0:00:02 > 0:00:06Every nation and every region now has a decision to make.
0:00:06 > 0:00:11Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.
0:00:11 > 0:00:15This programme contains scenes which some viewers may find upsetting.
0:00:15 > 0:00:17A few days after 9/11,
0:00:17 > 0:00:20Iraq's intelligence service received a secret message
0:00:20 > 0:00:21from a trusted emissary.
0:00:37 > 0:00:41The Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, gave the order -
0:00:41 > 0:00:44"Tell America Iraq will help fight al-Qaeda."
0:00:56 > 0:00:59Saddam Hussein's answer was quite different.
0:01:15 > 0:01:17Saddam went on to say
0:01:17 > 0:01:20that UN sanctions had killed far more in Iraq
0:01:20 > 0:01:23than died on 9/11 in New York.
0:01:44 > 0:01:48This series tells the inside story of a decade of war in Iraq.
0:01:53 > 0:01:55From the road to invasion...
0:01:55 > 0:01:58to the birth of an uncertain democracy...
0:01:58 > 0:02:00THEY CHANT
0:02:00 > 0:02:03..and the attempts to put an end to the killing
0:02:03 > 0:02:05that has claimed over 100,000 lives.
0:02:07 > 0:02:13I had taken the view we needed, really, to remake the Middle East,
0:02:13 > 0:02:15and therefore in the end, you're going to have to go through,
0:02:15 > 0:02:17I'm afraid, this long and drawn out
0:02:17 > 0:02:20and sometimes bloody process of transition.
0:02:20 > 0:02:23You've got to deal with what you've got
0:02:23 > 0:02:25and, uh...
0:02:25 > 0:02:28anybody, basically, was better than Saddam Hussein.
0:02:48 > 0:02:53In January 2002, the War on Terror was four months old.
0:02:53 > 0:02:57The allies had deposed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
0:02:57 > 0:02:59Now, Vice President, Dick Cheney,
0:02:59 > 0:03:02turned his attention to the next target.
0:03:02 > 0:03:04Another terrorist attack,
0:03:04 > 0:03:07and everybody was convinced there'd be a follow-on to 9/11...
0:03:07 > 0:03:13The place where we thought the biggest threat would lie
0:03:13 > 0:03:15was Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
0:03:15 > 0:03:18THEY CHANT
0:03:18 > 0:03:19Ten years before,
0:03:19 > 0:03:22America had defeated Saddam in the First Gulf War,
0:03:22 > 0:03:24but left him in power.
0:03:26 > 0:03:28Now, many in the Bush administration
0:03:28 > 0:03:31thought the time had come to get rid of him.
0:03:32 > 0:03:34I asked the CIA Director
0:03:34 > 0:03:38if he could bring down a couple of his folks who worked that account
0:03:38 > 0:03:39and to brief me.
0:03:41 > 0:03:44Was it possible, the Vice President asked,
0:03:44 > 0:03:48to avoid war by organising a coup d'etat to overthrow Saddam?
0:03:48 > 0:03:50And I explained to him,
0:03:50 > 0:03:53we have looked at covert action on Iraq for years,
0:03:53 > 0:03:56we have tried every effort, but he has organised his regime
0:03:56 > 0:04:00to stop exactly that sort of thing and to stop a coup.
0:04:00 > 0:04:02He has destroyed the opposition,
0:04:02 > 0:04:05he has destroyed anybody who has a talent to do this,
0:04:05 > 0:04:07and I said, "Mr Vice President, we can't do a coup.
0:04:07 > 0:04:11"The possibility of overthrowing Saddam Hussein via coup is nil."
0:04:12 > 0:04:15It was clear from what they told me
0:04:15 > 0:04:18that you weren't going to be successful in trying to mount
0:04:18 > 0:04:21some kind of coup against Saddam that changed the regime,
0:04:21 > 0:04:24that it would take more direct action.
0:04:24 > 0:04:26And he said, "Look, we made a mistake last time.
0:04:26 > 0:04:30"We're going to correct this mistake this time".
0:04:30 > 0:04:31I interpret that to mean
0:04:31 > 0:04:34"We stopped short of Baghdad and didn't remove him,
0:04:34 > 0:04:36"so we'll fix that and remove him."
0:04:38 > 0:04:41Removing Saddam almost certainly meant war.
0:04:41 > 0:04:45So good intelligence inside Iraq would be essential.
0:04:47 > 0:04:49The Kurds, from the mountainous north,
0:04:49 > 0:04:51had been fighting Saddam for decades.
0:04:51 > 0:04:53The Americans turned to them.
0:04:57 > 0:05:00The Kurds had helped the Americans in the past,
0:05:00 > 0:05:01but it had cost them dear.
0:05:07 > 0:05:12I refused to have any kind of contact with the United States of America.
0:05:12 > 0:05:16But at that time in Iraq, we reached the conclusion
0:05:16 > 0:05:21that the removal of dictatorship was impossible
0:05:21 > 0:05:23without the support from outside.
0:05:26 > 0:05:29The Kurdish leaders were flown to a secret CIA training camp
0:05:29 > 0:05:31in rural Virginia.
0:05:33 > 0:05:35This was supposed to be A - a secret visit,
0:05:35 > 0:05:38secondly, also, the location was supposed to be secret,
0:05:38 > 0:05:41so the windows were closed or taped off,
0:05:41 > 0:05:45but the navigation maps on the seats were still on,
0:05:45 > 0:05:48so we knew where we were exactly going to land.
0:05:48 > 0:05:51They had come to meet senior officials of the CIA.
0:05:53 > 0:05:57We said "In the event that the United States embarks on this operation,
0:05:57 > 0:06:02"we're going to need a network of intelligence agents in Iraq."
0:06:02 > 0:06:06We did not have as robust a network as we would have liked.
0:06:06 > 0:06:09The Kurds did and the Kurds had networks, the Kurds had contacts,
0:06:09 > 0:06:12there were Kurds throughout all of Iraq and I explained to them
0:06:12 > 0:06:15that "Kurds are an integral part of this thing. We need you
0:06:15 > 0:06:17"to provide access to intelligence,
0:06:17 > 0:06:19"to provide access to your territory."
0:06:31 > 0:06:35We had people explaining on a whiteboard actually,
0:06:35 > 0:06:38specifically the times, the dates,
0:06:38 > 0:06:44the landing of some forces that were to come to the Kurdish areas
0:06:44 > 0:06:49and so on, and I realised "This is, at long last, it is for real."
0:06:49 > 0:06:53And I remember whispering into the ears of Mr Talabani, I said,
0:06:53 > 0:06:56"This time, you can get rid of Saddam Hussein."
0:06:57 > 0:07:00THEY CHANT
0:07:01 > 0:07:05The Americans feared Saddam would supply al-Qaeda with chemical,
0:07:05 > 0:07:10biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction - WMD.
0:07:12 > 0:07:15He'd already used a chemical weapon - nerve gas -
0:07:15 > 0:07:17during his war against Iran.
