0:00:02 > 0:00:06This programme contains scenes which some viewers may find upsetting
0:00:06 > 0:00:12Three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, America still had 130,000 troops in Iraq.
0:00:15 > 0:00:18Our strategy can be summed up this way.
0:00:18 > 0:00:22As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.
0:00:26 > 0:00:32But by the summer of 2006, President Bush's plan was looking hopeless.
0:00:38 > 0:00:42His top Iraq adviser got a call from a friend in Baghdad.
0:00:42 > 0:00:46She said, "If the Americans leave, we will descend into,
0:00:46 > 0:00:48"you know, mass killings and violence.
0:00:48 > 0:00:53"So please, please, please make sure that the Americans stay.
0:00:53 > 0:00:55"It is the only thing keeping us alive."
0:00:55 > 0:00:58The President then gathered his Iraq team.
0:00:58 > 0:01:00The President turned to me and he said,
0:01:00 > 0:01:03"Our strategy's not working, Hadley. We need a new strategy."
0:01:03 > 0:01:07My basic concern was that it was important that we not just walk away.
0:01:07 > 0:01:11That we had to win, that we had to have a victory.
0:01:11 > 0:01:15Their hopes rested on Iraq's new Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki.
0:01:16 > 0:01:18The President said very clearly,
0:01:18 > 0:01:20"We need to help him. I need to help him.
0:01:20 > 0:01:23"He's never led a country before, he's certainly never led a country
0:01:23 > 0:01:26"in this difficult and challenging a time."
0:01:39 > 0:01:42But the Americans would soon begin to question
0:01:42 > 0:01:46whether Maliki was the solution or part of the problem.
0:02:02 > 0:02:06Baghdad, a year before Nouri Maliki became Prime Minister.
0:02:10 > 0:02:12Iraq's capital had long been home
0:02:12 > 0:02:15to members of the two biggest Muslim sects.
0:02:15 > 0:02:17The Sunnis...and the Shia.
0:02:20 > 0:02:22Abu Abed, a Sunni,
0:02:22 > 0:02:25had been a military intelligence officer under Saddam.
0:02:26 > 0:02:31In August 2005, his family were targeted by a Shia death squad.
0:02:48 > 0:02:52Under Saddam's regime, the Shia majority had been oppressed.
0:02:53 > 0:02:55Now they were in control.
0:02:55 > 0:02:59Militias operated freely from government ministries.
0:03:19 > 0:03:22His brother was taken away...and killed.
0:04:18 > 0:04:21Sunni politicians called on the government
0:04:21 > 0:04:24to stop killing their people.
0:04:24 > 0:04:29The Prime Minister, Ibrahim Jaafari, a Shia, said they weren't.
0:04:29 > 0:04:33The only Sunnis they were targeting were the extremists of Al-Qaeda.
0:04:48 > 0:04:52Al-Qaeda in Iraq set out to destroy the Shia-led government.
0:04:54 > 0:04:57Their first step was to provoke a civil war.
0:05:03 > 0:05:06A huge Al-Qaeda bomb ripped apart
0:05:06 > 0:05:09one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam.
0:05:09 > 0:05:11The Al-Askari Mosque.
0:05:11 > 0:05:14The target was well chosen.
0:05:14 > 0:05:18It was bound to provoke Shia militias to retaliate against the Sunnis.
0:05:18 > 0:05:20CHANTING
0:05:27 > 0:05:30I went to Prime Minister Jaafari with the Ambassador and said,
0:05:30 > 0:05:33"Prime Minister, this is a significant situation
0:05:33 > 0:05:38"and it requires your...the immediate action of your government
0:05:38 > 0:05:42"to resolve. And we strongly recommend that you apply a curfew."
0:05:52 > 0:05:56Prime Minister Jaafari, the head of a Shia religious party,
0:05:56 > 0:05:59did not dare clamp down on his fellow Shia.
0:06:00 > 0:06:04It was clear to me that he was under enormous pressure
0:06:04 > 0:06:06er...from his constituents,
0:06:06 > 0:06:11er...and that things had gone too far,
0:06:11 > 0:06:16the government had been ineffective in protecting the Shia population.
0:06:16 > 0:06:18What Prime Minister Jaafari expressed to me was
0:06:18 > 0:06:24that this is a significant attack on the Shia population of Iraq
0:06:24 > 0:06:30and that they needed to let off steam, in his words.
0:06:42 > 0:06:45Revenge attacks against Sunnis began that night.
0:06:56 > 0:06:57After hundreds of deaths,
0:06:57 > 0:07:00the Prime Minister finally ordered the curfew.
0:07:15 > 0:07:19Jaafari's hesitation had already led him into political difficulties.
0:07:19 > 0:07:22Following elections, he was struggling to put together
0:07:22 > 0:07:23a new coalition government.
0:07:26 > 0:07:28For ten weeks, the Americans had been waiting.
0:07:28 > 0:07:31The President phoned his British ally.
0:07:33 > 0:07:37President Bush and I discussed how to make progress in circumstances
0:07:37 > 0:07:40where it was obvious that the present Prime Minister,
0:07:40 > 0:07:43whatever his merits, didn't have the executive capacity
0:07:43 > 0:07:46to really drive through the changes necessary.
0:07:46 > 0:07:50The President really put his foot down and said,
0:07:50 > 0:07:53"We've bet on a lame horse long enough
0:07:53 > 0:07:56"and we have to try to find an alternative to Jaafari."
0:07:59 > 0:08:02If Prime Minister Jaafari could be persuaded to stand aside,
0:08:02 > 0:08:05another leader could be chosen from among the Shia parties
0:08:05 > 0:08:07that had won the election.
0:08:12 > 0:08:15Condi and I decided we need to find a moment
0:08:15 > 0:08:18to go and pay Doctor Jaafari a fraternal visit.
0:08:20 > 0:08:23Britain's Foreign Secretary wasn't taking any chances.
0:08:24 > 0:08:26We were the occupying powers.
0:08:26 > 0:08:29We were the postcolonial imperialists
0:08:29 > 0:08:33trying to remove a democratically elected Prime Minister,
0:08:33 > 0:08:36albeit for good reason, but that's what we were doing.
