0:00:05 > 0:00:07BARACK OBAMA: 'Today, at my direction,
0:00:07 > 0:00:13'the United States launched a targeted operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
0:00:13 > 0:00:15'After a firefight, they killed Osama Bin Laden
0:00:15 > 0:00:18'and took custody of his body.'
0:00:18 > 0:00:22Earlier this year, America shot dead the Al-Qaeda leader
0:00:22 > 0:00:24in his hiding place in Pakistan.
0:00:24 > 0:00:28Publicly, Pakistan is one of America's closest allies,
0:00:28 > 0:00:33yet every step of the operation was kept secret from it.
0:00:33 > 0:00:37This series tells the hidden story of how, for a decade,
0:00:37 > 0:00:40Pakistan deceived America and the West...
0:00:40 > 0:00:43and was then found out.
0:00:43 > 0:00:46Unfortunately, one guy we missed, that's the number one guy.
0:00:46 > 0:00:49And so we got all the blame.
0:00:49 > 0:00:53You didn't have to be Sherlock Holmes to put the dots together.
0:00:53 > 0:00:56Pakistan was playing a double game and double-dealing us.
0:00:57 > 0:01:01It's a story that begins with the hunt for Al-Qaeda.
0:01:01 > 0:01:03I'm a native New Yorker, you know,
0:01:03 > 0:01:05I'm thinking in my heart, this is revenge.
0:01:07 > 0:01:09But it's also a story of how and why
0:01:09 > 0:01:13Pakistan continues to give secret support to the Taliban.
0:01:14 > 0:01:18First, they support us by providing a place to hide.
0:01:18 > 0:01:21Secondly, they provide us with weapons.
0:01:23 > 0:01:27Above all, it is the story of how Pakistan, a supposed ally,
0:01:27 > 0:01:32stands accused by top Western intelligence officers and diplomats
0:01:32 > 0:01:37of causing the deaths of thousands of coalition soldiers in Afghanistan.
0:01:37 > 0:01:40Deaths that continue to this day.
0:01:40 > 0:01:45We are literally seeing hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of fighters pouring in from Pakistan.
0:01:47 > 0:01:52I think it was quite clear to us that the Pakistanis were playing very much a double game.
0:01:54 > 0:01:56'The stakes here are huge.'
0:02:17 > 0:02:21GEORGE W BUSH: 'The Taliban has been given the opportunity to surrender
0:02:21 > 0:02:26'all the terrorists in Afghanistan and to close down their camps and operations.
0:02:26 > 0:02:31'Forewarning has been given and time is running out.
0:02:31 > 0:02:34'The United States is presenting a clear choice to every nation.
0:02:34 > 0:02:38'Stand with the civilised world or stand with the terrorists.
0:02:38 > 0:02:41'And for those nations that stand with the terrorists,
0:02:41 > 0:02:44'there will be a heavy price.'
0:02:47 > 0:02:52The Taliban regime ignored President Bush's threat.
0:02:52 > 0:02:55It refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden.
0:02:55 > 0:02:58My fellow Americans, let's roll.
0:03:08 > 0:03:13A month after 9/11, the United States began to bomb Afghanistan,
0:03:13 > 0:03:16from where the attacks had been planned.
0:03:18 > 0:03:19Yes!
0:03:23 > 0:03:26DISTANT EXPLOSION
0:03:28 > 0:03:31The Americans' aim was to employ their military might
0:03:31 > 0:03:35to prevent Afghanistan being used again as a terrorist base...
0:03:37 > 0:03:39..and to destroy Al-Qaeda.
0:03:40 > 0:03:43Their allies were the Northern Alliance,
0:03:43 > 0:03:46made up of local Afghan warlords,
0:03:46 > 0:03:50united by their hatred of the Taliban.
0:03:51 > 0:03:54US special forces and CIA agents
0:03:54 > 0:03:57were directing operations on the ground.
0:03:57 > 0:03:59Their commander was Gary Berntsen.
0:04:01 > 0:04:06Well, of course, for me, I'm a native New Yorker, you know.
0:04:06 > 0:04:10I'm not ashamed to say the fact that for me this was, in a way,
0:04:10 > 0:04:12I'm thinking in my heart, this is revenge.
0:04:12 > 0:04:15They have come in, they have killed our people.
0:04:15 > 0:04:18I will deliver justice to as many of these people as possible.
0:04:18 > 0:04:20We're going to dispatch them to the next world.
0:04:20 > 0:04:23EXPLOSIONS
0:04:25 > 0:04:31As the bombing intensified, some senior Taliban commanders retreated
0:04:31 > 0:04:34to the airfield at Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan.
0:04:34 > 0:04:37But they were not alone.
0:04:37 > 0:04:42Before 9/11, neighbouring Pakistan had been the Taliban's closest ally.
0:04:42 > 0:04:44Events had moved so fast,
0:04:44 > 0:04:49the Taliban still had Pakistani military advisers with them.
0:04:49 > 0:04:54Now, the Pakistanis were still secretly supporting the Taliban,
0:04:54 > 0:04:58even though they said in public they were on the Americans' side.
0:05:00 > 0:05:03What happened next in Kunduz was the first evidence
0:05:03 > 0:05:06of an audacious Pakistani double cross
0:05:06 > 0:05:07that would last a decade.
0:05:11 > 0:05:15In December of 2001, as American forces,
0:05:15 > 0:05:18American air power and the Northern Alliance on the ground
0:05:18 > 0:05:20was putting the Taliban to the knife across the country,
0:05:20 > 0:05:23one of the more difficult episodes
0:05:23 > 0:05:27that really made it very, very difficult to trust the Pakistanis
0:05:27 > 0:05:29was the Kunduz airlift.
0:05:29 > 0:05:34The Northern Alliance came to me in a fit of rage,
0:05:34 > 0:05:39stating that the Pakistani aircraft were landing in Kunduz on an airfield
0:05:39 > 0:05:42and were evacuating the Taliban.
0:05:42 > 0:05:45I actually asked Amrullah Saleh, who would later become
0:05:45 > 0:05:48the Northern Alliance chief of intelligence, so you know,
0:05:48 > 0:05:50I asked him if he was smoking hashish.
0:05:50 > 0:05:51I couldn't believe it.
0:05:53 > 0:05:55Those planes did fly in.
0:05:55 > 0:05:57The stated reason for them entering was, of course,
0:05:57 > 0:06:01to evacuate some of the military officers that had been up there,
0:06:01 > 0:06:03but the Taliban fought their way onto those planes
0:06:03 > 0:06:06and an air corridor allowed many of the leadership
0:06:06 > 0:06:11of the Taliban's northern command to be flown out of Afghanistan,
0:06:11 > 0:06:14while the rest of us were trying to destroy them.
0:06:14 > 0:06:18I was horrified by the duplicity on the Pakistanis' part.
0:06:20 > 0:06:24One of the Taliban fighters uses the name Commander Aziz.
0:06:24 > 0:06:28He's still active in the Taliban and has hidden his identity.
0:06:28 > 0:06:30He is speaking publicly for the first time.
0:06:32 > 0:06:35We saw wounded and dead everywhere.
0:06:35 > 0:06:37On the roads, in the streets.
0:06:39 > 0:06:43Everybody was escaping, chased by the enemy.
0:06:43 > 0:06:46Aziz claims to have watched
0:06:46 > 0:06:50as the Pakistani military airlifted not just their personnel,
0:06:50 > 0:06:52but also his Taliban commanders.
0:06:55 > 0:06:58I literally saw it with my own eyes.
0:06:58 > 0:07:03The programme of evacuation began around 4pm
0:07:03 > 0:07:05and went on until about 11 at night.
0:07:08 > 0:07:12The roars of the planes to take them away could be heard the entire time.
0:07:12 > 0:07:15God knows everything.
0:07:15 > 0:07:18The military planes transferred them in about ten flights.
0:07:22 > 0:07:27The problem with Pakistan is that they had deceived us in Kunduz.
0:07:27 > 0:07:31I think it demonstrated their true colours.
0:07:40 > 0:07:43In the Pakistani capital Islamabad,
0:07:43 > 0:07:46there was a hidden determination to help the Taliban live
0:07:46 > 0:07:48to fight another day.
0:07:49 > 0:07:51Two weeks before Kunduz,
0:07:51 > 0:07:54the head of Pakistan's intelligence service,
0:07:54 > 0:07:57the ISI, travelled to a secret meeting.
0:07:59 > 0:08:02General Mahmud Ahmed was one of the most powerful men
0:08:02 > 0:08:04in Pakistan's military regime.
0:08:04 > 0:08:09He had nurtured the Taliban since their rise to power.
0:08:09 > 0:08:13General Mahmud, it is claimed, told the Taliban ambassador,
0:08:13 > 0:08:17Mullah Zaeef, that whatever was said publicly,
0:08:17 > 0:08:21Pakistan and the ISI would still secretly support the Taliban.
0:08:51 > 0:08:55In the 1990s, Pakistan had helped create the Taliban
0:08:55 > 0:08:59to prevent Afghanistan falling under the influence of India,
0:08:59 > 0:09:01Pakistan's enduring enemy.
0:09:01 > 0:09:07Of course, for Pakistan, the overwhelming obsession is India.
0:09:07 > 0:09:13This eternal worry that India is using Afghanistan
0:09:13 > 0:09:16to surround Pakistan.
0:09:16 > 0:09:18So, that is the central obsession
0:09:18 > 0:09:22and, of course, as every state is entitled to do,
0:09:22 > 0:09:25their priority is their national security and survival,
0:09:25 > 0:09:28and they regard the Americans and us
0:09:28 > 0:09:32as somewhat impermanent fair-weather friends.
0:09:32 > 0:09:35Support for the Taliban ran through the highest levels
0:09:35 > 0:09:39of Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment.
0:09:40 > 0:09:44Will Taliban go away? They're not going to go away.
0:09:44 > 0:09:48Eventually, it is they who are going to be on our borders.
0:09:48 > 0:09:51We have to co-exist with them, we have to learn to live with them.
0:09:51 > 0:09:56Can we afford to have a hostile Afghanistan on our back?
0:09:56 > 0:09:57No, we cannot.
0:09:57 > 0:10:03The collective wisdom of the nation says that we must continue
0:10:03 > 0:10:05to have good linkages with Taliban.
0:10:05 > 0:10:08It is in Pakistan's national interest
0:10:08 > 0:10:10and I think everybody knows
0:10:10 > 0:10:12that it is in Pakistan's national interest.
0:10:13 > 0:10:19Pakistan's support for the Taliban did not come as news to the CIA.
0:10:19 > 0:10:22Philip Mudd was briefing the White House regularly.
0:10:22 > 0:10:26He was in Afghanistan in that autumn of 2001.
0:10:26 > 0:10:29I was there on the ground and the Americans said,
0:10:29 > 0:10:33"Well, you must be with us, we just lost 3,000 people".
0:10:33 > 0:10:35Well, not everybody was.
0:10:35 > 0:10:38We shouldn't be surprised to find
0:10:38 > 0:10:40not only that there are people in Pakistan
0:10:40 > 0:10:43who, before 911, were supporting the Taliban...
0:10:43 > 0:10:44Of course there were.
0:10:44 > 0:10:46They were creating a friend on their back door.
0:10:46 > 0:10:50I remember watching things like the Kunduz operation, saying,
0:10:50 > 0:10:52"We shouldn't be surprised
0:10:52 > 0:10:56"that there were sympathisers within the Pakistani security service".
0:11:00 > 0:11:03The powerful Pakistani security service - the ISI,
0:11:03 > 0:11:05or Inter-Services Intelligence,
0:11:05 > 0:11:08operates from this headquarters in Islamabad.
0:11:09 > 0:11:12The ISI is part of the military.
0:11:12 > 0:11:13Its agents are mostly soldiers
0:11:13 > 0:11:16and it's always commanded by a senior general.
0:11:16 > 0:11:20In the 1980s, it worked with the CIA and MI6
0:11:20 > 0:11:22to support the Afghan Mujahideen
0:11:22 > 0:11:25fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
0:11:27 > 0:11:31I've worked with the ISI for more than three decades.
0:11:31 > 0:11:35It is part of the Pakistani army,
0:11:35 > 0:11:39but it operates, generally, beyond the control
0:11:39 > 0:11:41of the Pakistani government as a whole.
0:11:41 > 0:11:46There are many grey areas about the ISI's behaviour.
0:11:51 > 0:11:54(GEORGE BUSH) There's an old poster out West, as I recall,
0:11:54 > 0:11:57that said, "Wanted, dead or alive".
0:11:57 > 0:12:00All I want, and America, wants him brought to justice,
0:12:00 > 0:12:03that's what we want.
0:12:03 > 0:12:05In early December 2001,
0:12:05 > 0:12:08in the weeks following the Kunduz airlift,
0:12:08 > 0:12:10more Taliban fighters were cornered.
0:12:10 > 0:12:13This time, in the Afghan mountains of Tora Bora,
0:12:13 > 0:12:16close to the border with Pakistan.
0:12:16 > 0:12:19With them were fighters from Al-Qaeda,
0:12:19 > 0:12:21an estimated 1,500 men in all.
0:12:21 > 0:12:25The CIA's Gary Berntsen discovered Osama Bin Laden
0:12:25 > 0:12:27was tantalisingly within reach.
0:12:29 > 0:12:31One of our people picks up a radio.
0:12:31 > 0:12:35It's essentially a hunting radio. Nothing complicated, no encryption.
0:12:35 > 0:12:38This is what they're using to talk with one another.
0:12:38 > 0:12:41We're able to actually listen to them speak to one another
0:12:41 > 0:12:43and assess, you know, their position.
0:12:43 > 0:12:45We actually saw Bin Laden and his son come out.
0:12:45 > 0:12:48Reporter gave us a pretty good description.
0:12:48 > 0:12:49We thought, "This is a bit suspect".
0:12:51 > 0:12:58We've got B-52s, we've got B-1s, we've got B-2s, F-16s.
0:12:58 > 0:13:01Everything in the US arsenal,
0:13:01 > 0:13:04every aircraft that you can strap a bomb onto
0:13:04 > 0:13:08is flying in there and dropping weapons on Tora Bora.
0:13:08 > 0:13:10But to Berntsen's frustration,
0:13:10 > 0:13:14US Central Command refused to send the extra ground troops
0:13:14 > 0:13:16that he requested.
0:13:16 > 0:13:19And the Taliban fighters, together with Bin Laden and his men,
0:13:19 > 0:13:21had a potential escape route -
0:13:21 > 0:13:26across the Afghan border and into Pakistan.
0:13:26 > 0:13:29The critical piece in this, of course, was,
0:13:29 > 0:13:32we are told that the Pakistani Frontier Force
0:13:32 > 0:13:35will cover the back of the mountain.
0:13:35 > 0:13:38That statement from the Pakistanis convinced the US
0:13:38 > 0:13:40that they didn't need to send additional forces in.
0:13:40 > 0:13:44It was a miscalculation on the part of the US.
0:13:45 > 0:13:49But the trapped Taliban fighters and their Al-Qaeda guests
0:13:49 > 0:13:53needed help somehow to reach the border.
0:13:53 > 0:13:56There are allegations it came from familiar quarters,
0:13:56 > 0:13:59as one of the most influential Northern Alliance warlords,
0:13:59 > 0:14:01Zahir Qadir, reveals.
0:14:20 > 0:14:24The three Afghan warlords convened a secret meeting
0:14:24 > 0:14:26to agree tactics.
0:14:26 > 0:14:30One of them, Haji Zaman, came up with a controversial plan -
0:14:30 > 0:14:33to grant the Taliban a 12-hour ceasefire
0:14:33 > 0:14:37so they could gather their men and weapons and surrender.
0:14:57 > 0:15:00Qadir's fears were borne out.
0:15:00 > 0:15:03Many of the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda guests
0:15:03 > 0:15:07used the ceasefire to head for the border.
0:15:07 > 0:15:11To Qadir, it was evidence that his fellow warlord, Haji Zaman,
0:15:11 > 0:15:12had double crossed him.
0:15:12 > 0:15:17Zaman had once been a major Taliban commander himself
0:15:17 > 0:15:21and was known to have had links with the ISI in the past.
0:15:48 > 0:15:50Qadir's claims are impossible to verify
0:15:50 > 0:15:53and Haji Zaman was assassinated
0:15:53 > 0:15:55when he returned to Afghanistan last year.
0:15:56 > 0:16:01What is certain is that in the months after America attacked,
0:16:01 > 0:16:03most of the Taliban fighters escaped,
0:16:03 > 0:16:05alongside their Al-Qaeda allies.
0:16:07 > 0:16:11One middle-ranking Taliban commander who'd got away at Tora Bora
0:16:11 > 0:16:13and is still an active fighter,
0:16:13 > 0:16:16reveals where they ended up.
0:16:16 > 0:16:19He's an Afghan who uses the name Mullah Qaseem
0:16:19 > 0:16:22but asked for his real identity to be kept hidden.
0:16:24 > 0:16:28TRANSLATION: We fought for some time, but later on, we escaped.
0:16:30 > 0:16:32We all wanted to reach safety.
0:16:34 > 0:16:37We went to places safe from bombardment,
0:16:37 > 0:16:41but when they were invaded, we escaped to Pakistan.
0:16:44 > 0:16:47We had no problem at the border.
0:16:51 > 0:16:53Then, we went to Peshawar.
0:16:56 > 0:17:01We got together into groups of four or five people who we trusted.
0:17:07 > 0:17:11The police were not arresting or jailing Afghans when they saw us...
0:17:12 > 0:17:15..so, we didn't face many difficulties.
0:17:16 > 0:17:21The escaping Taliban fighters were members of the Pashtun tribe.
0:17:21 > 0:17:25The Pashtuns are spread across Pakistan's tribal areas
0:17:25 > 0:17:27and southern Afghanistan.
0:17:27 > 0:17:30Linked by language and ethnicity,
0:17:30 > 0:17:34they don't recognise the border between the two countries.
0:17:34 > 0:17:38They were coming back to their own kith and kin,
0:17:38 > 0:17:42coming to Pakistan, who had been supporting them against the Soviets,
0:17:42 > 0:17:46providing them the sanctuary and the base for the last decade or so,
0:17:46 > 0:17:49who had very deep relations with them.
0:17:49 > 0:17:51They were welcomed.
0:17:51 > 0:17:54We have the same blood running in our veins.
0:17:54 > 0:17:56Senior figures in Pakistan's intelligence
0:17:56 > 0:17:58and military establishment
0:17:58 > 0:18:00were already aware that the Taliban had survived
0:18:00 > 0:18:02to fight another day.
0:18:03 > 0:18:07Did you think that the Taliban had been defeated?
0:18:08 > 0:18:09No.
0:18:11 > 0:18:13I mean, to be very exact,
0:18:13 > 0:18:19the total casualties they suffered was about 1,100, who were killed.
0:18:19 > 0:18:25The rest had hidden themselves, they had fallen back.
0:18:25 > 0:18:28The war in Afghanistan seemed over.
0:18:28 > 0:18:31A new government, under President Hamid Karzai,
0:18:31 > 0:18:35took power, backed by America and its allies.
0:18:35 > 0:18:38America no longer cared about the Taliban.
0:18:38 > 0:18:41Its primary target, as it always had been,
0:18:41 > 0:18:43was Al-Qaeda,
0:18:43 > 0:18:46which now meant hunting them down in Pakistan.
0:18:46 > 0:18:50The Taliban had always been quite distinct, organisationally,
0:18:50 > 0:18:54from Al-Qaeda and I did not see the Taliban
0:18:54 > 0:18:57as being a real material threat.
0:18:57 > 0:18:59We were focused like a laser beam on Al-Qaeda.
0:18:59 > 0:19:02These were the people who were responsible for 9/11,
0:19:02 > 0:19:06these were the people who we feared,
0:19:06 > 0:19:09if they managed to make good their escape,
0:19:09 > 0:19:12would continue attacking US interests around the world.
0:19:12 > 0:19:17That was, by far, our number one priority.
0:19:17 > 0:19:20We didn't want anything to interfere with that.
0:19:20 > 0:19:25Some of their leadership started going into urban spaces of Pakistan.
0:19:25 > 0:19:26So, in the spring,
0:19:26 > 0:19:30you've got a fundamental problem in this campaign,
0:19:30 > 0:19:34and that is starting to try to find people in urban areas of Pakistan
0:19:34 > 0:19:36and starting to try to figure out
0:19:36 > 0:19:38how we could work with the Pakistanis on that.
0:19:44 > 0:19:49The next 18 months, through 2002 and 2003,
0:19:49 > 0:19:53seemed to show the US and Pakistan co-operating against Al-Qaeda,
0:19:53 > 0:19:56through their spy agencies, the ISI and the CIA.
0:19:59 > 0:20:02The Taliban's survival mattered to Pakistan.
0:20:02 > 0:20:04Al-Qaeda's didn't.
0:20:04 > 0:20:08Each arrest helped unlock what would become billions of dollars
0:20:08 > 0:20:09of US military aid.
0:20:13 > 0:20:18The ISI would do confirmatory checks on the ground,
0:20:18 > 0:20:20focusing specifically on Al-Qaeda,
0:20:20 > 0:20:24the Arab members of Al-Qaeda who'd fled out of Afghanistan.
0:20:24 > 0:20:27We and the Pakistanis had perfected a methodology
0:20:27 > 0:20:30for conducting raids to capture these people.
0:20:31 > 0:20:35It was a series of rolling raids, almost night after night,
0:20:35 > 0:20:38and that was the way that we did business in those early days.
0:20:38 > 0:20:43But even then, there were limits to US/Pakistani co-operation.
0:20:43 > 0:20:46In the past, the ISI had built close links
0:20:46 > 0:20:49with various Pakistani militant groups fighting India
0:20:49 > 0:20:52in the disputed territory of Kashmir,
0:20:52 > 0:20:53and even with Al-Qaeda.
0:20:55 > 0:20:59Now, the ISI went to great lengths to cover these tracks,
0:20:59 > 0:21:01as became evident during the disappearance
0:21:01 > 0:21:05of an American journalist in early 2002.
0:21:07 > 0:21:08On the 23rd of January,
0:21:08 > 0:21:11the 38-year-old Daniel Pearl was kidnapped
0:21:11 > 0:21:14in the Pakistani city of Karachi.
0:21:20 > 0:21:23It soon emerged that the militant group that had abducted him
0:21:23 > 0:21:26was one of those fighting Indian troops in Kashmir,
0:21:26 > 0:21:31with, the CIA suspected, the secret support of the ISI.
0:21:36 > 0:21:41I think, to the extent that some of those extremists,
0:21:41 > 0:21:43may have been affiliated with groups
0:21:43 > 0:21:46that had received some measure of support
0:21:46 > 0:21:49from the army of Pakistan in the past,
0:21:49 > 0:21:51those were details which the Pakistanis
0:21:51 > 0:21:54would not particularly have wanted to come to light.
0:21:54 > 0:21:57Two weeks later, with Pearl still missing,
0:21:57 > 0:22:01the British-born mastermind of the kidnap, Omar Sheikh,
0:22:01 > 0:22:04decided to hand himself in to the authorities.
0:22:05 > 0:22:07But not to the police.
0:22:07 > 0:22:12Omar Sheikh had links with the ISI stretching back to the 1990s
0:22:12 > 0:22:16and he now chose to give himself up to a former ISI official.
0:22:16 > 0:22:19The ISI kept the news secret.
0:22:20 > 0:22:23We had reason to believe that he had been detained,
0:22:23 > 0:22:25and specifically, by the ISI,
0:22:25 > 0:22:30and so, I went to a very trusted counterpart within the ISI and said,
0:22:30 > 0:22:32"How about it? Do you have him?"
0:22:32 > 0:22:36And he said, "Well, let me look into it".
0:22:36 > 0:22:40He came back to me a few hours later and said, "No, we don't have him".
0:22:40 > 0:22:42And I knew he was lying to me.
0:22:42 > 0:22:46Eventually, but only under extreme pressure,
0:22:46 > 0:22:50the ISI did hand over Omar Sheikh to the police.
0:22:53 > 0:22:55Later, he himself said,
0:22:55 > 0:22:57in open court, that he had been detained by the ISI
0:22:57 > 0:23:01and been kept for, you know, some seven or eight days or so,
0:23:01 > 0:23:04and we can only guess what those conversations were like.
0:23:04 > 0:23:08I suspect that he was strongly encouraged by the ISI
0:23:08 > 0:23:11not to say too much about his past life.
0:23:11 > 0:23:15I think the Pakistanis were probably concerned
0:23:15 > 0:23:18about what other stories he might tell.
0:23:18 > 0:23:22In particular, there were suspicions that before 9/11,
0:23:22 > 0:23:24the ISI had indeed encouraged such groups
0:23:24 > 0:23:27to develop contacts with Al-Qaeda.
0:23:27 > 0:23:31The closeness of the links between Omar Sheikh's group and Al-Qaeda
0:23:31 > 0:23:34were soon to be brutally demonstrated.
0:23:34 > 0:23:37The local police chief, Detective Fayyaz Khan,
0:23:37 > 0:23:39takes up the story.
0:24:25 > 0:24:27The man who beheaded Daniel Pearl
0:24:27 > 0:24:31was the self-proclaimed Al-Qaeda mastermind of 9/11,
0:24:31 > 0:24:33Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
0:24:34 > 0:24:37When, a year later, he was arrested by the ISI
0:24:37 > 0:24:41in the military town of Rawalpindi, the Pakistanis claimed
0:24:41 > 0:24:44it showed they were indispensable in the battle against Al-Qaeda.
0:24:46 > 0:24:50If you look at the wanted list which the United States issued,
0:24:50 > 0:24:54most of those guys were actually nabbed by the ISI.
0:24:54 > 0:24:59So, ISI was very active and has been keeping a watch in all the cities,
0:24:59 > 0:25:03but then, it's a country of 180 million people,
0:25:03 > 0:25:07so ISI has been active in all these cities, looking for Al-Qaeda,
0:25:07 > 0:25:08picking them up.
0:25:08 > 0:25:13Unfortunately, one guy we missed, that's the number one guy,
0:25:13 > 0:25:16and so, we got all the blame.
0:25:16 > 0:25:19But even in the early days of 2002 and 2003,
0:25:19 > 0:25:22the Americans had doubts about Pakistan.
0:25:22 > 0:25:27Inside the CIA, it was noted that no senior Taliban figures
0:25:27 > 0:25:30were arrested during this period.
0:25:30 > 0:25:33For all the arrests of Al-Qaeda members like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
0:25:33 > 0:25:37the CIA questioned the true motives of Pakistan's military dictator
0:25:37 > 0:25:40General Pervez Musharraf.
0:25:41 > 0:25:44Pakistan, and particularly General Musharraf,
0:25:44 > 0:25:48played the Bush administration like a fiddle.
0:25:48 > 0:25:52They gave us just enough, in terms of Al-Qaeda,
0:25:52 > 0:25:54to keep the Bush administration happy,
0:25:54 > 0:26:00but not enough to actually eliminate Al-Qaeda as an organisation,
0:26:00 > 0:26:03and virtually nothing on the Taliban.
0:26:03 > 0:26:07Musharraf knew that before every meeting between the two of them,
0:26:07 > 0:26:10he needed to reinforce his stock,
0:26:10 > 0:26:14and he did that by giving us a prominent Al-Qaeda operative.
0:26:14 > 0:26:16The Pakistanis would, fortuitously,
0:26:16 > 0:26:20on the verge of a summit meeting between Bush and Musharraf,
0:26:20 > 0:26:25produce number three, number four, in the Al-Qaeda hierarchy,
0:26:25 > 0:26:27and that way, take away any criticism
0:26:27 > 0:26:31that might come from the Americans over Pakistan's double game.
0:26:31 > 0:26:35Meanwhile, the reports from Islamabad
0:26:35 > 0:26:37that were reaching the British at this time
0:26:37 > 0:26:40seemed to bear out the American claims.
0:26:41 > 0:26:45Colonel Richard Kemp was working at the heart of Whitehall,
0:26:45 > 0:26:50and intelligence reports from MI5 and MI6 passed across his desk.
0:26:51 > 0:26:54I think it was quite clear to us
0:26:54 > 0:26:57that the Pakistanis were playing very much a double game
0:26:57 > 0:27:01and a lot of what they were saying and some of what they were doing
0:27:01 > 0:27:06was very clearly aimed at the eyes of the West
0:27:06 > 0:27:08and didn't necessarily reflect their real intentions
0:27:08 > 0:27:10and their real actions,
0:27:10 > 0:27:13so, I think we felt that there would be elements of the Taliban
0:27:13 > 0:27:16who were still being supported by Pakistan
0:27:16 > 0:27:20and who Pakistan was still prepared to have operating on its territory.
0:27:20 > 0:27:24The clearest evidence for this double game
0:27:24 > 0:27:27lay in the Pakistani town of Quetta,
0:27:27 > 0:27:30just across the border from the Afghan province of Helmand.
0:27:30 > 0:27:36In 2003, the Taliban set up a government in exile there.
0:27:37 > 0:27:40Christina Lamb was reporting from Pakistan at the time.
0:27:44 > 0:27:49In 2003, I was in Quetta and Quetta was like Taliban central.
0:27:51 > 0:27:53Taliban were everywhere.
0:27:53 > 0:27:55You could see them all over the town,
0:27:55 > 0:27:59and there was training camps,
0:27:59 > 0:28:02you could see recruiting going on, fund-raising,
0:28:02 > 0:28:07and it was all quite open.
0:28:08 > 0:28:11From this sanctuary, the Taliban began to launch attacks
0:28:11 > 0:28:14against the forces of the new Afghan government
0:28:14 > 0:28:17and the US troops supporting them.
0:28:18 > 0:28:21Pakistan did not stop the attacks.
0:28:24 > 0:28:27Mullah Qaseem, a Taliban commander,
0:28:27 > 0:28:30was one of those who used Quetta as a base.
0:28:30 > 0:28:34We were sent to different places over the border in Afghanistan,
0:28:34 > 0:28:37places like Paktika and Khost.
0:28:37 > 0:28:41We would cross the border and carry out operations there,
0:28:41 > 0:28:43depending on what equipment we had.
0:28:46 > 0:28:50Once we'd used up our ammunition, we'd return to our base
0:28:50 > 0:28:52and another group would take our place,
0:28:52 > 0:28:54so we were able to keep it going.
0:28:59 > 0:29:02For a fighter, there are two important things -
0:29:02 > 0:29:04supplies and a place to hide.
0:29:09 > 0:29:11Pakistan plays a significant role.
0:29:11 > 0:29:13First, they support us
0:29:13 > 0:29:16by providing a place to hide, which is really important.
0:29:16 > 0:29:21Secondly, they provide us with weapons.
0:29:21 > 0:29:27HE SINGS IN HIS OWN DIALECT
0:29:36 > 0:29:40SHOTS FIRED
0:29:41 > 0:29:43The American troops still in Afghanistan
0:29:43 > 0:29:46had been told the Taliban had been defeated
0:29:46 > 0:29:49and that Pakistan was their ally.
0:29:53 > 0:29:55Their commander, General Dan McNeill,
0:29:55 > 0:29:58found the truth on the ground was the opposite -
0:29:58 > 0:30:02the Taliban was reconstituting itself as a fighting force,
0:30:02 > 0:30:04helped by Pakistan.
0:30:05 > 0:30:10'Along the border, there's an Afghan town called Shkin.'
0:30:10 > 0:30:14It was always a difficult place, it continues to be to this day.
0:30:14 > 0:30:19'We had our forward operating base there, a very small one, very light footprint,
0:30:19 > 0:30:22'but it was sufficient for what we needed it to do.'
0:30:26 > 0:30:29'So one night, late 2002,
0:30:29 > 0:30:35we observed a dismounted patrol, might have been 20 or 30 people,'
0:30:35 > 0:30:37come across the border out of Angoor Adda,
0:30:37 > 0:30:43'the Pakistani village on the other side of the border from Shkin.'
0:30:43 > 0:30:46It was clear that they meant mischief and malice.
0:30:46 > 0:30:47Incoming!
0:30:48 > 0:30:54'We watched them come by the Pakistani Frontier Corps facility, they walked right by the walls,'
0:30:54 > 0:30:56Anybody who was manning those walls
0:30:56 > 0:30:59or guarding the gate would have to see them, without question.
0:31:01 > 0:31:05'They were going to attack the Afghan outpost and wait for us
0:31:05 > 0:31:08'to come out in our mounted quick-reaction force
0:31:08 > 0:31:11'and they were going to ambush the quick-reaction force.'
0:31:11 > 0:31:15We had to quickly devise a plan to ambush the ambushers.
0:31:17 > 0:31:19'And that, indeed, is the way it unfolded.
0:31:19 > 0:31:23'We watched the remnants of that force go back
0:31:23 > 0:31:27'pretty much the same way they came, going back into Pakistan.
0:31:27 > 0:31:29'Someone had to know they were walking,
0:31:29 > 0:31:33'and when I talked the next day or so to the Pakistani brothers about it,'
0:31:33 > 0:31:36if I remember correctly the division commander was in that area,
0:31:36 > 0:31:41"No, didn't happen that way, couldn't have happened, they didn't come by our place."
0:31:47 > 0:31:51While Pakistan proclaimed itself the ally of America,
0:31:51 > 0:31:56it was simultaneously allowing itself to be the Taliban's sanctuary.
0:31:56 > 0:32:01For Mullah Qaseem and his comrades, it was the difference between life and death.
0:32:05 > 0:32:08- TRANSLATION:- 'During the night we planted mines.'
0:32:11 > 0:32:14There is a kind of plane that makes a droning sound.
0:32:14 > 0:32:21They are called computer planes... whatever. They followed us.
0:32:21 > 0:32:25'Later on, helicopters came. My friend was wounded.
0:32:28 > 0:32:30'Pakistan is our second home.'
0:32:32 > 0:32:35'We feel safer in Pakistan than we do in Afghanistan.'
0:32:35 > 0:32:39We took him to a private hospital in Peshawar.
0:32:39 > 0:32:44If a Talib gets injured and is taken to the hospital, he's accepted regardless.
0:32:49 > 0:32:53In Kabul, the new government's intelligence chief monitored
0:32:53 > 0:32:55the Taliban resurgence with dismay.
0:32:57 > 0:32:59Amrulleh Saleh was part of a government
0:32:59 > 0:33:03that bitterly resented Pakistan's role in supporting the Taliban.
0:33:05 > 0:33:10If a wounded guy goes to one of our hospitals and says, "Treat me,"
0:33:10 > 0:33:17the doctor will ask, "How did you get injured?"
0:33:17 > 0:33:23But when a Taliban gets wounded, the entire medical system
0:33:23 > 0:33:28of Pakistan is in his service, nobody asks him, "Where were you wounded?"
0:33:30 > 0:33:34'The Pakistanis never dismantled the infrastructure
0:33:34 > 0:33:37'which was supporting the Taliban back in the '90s.'
0:33:39 > 0:33:43The charge sheet against Pakistan was growing.
0:33:46 > 0:33:48In late 2003, Colonel Tony Shaffer
0:33:48 > 0:33:52was working for US military intelligence in eastern Afghanistan.
0:33:53 > 0:33:58'It was very clear there was major support being provided
0:33:58 > 0:34:00'to the Taliban in Pakistan in some form.'
0:34:03 > 0:34:11The most notable evidence we had early on was a female intelligence operative -
0:34:11 > 0:34:15'an ISI operative - being rolled up as part of Taliban raiding party.
0:34:15 > 0:34:19'This was something that you could not deny.
0:34:19 > 0:34:23'There was vetting done to verify
0:34:23 > 0:34:26'this female operative's affiliation with the ISI.'
0:34:28 > 0:34:32And apparently, there was a great effort made behind the scenes to bring her back.
0:34:32 > 0:34:36I was of a mind, as were other officers, to send her to Guantanamo Bay,
0:34:36 > 0:34:39we believed that that would be the adequate disposition.
0:34:39 > 0:34:41Unfortunately, politics came into play
0:34:41 > 0:34:45and eventually she was returned to the Pakistani ISI.
0:34:45 > 0:34:50'So in my eyes, and the eyes of others who I was working with,
0:34:50 > 0:34:54'it was irrefutable evidence of Pakistani support for the Taliban.'
0:34:55 > 0:35:00The American claim is lent further credence by the Taliban commander,
0:35:00 > 0:35:03Mullah Qaseem, who says he witnessed the ISI in action.
0:35:05 > 0:35:11- TRANSLATION:- 'I have seen the ISI dressed as Mullahs, as preachers,
0:35:11 > 0:35:13'and as Muslim scholars.'
0:35:14 > 0:35:18'They do come but they don't come in uniform.'
0:35:21 > 0:35:25The Taliban movement was created with the help of the ISI.
0:35:26 > 0:35:31It is like when a tree grows - one has to plant it and water it.
0:35:32 > 0:35:36Supported by Pakistan, the Taliban killed 52
0:35:36 > 0:35:41and wounded hundreds of American troops in Afghanistan in 2004.
0:35:41 > 0:35:46But as long as Pakistan helped hunt Al-Qaeda, America was willing
0:35:46 > 0:35:49to downplay what they saw as Pakistan's duplicity.
0:35:49 > 0:35:52- ANNOUNCER:- President George W Bush!
0:35:52 > 0:35:53CHEERING
0:35:53 > 0:35:552004 was an election year.
0:35:55 > 0:35:587,000 miles away in Washington,
0:35:58 > 0:36:02the President wanted to claim progress in the War on Terror.
0:36:02 > 0:36:05GEORGE W BUSH: 'Our strategy is succeeding.
0:36:05 > 0:36:10'Four years ago, Pakistan was a transit point for terrorist groups.
0:36:10 > 0:36:14'Today, Pakistan is capturing terrorist leaders
0:36:14 > 0:36:18'and more than three quarters of Al-Qaeda's key members and associates
0:36:18 > 0:36:23'have been detailed or killed, and America and the world are safer.'
0:36:23 > 0:36:27CHEERING
0:36:27 > 0:36:33President Bush had already formally named Pakistan as a "major non-NATO ally",
0:36:33 > 0:36:36in recognition of its role in fighting Al-Qaeda.
0:36:36 > 0:36:39'I think the Bush administration, for a long time,
0:36:39 > 0:36:42'was in denial about Pakistani behaviour.'
0:36:42 > 0:36:46The Pakistanis were our most important ally
0:36:46 > 0:36:48in going after Al-Qaeda.
0:36:48 > 0:36:52Their duplicity in continuing to support the Taliban was
0:36:52 > 0:36:56something the Bush administration didn't want to face up to.
0:36:56 > 0:37:00You've got the state diplomatic interest, of look, you know,
0:37:00 > 0:37:06we need the Pakistanis, and we can't insult them and embarrass them,
0:37:06 > 0:37:09we need to work with these guys, everybody acknowledges that.
0:37:09 > 0:37:13'So there's only so much pressing you can do if you want to get
0:37:13 > 0:37:17'the kind of positive reaction from them that we all know we need.'
0:37:19 > 0:37:22Meanwhile, Pakistan's apparent willingness
0:37:22 > 0:37:26to barter Al-Qaeda figures to divert American attention
0:37:26 > 0:37:30from its support for the Taliban had provoked a reaction...
0:37:30 > 0:37:33from Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers.
0:37:33 > 0:37:37NEWSREADER: '14 people have died in a failed assassination attempt
0:37:37 > 0:37:38'on the President of Pakistan.
0:37:38 > 0:37:41'It's the second time in less than a fortnight
0:37:41 > 0:37:43'that President Pervez Musharraf has been targeted.
0:37:43 > 0:37:47'His motorcade was heading towards the capital, Islamabad...'
0:37:49 > 0:37:51In December 2003,
0:37:51 > 0:37:55two assassination attempts were made on the Pakistani President.
0:37:55 > 0:37:59Both were thought to have been masterminded by Pakistani militant groups
0:37:59 > 0:38:02working in association with Al-Qaeda.
0:38:04 > 0:38:06'Two attempts were made on him.'
0:38:06 > 0:38:08And the people who were caught,
0:38:08 > 0:38:13there were three from his own commando unit,
0:38:13 > 0:38:15there were two from his security.
0:38:15 > 0:38:19Five of them were hanged for the crime that they had committed.
0:38:21 > 0:38:24The attacks were eventually blamed on Amjad Farooqi,
0:38:24 > 0:38:27an Islamic militant with links to Al-Qaeda.
0:38:30 > 0:38:34In retaliation, President Musharraf ordered the army to attack Al-Qaeda
0:38:34 > 0:38:38and their allies in their stronghold of South Waziristan,
0:38:38 > 0:38:42in the heart of Pakistan's untamed tribal areas.
0:38:42 > 0:38:47'Musharraf was told, "Look, they masterminded it in Waziristan,"'
0:38:47 > 0:38:52and at that time, Waziristan was kind of in a point of boiling.
0:38:52 > 0:38:56'And Musharraf, without a second thought, unleashed the army on them.'
0:39:00 > 0:39:03The fighting that followed was fierce.
0:39:04 > 0:39:07But at the height of the offensive, an incident took place
0:39:07 > 0:39:12that raised American doubts about whether Pakistani intelligence could be trusted
0:39:12 > 0:39:15when it came to hunting down Al-Qaeda's top leadership.
0:39:18 > 0:39:22Spies working for the Americans had pinpointed Bin Laden's number two,
0:39:22 > 0:39:27Ayman al-Zawahari, in the Pakistani town of Wana,
0:39:27 > 0:39:29capital of South Waziristan.
0:39:30 > 0:39:33'The bad guys if you will, Al-Qaeda and Taliban,
0:39:33 > 0:39:35set up at a place called the Al-Qaeda hotel.'
0:39:35 > 0:39:43This was a full-on hotel which was actively a headquarters
0:39:43 > 0:39:49for everything we could see going on to conduct operations to kill people.
0:39:49 > 0:39:52'The most notable interest we had was that there was a pattern
0:39:52 > 0:39:55'of what we would call a high-value target, HVT.'
0:39:55 > 0:39:58The patterns of activity and communication
0:39:58 > 0:40:00indicated that there was a large fish there.
0:40:01 > 0:40:05We found out that Dr Zawahiri was hanging out there,
0:40:05 > 0:40:09and this information was passed to the Pakistanis.
0:40:09 > 0:40:14The information was promptly used to plan a great military operation
0:40:14 > 0:40:18using the Pakistani army, and the end result was pretty much nothing.
0:40:19 > 0:40:23I was in Wana and I am the one who carried out this operation.
0:40:23 > 0:40:25And once we got the information
0:40:25 > 0:40:29there were reports that some elements are there.
0:40:29 > 0:40:34So the operation started early morning, with the first light.
0:40:34 > 0:40:38And first the aviation and the special forces, they went in,
0:40:38 > 0:40:41and they went in and killed a number of people.
0:40:41 > 0:40:46But by that time the ground forces, which I was commanding, went in.
0:40:46 > 0:40:50A number of dead bodies were there but others had been taken
0:40:50 > 0:40:55and any surviving members might have fled.
0:40:57 > 0:41:01Although the Pakistani military had captured many Al-Qaeda prisoners,
0:41:01 > 0:41:05the most high-value target, Zawahari himself, was not among them.
0:41:08 > 0:41:14We found out that 24 hours before going in, the HVT,
0:41:14 > 0:41:17in this case Dr Zawahiri, was given fair warning,
0:41:17 > 0:41:20"You're about to be attacked, you'd better skedaddle."
0:41:20 > 0:41:24And the reason being is because the ISI was able to give tip-off information
0:41:24 > 0:41:28to the Al-Qaeda and Taliban folks in the safe haven
0:41:28 > 0:41:31and allow them to escape ahead of the attack.
0:41:32 > 0:41:38The Americans suspected the ISI of secretly protecting Zawahiri,
0:41:38 > 0:41:41because while the Al-Qaeda threat remained high,
0:41:41 > 0:41:46the case for continued US aid to Pakistan remained strong.
0:41:46 > 0:41:50When you're running these operations, I think you have a legitimate concern
0:41:50 > 0:41:55that a few of the people you're dealing with might let that information out the back door.
0:41:55 > 0:41:58And that clearly was a concern we had over time.
0:41:58 > 0:42:00If you develop critical information on a point target
0:42:00 > 0:42:02that's unique and perishable,
0:42:02 > 0:42:06you just can't afford to let that stuff go out the back door
0:42:06 > 0:42:08because that target will spook immediately.
0:42:08 > 0:42:12He'll go back to plotting. You might not pick him up for another year or two.
0:42:12 > 0:42:18The Pakistanis deny the charge that they deliberately let Zawahiri get away.
0:42:18 > 0:42:20What is clear,
0:42:20 > 0:42:24is that Zawahari continued in overall charge of Al-Qaeda's military operations
0:42:24 > 0:42:26for the next five years.
0:42:29 > 0:42:34During that time, Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for 313 attacks,
0:42:34 > 0:42:38resulting in the deaths of 3,010 people.
0:42:40 > 0:42:43And since Osama Bin Laden's death earlier this year,
0:42:43 > 0:42:47Zawahiri has become the new Al-Qaeda leader.
0:42:51 > 0:42:56After the Battle Of Wana, the first of a series of truces was struck.
0:42:56 > 0:43:01The Pakistanis would back off Al-Qaeda and their local allies
0:43:01 > 0:43:03if they agreed not to attack Pakistani targets.
0:43:05 > 0:43:08But to American frustration, throughout this period,
0:43:08 > 0:43:12the Pakistani military had not confronted the Taliban fighters
0:43:12 > 0:43:16who continued to attack the Americans in Afghanistan
0:43:16 > 0:43:18from their bases in Pakistan.
0:43:20 > 0:43:22It's been a long war for a lot of people.
0:43:24 > 0:43:30I think the first time I ever... killed a man...
0:43:30 > 0:43:32certainly had an effect on me.
0:43:32 > 0:43:36It's been a difficult campaign in which, you know,
0:43:36 > 0:43:41I lost several friends and I think that heightens the frustration
0:43:41 > 0:43:44that I have about Pakistan.
0:43:46 > 0:43:48To Captain Andrew Exum,
0:43:48 > 0:43:50who was part of a Special Operations task force,
0:43:50 > 0:43:53one particular incident stands out.
0:43:55 > 0:43:56In the spring of 2004,
0:43:56 > 0:44:00I was leading a quick reaction force of US Army Rangers
0:44:00 > 0:44:01in Eastern Afghanistan...
0:44:01 > 0:44:04Allahu Akbar!
0:44:04 > 0:44:09..and we got spun up one night because a Ranger unit that was in a blocking position
0:44:09 > 0:44:12down in the border with Pakistan had come under fire.
0:44:13 > 0:44:18The quick reaction force, that unit had a young Ranger named Pat Tillman,
0:44:18 > 0:44:22who was a US football star
0:44:22 > 0:44:24and, in that firefight,
0:44:24 > 0:44:29he was killed by friendly fire actually from his own unit.
0:44:29 > 0:44:31In the aftermath of his death,
0:44:31 > 0:44:37people lost sight of the fact of why those Rangers were there on the border in the first place.
0:44:37 > 0:44:42They were there in expectation of a Pakistani army offensive through Waziristan,
0:44:42 > 0:44:48that was going to push these militants out of Waziristan and back into Afghanistan.
0:44:48 > 0:44:50And obviously that never took place.
0:44:50 > 0:44:55And I think that in Tillman's death you see so much the futility
0:44:55 > 0:44:58with which this conflict has been waged
0:44:58 > 0:45:02in light of our partner in Afghanistan that at times has been incompetent,
0:45:02 > 0:45:06at times has simply not had the capacity
0:45:06 > 0:45:08or the will to take on these militant groups,
0:45:08 > 0:45:14and at times and in instances has been complicit with these militant groups.
0:45:17 > 0:45:21The Forward Operating Base was re-named in honour of the young football star.
0:45:32 > 0:45:35Meanwhile, the CIA made another discovery
0:45:35 > 0:45:37that was to have lethal repercussions.
0:45:42 > 0:45:47Inside Pakistan, scores of training camps had been built
0:45:47 > 0:45:52to help teach Taliban fighters how to kill American soldiers.
0:45:52 > 0:45:56Mullah Qaseem was an early recruit.
0:45:56 > 0:46:00It was like a workshop.
0:46:02 > 0:46:08The important thing was that we should be able to convince people.
0:46:08 > 0:46:11The Americans and British who'd come to your country
0:46:11 > 0:46:15hadn't come to build it but to destroy it.
0:46:16 > 0:46:19"Your country has been invaded.
0:46:19 > 0:46:22"Remember your ancestors who made the British run away
0:46:22 > 0:46:25"and successfully fought the Russians.
0:46:25 > 0:46:28"In the name of Islam, you should gather people together
0:46:28 > 0:46:30"and get them ready for jihad."
0:46:33 > 0:46:35Another Taliban commander,
0:46:35 > 0:46:39who still actively fights under the name of Mullah Azizullah,
0:46:39 > 0:46:43says many of his teachers were from Pakistani intelligence.
0:46:43 > 0:46:45He's asked to hide his identity.
0:46:48 > 0:46:51They are all the ISI's men.
0:46:51 > 0:46:54They are the ones who run the training.
0:46:57 > 0:47:04First they train us about bombs. Then they give us practical guidance.
0:47:04 > 0:47:12Their generals are everywhere. They are present during the training.
0:47:12 > 0:47:15The official spokesman for the ISI
0:47:15 > 0:47:19denies that there was any such support for the camps.
0:47:20 > 0:47:23These camps, they got...
0:47:23 > 0:47:28probably reinitiated by themselves
0:47:28 > 0:47:33when the Taliban crossed over from Afghanistan in 2001/02
0:47:33 > 0:47:36and they started reorganising.
0:47:36 > 0:47:40So to say that these militant groups
0:47:40 > 0:47:44were being supported by the state
0:47:44 > 0:47:47with the organised camps in these areas, et cetera,
0:47:47 > 0:47:50I think nothing could be further from the truth.
0:47:52 > 0:47:56The official denial is dismissed by Latif Afridi,
0:47:56 > 0:48:01one of Pakistan's senior judges and a native of the tribal area.
0:48:01 > 0:48:05He has no doubt about the importance of Pakistani intelligence
0:48:05 > 0:48:08to the Taliban training camps.
0:48:08 > 0:48:12< Would it have been possible for those camps to have been created
0:48:12 > 0:48:14without the knowledge of the ISI?
0:48:14 > 0:48:16No, it was not possible.
0:48:16 > 0:48:22See, during this period, ISI had trained guerrilla fighters.
0:48:22 > 0:48:27People say there were 600 Chinese there, Punjabis there,
0:48:27 > 0:48:30you see Chechens, there's Arabs, there's Tajiks,
0:48:30 > 0:48:33God knows how many other...
0:48:33 > 0:48:39peoples from other nationalities. But these people have been allowed
0:48:39 > 0:48:42with the explicit approval of our agencies.
0:48:43 > 0:48:46But the ISI were not the only backers of the camps.
0:48:46 > 0:48:50According to another middle-ranking Taliban commander,
0:48:50 > 0:48:53breaking his silence for the first time.
0:48:53 > 0:48:56Still fighting under the name of Najib,
0:48:56 > 0:48:59he joined the insurgency eight years ago.
0:49:00 > 0:49:04I was in the camp for a month.
0:49:04 > 0:49:10They were giving us practical training in whatever weapons we specialised in.
0:49:10 > 0:49:14I was trained to fire RPGs.
0:49:18 > 0:49:23The instructors were from Al-Qaeda. We were all Al-Qaeda.
0:49:23 > 0:49:28They were preaching about the importance of jihad,
0:49:28 > 0:49:32and suicide bombers were taken to a different section and were kept apart from us.
0:49:32 > 0:49:36Those who were taught to be suicide bombers were there.
0:49:38 > 0:49:42The CIA were becoming aware of the scale of the Taliban training camps
0:49:42 > 0:49:48and the fact that Al-Qaeda were talent-spotting potential suicide bombers.
0:49:48 > 0:49:53What we were seeing was people, for example kids from Britain, kids from North America,
0:49:53 > 0:49:58showing up in little training compounds in the tribal areas.
0:49:58 > 0:50:00In some cases you might have Al-Qaeda running them.
0:50:00 > 0:50:03I'm talking about the core group of Al-Qaeda people
0:50:03 > 0:50:06who were charged with training and sending people
0:50:06 > 0:50:09into western Europe and North America.
0:50:12 > 0:50:16In the winter of 2004, two young British men
0:50:16 > 0:50:20made the long journey to Pakistan to be trained for jihad.
0:50:20 > 0:50:23While there, they were singled out by Al-Qaeda,
0:50:23 > 0:50:27who decided they would be more useful to the jihadi cause
0:50:27 > 0:50:31if they returned home to conduct operations there.
0:50:31 > 0:50:33'Emergency?'
0:50:33 > 0:50:36'Hi, there's a bus just exploded outside, in Tavistock Square,
0:50:36 > 0:50:39'just outside my window.
0:50:39 > 0:50:42'There's people lying on the ground and everything.
0:50:42 > 0:50:45'There's a London bus, it's a 30, I think,
0:50:45 > 0:50:49'but there's people dead and everything, by the looks of it.'
0:50:51 > 0:50:56On 7/7, I was in my office in Whitehall in the Cabinet Office
0:50:56 > 0:51:00and I received notification of explosions in the London Underground
0:51:00 > 0:51:03and, obviously, this was not an accident, this was obviously...
0:51:03 > 0:51:05Britain was under attack.
0:51:05 > 0:51:12The intelligence reports soon revealed the bombers' visits to the training camps in Pakistan.
0:51:12 > 0:51:13Over a number of years,
0:51:13 > 0:51:16I'd been monitoring international terrorist activity,
0:51:16 > 0:51:18not just in the UK but around the globe,
0:51:18 > 0:51:22and I'd seen, in virtually every case, links back to Pakistan,
0:51:22 > 0:51:25so it didn't come in any way as a surprise to find
0:51:25 > 0:51:27that terrorists operating in the UK
0:51:27 > 0:51:31were being directed by Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan.
0:51:31 > 0:51:38The British also suspected the role of Pakistani intelligence in the training camps.
0:51:38 > 0:51:40The ISI, of course, must take responsibility
0:51:40 > 0:51:44for the fact that some of these camps were still up and running,
0:51:44 > 0:51:49including, perhaps, the camp that was responsible for training the 7/7 attackers.
0:51:53 > 0:51:57The new influx of suicide bombers trained in the camps
0:51:57 > 0:52:01soon made their presence felt on the ground in Afghanistan too.
0:52:08 > 0:52:11The numbers on suicide attacks...
0:52:11 > 0:52:152003 in Afghanistan - there were two suicide attacks,
0:52:15 > 0:52:192004 - five suicide attacks,
0:52:19 > 0:52:232005 - 17 suicide attacks in Afghanistan.
0:52:23 > 0:52:26Those are the three primary years I was there.
0:52:26 > 0:52:29The following year in '06 - there were 139 suicide attacks.
0:52:36 > 0:52:39MAN SCREAMS
0:52:42 > 0:52:46That leads me to suspect that our friends in Pakistan
0:52:46 > 0:52:49may have decided to re-energise the Taliban
0:52:49 > 0:52:54so that they would have a proxy force in whatever was going to happen after the Americans were gone.
0:52:54 > 0:53:00But the Americans, too, must shoulder some responsibility for the resurgent Taliban.
0:53:11 > 0:53:13In the years after 9/11,
0:53:13 > 0:53:17the Americans had shown little interest in rebuilding Afghanistan,
0:53:17 > 0:53:21which helped the Taliban to take root and prosper.
0:53:24 > 0:53:29Then, in 2005, just as the Taliban was becoming an effective fighting force,
0:53:29 > 0:53:34the Americans decided to hand over military control to NATO.
0:53:35 > 0:53:39The Americans wanted to concentrate on Iraq instead.
0:53:43 > 0:53:46The decision was to have momentous consequences,
0:53:46 > 0:53:50as the Taliban sensed an opportunity and stepped up their attacks.
0:53:55 > 0:53:58The night before I went back into one particular area -
0:53:58 > 0:54:02this was in Helmand Province in the spring of 2006 -
0:54:02 > 0:54:05a friend of mine came and knocked on my door
0:54:05 > 0:54:09and said, "Look, Mike, as your friend, as your classmate,
0:54:09 > 0:54:13"I'm begging you not to go in there. We are literally seeing hundreds
0:54:13 > 0:54:17"and hundreds and hundreds of fighters pouring in from Pakistan
0:54:17 > 0:54:20"and it is not what you think it is any more."
0:54:20 > 0:54:23And he was truly concerned for my life.
0:54:23 > 0:54:26And it turned out to be a very legitimate concern.
0:54:28 > 0:54:34There were many times when I didn't know if I was going to live.
0:54:34 > 0:54:37We experienced insurgents crossing the border
0:54:37 > 0:54:41within very close proximity of Pakistani military posts.
0:54:43 > 0:54:48We experienced both artillery and rocket fire from the other side of the border,
0:54:48 > 0:54:51that the Pakistanis didn't respond to.
0:54:51 > 0:54:56We were experiencing 200/300/400-man ambushes.
0:54:56 > 0:54:59These we're very sophisticated three-sided ambushes,
0:54:59 > 0:55:02particularly along the Helmand River valley.
0:55:02 > 0:55:08Things as sophisticated as floating barges with RPG and mortar teams,
0:55:08 > 0:55:12multiple layers of mortar, artillery and heavy machine guns.
0:55:12 > 0:55:15It was definitely a turn for the worse
0:55:15 > 0:55:21in both the security situation but also the insurgents' capabilities.
0:55:21 > 0:55:26Major Mike Waltz, who had spent two years in the field,
0:55:26 > 0:55:30during which time the Taliban attacks on coalition troops had more than doubled,
0:55:30 > 0:55:35now returned to Washington in 2006 as an adviser to the Pentagon on the Afghan desk.
0:55:37 > 0:55:40My message coming back to Washington,
0:55:40 > 0:55:42particularly on the state of the Taliban,
0:55:42 > 0:55:44was that the insurgency had reconstituted,
0:55:44 > 0:55:47the security situation was getting appreciably worse
0:55:47 > 0:55:50and that if we didn't adopt a different strategy,
0:55:50 > 0:55:54namely a counter-insurgency strategy and the resources to back it,
0:55:54 > 0:55:58that the situation was just going to continue to decline.
0:55:58 > 0:56:00And yet this harsh appraisal
0:56:00 > 0:56:05and the critical role of Pakistan didn't shape British thinking.
0:56:05 > 0:56:08As part of the new NATO-led campaign,
0:56:08 > 0:56:13the British set off for Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan,
0:56:13 > 0:56:17believing this was a peacekeeping and reconstruction mission.
0:56:17 > 0:56:20We certainly didn't have a good handle on that at the time
0:56:20 > 0:56:23and I don't think that the decision to go into Helmand
0:56:23 > 0:56:27was informed by intelligence.
0:56:27 > 0:56:31That then turned out to be a mistake.
0:56:31 > 0:56:35Without the support that Pakistan gives, without providing a safe haven
0:56:35 > 0:56:38and also physical support and in some cases direction,
0:56:38 > 0:56:40I don't think the Taliban could have operated
0:56:40 > 0:56:43and built themselves up in the way they did.
0:56:46 > 0:56:49- Nobby!- White house, three building. - On that target!
0:56:52 > 0:56:56Almost immediately, the British troops found themselves in the most brutal and intense combat
0:56:56 > 0:56:58the army had seen for decades.
0:57:00 > 0:57:03Last burst, last burst.
0:57:04 > 0:57:08At times, they were in danger of being overrun.
0:57:08 > 0:57:11Nobby! Nobby!
0:57:11 > 0:57:13Probably, the first fatalities when I was there
0:57:13 > 0:57:15was three guys that were attached to the company
0:57:15 > 0:57:18were killed one night and that, obviously...
0:57:18 > 0:57:21really brings it home. Quite a sobering sense.
0:57:21 > 0:57:24Rapid...fire.
0:57:24 > 0:57:28This isn't what were supposed to be doing, defending places.
0:57:28 > 0:57:30We're supposed to be having a positive effect,
0:57:30 > 0:57:34not being tied down exchanging fire with Taliban.
0:57:38 > 0:57:41What was by now unmistakable to the West
0:57:41 > 0:57:44was that Pakistan's complicity with the Taliban
0:57:44 > 0:57:46was costing British lives.
0:57:48 > 0:57:52By 2006, it was abundantly clear
0:57:52 > 0:57:54that the Pakistani intelligence service
0:57:54 > 0:57:57was orchestrating the revival of the Afghan Taliban.
0:57:57 > 0:58:02And, to me, that was the moment when it was clear we'd been double-dealt.
0:58:02 > 0:58:07We'd had our suspicions before then but in 2006 it was unequivocal.
0:58:07 > 0:58:10The Afghan Taliban were back,
0:58:10 > 0:58:13they were surging across southern Afghanistan
0:58:13 > 0:58:18and they could only do that if they had the support of the Pakistani intelligence service.
0:58:20 > 0:58:25Next time on Secret Pakistan, The double-cross is discovered...
0:58:26 > 0:58:29..America strikes back
0:58:29 > 0:58:32but Pakistan's help to the Taliban continues.
0:58:37 > 0:58:40Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd
0:58:40 > 0:58:43E-mail subtitling@bbc.co.uk