0:07:19 > 0:07:24And he used it to kill more than 3000 Kurds in a single day.
0:07:30 > 0:07:34Iraq had developed chemical weapons and used them.
0:07:34 > 0:07:36It had developed biological weapons.
0:07:36 > 0:07:40It had almost gotten to a nuclear weapon
0:07:40 > 0:07:42before the First Gulf War began.
0:07:42 > 0:07:44So, Iraq was a known quantity
0:07:44 > 0:07:46when it came to having weapons of mass destruction.
0:07:54 > 0:07:56I explained to the Prime Minister
0:07:56 > 0:08:00that "The policy of my government is the removal of Saddam,
0:08:00 > 0:08:02"and all options are on the table."
0:08:02 > 0:08:04The President is right to draw attention
0:08:04 > 0:08:07to the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
0:08:08 > 0:08:11But George Bush's closest ally had a problem.
0:08:11 > 0:08:13At any point in time, we will of course make sure
0:08:13 > 0:08:16that Parliament is properly consulted.
0:08:16 > 0:08:19The Prime Minister will be aware of concern throughout the country
0:08:19 > 0:08:23that by the time this House returns in the autumn,
0:08:23 > 0:08:25we will be at war with Iraq.
0:08:25 > 0:08:28Does he... members may groan,
0:08:28 > 0:08:31but many millions of people are concerned.
0:08:35 > 0:08:37- REPORTER:- Prime Minister,
0:08:37 > 0:08:40do you and President Bush agree with how to deal with Iraq?
0:08:40 > 0:08:42The day before his summer break,
0:08:42 > 0:08:45Tony Blair called his senior colleagues to Downing Street.
0:08:48 > 0:08:51The Head of the Secret Intelligence Service had just been in America
0:08:51 > 0:08:53and he was very much of the view that the Americans
0:08:53 > 0:08:57basically had decided this was going to happen.
0:08:57 > 0:09:01And it was a question of when, rather than if.
0:09:01 > 0:09:05So I posed the choices - were we going to support the Americans
0:09:05 > 0:09:08in their objective of regime change,
0:09:08 > 0:09:13or was it about requiring compliance by Saddam
0:09:13 > 0:09:18of his United Nations obligations to rid himself of his chemical
0:09:18 > 0:09:21and biological weapons, the weapons of mass destruction?
0:09:21 > 0:09:23I said to Jack, the issue was undoubtedly
0:09:23 > 0:09:27the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
0:09:27 > 0:09:34But obviously, the nature of the regime is of some importance
0:09:34 > 0:09:39when you consider the threat of such a regime having WMDs.
0:09:39 > 0:09:44So the separation of the two has always been a little unreal.
0:09:44 > 0:09:46We could not be involved in any kind of military action
0:09:46 > 0:09:51whose objective was regime change, because that is unlawful
0:09:51 > 0:09:54according to our interpretation of international law.
0:09:54 > 0:09:58Jack was very clear that just because the Americans are saying something,
0:09:58 > 0:10:02does not mean the British government have to do it.
0:10:02 > 0:10:05But Tony was very clear that that would have been a huge break
0:10:05 > 0:10:10with British foreign policy and he said directly to Jack,
0:10:10 > 0:10:14"Look, this is worse than you think. I actually do believe in this."
0:10:23 > 0:10:26While America and Britain were talking war,
0:10:26 > 0:10:29in Saddam's court, it was business as usual.
0:10:46 > 0:10:50Saddam had executed hundreds of officers for saying things
0:10:50 > 0:10:51he didn't want to hear.
0:10:51 > 0:10:55Now one general from his elite Republican Guard took a risk.
0:11:52 > 0:11:54General Hamdani had to wait
0:11:54 > 0:11:56until the end of the meeting to learn his fate.
0:13:03 > 0:13:05- Commander, how are you? - All right, sir.
0:13:05 > 0:13:07We'll see you Friday.
0:13:07 > 0:13:12In America that summer, the debate over Iraq that mattered
0:13:12 > 0:13:15was within the President's national security team.
0:13:15 > 0:13:18Vice-President Dick Cheney wanted the President to act now.
0:13:24 > 0:13:28But Secretary of State Colin Powell spent the summer worrying
0:13:28 > 0:13:32that President Bush was being steam-rollered into war.
0:13:32 > 0:13:34He asked the President for a private meeting.
0:13:36 > 0:13:39The point I made to him is that I was a little uneasy
0:13:39 > 0:13:42that all of the briefings the President had been getting
0:13:42 > 0:13:45with respect to Iraq had been dealing with war plans,
0:13:45 > 0:13:48and how long it takes to get troops there.
0:13:48 > 0:13:50I said, "We have to do something either diplomatically
0:13:50 > 0:13:54"or through the use of military force. We're going to need allies,
0:13:54 > 0:13:56"we're going to need people who will support us."
0:13:56 > 0:13:59And he thought about it for a moment. He said, "What shall we do?"
0:13:59 > 0:14:02And I said, "I recommend you take it to the UN.
0:14:02 > 0:14:03"They are the aggrieved party.
0:14:03 > 0:14:06"It's their resolutions that have been offended."
0:14:06 > 0:14:09Powell's arguments convinced the President they should seek
0:14:09 > 0:14:14a new UN resolution demanding the return of the weapons inspectors
0:14:14 > 0:14:16Saddam had expelled four years earlier.
0:14:19 > 0:14:22Vice President Dick Cheney was unhappy.
0:14:22 > 0:14:23Thank you.
0:14:26 > 0:14:30A person would be right to question any suggestion that we should
0:14:30 > 0:14:35just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over.
0:14:36 > 0:14:39Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and retreat,
0:14:39 > 0:14:43and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception.
0:14:43 > 0:14:47In his speech, he effectively shot down the proposal,
0:14:47 > 0:14:49shot down what we were getting ready to do.
0:14:49 > 0:14:52The UN couldn't do this. It was probably a waste of time,
0:14:52 > 0:14:56everything that you shouldn't have said, in my humble judgement,
0:14:56 > 0:14:59with respect to a decision the President had made.
0:15:06 > 0:15:09Colin Powell was on holiday in the Hamptons, on Long Island,
0:15:09 > 0:15:12at the estate of the cosmetics heir, Ron Lauder.
0:15:15 > 0:15:17Powell was short of allies in Washington.
0:15:17 > 0:15:20So he looked across the Atlantic for help.
0:15:21 > 0:15:23Went on Concorde.
0:15:23 > 0:15:26Sat next to Dustin Hoffman, so I was sort of starstruck,
0:15:26 > 0:15:29so you know - who the devil was I?
0:15:29 > 0:15:33I was just another European Foreign Minister.
0:15:33 > 0:15:39So anyway, went on Concorde, got a helicopter straight from
0:15:39 > 0:15:42the side of the plane to the house in which Colin Powell was staying.