0:08:36 > 0:08:37So this was tough stuff.
0:08:37 > 0:08:40It is not my responsibility
0:08:40 > 0:08:42or the responsibility of Secretary Straw
0:08:42 > 0:08:45to determine who is going to be the Prime Minister of Iraq.
0:08:45 > 0:08:47That can only be determined by Iraqis.
0:08:48 > 0:08:51But in private, Secretary Rice
0:08:51 > 0:08:54would use all her diplomatic skills on Jaafari.
0:08:54 > 0:08:56She was quite effective.
0:08:56 > 0:08:58I thought she praised him
0:08:58 > 0:09:01for being one of the initial leaders of Iraq,
0:09:01 > 0:09:04Father of...of...of a new Iraq.
0:09:04 > 0:09:06And that he had done great things
0:09:06 > 0:09:09in terms of what he had achieved already.
0:09:29 > 0:09:33I talked to Jaafari, as it were, politician to politician,
0:09:33 > 0:09:35and said this was a rough game of politics,
0:09:35 > 0:09:39but if you didn't have majority support, you had to go.
0:09:39 > 0:09:42That he needed to think about the fact that he had,
0:09:42 > 0:09:44plainly, in our judgement, lost confidence
0:09:44 > 0:09:46and couldn't sustain a government.
0:10:08 > 0:10:10As it happens, the United States and the United Kingdom
0:10:10 > 0:10:12are the people who are delivering
0:10:12 > 0:10:15whatever security your people have got here,
0:10:15 > 0:10:17and putting in the money.
0:10:17 > 0:10:20So we're very, very sorry, but our judgement is
0:10:20 > 0:10:23that you cannot sustain a democratically-elected government,
0:10:23 > 0:10:26you're going to have to move aside for somebody who can.
0:10:28 > 0:10:30Jaafari grudgingly gave in.
0:10:41 > 0:10:44Jaafari would have to be succeeded by another Shia leader.
0:10:46 > 0:10:52But many of them had been exiled for years in neighbouring Iran.
0:10:52 > 0:10:54The Americans wanted a Prime Minister
0:10:54 > 0:10:57who would not be the pawn of their biggest enemy in the Middle East.
0:11:00 > 0:11:03The number two from Jaafari's party, Nouri Maliki,
0:11:03 > 0:11:06caught the Americans' eye.
0:11:06 > 0:11:10Maliki was really a pretty unknown quantity.
0:11:10 > 0:11:15But we did know that he had spent his time in Syria rather than Iran
0:11:15 > 0:11:17during the period of Saddam Hussein,
0:11:17 > 0:11:20and that was a source of some reassurance.
0:11:21 > 0:11:23Nouri Maliki got the nod.
0:11:58 > 0:12:00We're encouraged by the formation of the unity government
0:12:00 > 0:12:04and we recognise our responsibility to help that new government.
0:12:04 > 0:12:07Whatever we do will be toward a strategy of victory.
0:12:07 > 0:12:09Thank you.
0:12:09 > 0:12:12President Bush gathered his senior advisors at Camp David
0:12:12 > 0:12:15to discuss whether the new Iraqi government
0:12:15 > 0:12:18needed a new American strategy.
0:12:18 > 0:12:22General Casey, the Commander in Iraq, joined by video link.
0:12:24 > 0:12:26We'd hear from Casey in Baghdad
0:12:26 > 0:12:31and there was a desire to wrap it up as quickly as possible
0:12:31 > 0:12:35and pass over responsibility to the Iraqis
0:12:35 > 0:12:38and for us to get out.
0:12:38 > 0:12:41I said the longer we stayed in Iraq in force,
0:12:41 > 0:12:45the more the Iraqis relied on us to solve their problems.
0:12:45 > 0:12:49And the less they did to resolve their problems.
0:12:49 > 0:12:52We would have to draw down to win.
0:12:52 > 0:12:55I thought at that point that was too soon.
0:12:55 > 0:12:56My basic concern was
0:12:56 > 0:12:59that it was important that we not just walk away.
0:12:59 > 0:13:01That we had to win. That we had to have a victory
0:13:01 > 0:13:05and we had to leave behind a stable, democratically-elected government
0:13:05 > 0:13:08with an adequately trained and sized force.
0:13:08 > 0:13:13President Bush seemed less concerned with the debate over strategy,
0:13:13 > 0:13:15more with who was going to implement it.
0:13:16 > 0:13:19The President focused on the importance of Maliki
0:13:19 > 0:13:21right from the get-go.
0:13:21 > 0:13:23And one of the things he said was,
0:13:23 > 0:13:25"This man's never led a country before,
0:13:25 > 0:13:29"never led a country facing the challenges that Iraq faces.
0:13:29 > 0:13:32"We've got to help him succeed. I've got to help him succeed.
0:13:32 > 0:13:37"I've got to help him learn how to lead his country.
0:13:37 > 0:13:40"Because, in the end of the day, we can't succeed
0:13:40 > 0:13:42"without Maliki succeeding in Iraq."
0:13:45 > 0:13:46Bush had a plan.
0:13:46 > 0:13:49First, he dismissed his team for the night.
0:13:51 > 0:13:55Secret Service obviously played a major role in the whole operation.
0:13:55 > 0:13:59I think Condi knew, probably Rumsfeld knew, as well, too,
0:13:59 > 0:14:04um...that the President was going to sneak out from Camp David.
0:14:09 > 0:14:13The next morning, when they all convened again
0:14:13 > 0:14:15and looked around for the President,
0:14:15 > 0:14:20he popped up on a video screen courtesy of Baghdad.
0:14:20 > 0:14:23I've come to not only look you in the eye,
0:14:23 > 0:14:27er...I've also come to tell you
0:14:27 > 0:14:31that when America gives its word, it will keep its word.
0:14:31 > 0:14:35The President really enjoyed the joke he had played on his cabinet.
0:14:35 > 0:14:37Yes, he...he got a big kick out of it.
0:14:37 > 0:14:42The problem was he had completely defeated the objective we had,
0:14:42 > 0:14:47beginning discussions within the US team about a new strategy.
0:14:48 > 0:14:51To Bush, what mattered now was to back Maliki.
0:14:52 > 0:14:55But Maliki was in a precarious position.
0:14:55 > 0:14:59Other leaders were much more popular amongst his fellow Shia.
0:15:01 > 0:15:03Especially here.
0:15:03 > 0:15:07The Baghdad slum of Sadr City was home to three million Shia.
0:15:07 > 0:15:10And it was the heartland of the most active Shia militia.
0:15:11 > 0:15:13Their leader was Muqtada al-Sadr.
0:15:25 > 0:15:29Al-Sadr had won a huge following among Shia throughout Iraq
0:15:29 > 0:15:31with his fierce opposition to American occupation.
0:15:43 > 0:15:46Sadr's political wing had won enough seats in parliament
0:15:46 > 0:15:49to make or break Maliki's governing coalition.
0:15:52 > 0:15:55A few days after Maliki became Prime Minister,
0:15:55 > 0:15:58the Americans targeted Sadr's militia.
0:16:00 > 0:16:04Their operation would provide the first test of Maliki's leadership.
0:16:05 > 0:16:08We had an operation in Sadr City where we employed a gunship
0:16:08 > 0:16:10that shoots grenades the size of your fist.
0:16:10 > 0:16:12It makes...sounds pretty loud.
0:16:12 > 0:16:14GUNFIRE
0:16:16 > 0:16:19And the Prime Minister was upset about that
0:16:19 > 0:16:23because they called me and said, "They're bombing Sadr City."
0:16:26 > 0:16:28SHOUTING
0:16:38 > 0:16:43And so what he asked me to do is not to conduct any attacks in Sadr City
0:16:43 > 0:16:45against particular individuals.
0:16:45 > 0:16:48And I think we had a list of 10 or a dozen individuals
0:16:48 > 0:16:53that we would not target without his approval.
0:16:53 > 0:16:56Maliki's approval would also be required
0:16:56 > 0:16:59for operations in Muqtada's strongholds.
0:17:01 > 0:17:05Only days later, General Casey needed such approval.
0:17:05 > 0:17:07He took the Prime Minister a video
0:17:07 > 0:17:09recorded by a US drone plane over Sadr City.
0:17:11 > 0:17:15We had the computer and we sat the computer right down on the table in front of him,
0:17:15 > 0:17:17sat him down and said, "Push the button."
0:17:17 > 0:17:20I said, "Prime Minister, you need to see this."
0:17:44 > 0:17:46The American drone tracked the killers
0:17:46 > 0:17:48to a local base of Muqtada al-Sadr.
0:17:49 > 0:17:52I said, "Prime Minister, we need to go into this facility tonight."
0:17:53 > 0:17:56They're probably going to use this time
0:17:56 > 0:17:59to clear out any evidence out of the facility
0:17:59 > 0:18:02and anything we do after this is probably going to be too late.
0:18:13 > 0:18:16He had said to us, "Don't do the military thing.
0:18:16 > 0:18:19"Let me do it, deal with it politically,
0:18:19 > 0:18:21"because they are my friends, they will listen to me."
0:18:21 > 0:18:24They decided it was too volatile
0:18:24 > 0:18:28and that he didn't want us to conduct any operations there.
0:18:28 > 0:18:31And the Ambassador and I thought to ourselves,
0:18:31 > 0:18:32"This is not a very good start."
0:18:32 > 0:18:35SIRENS WAIL
0:18:35 > 0:18:38A few weeks later, all hell broke loose.
0:18:40 > 0:18:42The Battle for Baghdad began.
0:18:47 > 0:18:52Al-Qaeda attacked the Shia in Sadr City with a car bomb, killing 62.
0:18:55 > 0:18:57SHOUTING
0:19:02 > 0:19:05A week later, Shia militia in another neighbourhood
0:19:05 > 0:19:08set up checkpoints to identify Sunnis.
0:19:10 > 0:19:13And they killed 50.
0:19:13 > 0:19:14RAPID GUNFIRE
0:19:15 > 0:19:17In mixed neighbourhoods,
0:19:17 > 0:19:19Shia militias drove Sunnis from their homes.
0:19:33 > 0:19:37Networks of local Sunni fighters joined the battle.
0:19:54 > 0:19:56Militias sometimes gave notice.
0:20:12 > 0:20:17By the end of July, 1,855 Baghdad residents had been killed.
0:20:22 > 0:20:26Extremist factions were taking control of the streets.
0:20:26 > 0:20:29Muqtada's Mahdi army on the Shia side
0:20:29 > 0:20:31and Al-Qaeda on the Sunni side.
0:20:34 > 0:20:37Hoping to break the cycle of retribution,
0:20:37 > 0:20:40the Americans asked Maliki's National Security Advisor
0:20:40 > 0:20:42to use his influence with the Shia militia.
0:20:43 > 0:20:46They didn't get the answer they'd hoped for.
0:20:46 > 0:20:52I told General Casey that some of the Shia community felt that
0:20:52 > 0:20:55the Shia militia
0:20:55 > 0:21:00were fulfilling their duty and protecting them.
0:21:00 > 0:21:04I said that it was the Shia militia and death squads
0:21:04 > 0:21:08that were murdering civilians in Baghdad,
0:21:08 > 0:21:10and the area around Baghdad,
0:21:10 > 0:21:13that was the most dangerous long-term threat.
0:21:13 > 0:21:16Well, George, the Shia militia
0:21:16 > 0:21:19is fighting Al-Qaeda in some of these districts.
0:21:21 > 0:21:26Wouldn't it be better if we leave these two fight
0:21:26 > 0:21:31and...and the winner from that fight
0:21:31 > 0:21:33will be much weaker,
0:21:33 > 0:21:36and we can deal with that
0:21:36 > 0:21:40weak winner much easier.
0:21:41 > 0:21:43It was at that time I realised
0:21:43 > 0:21:48that we had a significantly different view of the threat.
0:21:50 > 0:21:53President Bush had promised that invading Iraq
0:21:53 > 0:21:56would improve the lives of its people.
0:21:56 > 0:21:59He had yet to realise that the violence now gripping the country
0:21:59 > 0:22:02had left that goal in ruins.
0:22:02 > 0:22:05But a routine briefing with his top Iraq adviser
0:22:05 > 0:22:08would change everything.
0:22:08 > 0:22:09The President said to Meghan,
0:22:09 > 0:22:11knowing that she had spent several years in Baghdad
0:22:11 > 0:22:13and had lots of contacts in Iraq,
0:22:13 > 0:22:17"What are your, what are your, what do your friends tell you
0:22:17 > 0:22:19"the situation in Iraq is like?"
0:22:19 > 0:22:24I said, "Mr President, it's hell. Baghdad is hell.
0:22:24 > 0:22:28"This place is a cauldron. It is consumed with killing."
0:22:28 > 0:22:32This was one of his people who is committed to the Iraqi project
0:22:32 > 0:22:38saying to him, "Mr President, we're on the verge of failure."
0:22:41 > 0:22:45The American public were clamouring to bring their boys home.
0:22:45 > 0:22:48But the national security advisor suggested to the President
0:22:48 > 0:22:51he take a gigantic risk.
0:22:51 > 0:22:54Send more troops in.
0:22:54 > 0:22:58A surge of thousands of additional American troops to Baghdad
0:22:58 > 0:23:00might stem the violence.
0:23:01 > 0:23:03Bush hesitated.
0:23:03 > 0:23:07He wasn't sure he could trust the Iraqi Prime Minister.
0:23:07 > 0:23:09It was really this issue.
0:23:09 > 0:23:13Is he a sectarian with a sectarian agenda?
0:23:13 > 0:23:16Is he a non-sectarian,
0:23:16 > 0:23:17an agenda for all of Iraq,
0:23:17 > 0:23:20but simply does not have the means to deliver?
0:23:22 > 0:23:24Bush went to find out for himself.
0:23:30 > 0:23:33He knew that he was going to put Maliki on the spot.
0:23:33 > 0:23:35He set out to charm him.
0:24:03 > 0:24:05Before Bush could get serious,
0:24:05 > 0:24:08the Iraqis offered up their own plan to end the violence.
0:24:09 > 0:24:13We call it the Prime Minister Maliki Baghdad Security Plan.
0:24:15 > 0:24:18And we believe that was a very good plan
0:24:18 > 0:24:22because what the basic, er...principle in that
0:24:22 > 0:24:27is for the American troops to pull back to their barracks
0:24:27 > 0:24:32and to leave the streets and the communities for us.
0:24:34 > 0:24:38But President Bush wasn't ready to trust Maliki to do it alone.
0:24:38 > 0:24:42He revealed his own plan - the surge.
0:24:42 > 0:24:45The President said, "I'd be willing to deploy
0:24:45 > 0:24:47"tens of thousands of additional US forces
0:24:47 > 0:24:49"to help you control your country.
0:24:49 > 0:24:52"But only if I have a commitment from you on a series of things."
0:24:52 > 0:24:55First and foremost among them was that
0:24:55 > 0:24:57we could not have political interference
0:24:57 > 0:25:00into the targeting of the most extreme cells
0:25:00 > 0:25:04of the Shia militia groups. And that was really number one.
0:25:04 > 0:25:06Because we were not going to deploy US forces
0:25:06 > 0:25:11to babysit as Shia militias took over the streets of Baghdad.
0:25:32 > 0:25:33The President said,
0:25:33 > 0:25:38"I know I'm asking you to do something very hard here.
0:25:38 > 0:25:42"But I can tell you I'm about to do something very hard.
0:25:42 > 0:25:46"I, as President of the United States, am about to increase troops
0:25:46 > 0:25:50"when the whole country thinks I'm about to reduce the troops."
0:25:50 > 0:25:54This then called down credit on a bank account
0:25:54 > 0:25:58that the President had been investing in all these many months
0:25:58 > 0:26:02in developing a strong personal relationship with Maliki.
0:26:03 > 0:26:07Maliki accepted the Americans' conditions.
0:26:07 > 0:26:09Bush could now make his gamble public.
0:26:09 > 0:26:12His last throw at achieving victory in Iraq.
0:26:14 > 0:26:16America will change our strategy
0:26:16 > 0:26:18to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign
0:26:18 > 0:26:20to put down sectarian violence
0:26:20 > 0:26:24and bring security to the people of Baghdad.
0:26:24 > 0:26:28This will require increasing American force levels.
0:26:28 > 0:26:31So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq.
0:26:34 > 0:26:37The new troops would also have a new boss -
0:26:37 > 0:26:39General David Petraeus.
0:26:39 > 0:26:42I give you my full support and wish you Godspeed.
0:26:43 > 0:26:47The American General's first mission would be an awkward one.
0:26:47 > 0:26:51While his 20,000 new troops prepared to go into Iraq,
0:26:51 > 0:26:55Britain's 7,000 troops were preparing to pull out
0:26:55 > 0:26:57from Iraq's southern province, Basra.
0:27:02 > 0:27:04General Petraeus would have to change
0:27:04 > 0:27:06the British Prime Minister's mind.
0:27:06 > 0:27:09I said the justification for keeping large numbers of troops in Basra
0:27:09 > 0:27:13was a lot less than the justification
0:27:13 > 0:27:15for surging the American troops in Baghdad,
0:27:15 > 0:27:19which is where the bulk of the terrorism was happening.
0:27:19 > 0:27:22What I sought to do, frankly, was just to remind him
0:27:22 > 0:27:26of a very important dynamic, which was coalition will.
0:27:26 > 0:27:28And at a time when we were trying to demonstrate
0:27:28 > 0:27:30to the enemies on the ground
0:27:30 > 0:27:33that this coalition will is unshakable,
0:27:33 > 0:27:35that to have the number two partner in this,
0:27:35 > 0:27:39the most important partner for the United States to initiate a drawdown
0:27:39 > 0:27:43would send a very confusing message.
0:27:43 > 0:27:46I remember David Petraeus saying to me,
0:27:46 > 0:27:51"Look, you know, we understand why the situation in Basra is different,
0:27:51 > 0:27:55"why it's sensible for the British to draw down their troops,
0:27:55 > 0:27:58"but right at the moment we surge is not the moment to do it."
0:27:58 > 0:28:02Statement, the Prime Minister.
0:28:02 > 0:28:03Tony Blair backed down.
0:28:05 > 0:28:08The UK military presence will continue into 2008,
0:28:08 > 0:28:11for as long as we are wanted and have a job to do.
0:28:15 > 0:28:17General Petraeus flew onto Iraq
0:28:17 > 0:28:20after the bloodiest month of the entire war.
0:28:21 > 0:28:26Each day in January, more than 100 civilians were killed.
0:28:26 > 0:28:30Even within institutions whose job was to preserve human life.
0:28:32 > 0:28:34The Ministry of Health was known as
0:28:34 > 0:28:39a very, very dangerous organisation in the grip of Shia militia leaders,
0:28:39 > 0:28:41to the point that Sunni Arabs,
0:28:41 > 0:28:44if they checked into a hospital because they were injured,
0:28:44 > 0:28:48feared they might not get out again, except through the morgue.
0:28:48 > 0:28:50The Ministry of Health was controlled
0:28:50 > 0:28:53by a founder member of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia.
0:28:53 > 0:28:56And militiamen were inside with him.
0:29:15 > 0:29:19Petraeus asked the Prime Minister to dismiss the Deputy Health Minister.
0:29:19 > 0:29:22But this was a step that could lead Muqtada al-Sadr
0:29:22 > 0:29:25to withdraw his backing of the government.
0:29:25 > 0:29:27Maliki asked Petraeus to help him out.
0:29:28 > 0:29:33He said, "Could you arrest the Deputy Minister of Health?"
0:29:33 > 0:29:36And I thought this was a mistranslation.
0:29:36 > 0:29:38I mean, think of a Prime Minister in the UK
0:29:38 > 0:29:44asking a coalition commander to arrest one of HIS deputy ministers.
0:29:44 > 0:29:47And that's what, in fact, Prime Minister Maliki wanted.
0:29:50 > 0:29:51The Minister was arrested.
0:29:53 > 0:29:57But it did not halt the sectarian cleansing that was sweeping Baghdad.
0:29:59 > 0:30:01A city of mainly mixed neighbourhoods
0:30:01 > 0:30:05had been transformed into Shia and Sunni enclaves.
0:30:07 > 0:30:09The Shia gained the most territory.
0:30:14 > 0:30:18Petraeus decided to send his troops to live in warring neighbourhoods
0:30:18 > 0:30:20to separate the rival factions.
0:30:22 > 0:30:25But that alone would not be enough.
0:30:25 > 0:30:27He also needed a political solution.
0:30:27 > 0:30:31So he ordered his British number two, General Graeme Lamb,
0:30:31 > 0:30:33to look among the enemy
0:30:33 > 0:30:37to find some who might be persuaded to stop fighting.
0:30:37 > 0:30:42If your brother, your sister or your uncle or your aunt...
0:30:42 > 0:30:47you know, spent his last days chained to a chair...
0:30:47 > 0:30:51being Black & Deckered to death...
0:30:51 > 0:30:56then that person's going to have a pretty unreasonable damned attitude
0:30:56 > 0:30:59to, "Oh, let's be reasonable here, peace will prevail.
0:30:59 > 0:31:01"Just give peace a chance."
0:31:01 > 0:31:05But it doesn't mean that they're naturally irreconcilable
0:31:05 > 0:31:08or just lost to humanity.
0:31:08 > 0:31:12General Lamb would not only have to win over his enemies.
0:31:12 > 0:31:16Some of the American commanders were almost as reluctant.
0:31:16 > 0:31:20I said, "Hey, listen. This is the level of anger that is out there.
0:31:20 > 0:31:25"And if we do not check this and quickly,
0:31:25 > 0:31:28"we will not get it back."
0:31:28 > 0:31:31As he was initially walking me through this
0:31:31 > 0:31:34and said, "We need to reconcile with some of these people," I said,
0:31:34 > 0:31:37"I will not reconcile or it will be difficult for me to reconcile
0:31:37 > 0:31:39"with anybody with blood on their hands."
0:31:39 > 0:31:42Oh, I turned around and said, "We've both got blood...
0:31:42 > 0:31:44"you know, we...we...we're covered in blood.
0:31:44 > 0:31:47"You know, we're both hurting.
0:31:47 > 0:31:50"And we're both guilty.
0:31:50 > 0:31:54"But if you discard those who have been fighting against us
0:31:54 > 0:31:57"from an opportunity to dialogue,
0:31:57 > 0:32:00"then the truth is, this can't work."
0:32:01 > 0:32:05The Generals agreed to look for insurgents they could talk to.
0:32:06 > 0:32:08What Al-Qaeda did next
0:32:08 > 0:32:10would inadvertently provide the opportunity.
0:32:12 > 0:32:16In the spring of 2007, they greeted the American surge
0:32:16 > 0:32:21with a counteroffensive of suicide attacks and roadside bombs.
0:32:24 > 0:32:26In one Baghdad neighbourhood,
0:32:26 > 0:32:29they killed seven US troops with a single bomb.
0:32:29 > 0:32:32SHOUTING AND GUNFIRE
0:32:34 > 0:32:36While I was out at the site,
0:32:36 > 0:32:41another patrol got hit, this time consisting of four tanks.
0:32:41 > 0:32:44So there was a huge fight going on in Ameriya at this time.
0:32:46 > 0:32:48The district Ameriya
0:32:48 > 0:32:52was Al-Qaeda's most important stronghold in the capital.
0:32:52 > 0:32:54They had gained control of the area
0:32:54 > 0:32:58by protecting local Sunnis from Shia violence.
0:32:58 > 0:33:02But they had turned it into the capital of their own Islamic state,
0:33:02 > 0:33:04where they imposed strict religious law.
0:33:06 > 0:33:10For one local leader, himself a Sunni, it had gone too far.
0:33:44 > 0:33:46Abu Abed decided it was time
0:33:46 > 0:33:48to reclaim the neighbourhood from Al-Qaeda.
0:33:50 > 0:33:53A colleague told the US area commander.
0:33:54 > 0:33:57He said, "We're going to attack Al-Qaeda tomorrow.
0:33:57 > 0:34:01"We need to do this. This needs to be the people of Ameriya."
0:34:01 > 0:34:03So I told him, "OK.
0:34:03 > 0:34:08"Do not point your weapons at my soldiers,
0:34:08 > 0:34:11"do not point your weapons at any civilians.
0:34:11 > 0:34:14"If you do, we'll kill you."
0:34:14 > 0:34:17And then I wished him good luck.
0:34:23 > 0:34:25RAPID GUNFIRE
0:34:43 > 0:34:45Abu Abed's men celebrated.
0:34:45 > 0:34:47RAPID GUNFIRE
0:34:51 > 0:34:53Too soon.
0:34:53 > 0:34:55SHOUTING
0:34:57 > 0:34:59The next day, Al-Qaeda counter-attacked
0:34:59 > 0:35:02and drove the locals back to a single isolated mosque.
0:35:12 > 0:35:14GUNFIRE
0:35:32 > 0:35:35RAPID GUNFIRE
0:35:37 > 0:35:39The cavalry had arrived.
0:35:39 > 0:35:42US 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry.
0:35:46 > 0:35:47The rescue of the local Sunnis
0:35:47 > 0:35:51was the opportunity the Americans had been looking for.
0:35:51 > 0:35:56They began negotiations to organise and pay Abu Abed's fighters.
0:35:56 > 0:36:00In return, the Sunnis would maintain local security
0:36:00 > 0:36:03and keep Al-Qaeda out.
0:36:03 > 0:36:07Within months, tens of thousands of Sunnis throughout Baghdad
0:36:07 > 0:36:09were on the US Government payroll.
0:36:11 > 0:36:13Local Iraqis are throwing in with us,
0:36:13 > 0:36:15and that's something that we have to build on.
0:36:15 > 0:36:17There is some momentum
0:36:17 > 0:36:20and its something we have to capitalise on now
0:36:20 > 0:36:23and make the most of while we have all of our forces here.
0:36:26 > 0:36:28General Petraeus asked Prime Minister Maliki
0:36:28 > 0:36:32to incorporate the volunteers into the Iraqi security forces.
0:36:32 > 0:36:36But the Shia leader was suspicious of the former Sunni insurgents.
0:36:58 > 0:37:01He expressed what can only charitably be termed as
0:37:01 > 0:37:03very significant reservations.
0:37:19 > 0:37:21The main argument we used was,
0:37:21 > 0:37:24"Look, we've expended a lot of effort
0:37:24 > 0:37:27"to take these guys out of the fight.
0:37:27 > 0:37:29"You don't want to push them back into it."
0:37:40 > 0:37:41In case they were double-crossed,
0:37:41 > 0:37:44the Americans had recorded the recruits' DNA,
0:37:44 > 0:37:47fingerprints and retina scans.
0:37:48 > 0:37:50It paid off.
0:37:50 > 0:37:52The young men who were sort of the foot soldiers
0:37:52 > 0:37:55who would plant an IED for 50...
0:37:56 > 0:37:58..they started coming over to our side.
0:37:58 > 0:38:01And they knew who was behind what was going on.
0:38:01 > 0:38:03So it increased our intelligence,
0:38:03 > 0:38:05increased the effectiveness of our targeting
0:38:05 > 0:38:07and brought security to the area.
0:38:07 > 0:38:09GUNFIRE
0:38:10 > 0:38:12Armed with this intelligence,
0:38:12 > 0:38:15US forces went after Al-Qaeda's hardcore.
0:38:17 > 0:38:23In September 2007, sectarian killing finally began to slow.
0:38:28 > 0:38:32Maliki agreed to incorporate 20% of the Sunni volunteers
0:38:32 > 0:38:34into Iraq's security forces.
0:38:36 > 0:38:39But he also took a tighter hold of those forces.
0:38:41 > 0:38:45He took charge of appointing senior officers.
0:38:45 > 0:38:47And the country's elite Special Forces
0:38:47 > 0:38:50would now report directly to him.
0:38:51 > 0:38:55Maliki was at last providing strong leadership.
0:38:55 > 0:38:57But the Shia Prime Minister
0:38:57 > 0:39:00had yet to confront the power of the Shia militias.
0:39:04 > 0:39:08In early 2008, Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army
0:39:08 > 0:39:11delivered a challenge that Maliki could not ignore.
0:39:13 > 0:39:16They took control in Iraq's southern capital, Basra,
0:39:16 > 0:39:19after the British forces there finally left.
0:39:19 > 0:39:22SHOUTING
0:39:32 > 0:39:36Most of Iraq's oil exports flow through Basra,
0:39:36 > 0:39:37the country's only port.
0:39:39 > 0:39:41Whoever controlled the city
0:39:41 > 0:39:44controlled over 70% of Iraq's revenue.
0:39:45 > 0:39:49Prime Minister Maliki was prepared to risk everything for Basra.
0:39:51 > 0:39:56On 22nd March, the Prime Minister summoned General Petraeus.
0:39:56 > 0:39:58The General was in for a surprise.
0:40:00 > 0:40:03He said he was going to move to Basra himself
0:40:03 > 0:40:07with his principle ministers and his own security brigade,
0:40:07 > 0:40:11and he was ordering four Iraqi brigades down there immediately
0:40:11 > 0:40:15to deal with situation in...in Basra.
0:40:39 > 0:40:42I said, "Prime Minister, you know, whenever I've briefed you before,
0:40:42 > 0:40:46"We always had what we call the setting, the conditions phase of the operation.
0:40:46 > 0:40:49"We move the attack helicopters, the predators,
0:40:49 > 0:40:53"the close air support aircraft,
0:40:53 > 0:40:56"the medical evacuation, logistics, you name it,
0:40:56 > 0:40:59"it all has to be moved down to support your forces."
0:41:08 > 0:41:14Dave was there, er... called me immediately and said, you know,
0:41:14 > 0:41:15"Oh, my God!"
0:41:56 > 0:41:59Maliki had called the Mahdi army criminals
0:41:59 > 0:42:01and said they would be arrested.
0:42:01 > 0:42:03Al-Sadr told him to get out of town.
0:42:22 > 0:42:25Muqtada's Mahdi army quickly repelled Maliki's forces.
0:42:34 > 0:42:37They showered rockets and mortars on Maliki himself,
0:42:37 > 0:42:39holed up in the Presidential palace.
0:42:47 > 0:42:51General Petraeus and I were communicating with the Prime Minister by cell phone
0:42:51 > 0:42:53huddled in my office and suggesting at one point
0:42:53 > 0:42:58that, um...perhaps the wisest thing to do
0:42:58 > 0:43:01would be to declare a victory, um...
0:43:01 > 0:43:05and, um...reposition, reconsolidate his forces
0:43:05 > 0:43:07before he lost them all.
0:43:14 > 0:43:18I said, "Prime Minister, you've got into a desperate situation.
0:43:18 > 0:43:23"You could lose. The militia, these gangs, these criminals
0:43:23 > 0:43:25"could actually defeat your forces."
0:43:56 > 0:43:59In Washington, President Bush was warned
0:43:59 > 0:44:01that Maliki's forces were losing.
0:44:01 > 0:44:04I had in my hand a series of maps
0:44:04 > 0:44:07which showed that the Iraqi army units in Basra
0:44:07 > 0:44:09at the time were surrounded,
0:44:09 > 0:44:12unable to resupply and surrounded by militias.
0:44:12 > 0:44:16There was some questioning about whether there should be whole-hearted support
0:44:16 > 0:44:20for someone who had taken such a rash decision.
0:44:20 > 0:44:24But George Bush had no such doubts.
0:44:24 > 0:44:27The President came charging from behind his desk and said,
0:44:27 > 0:44:28"Don't tell me this is a bad thing."
0:44:28 > 0:44:33And the President said, "This is the Iraqis stepping up.
0:44:33 > 0:44:36"We need to ensure that Maliki succeeds."
0:44:36 > 0:44:39So, turning to the military,
0:44:39 > 0:44:43"Your job, General, is not to get him to come back,
0:44:43 > 0:44:46"your job is to get a team over there that helps him succeed."
0:44:47 > 0:44:50The Iraqis had no air power.
0:44:50 > 0:44:54Petraeus ordered attack helicopters and armed drones down to Basra.
0:45:03 > 0:45:05Maliki took control of the city.
0:45:07 > 0:45:09Now he seized the opportunity
0:45:09 > 0:45:12to present Muqtada al-Sadr with an ultimatum.
0:45:12 > 0:45:15Give up his militia or his political movement.
0:45:28 > 0:45:31Muqtada called a permanent ceasefire.
0:45:31 > 0:45:33It looked like the end of the Mahdi army
0:45:33 > 0:45:36and a stunning victory for the Prime Minister.
0:45:39 > 0:45:42Now the Americans had helped Maliki vanquish
0:45:42 > 0:45:44both his Shia and Sunni foes,
0:45:44 > 0:45:47he reckoned he could go it alone.
0:45:47 > 0:45:50He told President Bush he wanted a firm date
0:45:50 > 0:45:52for the withdrawal of US troops.
0:45:53 > 0:45:55The President threw his hands in the air and said,
0:45:55 > 0:45:59"A year ago, we were complaining that Maliki is too weak,
0:45:59 > 0:46:02"now we're complaining that he's too strong."
0:46:05 > 0:46:08The President gave Maliki what he wanted.
0:46:08 > 0:46:09The agreement lays out a framework
0:46:09 > 0:46:12for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq.
0:46:12 > 0:46:17A withdrawal that is possible because of the success of the surge.
0:46:20 > 0:46:22INDISTINCT SHOUTS
0:46:29 > 0:46:32OK, everybody calm down for a minute.
0:46:32 > 0:46:35Bush left as he had come.
0:46:35 > 0:46:38Not quite understanding the country he had liberated.
0:46:39 > 0:46:44If you want the facts, it's a size 10 shoe that he threw!
0:47:02 > 0:47:04Despite the embarrassment,
0:47:04 > 0:47:07Maliki had fixed a date for the Americans to go home.
0:47:09 > 0:47:13But had his triumph come at too high a cost for his countrymen?
0:47:16 > 0:47:18Maliki's political opponents
0:47:18 > 0:47:21argued that he had begun to destroy Iraq's democracy.
0:47:24 > 0:47:27As the next election approached, they claimed that he was using
0:47:27 > 0:47:31the police and intelligence services against them.
0:47:43 > 0:47:46Led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi,
0:47:46 > 0:47:48they formed a coalition
0:47:48 > 0:47:51of 10 secular and Sunni parties called Iraqiya.
0:47:53 > 0:47:57They ran as the non-religious, non-sectarian opponents to Maliki.
0:47:58 > 0:48:03It was clear to me that the country is going out of the way
0:48:03 > 0:48:07and the political process is being compromised completely.
0:48:10 > 0:48:14In February 2010, just weeks before the election,
0:48:14 > 0:48:1866 of Iraqiya's candidates were disqualified.
0:48:18 > 0:48:20The allegation against them
0:48:20 > 0:48:23was that they had ties to the former regime of Saddam Hussein.
0:48:26 > 0:48:29We don't know how to appeal.
0:48:29 > 0:48:31We sent the letter to the court,
0:48:31 > 0:48:35but we don't have a way to defend ourself.
0:48:35 > 0:48:39Saleh Mutlaq, one of the first Sunni leaders
0:48:39 > 0:48:42to take the risk of working with Shia governments,
0:48:42 > 0:48:43was himself among the accused.
0:49:04 > 0:49:07Next, Mutlaq was accused of supporting terrorism.
0:49:38 > 0:49:41Despite the intimidation of their candidates,
0:49:41 > 0:49:44Iraqiya won two seats more than Maliki.
0:49:44 > 0:49:45MUSIC BLARES
0:49:49 > 0:49:51Maliki refused to accept the result.
0:50:06 > 0:50:10He demanded a recount, but failed to realise
0:50:10 > 0:50:14how independent the Independent Electoral Commission actually was.
0:50:26 > 0:50:30The two sides signed an agreement to share power.
0:50:30 > 0:50:33Maliki would continue as Prime Minister.
0:50:33 > 0:50:36Iraqiya would get three of the government's top posts,
0:50:36 > 0:50:40including the Deputy Prime Ministership for Saleh Mutlaq.
0:50:42 > 0:50:46Some checks on Maliki's exercise of power were also agreed.
0:50:47 > 0:50:50At least that was the theory.
0:50:50 > 0:50:52I said to Maliki that, er...
0:50:52 > 0:50:55"You embark on the power sharing
0:50:55 > 0:50:57"and implement the agreement,
0:50:57 > 0:51:01"and then we will be one party, one side, one team."
0:51:02 > 0:51:08Unfortunately, he never implemented ultimately the power sharing.
0:51:08 > 0:51:11SHOUTING
0:51:11 > 0:51:15Within three months, thousands of protestors took to the streets.
0:51:21 > 0:51:24Angry crowds tried to storm government buildings.
0:51:24 > 0:51:26CHANTING
0:51:26 > 0:51:28GUNFIRE
0:51:36 > 0:51:38Maliki's forces killed 23 protestors.
0:51:43 > 0:51:47Over the following months, more than 600 Sunni were arrested,
0:51:47 > 0:51:50as was the head of the Electoral Commission.
0:51:52 > 0:51:55All under the authority of the man Maliki had appointed
0:51:55 > 0:51:59as acting Interior Minister - himself.
0:52:09 > 0:52:12The Prime Minister insisted he was simply responding
0:52:12 > 0:52:16to the terrorism Iraq continued to face.
0:52:16 > 0:52:19He blamed some Sunni opposition leaders.
0:52:35 > 0:52:39MILITARY BAND PLAYS TAPS
0:52:44 > 0:52:48The new US administration backed the Prime Minister.
0:52:49 > 0:52:55In December 2011, President Obama invited Maliki to Washington
0:52:55 > 0:52:57to mark the end of the Americans' mission in Iraq.
0:53:00 > 0:53:04Today I'm proud to welcome Prime Minister Maliki,
0:53:04 > 0:53:07the elected leader of a sovereign,
0:53:07 > 0:53:11self-reliant and democratic Iraq.
0:53:11 > 0:53:15The Prime Minister leads Iraq's most inclusive government yet.
0:53:34 > 0:53:37The Deputy Prime Minister, back in Baghdad,
0:53:37 > 0:53:39could stand it no longer.
0:53:39 > 0:53:44It is a one-party show and one-man show. Yes.
0:53:44 > 0:53:48Al-Maliki is the most dictator
0:53:48 > 0:53:51we have ever seen in our history.
0:54:05 > 0:54:07Two days later, Deputy Prime Minister Mutlaq
0:54:07 > 0:54:09had some unexpected visitors.
0:54:26 > 0:54:29The Iraqiya people called me and they said,
0:54:29 > 0:54:33"There is a wave of arrests and tanks are surrounding us."
0:54:33 > 0:54:37An elite army unit, commanded by Maliki's son,
0:54:37 > 0:54:42was pointing its guns at three of Iraqiya's top leaders.
0:54:42 > 0:54:44Maliki said it was part of a judicial investigation
0:54:44 > 0:54:46of one of them,
0:54:46 > 0:54:50the Sunni Vice President, Tariq Hashimi.
0:55:07 > 0:55:11The new director of the CIA flew to Baghdad.
0:55:12 > 0:55:14I went in to see Prime Minister Maliki.
0:55:14 > 0:55:18He would rightly point out that these were legal arrest warrants
0:55:18 > 0:55:21that were issued to the police and executed.
0:55:21 > 0:55:24Er...but frankly, there were no arrest warrants
0:55:24 > 0:55:27for the Shia militia bodyguards,
0:55:27 > 0:55:30of the Shia politicians who had plenty of blood on their hands,
0:55:30 > 0:55:37so it seemed as if this was an exclusively Sunni, er...affliction
0:55:37 > 0:55:40visited on them by a Shia-predominant government.
0:55:41 > 0:55:45The leadership of Iraqiya met at the house of the Vice President,
0:55:45 > 0:55:48still surrounded by armoured vehicles.
0:56:04 > 0:56:07The meeting was very tense.
0:56:07 > 0:56:08The tanks were obvious outside.
0:56:10 > 0:56:14And you could see that, er...the body language
0:56:14 > 0:56:18that, er...democracy is finished in the country.
0:56:18 > 0:56:21You could see it, you could read it in the eyes.
0:56:31 > 0:56:36The Vice President Tariq Hashimi left the country, fearing arrest.
0:56:36 > 0:56:40In his absence, he was found guilty of orchestrating murder
0:56:40 > 0:56:42and sentenced to death five times.
0:56:44 > 0:56:48Maliki's government continued to target Iraqiya.
0:56:49 > 0:56:54The bodyguards of key members were arrested one after another.
0:56:54 > 0:56:55They were interrogated
0:56:55 > 0:57:00and confessed to crimes implicating their bosses in terrorism.
0:57:00 > 0:57:03One of the bodyguards died in custody.
0:57:20 > 0:57:23Sunni demonstrations continued to grow.
0:57:23 > 0:57:25SHOUTING
0:57:25 > 0:57:28Maliki again sent in the troops.
0:57:28 > 0:57:30SHOUTING AND GUNFIRE
0:57:39 > 0:57:43Sunni extremists started to attack police and army units.
0:57:45 > 0:57:50April 2013 should have been a time of celebration.
0:57:50 > 0:57:54It was ten years since Saddam had been defeated.
0:57:54 > 0:57:59Instead, that month, Iraqis buried more than 700 victims
0:57:59 > 0:58:02of sectarian violence. The worst in five years.
0:58:03 > 0:58:06And Maliki banned journalists from Al Jazeera
0:58:06 > 0:58:09and nine other television channels.
0:58:14 > 0:58:20In 2003, the Americans and British achieved their main objective.
0:58:20 > 0:58:22Getting rid of Saddam Hussein.
0:58:25 > 0:58:28More than 170,000 have since been killed.
0:58:31 > 0:58:36The new Iraq is hardly what the liberators had in mind.
0:59:02 > 0:59:05Subtitles by Red Bee Media Ltd