0:00:05 > 0:00:11It was just before 7.30 on the morning of the 1st of July, 1916.
0:00:11 > 0:00:14Along a 25-mile battlefront in northern France,
0:00:14 > 0:00:16British and French troops were ready
0:00:16 > 0:00:18to embark on an offensive they'd been told
0:00:18 > 0:00:23would be a walkover, and hasten the end of the First World War.
0:00:25 > 0:00:27The Battle of the Somme was about to begin.
0:00:33 > 0:00:35When the whistle sounded at zero hour,
0:00:35 > 0:00:39tens of thousands strode confidently towards their enemy.
0:00:41 > 0:00:45Facing them was an outnumbered and outgunned German army
0:00:45 > 0:00:47that British commanders believed
0:00:47 > 0:00:51had already been shattered and demoralised by monstrous shellfire.
0:00:53 > 0:00:55But there was no walkover.
0:00:55 > 0:00:58And the loss and suffering on this day, and in the months to come,
0:00:58 > 0:01:01has made the Somme a symbol of a senseless slaughter.
0:01:03 > 0:01:07At its sombre close months later, the casualty count, those killed,
0:01:07 > 0:01:10wounded and missing, would far exceed a million.
0:01:12 > 0:01:14So what exactly happened here,
0:01:14 > 0:01:16and why?
0:01:17 > 0:01:19My name is Peter Barton.
0:01:19 > 0:01:21For over three decades as a writer,
0:01:21 > 0:01:23broadcaster and battlefield archaeologist,
0:01:23 > 0:01:26I've come to know the Somme intimately.
0:01:27 > 0:01:30But during those years I've grown ever more uneasy
0:01:30 > 0:01:31about the battle's history,
0:01:31 > 0:01:35because the overwhelming majority of accounts have been written
0:01:35 > 0:01:39from an almost exclusively British perspective.
0:01:39 > 0:01:41The German experience -
0:01:41 > 0:01:44their strategy, habits, tactics and character -
0:01:44 > 0:01:48all this has been practically ignored.
0:01:48 > 0:01:53For 100 years, we've told ourselves a self-serving story.
0:01:55 > 0:01:57So to commemorate the centenary of the battle,
0:01:57 > 0:02:01this series will look at history from both sides of the wire,
0:02:01 > 0:02:03giving the Germans an equal voice
0:02:03 > 0:02:06through the medium of their own remarkable archives.
0:02:09 > 0:02:12Here lie mountains of maps, diaries, reports, plans,
0:02:12 > 0:02:16records of interrogations and captured documents.
0:02:16 > 0:02:19We might find things here which we don't like -
0:02:19 > 0:02:22they might be distasteful, they might be deeply troubling.
0:02:22 > 0:02:23And there ARE things like that.
0:02:23 > 0:02:26But we have to know that, otherwise we have faulty history,
0:02:26 > 0:02:29and that is no good to anybody at all.
0:02:31 > 0:02:34These archives provide fresh evidence
0:02:34 > 0:02:36for why the campaign lasted so long,
0:02:36 > 0:02:39and why there was carnage on such a scale.
0:02:39 > 0:02:41And these unique compelling sources
0:02:41 > 0:02:44will lead me to what may be for some
0:02:44 > 0:02:47uncomfortable conclusions.
0:02:47 > 0:02:48Most importantly,
0:02:48 > 0:02:51there was no British or French victory on the Somme.
0:02:51 > 0:02:54Rather, the Germans fought a defensive campaign
0:02:54 > 0:02:56of such resolve and flexibility
0:02:56 > 0:03:00that the Allies could find no effective response,
0:03:00 > 0:03:03and that campaign was founded on a tactical revolution
0:03:03 > 0:03:08that would prolong the war itself beyond all expectations.
0:03:08 > 0:03:11But the Germans were greatly assisted by British recklessness
0:03:11 > 0:03:13and foolhardiness.
0:03:14 > 0:03:19And what went so disastrously wrong did so from the very start.
0:03:54 > 0:03:57The week leading up to the first day of fighting saw the longest
0:03:57 > 0:04:00and heaviest bombardment in military history.
0:04:05 > 0:04:09By the summer of 1916, the British and French were operating under
0:04:09 > 0:04:14the maxim, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies."
0:04:16 > 0:04:21Five days of intense shellfire would destroy enemy shelters,
0:04:21 > 0:04:24trenches and protecting barbed wire.
0:04:24 > 0:04:28Surprise was not part of the plan.
0:04:39 > 0:04:41The scene in this valley was typical.
0:04:41 > 0:04:45The German trenches lie one- and-a-half miles beyond the ridge.
0:04:45 > 0:04:47Hidden from hostile eyes,
0:04:47 > 0:04:50British and French guns crouch in every hollow,
0:04:50 > 0:04:51in every fold in the ground,
0:04:51 > 0:04:56in every ruin, in every wood, in every copse, behind every hedge.
0:04:56 > 0:05:00All along the battlefront, in the seven days before the 1st of July,
0:05:00 > 0:05:031,500 guns of all calibres -
0:05:03 > 0:05:06that's a four-to-one advantage over the enemy -
0:05:06 > 0:05:11fire an astonishing 1.5 million shells.
0:05:19 > 0:05:22The Allied purpose was unambiguous -
0:05:22 > 0:05:26the long planned for elimination of all enemy resistance.
0:05:28 > 0:05:32The German medical officer, Stefan Westmann, trying desperately to
0:05:32 > 0:05:36survive and save others, it was a hell on earth.
0:05:38 > 0:05:41"Often we found bodies crushed to pulp,
0:05:41 > 0:05:44"or bunks full of suffocated soldiers.
0:05:44 > 0:05:47"The drum fire never ceased, no food or water reached us.
0:05:49 > 0:05:52"Down below, men became hysterical."
0:06:01 > 0:06:03Day after day the howling shells
0:06:03 > 0:06:05cultivated ever greater British optimism
0:06:05 > 0:06:07about the approaching clash.
0:06:07 > 0:06:11The infantry were reassured by both the incessant crash of the guns,
0:06:11 > 0:06:13and the confidence of their officers.
0:06:13 > 0:06:15It would be straightforward, they said.
0:06:15 > 0:06:18A leisurely mopping up of the few remaining Germans alive.
0:06:22 > 0:06:26On the evening of the 30th of June, after a postponement of two days
0:06:26 > 0:06:27because of poor weather,
0:06:27 > 0:06:32battalion after battalion of excited but apprehensive men
0:06:32 > 0:06:34walked down avenues like this,
0:06:34 > 0:06:39ready to take up their positions at the front for the following morning.
0:06:42 > 0:06:45Confident, too, was the commander-in-chief
0:06:45 > 0:06:47of British and imperial forces,
0:06:47 > 0:06:48General Sir Douglas Haig,
0:06:48 > 0:06:51who had established his personal quarters here
0:06:51 > 0:06:53at the Chateau do Beaurepaire.
0:06:53 > 0:06:58Haig knew the Allies enjoyed a daunting superiority in men, guns,
0:06:58 > 0:07:00shells and aircraft.
0:07:00 > 0:07:01And as a devout Christian,
0:07:01 > 0:07:04his faith also gave him the conviction
0:07:04 > 0:07:07that a higher power was on his side.
0:07:07 > 0:07:11On the eve of battle, Haig wrote in his diary,
0:07:11 > 0:07:15"Preparations were never so thorough, nor troops better trained.
0:07:15 > 0:07:18"The wire has never been so well cut,
0:07:18 > 0:07:20"nor the artillery preparation so thorough.
0:07:20 > 0:07:23"The men are in splendid spirits.
