0:00:03 > 0:00:07'Afghanistan, one of the most isolated, barren landscapes on Earth.
0:00:10 > 0:00:13'And for three of the greatest powers the world has ever seen
0:00:13 > 0:00:17'an unlikely target, an enduring obsession
0:00:17 > 0:00:19'and an unwinnable war.'
0:00:21 > 0:00:26In the 21st century, a US-led coalition attacked
0:00:26 > 0:00:28and is still mired there.
0:00:28 > 0:00:31In the 19th century, it was the British Empire who invaded
0:00:31 > 0:00:34and suffered an agonising defeat.
0:00:34 > 0:00:36And in the 20th century,
0:00:36 > 0:00:39with communism dominating almost half the globe,
0:00:39 > 0:00:41Soviet Russia decided to invade.
0:00:41 > 0:00:46Their mission, to quell the growing Afghan insurgency,
0:00:46 > 0:00:51stabilise the government, train the Afghan Army and leave.
0:00:51 > 0:00:53They thought it would take 12 months.
0:00:53 > 0:00:59Nine years later, after more than a million Afghans had been killed,
0:00:59 > 0:01:04all the Soviet Union could look back on was humiliation.
0:01:04 > 0:01:09Like the British in the 19th century and the US-led coalition today,
0:01:09 > 0:01:14the Soviets found themselves trapped and fighting a fierce resistance.
0:01:14 > 0:01:15HE SHOUTS
0:01:25 > 0:01:27If you were going to pass a message
0:01:27 > 0:01:30to the American and British troops today,
0:01:30 > 0:01:31what would you say to them?
0:01:31 > 0:01:35IN RUSSIAN:
0:01:35 > 0:01:38'After the British experience in the 19th century,
0:01:38 > 0:01:43'Afghanistan was dubbed "the Graveyard of Empires."
0:01:43 > 0:01:49'So why did two superpowers invade in the 20th and 21st centuries
0:01:49 > 0:01:54'and once again make Afghanistan a place of tragedy?'
0:02:04 > 0:02:06EXPLOSION
0:02:06 > 0:02:10For many in the West, Afghanistan is now synonymous with war.
0:02:10 > 0:02:13A land where soldiers go to die.
0:02:13 > 0:02:15A place which is believed to represent
0:02:15 > 0:02:18such an overwhelming threat to the security of the West
0:02:18 > 0:02:24that over a 100,000 western soldiers are currently stationed here,
0:02:24 > 0:02:29in a war costing 130 billion a year.
0:02:33 > 0:02:37It's a million miles from the vision of the country I had as a child...
0:02:40 > 0:02:43'..because when Afghanistan first entered my consciousness,
0:02:43 > 0:02:47'it was as a place of peace.'
0:02:47 > 0:02:48This place, Istalif,
0:02:48 > 0:02:52was one of the great tourist traps on the hippie trail.
0:02:52 > 0:02:55My mother came here in the 1960s, my sister in the 1970s,
0:02:55 > 0:02:58and when I visit people often in suburban houses in England,
0:02:58 > 0:03:01I see the distinctive blue ceramics that they bought.
0:03:01 > 0:03:04For travellers, this was a very peaceful place
0:03:04 > 0:03:07where they experienced the generosity of Afghans.
0:03:21 > 0:03:25All the people who came on that overland trail as hippies
0:03:25 > 0:03:28were feeling that they were living in a beautiful bubble,
0:03:28 > 0:03:30a land that time forgot.
0:03:30 > 0:03:34A Shangri-La where you could go to have a relaxed time,
0:03:34 > 0:03:38smoke some drugs and buy some woolly jackets.
0:03:39 > 0:03:43But a peaceful Afghanistan wasn't just a hippie mirage.
0:03:43 > 0:03:47'In Boston, I've come to meet an anthropologist and historian
0:03:47 > 0:03:51'who spent a lot of time travelling in Afghanistan in the 1970s,
0:03:51 > 0:03:54'Professor Tom Barfield.'
0:03:54 > 0:03:56You had this perfectly peaceful Afghanistan
0:03:56 > 0:04:00where I, as a foreigner, could travel unarmed all over the country
0:04:00 > 0:04:03and there was never any trouble. And I never saw anybody armed.
0:04:03 > 0:04:05Now, people look back on it as a golden age.
0:04:05 > 0:04:09It was a time of peace and security where people went about their business.
0:04:12 > 0:04:17From 1929 to 1978, Afghanistan has 50 years of peace,
0:04:17 > 0:04:21most European countries can't make that statement in the mid-20th century.
0:04:21 > 0:04:24Afghanistan was absolutely at peace.
0:04:24 > 0:04:27'God expressed his love for all the children of mankind.
0:04:27 > 0:04:31'May the life of these children of Afghanistan be a happy life.'
0:04:34 > 0:04:38But while it was a peaceful place, it was not a unified one.
0:04:38 > 0:04:41Because, outside the cities, Afghanistan was,
0:04:41 > 0:04:43and remains, in many ways,
0:04:43 > 0:04:47a country of 20,000 diverse, isolated villages,
0:04:47 > 0:04:51where every village chief is almost a king.
0:04:51 > 0:04:53That was the case when the British invaded in the 19th century.
0:04:53 > 0:04:56It was still pretty much the case
0:04:56 > 0:04:59when the hippies came in the 1960s and '70s.
0:04:59 > 0:05:00And it was definitely what I found
0:05:00 > 0:05:04when I walked across Afghanistan at the end of 2001.
0:05:04 > 0:05:06These self-contained communities
0:05:06 > 0:05:09posed little danger to the outside world.
0:05:11 > 0:05:14But by the 1960s, foreign governments were beginning
0:05:14 > 0:05:17to take a very threatening interest in Afghanistan.
0:05:17 > 0:05:20Because, once again, they were perceiving it
0:05:20 > 0:05:23as a key strategic point for empires.
0:05:23 > 0:05:26A centre point in the Cold War dividing the new superpowers,
0:05:26 > 0:05:31the Soviet Union from the allies of the United States.
0:05:31 > 0:05:33Afghanistan was surrounded.
0:05:33 > 0:05:35To the north, the Soviet Union.
0:05:35 > 0:05:36East and west,
0:05:36 > 0:05:39the US allies Iran and Pakistan.