0:15:45 > 0:15:48After a quick spin in one of their host's classic cars,
0:15:48 > 0:15:51the two foreign ministers worked out how they could put together
0:15:51 > 0:15:54an international coalition against Iraq.
0:15:55 > 0:15:59I said to him, unless we go down the UN route -
0:15:59 > 0:16:03with, brackets, the possibility that this could be resolved peacefully -
0:16:03 > 0:16:07the Brits can't be involved, full stop.
0:16:07 > 0:16:09It would be unlawful and even if it were lawful,
0:16:09 > 0:16:12there would not be a majority for it.
0:16:12 > 0:16:15The point I made to him is that the Vice President always had
0:16:15 > 0:16:17a reluctance to take what he believed
0:16:17 > 0:16:19is something for us to decide
0:16:19 > 0:16:23and sort of take it to the United Nations and get others involved.
0:16:28 > 0:16:31President Bush would have to choose between Colin Powell
0:16:31 > 0:16:32and Dick Cheney.
0:16:32 > 0:16:34He called his team to Camp David.
0:16:37 > 0:16:40If Bush agreed with Cheney, Tony Blair would be
0:16:40 > 0:16:42put in an impossible position.
0:16:43 > 0:16:47Blair asked the President if he could put his case face-to-face.
0:16:47 > 0:16:50He would fly to America to do so.
0:16:53 > 0:16:56The only way we were going to get the United States
0:16:56 > 0:17:00back down the United Nations path was by making it clear we were there
0:17:00 > 0:17:04as allies. We weren't going to be fair-weather friends on this issue,
0:17:04 > 0:17:06we were going to be with them dealing with it.
0:17:06 > 0:17:10We learnt either just before we were leaving for the States or even
0:17:10 > 0:17:14when we were en route that Dick Cheney was going to be there as well.
0:17:14 > 0:17:18The atmosphere on the plane over was really tough.
0:17:18 > 0:17:21Tony was extremely stressed, actually,
0:17:21 > 0:17:25I mean, he was writing arguments and getting his thoughts straight.
0:17:25 > 0:17:29And he'd want to talk individually, he'd call you over one by one
0:17:29 > 0:17:34and go through the arguments, you know, and it was just a very tough,
0:17:34 > 0:17:36a tough plane journey, actually.
0:17:38 > 0:17:41The President had spent the weekend closeted in Laurel Lodge
0:17:41 > 0:17:43with his National Security team.
0:17:45 > 0:17:48Blair's arrival interrupted a fierce debate.
0:17:53 > 0:17:56We went into, there's a small office the President has
0:17:56 > 0:17:57there at Laurel Lodge
0:17:57 > 0:18:00and I can remember the three of us sitting in there
0:18:00 > 0:18:05talking about this question of the United Nations resolution.
0:18:05 > 0:18:11I argued very strongly that it was necessary to have that UN support
0:18:11 > 0:18:15behind us, that because of the seriousness
0:18:15 > 0:18:17and consequences of military action,
0:18:17 > 0:18:22we had to give it one last go at resolving this peacefully.
0:18:22 > 0:18:28Another resolution would be passed and would have the same effect
0:18:28 > 0:18:30as the others - in effect, nothing would happen.
0:18:30 > 0:18:34I argued that going to the UN was likely to get us all tangled up
0:18:34 > 0:18:38and once you pull the trigger and start to move, you've got to move.
0:18:38 > 0:18:43President Bush was more in listening mode at that point
0:18:43 > 0:18:47but then afterwards, as we were talking together,
0:18:47 > 0:18:50President Bush made it clear that on balance, his judgement was also
0:18:50 > 0:18:53that it was better to have a UN resolution.
0:18:57 > 0:18:59Blair had won - for the time being.
0:19:03 > 0:19:05We will work with the UN Security Council
0:19:05 > 0:19:09for the necessary resolutions.
0:19:09 > 0:19:13But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted.
0:19:15 > 0:19:18The Security Council resolutions will be enforced.
0:19:20 > 0:19:24The just demands of peace and security will be met.
0:19:26 > 0:19:28Or action will be unavoidable.
0:19:33 > 0:19:36It was a declaration of war against Iraq.
0:19:36 > 0:19:38So you can imagine,
0:19:38 > 0:19:41you as a representative of your country,
0:19:41 > 0:19:45you as a human being,
0:19:45 > 0:19:48that somebody tell you, "We will kill you".
0:19:51 > 0:19:54I decided that it is time now
0:19:54 > 0:19:59to do a pre-emptive action to stop the United States
0:19:59 > 0:20:04from this plan of war against Iraq.
0:20:04 > 0:20:09I sent a coded message to the President proposing approval
0:20:09 > 0:20:12to let inspectors back.
0:20:40 > 0:20:44Saddam finally agreed the weapons inspectors could return to Iraq.
0:20:45 > 0:20:49Though Saddam strongly denied possessing banned weapons,
0:20:49 > 0:20:51most governments thought he was lying.
0:20:54 > 0:20:57At the end of the Gulf War in 1991,
0:20:57 > 0:21:01Iraq had been ordered by the UN to destroy all its WMD.
0:21:03 > 0:21:05It didn't.
0:21:36 > 0:21:40Saddam suspected that the Americans had uncovered his deception.
0:21:40 > 0:21:45So a few months after the war, he had the remaining WMD destroyed.
0:22:07 > 0:22:09Throughout 2002, American, British
0:22:09 > 0:22:11and other Western intelligence agencies
0:22:11 > 0:22:14were desperately searching the world
0:22:14 > 0:22:18for hard evidence that Saddam still had weapons of mass destruction.
0:22:20 > 0:22:24Then the French secret service made what promised to be
0:22:24 > 0:22:25the crucial breakthrough.
0:22:27 > 0:22:29I was contacted by my French colleagues
0:22:29 > 0:22:33whom I'd been working with on counter-terrorism matters,
0:22:33 > 0:22:37and they told me that they had access, through an intermediary
0:22:37 > 0:22:44in Paris, to an Iraqi minister very high in Saddam Hussein's Cabinet,
0:22:44 > 0:22:45who may want to defect.
0:22:47 > 0:22:49The man they were talking about was
0:22:49 > 0:22:52Saddam's Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri.
0:22:52 > 0:22:55I said it was a long shot.
0:22:55 > 0:22:58But it was at least worthwhile following up.
0:22:58 > 0:23:03When this message came, we collectively in Iraq operations
0:23:03 > 0:23:07looked at it and thought that this was just bullshit.
0:23:07 > 0:23:10There was no reason why the newly-minted Iraqi Foreign Minister
0:23:10 > 0:23:13would have any information on WMD.
0:23:13 > 0:23:16Saddam doesn't share it, this guy was not an insider,
0:23:16 > 0:23:18he was not one of the loyal few.
0:23:20 > 0:23:25But Rueda's boss, George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, overruled him.
0:23:25 > 0:23:28Director Tenet briefed the President on this operation.
0:23:28 > 0:23:31The President made it clear, said this would be a great coup
0:23:31 > 0:23:33if we can get him to defect and get up in front of television
0:23:33 > 0:23:36or the UN and say "We have WMD".
0:23:37 > 0:23:40But French Intelligence had no direct contact
0:23:40 > 0:23:41with Foreign Minister Sabri.
0:23:43 > 0:23:46They relied on an intermediary, Nabil Mograbi,
0:23:46 > 0:23:49long one of their trusted sources.
0:24:07 > 0:24:11The prize was so big, the CIA agreed to pay the intermediary
0:24:11 > 0:24:16200,000 upfront - far in excess of their normal rate.
0:24:19 > 0:24:22Foreign Minister Sabri was to address the United Nations.
0:24:22 > 0:24:26It offered a rare chance to get to him for a private meeting.
0:24:26 > 0:24:29Mograbi went to New York to see if Sabri would defect
0:24:29 > 0:24:35or at least answer the CIA's questions about WMD.
0:24:35 > 0:24:38I was in New York in mid-September 2002,
0:24:38 > 0:24:46an Arab ex-journalist living in France telephoned me,
0:24:46 > 0:24:52saying he would like to say hello to me. I said yes.
0:24:52 > 0:24:56I had suspicions at the time that he has links
0:24:56 > 0:24:59with the French authorities, I'm not sure.
0:25:02 > 0:25:04Sabri met the intermediary at the residence
0:25:04 > 0:25:06of the Iraqi ambassador to the UN.
0:25:08 > 0:25:13He came to me and he started asking me about how I felt
0:25:13 > 0:25:20about my new job, how I was doing, was I happy with it or not.
0:25:20 > 0:25:22And then he shifted the questions
0:25:22 > 0:25:26to my relationship with President Saddam.
0:25:26 > 0:25:29This was exactly what happened - that's it.
0:25:29 > 0:25:32Something else happened. The CIA prepared a test
0:25:32 > 0:25:36to prove whether Mograbi had really met Sabri.
0:25:36 > 0:25:40We came up with a little ploy, which was to have the intermediary
0:25:40 > 0:25:45have a couple of suits custom-made for the Minister and to give them
0:25:45 > 0:25:49to him the night before he spoke at the UN General Assembly,
0:25:49 > 0:25:53and ask the Minister to wear one while he was giving the speech.
0:25:53 > 0:25:54Ladies and gentlemen,
0:25:54 > 0:25:58Iraq has always defended the principles and values that...
0:25:58 > 0:26:01'When I saw the presentation on the TV news later
0:26:01 > 0:26:02'I was very happy to see'
0:26:02 > 0:26:05that the Minister was wearing my suit during his speech to the world.
0:26:05 > 0:26:09It showed that they had in fact met.
0:26:11 > 0:26:16On the morning of Sabri's speech, the CIA interviewed Mograbi.
0:26:17 > 0:26:21The intermediary was able to get detailed answers to the questions
0:26:21 > 0:26:27we had posed, the relevant questions on weapons of mass destruction.
0:26:27 > 0:26:32The report of their interview was fast-tracked to the CIA bosses.
0:26:32 > 0:26:33'An important report comes in'
0:26:33 > 0:26:35from a source who claims to have access
0:26:35 > 0:26:39to the current Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri,
0:26:39 > 0:26:41that makes quite an impression,
0:26:41 > 0:26:44particularly on some of the senior people in Washington.
0:26:44 > 0:26:47The report said that the Foreign Minister had confirmed
0:26:47 > 0:26:50that Iraqi scientists were developing
0:26:50 > 0:26:52weapons of mass destruction for Saddam.
0:26:52 > 0:26:56People working this problem for him tell him
0:26:56 > 0:27:00they can put together a programme with nuclear weapons,
0:27:00 > 0:27:03or close to nuclear weapons, in 18 to 24 months.
0:27:04 > 0:27:08The source also says that he has chemical weapons and has mounted them
0:27:08 > 0:27:14on medium-range launchers as a kind of last resort to use
0:27:14 > 0:27:17in the event that he experiences an invasion
0:27:17 > 0:27:20or some kind of military action,
0:27:20 > 0:27:24and that his biological programme is not very big, but is nascent.
0:27:27 > 0:27:30The President and his allies had been saying for years
0:27:30 > 0:27:33that Saddam had WMD.
0:27:33 > 0:27:36The report appeared to provide high-level confirmation.
0:27:36 > 0:27:39CIA bosses sent it to the White House.
0:27:41 > 0:27:45Those who had read the Naji Sabri reporting had some confidence
0:27:45 > 0:27:52that it gave a very reassuring view of Saddam's WMD status and, again,
0:27:52 > 0:27:55the sensitivity of that and the origin of that was such
0:27:55 > 0:27:59that you didn't put it out in public, but in the background of things
0:27:59 > 0:28:00it strengthened everyone's confidence
0:28:00 > 0:28:03that what you were saying was accurate.
0:28:05 > 0:28:10Four years later, when the US Senate investigated intelligence failures,
0:28:10 > 0:28:13CIA agent Murray made a shocking accusation.
0:28:15 > 0:28:18He said that the report of his meeting with the intermediary
0:28:18 > 0:28:22had been changed by a CIA colleague to say that Saddam had WMD.
0:28:24 > 0:28:27Murray now claimed that the intermediary meant the opposite.
0:28:29 > 0:28:32The intermediary told me
0:28:32 > 0:28:35they were never able to produce a weapons programme.
0:28:35 > 0:28:38There literally were no stockpiles of offensive weapons
0:28:38 > 0:28:40of mass destruction.
0:28:40 > 0:28:43The Senate investigation could find no evidence
0:28:43 > 0:28:45to support Murray's accusation.
0:28:45 > 0:28:48And the reason Murray said nothing for four years?
0:28:48 > 0:28:52He says he did not see the report of the meeting at the time.
0:28:53 > 0:28:56When the war was over in 2003,
0:28:56 > 0:28:59a CIA team was finally able to interview Sabri
0:28:59 > 0:29:01without a go-between.
0:29:02 > 0:29:04And he looked at us like we were horses' asses
0:29:04 > 0:29:07and said "What defection? What WMD?
0:29:07 > 0:29:10"I don't know what you're talking about!"
0:29:10 > 0:29:14It was a stunning revelation that the source was fabricating this.
0:29:18 > 0:29:21Mograbi declined our invitation to say on the record what
0:29:21 > 0:29:23he discussed with Naji Sabri.
0:29:25 > 0:29:28Today, it is difficult to establish what actually happened
0:29:28 > 0:29:31or even where the information in the report came from.
0:29:33 > 0:29:37But in the months leading up to the war, decision makers believed
0:29:37 > 0:29:41that Saddam's Foreign Minister had confirmed that Iraq had WMD.
0:29:43 > 0:29:47Western intelligence agencies had gathered thousands of reports,
0:29:47 > 0:29:50using both human and electronic sources -
0:29:50 > 0:29:54most of them pointed to the same conclusion.
0:29:54 > 0:29:59There was a fairly strong flow of information, and of course
0:29:59 > 0:30:03all this was against the background of the situation where the thing
0:30:03 > 0:30:07that was not in doubt was that he had had WMD and had used them.
0:30:07 > 0:30:10PROTESTERS CHANT
0:30:10 > 0:30:14Don't attack Iraq! Don't attack Iraq!
0:30:14 > 0:30:17In Britain, opposition to a war was growing -
0:30:17 > 0:30:22and with it, the demand for the facts about Saddam's WMD.
0:30:26 > 0:30:30We were under enormous pressure to say what we knew
0:30:30 > 0:30:32from the intelligence we had.
0:30:40 > 0:30:43We have heard again and again there is a dossier of evidence
0:30:43 > 0:30:46about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.
0:30:46 > 0:30:50Why haven't we got it up to now, and when are we going to see it?
0:30:50 > 0:30:51A lot of the work has already been done,
0:30:51 > 0:30:54there needs to be some more work and some more checking done.
0:30:54 > 0:30:56But I think probably the best thing to do is to publish that
0:30:56 > 0:30:58within the next few weeks.
0:30:58 > 0:31:02From the moment that it was announced, this was going
0:31:02 > 0:31:03to be kind of such a big thing.
0:31:03 > 0:31:07So the build-up to it was enormous
0:31:07 > 0:31:11and my worry was always that, actually,
0:31:11 > 0:31:16it's not necessarily going to meet these incredible expectations.
0:31:18 > 0:31:21The document was drafted by a group chaired by the head
0:31:21 > 0:31:24of the joint intelligence committee, John Scarlett.
0:31:24 > 0:31:29The role of Alastair Campbell would later provoke controversy.
0:31:29 > 0:31:31He made sure the case was put as strongly
0:31:31 > 0:31:34as the intelligence professionals would allow.
0:31:34 > 0:31:37A lot of it was going to be historical,
0:31:37 > 0:31:39a lot of it was going to be quite bland, a lot of it was going
0:31:39 > 0:31:41to be very dry and that's as it should have been.
0:31:41 > 0:31:44The key thing the security services had insisted upon was that
0:31:44 > 0:31:47the report should be theirs.
0:31:47 > 0:31:50So I wrote the foreword to it, but the actual report was theirs.
0:31:50 > 0:31:53The decision as to which intelligence to insert into it
0:31:53 > 0:31:54was also theirs.
0:31:55 > 0:31:59Parliament was recalled to debate the report.
0:31:59 > 0:32:01Order!
0:32:01 > 0:32:04The history of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction
0:32:04 > 0:32:07is not American or British propaganda.
0:32:07 > 0:32:12His weapons of mass destruction programme is active,
0:32:12 > 0:32:13detailed and growing.
0:32:13 > 0:32:17The Prime Minister then made an astonishing claim,
0:32:17 > 0:32:20based on information received a month before he spoke
0:32:20 > 0:32:23that never went through the full checking process.
0:32:23 > 0:32:28It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons
0:32:28 > 0:32:31which could be activated within 45 minutes
0:32:31 > 0:32:35and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.
0:32:37 > 0:32:40The Prime Minister got the headlines he wanted.
0:32:43 > 0:32:45Though he would later regret it.
0:32:46 > 0:32:49I've absolutely no doubt that if I had my time over again,
0:32:49 > 0:32:53I would have simply published the intelligence reports
0:32:53 > 0:32:56that came to me, and then all this stuff about deceit and lies
0:32:56 > 0:33:00and all the rest of it would have been put to one side.
0:33:04 > 0:33:08In November, the United Nations resolution that Tony Blair
0:33:08 > 0:33:11and Colin Powell had pressed for passed unanimously.
0:33:13 > 0:33:16The clock for invasion was set ticking.
0:33:17 > 0:33:21Iraq was given 30 days to prove it had got rid of all its WMD.
0:33:23 > 0:33:27Iraqi scientists and technicians set out to provide the evidence.
0:33:59 > 0:34:03The report was 12,000 pages long.
0:34:04 > 0:34:06But it wasn't enough for the Americans.
0:34:08 > 0:34:13Saddam provides a declaration which is high in volume
0:34:13 > 0:34:15and shy in content.
0:34:15 > 0:34:19There's really nothing new. There's nothing that comes close
0:34:19 > 0:34:20to being a full accounting.
0:34:22 > 0:34:25President Bush believed he had the justification
0:34:25 > 0:34:27he needed to depose Saddam.
0:34:28 > 0:34:32But he worried he had not yet explained the case for war.
0:34:32 > 0:34:35He summoned CIA chiefs to the White House.
0:34:37 > 0:34:42And he asks John McLaughlin to start presenting the intelligence case
0:34:42 > 0:34:47that Saddam Hussein has unaccounted-for
0:34:47 > 0:34:48weapons of mass destruction.
0:34:48 > 0:34:56I said things like, "We can document that Saddam has exceeded
0:34:56 > 0:35:01"the UN-imposed limits for the range of his missiles."
0:35:01 > 0:35:02We had some charts and graphs
0:35:02 > 0:35:06that showed particularly for missile testing and such.
0:35:06 > 0:35:11And he built the case sort of block by block from the bottom up.
0:35:11 > 0:35:14Very detailed, very granual.
0:35:14 > 0:35:19I went through the briefing and I, in my usual way, was very caveated
0:35:19 > 0:35:21and careful in what I said.
0:35:21 > 0:35:24And the President, of course, is thinking about how this is going
0:35:24 > 0:35:29to work in a public audience, and at about 20 minutes in
0:35:29 > 0:35:36he stops John and he says, "John, is this the best we can do?"
0:35:36 > 0:35:39"Is this the best intelligence case we have?"
0:35:41 > 0:35:45The CIA director, George Tenet, came to the aid of his deputy.
0:35:45 > 0:35:48I can remember the President turned to George,
0:35:48 > 0:35:52sitting on the couch to the right of the fireplace where the President
0:35:52 > 0:35:55and I were sitting on the chairs next to the fireplace,
0:35:55 > 0:35:58and he asked George, he said, "Just how good is our case
0:35:58 > 0:36:01"on Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction?"
0:36:01 > 0:36:03And George immediately responded,
0:36:03 > 0:36:07he said, "It's a slam dunk, Mr President, it's a slam dunk."
0:36:08 > 0:36:12So the President concludes we need to make a case like a lawyer
0:36:12 > 0:36:16would make a case before a jury in a closing argument.
0:36:16 > 0:36:18"Hadley, you and Libby are lawyers,
0:36:18 > 0:36:23"why don't you guys take this intelligence, go out and write
0:36:23 > 0:36:28"a legal brief on behalf of a use of force against Saddam Hussein?"
0:36:31 > 0:36:34The President instructed Colin Powell to present the case.
0:36:36 > 0:36:38A special session of the UN was convened to hear him.
0:36:40 > 0:36:43The White House sent him its draft presentation.
0:36:43 > 0:36:45I called him and just said,
0:36:45 > 0:36:48"Look, Colin, I think it's a pretty good package,
0:36:48 > 0:36:50"I hope you'll take a look at it."
0:36:50 > 0:36:54We weren't trying to, you know, say, "This is what you've got to use,"
0:36:54 > 0:36:57we were trying to be helpful at the direction of the President.
0:36:57 > 0:37:01It went first to my assistant, and when he reported to me
0:37:01 > 0:37:04later in the afternoon "That this is not a case,
0:37:04 > 0:37:07"it does not hang together, there is not back-up material
0:37:07 > 0:37:11"for the assertions and claims that are made, it's unusable",
0:37:11 > 0:37:14that was enough for me to call Dr Rice and say,
0:37:14 > 0:37:16"Look, we got a problem.
0:37:16 > 0:37:19"All I have is the weapons of mass destruction case -
0:37:19 > 0:37:23"I don't have the human rights case, I don't have the terrorism case,
0:37:23 > 0:37:26"and you need to get more time, we need a little more time."
0:37:26 > 0:37:28And her answer was, "Jeez, sorry, too late,
0:37:28 > 0:37:31"the President has already announced it publicly."
0:37:34 > 0:37:37Colin Powell would have just one week to prepare.
0:37:39 > 0:37:40Armed with the draft,
0:37:40 > 0:37:44he raced over to CIA headquarters to check the facts.
0:37:46 > 0:37:47When I went out to the CIA,
0:37:47 > 0:37:53to start working on a new draft of the documentation, the focus
0:37:53 > 0:37:55was weapons of mass destruction,
0:37:55 > 0:37:57because that was the cause celebre that,
0:37:57 > 0:38:00that would either require us to go to war or not.
0:38:01 > 0:38:02The CIA assured Powell
0:38:02 > 0:38:05that Saddam was trying to obtain nuclear centrifuges
0:38:05 > 0:38:09and was training al-Qaeda operatives in the use of WMD.
0:38:11 > 0:38:15I didn't come up with that information, I spent four days
0:38:15 > 0:38:20sorting through the material to get what I thought was most sustainable.
0:38:20 > 0:38:24It was attested to by 16 intelligence agencies, and British intelligence.
0:38:26 > 0:38:29The CIA was confident in its material - including
0:38:29 > 0:38:32the reporting that apparently came from Iraq's Foreign Minister.
0:38:32 > 0:38:37However, to protect the sources, much of it had to be kept secret.
0:38:37 > 0:38:41The reporting we had that traced to Naji Sabri, along with other
0:38:41 > 0:38:44reporting we had that was not being declassified,
0:38:44 > 0:38:47and in some cases has never been declassified,
0:38:47 > 0:38:49was in the background of people's thinking here.
0:38:49 > 0:38:52No single report ever takes you to certainty,
0:38:52 > 0:38:56but it's the kind of report that strengthened the broadly-held
0:38:56 > 0:38:58conviction that Saddam had WMD.
0:39:08 > 0:39:11What you will see is an accumulation of facts
0:39:11 > 0:39:13and disturbing patterns of behaviour.
0:39:13 > 0:39:16The facts and Iraq's behaviour show that Saddam Hussein
0:39:16 > 0:39:20and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more
0:39:20 > 0:39:22weapons of mass destruction.
0:39:22 > 0:39:25The Secretary of State presented America's case,
0:39:25 > 0:39:27complete with visual aids.
0:39:27 > 0:39:30Less than a teaspoon of dried anthrax -
0:39:30 > 0:39:33a little bit, about this amount...
0:39:33 > 0:39:36America's vast resources of intelligence gathering
0:39:36 > 0:39:38were displayed before the world.
0:39:38 > 0:39:42You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters
0:39:42 > 0:39:45issuing an instruction to an officer in the field.
0:39:45 > 0:39:50Whether this proved Saddam still had active WMD was open to dispute.
0:39:50 > 0:39:53This is part and parcel of a policy of evasion
0:39:53 > 0:39:56and deception that goes back 12 years.
0:39:56 > 0:40:00Their conversation took place just last week, on January 30th.
0:40:17 > 0:40:20TRANSLATION
0:40:47 > 0:40:51Thousands of troops were deploying to the Middle East.
0:40:51 > 0:40:53The chance of avoiding war was shrinking.
0:40:56 > 0:41:01The military worried that if you go through this huge deployment
0:41:01 > 0:41:04and months go by and then you get into the summer
0:41:04 > 0:41:07and it's too hot to contemplate military action
0:41:07 > 0:41:09and you bring people home...
0:41:09 > 0:41:12This idea that you would keep marching up the hill,
0:41:12 > 0:41:16then marching back down again was very unpalatable to them.
0:41:19 > 0:41:23One weekend in February, huge anti-war demonstrations
0:41:23 > 0:41:25were held in 60 countries.
0:41:46 > 0:41:49In London, about one million people took to the streets -
0:41:49 > 0:41:52the largest demonstration in British history.
0:41:56 > 0:41:59We all knew a lot of people on the demonstration -
0:41:59 > 0:42:01I mean, you know, family and friends.
0:42:01 > 0:42:06This was a very, very difficult day. Tony was pretty quiet.
0:42:06 > 0:42:11I mean, he knew this was kind of his people in a sense, this was,
0:42:11 > 0:42:15this was watching party supporters and government supporters
0:42:15 > 0:42:17expressing really strong opposition.
0:42:19 > 0:42:22Blair worried that he could not persuade his people
0:42:22 > 0:42:25that action against Saddam was legal or justified
0:42:25 > 0:42:28without another resolution from the UN,
0:42:28 > 0:42:30this one explicitly authorising war.
0:42:36 > 0:42:37To get this decisive resolution,
0:42:37 > 0:42:40he had to win the support of President Bush.
0:42:42 > 0:42:45When Prime Minister Blair showed up, he was asking us to do
0:42:45 > 0:42:51a second resolution, and most of us thought that was not a good idea.
0:42:51 > 0:42:53They said, "Look, we agree with you -
0:42:53 > 0:42:55"we go down the UN route in November,
0:42:55 > 0:42:57"we gave him a final opportunity, he's not taken it,
0:42:57 > 0:43:00"we've got a huge force stacked up, ready to go,
0:43:00 > 0:43:02"and there's a limit to how far we can... You know,
0:43:02 > 0:43:06"the only cooperation we're getting is because that force is there.
0:43:06 > 0:43:07"If you delay and delay
0:43:07 > 0:43:10"and delay, you know, he'll just slip through our fingers again."
0:43:10 > 0:43:12The nation expected we were going to act,
0:43:12 > 0:43:15the Congress had already voted and so forth,
0:43:15 > 0:43:18and we go back to the UN for another resolution,
0:43:18 > 0:43:19it looked like a sign of weakness.
0:43:19 > 0:43:21It was very hard for President Bush.
0:43:21 > 0:43:25He had already pulled his system down the UN route,
0:43:25 > 0:43:28but I thought it was important politically still to do it.
0:43:28 > 0:43:30The President decided
0:43:30 > 0:43:35if Tony Blair needed it for political purposes at home,
0:43:35 > 0:43:40it was important for us to go the extra mile for our ally.
0:43:44 > 0:43:47The previous UN resolution, which had led Saddam to readmit
0:43:47 > 0:43:50weapons inspectors, had passed unanimously.
0:43:52 > 0:43:55But some members of the Security Council now worried
0:43:55 > 0:43:57that America was rushing into war.
0:43:59 > 0:44:01TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH
0:44:20 > 0:44:24France, as a permanent member of the Security Council,
0:44:24 > 0:44:25could veto the resolution.
0:44:27 > 0:44:28So could Russia.
0:44:31 > 0:44:33Russia's leader, Vladimir Putin,
0:44:33 > 0:44:37was invited to Paris for a tete-a-tete with President Chirac.
0:44:44 > 0:44:48TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH
0:44:58 > 0:45:02Putin and Chirac agreed they would vote against the war unless
0:45:02 > 0:45:06the UN weapons inspectors were given time to finish their mission.
0:45:19 > 0:45:23On 6th March, the French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin
0:45:23 > 0:45:26had dinner in New York with Colin Powell.
0:46:05 > 0:46:10"Dominique, ne sous-estimez pas notre determination."
0:46:10 > 0:46:16"Dominique, please don't underestimate our determination."
0:46:17 > 0:46:21Three days later, the French President startled the world.
0:46:55 > 0:46:59A French "no" meant the UN resolution could not pass...
0:47:01 > 0:47:05..but, without a second resolution, many of Tony Blair's supporters
0:47:05 > 0:47:06thought war would be illegal.
0:47:08 > 0:47:12We undertook this strategy which was, in a sense, to expose him
0:47:12 > 0:47:13to the wrath of the voters
0:47:13 > 0:47:16and, particularly, I think, people who probably had been sympathetic
0:47:16 > 0:47:19to him most of the time he'd been Prime Minister.
0:47:19 > 0:47:22You've said since 1997 that there's no money for education,
0:47:22 > 0:47:24there's no money for decent hospitals
0:47:24 > 0:47:27but there's a bottomless pit when it comes to war.
0:47:27 > 0:47:30Is this what a Labour Party Prime Minister should be doing?
0:47:30 > 0:47:33You are attacking Iraq with George Bush,
0:47:33 > 0:47:36and it's not dissimilar to what Bin Laden
0:47:36 > 0:47:40or the al-Qaeda network done to America.
0:47:40 > 0:47:43They killed 3,000 or more innocent victims.
0:47:43 > 0:47:46How many innocent victims are you going to kill
0:47:46 > 0:47:48and how many people are going to suffer?
0:47:48 > 0:47:49APPLAUSE
0:47:49 > 0:47:52He was pretty livid when he came back, I mean, and, you know,
0:47:52 > 0:47:54he very, very rarely lost it,
0:47:54 > 0:47:56he, just, he's not that sort of person
0:47:56 > 0:47:59but he did give us a pretty hard time when he came back.
0:48:02 > 0:48:05Whips estimated almost half of Labour MPs
0:48:05 > 0:48:09would either vote against Blair or abstain if he backed the Americans
0:48:09 > 0:48:11without the legal cover of a second resolution.
0:48:13 > 0:48:15Tony Blair met Jack Straw.
0:48:15 > 0:48:18I said to Tony, "They are determined to go ahead
0:48:18 > 0:48:20"with this military action, come what may,
0:48:20 > 0:48:22"and there is a grave danger
0:48:22 > 0:48:25"that the only regime change that takes place
0:48:25 > 0:48:27"could be here in this room."
0:48:27 > 0:48:29I said, "Jack, I know that, I mean, I don't,
0:48:29 > 0:48:31"you know, I'm aware of how tough it is
0:48:31 > 0:48:33"and how much opposition there's going to be to it."
0:48:35 > 0:48:38President Bush called Tony Blair.
0:48:38 > 0:48:41Morning, Tony, how are you?
0:48:41 > 0:48:43The President says to him,
0:48:43 > 0:48:46"I know you've got this difficult vote in Parliament.
0:48:46 > 0:48:49"I would rather have you drop out of the coalition
0:48:49 > 0:48:54"and keep you...head of your government as an ally,
0:48:54 > 0:48:58"than have you try to stay in the coalition and lose your government."
0:48:58 > 0:49:00I think he was genuinely trying to reach out to me,
0:49:00 > 0:49:03in a situation of political difficulty, and I made it clear -
0:49:03 > 0:49:07if it was the right thing to do, I wanted my country to be part of it,
0:49:07 > 0:49:09and, you know, I meant what I said
0:49:09 > 0:49:11about standing shoulder to shoulder with the US,
0:49:11 > 0:49:14and I would prefer to have gone and left as Prime Minister,
0:49:14 > 0:49:17than to have backed out on the basis
0:49:17 > 0:49:19that it was too politically difficult.
0:49:22 > 0:49:24My fellow citizens...
0:49:25 > 0:49:28..events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision.
0:49:28 > 0:49:34'Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours...
0:49:35 > 0:49:39'..their refusal to do so will result in military conflict,
0:49:39 > 0:49:42'commenced at a time of our choosing.'
0:49:51 > 0:49:54'The Prime Minister will find out very shortly
0:49:54 > 0:49:55'just how many Labour MPs'
0:49:55 > 0:49:58have rejected his policy on war with Iraq.
0:49:58 > 0:50:02Tonight will pass into history as one of the key political moments
0:50:02 > 0:50:03in the lifetime of most of us.
0:50:03 > 0:50:05And the stakes could barely be higher -
0:50:05 > 0:50:08the Prime Minister warning his party he will not want to lead it
0:50:08 > 0:50:10if they do not back the war.
0:50:10 > 0:50:14In the frantic last-minute lobbying for votes,
0:50:14 > 0:50:16Jack Straw used a tried and trusted tactic...
0:50:16 > 0:50:18blame the French.
0:50:19 > 0:50:22One of the major arguments I made to Labour MPs
0:50:22 > 0:50:25was that it was the French who had,
0:50:25 > 0:50:29literally, forced us into this position of having to go to war
0:50:29 > 0:50:32because if we'd have got that second resolution,
0:50:32 > 0:50:34there would have been an ultimatum
0:50:34 > 0:50:37backed by the promise of military action,
0:50:37 > 0:50:39if Saddam had not cooperated.
0:50:39 > 0:50:41And, at that point, he would have cooperated, in my view.
0:50:41 > 0:50:43Some of it became completely ludicrous,
0:50:43 > 0:50:46so you'd see the same MP for the fourth time,
0:50:46 > 0:50:49who had a different excuse, if you like, each time,
0:50:49 > 0:50:52about why he or she could not make the decision yet,
0:50:52 > 0:50:56or had to go and take soundings from the constituency chairman again,
0:50:56 > 0:51:00or whatever, or indeed one finally said to us,
0:51:00 > 0:51:04"I've got to go and talk to my mother," who it turned out was dead.
0:51:05 > 0:51:09BLAIR: This is not the time to falter,
0:51:09 > 0:51:12this is the time for this House, not just this government,
0:51:12 > 0:51:16or indeed this Prime Minister, but for this House to give a lead.
0:51:16 > 0:51:18To show at the moment of decision
0:51:18 > 0:51:21that we have the courage to do the right thing.
0:51:21 > 0:51:23I beg to move the motion.
0:51:23 > 0:51:25ALL SHOUT
0:51:29 > 0:51:31The Commons voted for war -
0:51:31 > 0:51:35almost two-thirds of Labour MPs backed Tony Blair.
0:51:39 > 0:51:4327 hours remained before George Bush's ultimatum expired.
0:51:45 > 0:51:47Saddam summoned his military commanders.
0:53:22 > 0:53:26More than 200,000 allied troops were now massing on Iraq's borders.
0:53:37 > 0:53:40It was now Wednesday March 19th.
0:53:40 > 0:53:43The President's deadline was just six hours away.
0:53:45 > 0:53:47'It's about two o'clock in the afternoon.
0:53:47 > 0:53:50'None of us had had lunch, I hadn't even had breakfast.'
0:53:50 > 0:53:53George Tenet bursts through my door, our offices were connected.
0:53:53 > 0:53:57We had an intel report that came in, that said Saddam,
0:53:57 > 0:53:59that it looked like preparations were being made
0:53:59 > 0:54:02for a senior level meeting at Dora Farms,
0:54:02 > 0:54:05and the odds were that Saddam was going to be there.
0:54:07 > 0:54:10The CIA had got three members of Saddam's security team
0:54:10 > 0:54:12to spy for them.
0:54:12 > 0:54:15They were now at Dora Farms, on the banks of the Tigris River,
0:54:15 > 0:54:18one of Saddam's palaces.
0:54:18 > 0:54:21They were sending information directly from the palace
0:54:21 > 0:54:24to the CIA's head of Iraq Operations.
0:54:26 > 0:54:27Our problem is, we don't have a set time.
0:54:27 > 0:54:29Saddam does not keep a schedule -
0:54:29 > 0:54:33one of his survival techniques is unpredictability -
0:54:33 > 0:54:35but, based on what we do understand,
0:54:35 > 0:54:38we believe he will probably be there anywhere between 1 and 3am,
0:54:38 > 0:54:41and the odds are, he will be gone before the sun rises.
0:54:41 > 0:54:45This is perhaps an opportunity to decapitate the regime
0:54:45 > 0:54:47and avoid a major war.
0:54:47 > 0:54:48It'd be over.
0:54:48 > 0:54:50And at that point, adrenaline takes over.
0:54:50 > 0:54:52We jump into our black Suburbans,
0:54:52 > 0:54:54race down the road to the White House.
0:54:55 > 0:54:58I'm grilled by members of the cabinet,
0:54:58 > 0:54:59"How good is the information?"
0:54:59 > 0:55:01As we're doing this, intelligence is starting to flow,
0:55:01 > 0:55:04more reporting is coming into the situation room,
0:55:04 > 0:55:07and they bring it in, they give it to me, I start looking at it,
0:55:07 > 0:55:09and it starts to change, and shape the picture.
0:55:09 > 0:55:12John McLaughlin and I are on our knees at a coffee table
0:55:12 > 0:55:13with maps spread out,
0:55:13 > 0:55:16trying to take what's coming in from intelligence channels
0:55:16 > 0:55:17that's a narrative.
0:55:17 > 0:55:20We can probably even guess which rooms he may be in,
0:55:20 > 0:55:21in this farm complex.
0:55:21 > 0:55:25The President's, of course, nightmare is that we conduct
0:55:25 > 0:55:29a military strike, it's actually a disinformation campaign
0:55:29 > 0:55:32and we hit a school bus loaded with children -
0:55:32 > 0:55:33and that's how the war begins.
0:55:33 > 0:55:37Not a good way to begin a major military operation.
0:55:37 > 0:55:41Then the President kicked everybody out except me. He asked me to stay,
0:55:41 > 0:55:43and then turned to me, and asked me,
0:55:43 > 0:55:46and said, "Dick, what do you think we should do?"
0:55:46 > 0:55:53And I, basically, recommended that I thought we should take the chance
0:55:53 > 0:55:55that, in fact, Saddam might be there,
0:55:55 > 0:56:00and that it would be a quick, and easy way
0:56:00 > 0:56:02to bring the conflict to an end,
0:56:02 > 0:56:05if, in fact, we could eliminate him in the first hour.
0:56:08 > 0:56:12The President decided to strike as soon as his deadline expired.
0:56:22 > 0:56:26'The initial intelligence reports are encouraging.'
0:56:26 > 0:56:29We're told that somebody who looks like Saddam Hussein
0:56:29 > 0:56:32has been removed from the rubble.
0:56:32 > 0:56:36He's blue, and the thought is, maybe this has worked.
0:56:36 > 0:56:41But subsequent reports are less encouraging
0:56:41 > 0:56:45and whoever that was, that was taken out from the, from the rubble,
0:56:45 > 0:56:47it was not Saddam Hussein,
0:56:47 > 0:56:53and this last-ditch effort to head off a war has regrettably failed.
0:56:57 > 0:57:01In Baghdad, General Hamdani asked for an urgent meeting
0:57:01 > 0:57:03with Saddam's son, Qusay.
0:57:42 > 0:57:45At 5.30 in the morning, Iraqi time,
0:57:45 > 0:57:49the coalition launched a massive air and land attack on Iraq.
0:57:50 > 0:57:52War had begun.
0:58:01 > 0:58:04EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE
0:58:06 > 0:58:08'You all right?'
0:58:08 > 0:58:11No, man, no. This is a bad day!
0:58:11 > 0:58:12In the next episode...
0:58:14 > 0:58:16..how America and Britain quickly won the war...
0:58:20 > 0:58:22..but lost the peace.
0:58:25 > 0:58:27I said to the President,
0:58:27 > 0:58:29"This is going to be more like a marathon than a sprint.
0:58:29 > 0:58:30"It's going to take time."
0:58:30 > 0:58:33Fixing a country is not something you do overnight.
0:58:33 > 0:58:37MEN CHANT AND SINGING
0:58:37 > 0:58:41Imagine, now we are running a country which has nothing.
0:58:41 > 0:58:45It has no army, no police, no money. Nothing, nothing at all!
0:58:45 > 0:58:48MEN CHANT
0:59:13 > 0:59:16Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd