0:00:09 > 0:00:13- MARGARET THATCHER:- Dr FitzGerald and I have today signed
0:00:13 > 0:00:15a serious and solemn agreement
0:00:15 > 0:00:17which signifies the way ahead
0:00:17 > 0:00:20in relations between our two countries.
0:00:21 > 0:00:25Well, I think the two things Margaret Thatcher possibly regretted,
0:00:25 > 0:00:29looking back over her time, were the Anglo-Irish Agreement
0:00:29 > 0:00:34and the need to surrender sovereignty over Hong Kong back to China.
0:00:34 > 0:00:38The Irish Republic will be able to put forward views and proposals
0:00:38 > 0:00:42in the conference on stated aspects of Northern Ireland affairs.
0:00:44 > 0:00:49And if Mary, Queen of Scots went to her grave with Calais engraved on her heart,
0:00:49 > 0:00:51maybe Margaret Thatcher went to hers
0:00:51 > 0:00:55with the Anglo-Irish Agreement and Hong Kong on her heart.
0:00:57 > 0:00:59Against all her political instincts,
0:00:59 > 0:01:02on the morning of November 15th 1985,
0:01:02 > 0:01:05Margaret Thatcher flew into Hillsborough Castle
0:01:05 > 0:01:07to sign an agreement she had been told
0:01:07 > 0:01:10would help to bring an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.
0:01:10 > 0:01:14Her closest friend at Westminster had just resigned in protest
0:01:14 > 0:01:17and furious Unionists were already gathering at the gates.
0:01:18 > 0:01:22It had gone so far by then there was no going back on it.
0:01:22 > 0:01:26For two years, Robert Armstrong was Margaret Thatcher's lead negotiator
0:01:26 > 0:01:29and the chief architect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
0:01:29 > 0:01:33Despite several setbacks, including an IRA attempt to kill her,
0:01:33 > 0:01:38he'd kept the process on track and ensured Unionists were excluded.
0:01:39 > 0:01:43It was a deliberate, massive betrayal of the Unionists
0:01:43 > 0:01:45by Margaret Thatcher.
0:01:47 > 0:01:50We were dreadfully angry,
0:01:50 > 0:01:56to the point that we almost lost faith in the democratic process.
0:01:58 > 0:02:04Why did Margaret Thatcher deliberately keep Unionists in the dark on the Anglo-Irish Agreement?
0:02:04 > 0:02:07Why did she betray them and behind their backs
0:02:07 > 0:02:10talk to the very terrorists she had sworn to defeat?
0:02:12 > 0:02:16It was very much sort of back-channel discussion,
0:02:16 > 0:02:18but nothing disreputable about that.
0:02:44 > 0:02:45During 11 years in power,
0:02:45 > 0:02:49Margaret Thatcher polarised and inspired in equal measure,
0:02:49 > 0:02:52not only in Britain but around the world.
0:02:52 > 0:02:56She helped end the Cold War and won victory in the Falklands,
0:02:56 > 0:02:58but she will forever be associated
0:02:58 > 0:03:02with the violence of the miners' strike and the poll tax riots.
0:03:02 > 0:03:06DAVID CAMERON: Margaret Thatcher didn't just lead our country,
0:03:06 > 0:03:08she saved our country.
0:03:08 > 0:03:12In Northern Ireland, it's her role in the conflict that defines her legacy.
0:03:12 > 0:03:14Despite landslide election victories
0:03:14 > 0:03:17and an historic agreement with Dublin,
0:03:17 > 0:03:19she failed to bring an end to the violence.
0:03:21 > 0:03:25She was, I think, far more interested in her world position,
0:03:25 > 0:03:26dealing with Ronald Reagan
0:03:26 > 0:03:30and the bigger issues of the day, as opposed to dealing
0:03:30 > 0:03:33with Northern Ireland, which I suspect she considered to be a security problem
0:03:33 > 0:03:36and if it was contained, then she wasn't going to lose sleep
0:03:36 > 0:03:39over the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland
0:03:39 > 0:03:40fighting with one another.
0:03:46 > 0:03:52- THATCHER:- We shall give the strongest possible support to the security forces in combating terrorism
0:03:52 > 0:03:56and there will be no amnesty for convicted terrorists.
0:04:00 > 0:04:02The long road to Hillsborough
0:04:02 > 0:04:06began during Margaret Thatcher's rise to power a decade earlier,
0:04:06 > 0:04:07when she defeated Ted Heath
0:04:07 > 0:04:10for the leadership of the Conservative Party.
0:04:11 > 0:04:13The MP who helped organise her campaign
0:04:13 > 0:04:16was also her spokesman in Northern Ireland
0:04:16 > 0:04:19and the prism through which she viewed the Troubles.
0:04:21 > 0:04:24Heath had to go
0:04:24 > 0:04:29and we had to have a new leader, and it was then Airey Neave
0:04:29 > 0:04:31who came to me and said,
0:04:31 > 0:04:36"Look, the one that could do it is Margaret."
0:04:37 > 0:04:44So I joined Airey Neave's team to win the election
0:04:44 > 0:04:47for her to become leader of the party.
0:04:48 > 0:04:50In this car or that car?
0:04:50 > 0:04:53She came over here, conducted by Airey Neave,
0:04:53 > 0:04:59and I wasn't hugely impressed by her, oddly enough, at that time.
0:04:59 > 0:05:00I thought she was rather mousy looking.
0:05:02 > 0:05:06We do want to see the Government show determination to defeat terrorism.
0:05:06 > 0:05:09We don't want any more dealings with terrorists
0:05:09 > 0:05:12and we do want the security forces to have adequate powers,
0:05:12 > 0:05:16especially legal powers, to get on top of the leaders of the terrorists.
0:05:16 > 0:05:20Airey took the view that there had to be a military solution
0:05:20 > 0:05:24to the problem before there could be a political solution.
0:05:26 > 0:05:30In his own words to me,
0:05:30 > 0:05:34"An army that's winning needs no recruiting sergeant."
0:05:36 > 0:05:40Margaret Thatcher and Airey Neave came from a generation
0:05:40 > 0:05:44of politicians shaped by the events of World War II and its aftermath.
0:05:46 > 0:05:48Airey Neave had escaped from Colditz,
0:05:48 > 0:05:51while as a teenager Margaret Thatcher had seen her home town
0:05:51 > 0:05:54in the north-east of England bombed by the Germans.
0:05:55 > 0:05:59The war and the events that led up to it would later shape
0:05:59 > 0:06:02her political outlook and thinking on Northern Ireland.
0:06:04 > 0:06:12One of the analogies that she quite frequently mentioned
0:06:12 > 0:06:15was the Sudetenland.
0:06:15 > 0:06:21When Czechoslovakia was carved out in the Treaty of Versailles,
0:06:21 > 0:06:26a very large and industrially prosperous chunk of it
0:06:26 > 0:06:28was the Sudetenland.
0:06:28 > 0:06:33And she brought Garret up short on one occasion when he was trying to...
0:06:33 > 0:06:39He was saying, well, the nationalist community are a permanent minority.
0:06:39 > 0:06:45They have no access to power because of the first-past-the-post system
0:06:45 > 0:06:48and so on and so forth,
0:06:48 > 0:06:53and she said, "I see. It's like the Sudetenland,"
0:06:53 > 0:06:58which certainly halted Garret and stopped him in his tracks.
0:07:00 > 0:07:04She mentioned the Sudeten Germans,
0:07:04 > 0:07:08where you've a group of people from a certain tribe,
0:07:08 > 0:07:11who find themselves as a minority in a country
0:07:11 > 0:07:15where another larger tribe is dominant,
0:07:15 > 0:07:17and her attitude to that was,
0:07:17 > 0:07:20"Well, tough luck. What do you expect me to do?"
0:07:22 > 0:07:29Margaret Thatcher tended to think of the Republic's claim on Northern Ireland
0:07:29 > 0:07:35rather as Hitler's claim on the Sudetenland
0:07:35 > 0:07:40because it was the same situation, mutatis mutandis.
0:07:43 > 0:07:48I think that's actually quite revealing.
0:07:48 > 0:07:50I think that analogy was in her mind.
0:07:53 > 0:07:57The conflict in Northern Ireland reached Margaret Thatcher personally
0:07:57 > 0:08:00just weeks before she became Prime Minister,
0:08:00 > 0:08:04when Airey Neave was murdered in a republican bomb attack at the House of Commons.
0:08:05 > 0:08:08Not only had she lost a close friend and confidant,
0:08:08 > 0:08:11but her chief adviser on Northern Ireland.
0:08:13 > 0:08:20- ..been killed in a bomb outside Parliament.- Who?- We don't know yet.
0:08:20 > 0:08:22Terrible news, Mrs Thatcher.
0:08:22 > 0:08:29She'd lost her right-hand man, as it were, before she started, to terrorism.
0:08:32 > 0:08:36I don't think she had any doubts about how to carry on
0:08:36 > 0:08:43and that was, "We will not allow terrorism to subvert democracy."
0:08:46 > 0:08:53His murder helped to give Margaret
0:08:53 > 0:09:02this almost antipathy to the Republic and to the Irish.
0:09:07 > 0:09:09- THATCHER:- Some devils got him
0:09:09 > 0:09:13and they must never, never, never be allowed to triumph.
0:09:13 > 0:09:15They must never prevail.
0:09:17 > 0:09:22Airey Neave had viewed Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom
0:09:22 > 0:09:25and believed that the conflict had to be won militarily.
0:09:25 > 0:09:27After his death,
0:09:27 > 0:09:30Airey Neave's opinions became Margaret Thatcher's policies.
0:09:30 > 0:09:34I've come to see the troops here and I've come to see the people
0:09:34 > 0:09:37and hear what they have to say to me.
0:09:37 > 0:09:41I don't think she really had any affection for the place at all
0:09:41 > 0:09:45or any particular interest in it.
0:09:45 > 0:09:51It was, you know, an irritating security problem to be dealt with in that way.
0:09:51 > 0:09:53She was happier talking to soldiers.
0:09:59 > 0:10:03Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979.
0:10:03 > 0:10:06Despite having been in Parliament for 20 years,
0:10:06 > 0:10:10she'd failed to create a single relationship with the leaders of Unionism.
0:10:14 > 0:10:17She was a Unionist in principle,
0:10:17 > 0:10:24but she found discussing Irish matters with the Unionists
0:10:24 > 0:10:25uphill work.
0:10:28 > 0:10:33They didn't have the same mindset and we all knew that.
0:10:34 > 0:10:38How did she view leaders like Ian Paisley and Jim Molyneaux at that time?
0:10:38 > 0:10:42Well, I suppose they were sent to try us, weren't they?
0:10:45 > 0:10:46She had great affection for some,
0:10:46 > 0:10:49Ken Maginnis in particular, whom she had a great respect
0:10:49 > 0:10:53and admiration for in his difficult position in Fermanagh.
0:10:55 > 0:11:00She sat down at the communal table
0:11:00 > 0:11:03on one evening and said, "Oh, yes, I've heard of you.
0:11:03 > 0:11:05"You served with the UDR."
0:11:05 > 0:11:09And from that, we were really quite good friends.
0:11:09 > 0:11:12We got on very well.
0:11:12 > 0:11:14And she would call me...
0:11:14 > 0:11:17the only person besides my mother who would do so,
0:11:17 > 0:11:19would call me Kenneth.
0:11:19 > 0:11:22"Kenneth, could I see you about this?"
0:11:30 > 0:11:34Unionists knew that Margaret Thatcher could patronise them,
0:11:34 > 0:11:37but the IRA forced the conflict onto her agenda,
0:11:37 > 0:11:39just weeks after she became Prime Minister,
0:11:39 > 0:11:42killing Lord Mountbatten and 18 soldiers
0:11:42 > 0:11:45in separate attacks in August 1979.
0:11:48 > 0:11:53The death of Lord Mountbatten made her see the Northern Ireland problem
0:11:53 > 0:11:56basically in security terms.
0:11:56 > 0:11:59This was a problem of trying to bring security to the province
0:11:59 > 0:12:01to try to deal with terrorism.
0:12:01 > 0:12:04It was a problem for the military to be involved in dealing with
0:12:04 > 0:12:07as well as the police. It conditioned her whole outlook.
0:12:12 > 0:12:15The Mountbatten murder caused Margaret Thatcher
0:12:15 > 0:12:18to review her military strategy in Northern Ireland.
0:12:18 > 0:12:21It would be the first of many such reviews during her time in power.
0:12:23 > 0:12:26Irish Premier Jack Lynch travelled to London
0:12:26 > 0:12:28for Lord Mountbatten's funeral
0:12:28 > 0:12:30and later to meet Margaret Thatcher in Downing Street
0:12:30 > 0:12:33where she demanded greater security cooperation
0:12:33 > 0:12:36from him and his government.
0:12:36 > 0:12:40Downing Street minutes of the meeting highlight her priorities.
0:12:42 > 0:12:44Maggie entered the room. I recall her fairly vividly there,
0:12:44 > 0:12:48dressed in black, mourning black, from head to toe.
0:12:48 > 0:12:51We had already received intimations from the British
0:12:51 > 0:12:54that they were going to have a shopping list of
0:12:54 > 0:12:57what they wished for new security cooperation measures,
0:12:57 > 0:13:02most notably, I suppose, in respect of later events that came out,
0:13:02 > 0:13:06the question of helicopter overflight a certain distance into the Republic.
0:13:06 > 0:13:10Of course, we already had going on for a number of years
0:13:10 > 0:13:13the arguments about extradition.
0:13:13 > 0:13:18So, it was quite a contentious meeting, I think it's fair to say.
0:13:18 > 0:13:22Somebody made the suggestion that, "You know, Prime Minister,
0:13:22 > 0:13:25"there may be a certain amount of sympathy
0:13:25 > 0:13:28"with what IRA are at with their aims,
0:13:28 > 0:13:31"not necessarily with their methods, with their aims."
0:13:31 > 0:13:34She became furious.
0:13:34 > 0:13:36She jumped up from her chair.
0:13:36 > 0:13:40She thumped the table and was almost about to leap over the table.
0:13:40 > 0:13:43"Are you condoning murder?"
0:13:43 > 0:13:45And you know, "If this is the way you're going to...
0:13:45 > 0:13:48"If this is your attitude, we finish."
0:13:48 > 0:13:53And...Jack Lynch kind of put his hand out
0:13:53 > 0:13:56and said, "Look, Prime Minister, we both have the same objective.
0:13:56 > 0:14:01"Don't continue with this sort of attitude."
0:14:01 > 0:14:04She quietened down.
0:14:04 > 0:14:08Jack Lynch was utterly and totally useless, as wet as a whistle,
0:14:08 > 0:14:10would never do anything.
0:14:10 > 0:14:12I mean, the man was a prisoner.
0:14:13 > 0:14:15Well, he seemed to be.
0:14:15 > 0:14:20She concluded there was nothing doing at a very early meeting with him. There never was.
0:14:23 > 0:14:26Thatcher's instinctive reaction to the violence had been to demand
0:14:26 > 0:14:29that Dublin introduce new security measures.
0:14:29 > 0:14:30But it had failed
0:14:30 > 0:14:33and only contributed to the political pressure on Jack Lynch
0:14:33 > 0:14:35who resigned weeks later.
0:14:37 > 0:14:41Now Thatcher had a new partner in Dublin, Charles J Haughey.
0:14:43 > 0:14:46I would have to say there was a sort of glint in his eye
0:14:46 > 0:14:49which she found actually quite attractive.
0:14:51 > 0:14:56He set out to charm her and I suppose at the beginning,
0:14:56 > 0:14:58she was slightly susceptible to the charm
0:14:58 > 0:15:02and relations developed reasonably well.
0:15:04 > 0:15:09She said to me that we had all been making a great mistake
0:15:09 > 0:15:11about Charles Haughey,
0:15:11 > 0:15:14that he was a romantic idealist...
0:15:14 > 0:15:18and that wasn't entirely consistent
0:15:18 > 0:15:21with the view which I had learnt to have of Charlie Haughey.
0:15:26 > 0:15:29Charles Haughey flirted with Thatcher, but had no interest
0:15:29 > 0:15:33in giving in to her demands for greater security cooperation.
0:15:33 > 0:15:35He wanted an international conference convened
0:15:35 > 0:15:38to bring all parties to the negotiating table.
0:15:40 > 0:15:43But by the time they met in Dublin in December 1980,
0:15:43 > 0:15:46the political romance was all but over.
0:15:47 > 0:15:51IRA inmates at the Long Kesh Prison had begun a hunger strike
0:15:51 > 0:15:53in protest at conditions.
0:15:53 > 0:15:57And as the summit got under way, two hunger strikers were close to death.
0:16:01 > 0:16:05Some of the older prisoners wanted to bring the issue to a head,
0:16:05 > 0:16:07wanted to bring it to the point
0:16:07 > 0:16:08where there could be talking
0:16:08 > 0:16:11and where there could be a resolution
0:16:11 > 0:16:14and that almost happened, but didn't.
0:16:14 > 0:16:16- When do we want it?- Now!
0:16:16 > 0:16:18- What do we want?- Political status.
0:16:18 > 0:16:22I genuinely believe that the reason
0:16:22 > 0:16:25Thatcher came with...
0:16:25 > 0:16:30a very high-ranking delegation...
0:16:30 > 0:16:34it was Carrington, Howe, so on,
0:16:34 > 0:16:37to Dublin Castle in 1980
0:16:37 > 0:16:42and during that summit the hunger strike was still on,
0:16:42 > 0:16:48it was to try and defuse that situation.
0:16:48 > 0:16:51So, I think that...
0:16:51 > 0:16:56the first hunger strike contributed to
0:16:56 > 0:16:59pushing her into the direction
0:16:59 > 0:17:04of agreeing what was called at the time an Anglo-Irish framework.
0:17:06 > 0:17:09We were all concerned about the hunger strikers
0:17:09 > 0:17:14and about the possible consequences, not just...
0:17:14 > 0:17:17I mean, in Northern Ireland itself and in Ireland,
0:17:17 > 0:17:19but in the United States and internationally.
0:17:23 > 0:17:27Still very deeply concerned and anxious about the H-Block situation
0:17:27 > 0:17:30and I have made that clear to the British Prime Minister
0:17:30 > 0:17:32and to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
0:17:32 > 0:17:35that if there's any possible way in which the Irish Government
0:17:35 > 0:17:38can assist in bringing forward a solution, we stand ready to do so.
0:17:45 > 0:17:48The first hunger strike broke down in confusion.
0:17:48 > 0:17:51For a time, it was thought that Margaret Thatcher's Government
0:17:51 > 0:17:54had given in to the prisoners' demands, but she hadn't.
0:17:56 > 0:17:58I think the tragedy was...
0:17:58 > 0:18:01it could all have been settled, I think,
0:18:01 > 0:18:03after the first hunger strike.
0:18:07 > 0:18:11- THATCHER: - We will not compromise on this.
0:18:11 > 0:18:13There will be no political status.
0:18:16 > 0:18:19You know, these are just awful situations, you know,
0:18:19 > 0:18:23in which there's sort of no right answer.
0:18:26 > 0:18:29In March 1981, a second hunger strike began,
0:18:29 > 0:18:31which led to the death of Bobby Sands
0:18:31 > 0:18:33and nine other republican prisoners.
0:18:35 > 0:18:39During the seven-month-long dispute, almost 70 people were murdered.
0:18:41 > 0:18:45Men of violence have chosen, in recent months,
0:18:45 > 0:18:49to play what may well be their last card.
0:18:49 > 0:18:53They've turned their violence against themselves,
0:18:53 > 0:18:56through the prison hunger strike to death.
0:19:03 > 0:19:07It was the IRA high command which killed those men.
0:19:08 > 0:19:10Not Margaret Thatcher.
0:19:10 > 0:19:12They weren't starved to death by her.
0:19:12 > 0:19:15They were starved to death by their high command.
0:19:21 > 0:19:23I think that we got ourselves into...
0:19:23 > 0:19:24the Government got itself into a position
0:19:24 > 0:19:28where once the hunger strike had started,
0:19:28 > 0:19:32it was very difficult for them to find a way out,
0:19:32 > 0:19:35and so they just had to let it take its course.
0:19:35 > 0:19:38I wouldn't like to comment on whether or not
0:19:38 > 0:19:41there were ways in which the hunger strike could have been avoided,
0:19:41 > 0:19:44but the way the policy was being pursued at that time,
0:19:44 > 0:19:46the hunger strike was inevitable
0:19:46 > 0:19:49and the difficulties of getting rid of the hunger strike
0:19:49 > 0:19:51followed naturally from that.
0:19:51 > 0:19:56Once she was set upon a course, she was not easily shaken off it.
0:19:59 > 0:20:02In public, Margaret Thatcher was dogmatic,
0:20:02 > 0:20:04yet secretly, she negotiated.
0:20:04 > 0:20:06Her own handwriting can be seen
0:20:06 > 0:20:08on a message that was sent directly to the prisoners.
0:20:11 > 0:20:14Was she aware that it could be resolved? Yes, I would say yes.
0:20:14 > 0:20:20Clearly she would have known - and if she didn't, she should have -
0:20:20 > 0:20:24that the hunger strike could have been...
0:20:24 > 0:20:27could have been ended without anyone dying,
0:20:27 > 0:20:32and she decided that wasn't going to be the case.
0:20:32 > 0:20:34The hunger strike was the first time
0:20:34 > 0:20:37she'd negotiated with the republican leadership.
0:20:37 > 0:20:39Later, she would use secret back channels
0:20:39 > 0:20:41to communicate again with republicans -
0:20:41 > 0:20:45communications that would ultimately lead to the IRA cease-fire.
0:20:47 > 0:20:51She was vilified in republican folklore,
0:20:51 > 0:20:56of her being this unfeeling person who let people die.
0:20:56 > 0:21:01And... it's quite clear that she was...
0:21:01 > 0:21:04there was more going on in the background,
0:21:04 > 0:21:08that Mrs Thatcher, too, was prepared to deal.
0:21:08 > 0:21:13There were offers and compromises being floated round.
0:21:18 > 0:21:24Sands, Bobby. Anti H-Block/ Armagh Political Prisoner.
0:21:24 > 0:21:2530,000...
0:21:25 > 0:21:27- MAN:- Yeah!
0:21:27 > 0:21:30..492.
0:21:30 > 0:21:34West, Henry W. Ulster Unionist.
0:21:34 > 0:21:3829,046.
0:21:38 > 0:21:43And I declare that Bobby Sands has been duly elected
0:21:43 > 0:21:46to serve as a member for the said constituency.
0:21:48 > 0:21:51After the ending of the hunger strike,
0:21:51 > 0:21:52Margaret Thatcher conceded
0:21:52 > 0:21:56to the republican prisoners' demands for better conditions.
0:21:56 > 0:21:59But, much to the concern of both the British and Irish governments,
0:21:59 > 0:22:02outside the prison, the IRA was now rejuvenated
0:22:02 > 0:22:05and republicans were building a political base.
0:22:07 > 0:22:12I think her impact in Ireland in that respect
0:22:12 > 0:22:17was second only to that of General Sir John Maxwell in 1916,
0:22:17 > 0:22:23in that it led to a huge surge of support...
0:22:23 > 0:22:26for the republican movement.
0:22:26 > 0:22:35But now, as it happens, that did translate into...
0:22:35 > 0:22:38the growth of their political wing.
0:22:38 > 0:22:43But, I mean, this is what one might call unintended consequences.
0:22:45 > 0:22:47Thatcher was still sticking to Airey Neave's policy
0:22:47 > 0:22:50and attempting to defeat the IRA militarily,
0:22:50 > 0:22:52but it wasn't working.
0:22:52 > 0:22:54She used Northern Ireland
0:22:54 > 0:22:57as somewhere to banish her Cabinet enemies to.
0:22:57 > 0:23:01As Secretary of State, Jim Prior was sidelined in Northern Ireland
0:23:01 > 0:23:03and knew that Margaret Thatcher
0:23:03 > 0:23:07was relying on trusted friends for advice.
0:23:07 > 0:23:12The problem for Margaret was that she had two people
0:23:12 > 0:23:20who had powerful intellects and were absolutely out-and-out unionist.
0:23:20 > 0:23:26One was Ian Gow, who was a very, very decent man.
0:23:28 > 0:23:33Very good man, Ian Gow, and very popular in the party.
0:23:33 > 0:23:38But he was an out-and-out old-fashioned unionist.
0:23:38 > 0:23:41And the other man was Enoch Powell.
0:23:41 > 0:23:48They must recognise that this province is part and parcel
0:23:48 > 0:23:55by as good a right as any other of the United Kingdom.
0:23:55 > 0:23:57Enoch Powell, obviously,
0:23:57 > 0:24:01had very similar views to Margaret on quite a lot of issues,
0:24:01 > 0:24:03on the economy and so on,
0:24:03 > 0:24:07and because Northern Ireland was the only place
0:24:07 > 0:24:10where he could get a constituency,
0:24:10 > 0:24:14he became more unionist than any other unionist I ever met,
0:24:14 > 0:24:17I think, and they influenced...
0:24:17 > 0:24:19they had a great influence on Margaret.
0:24:29 > 0:24:31In the early '80s,
0:24:31 > 0:24:34her government was staggering from crisis to crisis.
0:24:34 > 0:24:37There were even Tories ready to challenge her leadership.
0:24:39 > 0:24:42Then the Argentinians decided to invade the Falkland Islands.
0:24:44 > 0:24:48The Government has now decided that a large task force
0:24:48 > 0:24:51will sail as soon as all preparations are complete.
0:24:59 > 0:25:01As she prepared for war,
0:25:01 > 0:25:04in Dublin, Charles Haughey saw an opportunity to stand up to Thatcher.
0:25:07 > 0:25:11In 1982, Ireland had a seat on the United Nations Security Council
0:25:11 > 0:25:15and Haughey used it to try to bring international pressure on Britain.
0:25:17 > 0:25:20I think she had begun to wonder before that, but that...
0:25:20 > 0:25:23that really confirmed her in the feeling
0:25:23 > 0:25:28that Haughey was not to be trusted and was not a friend of Britain.
0:25:30 > 0:25:34The extraordinary, unnecessary
0:25:34 > 0:25:40and mad initiative of Mr Haughey on the Falklands War
0:25:40 > 0:25:43ended any possibility of any dialogue of any sort.
0:25:47 > 0:25:51The battle of the Falklands was a remarkable military operation,
0:25:51 > 0:25:56boldly planned, bravely executed and brilliantly accomplished.
0:25:59 > 0:26:01Margaret Thatcher was now in an unassailable position
0:26:01 > 0:26:03in British politics,
0:26:03 > 0:26:06but Anglo-Irish relations had broken down.
0:26:06 > 0:26:09Then, over a late-night drink at a Downing Street dinner
0:26:09 > 0:26:11to toast her victory in the South Atlantic,
0:26:11 > 0:26:14she suggested for the first time that she was interested
0:26:14 > 0:26:17in seeking a political way forward for Northern Ireland.
0:26:19 > 0:26:22I said to her, "It seems to me a scandal
0:26:22 > 0:26:25"that the only place in the world now
0:26:25 > 0:26:29"where British lives are being lost in anger
0:26:29 > 0:26:33"is actually in the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland,"
0:26:33 > 0:26:37and that got us launched on a discussion of Ireland.
0:26:37 > 0:26:41- Just listen to everyone. I must go down.- Wave.
0:26:43 > 0:26:48At the end of this conversation, she said reflectively,
0:26:48 > 0:26:50"Mm, if we get back again,
0:26:50 > 0:26:54"I think I'd like to do something about Ireland."
0:26:59 > 0:27:04In June 1983, Margaret Thatcher was swept back into Downing Street.
0:27:04 > 0:27:06She would use her second term in office
0:27:06 > 0:27:08to take on the unions in Britain
0:27:08 > 0:27:11and the challenge the unionists in Northern Ireland.
0:27:13 > 0:27:17Mrs Thatcher won a three-figure majority in the House of Commons
0:27:17 > 0:27:20in the wake of the Falklands victory,
0:27:20 > 0:27:26and in Dublin, Garret FitzGerald had succeeded Charles Haughey
0:27:26 > 0:27:30with a majority which suggested that he would be around
0:27:30 > 0:27:33for quite a reasonable period of time.
0:27:36 > 0:27:39She came out of that election with a feeling
0:27:39 > 0:27:44that this was unfinished business which she needed to tackle.
0:27:48 > 0:27:52NEWSREADER: One of the worst days of terrorism London has seen.
0:27:52 > 0:27:55Mrs Thatcher called the bombers callous and cowardly.
0:27:55 > 0:27:57The force of the explosion was so great
0:27:57 > 0:28:00that parts of the car were flung across the park.
0:28:00 > 0:28:02So, too, were nails four and six inches long
0:28:02 > 0:28:05which had been packed around the bomb.
0:28:08 > 0:28:13Democracy is the rejection of violence,
0:28:13 > 0:28:17and we are never, never going to be defeated by bombs and bullets.
0:28:20 > 0:28:22After his election in 1982,
0:28:22 > 0:28:25Garret FitzGerald had written to Margaret Thatcher
0:28:25 > 0:28:28seeking to open talks on Northern Ireland.
0:28:28 > 0:28:29But still seething at the Irish behaviour
0:28:29 > 0:28:31during the Falklands dispute,
0:28:31 > 0:28:34Margaret Thatcher showed no interest in his invitation.
0:28:37 > 0:28:41He was deeply worried about developments in Northern Ireland.
0:28:41 > 0:28:45Particularly about... the term we used a lot of the time
0:28:45 > 0:28:48was the alienation of the minority,
0:28:48 > 0:28:51particularly following the hunger strikes,
0:28:51 > 0:28:54a belief that there was no hope in politics
0:28:54 > 0:28:57and that violence, apparently, was the only way forward.
0:28:59 > 0:29:02She didn't like the word alienation, I don't know,
0:29:02 > 0:29:05perhaps because she thought it was Marxist.
0:29:05 > 0:29:06So...
0:29:06 > 0:29:09And, of course, she never lived in Ireland or Northern Ireland,
0:29:09 > 0:29:11so she didn't really...
0:29:11 > 0:29:15I don't think she fully grasped
0:29:15 > 0:29:20why the nationalists were as resentful as they were.
0:29:20 > 0:29:24This morning, a British soldier was killed in Ballymurphy.
0:29:24 > 0:29:28Responsibility for that soldier's death
0:29:28 > 0:29:30lies with the British Government.
0:29:30 > 0:29:32- MAN:- The IRA. - The tragedy...
0:29:32 > 0:29:36The tragedy of Ireland rests with the London Government.
0:29:38 > 0:29:42The 1983 election had also seen Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams
0:29:42 > 0:29:44elected in West Belfast,
0:29:44 > 0:29:48consolidating republicans' move into constitutional politics.
0:29:51 > 0:29:56The buzz word was "alienation". That was the buzz word.
0:29:56 > 0:29:57And, you know,
0:29:57 > 0:30:01what that meant was the growth in support for Sinn Fein.
0:30:01 > 0:30:03So, that's what that was.
0:30:03 > 0:30:08It was nothing more or less than that. It was exclusive.
0:30:08 > 0:30:10It wasn't inclusive.
0:30:10 > 0:30:11CHEERING
0:30:14 > 0:30:19The Sinn Fein today, I mean, effectively dates...
0:30:19 > 0:30:24I mean, their year zero is the hunger strikes.
0:30:24 > 0:30:28I mean, their political development, I mean, dates from that point.
0:30:28 > 0:30:30I was certainly very conscious,
0:30:30 > 0:30:34and I think the same would have been true of Margaret Thatcher, that...
0:30:36 > 0:30:42..that Garret FitzGerald was as keen as we could be...
0:30:44 > 0:30:48..to try to prevent a revival or resurgence of IRA...
0:30:48 > 0:30:50of Sinn Fein...
0:30:52 > 0:30:56..power in the Irish Government, in the Irish political system.
0:30:56 > 0:30:58All right, now we're going to do it again inside.
0:30:58 > 0:31:03The problem was that at that moment, there was no dialogue with London.
0:31:03 > 0:31:06It wasn't there was no negotiation. There wasn't even chitchat.
0:31:11 > 0:31:13With this new political threat from Sinn Fein,
0:31:13 > 0:31:15coupled with a resurgent IRA,
0:31:15 > 0:31:18Garret FitzGerald changed tactics with Margaret Thatcher,
0:31:18 > 0:31:22and instead appealed to her only real interest in Northern Ireland -
0:31:22 > 0:31:23security.
0:31:23 > 0:31:26The Taoiseach decided that Michael Lillis
0:31:26 > 0:31:28should approach his London counterpart
0:31:28 > 0:31:30while he was in Dublin for a meeting.
0:31:32 > 0:31:36Michael, whom I'd never met before, or indeed never heard of before,
0:31:36 > 0:31:39said would I come for a walk with him along the canal?
0:31:43 > 0:31:47What I suggested was that we should try working together
0:31:47 > 0:31:51in the interest of security, right?
0:31:51 > 0:31:53Not for an Irish political agenda, but in the interest
0:31:53 > 0:31:57of improving the security and stability on the ground.
0:31:59 > 0:32:01Initially,
0:32:01 > 0:32:06the idea was to find some kind of agreement on matters of security.
0:32:06 > 0:32:09Her concern about Northern Ireland
0:32:09 > 0:32:13was about the loss of life and the injuries,
0:32:13 > 0:32:16which she took very seriously,
0:32:16 > 0:32:18both among the soldiers and the other security forces,
0:32:18 > 0:32:23the RUC, and among ordinary people,
0:32:23 > 0:32:24and she took very seriously
0:32:24 > 0:32:27the cost of supporting the Northern Irish economy.
0:32:29 > 0:32:32So, that's how... That's how the thing began.
0:32:36 > 0:32:38Margaret Thatcher agreed to open talks,
0:32:38 > 0:32:42but made a strategic decision not to involve the Northern Ireland Office.
0:32:43 > 0:32:46Instead, she gave the job to David Goodall and his boss,
0:32:46 > 0:32:49Robert Armstrong, who, as her chief security advisers,
0:32:49 > 0:32:52had access to the intelligence coming from Northern Ireland,
0:32:52 > 0:32:55including that from agents inside the IRA.
0:32:57 > 0:33:00We were very conscious of the fact
0:33:00 > 0:33:04that they both were at the absolute heart
0:33:04 > 0:33:09of the whole British power system, including security and intelligence.
0:33:13 > 0:33:18One of them, at one stage, told us that
0:33:18 > 0:33:22the communications codes that we had at that time
0:33:22 > 0:33:26were - I think the phrase was used - "easy to penetrate".
0:33:26 > 0:33:30In other words, they were able to read our...
0:33:30 > 0:33:31our messages.
0:33:32 > 0:33:35- WOMAN IN CROWD:- Stick to your guns, Maggie, you're a great girl.
0:33:35 > 0:33:37Thank you.
0:33:38 > 0:33:40Following her public handling of the hunger strikes,
0:33:40 > 0:33:43Margaret Thatcher's own security was an issue.
0:33:43 > 0:33:45She was now the IRA's number one target.
0:33:47 > 0:33:49I remember her saying, "They'll probably get me
0:33:49 > 0:33:53"in the end, but I don't like to hand myself to them on a plate."
0:34:00 > 0:34:04During the Conservative Party Conference in October 1984,
0:34:04 > 0:34:07the IRA's hatred for Margaret Thatcher exploded
0:34:07 > 0:34:09under a bath at the Grand Hotel Brighton,
0:34:09 > 0:34:12killing five people and injuring 31.
0:34:14 > 0:34:16I was peaceably abed...
0:34:18 > 0:34:22..when we heard the sound of the explosion.
0:34:22 > 0:34:26And then the room began to collapse about us.
0:34:26 > 0:34:31And, erm, then it was quite a long time waiting to be dug out.
0:34:31 > 0:34:35The bomb went off somewhere between 2:45 and 3:00.
0:34:35 > 0:34:39I know that because I looked up when I had finished something at 2:45,
0:34:39 > 0:34:43and I just turned to do one final paper,
0:34:43 > 0:34:44and then it went off.
0:34:44 > 0:34:47My husband was in bed and all the windows went,
0:34:47 > 0:34:50and the bathroom was extremely badly damaged.
0:34:50 > 0:34:51- In your own room?- Yes.
0:34:51 > 0:34:53I think that's enough, Prime Minister.
0:34:53 > 0:34:54We were very lucky...
0:34:54 > 0:34:58In some ways, I think that almost hardened her resolve.
0:34:58 > 0:35:01She said that publicly the day of the Brighton bomb,
0:35:01 > 0:35:04when she spoke to the Conservative Party Conference,
0:35:04 > 0:35:06and she followed through on it.
0:35:07 > 0:35:11This Government will not weaken.
0:35:12 > 0:35:15This nation will meet that challenge.
0:35:15 > 0:35:19Democracy will prevail.
0:35:19 > 0:35:21APPLAUSE AND CHEERING
0:35:22 > 0:35:24The Brighton bomb...
0:35:24 > 0:35:26I mean, I was amazed.
0:35:26 > 0:35:30I thought, that's the end of these negotiations, frankly.
0:35:32 > 0:35:36It's another example of her courage, I think.
0:35:36 > 0:35:40We had this charming message from the IRA,
0:35:40 > 0:35:42something about...
0:35:42 > 0:35:44"You can only..."
0:35:46 > 0:35:49"You may get away with it with it once or something." Anyway...
0:35:49 > 0:35:53- INTERVIWER:- "You need to be lucky every day..."- Yes.
0:35:58 > 0:36:03It's very regrettable that other people were killed
0:36:03 > 0:36:06or seriously injured, you know.
0:36:06 > 0:36:09But I felt then, and I said then, that I thought that was
0:36:09 > 0:36:11an entirely legitimate action,
0:36:11 > 0:36:13and that's still my position.
0:36:18 > 0:36:21The bomb hadn't wrecked the negotiations,
0:36:21 > 0:36:24but Margaret Thatcher almost brought them down herself.
0:36:24 > 0:36:27Garret FitzGerald had set up the New Ireland Forum,
0:36:27 > 0:36:31which had set out three options on all-Ireland relationships.
0:36:31 > 0:36:33Just a month after Brighton,
0:36:33 > 0:36:36she met with the Taoiseach at Chequers.
0:36:36 > 0:36:38The meeting appeared to have gone well,
0:36:38 > 0:36:41until Margaret Thatcher was later questioned at a press conference
0:36:41 > 0:36:45about the New Ireland Forum's three proposals.
0:36:45 > 0:36:48..and to pursue our shared aim of lasting peace
0:36:48 > 0:36:51and stability in Northern Ireland.
0:36:51 > 0:36:54It was embarrassing because, you know,
0:36:54 > 0:36:56my role was to be a yes man, clearly,
0:36:56 > 0:37:01and I was prepared to be a yes man, I wasn't wanting a quarrel with her.
0:37:01 > 0:37:06So I wasn't looking for a fight with the Prime Minister at all,
0:37:06 > 0:37:07and I...
0:37:07 > 0:37:11But I gave the impression, I think, of being a helpless sort of yes man,
0:37:11 > 0:37:12which I wasn't either.
0:37:12 > 0:37:19That a unified Ireland was one solution - that is out.
0:37:19 > 0:37:23A second solution was...
0:37:23 > 0:37:27a confederation of two states - that is out.
0:37:27 > 0:37:32A third solution was joint authority - that is out.
0:37:32 > 0:37:35That is a derogation from sovereignty.
0:37:35 > 0:37:40'It was an outrageous thing to have done. It was typical Thatcher.
0:37:40 > 0:37:42'Public opinion here,'
0:37:42 > 0:37:45in the south, was...
0:37:45 > 0:37:47incensed.
0:37:51 > 0:37:53And I was afraid at the time that the whole process
0:37:53 > 0:37:55was going to break down.
0:38:01 > 0:38:04In an attempt to get the talks back on track,
0:38:04 > 0:38:06Garret FitzGerald looked to Irish America
0:38:06 > 0:38:08and President Reagan for help.
0:38:10 > 0:38:12Luckily, as it happened,
0:38:12 > 0:38:15Margaret Thatcher had planned two visits to Washington -
0:38:15 > 0:38:20one in December '84, and one in February '85.
0:38:22 > 0:38:27And, obviously, we had briefed both Tip O'Neill's people
0:38:27 > 0:38:29and President Reagan's people.
0:38:31 > 0:38:32For over 10 years,
0:38:32 > 0:38:35Dublin had tried to win support in America in the hope of putting
0:38:35 > 0:38:39pressure on London to do something about Northern Ireland.
0:38:39 > 0:38:42But with Irish-American Tip O'Neill a leading figure on Capitol Hill
0:38:42 > 0:38:46and Ronald Reagan in the White House, they made a breakthrough.
0:38:48 > 0:38:50Clearly the relationship between Reagan
0:38:50 > 0:38:53and O'Neill was an excellent one.
0:38:53 > 0:38:57And O'Neill used it, in my view, to the full,
0:38:57 > 0:39:01to ensure that Reagan acted on Irish affairs
0:39:01 > 0:39:04when we needed somebody to act.
0:39:04 > 0:39:07And O'Neill's own background in Ireland
0:39:07 > 0:39:10was very deep and was very well-informed.
0:39:11 > 0:39:15'The United States Government was under pressure from its own
0:39:15 > 0:39:21'Irish lobby in Washington, and I think Mrs Thatcher understood'
0:39:21 > 0:39:24that the President and his colleagues
0:39:24 > 0:39:26needed help in dealing with that.
0:39:30 > 0:39:32Documents from the time show that Tip O'Neill
0:39:32 > 0:39:35wrote to President Reagan pressing him to raise the breakdown
0:39:35 > 0:39:37in the talks with Margaret Thatcher.
0:39:41 > 0:39:45Reagan, under pressure from O'Neill,
0:39:45 > 0:39:51several times asked Thatcher to go ahead with the agreement.
0:40:01 > 0:40:05Margaret Thatcher had reached the conclusion that Airey Neave's
0:40:05 > 0:40:08vision of military victory was simply unrealistic.
0:40:11 > 0:40:14Because the general view of the Army was
0:40:14 > 0:40:16that this was not a winnable war,
0:40:16 > 0:40:19that it was possibly possible to hold the field,
0:40:19 > 0:40:21roughly, to hold the field,
0:40:21 > 0:40:25but it was not possible to drive the IRA to defeat,
0:40:25 > 0:40:29as that...realising that that was their view
0:40:29 > 0:40:35sunk into her mind, she became more inclined to negotiate.
0:40:37 > 0:40:42For two years, Robert Armstrong met with his Dublin counterparts.
0:40:42 > 0:40:46In the autumn of 1985, the drafting was complete.
0:40:46 > 0:40:48Her officials were convinced she was ready
0:40:48 > 0:40:51to sign an historic agreement, but just weeks out
0:40:51 > 0:40:54from the target date for the Hillsborough Summit,
0:40:54 > 0:40:55Thatcher removed Douglas Hurd
0:40:55 > 0:40:58as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
0:40:58 > 0:41:01replacing him with former infantry officer Tom King,
0:41:01 > 0:41:04who was horrified by much of what was being proposed.
0:41:06 > 0:41:10He thought it was unfair. I mean, he's a very decent guy,
0:41:10 > 0:41:13and he just thought it was totally unfair to the unionists.
0:41:13 > 0:41:17But he did it, like the soldier that he also was.
0:41:17 > 0:41:21There are some advantages to having people who accept
0:41:21 > 0:41:23the discipline of command.
0:41:24 > 0:41:29Tom King was from a different strand in the Tory party, obviously,
0:41:29 > 0:41:32from Douglas Hurd, and...
0:41:34 > 0:41:38..I think was more conscious of the difficulties that could be created
0:41:38 > 0:41:42for the relationship with the unionists by the agreement.
0:41:42 > 0:41:46But it had gone so far by then there was no going back on it.
0:41:48 > 0:41:52Robert Armstrong, along with Douglas Hurd and Geoffrey Howe,
0:41:52 > 0:41:55helped Thatcher overcome concerns from Tom King
0:41:55 > 0:41:57and the Northern Ireland Office.
0:41:57 > 0:41:59And on the morning of November 15th,
0:41:59 > 0:42:03Margaret Thatcher boarded an RAF helicopter for Hillsborough Castle.
0:42:03 > 0:42:05But even as she arrived,
0:42:05 > 0:42:09she was met with a worrying reaction to an agreement she had yet to sign.
0:42:10 > 0:42:13The first thing that happened, Margaret Thatcher,
0:42:13 > 0:42:16the moment she arrived, disappeared upstairs
0:42:16 > 0:42:21to telephone Ian Gow, who was resigning as a minister.
0:42:23 > 0:42:27The Conservative MP Ian Gow, who was later murdered by the IRA,
0:42:27 > 0:42:29was a staunch unionist
0:42:29 > 0:42:32and one of Margaret Thatcher's closest friends at Westminster.
0:42:32 > 0:42:35That those who chose the bullet and the bomb
0:42:35 > 0:42:38will gain no concessions from Her Majesty's Government.
0:42:40 > 0:42:42He was particularly close to her, she trusted his judgment,
0:42:42 > 0:42:44and she was very unhappy
0:42:44 > 0:42:47that he resigned from the Government when she did sign it.
0:42:48 > 0:42:51- THATCHER:- Any change in the status of Northern Ireland
0:42:51 > 0:42:54would only come about with the consent
0:42:54 > 0:42:57of a majority of people of Northern Ireland.
0:42:59 > 0:43:03It was very obvious that this was something she was doing,
0:43:03 > 0:43:06perhaps on the advice of those around her.
0:43:06 > 0:43:10But, certainly, I think, if it was of her own volition,
0:43:10 > 0:43:12I think that it probably wouldn't have been done.
0:43:13 > 0:43:16And yet, Mrs Thatcher tells us
0:43:16 > 0:43:23that that Republic must have some say in our Province!
0:43:23 > 0:43:27We say never!
0:43:27 > 0:43:30Never! Never!
0:43:30 > 0:43:31Never.
0:43:32 > 0:43:36All 15 Unionist MPs reacted by resigning their seats
0:43:36 > 0:43:39and calling people out onto the streets in protest,
0:43:39 > 0:43:42culminating in a rally at Belfast City Hall
0:43:42 > 0:43:44attended by more than 100,000 people.
0:43:47 > 0:43:49Our initial reaction
0:43:49 > 0:43:51was certainly betrayal.
0:43:51 > 0:43:54Why didn't she discuss this with us?
0:43:54 > 0:43:56Why didn't we get a hint?
0:43:58 > 0:44:04It was an appalling betrayal of the, erm...
0:44:05 > 0:44:09..assumptions, which were well-founded, of unionists,
0:44:09 > 0:44:12that they could always trust, a) the Tory Party,
0:44:12 > 0:44:15but even more than that, the talisman of the Tory Party
0:44:15 > 0:44:19in terms of unionism, which was Margaret Thatcher.
0:44:19 > 0:44:21And they were left in the dark.
0:44:21 > 0:44:24So this was a deliberate policy...
0:44:24 > 0:44:27Let me speak as an Irish nationalist here,
0:44:27 > 0:44:30I'm not speaking as a British former official -
0:44:30 > 0:44:32they would have it in more polite terms,
0:44:32 > 0:44:34but I will tell you what the reality was -
0:44:34 > 0:44:37it was a deliberate, massive betrayal
0:44:37 > 0:44:40of the unionists by Margaret Thatcher.
0:44:42 > 0:44:44I'd like to indict you, Mrs Thatcher,
0:44:44 > 0:44:48as a traitor to the loyalist people of Northern Ireland
0:44:48 > 0:44:52in denying them their right to vote on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
0:44:52 > 0:44:55'Well, it was deliberate,'
0:44:55 > 0:44:59because it was felt that if the...
0:45:00 > 0:45:04That we couldn't consult the unionists because there would
0:45:04 > 0:45:07be no chance of any agreement to what we might consult.
0:45:07 > 0:45:11So it was an object of the exercise to reach an agreement
0:45:11 > 0:45:13which didn't depend upon their cooperation.
0:45:18 > 0:45:21Almost from the moment of Ian Gow's resignation,
0:45:21 > 0:45:24Margaret Thatcher regretted the agreement.
0:45:24 > 0:45:26So why had she signed it in the first place?
0:45:28 > 0:45:31I think she had an expectation...
0:45:32 > 0:45:37that signing the agreement would be like waving a magic wand.
0:45:37 > 0:45:43That the security situation would immediately improve.
0:45:43 > 0:45:47That the Provisionals would be sidelined.
0:45:49 > 0:45:52It went against the grain,
0:45:52 > 0:45:56but she was persuaded that it was the right thing to do
0:45:56 > 0:45:59and it was going to be helpful in...
0:45:59 > 0:46:04putting an end to IRA terrorism.
0:46:04 > 0:46:07To do something against the grain, you do tend to regret it afterwards.
0:46:07 > 0:46:11Half regret it, I mean half regret it.
0:46:11 > 0:46:14And of course she had the Americans to consider.
0:46:14 > 0:46:18It helped with the Americans, as she said herself.
0:46:18 > 0:46:22- My friend, Margaret Thatcher. - Thank you.
0:46:22 > 0:46:25Years later when she was dismissing the agreement
0:46:25 > 0:46:30and expressing her support for even Enoch Powell's rejection of it,
0:46:30 > 0:46:35she said to her friends, it was the Americans who made me do it.
0:46:37 > 0:46:40Margaret thatcher had wanted an agreement that would give her
0:46:40 > 0:46:43the security solution that Airey Neave had hoped for.
0:46:43 > 0:46:46She blamed Garret FitzGerald for the failings in the agreement.
0:46:47 > 0:46:51Do you think she would have felt let down by him?
0:46:51 > 0:46:55No, I think she felt let down by me
0:46:55 > 0:46:59and people like me that we didn't somehow...
0:47:00 > 0:47:07thole the insult and that we took her head on.
0:47:07 > 0:47:13I think she was more let down by us than by Garret.
0:47:20 > 0:47:23If Margaret Thatcher thought the agreement would cut off support
0:47:23 > 0:47:27from the terrorists and end the violence, she was soon proved wrong.
0:47:29 > 0:47:33After 1985, the IRA continued to kill as in Enniskillen,
0:47:33 > 0:47:35in November in 1987.
0:47:38 > 0:47:42But Margaret Thatcher's government was also more ready to use lethal
0:47:42 > 0:47:45force as at Loughgall when the SAS killed eight
0:47:45 > 0:47:48members of the IRA as they attempted to attack a police station.
0:47:52 > 0:47:54Once...
0:47:54 > 0:47:57the British and Irish governments...
0:47:57 > 0:48:01have concluded an agreement which obviously is
0:48:01 > 0:48:06sort of sold in America as an initiative of major importance, and so on,
0:48:06 > 0:48:10and that they're in tandem working together on the problem,
0:48:10 > 0:48:16then that leaves Britain much less exposed to
0:48:16 > 0:48:19criticism in terms of what it does and therefore
0:48:19 > 0:48:28if you like...gives a somewhat freer hand to its security forces.
0:48:31 > 0:48:34After eight soldiers died in an IRA attack on their bus
0:48:34 > 0:48:38near Ballygawley in County Tyrone in August 1988,
0:48:38 > 0:48:42Ken Maginnis was invited to meet Margaret thatcher who was
0:48:42 > 0:48:44seeking information on those behind the attack.
0:48:46 > 0:48:51She said, "Thank you very much for coming to see me,
0:48:51 > 0:48:52"now tell me who did this?"
0:48:53 > 0:49:00So I told her, because...I couldn't tell her 100%,
0:49:00 > 0:49:02but I was able to name names.
0:49:03 > 0:49:10Subsequently, believe it or not, there was an SAS operation
0:49:10 > 0:49:16when, er, the same team tried to kill...a coal man
0:49:16 > 0:49:21and they were ambushed and that was the end of that particular team.
0:49:24 > 0:49:27It looked like the Anglo-Irish Agreement was having
0:49:27 > 0:49:29no effect on the bigger problem.
0:49:29 > 0:49:32It began to move again, I think, towards the late '80s,
0:49:32 > 0:49:36when there were secret channels and people began to realise
0:49:36 > 0:49:39we must do something here again and try and make progress.
0:49:41 > 0:49:43The SAS operations such as Loughgall
0:49:43 > 0:49:47had a marked impact on republican morale, which was only added to
0:49:47 > 0:49:51by international reaction to the Enniskillen attack.
0:49:51 > 0:49:54During the hunger strikes Margaret Thatcher had opened up
0:49:54 > 0:49:57a secret channel to negotiate with the IRA leadership.
0:49:59 > 0:50:01Up until now it was thought that she hadn't reopened
0:50:01 > 0:50:05communications to the IRA until October 1990.
0:50:07 > 0:50:11But Margaret Thatcher's Secretary of State from 1985 to 1990
0:50:11 > 0:50:14has told this programme the British Government was exchanging
0:50:14 > 0:50:18messages with the IRA leadership in the years immediately after
0:50:18 > 0:50:20the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
0:50:21 > 0:50:24Were you aware at that point that actually things were occurring
0:50:24 > 0:50:27- in the undergrowth that could ultimately lead to progress?- Yes.
0:50:27 > 0:50:32- Yes, I was.- You were aware?- Yeah, yeah.- Can you tell us how you were aware and what you were aware of?
0:50:32 > 0:50:37I remember one particular phrase that lived on and got embroidered.
0:50:37 > 0:50:43It was whether there was any strategic or economic interest that
0:50:43 > 0:50:47could override the democratic wishes of the people of Northern Ireland.
0:50:47 > 0:50:51- And how did you send that message through?- That... I forget.
0:50:51 > 0:50:55I mean, it came through, you know, somebody speaking quietly to me
0:50:55 > 0:50:59and him speaking quietly to somebody else, but it was very much
0:50:59 > 0:51:04sort of back-channel discussion, but nothing disreputable about that.
0:51:04 > 0:51:06All the people involved in it,
0:51:06 > 0:51:09at some considerable personal risk of even, you know,
0:51:09 > 0:51:13getting involved in any of it, but undoubtedly it was the start of...
0:51:13 > 0:51:15As I maintain,
0:51:15 > 0:51:19the Anglo-Irish Agreement was the start of, actually,
0:51:19 > 0:51:23the gradual evolution of what became the peace process.
0:51:23 > 0:51:25Do you have any memory of that?
0:51:26 > 0:51:32No, none at all. And, er...you know, I would say authoritatively
0:51:32 > 0:51:37that there was no clarification sought by republicans.
0:51:37 > 0:51:40Er...the...
0:51:40 > 0:51:46the...the first engagement, face-to-face,
0:51:46 > 0:51:48between, er...
0:51:48 > 0:51:53us and the British was Martin McGuinness meeting
0:51:53 > 0:51:56the British contact in October 1990,
0:51:56 > 0:52:02so we certainly weren't about, er... seeking clarification.
0:52:07 > 0:52:11The first face-to-face meetings may not have happened until 1990,
0:52:11 > 0:52:14but a senior negotiator from the Irish government says
0:52:14 > 0:52:18he became aware the British were communicating with the IRA
0:52:18 > 0:52:20as early as 1986.
0:52:21 > 0:52:25At this time, Nicholas Scott was security minister at Stormont,
0:52:25 > 0:52:28working closely with the Secretary of State Tom King.
0:52:28 > 0:52:30It was Scott who alerted the Irish
0:52:30 > 0:52:33that London was in contact with the IRA.
0:52:36 > 0:52:39He told me on two occasions
0:52:39 > 0:52:43that there were communications with the Provisional IRA.
0:52:43 > 0:52:46He wouldn't give me any details. He couldn't.
0:52:46 > 0:52:50But what he said was unmistakably clear.
0:52:50 > 0:52:54In his view, it was very important to persuade the Provisional IRA
0:52:54 > 0:52:57to stop the campaign of violence,
0:52:57 > 0:52:59a proposition that I would agree with.
0:53:01 > 0:53:03It suited Mrs Thatcher,
0:53:03 > 0:53:07because her public profile was to be extremely tough, but behind it,
0:53:07 > 0:53:13she was prepared to at least look at the possibility of negotiation.
0:53:13 > 0:53:19I think that was not to the benefit of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
0:53:19 > 0:53:24It happened, of course, explicitly at the time of the hunger strike,
0:53:24 > 0:53:30but these contacts don't simply disappear when times get better.
0:53:31 > 0:53:35They played absolutely no part, I can truthfully say,
0:53:35 > 0:53:40in the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
0:53:43 > 0:53:47At no point did I ever see a secret report
0:53:47 > 0:53:51which had any bearing on what was going on at all.
0:53:51 > 0:53:53But that's not to say that people weren't,
0:53:53 > 0:53:57that there was absolutely no contact. I would be surprised if...
0:53:58 > 0:54:03I mean, even in wartime, if you had, you know,
0:54:03 > 0:54:07contacts with the enemy on a secret channel,
0:54:07 > 0:54:10you'd expect to try to have such contacts.
0:54:12 > 0:54:18The effect of that on the Provisionals was, of course,
0:54:18 > 0:54:21to encourage them to be even more intensive
0:54:21 > 0:54:23in their campaign of violence.
0:54:23 > 0:54:26In other words, every time this happened,
0:54:26 > 0:54:29going back to the earliest days of the Troubles,
0:54:29 > 0:54:33the Provisional IRA took encouragement
0:54:33 > 0:54:35from the fact that the British were reaching out to them.
0:54:42 > 0:54:44Margaret Thatcher didn't survive as Prime Minister
0:54:44 > 0:54:47to see the outcome of the process she'd begun.
0:54:47 > 0:54:52By late 1990, her old friends were beginning to desert her.
0:54:52 > 0:54:55When every step forward risked being subverted...
0:54:56 > 0:55:01It was a combination of the economy going wrong,
0:55:01 > 0:55:0411 and a half years of handbagging,
0:55:04 > 0:55:06a very wearing way of governing...
0:55:09 > 0:55:13..and then Europe, which finally sunk her.
0:55:18 > 0:55:21In November 1990, Margaret Thatcher was in Paris
0:55:21 > 0:55:25for a meeting of world leaders to mark the end of the Cold War,
0:55:25 > 0:55:28but it also spelt the end of her time in power.
0:55:28 > 0:55:31She was in a room at the British Embassy
0:55:31 > 0:55:34when the results of the Conservative Party vote came in from London.
0:55:34 > 0:55:37- I'm just going to tell the president.- Yes, of course.
0:55:37 > 0:55:39'I got the call first,'
0:55:39 > 0:55:44and she could see my face in the dressing room mirror
0:55:44 > 0:55:47and she knew what the outcome was.
0:55:47 > 0:55:49'I thought at that moment it was the end.'
0:55:49 > 0:55:51Mrs Thatcher, could I ask you to comment?
0:55:51 > 0:55:53Good evening, good evening.
0:55:53 > 0:55:56- Where's the microphone? - It's here. This is the microphone.
0:55:56 > 0:55:59'She was a few votes short, and I remember
0:55:59 > 0:56:02'we were watching the television news near the embassy,'
0:56:02 > 0:56:08Haughey turning to us and saying immediately, "She's gone."
0:56:10 > 0:56:13We're leaving Downing Street for the last time,
0:56:13 > 0:56:17and we're very happy that we leave the United Kingdom
0:56:17 > 0:56:21in a very, very much better state than when we came here.
0:56:27 > 0:56:31She had encouraged her image as an Iron Lady, yet in secret,
0:56:31 > 0:56:33she had negotiated with the IRA.
0:56:34 > 0:56:36She believed in the union,
0:56:36 > 0:56:38yet she was accused of betraying the unionists.
0:56:38 > 0:56:41During her 11 years in office,
0:56:41 > 0:56:44more than 1,000 people died as a result of the conflict.
0:56:44 > 0:56:48She had seen ten prisoners die on hunger strike,
0:56:48 > 0:56:51and signed an agreement she came to resent.
0:56:51 > 0:56:53But she'd opened up channels to the IRA
0:56:53 > 0:56:58that just may have begun the process that eventually led to peace.
0:57:00 > 0:57:04She never fully understood Ireland, north or south.
0:57:04 > 0:57:07If anything, she was more puzzled by the unionists
0:57:07 > 0:57:12than she was by the nationalists. She expected more of them,
0:57:12 > 0:57:14but she never, in my view,
0:57:14 > 0:57:20came to the understanding of Irish affairs.
0:57:23 > 0:57:26She was one of these people, a lot of the time you think,
0:57:26 > 0:57:28"Gosh, she's awful."
0:57:28 > 0:57:32I was very put off by her in some ways,
0:57:32 > 0:57:35but you can't, you can't not...
0:57:35 > 0:57:36You can't not admire her.
0:57:40 > 0:57:43She probably did what she thought was right,
0:57:43 > 0:57:45and none of us are one-dimensional,
0:57:45 > 0:57:47so I'm sure she wasn't one-dimensional.
0:57:47 > 0:57:49But, you know, she was in the job,
0:57:49 > 0:57:51and she could have done it differently.
0:57:55 > 0:57:58She would have welcomed peace in Northern Ireland
0:57:58 > 0:58:00because it was better, better than war,
0:58:00 > 0:58:04but she was never quite comfortable with the price that was paid for it.
0:58:07 > 0:58:10Do you think either of you actually understood the Irish
0:58:10 > 0:58:12any more in 1990 than you did in 1979?
0:58:12 > 0:58:14Oh, probably not.
0:58:15 > 0:58:17No, I don't make any claims about that.
0:58:17 > 0:58:20But they sure didn't understand us.
0:58:20 > 0:58:22HE LAUGHS