0:05:39 > 0:05:42And while the Americans feared a Soviet push south
0:05:42 > 0:05:45in search of a warm water port and oil reserves,
0:05:45 > 0:05:48the Soviets assumed that America was going to inspire instability
0:05:48 > 0:05:51on their southern border.
0:05:51 > 0:05:54And so, both powers tried to bring Afghanistan under their influence,
0:05:54 > 0:05:59sending in billions of roubles and dollars of economic support.
0:06:02 > 0:06:06In the snowy countryside outside of Moscow,
0:06:06 > 0:06:10'I've come to meet a man who spent much of his career in Afghanistan,
0:06:10 > 0:06:14'helping to coordinate economic development in the country in the 1960s,
0:06:14 > 0:06:18'Soviet economic adviser, Valeri Ivanov.'
0:07:15 > 0:07:17With projects like this,
0:07:17 > 0:07:23Afghanistan became the fourth largest recipient of Soviet aid anywhere in the world.
0:07:23 > 0:07:26But, at the same time, in the south of the country,
0:07:26 > 0:07:31the United States was also constructing dams and housing.
0:07:31 > 0:07:36Two superpowers jockeying for influence in a far smaller country.
0:07:36 > 0:07:39As indeed they were doing again and again across the world,
0:07:39 > 0:07:43because the Cold War stretched from Berlin to Korea,
0:07:43 > 0:07:46Latin America to Indochina.
0:07:46 > 0:07:50'Communism denies religion and debases the individual
0:07:50 > 0:07:53'to a part of a vast machine that powers the state.
0:07:53 > 0:07:57'Children are taken early and moulded to fit the machine.
0:07:57 > 0:07:59'Here is no search for the truth.'
0:08:08 > 0:08:11'As communism and capitalism clashed,
0:08:11 > 0:08:14'foreign aid flowing into Afghanistan
0:08:14 > 0:08:17'paid for places like this - Kabul University.
0:08:17 > 0:08:20'Here many of the bright young minds of Afghanistan,
0:08:20 > 0:08:22'hungry for new ideas,
0:08:22 > 0:08:27'were excited by the opportunity to bring rapid change to their country.
0:08:27 > 0:08:30'Some focused on communism,'
0:08:30 > 0:08:32others immersed themselves in political Islam,
0:08:32 > 0:08:38an ideology rejecting both the Soviet Union and the United States.
0:08:38 > 0:08:44The university became a hotbed of Afghan radicalism.
0:08:44 > 0:08:49In the 1970s, the peaceful gardens and foreign-funded buildings
0:08:49 > 0:08:53here at Kabul University had been taken over by radicals.
0:08:53 > 0:08:56Maoist and Leninist students marching in the streets.
0:08:56 > 0:09:00And over there, professors funded by Egyptian Muslims
0:09:00 > 0:09:02training on Kalashnikovs.
0:09:02 > 0:09:05Islamists and communists in a race
0:09:05 > 0:09:09to see who could kick over the traces of the old Afghanistan
0:09:09 > 0:09:12and create their new paradise.
0:09:12 > 0:09:14And it was the communists who got there first
0:09:14 > 0:09:20infiltrating the army and, in April 1978, taking control of the country.
0:09:26 > 0:09:28Communism was a foreign idea,
0:09:28 > 0:09:33but it was Afghans themselves and not foreigners who implemented it.
0:09:33 > 0:09:37They believed ideology would transform their country.
0:09:37 > 0:09:39And coming to power the new Communist president,
0:09:39 > 0:09:41Nur Mohammad Taraki,
0:09:41 > 0:09:44announced a manifesto of staggering ambition.
0:09:44 > 0:09:49Secular education, equality for women
0:09:49 > 0:09:50and with wild optimism he predicted
0:09:50 > 0:09:54the mosques would be empty within a year.
0:09:54 > 0:09:57'In Kabul, I've come to meet Hamidullah Tarzi,
0:09:57 > 0:10:01'who was a minister in these first Afghan Communist cabinets.
0:10:01 > 0:10:05'And I wanted to talk to him about the wisdom and the speed
0:10:05 > 0:10:08'of some of these extraordinary reforms.'
0:10:17 > 0:10:20And education for women and literacy?
0:10:24 > 0:10:28Why did people resist them? Why was there a resistance?
0:10:53 > 0:10:56'When people tried to resist the revolution,
0:10:56 > 0:10:59'the Afghan communists responded with terror,
0:10:59 > 0:11:02'brutally driving through their reforms.
0:11:02 > 0:11:05'And nothing symbolises the horror of their rule more than this,
0:11:05 > 0:11:07'the PuliCharki Prison.'
0:11:11 > 0:11:14It almost feels inappropriate to be here.
0:11:14 > 0:11:18I have a friend in Kabul who had 71 members of his family
0:11:18 > 0:11:22executed in the courtyard adjoining this building.
0:11:24 > 0:11:28The few months after the Afghan communists took power,
0:11:28 > 0:11:3012,000 Afghans had been arrested,
0:11:30 > 0:11:34put in Kabul prisons and were then executed.
0:11:44 > 0:11:48'And this contained at one time 15,000 prisoners,
0:11:48 > 0:11:51'many of them political prisoners.
0:11:51 > 0:11:55'The contrast between this brutal, rigid concrete prison,
0:11:55 > 0:11:59'and the reality of rural Afghanistan,
0:11:59 > 0:12:02'the mud houses, the villages,
0:12:02 > 0:12:05'in the centre of which this sat,
0:12:05 > 0:12:09'some great modern horror.'
0:12:09 > 0:12:12It's the brutal arrival of a modern state
0:12:12 > 0:12:16trying to impose its ideology on a country.
0:12:19 > 0:12:23By 1979, the Afghan communists were facing growing unrest,
0:12:23 > 0:12:28particularly in the more conservative, religious countryside outside Kabul.
0:12:28 > 0:12:33Their followers were beginning to mutiny and they were losing control.
0:12:35 > 0:12:38Finally, the Afghan president, Nur Mohammad Taraki,
0:12:38 > 0:12:41flew to Moscow to see his friend and ally,
0:12:41 > 0:12:43Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev,
0:12:43 > 0:12:48and he pled with the Soviets to send troops to Afghanistan
0:12:48 > 0:12:51to prop up and secure this Communist revolution.
0:12:51 > 0:12:55But the reaction was not what you might expect.
0:12:55 > 0:13:00You would have thought that the revolution in Afghanistan in 1978
0:13:00 > 0:13:03would have been a great moment for the Soviet Union.
0:13:03 > 0:13:09Suddenly, a new communist country had emerged in the late 1970s.
0:13:09 > 0:13:10The Cold War, you would have thought,
0:13:10 > 0:13:13was swinging in their direction.
0:13:13 > 0:13:16But, actually, the reaction that came here in the Kremlin
0:13:16 > 0:13:20was not one of celebration, not one of popping champagne corks,
0:13:20 > 0:13:23but profound nervousness and trepidation
0:13:23 > 0:13:26about what Afghanistan had got itself into,
0:13:26 > 0:13:29and what this would mean for the Soviet Union.
0:13:31 > 0:13:35'And the historical records of the Politburo have now been released,
0:13:35 > 0:13:40'confirming just how bewildered and anxious the Russians were.
0:13:40 > 0:13:43'Again and again, the documents show the Foreign Minister,
0:13:43 > 0:13:47'the Intelligence Minister and the Defence Minister saying'
0:13:47 > 0:13:50that if the Soviet Union got involved,
0:13:50 > 0:13:52it would firstly spark Muslim resentment.
0:13:52 > 0:13:55It would turn the Afghan government into a puppet.
0:13:55 > 0:13:59And it would destroy the Soviet Union's reputation around the world.
0:13:59 > 0:14:04And yet, in the end, despite all these fears,
0:14:04 > 0:14:07Brezhnev considered invasion.
0:14:07 > 0:14:11'A man who saw Russia's interaction with Afghanistan firsthand
0:14:11 > 0:14:15'was Sir Rodric Braithwaite, later Britain's Ambassador to Moscow.'
0:14:15 > 0:14:18The crucial incident was when Taraki, the president,
0:14:18 > 0:14:22who was a sort of favourite of Brezhnev's, the then Soviet leader,
0:14:22 > 0:14:26was assassinated by his number two, Amin.
0:14:26 > 0:14:29And Brezhnev took that very personally,
0:14:29 > 0:14:33he had vowed to protect this guy, this guy ended up dead.
0:14:33 > 0:14:36Amin was out of control.
0:14:36 > 0:14:42IN RUSSIAN:
0:14:57 > 0:15:00A decision was taken absolutely at the last minute.
0:15:00 > 0:15:04There was a great outcry that the CIA had failed to predict it,
0:15:04 > 0:15:08but they, they couldn't predict something that the Russians themselves hadn't yet decided to do.
0:15:15 > 0:15:17'Christmas Eve 1979,
0:15:17 > 0:15:22'Soviet Special Forces exploded into the Afghan presidential palace.'
0:15:22 > 0:15:24Up through the gardens, swarming in through the windows,
0:15:24 > 0:15:28shooting the President's bodyguard and then the President himself.
0:15:28 > 0:15:3380,000 Soviet troops followed, flowing across the borders
0:15:33 > 0:15:36and the world looked on in horror.
0:15:44 > 0:15:48This is a callous violation of International Law.
0:15:48 > 0:15:50It is a deliberate effort
0:15:50 > 0:15:53of a powerful atheistic government
0:15:53 > 0:15:56to subjugate an independent Islamic people.
0:15:59 > 0:16:02Why did the Soviet Union finally make the decision
0:16:02 > 0:16:04to send in their troops?
0:16:04 > 0:16:06The answer is that, like all empires,
0:16:06 > 0:16:08they didn't want to look weak.
0:16:08 > 0:16:11This was a mini-communist state, an ally on their borders,
0:16:11 > 0:16:15and they couldn't let Afghanistan collapse.
0:16:15 > 0:16:17Something had to be done.
0:16:19 > 0:16:24We underestimate the sense of insecurity that all empires feel.
0:16:24 > 0:16:26We were terrified at the end of the 19th century,
0:16:26 > 0:16:28at the height of British imperialism that somebody,
0:16:28 > 0:16:31the Germans or somebody's going take it all away from us.
0:16:31 > 0:16:35And I think that's, that affects policymaking
0:16:35 > 0:16:38in empires at the imperial level.
0:16:38 > 0:16:41So you see a threat. You think, "Well, if we don't deal with it now,
0:16:41 > 0:16:43"it'll come round and bite us from behind."
0:16:43 > 0:16:45And I think Afghanistan falls into that category.
0:16:47 > 0:16:50But for every wary and neurotic politician,
0:16:50 > 0:16:54there was a Soviet soldier confident of success.
0:16:54 > 0:16:56And none more so than the vanguard,
0:16:56 > 0:17:00the Soviet parachute regiment, or "Blue Berets,"
0:17:00 > 0:17:02the cream of the Soviet military.
0:17:02 > 0:17:07Among these veterans are many men who were involved in that invasion.
0:17:07 > 0:17:11This is the 25th anniversary concert of the Blue Beret Band.
0:17:11 > 0:17:13And almost everybody in the audience
0:17:13 > 0:17:15is somebody who has either been in the military
0:17:15 > 0:17:17or is related to someone in the military.
0:17:25 > 0:17:27APPLAUSE
0:17:27 > 0:17:30IN RUSSIAN:
0:17:43 > 0:17:46Like many American and British soldiers today,
0:17:46 > 0:17:48these troops felt they were part of a bigger mission
0:17:48 > 0:17:52to modernise and change Afghanistan for the better.
0:18:04 > 0:18:08IN RUSSIAN:
0:18:24 > 0:18:26These invading soldiers were told
0:18:26 > 0:18:30their mission was to support the new Afghan Communist government
0:18:30 > 0:18:33and that the intervention would be over in a year.
0:18:33 > 0:18:37But they'd completely underestimated the Afghan reaction.
0:18:38 > 0:18:40EXPLOSION
0:18:40 > 0:18:42The Afghans turned against these foreigners,
0:18:42 > 0:18:45just as they had against the British in the 19th century.
0:18:45 > 0:18:48This was driven partly by nationalism
0:18:48 > 0:18:51but religion was also a key factor.
0:18:51 > 0:18:52The Russians made this very easy
0:18:52 > 0:18:55because the Soviet Union was a declared atheist state
0:18:55 > 0:18:57so they... "We are atheists,
0:18:57 > 0:19:00"we actually have a Bureau of Atheism!" Wow, it's easy.