0:07:23 > 0:07:25"I have personally seen all the corps commanders,
0:07:25 > 0:07:28"and one and all are full of confidence.
0:07:28 > 0:07:30"With God's help, I feel hopeful."
0:07:32 > 0:07:36Perhaps the commander-in-chief would have been less buoyant had he known
0:07:36 > 0:07:40that for months, the Germans had been intercepting British telephone
0:07:40 > 0:07:45conversations, and knew a great deal about his army and their intentions.
0:07:46 > 0:07:48My research in the German archives
0:07:48 > 0:07:51provides the stunning revelation that they did this
0:07:51 > 0:07:53by using a machine called a Moritz.
0:07:55 > 0:07:58On the Somme front there were ten underground listening stations
0:07:58 > 0:08:01manned day and night.
0:08:01 > 0:08:06By intercepting careless enemy telephone calls, a mass of vital
0:08:06 > 0:08:08intelligence on deployments,
0:08:08 > 0:08:11garrison strengths, arrivals and departures,
0:08:11 > 0:08:15codes, tactics and weaponry, tumbled into German hands.
0:08:17 > 0:08:20What they did not know, however, even on the eve of battle,
0:08:20 > 0:08:24was the exact moment of Allied assault.
0:08:24 > 0:08:28But then Moritz Station 28, at La Boisselle, came up trumps.
0:08:28 > 0:08:32In the early morning of the 1st of July, it intercepted two calls that
0:08:32 > 0:08:34indicated the assault was imminent.
0:08:40 > 0:08:43But what were British ambitions this day?
0:08:43 > 0:08:45How did their commanders plan to achieve them?
0:08:45 > 0:08:49And how was the Somme part of the wider Allied strategy
0:08:49 > 0:08:52to win the war?
0:08:52 > 0:08:5512 miles behind the Somme battlefront, the British 4th Army,
0:08:55 > 0:08:57tasked by Haig to achieve the breakthrough,
0:08:57 > 0:09:01had set up its headquarters at the Chateau de Querrieu.
0:09:01 > 0:09:04Here, its commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson,
0:09:04 > 0:09:07spent months refining battle plans.
0:09:07 > 0:09:11The grim chronicle of Allied endeavours in France and Belgium
0:09:11 > 0:09:13to date informed his every decision.
0:09:20 > 0:09:23Since its outbreak in August 1914,
0:09:23 > 0:09:26the war had been fought in Europe on Eastern, Southern
0:09:26 > 0:09:28and Western Fronts.
0:09:31 > 0:09:32After a few short weeks,
0:09:32 > 0:09:36although the Allies halted the German advance on Paris,
0:09:36 > 0:09:40the nature of fighting in France and Belgium swiftly changed from one
0:09:40 > 0:09:44of almost frenetic movement, to one of mutual siege.
0:09:44 > 0:09:48Static trench warfare.
0:09:48 > 0:09:52In the next 12 months, every attempt to break that siege failed.
0:09:55 > 0:09:59After disastrous results on the battlefield in 1915,
0:09:59 > 0:10:02it was decided that the 1916 campaign
0:10:02 > 0:10:06should be a joint enterprise with Britain, France,
0:10:06 > 0:10:12Russia and Italy each launching huge offensives in their own
0:10:12 > 0:10:14theatres of war, almost simultaneously.
0:10:16 > 0:10:19On the 14th of February 1916, Sir Douglas Haig
0:10:19 > 0:10:22and French commander-in-chief, General Joseph Joffre,
0:10:22 > 0:10:25agreed that on the Western Front, a combined Anglo-French offensive
0:10:25 > 0:10:29should take place where their troops stood shoulder to shoulder,
0:10:29 > 0:10:32near the River Somme, in Picardy.
0:10:32 > 0:10:36As always, France would take the lead.
0:10:36 > 0:10:39But preparations were soon overtaken by events elsewhere.
0:10:44 > 0:10:47A week later, chief of the German general staff,
0:10:47 > 0:10:49Field Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn,
0:10:49 > 0:10:52launched his own offensive at Verdun,
0:10:52 > 0:10:55100 miles south of the Somme.
0:10:55 > 0:10:58The purpose was to bring France to her knees
0:10:58 > 0:11:02by draining the lifeblood of her army by attrition.
0:11:07 > 0:11:11As fighting continued through the spring into the summer
0:11:11 > 0:11:13Verdun devoured French resources,
0:11:13 > 0:11:18drawing in troops and weapons from every part of the Western Front.
0:11:20 > 0:11:23So a new plan for the Somme was drawn up with smaller French
0:11:23 > 0:11:27participation, and with the British in the lead.
0:11:27 > 0:11:31From Maricourt in the south, where the British linked with the French,
0:11:31 > 0:11:35to Gommecourt in the north, where a diversionary assault was planned,
0:11:35 > 0:11:38Haig became responsible for 15 miles of battlefront.
0:11:41 > 0:11:42What this now meant
0:11:42 > 0:11:45was that Britain's contribution to the Somme had changed,
0:11:45 > 0:11:46and changed radically.
0:11:46 > 0:11:49After for so long playing a supporting role,
0:11:49 > 0:11:55it was now the British task to potentially save France from defeat.
0:11:57 > 0:12:00On the eve of battle, all objectives had been set.
0:12:02 > 0:12:04The artillery, it was claimed,
0:12:04 > 0:12:07had completed their mission of devastation,
0:12:07 > 0:12:12and now it was up to the infantry to engulf the German lines
0:12:12 > 0:12:13and wreak havoc.
0:12:14 > 0:12:18We begin their story in the northern sector of Serre,
0:12:18 > 0:12:20with soldiers from the north of England.
0:12:27 > 0:12:29The British 31st Division
0:12:29 > 0:12:33were all volunteers from Lancashire and Yorkshire.
0:12:35 > 0:12:3918 months before, they'd answered Lord Kitchener's call
0:12:39 > 0:12:42to fight for King and country.
0:12:43 > 0:12:45They'd enlisted with friends and colleagues from the same cities,
0:12:45 > 0:12:48towns, villages and workplaces
0:12:48 > 0:12:50to form what were called "pals battalions".
0:12:56 > 0:12:59Trained, but entirely inexperienced in combat,
0:12:59 > 0:13:01most of these men had never seen a German,
0:13:01 > 0:13:04never mind had the opportunity to kill one.
0:13:04 > 0:13:09Now the time to face that sworn and sober duty had arrived.
0:13:20 > 0:13:24Zero hour, on zero day, was set for 7.30 in the morning.
0:13:33 > 0:13:35When the whistle signalled the attack,
0:13:35 > 0:13:38the pals were to follow 4th Army instructions.
0:13:38 > 0:13:42They must push forward at a steady pace in successive lines.
0:13:45 > 0:13:46WHISTLE BLOWS
0:13:46 > 0:13:47ARTILLERY FIRE
0:13:52 > 0:13:55Every man carried his 303 Lee Enfield rifle
0:13:55 > 0:13:59with 18 inches of honed and polished Sheffield steel attached.
0:13:59 > 0:14:00And also...
0:14:01 > 0:14:03..two Mills bombs.
0:14:03 > 0:14:05And being north country soldiers,
0:14:05 > 0:14:09they called these Co-op bombs because everybody got a bit.
0:14:11 > 0:14:14There were two critical stipulations in the operations orders -
0:14:14 > 0:14:17do not stop and shoot.
0:14:17 > 0:14:20Because that simply interrupted momentum.
0:14:20 > 0:14:22And do not charge.
0:14:22 > 0:14:27It was unnecessary because by the time they reached the German trenches,
0:14:27 > 0:14:29the Germans would be destroyed by the artillery.
0:14:36 > 0:14:38Charging would simply sap energy,
0:14:38 > 0:14:40for the essence of British tactics here,
0:14:40 > 0:14:42and along the entire battlefront,
0:14:42 > 0:14:46was for the infantry to break like a tidal wave upon the enemy
0:14:46 > 0:14:52and kill with bayonet, bomb, bullet, rifle butt and, if necessary, boot,
0:14:52 > 0:14:55until all German resistance had been erased.
0:15:00 > 0:15:04Captain Walter Eubank of the 1st Border Regiment issued a final,
0:15:04 > 0:15:06brutal instruction to his men.
0:15:06 > 0:15:10"It is either kill or be killed, I tell them.
0:15:10 > 0:15:12"And God help the loser.
0:15:12 > 0:15:16"Each man knows every vital point on the Bosch's body
0:15:16 > 0:15:18"and where to make for."
0:15:25 > 0:15:28At Serre, the pals walked across no-man's-land
0:15:28 > 0:15:32towards an enemy a mere 200 yards away.
0:15:32 > 0:15:34But, contrary to all British expectations,
0:15:34 > 0:15:37many Germans had survived the bombardment
0:15:37 > 0:15:40and were waiting for the Tommies to attack.
0:15:40 > 0:15:41They had scores to settle.
0:15:44 > 0:15:46And, unlike Kitchener's new army,
0:15:46 > 0:15:49these men were well-trained professional
0:15:49 > 0:15:51or semiprofessional soldiers,
0:15:51 > 0:15:54with long experience of combat on the Somme.
0:15:55 > 0:15:57I'm now standing on the German frontline,
0:15:57 > 0:16:01looking down the ridge to where the pals attacked from.
0:16:01 > 0:16:04It was a day, very similar to today - bright and sunny.
0:16:04 > 0:16:10What happened was, that the Germans here saw the pals forming up
0:16:10 > 0:16:13before the assault signal had been given by the British.
0:16:13 > 0:16:15The observers fired red rockets
0:16:15 > 0:16:18to signal their artillery to bring down a rain of shrapnel
0:16:18 > 0:16:20and high explosive.
0:16:20 > 0:16:21They sounded the alarm
0:16:21 > 0:16:24to bring up their soldiers from their underground dugouts
0:16:24 > 0:16:27with their machine guns, and two ranks of those machine guns,
0:16:27 > 0:16:28right down this ridge,
0:16:28 > 0:16:32cut down the pals as they walked across the slope,
0:16:32 > 0:16:35as a scythe cuts corn.
0:16:40 > 0:16:45The primary function of every German defender was simple -
0:16:45 > 0:16:49neutralise the enemy before he reached your trenches.
0:16:50 > 0:16:53This, machine-gunner Karl Blenk did.
0:16:55 > 0:16:57"We were very surprised to see them walking.
0:16:57 > 0:16:59"We'd never seen that before.
0:17:01 > 0:17:04"When we started firing, we just had to load and reload.
0:17:05 > 0:17:07"They went down in their hundreds.
0:17:09 > 0:17:11"You didn't have to aim, you just fired into them.
0:17:13 > 0:17:17"If only they had run, they would have overwhelmed us."
0:17:28 > 0:17:30Beyond faulty British tactics,
0:17:30 > 0:17:34what else might explain the carnage here and elsewhere?
0:17:34 > 0:17:35The reason, again,
0:17:35 > 0:17:39was prior knowledge and compromised British plans.
0:17:40 > 0:17:43In the German archives there is also disturbing evidence,
0:17:43 > 0:17:47not just of careless talk, but of habitual British spilling of beans.
0:17:51 > 0:17:55There are hundreds of files here recording the interrogations of,
0:17:55 > 0:17:59and conversations with, both British and French prisoners
0:17:59 > 0:18:04captured during patrols and raids prior to the Battle of the Somme.
0:18:04 > 0:18:09Now, each one of these men knew that he must tell the enemy only name,
0:18:09 > 0:18:12rank, number and regiment.
0:18:12 > 0:18:16But, almost every single one of them offers them a great deal more.
0:18:16 > 0:18:20There is, for example, the case of Captain Trevor Hamblin,
0:18:20 > 0:18:22captured on the 7th of May, 1916.
0:18:22 > 0:18:24He was in the Worcestershire Regiment.
0:18:24 > 0:18:26There are photographs of him here,
0:18:26 > 0:18:28taken at that very time with his captors.
0:18:28 > 0:18:31And he was interviewed, we can see by the documents,
0:18:31 > 0:18:33on at least three occasions,
0:18:33 > 0:18:37each time giving his enemy more and more information.
0:18:40 > 0:18:43In one interview Captain Hamblin was tricked into divulging secrets about
0:18:43 > 0:18:47the recently formed British Machine Gun Corps.
0:18:47 > 0:18:49The ruse was hardly sophisticated.
0:18:49 > 0:18:51The information, said his German captors,
0:18:51 > 0:18:54would only be used in their post-war regimental history.
0:18:57 > 0:19:00And there's the file of 23-year-old Joseph Littman,
0:19:00 > 0:19:02a Royal Fusilier.
0:19:02 > 0:19:05Now, he'd volunteered just a week after war had been declared,
0:19:05 > 0:19:08and he'd already seen action on the Gallipoli peninsula.
0:19:08 > 0:19:11But just two days before battle, he did something very dangerous,
0:19:11 > 0:19:13and very serious.
0:19:13 > 0:19:15He deserted.
0:19:15 > 0:19:19Creeping across to the German trenches during a nocturnal patrol,
0:19:19 > 0:19:24and revealing vital intelligence about the imminent offensive.
0:19:29 > 0:19:31The general offensive is imminent.
0:19:31 > 0:19:35Confirmation of the 29th Division in the Beaumont sector
0:19:35 > 0:19:37and their order of battle.
0:19:37 > 0:19:39Company strength, 210 men.
0:19:40 > 0:19:48In this area, the 4th, 31st, 36th and 42nd Divisions will take part.
0:19:48 > 0:19:50The attack will take place ten minutes
0:19:50 > 0:19:55after the British artillery lifts on to the second German trench.
0:19:55 > 0:19:58Behind the front, Indian and British cavalry,
0:19:58 > 0:20:00they are standing by to advance.
0:20:01 > 0:20:05Commanders expect the battle to produce a decisive outcome.
0:20:05 > 0:20:07The troops are very confident of success.
0:20:11 > 0:20:14Yet documents show that almost every captured Tommy
0:20:14 > 0:20:16added to the already immense amount
0:20:16 > 0:20:18of secret intelligence in German hands.
0:20:18 > 0:20:22Most dangerous, however, was what prisoners carried in their pockets.
0:20:22 > 0:20:26Such as this extraordinary dossier found on a British sergeant
0:20:26 > 0:20:29during a German trench raid on the 13th of April 1916.
0:20:34 > 0:20:38It's a translation of a six-week course for officers and senior NCOs,
0:20:38 > 0:20:44teaching them the very latest in British offensive infantry tactics.
0:20:44 > 0:20:48It covers all aspects - the wave assault, trench-to-trench fighting,
0:20:48 > 0:20:50all arms cooperation, machine guns,
0:20:50 > 0:20:53stoked mortars, signalling, bombing.
0:20:53 > 0:20:57And it even comes with notes by Major General Sir Ivor Maxse,
0:20:57 > 0:21:00a British divisional commander.
0:21:00 > 0:21:03In short, what it does is give the Germans
0:21:03 > 0:21:07the very tactics the British were going to employ on the Somme.
0:21:07 > 0:21:09And even more than that,
0:21:09 > 0:21:13it came with a breakdown of all the British artillery available
0:21:13 > 0:21:14at that time,
0:21:14 > 0:21:19the calibre and the capabilities of every gun and every shell.
0:21:19 > 0:21:23And all this was in German hands ten weeks before the battle.
0:21:27 > 0:21:29This was not an isolated incident.
0:21:31 > 0:21:32There were others.
0:21:32 > 0:21:35And each one prompted the Germans to go to work...
0:21:37 > 0:21:40..deepening trenches, improving communications,
0:21:40 > 0:21:42building concrete observation posts,
0:21:42 > 0:21:47strengthening wire and installing more protective underground dugouts.
0:21:53 > 0:21:57And British GCHQ was blissfully unaware of any of it.
0:22:07 > 0:22:11The equally secret operation orders individually given to every
0:22:11 > 0:22:13British unit just before battle
0:22:13 > 0:22:15were framed around a rigid timetable.
0:22:16 > 0:22:19Here in the Beaumont-Hamel sector and nearby,
0:22:19 > 0:22:24the first objective lay 500 yards beyond the German frontline.
0:22:24 > 0:22:27They were allocated 20 minutes to reach it.
0:22:27 > 0:22:30For the next, it was an hour and 20, and so on.
0:22:32 > 0:22:35So these lines, on the 1st of July battle map,
0:22:35 > 0:22:39reveal what British commanders firmly believed was achievable
0:22:39 > 0:22:42with the resources at their disposal.
0:22:43 > 0:22:45And with confidence so high,
0:22:45 > 0:22:49it was decided that this unique moment in British history should be
0:22:49 > 0:22:52captured by the new medium of moving pictures.
0:22:55 > 0:22:58During the night of the 30th of June and the 1st of July,
0:22:58 > 0:23:01400 men arrived in this lane.
0:23:01 > 0:23:03They came through a tunnel in this bank.
0:23:03 > 0:23:05And they would have been surprised to see,
0:23:05 > 0:23:08not long before the battle began,
0:23:08 > 0:23:12the official cinematographer and his assistant arrive to film them
0:23:12 > 0:23:14as they waited to go over the top.
0:23:20 > 0:23:22The film he took on that morning
0:23:22 > 0:23:26is probably the most powerful imagery of the entire war,
0:23:26 > 0:23:28because it's authentic.
0:23:28 > 0:23:33These are men going to an entirely unknown fate.
0:23:33 > 0:23:37At 7.30 they'll climb out of this lane, through the bushes,
0:23:37 > 0:23:39towards the Germans.
0:23:48 > 0:23:52In the adjacent sector, the Germans occupied a dominating crest
0:23:52 > 0:23:54known as the Hawthorn Ridge.
0:23:55 > 0:23:59For months, the Royal Engineers had been digging a tunnel under
0:23:59 > 0:24:05no-man's-land 300 yards long and 75 feet beneath the surface.
0:24:09 > 0:24:12Where it ended, under the German frontline trenches,
0:24:12 > 0:24:15they planted a huge mine.
0:24:16 > 0:24:19The moment of its detonation was captured
0:24:19 > 0:24:22by the same cinematographer, Geoffrey Malins.
0:24:22 > 0:24:24DEEP RUMBLING
0:24:24 > 0:24:25HUGE EXPLOSION
0:24:32 > 0:24:35This is the vast crater today,
0:24:35 > 0:24:38evidence of a terrible destructive power.
0:24:40 > 0:24:41But there'd been a problem.
0:24:41 > 0:24:46It was decided that the mine should be blown at 7.20am,
0:24:46 > 0:24:49ten minutes before the main infantry assault.
0:24:50 > 0:24:54For the enemy, there could not have been a more revealing indicator
0:24:54 > 0:24:57that the offensive was about to commence.
0:24:59 > 0:25:03When those 18 tonnes of explosive blew beneath this fortress -
0:25:03 > 0:25:05which is what it was -
0:25:05 > 0:25:09every German to either side who felt it or saw the plume of smoke
0:25:09 > 0:25:12was instantly warned. So they were not at the bottom of their dugout,
0:25:12 > 0:25:14they were halfway up the steps.
0:25:14 > 0:25:18All they had to do was wait for the enemy to leave his trenches.
0:25:23 > 0:25:25Equally astonishing footage by Malins
0:25:25 > 0:25:26then shows the British advancing
0:25:26 > 0:25:31from their trenches on the Hawthorn Ridge under murderous enemy fire
0:25:31 > 0:25:34and watched by helpless comrades.
0:25:39 > 0:25:41By noon, many of the men Malins had filmed
0:25:41 > 0:25:45here were lying dead or wounded in front of the enemy wire.
0:26:00 > 0:26:02Close by Hawthorn Ridge there is, today,
0:26:02 > 0:26:06a memorial park where one can still see the original trenches
0:26:06 > 0:26:07and shell holes.
0:26:09 > 0:26:13Here, on the 1st of July, were soldiers not only from Britain,
0:26:13 > 0:26:15but from the north-east coast of Canada.
0:26:19 > 0:26:23In this reserve trench 200 yards behind the frontline,
0:26:23 > 0:26:26the 1st Battalion of the Newfoundland Regiment
0:26:26 > 0:26:28awaited their moment of glory.
0:26:30 > 0:26:33At 9.15 they were ordered into the attack from this point,
0:26:33 > 0:26:38because every trench to their front was clogged with wounded Welsh and
0:26:38 > 0:26:43Cumbrian troops from the disastrous assaults at 7.30.
0:26:43 > 0:26:45Captain Arthur Raley later remembered
0:26:45 > 0:26:48the steady walk of his men onto what he called
0:26:48 > 0:26:52"a deadly piece of ground to cross."
0:26:54 > 0:26:57As the only body of troops now moving in the open,
0:26:57 > 0:27:02on this very spot, they were trapped and exposed,
0:27:02 > 0:27:06and facing withering multiple German machine-gun fire.
0:27:09 > 0:27:13Many were cut down before even reaching their own frontline.
0:27:22 > 0:27:25The casualties of the Newfoundlanders here
0:27:25 > 0:27:27almost defy belief.
0:27:27 > 0:27:29They lost every single officer,
0:27:29 > 0:27:35and 87% of their number in these fields before me.
0:27:35 > 0:27:38They had travelled 6,500 miles,
0:27:38 > 0:27:40served in two theatres of war,
0:27:40 > 0:27:42to meet this cheerless fate.
0:27:43 > 0:27:47It's very doubtful that even one of them had seen a German.
0:27:54 > 0:27:56Once more, the question we need to ask is,
0:27:56 > 0:28:01just how could such catastrophic failure like this have happened?
0:28:01 > 0:28:06And to answer this, I've crossed to the other side of no-man's-land.
0:28:07 > 0:28:10Studying the landscape with the original documents,
0:28:10 > 0:28:13we can understand what the Germans did well here,
0:28:13 > 0:28:16rather than what the British did poorly.
0:28:16 > 0:28:20They'd occupied this sector for more than a year and a half,
0:28:20 > 0:28:22knew the ground intimately,
0:28:22 > 0:28:27and had designed defences of deadly sophistication for just such a day.
0:28:29 > 0:28:31I'm looking at one of the maps
0:28:31 > 0:28:33I picked up from the Stuttgart archive.
0:28:33 > 0:28:36We are about 200 yards behind the German frontline,
0:28:36 > 0:28:37but overlooking it.
0:28:37 > 0:28:42Not only did fire come from here, but from the Thiepval Ridge -
0:28:42 > 0:28:45you can see the monument in the far distance there.
0:28:45 > 0:28:47And probably, most importantly,
0:28:47 > 0:28:51numerous machine guns along the Beaucourt Ridge
0:28:51 > 0:28:53on the horizon over there.
0:28:53 > 0:28:55All those were firing at the same time,
0:28:55 > 0:28:59creating an interlocking field of fire.
0:29:01 > 0:29:02That's a German bullet.
0:29:02 > 0:29:06But tens of thousands of these were being fired every minute.
0:29:09 > 0:29:11Let's just look at how those guns on
0:29:11 > 0:29:13the Beaucourt Ridge were deployed.
0:29:15 > 0:29:19They were sighted to fire just over the heads of the troops in their own
0:29:19 > 0:29:23front and support lines, and deluge not only no-man's-land,
0:29:23 > 0:29:28but the British front, support and reserve trenches as well.
0:29:31 > 0:29:34It is this shrewd use of terrain
0:29:34 > 0:29:39that explains why so many suffered and died here on the 1st of July.
0:29:50 > 0:29:54The objectives decided upon by British tacticians
0:29:54 > 0:29:59reflected a collective and fatal underestimation of their enemy.
0:30:01 > 0:30:05And that problem was compounded by Haig and Rawlinson
0:30:05 > 0:30:07holding radically different views
0:30:07 > 0:30:10on how this first phase of the offensive should be approached.
0:30:13 > 0:30:17Sir Henry Rawlinson was an infantryman by trade,
0:30:17 > 0:30:20and the hard lessons he had learned at the hands of the Germans in 1915
0:30:20 > 0:30:26had taught him just how critical the opening moves of a battle could be.
0:30:27 > 0:30:29So, for the Somme,
0:30:29 > 0:30:33he based his tactics upon "bite and hold".
0:30:33 > 0:30:37"Bite and hold" was a step-by-step method that entailed grabbing and
0:30:37 > 0:30:42consolidating a limited set of initial objectives - in this case,
0:30:42 > 0:30:45the German frontline - before approaching further targets.
0:30:47 > 0:30:51It required both planning and patience.
0:30:51 > 0:30:53But Haig wanted more.
0:30:53 > 0:30:57He was a cavalryman, schooled in the traditions of derring-do.
0:30:57 > 0:31:00In the parlance of the time, Haig was a thruster.
0:31:02 > 0:31:06Haig believed Rawlinson's plan to be far too cautious.
0:31:06 > 0:31:09It lacked surprise, it lacked imagination, it lacked ambition -
0:31:09 > 0:31:13it lacked everything that appealed to a thruster.
0:31:13 > 0:31:17What he wanted was to create panic, to open the door for his cavalry,
0:31:17 > 0:31:20to see the Germans in headlong flight,
0:31:20 > 0:31:25and potentially to bring about the beginning of the end of the war.
0:31:26 > 0:31:28The German frontline system was not
0:31:28 > 0:31:30the only hurdle to be negotiated, however.
0:31:30 > 0:31:35Behind it, they'd installed a second line of defence.
0:31:35 > 0:31:37So to achieve the breakthrough that would permit his cavalry
0:31:37 > 0:31:41to be loosed, Haig ordered that both positions be secured.
0:31:42 > 0:31:46But Rawlinson believed this would dilute the power
0:31:46 > 0:31:49of his artillery and overstretch his infantry.
0:31:49 > 0:31:51And he would be proved right.
0:31:51 > 0:31:54But he had no choice but to follow the orders
0:31:54 > 0:31:56of his commander-in-chief.
0:32:03 > 0:32:04Crossing the River Ancre
0:32:04 > 0:32:07and approaching the centre of the British battlefront,
0:32:07 > 0:32:10we reach the place where Haig's ambition to take the German
0:32:10 > 0:32:13second line came closest to being realised -
0:32:13 > 0:32:15in the Thiepval sector.
0:32:22 > 0:32:26Here were gathered men from the British 36th Division.
0:32:28 > 0:32:32They were Ulstermen - volunteers from Londonderry, Tyrone, Armagh,
0:32:32 > 0:32:35Belfast, Antrim and Donegal.
0:32:40 > 0:32:43Many had been part of the Ulster Volunteer Force,
0:32:43 > 0:32:46the militia created before the war to resist -
0:32:46 > 0:32:49with arms, if necessary - the imposition of home rule.
0:32:57 > 0:32:58The Ulsters' first challenge
0:32:58 > 0:33:01was of course to take the German frontlines.
0:33:01 > 0:33:05But beyond them lay a critical intermediate target -
0:33:05 > 0:33:07the Schwaben Redoubt.
0:33:08 > 0:33:11One of their many "schwerpunkt", strong points,
0:33:11 > 0:33:15strategically positioned between the two main defensive lines,
0:33:15 > 0:33:19it was a warren of trenches, dugouts and machine-gun emplacements,
0:33:19 > 0:33:23600 yards wide and 200 yards broad.
0:33:25 > 0:33:30The redoubt commanded the landscape in all directions.
0:33:30 > 0:33:34For the Ulsters to reach the German second line, it had to fall.
0:33:39 > 0:33:44The Ulstermen had employed very similar tactics to the other units
0:33:44 > 0:33:46to the north - all those who had failed.
0:33:46 > 0:33:48But here, there was a crucial difference.
0:33:48 > 0:33:52They had come out of the wood, they had formed up in no-man's-land
0:33:52 > 0:33:56and from there, they charged the German lines.
0:33:56 > 0:33:57So how did they do that?
0:33:57 > 0:34:00They did that by dumping all the heavy equipment
0:34:00 > 0:34:02they were meant to take with them in the lane -
0:34:02 > 0:34:04picks, shovels, barbed wire -
0:34:04 > 0:34:07that could all stay behind, so they could get across to the Germans,
0:34:07 > 0:34:10mercilessly, as soon as possible.
0:34:10 > 0:34:14Unlike the long-distance carnage at Beaumont-Hamel,
0:34:14 > 0:34:17the fighting here was face-to-face,
0:34:17 > 0:34:21hand-to-hand, frenzied and vicious.
0:34:21 > 0:34:26It was a clash of bomb and bayonet, even sharpened shovels.
0:34:26 > 0:34:29The Ulsters had trained long and hard for this moment
0:34:29 > 0:34:31and, like every other British soldier,
0:34:31 > 0:34:34they were expected to give the enemy no quarter.
0:34:38 > 0:34:41By 9.30am, it was already being reported
0:34:41 > 0:34:44that the redoubt was theirs.
0:34:44 > 0:34:46The Ulsters could now move against
0:34:46 > 0:34:50the final objective that Haig so coveted. And so they pushed on,
0:34:50 > 0:34:53expecting support from neighbouring British divisions advancing
0:34:53 > 0:34:56in unison on both flanks.
0:35:03 > 0:35:04Three miles to the south,
0:35:04 > 0:35:08on the Roman road that links the towns of Albert and Bapaume,
0:35:08 > 0:35:11lies the village of La Boisselle.
0:35:11 > 0:35:15On its northern side was a gentle dell known to the Tommies
0:35:15 > 0:35:17as Mash Valley.
0:35:20 > 0:35:22Here, the Tyneside Irish,
0:35:22 > 0:35:25a brigade of volunteers from the north-east of England,
0:35:25 > 0:35:29mostly of Irish descent, waited for zero hour.
0:35:32 > 0:35:37In Mash Valley, no-man's-land was wider than anywhere on the Somme.
0:35:37 > 0:35:41But their steady advance illustrates the confidence the British
0:35:41 > 0:35:44had invested in the neutralising power of the artillery.
0:35:51 > 0:35:54One Tynesider later recalled the sound of larks singing
0:35:54 > 0:35:56just before the whistles blew.
0:35:57 > 0:35:59Another, a drum beating time.
0:36:01 > 0:36:03And amongst the waves of plodding infantry,
0:36:03 > 0:36:06a Piper Cunningham played the tune Minstrel Boy.
0:36:17 > 0:36:19The attacks in Mash Valley were greeted
0:36:19 > 0:36:22by machine guns spitting from the front,
0:36:22 > 0:36:25from the flanks, in what's called enfilade fire,
0:36:25 > 0:36:28and again, from distant ridges.
0:36:28 > 0:36:31A German artillery barrage completed the deadly equation.
0:36:34 > 0:36:37ARTILLERY FIRE BOOMS
0:36:41 > 0:36:44As the thinning ranks drew close to the German trenches,
0:36:44 > 0:36:46the troops encountered lethal evidence
0:36:46 > 0:36:48of the failure of the British guns.
0:36:50 > 0:36:55They had been assured that the enemy barbed wire would be swept away.
0:36:57 > 0:37:00But many here and elsewhere who survived no-man's-land
0:37:00 > 0:37:05found themselves trapped by a deadly barrier of steel thorns.
0:37:09 > 0:37:12This is German First World War barbed wire.
0:37:12 > 0:37:14It has been in the ground for 100 years,
0:37:14 > 0:37:18and yet every single one of these barbs is still razor sharp.
0:37:18 > 0:37:22It only takes one to catch on your trousers and you become
0:37:22 > 0:37:26a stationary target, a sitting duck for German sharpshooters.
0:37:26 > 0:37:29It's really a weapon of mass destruction.
0:37:32 > 0:37:35One Seaforth Highlander, Private JS Reid, recalled...
0:37:38 > 0:37:42"I could see that our leading waves had got caught with their kilts.
0:37:42 > 0:37:46"They were killed hanging on the wire, riddled with bullets,
0:37:46 > 0:37:49"like crows shot on a dyke."
0:37:54 > 0:37:56But that was not all.
0:37:56 > 0:37:57On the battlefield today,
0:37:57 > 0:38:01it's difficult to avoid evidence of another problem facing
0:38:01 > 0:38:03the British artillery -
0:38:03 > 0:38:05faulty ammunition.
0:38:07 > 0:38:10These are three British shells,
0:38:10 > 0:38:14but, importantly, they are three British DUD shells.
0:38:14 > 0:38:16They have not exploded.
0:38:16 > 0:38:20And the reason why I'm saying this is because in the German archives,
0:38:20 > 0:38:25what I have found is, the minimum percentage of duds is 40%.
0:38:25 > 0:38:29The maximum is 90%.
0:38:29 > 0:38:34And what that means is, one shell out of ten exploding on impact.
0:38:39 > 0:38:41So the shelling couldn't produce
0:38:41 > 0:38:44the annihilating firestorm that had been promised.
0:38:49 > 0:38:52And as the Tommies discovered in the few places where they did enter
0:38:52 > 0:38:56the enemy line, many German shelters were still intact
0:38:56 > 0:38:58and their occupants very much alive.
0:39:04 > 0:39:08Today, a site like this helps us understand why.
0:39:08 > 0:39:10A medieval refuge under a church,
0:39:10 > 0:39:14converted by the Germans into a deep dugout.
0:39:17 > 0:39:19In the 18 months before the battle,
0:39:19 > 0:39:22thousands had been installed in the trenches all along the front.
0:39:24 > 0:39:28Blueprints and plans in German archives reveal the meticulous
0:39:28 > 0:39:32and considered thought that went into their design and siting.
0:39:42 > 0:39:44We're about 30 feet underground.
0:39:47 > 0:39:51This is a particularly sophisticated German dugout.
0:39:51 > 0:39:52But it gives us a really good idea
0:39:52 > 0:39:54of the kind of atmosphere and ambience
0:39:54 > 0:39:57that the originals would have had in the frontline.
0:39:57 > 0:40:01This one has electricity cables, it's got communication cables,
0:40:01 > 0:40:03so they were constantly in touch with the rear,
0:40:03 > 0:40:06with the artillery in particular.
0:40:06 > 0:40:10Brick arch here, that's to give it extra support.
0:40:10 > 0:40:12And here's a ventilation chimney
0:40:12 > 0:40:15going up to the surface to take the fumes out.
0:40:17 > 0:40:19Let's have a look in here.
0:40:19 > 0:40:22This is the kind of place where they would have lived.
0:40:25 > 0:40:28Reinforced concrete roof with steel beams.
0:40:28 > 0:40:32Even the heaviest British high explosive shell
0:40:32 > 0:40:34couldn't hurt you down here.
0:40:34 > 0:40:37It would shake the place, it would make the candles go out,
0:40:37 > 0:40:39but you would be safe.
0:40:39 > 0:40:43And thousands and thousands of soldiers were accommodated
0:40:43 > 0:40:44in places like this.
0:40:48 > 0:40:52But the British also toiled in the chalk and clay of the Somme.
0:40:52 > 0:40:55And their labours would help to bring welcome success
0:40:55 > 0:40:57on the 1st of July.
0:40:58 > 0:41:01The scale of catastrophe in the north and centre
0:41:01 > 0:41:03has led to an enduring myth
0:41:03 > 0:41:07that the first day of battle saw complete British failure.
0:41:07 > 0:41:09But this was far from true.
0:41:11 > 0:41:14By noon, there'd been success in and around the villages of Mametz,
0:41:14 > 0:41:16Montauban,
0:41:16 > 0:41:18and here in the Maricourt sector,
0:41:18 > 0:41:21where the British advanced side-by-side with their French ally.
0:41:29 > 0:41:31In these southern sectors,
0:41:31 > 0:41:34the British employed every tool in the military tool box
0:41:34 > 0:41:37to assist their vulnerable infantry.
0:41:38 > 0:41:42The most audacious of these schemes was invisible to the eye,
0:41:42 > 0:41:45and also, therefore, to the enemy.
0:41:45 > 0:41:46Here in these fields,
0:41:46 > 0:41:50the Royal Engineers dug dozens of Russian saps -
0:41:50 > 0:41:52tunnels beneath no-man's-land -
0:41:52 > 0:41:56which reached all the way to the German trenches.
0:41:56 > 0:42:00What they sought to achieve by this underground war was shock,
0:42:00 > 0:42:04terror and, most importantly, surprise.
0:42:16 > 0:42:18This is a typical Russian sap.
0:42:18 > 0:42:21Barely big enough for somebody my size to walk along.
0:42:26 > 0:42:29In the south, 13 were installed by tunnellers recruited from mines
0:42:29 > 0:42:32and quarries from across the British Empire,
0:42:32 > 0:42:36who found the Picardy chalk a perfect medium for their work.
0:42:46 > 0:42:49Once completed, multiple explosive charges
0:42:49 > 0:42:52were planted at the end of each tunnel,
0:42:52 > 0:42:55for detonation just before zero hour.
0:42:57 > 0:42:59Just back from those mines,
0:42:59 > 0:43:03there would be galleries going to the surface with a manhole,
0:43:03 > 0:43:05so the moment those mines blew,
0:43:05 > 0:43:08out of that manhole would rush a group of bombers,
0:43:08 > 0:43:11and go straight into the German trenches.
0:43:11 > 0:43:13And this is where the surprise came in.
0:43:13 > 0:43:17Whilst the gunfire and mines created shock and awe
0:43:17 > 0:43:18in the enemy trenches...
0:43:18 > 0:43:20HUGE EXPLOSIONS
0:43:20 > 0:43:27..British bombers had not even had to set foot upon no-man's-land.
0:43:27 > 0:43:31And the very same tunnels were also employed to house machine-gun posts,
0:43:31 > 0:43:35mortar emplacements, and even two-and-a-half-tonne flame-throwers,
0:43:35 > 0:43:39all firing from hidden, unexpected locations.
0:43:45 > 0:43:47And on the 1st of July,
0:43:47 > 0:43:49the combination of massed heavy artillery
0:43:49 > 0:43:53and the Russian saps helped the 18th and 30th Divisions
0:43:53 > 0:43:56achieve all their objectives in the south.
0:43:56 > 0:43:59But to obtain a fuller explanation for British success here,
0:43:59 > 0:44:02we must look at the German account.
0:44:02 > 0:44:05From reports received from this area,
0:44:05 > 0:44:10the Germans frankly acknowledged the weakness in their southern defences.
0:44:10 > 0:44:13Despite the efforts made in the months leading up to battle,
0:44:13 > 0:44:18they were still nowhere near as well developed as those in the north.
0:44:18 > 0:44:19There were fewer deep dugouts,
0:44:19 > 0:44:22telephone communications were poorer,
0:44:22 > 0:44:24wire entanglements were thinner.
0:44:24 > 0:44:26Garrison strengths were very similar -
0:44:26 > 0:44:29they were still outnumbered five or six to one.
0:44:29 > 0:44:35On the 1st of July 1916, therefore, it led to catastrophe.
0:44:35 > 0:44:38For example, the 6th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment,
0:44:38 > 0:44:43who were here, went into battle with 3,500 men.
0:44:43 > 0:44:47The following day only 500 answered to the roll call.
0:44:55 > 0:44:59Whilst in the south the impressive Allied progress soon became clear,
0:44:59 > 0:45:02the picture elsewhere was much more confusing.
0:45:03 > 0:45:07Here at Querrieu, Sir Henry Rawlinson received telegrams
0:45:07 > 0:45:09from all parts of the battlefront.
0:45:09 > 0:45:11They were recorded in this log.
0:45:12 > 0:45:14During the morning,
0:45:14 > 0:45:17they provided an optimistic but misleading account
0:45:17 > 0:45:20of the fighting in his central and northern sectors.
0:45:20 > 0:45:24"7.46am, the whole of the 8th Corps is over the German frontline."
0:45:25 > 0:45:29Messages falsely state that German lines had been taken,
0:45:29 > 0:45:31fresh attacks were going well,
0:45:31 > 0:45:33and British troops had been seen in places they were not.
0:45:33 > 0:45:37"9.47am. Am moving corps reserve to Mailly,
0:45:37 > 0:45:39"so as to be ready to exploit success."
0:45:40 > 0:45:45It was from lunchtime onwards that the tone changed to one that was
0:45:45 > 0:45:46horribly familiar.
0:45:47 > 0:45:49Here's an example.
0:45:51 > 0:45:57"2.45pm. 29th Division are all back in their own frontline trenches.
0:45:57 > 0:45:59"There are a few men holding Hawthorn Crater.
0:45:59 > 0:46:02"They were unable to make the projected attack,
0:46:02 > 0:46:05"owing to the congestion of wounded, etc,
0:46:05 > 0:46:08"in our frontline and communication trenches.
0:46:08 > 0:46:10"The 86th Brigade have lost heavily.
0:46:10 > 0:46:13"The 10th Brigade has been used up."
0:46:22 > 0:46:24Despite the grim outlook,
0:46:24 > 0:46:284th Army HQ awaited better news from the 36th Division.
0:46:29 > 0:46:34It had been reported that the Ulstermen had taken the Schwaben Redoubt,
0:46:34 > 0:46:37and were pushing towards the German second line.
0:46:39 > 0:46:42The truth was, they were now in deep trouble.
0:46:42 > 0:46:47Exhausted, short of ammunition and water, and alone.
0:46:50 > 0:46:54By mid-afternoon, the Ulsters knew they were isolated.
0:46:54 > 0:46:58The Germans had laid down a carpet of fire over no-man's-land,
0:46:58 > 0:47:00artillery and machine guns.
0:47:00 > 0:47:03Communications had completely broken down - no telephones,
0:47:03 > 0:47:06a runner could not get through. Support could not reach them.
0:47:06 > 0:47:10On their right, the 32nd Division had failed, that's plain.
0:47:10 > 0:47:13On their left, the 29th Division had failed.
0:47:13 > 0:47:18The Germans now knew that the time was ripe for counterattack.
0:47:24 > 0:47:28The Munich archives tell us what happened as evening fell.
0:47:30 > 0:47:32Here's a report by Hauptmann Wurm,
0:47:32 > 0:47:36a captain in the 8th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment.
0:47:36 > 0:47:39Ordered to drive the Ulsters out by counterattack,
0:47:39 > 0:47:41the tactic known as Gegenstossen.
0:47:41 > 0:47:47Wurm describes pushing his enemy back and then trapping them.
0:47:48 > 0:47:53It's an incredible document because it's so comprehensive.
0:47:53 > 0:47:56You can follow the action minute by minute by minute.
0:47:56 > 0:47:59In it is his report, corrected.
0:47:59 > 0:48:03And every message which he sent, some of them mud-covered.
0:48:03 > 0:48:04Look at that.
0:48:04 > 0:48:09Given to a runner so they could help retake the Schwaben Redoubt,
0:48:09 > 0:48:11eject those Ulsters.
0:48:18 > 0:48:21Captain Wurm reports that in the gathering gloom,
0:48:21 > 0:48:27his troops stayed in contact by singing a recognition song, Die Wacht am Rhein,
0:48:27 > 0:48:29The Watch On The Rhine.
0:48:34 > 0:48:39"Our men moved forward under constant hostile artillery fire.
0:48:39 > 0:48:43"The enemy found himself threatened from the rear and withdrew.
0:48:43 > 0:48:45"Evidently because in the darkness,
0:48:45 > 0:48:47"the noise made by the oncoming troops
0:48:47 > 0:48:50"had convinced him that he was facing a much stronger force.
0:48:53 > 0:48:57"The enemy was in retreat, and the Schwaben Redoubt was ours."
0:49:05 > 0:49:09The day that had begun with Ulster triumph had, by sunset,
0:49:09 > 0:49:12ended in anti-climactic defeat.
0:49:12 > 0:49:14And as twilight ebbed from the battlefield,
0:49:14 > 0:49:17those who survived the fighting
0:49:17 > 0:49:21had both participated in and bore witness to terrible violence.
0:49:24 > 0:49:28But some had committed acts of deplorable cruelty, too.
0:49:28 > 0:49:30War crimes.
0:49:31 > 0:49:33What happened at the moment of surrender
0:49:33 > 0:49:36and soon afterwards was a grey area.
0:49:36 > 0:49:40The power of life or death lying solely with the captor,
0:49:40 > 0:49:42never the captive.
0:49:42 > 0:49:45If orders were issued to take no prisoners,
0:49:45 > 0:49:47they had to be implemented,
0:49:47 > 0:49:52for military training is based upon obedience without question.
0:49:53 > 0:49:56In the German archives, there exists files of interviews
0:49:56 > 0:49:59with exchanged German prisoners interned in camps
0:49:59 > 0:50:02in neutral Switzerland and Holland.
0:50:02 > 0:50:06They contain hundreds of allegations of Allied brutality.
0:50:06 > 0:50:12For example, this account from the 1st of July comes from appendix 22.
0:50:12 > 0:50:14"Infanterist Ritler and another soldier
0:50:14 > 0:50:18"had been taken prisoner and were awaiting evacuation to the rear,
0:50:18 > 0:50:22"when a British infantryman fired on the two defenceless men,
0:50:22 > 0:50:26"wounding Ritler and killing his comrade.
0:50:26 > 0:50:30"He left Ritler lying in a pool of his own blood and went away.
0:50:30 > 0:50:32"The next day, another British soldier came
0:50:32 > 0:50:35"and stabbed Ritler in the back twice with his bayonet."
0:50:39 > 0:50:44British records alleging German brutality are harder to find.
0:50:44 > 0:50:46But here's one from Major Henry Hance,
0:50:46 > 0:50:49with the Royal Engineers in Mash Valley.
0:50:50 > 0:50:54"All the dead hanging on the wire, where it was still intact,
0:50:54 > 0:50:56"had had the backs of their heads bashed in.
0:50:58 > 0:51:00"The German patrols at night
0:51:00 > 0:51:04"had either murdered our wounded or mutilated our dead.
0:51:04 > 0:51:07"That no-man's-land, in front of Ovillers,
0:51:07 > 0:51:11"was the worst sight I saw in the whole war."
0:51:34 > 0:51:38Throughout the day, British wounded were first treated at aid posts
0:51:38 > 0:51:40on the battlefield,
0:51:40 > 0:51:42the most serious then being evacuated to a number
0:51:42 > 0:51:46of large casualty clearing stations behind the lines,
0:51:46 > 0:51:47where surgery was carried out.
0:51:49 > 0:51:52They were then transported by ambulance, rail or by barge,
0:51:52 > 0:51:54as here at Corby on the Somme,
0:51:54 > 0:51:58to hospitals on the French coast or across the Channel to the UK.
0:52:00 > 0:52:01After long deliberation,
0:52:01 > 0:52:04it was estimated that on the first day of battle,
0:52:04 > 0:52:07there would be 10,000 British casualties.
0:52:07 > 0:52:10And it was this figure on which the medical corps based all their planning,
0:52:10 > 0:52:14from hospitals to bandages to graves.
0:52:14 > 0:52:18But the actual number was up to five times greater,
0:52:18 > 0:52:21with serious implications for the fate of the wounded.
0:52:23 > 0:52:26It was habitual British underestimation
0:52:26 > 0:52:30of their German enemy that led to a tragic underestimation
0:52:30 > 0:52:33of the medical requirements.
0:52:33 > 0:52:35They were overwhelmed.
0:52:35 > 0:52:40And as a result, countless men died who might have been saved.
0:52:49 > 0:52:51On the 2nd of July, a Sunday,
0:52:51 > 0:52:55the commander-in-chief, as always, went to church.
0:52:55 > 0:52:57He afterwards wrote that the previous day
0:52:57 > 0:53:00had been one of downs and ups.
0:53:01 > 0:53:03And that diary entry concluded...
0:53:03 > 0:53:06"The Adjutant General reported today
0:53:06 > 0:53:11"that the total casualties are estimated at 40,000 to date.
0:53:11 > 0:53:13"This cannot be considered severe,
0:53:13 > 0:53:17"in view of the numbers of engaged and the length of front attacked."
0:53:22 > 0:53:29In fact, there were exactly 57,470 British casualties
0:53:29 > 0:53:31on the 1st of July.
0:53:31 > 0:53:35Of which, 19,240 men perished.
0:53:36 > 0:53:41It remains the most costly day in British military history.
0:53:49 > 0:53:53So what had been gained for such a historic toll?
0:53:53 > 0:53:55Let us return to the battle map.
0:53:57 > 0:54:01In the south, the Allies achieved practically all their objectives.
0:54:02 > 0:54:05But on three-quarters of the British battlefront,
0:54:05 > 0:54:09the German frontline was at best only temporarily occupied
0:54:09 > 0:54:12by the infantry and, at worst, untouched.
0:54:14 > 0:54:17The German's second line was never threatened.
0:54:40 > 0:54:44It is worth visiting the Munich archives one more time,
0:54:44 > 0:54:47because their collections can also tell us
0:54:47 > 0:54:50what British prisoners thought were the reasons
0:54:50 > 0:54:54behind the disasters of the 1st of July in the northern sectors,
0:54:54 > 0:54:57and how they explained that to their German captors.
0:54:57 > 0:55:02It is, so to speak, a postmortem in every way.
0:55:02 > 0:55:05And this document alone
0:55:05 > 0:55:08provides a sombre indictment of British planning.
0:55:10 > 0:55:11The document's entitled
0:55:11 > 0:55:14Conversations With British Prisoners,
0:55:14 > 0:55:16and records the views of wounded soldiers
0:55:16 > 0:55:20of all ranks being treated in a German military hospital.
0:55:24 > 0:55:25"The German wire defences
0:55:25 > 0:55:29"were still in astonishingly good condition in many places.
0:55:29 > 0:55:33"And the first wave of attack was unable to penetrate them.
0:55:33 > 0:55:35"The attackers had been led to believe
0:55:35 > 0:55:38"that they would encounter little or no opposition,
0:55:38 > 0:55:40"hence the leisurely pace of their advance,
0:55:40 > 0:55:44"and the resulting heavy casualties.
0:55:44 > 0:55:46"The German machine-gun fire
0:55:46 > 0:55:49"was such that a breakthrough was never a possibility."
0:55:56 > 0:55:57Despite the losses,
0:55:57 > 0:56:01there was no question but that the offensive would continue.
0:56:03 > 0:56:07After church, the commander-in-chief motored to Querrieu to discuss
0:56:07 > 0:56:09future operations with Rawlinson.
0:56:11 > 0:56:16Rawlinson favoured renewal in the north, so too did the French.
0:56:16 > 0:56:19But Hague believed that Allied success in the south
0:56:19 > 0:56:21must be exploited.
0:56:21 > 0:56:26Discussions were heated, but his will once more prevailed.
0:56:29 > 0:56:33To secure a platform for the next major attack in ten days' time,
0:56:33 > 0:56:38there were 46 separate assaults involving over 90,000 men.
0:56:44 > 0:56:47But they were planned locally without central coordination,
0:56:47 > 0:56:52and launched on narrow fronts, which played into German hands.
0:56:52 > 0:56:55Gains were made, but slowly.
0:56:55 > 0:56:58And again, at a terrible price -
0:56:58 > 0:57:01a further 25,000 casualties.
0:57:02 > 0:57:05And new sites of sacrifice emerged,
0:57:05 > 0:57:09Ovillers, Contalmaison and Mametz Wood.
0:57:12 > 0:57:14The Germans suffered too.
0:57:14 > 0:57:17But being on the defence, their losses were hardly comparable -
0:57:17 > 0:57:1930,000 since the 24th of June.
0:57:21 > 0:57:22A host of captured documents
0:57:22 > 0:57:27had told them what the Allies had wanted to achieve, and how.
0:57:27 > 0:57:30And the piecemeal nature of recent British attacks
0:57:30 > 0:57:34had provided a little precious time to bring up fresh troops
0:57:34 > 0:57:35and install new defences.
0:57:44 > 0:57:46Meanwhile back here at Querrieu,
0:57:46 > 0:57:49Sir Henry Rawlinson observed that his commander-in-chief's
0:57:49 > 0:57:53legendary confidence and optimism was undiminished.
0:57:53 > 0:57:55The next great venture would make up
0:57:55 > 0:57:58for all the failures of the first fortnight,
0:57:58 > 0:58:03devour the enemy defences, and unleash his cavalry.
0:58:03 > 0:58:07The first phase of the Battle of the Somme was over.
0:58:07 > 0:58:10The next was about to commence, and with it,
0:58:10 > 0:58:13a remarkable German tactical revolution
0:58:13 > 0:58:16that would stifle Allied progress on the battlefield
0:58:16 > 0:58:18and prolong the slaughter.