:12 > 0:16:14And he did? He dismantled it?
0:16:14 > 0:16:15He did dismantle it.
0:16:15 > 0:16:19However, he "re-mantled" it a couple of kilometres away.
0:16:19 > 0:16:20Now, when I went back to him,
0:16:20 > 0:16:25I said "Now, this time, I need you to dismantle this terrorist camp.
0:16:25 > 0:16:31"So let's say you have 12 in total, tomorrow there'll be 11 and every day after this there'll be 11."
0:16:31 > 0:16:33"OK, I agree". And he did it.
0:16:36 > 0:16:39Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan
0:16:39 > 0:16:42now occupy cells in Guantanamo Bay.
0:16:45 > 0:16:49Four months after 9/11, there was a feeling in Washington
0:16:49 > 0:16:51of mission accomplished.
0:16:57 > 0:17:00Liberated from the austerity of the Taliban regime,
0:17:00 > 0:17:04Afghans celebrated the birth of new freedoms.
0:17:04 > 0:17:06A free press, a role for women
0:17:06 > 0:17:10and eventually the first democratically elected head of state.
0:17:10 > 0:17:13But the Americans made it clear from the start
0:17:13 > 0:17:17that they weren't there to rebuild Afghanistan.
0:17:17 > 0:17:21That was a job for Hamid Karzai's new government.
0:17:21 > 0:17:23The US insisted that public safety
0:17:23 > 0:17:28in Afghanistan should be a responsibility for the Afghans,
0:17:28 > 0:17:29despite the fact
0:17:29 > 0:17:33that at this point the country had no army and no police force.
0:17:33 > 0:17:35The US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld,
0:17:35 > 0:17:38said it would be a fool's errand
0:17:38 > 0:17:44to get more involved in a tribal society as complex as Afghanistan.
0:17:44 > 0:17:48Rumsfeld said US forces would use their influence to prevent outright fighting,
0:17:48 > 0:17:53but that nobody would do peacekeeping or public security outside of Kabul.
0:17:57 > 0:17:59Wouldn't get that in Colchester, would you?
0:17:59 > 0:18:01Britain led the first group
0:18:01 > 0:18:05of international forces to assist with the security of Kabul.
0:18:05 > 0:18:11That left 80% of the country - more than twice the size of the UK - unsecured.
0:18:13 > 0:18:17Who did Secretary Rumsfeld think then was going to keep
0:18:17 > 0:18:20law and order if it wasn't going to be a stabilisation force?
0:18:20 > 0:18:24- My view is, he did not care. - How did he imagine
0:18:24 > 0:18:26that stability was going to arise out of a....
0:18:26 > 0:18:32I don't think, I don't think he cared about stability. He was intent, give him his credit,
0:18:32 > 0:18:35on dismantling and destroying Al-Qaeda.
0:18:35 > 0:18:39I don't think he was intent at all on what the Afghan of the future,
0:18:39 > 0:18:41the Afghanistan of the future would look like.
0:18:41 > 0:18:45It was right not to put ourselves in the business of trying to govern
0:18:45 > 0:18:49a foreign country for which we had neither the cultural
0:18:49 > 0:18:52nor the linguistic capacity to do it
0:18:52 > 0:18:56and which would have dragged us into Afghan quarrels,
0:18:56 > 0:19:02and pretty soon we would be the problem, not as an occupying power, but it's beyond our competence.
0:19:02 > 0:19:06On the other hand, I think we should have done more to build up
0:19:06 > 0:19:10- the Afghan capability to provide for their own security.- Security forces.
0:19:10 > 0:19:17If there's one thing I would wish we had done, it was to use the time when things were relatively quiet.
0:19:17 > 0:19:21Karzai had no militia of his own.
0:19:21 > 0:19:25His interim government brokered by the UN included warlords -
0:19:25 > 0:19:30the same people whose violence and corruption
0:19:30 > 0:19:32had given rise to the Taliban.
0:19:32 > 0:19:35While they occupied cabinet seats in Kabul,
0:19:35 > 0:19:38their militias filled the power vacuum outside.
0:19:38 > 0:19:43People forget that he didn't create this administration, we did. The international community,
0:19:43 > 0:19:46including the United Nations,
0:19:46 > 0:19:50including myself, we formed this government.
0:19:50 > 0:19:53We told him "please come to Kabul and lead this group".
0:19:53 > 0:19:59We allied ourselves with former warlords.
0:19:59 > 0:20:01Our objective was to destroy Al-Qaeda.
0:20:01 > 0:20:05And we very much then created and empowered
0:20:05 > 0:20:11a group of political actors not accountable and also people who,
0:20:11 > 0:20:17as they grew in power, actually caused more instability.
0:20:17 > 0:20:21In all this, the Taliban, who just months earlier had been
0:20:21 > 0:20:26the government of Afghanistan, seemed to have just vanished.
0:20:26 > 0:20:31I was one of the people who was saying "look, where are the Taliban?
0:20:33 > 0:20:38"They're, you know, these people controlled 90% of the country a few weeks ago."
0:20:38 > 0:20:41- And what was the response? - The response was
0:20:41 > 0:20:44"they've been defeated, it's gone, finished, they'll never come back."
0:20:47 > 0:20:51Within six months of the invasion, Britain and America began to avert
0:20:51 > 0:20:56their gaze from Afghanistan, pre-occupied by another matter.
0:20:58 > 0:21:00Preparations for the war in Iraq.
0:21:03 > 0:21:07The biggest single mistake? Just one?
0:21:07 > 0:21:08Probably Iraq.
0:21:16 > 0:21:22We didn't know then, you know, the most important player in Afghanistan,
0:21:22 > 0:21:26the Americans, was absent-minded from day one,
0:21:26 > 0:21:29was looking somewhere else.
0:21:32 > 0:21:37The world was now focused almost exclusively on Iraq, while Taliban
0:21:37 > 0:21:42gunmen started to cross the porous border into southern Afghanistan.
0:21:42 > 0:21:49It was March 2003, just 18 months after the invasion.
0:21:49 > 0:21:52The Taliban were back.
0:21:52 > 0:21:55The Taliban went into Kandahar
0:21:55 > 0:22:00and they were looking for targets and there were very few targets,
0:22:00 > 0:22:04there were just Afghans living there, there were no foreign troops.
0:22:04 > 0:22:08There were a few Afghan government representatives who really weren't
0:22:08 > 0:22:12worth killing as far as the Taliban were concerned in those early days.
0:22:12 > 0:22:15So the Taliban just went further and further
0:22:15 > 0:22:19into Afghanistan, looking for targets.
0:22:19 > 0:22:22'The UN in Afghanistan has ordered staff not to travel by road
0:22:22 > 0:22:27'in the area where an international Red Cross worker was murdered last Thursday.'
0:22:27 > 0:22:31'He was ordered out of his car by a group of armed men and then shot.'
0:22:31 > 0:22:35You had American generals sending off cables, saying,
0:22:35 > 0:22:40you know, "something is happening", and sending cables even to Rumsfeld.
0:22:40 > 0:22:42And I think Rumsfeld ignored them.
0:22:42 > 0:22:45The White House ignored them.
0:22:45 > 0:22:52We clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period
0:22:52 > 0:22:56of stability and stabilisation and reconstruction and...activities.
0:23:00 > 0:23:04It was the forgotten war of 2002 to 2005.
0:23:04 > 0:23:09The Taliban were reorganising. They were licking their wounds
0:23:09 > 0:23:12and figuring out what to do next.
0:23:12 > 0:23:18There wasn't a heavy British or coalition loss, and the country seemed to be relatively stable.
0:23:18 > 0:23:20It wasn't a war on the front pages.
0:23:22 > 0:23:26Yet the Afghan war was far from over.
0:23:26 > 0:23:29In fact, it was about to reignite.
0:23:31 > 0:23:36By 2005, NATO was in control and did what Washington had so opposed at the start.
0:23:36 > 0:23:43They increased troop numbers and inched towards nation-building.
0:23:43 > 0:23:49NATO wanted to extend the authority of the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, beyond Kabul.
0:23:49 > 0:23:54Britain took on Helmand province.
0:24:00 > 0:24:04It was suggested that I go down to this place called Lashkar Gah.
0:24:07 > 0:24:11And everybody said, "it's not entirely safe, but you'll be OK."
0:24:12 > 0:24:16Boarding an old Russian helicopter, Britain's Foreign Office minister
0:24:16 > 0:24:23decided to take a look for himself at Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand province.
0:24:23 > 0:24:26And as we came into Lashkar Gah,
0:24:26 > 0:24:31I saw down below me this Beau Geste fort.
0:24:31 > 0:24:34The commander was a guy called Colonel Hogberg.
0:24:34 > 0:24:36I said, "what's it like here?"
0:24:36 > 0:24:42And he said, "well, sir, it ain't the end of the earth, but you can see it from here!"
0:24:42 > 0:24:47He said you could be wandering into a fight between two tribes
0:24:47 > 0:24:51or sub-tribes or villages over water rights.
0:24:51 > 0:24:55You could run into a drugs convoy.
0:24:55 > 0:24:59And he pointed out to me that some of these drugs columns
0:24:59 > 0:25:03actually had anti-aircraft missiles on them.
0:25:03 > 0:25:04You could be running into Taliban,
0:25:04 > 0:25:07or just a village that didn't like strangers.
0:25:07 > 0:25:11He said "we don't hang around, because you never know who's shooting at you."
0:25:11 > 0:25:14And this really struck me at the time
0:25:14 > 0:25:20as being an observation that we ought to take a bit of notice of.
0:25:20 > 0:25:22Helmand had little infrastructure,
0:25:22 > 0:25:27few public services, no functioning security, economy or justice system.
0:25:27 > 0:25:33The Blair government's vision for Helmand, however, did not lack for ambition.
0:25:33 > 0:25:37The original vision was that Karzai would be able to create
0:25:37 > 0:25:40a growing and sustainable peace,
0:25:40 > 0:25:44and this would create a space in which governance would spread.
0:25:44 > 0:25:48And some people likened this to creating Belgium in a couple of years.
0:25:50 > 0:25:55A team of experts was dispatched to Helmand by Whitehall in late 2005.
0:25:55 > 0:25:58Their task was to plan the delivery of this vision,
0:25:58 > 0:26:03with troops providing protection and expected home in just three years.
0:26:03 > 0:26:06It was a task of biblical proportions.
0:26:06 > 0:26:08It was a medieval province,
0:26:08 > 0:26:12vast open spaces. There was no infrastructure.
0:26:12 > 0:26:16I remember flying across the province's only road.
0:26:16 > 0:26:18Corruption ran from top to bottom.
0:26:18 > 0:26:21So when one looked at all of this,
0:26:21 > 0:26:26one saw a rudderless expanse of not much,
0:26:26 > 0:26:28where the principal economy was drugs.
0:26:28 > 0:26:31Some estimates said that 80%
0:26:31 > 0:26:33of the population were illiterate, and that extended
0:26:33 > 0:26:39to many key functions in government, including the Director of Education,
0:26:39 > 0:26:41who could not read or write.
0:26:41 > 0:26:45We didn't know how many police stations there were. The chief of police wasn't sure either.
0:26:45 > 0:26:48There were sporadic outbursts of violence
0:26:48 > 0:26:50because of the drug trafficking.
0:26:50 > 0:26:53And when I asked the American officer
0:26:53 > 0:26:57what background research I should do to understand Helmand better,
0:26:57 > 0:27:00he said I should watch The Sopranos.
0:27:00 > 0:27:05On their return home for Christmas, the planners met up with their Whitehall masters.
0:27:05 > 0:27:09The planners told them their vision for Helmand was unrealistic.
0:27:09 > 0:27:16The overwhelming impression I had of that afternoon was of the clock ticking.
0:27:16 > 0:27:21The conclusion that this was not achievable in three years
0:27:21 > 0:27:24was not an acceptable conclusion.
0:27:24 > 0:27:28There was an unforgiving timeline,
0:27:28 > 0:27:31and there was no time for discussion.
0:27:33 > 0:27:36The planners were told to get on with it.
0:27:36 > 0:27:39But they weren't the only ones asking awkward questions.
0:27:39 > 0:27:44The Foreign Office minister wrote to the Ministry of Defence.
0:27:44 > 0:27:48We're planning to go down there with 3,300 troops.
0:27:48 > 0:27:52We had 30,000 in Northern Ireland.
0:27:52 > 0:27:56Are we sure that we're going to be able to do something about this?
0:27:56 > 0:28:01And have we got enough helicopters, have we got enough water, can we, you know, can we do all of this?
0:28:03 > 0:28:06The generals said yes, yes, and yes.
0:28:06 > 0:28:10The military momentum was unstoppable.
0:28:10 > 0:28:13Britain was going to Helmand, come what may.
0:28:17 > 0:28:2416 Air Assault was the brigade chosen to provide protection for the reconstruction mission.
0:28:24 > 0:28:27They did anticipate some fighting.
0:28:27 > 0:28:31There was an awful lot of grenade launcher
0:28:31 > 0:28:33practice going on down the road.
0:28:33 > 0:28:38And there wasn't much of a queue for the development brief.
0:28:42 > 0:28:45There were a lot of stripped down vehicles going past.
0:28:49 > 0:28:54This was, I think, every soldier's dream, Afghanistan.
0:28:54 > 0:28:59Hugely historically resonant, extraordinary country, classic soldiering.
0:29:02 > 0:29:06Perhaps, as a former soldier myself, I understand that.
0:29:06 > 0:29:10My sense was that they had come with a larger place in the plan
0:29:10 > 0:29:12for malleting the Taliban.
0:29:12 > 0:29:16No, I dispute that. I mean, I'd been in the military for two dozen years.
0:29:16 > 0:29:18I'd been on a lot of operations.
0:29:18 > 0:29:22I knew the consequences of the wrong use of force.
0:29:22 > 0:29:24I'd been in Afghanistan twice before.
0:29:26 > 0:29:30The force deployed gave a maximum of only 800 fighting soldiers.
0:29:30 > 0:29:33So the reconstruction mission was limited
0:29:33 > 0:29:39to the central area of Helmand around the capital, Lashkar Gah.
0:29:44 > 0:29:49'Out on patrol in Helmand, the British troops have arrived
0:29:49 > 0:29:52'and are introducing themselves to their neighbours.'
0:29:54 > 0:29:55I'm good, fine. How are you?
0:29:55 > 0:30:01Does he understand why the British soldiers are in Lashkar Gah?
0:30:02 > 0:30:04TRANSLATOR: No, sir. He said no.
0:30:06 > 0:30:11From the moment troops arrived, Helmand's Afghan governor warned that his authority was being
0:30:11 > 0:30:15undermined by lawless gunmen in the north.
0:30:15 > 0:30:17He urged the army to deal with them.
0:30:19 > 0:30:22His argument was very much saying,
0:30:22 > 0:30:26"I need you to make sure that the flag of Afghanistan flies
0:30:26 > 0:30:28"over all of the district centres".
0:30:28 > 0:30:31Did you resist that to begin with or not?
0:30:31 > 0:30:35We did, we made it very clear that we were going to be extremely limited
0:30:35 > 0:30:39in our capability to do other operations.
0:30:41 > 0:30:45The generals in London judged that deploying north was unsustainable.
0:30:45 > 0:30:49But the Helmand Governor persevered and was supported
0:30:49 > 0:30:53by the British embassy in Kabul and the Secret Intelligence Service.
0:30:53 > 0:30:57By late May, the generals relented.
0:30:57 > 0:31:03The order was given to defend positions up to 70 miles from the reconstruction area.
0:31:10 > 0:31:15By late June, the army was thinly spread across three new flashpoints
0:31:15 > 0:31:20and about to stretch to yet a fourth - the town of Sangin.
0:31:24 > 0:31:25There were no angels in Sangin.
0:31:25 > 0:31:31There were two warring drug cartels, effectively, in Sangin.
0:31:31 > 0:31:34And here we were, about to deploy British troops
0:31:34 > 0:31:36in between those two drugs cartels.
0:31:36 > 0:31:44I did everything I possibly could to engage anyone who had decision-making authority to say "this is madness.
0:31:44 > 0:31:47- "This cannot be happening." - But it was.
0:31:47 > 0:31:52The arrival of the troops stirred up a hornets' nest.
0:31:52 > 0:31:56I was furious watching that type of decision-making
0:31:56 > 0:32:02that ended up...uprooting the entire plan that we'd devised.
0:32:04 > 0:32:07The summer of 2006 saw the British army
0:32:07 > 0:32:12engaged in some of its fiercest fighting in half a century.
0:32:15 > 0:32:20- How does this compare to Iraq? - Oh, it's a lot worse. That was a lot better.
0:32:20 > 0:32:22We didn't see any action in Iraq.
0:32:22 > 0:32:25Out here, every day you can guarantee small arms fire incoming.
0:32:30 > 0:32:33Pinned down in a series of Alamos across the north of Helmand,
0:32:33 > 0:32:37British soldiers became magnets for attacks from the Taliban,
0:32:37 > 0:32:42drug gangs and locals just angry at the presence of foreigners.
0:32:42 > 0:32:47A lot of the people we were killing were effectively farmers who'd had
0:32:47 > 0:32:52- AK-47s put in their hands by the Taliban leadership.- Part-time Talibs.
0:32:52 > 0:32:55Part-time Talibs, part-time Talibs and not very well trained ones.
0:32:55 > 0:32:58We killed huge numbers of them.
0:32:58 > 0:33:01I don't think that was to our liking at all. We were conscious
0:33:01 > 0:33:05that with everyone we killed, we were probably actually fuelling the insurgency.
0:33:07 > 0:33:10The general responsible for overseeing day to day operations
0:33:10 > 0:33:15in Helmand was Sir Peter Wall, now head of the British Army.
0:33:15 > 0:33:18The mission changed dramatically.
0:33:18 > 0:33:21- No, I don't think the mission did change.- Really?- No.
0:33:21 > 0:33:22Change in what way?
0:33:22 > 0:33:26Do you mean the aim changed or the mode of delivery changed?
0:33:26 > 0:33:28Well, the original mission was a sort of
0:33:28 > 0:33:31"hearts and minds, help bring governance" mission
0:33:31 > 0:33:34for this limited area in the centre of Helmand.
0:33:34 > 0:33:39And within a matter of weeks, 16 Air Assault were fighting for their lives in a series of Alamos
0:33:39 > 0:33:41and no governance, none at all taking place.
0:33:41 > 0:33:46Had we not gone north, what would have happened, in your estimation?
0:33:46 > 0:33:48That's not for me to say.
0:33:48 > 0:33:52- You were in charge of operational decision.- Yeah.
0:33:52 > 0:33:54So what's your estimation?
0:33:54 > 0:33:57Afghan governance in Helmand would have collapsed.
0:33:57 > 0:34:02You'd have seen the Taliban breaking out, and you'd have had your Alamos in different parts of Helmand.
0:34:13 > 0:34:16Fuck me!
0:34:16 > 0:34:19Where have you seen the Taliban? Where?
0:34:20 > 0:34:23The original mission was to win hearts and minds.
0:34:23 > 0:34:29You would accept, I guess, that if only because we needed to protect our soldiers,
0:34:29 > 0:34:32that quite a lot of Afghan hearts were lost in the process?
0:34:32 > 0:34:35Undoubtedly. Yeah, undoubtedly. I accept that.
0:34:35 > 0:34:38This guy is ID-ing these here and saying they're Taliban.
0:34:39 > 0:34:43Two men?
0:34:43 > 0:34:44Taliban, yeah?
0:34:44 > 0:34:49How much of your original plan did you manage to implement?
0:34:49 > 0:34:51Not really very much!
0:34:53 > 0:34:55After the first 18 months of hard fighting,
0:34:55 > 0:34:59understanding the challenges the Taliban posed,
0:34:59 > 0:35:04our expectations changed from Belgium in two years
0:35:04 > 0:35:06to Bangladesh in 30.
0:35:06 > 0:35:09The scale of the challenges really became apparent.
0:35:13 > 0:35:15Jesus! Stay still.
0:35:15 > 0:35:17Stay fucking still.
0:35:17 > 0:35:20Jack, we've got to get him out now!
0:35:27 > 0:35:33In the first five years of the Afghan conflict, two British soldiers had been killed in action.
0:35:33 > 0:35:37In 2006 alone, that rose to 39.
0:35:37 > 0:35:42A slow drumbeat of death began to roll.
0:35:46 > 0:35:49Ministers said the sacrifice was about keeping the streets of Britain
0:35:49 > 0:35:53safe by denying Al-Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan.
0:36:02 > 0:36:06Yet a mission that had been intended to help stabilise Afghanistan
0:36:06 > 0:36:10seemed to have made it less stable.
0:36:10 > 0:36:16'There's no doubt that the Taliban are growing in confidence and they're focusing their attention on Kabul.'
0:36:16 > 0:36:19'Another bomb blast on the streets of Kabul.
0:36:19 > 0:36:22'This is becoming increasingly familiar.'
0:36:26 > 0:36:31By the start of 2007, violence had spread across much of the country,
0:36:31 > 0:36:34with a sevenfold increase in suicide bombings.
0:36:34 > 0:36:39Many were being planned and executed from Pakistan.
0:36:40 > 0:36:45The then US commander was General Karl Eikenberry.
0:36:45 > 0:36:50He had regular meetings with the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai.
0:36:50 > 0:36:55'Many of my conversations with him were conversations'
0:36:55 > 0:36:59of maybe 60 minutes and 58 minutes would be spent on Pakistan.
0:36:59 > 0:37:01And my view was, initially,
0:37:01 > 0:37:05'he seems to be obsessing on this subject, but I have to tell you,'
0:37:05 > 0:37:09as I look back on it, he was correct, it was a very serious problem.
0:37:09 > 0:37:12I think around that time Pakistan came to the conclusion
0:37:12 > 0:37:15maybe the coalition was going to be short of breath.
0:37:15 > 0:37:18I believe very strongly that if the coalition
0:37:18 > 0:37:22was not going to prevail in Afghanistan then Pakistan
0:37:22 > 0:37:24wanted to make sure that they had some seat at the table.
0:37:26 > 0:37:29A seat for Pakistan by using the Taliban
0:37:29 > 0:37:33to gain influence inside Afghanistan.
0:37:33 > 0:37:38The CIA concluded that America's closest ally in the region could no longer be trusted.
0:37:38 > 0:37:45Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, was playing a double game.
0:37:46 > 0:37:49Do you want to know where the headquarters of the Afghan Taliban is?
0:37:49 > 0:37:53Find the headquarters of the ISI, they are in the same building.
0:37:53 > 0:37:56We've even had reports of Pakistani officers
0:37:56 > 0:37:59being killed inside Afghanistan,
0:37:59 > 0:38:03fighting with the Afghan Taliban as expert advisors to them.
0:38:05 > 0:38:11The Afghans also insist that Pakistan intelligence was protecting the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.
0:38:11 > 0:38:13- They know where he is?- Of course.
0:38:13 > 0:38:15He is in their safe house.
0:38:17 > 0:38:20Did they ever tell you where he was when you were...?
0:38:20 > 0:38:23I told them where he was and they got panicked.
0:38:23 > 0:38:26Not once, not twice - time and again.
0:38:26 > 0:38:28Why did you not hand over Mullah Omar to the Americans?
0:38:28 > 0:38:30He never came to Pakistan.
0:38:30 > 0:38:32- He did!- That is the normal belief.
0:38:32 > 0:38:34He came to Pakistan at the end of 2002.
0:38:34 > 0:38:36No, I don't think so, ever.
0:38:36 > 0:38:38You don't think he is even there today?
0:38:38 > 0:38:40No, I don't think. He'll be mad if he's in Pakistan.
0:38:40 > 0:38:45- Where do you think he is? - He'll be in his own area.
0:38:45 > 0:38:47- In Afghanistan?- Yes.
0:38:47 > 0:38:49You think Mullah Omar is in Afghanistan?
0:38:49 > 0:38:52- Yes, indeed.- You must be the only person who does?
0:38:52 > 0:38:54Well, I'm the only person? No.
0:38:55 > 0:38:59The people who don't believe that are probably West and United States.
0:38:59 > 0:39:03I don't think anyone else believes that he is in Pakistan.
0:39:08 > 0:39:13By the end of 2008, many of the Bush administration's major goals
0:39:13 > 0:39:16for Afghanistan were in reverse.
0:39:16 > 0:39:19The 'Lite' military footprint was heavier.
0:39:19 > 0:39:2453,000 NATO troops - mostly American - and rising.
0:39:24 > 0:39:28Washington, once determined to avoid nation-building,
0:39:28 > 0:39:30was now spending many billions.
0:39:30 > 0:39:36And Pakistan, once their friend, was betraying them.
0:39:36 > 0:39:40America was getting sucked in deeper and deeper and there seemed no way out.
0:39:40 > 0:39:43CROWD CHEERS
0:39:45 > 0:39:50- Thank you.- All eyes turned to a new president for fresh thinking.
0:39:50 > 0:39:54Thank you so much, everybody, thank you very much.
0:39:54 > 0:39:56Thank you, everybody.
0:39:58 > 0:40:01We meet at one of those defining moments,
0:40:01 > 0:40:04a moment when our nation is at war.
0:40:04 > 0:40:07'We left him a very poor hand of cards,'
0:40:07 > 0:40:13with very few choices. When Mr Obama came aboard,
0:40:13 > 0:40:18he was immediately faced with, "Be careful, don't lose Afghanistan."
0:40:22 > 0:40:29The President asked me to fly with him to California in early March 2009.
0:40:29 > 0:40:34And after reading my report, we spent the better part of a couple of hours going through it.
0:40:36 > 0:40:39President Obama had asked Bruce Riedel
0:40:39 > 0:40:43to write a no-holds-barred report on the Afghan crisis,
0:40:43 > 0:40:48and Riedel did not pull his punches.
0:40:48 > 0:40:53Defeat is what we were staring in the eye two years ago, catastrophic defeat in Afghanistan.
0:40:53 > 0:40:56With the Taliban taking over the southern half of the country
0:40:56 > 0:40:59and maybe being able to march on Kabul at some point in the future
0:40:59 > 0:41:04and the NATO Alliance fragmenting and falling apart.
0:41:06 > 0:41:10The President ordered his staff to go back to basics.
0:41:10 > 0:41:13What exactly were America's goals,
0:41:13 > 0:41:16and how best to achieve them?
0:41:16 > 0:41:19A gruelling policy review ensued.
0:41:19 > 0:41:21It would take eight long months.
0:41:29 > 0:41:32In settings somewhat humbler than Air Force One,
0:41:32 > 0:41:36an equally bleak picture had been briefed to the British Prime Minister.
0:41:39 > 0:41:43I was on my way home for the weekend and I'd got to Cardiff station
0:41:43 > 0:41:47and just got on the train that goes up the valley, and it was packed out.
0:41:47 > 0:41:53Suddenly the Prime Minister was on the phone, and you can't not take a call from the Prime Minister!
0:41:53 > 0:42:00Gordon Brown wanted Kim Howells' assessment of the Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai.
0:42:00 > 0:42:05Seven years earlier Karzai had been seen as Afghanistan's saviour.
0:42:05 > 0:42:08I told him that we would find it increasingly difficult
0:42:08 > 0:42:10trying to argue the case for continued death
0:42:10 > 0:42:16and the maiming of our young people in Afghanistan
0:42:16 > 0:42:21when they were fighting to prop up a regime that was basically...
0:42:21 > 0:42:22up to its eyeballs in corruption.
0:42:26 > 0:42:30These mansions had sprung up in a part of Kabul
0:42:30 > 0:42:35exclusively reserved for Afghanistan's military and political elite.
0:42:35 > 0:42:38Ordinary Afghans could only wonder how such luxuries
0:42:38 > 0:42:42could be afforded on a government wage.
0:42:46 > 0:42:50In early 2009, one of the US senators overseeing
0:42:50 > 0:42:54America's multi-billion-dollar investment in Afghanistan
0:42:54 > 0:42:58confronted Karzai in the Presidential Palace.
0:42:58 > 0:43:00The corruption in the country is rampant,
0:43:00 > 0:43:05very frustrating to go there year in and year out and say
0:43:05 > 0:43:09"When is somebody going to jail in Afghanistan for ripping off the Afghan people?
0:43:09 > 0:43:15"When is somebody connected to the highest narcotics dealer ever going to go to jail in this country?"
0:43:15 > 0:43:18- You said this to President Karzai? - Absolutely, just like I'm saying it.
0:43:18 > 0:43:20- At the dinner table?- Yes.
0:43:20 > 0:43:23"How much longer are the Afghan people going to have to wait
0:43:23 > 0:43:26"and the world going to have to wait till you see things change here?"
0:43:31 > 0:43:34This is Afghan MP, Dr Basher Dost,
0:43:34 > 0:43:39famous for giving most of his salary to the poor.
0:43:39 > 0:43:43In 2004, he resigned as Karzai's planning minister
0:43:43 > 0:43:46in protest at the epic scale of corruption.
0:43:46 > 0:43:51Karzai offered to let Bashar Dost head a new anti-corruption commission.
0:43:51 > 0:43:58He agreed, but only if he could investigate Karzai's cabinet.
0:44:10 > 0:44:11What was his response?
0:44:26 > 0:44:27So you left the government?
0:44:31 > 0:44:35In August 2009, Karzai stood for re-election.
0:44:35 > 0:44:39- NEWSREADER:- Voting is underway in Afghanistan's presidential election.
0:44:39 > 0:44:43Corruption, fraud, apathy and the threat of attacks from the Taliban...
0:44:43 > 0:44:50Allegations of vote rigging and fraud have been ringing across the cities, valleys and plains of Afghanistan.
0:44:50 > 0:44:54The presidential election was wreathed in corruption.
0:44:54 > 0:44:57Ballot boxes were stuffed with false papers.
0:44:57 > 0:45:00The campaigns of both frontrunners were implicated.
0:45:00 > 0:45:04Karzai won a second term in office,
0:45:04 > 0:45:09but for the West it meant five more years with a partner who'd become a liability
0:45:09 > 0:45:14and whose state of mind was also ringing alarm bells.
0:45:14 > 0:45:16'President Karzai said to me several times'
0:45:16 > 0:45:20that he suspected the British Army was involved in
0:45:20 > 0:45:23the drugs trade in Helmand, otherwise we could have ended it.
0:45:23 > 0:45:28He was sure that if we really wanted to, we could defeat the Taliban in Helmand
0:45:28 > 0:45:33and we were choosing to keep the fighting going in order to give us an excuse to be there.
0:45:33 > 0:45:36I mean, there is an extraordinary paranoia.
0:45:36 > 0:45:44Afghanistan was beginning to look like just another tin-pot dictatorship.
0:45:47 > 0:45:55In America, on 1st December 2009, the President announced the results of his long-awaited Afghan review.
0:45:55 > 0:45:59I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan
0:45:59 > 0:46:04and the strategy my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion.
0:46:04 > 0:46:07After years of drift,
0:46:07 > 0:46:10America SEEMED to set its compass.
0:46:10 > 0:46:11It was getting out of Afghanistan.
0:46:11 > 0:46:16But not before having one last crack at the Taliban.
0:46:16 > 0:46:20If I did not think that the security of the United States
0:46:20 > 0:46:24and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan,
0:46:24 > 0:46:27I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.
0:46:27 > 0:46:31To reverse the Taliban's momentum,
0:46:31 > 0:46:35the generals told the President there'd need to be a military surge.
0:46:37 > 0:46:41The President sent another 30,000 troops to war.
0:46:41 > 0:46:48This has taken the total number of troops in Afghanistan to 142,000.
0:46:49 > 0:46:55What you do today, you will have to live with that shit for the next 10, 20, 30-plus years.
0:46:55 > 0:47:00This president decided that once in, he was in all the way
0:47:00 > 0:47:05and that he needed to give our commanders in Afghanistan
0:47:05 > 0:47:09the troops they felt necessary in order to turn the situation around.
0:47:09 > 0:47:11For the first time
0:47:11 > 0:47:17we had, if you like, the end state quantified in military terms.
0:47:17 > 0:47:20Up until then we had just been increasing bit by bit
0:47:20 > 0:47:23with never any clue of when enough was going to be enough.
0:47:24 > 0:47:30The Americans decided that to secure Helmand, 30,000 troops were needed.
0:47:30 > 0:47:34The most Britain could supply was 10,000.
0:47:35 > 0:47:38If the Americans hadn't gone into Helmand,
0:47:38 > 0:47:44there would have been a strategic defeat for the British Army.
0:47:44 > 0:47:50Well, there would have been an inability to get our strategic objectives secured,
0:47:50 > 0:47:53because the force levels required were beyond us.
0:47:53 > 0:47:56That's not a strategic defeat for the British Army.
0:47:56 > 0:47:57It's a strategic defeat for NATO,
0:47:57 > 0:48:00but the British Army would have done its job magnificently.
0:48:00 > 0:48:05The purpose of the surge is to clear ground held by the Taliban.
0:48:05 > 0:48:07Smoking!
0:48:09 > 0:48:10GUN FIRE
0:48:10 > 0:48:11Yeah, bitch!
0:48:17 > 0:48:19Oh, yeah, baby!
0:48:20 > 0:48:22I fucking love you. Do it right.
0:48:22 > 0:48:24- Check? - MEN SHOUT IN RESPONSE
0:48:25 > 0:48:32The Americans want to hand over the whole of Afghanistan to Afghan security forces by 2015.
0:48:32 > 0:48:36When the surge was announced, the British Foreign Secretary
0:48:36 > 0:48:40and his special envoy thought this was wildly ambitious.
0:48:40 > 0:48:44We asked a very senior Afghan minister
0:48:44 > 0:48:49how long the Afghan authorities would stay in Helmand after we left.
0:48:49 > 0:48:54And the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, was expecting an answer -
0:48:54 > 0:48:58three years, six years, you know, however long it took.
0:48:58 > 0:49:04And the answer from this minister - very close to President Karzai, knows Helmand very well -
0:49:04 > 0:49:10his answer with a broad grin was, "24 hours, Foreign Secretary, 24 hours."
0:49:10 > 0:49:12The Americans say that since then,
0:49:12 > 0:49:19there's been much progress from a 12 billion-a-year training programme.
0:49:19 > 0:49:25Yet they are building an Afghan army and police force whose cost neither they nor the Afghans can sustain.
0:49:27 > 0:49:33And corruption and drug-taking are still endemic, even while on guard duty.
0:49:35 > 0:49:41Ultimately, as long as the Afghan government lacks legitimacy with the overwhelming majority,
0:49:41 > 0:49:47its security forces may not be able to hold the Taliban at bay.
0:49:47 > 0:49:50At the end of the day if you follow a counter insurgency strategy,
0:49:50 > 0:49:52you must be true to its precepts.
0:49:52 > 0:49:56And one of the principal precepts is, in a counter insurgency,
0:49:56 > 0:49:59you're only as good as the government you represent and serve.
0:49:59 > 0:50:02In this case it's the government of Afghanistan.
0:50:04 > 0:50:11That is why the Americans say that US troops will only be withdrawn from combat by 2015
0:50:11 > 0:50:15if the Afghans are capable by then of taking over.
0:50:15 > 0:50:18Not so the British.
0:50:22 > 0:50:24In May last year, Britain got a new leader.
0:50:24 > 0:50:32Like the President, the Prime Minister says he too will withdraw combat forces by 2015.
0:50:32 > 0:50:36I believe the country needs to know there is an end point to all of this.
0:50:36 > 0:50:40From 2015, there will not be troops in anything like the numbers there are now
0:50:40 > 0:50:42and crucially they will not be in a combat role.
0:50:46 > 0:50:52Unlike the American President, however, the Prime Minister intends to withdraw from combat by 2015
0:50:52 > 0:50:58whether or not Afghan forces can prevent al-Qaeda returning to Afghanistan
0:50:58 > 0:51:04even though that's always been the justification for our soldiers dying there.
0:51:04 > 0:51:07If the assessment at the end of 2014 is that
0:51:07 > 0:51:11Afghanistan hasn't been hardened against the return of al-Qaeda,
0:51:11 > 0:51:14might that deadline have to slip?
0:51:14 > 0:51:16No, the deadline is a deadline and it won't slip.
0:51:16 > 0:51:22We have paid a very, very large price in terms of the number of young men
0:51:22 > 0:51:25and indeed some young women that we've lost in Afghanistan,
0:51:25 > 0:51:27now over 360 people.
0:51:27 > 0:51:32And I think if you're going to maintain public support and backing for what we're doing,
0:51:32 > 0:51:37it's important to give people a clear idea that there is an end to this.
0:51:37 > 0:51:40There are lots of domestic political reasons
0:51:40 > 0:51:43why the Prime Minister has selected that option
0:51:43 > 0:51:48and we've committed ourselves as the British Army to deliver against that timeline.
0:51:48 > 0:51:52And whether or not it turns out to be an absolute timeline
0:51:52 > 0:51:57or more conditions-based approach nearer the time, we shall find out.
0:51:57 > 0:52:00So it's not an absolute commitment then
0:52:00 > 0:52:05that we will get out of combat operations, irrespective of the conditions on the ground?
0:52:05 > 0:52:09- It's certainly the intention. - The intention, yeah, but things could change?
0:52:10 > 0:52:12Well, things could always change.
0:52:12 > 0:52:16I mean, things change weekly in politics and in strategic issues.
0:52:16 > 0:52:21For some time, Britain's special representative to Afghanistan had been arguing
0:52:21 > 0:52:25that the only way out was to start talking to the Taliban.
0:52:28 > 0:52:36Last summer Sherard Cowper-Coles attended a summit of Afghan experts at Chequers hosted by David Cameron.
0:52:36 > 0:52:41Stabilising Afghanistan isn't a question of pumping in more and more troops,
0:52:41 > 0:52:45or training up a vast national army to garrison the country.
0:52:45 > 0:52:51It's creating, arriving at a political settlement
0:52:51 > 0:52:56and then using military force to underpin that settlement, but not to deliver it.
0:52:56 > 0:53:00The simple conclusion that we came to is that
0:53:00 > 0:53:05most insurgencies down history and around the world have ended in two ways -
0:53:05 > 0:53:13one, with some military success, but secondly, with some political process and solution as well.
0:53:13 > 0:53:16The new Prime Minister decided that it was time
0:53:16 > 0:53:21to take political risks - to start talking to the Taliban.
0:53:21 > 0:53:27Last February, Washington agreed - something they'd previously opposed.
0:53:27 > 0:53:32The Americans say a Taliban team, including an aide to the leader Mullah Omar,
0:53:32 > 0:53:35are now engaged in exploratory talks.
0:53:41 > 0:53:43Eliminate any collateral damage.
0:53:43 > 0:53:47Fire. Shoot again.
0:53:47 > 0:53:49One more.
0:53:51 > 0:53:55One, two, three, four, five, six, seven guys. Two guys running up the wadi.
0:53:55 > 0:54:00But whilst American officials are talking to the Taliban,
0:54:00 > 0:54:06American special forces are also seeking out and killing many individual Taliban commanders.
0:54:09 > 0:54:13In a typical 90-day period special mission units
0:54:13 > 0:54:16kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders.
0:54:16 > 0:54:21The Americans say that only this relentless lethal pressure
0:54:21 > 0:54:25will persuade the Taliban to negotiate seriously.
0:54:25 > 0:54:31The Taliban say the only outcome will be yet more attacks directed at coalition forces.
0:55:05 > 0:55:13On a moonless night last month, American special forces set course for Pakistan.
0:55:13 > 0:55:18Their target - Osama Bin Laden, the man the Taliban leadership still revere
0:55:18 > 0:55:23as the leader of the Islamic jihad against the infidel invaders.
0:55:23 > 0:55:26GUNSHOTS
0:55:26 > 0:55:33On nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al-Qaeda's terror,
0:55:33 > 0:55:35justice has been done...
0:55:35 > 0:55:38- CROWD CHEERS - USA! USA!
0:55:42 > 0:55:43I couldn't be more proud.
0:55:43 > 0:55:45It's been a long ten years.
0:55:50 > 0:55:56The Americans may have removed Bin Laden from the scene, but what of his original objectives?
0:55:56 > 0:56:01The objective of September 11th
0:56:01 > 0:56:07was to goad the United States into invading Afghanistan.
0:56:07 > 0:56:10Then they could destroy an American army in Afghanistan,
0:56:10 > 0:56:13shatter our will at home
0:56:13 > 0:56:18and lead the United States and our allies to get out of the Islamic world.
0:56:22 > 0:56:26Bin Laden did provoke the longest war in America's history,
0:56:26 > 0:56:32and the financial cost has become unsustainable, never mind the human toll.
0:56:42 > 0:56:46You are going to say that we killed your women and your children
0:56:46 > 0:56:47and that is not true.
0:56:47 > 0:56:51So what about the coalition's war objectives?
0:56:51 > 0:56:56They say they've dismantled al-Qaeda's base in Afghanistan,
0:56:56 > 0:57:01but it's been re-mantled across the border in Pakistan.
0:57:01 > 0:57:05We have not succeeded yet in
0:57:05 > 0:57:07partnering the state of Afghanistan
0:57:07 > 0:57:10to ensure that al-Qaeda cannot return here.
0:57:10 > 0:57:15Ten years ago, we thought we could get in and out quickly.
0:57:15 > 0:57:19Today, we're still struggling to build an Afghan government
0:57:19 > 0:57:22that can stand on its own two feet...
0:57:22 > 0:57:24GUNSHOTS AND EXPLOSIONS
0:57:24 > 0:57:26..and now we're losing patience.
0:57:26 > 0:57:29I think no-one really understood,
0:57:29 > 0:57:32perhaps still no-one really does understand
0:57:32 > 0:57:36the scale of the challenge we've taken on in Afghanistan.
0:57:36 > 0:57:40We would never, in the 19th century, have created a colony,
0:57:40 > 0:57:43run it for five or ten years, and then said, "It's over to you now."
0:57:43 > 0:57:47But that's really what our so-called strategy in Afghanistan is.
0:57:47 > 0:57:51If it's going to take 30 years to stabilise Afghanistan,
0:57:51 > 0:57:55let the Afghans go through those 30 years of stabilisation,
0:57:55 > 0:57:58because we will never do it.
0:57:59 > 0:58:06We have not 30 years, but just three years to get it finally right.
0:58:06 > 0:58:12The armies of the international coalition are all heading for the exits.
0:58:15 > 0:58:18Next week Mark Urban tells the inside story
0:58:18 > 0:58:22of the bloody five-year battle for Helmand with unique access
0:58:22 > 0:58:27to the generals and frontline troops who have had to fight it.
0:58:42 > 0:58:45Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd
0:58:45 > 0:58:48E-mail subtitling@bbc.co.uk