0:19:00 > 0:19:03So we are fighting against these atheist communists,
0:19:03 > 0:19:05so that was easy to talk about,
0:19:05 > 0:19:07it was placing the war in a jihad context.
0:19:11 > 0:19:15When Afghans try to explain why they fought the Russians,
0:19:15 > 0:19:17they often talk about religion.
0:19:17 > 0:19:21'Here I've come to meet a group of six Mujahideen
0:19:21 > 0:19:23'from a poor village 90 miles from Kabul.
0:19:23 > 0:19:28'They're almost all that remains of a unit which was once nearly 50 men,
0:19:28 > 0:19:31'most of whom were killed in the fight against the Russians.
0:19:31 > 0:19:33'This is how they explain their war.'
0:19:35 > 0:19:40IN NATIVE LANGUAGE:
0:20:29 > 0:20:32'Many in the Soviet capital had agonised
0:20:32 > 0:20:35'over the decision to invade Afghanistan.
0:20:35 > 0:20:39'Many in the Politburo itself warned it was a trap.
0:20:39 > 0:20:42'So was the growing insurgency confirmation that the sceptics had been right?
0:20:42 > 0:20:46'In Moscow, I've come to meet a man
0:20:46 > 0:20:49'who was on the frontline of the Soviet war.
0:20:49 > 0:20:52'One of Russia's most decorated and respected war heroes,
0:20:52 > 0:20:55'General Ruslan Aushev.'
0:21:00 > 0:21:04IN RUSSIAN:
0:21:53 > 0:21:57In one of these attacks on this beautiful district of Panjshir,
0:21:57 > 0:22:03the Soviets entered with nearly 400 aircraft and helicopters,
0:22:03 > 0:22:08carpet bombing the valley floor and following up with 13,000 troops.
0:22:08 > 0:22:13But the Mujahideen had simply disappeared
0:22:13 > 0:22:16and when the Soviets left, they returned.
0:23:14 > 0:23:16HE SHOUTS
0:23:30 > 0:23:32EXPLOSION AND SHOOTING
0:23:32 > 0:23:37The resistance of the Mujahideen was about to become even more formidable
0:23:37 > 0:23:40for they had a new ally, the unlikeliest friend.
0:23:40 > 0:23:44'Because the United States had spotted an opportunity
0:23:44 > 0:23:48'to strike a blow to their enemy in the Cold War.
0:23:48 > 0:23:52'Running the CIA in Asia at this time was Chuck Cogan.'
0:23:52 > 0:23:58The Soviets were taking advantage of our perceived weakness
0:23:58 > 0:24:00and were advancing on all fronts.
0:24:00 > 0:24:05The Cuban proxies in Angola, the other advances in the Horn of Africa,
0:24:05 > 0:24:10and it seemed as though we were, we had lost momentum.
0:24:10 > 0:24:15And then, at the end of the '70s, in '79,
0:24:15 > 0:24:18this opportunity arose in Afghanistan
0:24:18 > 0:24:24when the Pakistan Intelligence Service approached us
0:24:24 > 0:24:29and asked if we could help support the Mujahideen,
0:24:29 > 0:24:33the rebels who had risen up against the Communist government.
0:24:33 > 0:24:36When this opportunity arose in Afghanistan,
0:24:36 > 0:24:39I mean, the watchword was revenge.
0:24:39 > 0:24:41Revenge above all for Vietnam.
0:24:41 > 0:24:45The communist governments had supported the resistance in Vietnam,
0:24:45 > 0:24:49and 58,000 Americans had been killed in this faraway land,
0:24:49 > 0:24:53in the first ever humiliation of the United States.
0:24:53 > 0:24:55Now, six years later, the US saw a chance
0:24:55 > 0:24:59to give the Soviet Union a taste of their own medicine.
0:24:59 > 0:25:04We felt that somehow if we could sort of right this balance
0:25:04 > 0:25:08and inflict as much damage as possible on Russian soldiers,
0:25:08 > 0:25:13this would be a sort of a semi-vindication.
0:25:13 > 0:25:18Cogan authorised a plan to covertly supply weapons
0:25:18 > 0:25:22across the Pakistani border to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan,
0:25:22 > 0:25:25but only weapons that could not be traced back to the US.
0:25:25 > 0:25:32And Cogan agreed the plan directly with Pakistan's military ruler, General Zia.
0:25:32 > 0:25:35This Afghan covert action programme run by the agency
0:25:35 > 0:25:38would never have gotten off the ground without Zia.
0:25:38 > 0:25:41And I can remember meeting Zia
0:25:41 > 0:25:44in Zia's rather modest bungalow in Rawalpindi.
0:25:44 > 0:25:46And during the meeting,
0:25:46 > 0:25:52Zia brought out this huge map of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
0:25:52 > 0:25:56and he put a red template over the southern part
0:25:56 > 0:26:01of where Afghanistan touches Pakistan and Iran.
0:26:01 > 0:26:06The Pakistanis always want to have an influence in Afghanistan,
0:26:06 > 0:26:07as an insurance against India,
0:26:07 > 0:26:11and as a sort of rearguard for themselves,
0:26:11 > 0:26:15they decided to help the Mujahideen.
0:26:15 > 0:26:18And at the same time Zia used another simile,
0:26:18 > 0:26:21which he used frequently, and that is,
0:26:21 > 0:26:24"The pot should be kept boiling, but should not boil over."
0:26:24 > 0:26:29In other words, the Soviets should not be antagonised by this amount of,
0:26:29 > 0:26:33huge amount of weaponry to the point that they would intervene
0:26:33 > 0:26:36to attack across the border into Pakistan
0:26:36 > 0:26:40or some other action, air attacks, and we were very conscious of this.
0:26:41 > 0:26:48For that reason, Cogan's operation remained relatively small and secret
0:26:48 > 0:26:51and in itself it would have had only a modest effect
0:26:51 > 0:26:54upon the outcome of the Afghan-Soviet war.
0:27:01 > 0:27:03'But, at this point, the Islamist Afghans
0:27:03 > 0:27:07'acquired the most unexpected anti-communist ally of all.
0:27:07 > 0:27:12'The Christian, Texan, wealthy socialite, Joanne Herring.'
0:27:12 > 0:27:15- There's very few champions like Miss Herring.- That's right, that's right.
0:27:15 > 0:27:20- The man you just met is one of the richest men in Houston...- Right.
0:27:20 > 0:27:22..and he is wonderful.
0:27:22 > 0:27:26He does so much and, and I'm working on him for Afghanistan.
0:27:26 > 0:27:31This is an evening which both shows Joanne Herring
0:27:31 > 0:27:34as part of the Texan elite with whom she raises money
0:27:34 > 0:27:35at gala dinners like this
0:27:35 > 0:27:38and through whom she influences policy,
0:27:38 > 0:27:41but it's also a reminder that she is a very unique individual.
0:27:41 > 0:27:44She is somebody who almost single-handedly
0:27:44 > 0:27:46created the entire American support
0:27:46 > 0:27:49for the Mujahideen during the Afghan war.
0:27:49 > 0:27:52'The CIA was of course already involved with the resistance,
0:27:52 > 0:27:54'but it was this society hostess
0:27:54 > 0:27:57'which took it into a different league financially.
0:27:57 > 0:28:00'And she did it for the most improbable reasons
0:28:00 > 0:28:02'and in the most unlikely way.'
0:28:02 > 0:28:08I worked with the Afghan poor in the mountains.
0:28:08 > 0:28:13I felt that they were an honourable people, and that they valued honour,
0:28:13 > 0:28:16but they valued freedom more than anything on Earth.
0:28:16 > 0:28:20And when you think of the juggernauts that they have faced.
0:28:20 > 0:28:23Great Britain was the strongest country in the world,
0:28:23 > 0:28:26the sun never set really on the British flag.
0:28:26 > 0:28:31And they were now facing, when I was there,
0:28:31 > 0:28:37the greatest build-up of military might in history
0:28:37 > 0:28:41and they were willing to fight to the death against that
0:28:41 > 0:28:43with pitchforks, so to speak.
0:28:43 > 0:28:45Joanne Herring's mission was
0:28:45 > 0:28:47to make sure it wasn't pitchforks or ancient rifles
0:28:47 > 0:28:49that the Mujahideen had to fight with,
0:28:49 > 0:28:52but that they could take on the Soviet military
0:28:52 > 0:28:55with the latest in 20th century weaponry.
0:28:55 > 0:28:59And the secret of her success was one relationship in particular.
0:28:59 > 0:29:03So, guess who I was dating?
0:29:03 > 0:29:05- SHE CHUCKLES - Charlie!
0:29:05 > 0:29:08The minute Charlie heard about it, wow!
0:29:08 > 0:29:12He understood the communists, and he wanted to stop them too.
0:29:12 > 0:29:14Joanne Herring's boyfriend
0:29:14 > 0:29:18happened to be Texan Congressman Charlie Wilson.
0:29:18 > 0:29:21And crucially, he sat on the Congressional Committee
0:29:21 > 0:29:25which set the budgets for the CIA Covert Operations.
0:29:25 > 0:29:29And what happened next was brilliantly portrayed
0:29:29 > 0:29:32in the Hollywood film Charlie Wilson's War.
0:29:32 > 0:29:36- What do you want me to do, Joanne? - This is what I want you to do.
0:29:36 > 0:29:39I want you to save Afghanistan for the Afghans.
0:29:39 > 0:29:43I want you to deliver such a crushing defeat to the Soviets
0:29:43 > 0:29:46that communism crumbles and, in so doing, end the Cold War.
0:29:46 > 0:29:49I'll tell you, I'd do it too, but I've got this Dairy Queen problem in Nacogdoches.
0:29:49 > 0:29:54Don't underestimate me, Charlie. Believe everything you've heard.
0:29:54 > 0:29:57- What exactly do you want me to do? - Go to Pakistan and meet with Zia.
0:29:57 > 0:30:01- Zia?- Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.
0:30:01 > 0:30:04- He's the President of Pakistan! - I've already arranged it.
0:30:04 > 0:30:09With Joanne Herring's help, Charlie Wilson lobbied and cajoled the committee,
0:30:09 > 0:30:14and persuaded them to channel incredible quantities of funds, in secret, to the Mujahideen.
0:30:14 > 0:30:17Total US funding for the resistance
0:30:17 > 0:30:20went from five million to nine billion dollars.
0:30:20 > 0:30:24It became the largest covert operation in US history.
0:30:24 > 0:30:26But Charlie Wilson never pretended
0:30:26 > 0:30:29to have a deep understanding of Afghanistan itself,
0:30:29 > 0:30:31let alone its problems.
0:30:31 > 0:30:35When I try to think about Charlie Wilson,
0:30:35 > 0:30:38I tend to come back to this building,
0:30:38 > 0:30:40because this, the Lincoln Memorial,
0:30:40 > 0:30:42with the Gettysburg address on the wall,
0:30:42 > 0:30:45was Charlie Wilson's favourite place in DC.
0:30:45 > 0:30:47And when he talks about Afghanistan,
0:30:47 > 0:30:49he said that the war in Afghanistan was like Gettysburg.
0:30:49 > 0:30:51How could Charlie Wilson think
0:30:51 > 0:30:55that a bundle of mountains in central Afghanistan,
0:30:55 > 0:30:5910,000 miles away, was like Gettysburg?
0:30:59 > 0:31:04Somehow though in his mind, he was a hero, he was Lincoln,
0:31:04 > 0:31:09and what was happening in Afghanistan seemed to him
0:31:09 > 0:31:14something that threatened the very survival of the United States.
0:31:20 > 0:31:22These Texan anti-communists
0:31:22 > 0:31:25who spoke of their common cause with the Mujahideen,
0:31:25 > 0:31:29romantically painting them as religious freedom fighters,
0:31:29 > 0:31:30were really only using Afghanistan
0:31:30 > 0:31:34as a proxy for their fight with Soviet Russia.
0:31:34 > 0:31:36But the billions of dollars of US funding,
0:31:36 > 0:31:39matched dollar for dollar by Saudi Arabia
0:31:39 > 0:31:43and the supply routes and safe havens provided by Pakistan
0:31:43 > 0:31:45transformed the fortunes of the Afghan resistance.
0:32:27 > 0:32:31Now, the Soviets faced not just a popular resistance,
0:32:31 > 0:32:36but a guerrilla army equipped with the latest in military hardware.
0:32:36 > 0:32:39And when America started supplying Stinger
0:32:39 > 0:32:42and other anti-aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen,
0:32:42 > 0:32:46they started bringing down Soviet helicopters.
0:32:52 > 0:32:56But it was the mines, or what we would call today IEDs,
0:32:56 > 0:32:58that the Soviets remember.
0:32:58 > 0:33:01And Afghans had become the specialists in mines they still are today.
0:33:04 > 0:33:09'General Muslim led the Afghan resistance in this part of the Panjshir valley.'
0:33:48 > 0:33:53The bulk of Soviet supplies came by roads like these
0:33:53 > 0:33:57and the Mujahideen attacks began to kill thousands of Soviets soldiers
0:33:57 > 0:34:00and cut off their supply routes.
0:34:00 > 0:34:04The Russians began to call this conflict a war of mines.
0:35:02 > 0:35:04The Soviet army brought in helicopters,
0:35:04 > 0:35:06experimented with new tactics,
0:35:06 > 0:35:09took the most brutal revenge against villages,
0:35:09 > 0:35:13but they were never able to defeat the insurgents.
0:35:17 > 0:35:19The Russian Special Forces
0:35:19 > 0:35:23that landed from helicopters on these ridgelines
0:35:23 > 0:35:26were some of the toughest, most courageous,
0:35:26 > 0:35:28best trained troops in the world.
0:35:28 > 0:35:31And yet, they never really saw their enemy.
0:35:31 > 0:35:35They were attacked with mines, people shot into their tents at night,
0:35:35 > 0:35:37they were suddenly ambushed with rockets.
0:35:37 > 0:35:40And when they wanted to put all their military training,
0:35:40 > 0:35:42all their courage, all their energy into action,
0:35:42 > 0:35:47they felt they were fighting an army of ghosts.
0:35:57 > 0:36:01'And so, if the Soviet tactics hadn't worked,
0:36:01 > 0:36:03'weren't working, and weren't going to work,
0:36:03 > 0:36:06'why did they continue?'
0:36:06 > 0:36:08A British ambassador once said to me
0:36:08 > 0:36:11that the US and its allies could not leave Afghanistan
0:36:11 > 0:36:15because they had lost too much blood and treasure.
0:36:15 > 0:36:18And the same thought has been in the minds of people for centuries here.
0:36:18 > 0:36:20SHOOTING
0:36:22 > 0:36:27Because when empires begin to lose, begin to spend,
0:36:27 > 0:36:30begin to have soldiers killed, begin to make promises,
0:36:30 > 0:36:33begin to produce justifications,
0:36:33 > 0:36:36it becomes more and more difficult for them to leave.
0:36:36 > 0:36:40And they end up simply piling more corpses
0:36:40 > 0:36:41on top of their soldier's bodies
0:36:41 > 0:36:46in the hope that this can somehow justify their loss.
0:36:50 > 0:36:53In very blunt terms,
0:36:53 > 0:36:57those soldiers are dead and gone, and they're never coming back,
0:36:57 > 0:36:59and you can never honour soldiers
0:36:59 > 0:37:03by piling more corpses on top of their head.
0:37:03 > 0:37:08But no general feels this, no politician can say this,
0:37:08 > 0:37:12and so the killing and the occupation continues
0:37:12 > 0:37:15far longer than it ever should.
0:37:24 > 0:37:27At home, the Soviets tried to conceal
0:37:27 > 0:37:30the failures and brutality of this occupation.
0:37:30 > 0:37:32The public was told the Soviets were popular,
0:37:32 > 0:37:35were helping the Afghan people
0:37:35 > 0:37:40and that the rebels were only a small minority of terrorists.
0:37:40 > 0:37:44In a Moscow library, I met with Vladimir Vyatkin,
0:37:44 > 0:37:47a state photographer sent to Afghanistan in the 1980s.
0:38:12 > 0:38:17'When he began to take photographs and ask questions about the war,
0:38:17 > 0:38:20'he was sent home and banned from further travel.'
0:38:20 > 0:38:23How much was he able to see of Kabul?
0:38:24 > 0:38:28TRANSLATES QUESTION INTO RUSSIAN
0:38:30 > 0:38:36IN RUSSIAN:
0:38:56 > 0:39:00As the Soviets tried to maintain the illusion
0:39:00 > 0:39:03that Afghanistan was a largely peaceful mission,
0:39:03 > 0:39:05dead bodies were returned to Russia,
0:39:05 > 0:39:07sealed in unopenable zinc coffins
0:39:07 > 0:39:10and delivered to their families at night.
0:39:16 > 0:39:21'Finally, Mikhael Gorbachev, who became General Secretary in 1985,
0:39:21 > 0:39:23'made the decision to withdraw.
0:39:23 > 0:39:26'It was the right decision and a courageous one.
0:39:26 > 0:39:30'But he had many interests to manage, not least the military,
0:39:30 > 0:39:33'who were demanding more time and more resources.
0:39:33 > 0:39:37'So the deadline was set three years out for 1988.'
0:39:39 > 0:39:42The parallels between Gorbachev and Obama are really striking.
0:39:42 > 0:39:45In both cases they come in, they accept that it's not going well.
0:39:45 > 0:39:49In both cases they do a mini-surge, they say to the military,
0:39:49 > 0:39:51"We're going to give you a little more time and more troops,
0:39:51 > 0:39:53"we're going to try harder."
0:39:56 > 0:40:00Under Gorbachev, the amount of expenditure on Afghanistan in fact goes up,
0:40:00 > 0:40:02but at the same time they're setting a deadline,
0:40:02 > 0:40:05and a deadline that completely erodes their authority.
0:40:05 > 0:40:08So between these two impossibilities,
0:40:08 > 0:40:10the impossibility of winning
0:40:10 > 0:40:14and the impossibility of acknowledging that you can't win,
0:40:14 > 0:40:17all the tragedy of Obama and Gorbachev emerges.
0:41:15 > 0:41:17If you were going to pass a message
0:41:17 > 0:41:20to the American and British troops today,
0:41:20 > 0:41:22what would you say to them?
0:41:35 > 0:41:38But the route out of Afghanistan is never quick or straight.
0:41:38 > 0:41:42Although it was now clear that Russia was withdrawing,
0:41:42 > 0:41:46it would still be years before the final soldier left.
0:41:46 > 0:41:49And whilst the bloodletting continued,
0:41:49 > 0:41:52no-one really believed in the project any more.
0:41:52 > 0:41:57Half as many soldiers died again following the decision to withdraw.
0:42:01 > 0:42:03By the time they leave,
0:42:03 > 0:42:05there's nobody there to greet them.
0:42:05 > 0:42:07Nobody from the Department of Defence,
0:42:07 > 0:42:11nobody from the Politburo, nobody from the party.
0:42:11 > 0:42:16They've sacrificed 25,000 lives for the ideal of the Soviet Union
0:42:16 > 0:42:20and not a single person pays them the courtesy
0:42:20 > 0:42:22of meeting them at the border.
0:42:29 > 0:42:33'The Afghan war may not have brought down the Soviet Empire,
0:42:33 > 0:42:35'but the war had dealt it a major blow,
0:42:35 > 0:42:38'both financially and to its prestige.
0:42:38 > 0:42:41'And the Politburo was embarrassed
0:42:41 > 0:42:44'even to honour the sacrifice of its soldiers.'
0:42:47 > 0:42:49This is the great monument
0:42:49 > 0:42:52to the Soviet soldiers of the Second World War.
0:42:52 > 0:42:56For generations now, Soviet soldiers have come to this flame
0:42:56 > 0:42:59to remember their sacrifice and their victory.
0:42:59 > 0:43:03But the Afghansti, the Soviet soldiers from Afghanistan,
0:43:03 > 0:43:05returned to a different world.
0:43:05 > 0:43:08They came from an almost shameful, secret war,
0:43:08 > 0:43:13'and the million who returned, many of them psychologically damaged,
0:43:13 > 0:43:16'returned to a Soviet Union that was itself collapsing.'
0:43:24 > 0:43:25Now, 12 years later,
0:43:25 > 0:43:30veterans of Afghanistan still meet in places like this,
0:43:30 > 0:43:32Moscow's Kombat Bar.
0:43:32 > 0:43:34I wanted to sit with them and find out
0:43:34 > 0:43:37'what these veterans thought
0:43:37 > 0:43:41'all this killing and sacrifice had been for.'
0:43:41 > 0:43:43IN RUSSIAN:
0:44:26 > 0:44:29Could you ask a little about whether they felt
0:44:29 > 0:44:32that they were trying to modernise the Afghan state?
0:44:57 > 0:45:00But many of these other veterans were much more sceptical
0:45:00 > 0:45:02about their mission and the ideology behind it.
0:45:58 > 0:46:01HE SINGS
0:46:38 > 0:46:41'But elsewhere, others were celebrating.
0:46:41 > 0:46:44'The US felt it had won a war
0:46:44 > 0:46:47'without losing a single American soldier.
0:46:47 > 0:46:50'For it was Afghans who had fought on their behalf.
0:46:50 > 0:46:53'Hundreds of thousands had died
0:46:53 > 0:46:58'and Afghanistan had been left with a shattered economy and government.
0:46:58 > 0:47:03'Would the US take responsibility for Afghanistan in the future?
0:47:03 > 0:47:07'The man who ran the CIA's covert action in the latter part of the war
0:47:07 > 0:47:09'now lives in rural Vermont.
0:47:09 > 0:47:13'He's never spoken publicly about Afghanistan before
0:47:13 > 0:47:18'and I wanted to ask Tom Twetten about the American post-war plan.'
0:47:18 > 0:47:23We have this sort of piece of paper in our system,
0:47:23 > 0:47:27which is called "the finding," that is signed by the President.
0:47:27 > 0:47:31Our finding on the Afghanistan said, "Push the Russians out,
0:47:31 > 0:47:35"support the Afghans, give them all the support they need",
0:47:35 > 0:47:39but it didn't say anything about what came next.
0:47:39 > 0:47:43I can remember being present at a congressional hearing
0:47:43 > 0:47:46in which one Congressman actually said,
0:47:46 > 0:47:50"So what party are you going to back?"
0:47:50 > 0:47:55And we said, "Well, that's not our problem, we don't do that."
0:47:55 > 0:47:58We're a tool of foreign policy.
0:47:58 > 0:48:04That covert action tool worked, was successful in this case,
0:48:04 > 0:48:07and then over to you, diplomats.
0:48:07 > 0:48:10That was a problem of really bad timing,
0:48:10 > 0:48:15because '88, '89, the wall came down in Berlin.
0:48:15 > 0:48:19It was the major event of the 20th century,
0:48:19 > 0:48:22the end of the Cold War really,
0:48:22 > 0:48:28and Afghanistan fell off the bottom.
0:48:28 > 0:48:31There were no funds for the reconstruction of Afghanistan,
0:48:31 > 0:48:34but what the Americans did leave was modern weaponry,
0:48:34 > 0:48:37some in the hands of Islamists
0:48:37 > 0:48:41increasingly connected to global terror networks.
0:48:41 > 0:48:46There was one goal that trumped all others,
0:48:46 > 0:48:51help the Afghans defend their soil, kill the Russians.
0:48:51 > 0:48:55Who was there to do it? They were all Islamists,
0:48:55 > 0:48:59and we didn't spend much time thinking about, you know,
0:48:59 > 0:49:03what degree of Islamist is it that we can't tolerate.
0:49:07 > 0:49:12Twetten's CIA had avoided the trap of outright occupation.
0:49:12 > 0:49:13But they had worked
0:49:13 > 0:49:17within a dangerously narrow and limited vision,
0:49:17 > 0:49:20funding brutal warlords, men linked to terrorists
0:49:20 > 0:49:23who would eventually kill thousands across the world.
0:49:27 > 0:49:30But the first to reap the consequences were not the Americans,
0:49:30 > 0:49:32but the Afghans themselves.
0:49:32 > 0:49:37Ten years of Soviet occupation had left Kabul largely intact.
0:49:37 > 0:49:40But when the Mujahideen seized the capital,
0:49:40 > 0:49:42they turned on each other,
0:49:42 > 0:49:46firing rockets from the ridgelines, destroying the very city
0:49:46 > 0:49:50and killing the very families they'd fought to liberate.
0:49:50 > 0:49:54The civil war, perhaps the very darkest period in Afghan history,
0:49:54 > 0:49:57lasted for five long years.
0:49:57 > 0:50:00'I asked these Afghan men
0:50:00 > 0:50:03'about its impact on their lives and their city.'
0:50:03 > 0:50:08IN NATIVE LANGUAGE:
0:50:36 > 0:50:39It was out of this dark period that the Taliban emerged,
0:50:39 > 0:50:42believers in a strict interpretation of Islamic law.
0:50:42 > 0:50:45Many were the orphan children of the Soviet war,
0:50:45 > 0:50:48taught in fundamentalist schools.
0:50:48 > 0:50:52They captured 90% of the country in just 2½ years.
0:50:52 > 0:50:55They're infamous today for their brutality,
0:50:55 > 0:50:59but many Afghans were at first grateful that the Taliban had won,
0:50:59 > 0:51:01because they ended the rule of the warlords,
0:51:01 > 0:51:04the gangster militias and the civil war.
0:51:37 > 0:51:42'I'm afraid many people in the centre of the old city of Kabul felt like that.'
0:51:42 > 0:51:44After three years of seeing these great heroic leaders,
0:51:44 > 0:51:48the resistance against the Soviet Union,
0:51:48 > 0:51:51turned into these monsters of depravity, corruption,
0:51:51 > 0:51:53power and killing,
0:51:53 > 0:51:56the Taliban seemed a relief.
0:52:00 > 0:52:04But for millions of Afghans, Taliban rule was hell.
0:52:04 > 0:52:06They banned girls from school,
0:52:06 > 0:52:10forced women to hide even their faces
0:52:10 > 0:52:14and they inflicted the most terrifying punishments.
0:52:14 > 0:52:16And yet, the West did not interfere.
0:52:16 > 0:52:19It wasn't the Taliban's cruelty
0:52:19 > 0:52:22that led to the next foreign invasion, it was this.
0:52:28 > 0:52:32The mastermind of 9/11 first came to Afghanistan
0:52:32 > 0:52:35to fight for Islam against the Soviet Union.
0:52:35 > 0:52:39He wasn't an Afghan, nor were the 9/11 hijackers,
0:52:39 > 0:52:43but the Taliban government gave them refuge.
0:52:43 > 0:52:47Once again, a superpower invaded
0:52:47 > 0:52:50and, this time, with good reason - to get Al Qaeda.
0:52:50 > 0:52:53The coalition brought many improvements to Afghanistan,
0:52:53 > 0:52:57particularly in the early days,
0:52:57 > 0:53:02but the US soon faced the almost irresistible temptations of empire.
0:53:02 > 0:53:06Like the Soviets, they were tempted to reshape Afghanistan
0:53:06 > 0:53:09ever more in their own image.
0:53:09 > 0:53:11And when the resistance began against them,
0:53:11 > 0:53:13like Britain and the Soviets before them,
0:53:13 > 0:53:16the coalition did not want to seem weak.
0:53:16 > 0:53:20And, once again, another superpower and its allies
0:53:20 > 0:53:25were trapped into investing more and more into Afghanistan.
0:53:27 > 0:53:30Now, the Taliban has formed again
0:53:30 > 0:53:34and the country faces more upheaval or even civil war.
0:53:39 > 0:53:41We're on our way to find Mullah Rocketi.
0:53:41 > 0:53:44He's a Taliban commander who took the name Rocketi
0:53:44 > 0:53:46cos he used to fire a lot of rockets.
0:53:46 > 0:53:49'The last time I met a Taliban commander,
0:53:49 > 0:53:52'people pulled guns on me and, and threatened to kill me.
0:53:52 > 0:53:56'This time, I'm really hoping for more of a political discussion.'
0:53:56 > 0:54:01I found him in reflective mood thinking back on the invasion
0:54:01 > 0:54:03and the cycle of Afghan politics.
0:54:03 > 0:54:10IN NATIVE LANGUAGE:
0:55:39 > 0:55:42Three mighty imperial powers,
0:55:42 > 0:55:48the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States,
0:55:48 > 0:55:51all came here, occupied and were trapped.
0:55:51 > 0:55:54For each, over the last 200 years,
0:55:54 > 0:55:56it was easy to enter Afghanistan,
0:55:56 > 0:55:58but proved very difficult to get out.
0:56:02 > 0:56:04In Boston's Helmand Restaurant,
0:56:04 > 0:56:06'owned by the sister of the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai,
0:56:06 > 0:56:10'I reflected on these two centuries of Afghan history
0:56:10 > 0:56:13'with my friend the historian Tom Barfield.'
0:56:13 > 0:56:17Foreigners always coming into Afghanistan think,
0:56:17 > 0:56:19"We have just what the Afghans need",
0:56:19 > 0:56:21and are surprised that the people aren't buying it.
0:56:21 > 0:56:25And a little bit more knowledge would be there is nothing
0:56:25 > 0:56:28that has been tried militarily or civilian in Afghanistan
0:56:28 > 0:56:33that two empires before haven't already succeeded or failed at doing.
0:56:33 > 0:56:38A little knowledge of that would be like, been there, done that.
0:56:38 > 0:56:41Or, you know, this road leads to a bad end.
0:56:48 > 0:56:51The price paid in these wars
0:56:51 > 0:56:56by the people of Afghanistan is unimaginable.
0:56:56 > 0:57:01A self-contained country targeted repeatedly by imperial powers,
0:57:01 > 0:57:04left with its society shattered
0:57:04 > 0:57:08and over a million Afghan dead.
0:57:08 > 0:57:11This suffering and the intervention of all these foreigners,
0:57:11 > 0:57:16Victorian British and Soviet Russian, CIA and Bin Laden,
0:57:16 > 0:57:19and the current coalition of nations,
0:57:19 > 0:57:21has shaped modern Afghanistan.
0:57:21 > 0:57:26But, ultimately, this is a story that reveals, for me,
0:57:26 > 0:57:30less about Afghanistan itself and more about the foreigners.
0:57:30 > 0:57:32There's something about invasion,
0:57:32 > 0:57:36particularly invasion of Afghanistan,
0:57:36 > 0:57:39which means that you go in very briefly and you get trapped
0:57:39 > 0:57:43because all these theories, your fear of Muslim terrorists,
0:57:43 > 0:57:46your fear of some other great superpower,
0:57:46 > 0:57:50your worries about your own pride trap you in that country.
0:57:50 > 0:57:53And from that point onwards, there's nothing that you feel you can do
0:57:53 > 0:57:59other than to dig ever and more futilely deeper.
0:58:05 > 0:58:12Afghanistan has been for so many men a place of heroism, self-sacrifice.
0:58:12 > 0:58:16And yet, in the end, all this energy, all this courage,
0:58:16 > 0:58:20was in pursuit of something which is simply wrong.
0:58:44 > 0:58:47Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd