0:00:02 > 0:00:08The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans,
0:00:08 > 0:00:10born in this century,
0:00:10 > 0:00:13tempered by war,
0:00:13 > 0:00:14disciplined by
0:00:14 > 0:00:16a hard and bitter peace.
0:00:19 > 0:00:22At 43, John Fitzgerald Kennedy
0:00:22 > 0:00:26was the youngest man ever elected President of the United States.
0:00:26 > 0:00:30He had promised bold new leadership, and to his supporters,
0:00:30 > 0:00:34his inauguration seemed to signal a new day.
0:00:36 > 0:00:41To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free,
0:00:41 > 0:00:44we pledge our word
0:00:44 > 0:00:50that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away
0:00:50 > 0:00:54merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny.
0:00:55 > 0:01:01We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view,
0:01:01 > 0:01:03but we shall always hope to find them
0:01:03 > 0:01:07strongly supporting their own freedom.
0:01:07 > 0:01:11And to remember that, in the past,
0:01:11 > 0:01:14those who foolishly sought power
0:01:14 > 0:01:17by riding the back of the tiger,
0:01:17 > 0:01:18ended up inside.
0:01:20 > 0:01:25This programme contains some scenes which some viewers may find upsetting.
0:01:26 > 0:01:29The new president gathered around him
0:01:29 > 0:01:31an extraordinary set of advisers,
0:01:31 > 0:01:35who shared his determination to confront communism.
0:01:35 > 0:01:38Including Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara.
0:01:40 > 0:01:42Like the president who picked them,
0:01:42 > 0:01:46all of Kennedy's men had served during World War II.
0:01:46 > 0:01:51Each had absorbed what they all believed was its central lesson,
0:01:51 > 0:01:55ambitious dictatorships needed to be halted in their tracks
0:01:55 > 0:02:00before they constituted a serious danger to the peace of the world.
0:02:01 > 0:02:06Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front,
0:02:06 > 0:02:09labelled by its enemies the Viet Cong,
0:02:09 > 0:02:11was determined to overthrow the
0:02:11 > 0:02:15anti-Communist and increasingly autocratic government
0:02:15 > 0:02:17of Ngo Dinh Diem.
0:02:18 > 0:02:23In North Vietnam, unbeknownst to Washington, Ho Chi Minh,
0:02:23 > 0:02:26the father of Vietnamese independence,
0:02:26 > 0:02:30was now sharing power with a more aggressive leader, Le Duan,
0:02:30 > 0:02:34who was even more impatient to reunify his country.
0:02:55 > 0:02:57None of us knew anything about Vietnam.
0:02:59 > 0:03:03Vietnam, in those days, was a piece on a chessboard.
0:03:03 > 0:03:05A strategic chessboard.
0:03:05 > 0:03:08Not a place with a culture and a history
0:03:08 > 0:03:14that we would have an impossible time changing.
0:03:14 > 0:03:17Even with the mighty force of the United States.
0:03:18 > 0:03:20Over the next three years,
0:03:20 > 0:03:23the United States would struggle to understand
0:03:23 > 0:03:26the complicated country it had come to save,
0:03:26 > 0:03:30fail to appreciate the enemy's resolve,
0:03:30 > 0:03:32and misread how the South Vietnamese people
0:03:32 > 0:03:35really felt about their government.
0:03:37 > 0:03:40The new president would find himself caught
0:03:40 > 0:03:44between the momentum of war and the desire for peace.
0:03:44 > 0:03:47Between humility and hubris.
0:03:47 > 0:03:51Between idealism and expediency.
0:03:51 > 0:03:53Between the truth and a lie.
0:04:08 > 0:04:10For all of John Kennedy's soaring rhetoric,
0:04:10 > 0:04:13for all the talent he gathered around him,
0:04:13 > 0:04:16the first months of his presidency did not go well.
0:04:17 > 0:04:22He approved a CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs
0:04:22 > 0:04:24that ended in disaster.
0:04:26 > 0:04:30He felt he'd been bullied by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev
0:04:30 > 0:04:33at a summit meeting in Vienna.
0:04:33 > 0:04:36He was unable to keep the Soviets from building the Berlin Wall.
0:04:38 > 0:04:40And in Southeast Asia,
0:04:40 > 0:04:44he refused to intervene against a Communist insurrection in Laos.
0:04:45 > 0:04:49Critics accused him of being immature, indecisive,
0:04:49 > 0:04:52inadequate to the task of combating
0:04:52 > 0:04:55what seemed to be a mounting Communist threat.
0:04:56 > 0:05:00"There are just so many concessions that we can make in one year,
0:05:00 > 0:05:04"and survive politically," he confided to an aide
0:05:04 > 0:05:06in the spring of 1961.
0:05:07 > 0:05:11In South Vietnam, Kennedy felt he had to act.
0:05:12 > 0:05:15After the president received reports
0:05:15 > 0:05:17that the Viet Cong might be in control
0:05:17 > 0:05:21of more than half the densely populated Mekong Delta,
0:05:21 > 0:05:26he dispatched General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to Vietnam.
0:05:27 > 0:05:31They urged him to commit American ground troops.
0:05:31 > 0:05:32Kennedy refused.
0:05:34 > 0:05:36"It would be like taking a first drink," he said,
0:05:36 > 0:05:41"The effect would soon wear off, and there would be demands for another,
0:05:41 > 0:05:43"and another, and another."
0:05:44 > 0:05:47Instead, in the midst of a Cold War,
0:05:47 > 0:05:50with its constant risk of nuclear confrontation,
0:05:50 > 0:05:52the president sported a new,
0:05:52 > 0:05:57flexible way to confront and contain communism.
0:05:57 > 0:05:58Limited war.
0:05:59 > 0:06:02This is another type of warfare.
0:06:02 > 0:06:04New in its intensity,
0:06:04 > 0:06:06ancient in its origin -
0:06:06 > 0:06:12war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins.
0:06:12 > 0:06:15War by ambush instead of by combat,
0:06:15 > 0:06:18by infiltration instead of aggression.
0:06:20 > 0:06:22To fight his limited wars,
0:06:22 > 0:06:26Kennedy hoped to use the elite Green Berets,
0:06:26 > 0:06:29Special Forces trained in guerrilla warfare -
0:06:29 > 0:06:31counterinsurgency.
0:06:33 > 0:06:37But Kennedy understood that counterinsurgency alone
0:06:37 > 0:06:39would never be enough,
0:06:39 > 0:06:42so he doubled funding for South Vietnam's army,
0:06:42 > 0:06:45dispatched helicopters and APCs -
0:06:45 > 0:06:47armoured personnel carriers.
0:06:50 > 0:06:54Kennedy also authorised the use of napalm,
0:06:54 > 0:06:58and the spraying of defoliants to deny cover to the Viet Cong,
0:06:58 > 0:07:01and destroy the crops that fed them.
0:07:03 > 0:07:05A whole array of chemicals was used,
0:07:05 > 0:07:09including one named for the colour of the stripes
0:07:09 > 0:07:14on the 55 gallon drums in which it came, Agent Orange.
0:07:15 > 0:07:18And the president quietly continued to increase
0:07:18 > 0:07:21the number of American military advisers.
0:07:22 > 0:07:24Within two years,
0:07:24 > 0:07:27the number he had inherited
0:07:27 > 0:07:31would grow to 11,300,
0:07:31 > 0:07:33empowered not only to teach
0:07:33 > 0:07:36the Army of the Republic of Vietnam - the ARVN -
0:07:36 > 0:07:40to fight a conventional war, but to accompany them into battle,
0:07:40 > 0:07:45a violation of the agreement that had divided Vietnam back in 1954.
0:07:48 > 0:07:53The administration did its best to hide from the American people
0:07:53 > 0:07:55the scale of the build-up that was taking place
0:07:55 > 0:07:57on the other side of the world,
0:07:57 > 0:08:00fearful that the public would not support
0:08:00 > 0:08:05the more active role advisers had begun to play in combat.
0:08:05 > 0:08:11Mr President, the Republican National Committee publication has said that you are...
0:08:11 > 0:08:16have been, less than candid with the American people as to how deeply we
0:08:16 > 0:08:19are involved in Vietnam.
0:08:19 > 0:08:21Could you throw any more light on that?
0:08:21 > 0:08:25We have increased our assistance to the government, its logistics.
0:08:25 > 0:08:27We have not sent combat troops there,
0:08:27 > 0:08:31though the training missions that we have there have been instructed
0:08:31 > 0:08:35if they are fired upon, they are too, of course, fire back
0:08:35 > 0:08:38to protect themselves, but we have not sent combat troops
0:08:38 > 0:08:41in the generally understood sense of the word.
0:08:41 > 0:08:43So, I feel that we are...
0:08:44 > 0:08:46..being as frank as we can be.
0:08:48 > 0:08:52What I have said to you is a description of our activity there.
0:08:57 > 0:08:59I was a child of the Cold War.
0:09:00 > 0:09:03When I got off the plane in Saigon
0:09:03 > 0:09:06on a humid evening in April 1962,
0:09:06 > 0:09:08I really believed in all the
0:09:08 > 0:09:09ideology of the Cold War.
0:09:10 > 0:09:13That if we lost South Vietnam,
0:09:13 > 0:09:17the rest of Southeast Asia would fall to the Communists.
0:09:17 > 0:09:20There was an international Communist conspiracy.
0:09:20 > 0:09:22We believed fervently in this stuff.
0:09:23 > 0:09:26Neil Sheehan was a 25-year-old reporter
0:09:26 > 0:09:29for United Press International, UPI.
0:09:29 > 0:09:33He had served three years in the Army
0:09:33 > 0:09:37in Korea and Japan before deciding to become a newspaperman.
0:09:37 > 0:09:41Vietnam was his first, full-time overseas assignment,
0:09:41 > 0:09:43and his only worry, he remembered,
0:09:43 > 0:09:45was that he would get there too late
0:09:45 > 0:09:47and miss out on the big story.
0:09:48 > 0:09:51Sheehan and other reporters rode along
0:09:51 > 0:09:54as the ARVN mounted a series of helicopter assaults
0:09:54 > 0:09:58on enemy strongholds in the Mekong Delta and elsewhere,
0:09:58 > 0:10:01and brought terror to the Viet Cong.
0:10:02 > 0:10:05American pilots were at the controls.
0:10:06 > 0:10:08It was a crusade, and it was thrilling.
0:10:10 > 0:10:12And you'd climb aboard the helicopters
0:10:12 > 0:10:16with the Vietnamese soldiers who were being taken out to battle,
0:10:16 > 0:10:18and you believed in what was happening.
0:10:18 > 0:10:22I mean, you had the sense that we're fighting here, and someday,
0:10:22 > 0:10:26we'll win, and this country will be a better country for our coming.
0:10:26 > 0:10:30The new M113 armoured personnel carriers
0:10:30 > 0:10:34were capable of churning across rivers and rice paddies,
0:10:34 > 0:10:36and right through the earth and dykes
0:10:36 > 0:10:39that separated one field from the next.
0:10:40 > 0:10:43The Viet Cong had nothing with which to stop them.
0:10:46 > 0:10:48We have some people running along the dykes.
0:10:48 > 0:10:53Actually, the canal is perpendicular to the one you're attacking now.
0:10:53 > 0:10:54They have on black uniforms,
0:10:54 > 0:10:57and I estimate approximately 30.
0:10:59 > 0:11:02That's what was causing us to win, you see.
0:11:02 > 0:11:05We were winning one after the other.
0:11:05 > 0:11:08And we were not meeting a heck of a lot of resistance.
0:11:10 > 0:11:13As the ARVN and their advisers pursued the Viet Cong,
0:11:13 > 0:11:15the government of Ngo Dinh Diem
0:11:15 > 0:11:18had launched an ambitious programme
0:11:18 > 0:11:21meant to gain control of the countryside
0:11:21 > 0:11:24by concentrating the rural population
0:11:24 > 0:11:27into thousands of fortified settlements.
0:11:27 > 0:11:31Ringed with barbed wire and moats, and bamboo spikes
0:11:31 > 0:11:34meant to keep out the Viet Cong.
0:11:34 > 0:11:37They were called strategic hamlets.
0:11:37 > 0:11:40Part of the effort to win the hearts and minds,
0:11:40 > 0:11:42and loyalty of the Vietnamese people.
0:11:44 > 0:11:48The French had tried something like it a decade before.
0:11:48 > 0:11:50They had called it pacification.
0:11:52 > 0:11:55President Diem's Strategic Hamlet Program
0:11:55 > 0:11:57is making substantial progress.
0:11:57 > 0:12:02About 1,600 of the some 14,000 hamlets
0:12:02 > 0:12:05have been fortified to date.
0:12:05 > 0:12:11By the summer of 1962, news from South Vietnam seemed so promising
0:12:11 > 0:12:14that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
0:12:14 > 0:12:18made sure the Pentagon was prepared to implement a plan
0:12:18 > 0:12:24for a gradual withdrawal of American advisers, to be completed by 1965.
0:12:25 > 0:12:27So far as most Americans knew,
0:12:27 > 0:12:31the United States was achieving its goal.
0:12:31 > 0:12:34A stable, independent, anti-Communist state
0:12:34 > 0:12:36in South Vietnam.
0:12:38 > 0:12:41"It was a struggle this country cannot shirk,"
0:12:41 > 0:12:43The New York Times said,
0:12:43 > 0:12:45"And the United States seem to be winning it."
0:12:49 > 0:12:51But that same summer,
0:12:51 > 0:12:53Ho Chi Minh travelled to Beijing
0:12:53 > 0:12:55in search of more help from the Chinese.
0:12:56 > 0:13:00The American build-up in South Vietnam had alarmed him
0:13:00 > 0:13:03and the other leaders in Hanoi.
0:13:03 > 0:13:08Ho told the Chinese that American attacks on North Vietnam itself
0:13:08 > 0:13:10now seemed only a matter of time.
0:13:12 > 0:13:15The Chinese promised to equip and arm
0:13:15 > 0:13:18tens of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers.
0:13:19 > 0:13:21Meanwhile, the Politburo in Hanoi
0:13:21 > 0:13:26had directed that every able-bodied North Vietnamese man
0:13:26 > 0:13:29be required to serve in the Armed Forces.
0:13:56 > 0:14:00People used to joke in Vietnam about winning the hearts and minds,
0:14:00 > 0:14:02and you hear that expression,
0:14:02 > 0:14:04but that should not be a joke.
0:14:04 > 0:14:06It's a serious, serious problem.
0:14:06 > 0:14:10If you pull off a military operation,
0:14:10 > 0:14:13and it may be successful on a military basis,
0:14:13 > 0:14:15but you destroy a village,
0:14:15 > 0:14:19then you've created a village of resistance.
0:14:19 > 0:14:23The important thing was not to alienate the population.
0:14:23 > 0:14:25If you got sniper fire from the hamlet,
0:14:25 > 0:14:28you send in riflemen to take out the sniper.
0:14:28 > 0:14:29You didn't shell the place
0:14:29 > 0:14:33because you were going to kill women and kids, and destroy houses,
0:14:33 > 0:14:36and you were going to turn the population against you.
0:14:37 > 0:14:41Most press coverage of Vietnam was upbeat,
0:14:41 > 0:14:43in the tradition of previous wars.
0:14:44 > 0:14:48But a handful of young reporters were beginning to see that from the
0:14:48 > 0:14:50Vietnamese countryside,
0:14:50 > 0:14:54things looked very different than they did from the press offices in
0:14:54 > 0:14:56Washington or Saigon.
0:14:58 > 0:15:01So it was terribly important that we not only win the war,
0:15:01 > 0:15:04but that we as reporters report the truth
0:15:04 > 0:15:07that would help to win the war.
0:15:07 > 0:15:10We were very fervent in wanting to report the truth
0:15:10 > 0:15:13because it was very important to the welfare of our country,
0:15:13 > 0:15:15and to the welfare of the world.
0:15:17 > 0:15:20Sheehan and his colleagues began asking tough questions
0:15:20 > 0:15:23about what constituted progress,
0:15:23 > 0:15:27what victory would look like, and if the people in the countryside,
0:15:27 > 0:15:31where 80% of South Vietnam's population lived,
0:15:31 > 0:15:34could ever trust the Government in Saigon.
0:15:37 > 0:15:40I remember going, during one of Robert McNamara's visits,
0:15:40 > 0:15:42out to one of these hamlets.
0:15:42 > 0:15:44The Vietnamese general command of the area
0:15:44 > 0:15:46was telling McNamara what a wonderful thing this was,
0:15:46 > 0:15:48and some of these farmers were down,
0:15:48 > 0:15:52digging a ditch around the hamlet.
0:15:52 > 0:15:55I looked at their faces, and they were really angry.
0:15:57 > 0:15:59I mean, it was very obvious to me
0:15:59 > 0:16:02that if these people could, they'd cut our throats.
0:16:06 > 0:16:10Farmers resented being forced to abandon their homes
0:16:10 > 0:16:13and move to strategic hamlets.
0:16:13 > 0:16:16Corrupt officials siphoned off funds,
0:16:16 > 0:16:18and villagers blamed the Diem regime
0:16:18 > 0:16:22for failing to protect them from guerrilla attacks.
0:16:23 > 0:16:25As the people's anger grew,
0:16:25 > 0:16:27so did the ranks of the Viet Cong.
0:16:29 > 0:16:33It turned out that the Viet Cong were recruiting men
0:16:33 > 0:16:36right out of those so-called strategic hamlets.
0:16:36 > 0:16:38And then the whole programme fell apart.
0:17:02 > 0:17:06Nguyen Ngoc's father was a postal clerk south of Da Nang.
0:17:06 > 0:17:10His brothers and sisters taught in South Vietnamese schools,
0:17:10 > 0:17:12but he joined the revolution,
0:17:12 > 0:17:15and as a political officer, wrote poems,
0:17:15 > 0:17:20songs and slogans to inspire the people in the countryside
0:17:20 > 0:17:21to support the Viet Cong.
0:17:23 > 0:17:28The Viet Cong cavalry would come in and talk to them,
0:17:28 > 0:17:33and their message is usually, "Bien dau buon cua minh thanh hanh dong,"
0:17:33 > 0:17:36which means, "Turn your grief into action.
0:17:36 > 0:17:37"Do something about it.
0:17:37 > 0:17:38"Join us.
0:17:39 > 0:17:43"We'll fight together. We'll liberate the country
0:17:43 > 0:17:45"from this corrupt, unjust government.
0:17:45 > 0:17:47"We'll throw out the foreigners.
0:17:47 > 0:17:50"We'll reunify the country,
0:17:50 > 0:17:53"and we'll bring in this great regime that will take care of you,
0:17:53 > 0:17:56"and bring economic and social justice."
0:17:59 > 0:18:04Secretary McNamara decided that he would draw up some kind of a chart
0:18:04 > 0:18:07to determine whether we were winning or not.
0:18:08 > 0:18:11And he was putting things in,
0:18:11 > 0:18:14like numbers of weapons recovered,
0:18:14 > 0:18:16numbers of Viet Cong killed...
0:18:16 > 0:18:18Very statistical.
0:18:22 > 0:18:26And he asked head of Special Operations, Edward Lansdale,
0:18:26 > 0:18:28to come down and look at this.
0:18:28 > 0:18:30And so Lansdale did, and he said,
0:18:30 > 0:18:32"There's something missing.
0:18:32 > 0:18:35"The feelings of the Vietnamese people."
0:18:35 > 0:18:38You couldn't reduce this to a statistic.
0:18:40 > 0:18:46Robert McNamara had vowed to make America's military cost-effective.
0:18:46 > 0:18:48He demanded that everything be quantified.
0:18:50 > 0:18:53In Saigon, General Paul D Harkins,
0:18:53 > 0:18:58head of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, known as MACV,
0:18:58 > 0:19:00dutifully complied.
0:19:00 > 0:19:04He and his staff generated mountains of daily, weekly,
0:19:04 > 0:19:07monthly and quarterly data,
0:19:07 > 0:19:10on more than 100 separate indicators.
0:19:10 > 0:19:14Far more data than could ever be adequately analysed.
0:19:19 > 0:19:21Punctuated by bouts of violence,
0:19:21 > 0:19:25as government forces come to grips with the black clad Communist
0:19:25 > 0:19:26rebel forces called the Viet Cong.
0:19:29 > 0:19:31The country's 12 million peasants
0:19:31 > 0:19:33can scarcely remember what peace was like.
0:21:31 > 0:21:36On our side, we were not as committed, and we were, um...
0:21:38 > 0:21:40Our leaders were corrupt and incompetent.
0:21:40 > 0:21:46And so, deep down, we always had this fear,
0:21:46 > 0:21:49this suspicion that,
0:21:49 > 0:21:51in the end, it would be the Communists that would win.
0:21:53 > 0:21:56When John Kennedy assembled what he thinks is
0:21:56 > 0:21:58the best and the brightest,
0:21:58 > 0:22:0020 years before that,
0:22:00 > 0:22:04in a cave in the northern part of Vietnam,
0:22:04 > 0:22:07Ho Chi Minh also put together his best and brightest.
0:22:07 > 0:22:10And these guys are at it for a while.
0:22:11 > 0:22:18And when we show up, they were far along to consolidating their victory
0:22:18 > 0:22:21over this inevitable conflict
0:22:21 > 0:22:24between Ho Chi Minh and John F Kennedy's vision.
0:22:25 > 0:22:28The more you think about the American strategy...
0:22:30 > 0:22:32..the more you...
0:22:33 > 0:22:36..know that it was never going to work out particularly well.
0:22:52 > 0:22:57I was at my top of my game when I was in combat.
0:23:02 > 0:23:05You don't have the luxury to indulge your fear,
0:23:05 > 0:23:08because other people's lives depend upon you keeping your head cold.
0:23:18 > 0:23:21You know, when something goes wrong,
0:23:21 > 0:23:22they call it emotional numbing,
0:23:22 > 0:23:24it's not very good in civilian life,
0:23:24 > 0:23:27but it's pretty useful in combat.
0:23:27 > 0:23:30HEAVY BREATHING
0:23:38 > 0:23:43To be able to get absolutely very cold about what needs to be done.
0:23:44 > 0:23:46And to stick with it.
0:23:52 > 0:23:57To me, it's a little bit distressing to realise that I was at my best,
0:23:57 > 0:23:59doing something as terrible as war.
0:24:09 > 0:24:12President Kennedy has staked his reputation in Asia
0:24:12 > 0:24:14on saving South Vietnam from communism.
0:24:15 > 0:24:17As the army makes the sweep towards
0:24:17 > 0:24:19a village suspected of harbouring Viet Cong,
0:24:19 > 0:24:21it can't tell whether it will meet resistance.
0:24:28 > 0:24:31The troops round up all the young men they can find,
0:24:31 > 0:24:34since they can't tell who is a Communist just by looking.
0:24:36 > 0:24:38Those who try to run for it are shot
0:24:38 > 0:24:41on the assumption they've something to hide.
0:25:37 > 0:25:41Back home, Americans were paying little attention
0:25:41 > 0:25:43to what was happening in Vietnam.
0:25:43 > 0:25:48They were watching The Beverly Hillbillies and Gunsmoke on TV.
0:25:48 > 0:25:50They were interested in whether
0:25:50 > 0:25:53the Yankees would win the World Series again,
0:25:53 > 0:25:55and in the recent death of Marilyn Monroe.
0:25:59 > 0:26:02But some Americans had been growing impatient
0:26:02 > 0:26:05with the slow pace of social change.
0:26:05 > 0:26:07We were told in the '50s
0:26:07 > 0:26:10that we lived in the best country in the world.
0:26:10 > 0:26:12In the middle of, you know,
0:26:12 > 0:26:15trying to figure out what it meant to be
0:26:15 > 0:26:17a citizen of this best country in the world,
0:26:17 > 0:26:20suddenly, the civil rights movement exploded
0:26:20 > 0:26:22into our consciousness.
0:26:28 > 0:26:31We didn't think we had any power.
0:26:31 > 0:26:34We didn't think we could be actors in history.
0:26:34 > 0:26:35That we could affect things.
0:26:44 > 0:26:45And suddenly, you know,
0:26:45 > 0:26:49these young, black students in the south were doing exactly that.
0:26:49 > 0:26:52And it just blew the tops of our heads off.
0:26:54 > 0:27:00MUSIC: Stand By Me By Ben E King
0:27:25 > 0:27:30Diem was simply the opposite of what democracy was.
0:27:31 > 0:27:35South Vietnam in the competition against the North,
0:27:35 > 0:27:39that should have been
0:27:39 > 0:27:44the golden opportunity to have that society open
0:27:44 > 0:27:46with the free press, and free expression.
0:27:48 > 0:27:50But there was not much choice
0:27:50 > 0:27:57if the two systems are structurally dictator and oppressive systems,
0:27:57 > 0:28:01one under the Communist Party, one under a family.
0:28:20 > 0:28:22Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu,
0:28:22 > 0:28:25ran a personal political party that mirrored
0:28:25 > 0:28:29the techniques and the ruthlessness of the Communists
0:28:29 > 0:28:33and supervised a host of internal security units
0:28:33 > 0:28:35that spied on, and seized,
0:28:35 > 0:28:36enemies of the regime.
0:28:38 > 0:28:43Some reporters who probed too deeply into what Diem and Nhu were doing
0:28:43 > 0:28:45were ordered out of the country.
0:28:47 > 0:28:49When an American journalist objected,
0:28:49 > 0:28:52Nhu's sharp-tongued wife told him,
0:28:52 > 0:28:56"Vietnam had no use for your crazy freedoms."
0:28:57 > 0:29:01What we should have done is either forced the Vietnamese,
0:29:01 > 0:29:05I mean, really forced them to clean up their act,
0:29:05 > 0:29:07and if they wouldn't clean up their act,
0:29:07 > 0:29:09to say, "We're out of here."
0:29:10 > 0:29:13Because we don't bet on losing horses.
0:29:13 > 0:29:15This is a losing horse.
0:29:15 > 0:29:18You are not going to win this insurgency.
0:29:18 > 0:29:19We, as Americans,
0:29:19 > 0:29:22should have understood the desire of the Vietnamese people
0:29:22 > 0:29:23to have their own country.
0:29:25 > 0:29:28I mean... We did the same thing to the Brits.
0:29:30 > 0:29:34In a few days after Christmas 1962,
0:29:34 > 0:29:37the seventh ARVN division got orders
0:29:37 > 0:29:40to capture a Viet Cong radio transmitter
0:29:40 > 0:29:44broadcasting from a spot some 40 miles south-west of Saigon,
0:29:44 > 0:29:47in a village called Tan Thoi.
0:29:47 > 0:29:50The village was surrounded by rice paddies,
0:29:50 > 0:29:55an irrigation dyke linked it to a neighbouring hamlet, Ap Bac.
0:29:57 > 0:30:02At 6:35 in the morning, on January second, 1963,
0:30:02 > 0:30:06ten American helicopters ferried an ARVN company
0:30:06 > 0:30:09to a spot just north of Tan Thoi.
0:30:12 > 0:30:14They met no resistance.
0:30:15 > 0:30:19Meanwhile, two South Vietnamese civil guard battalions
0:30:19 > 0:30:22approached Ap Bac from the South on foot.
0:30:25 > 0:30:27Facing them was Le Quan Cong,
0:30:27 > 0:30:32who had been a guerrilla fighter since 1951, when he was 12.
0:30:47 > 0:30:51The Viet Cong Commander let the civil guards get within 100 feet,
0:30:51 > 0:30:53before giving the order to fire.
0:30:56 > 0:30:59Several South Vietnamese soldiers were killed.
0:31:03 > 0:31:05Survivors hid behind a dyke.
0:31:09 > 0:31:12Ten more helicopters filled with troops,
0:31:12 > 0:31:16and escorted by five helicopter gunships, roared in to help.
0:31:43 > 0:31:48Viet Cong machine guns hit 14 of the 15 aircraft.
0:31:48 > 0:31:52Five would be destroyed, killing and wounding American crewmen.
0:32:02 > 0:32:05The enemy concentrated their fire on the ARVN
0:32:05 > 0:32:08struggling to get out of the downed helicopters.
0:32:08 > 0:32:11It was like shooting ducks for the Viet Cong,
0:32:11 > 0:32:13and American crewmen remember.
0:32:14 > 0:32:20Captain James Scanlon was an adviser to the seventh division of the ARVN.
0:32:20 > 0:32:23It would take him an hour to convince his ARVN counterpart
0:32:23 > 0:32:28to mount a rescue using a unit of APCs.
0:32:28 > 0:32:31Another two hours were lost before the APCs
0:32:31 > 0:32:34could make their way through the paddies towards the trapped men.
0:32:36 > 0:32:38By that time, the firing had died down.
0:32:40 > 0:32:41Everything was quiet.
0:32:41 > 0:32:44You could see the open expanse of rice fields,
0:32:44 > 0:32:48and my reaction was, "Hey, it was all over."
0:32:48 > 0:32:51The first two APCs drop their ramps.
0:32:51 > 0:32:53Infantry squad stepped out,
0:32:53 > 0:32:58prepared to spray the tree line with automatic fire as they advanced.
0:32:58 > 0:33:03In the past, that had been enough to make the Viet Cong scurry away.
0:33:04 > 0:33:06This time was different.
0:33:09 > 0:33:12Eight of the APCs came under attack.
0:33:12 > 0:33:15Within minutes, six of their gunners had been killed,
0:33:15 > 0:33:17shot through the head.
0:33:18 > 0:33:21And, boy, we got wrecked.
0:33:21 > 0:33:24So it was like a pool table, we were on the green
0:33:24 > 0:33:26and they were in the pocket, shooting at us.
0:33:29 > 0:33:32That night, the Viet Cong melted away.
0:33:34 > 0:33:35In the end, at least 80
0:33:35 > 0:33:39South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed.
0:33:39 > 0:33:44So had three American advisers, including captain Ken Good.
0:33:48 > 0:33:52We stacked the bomber personnel carriers with bodies,
0:33:52 > 0:33:56stacked them up on top until we couldn't stack any more.
0:33:56 > 0:34:00And I wouldn't let the Vietnamese touch the Americans.
0:34:02 > 0:34:05So I carried the Americans out
0:34:05 > 0:34:10and, um, and I was exhausted.
0:34:10 > 0:34:14They told me about Ken Good getting killed.
0:34:16 > 0:34:19And Ken and I had worked so hard with our two battalions,
0:34:19 > 0:34:23and to hear that he got killed hurt.
0:34:26 > 0:34:27Great guy.
0:34:30 > 0:34:35Back in Saigon, General Harkins immediately declared victory.
0:34:35 > 0:34:38"The ARVN forces had an objective," he said.
0:34:38 > 0:34:41"We took that objective, the VC left,
0:34:41 > 0:34:46"and their casualties were greater than those of the government forces.
0:34:46 > 0:34:48"What more do you want?"
0:34:50 > 0:34:52Ap Bac was terribly important.
0:34:52 > 0:34:54They shot down five helicopters
0:34:54 > 0:34:56which they previously were terrified of.
0:34:58 > 0:35:00They'd stopped the armoured personnel carriers.
0:35:01 > 0:35:03They demonstrated to their own people
0:35:03 > 0:35:06that you could resist the Americans and win.
0:35:26 > 0:35:29In Hanoi, the Battle of Ap Bac was seen by
0:35:29 > 0:35:31party First Secretary Le Duan
0:35:31 > 0:35:34and his Politburo allies,
0:35:34 > 0:35:38as evidence of the inherent weakness of the South Vietnamese regime.
0:35:40 > 0:35:43"We don't have a prayer of staying in Vietnam,"
0:35:43 > 0:35:48President Kennedy privately told a friend that spring.
0:35:48 > 0:35:50"These people hate us.
0:35:50 > 0:35:53"But I can't give up a piece of territory
0:35:53 > 0:35:55"like that to the Communists
0:35:55 > 0:35:57"and then get the people to re-elect me".
0:36:05 > 0:36:08Buddhist monks and nuns are joined by thousands of sympathisers
0:36:08 > 0:36:11to protest the government's restrictions
0:36:11 > 0:36:14on the practice of their religion in South Vietnam.
0:36:14 > 0:36:18Diem began by alienating the rural population,
0:36:18 > 0:36:20and that started the Viet Cong.
0:36:20 > 0:36:23Now he was alienating the urban population.
0:36:24 > 0:36:27In the months that followed the Battle of Ap Bac,
0:36:27 > 0:36:31South Vietnam plunged into civil strife
0:36:31 > 0:36:33that had little to do with the Viet Cong.
0:36:35 > 0:36:37Religion and nationalism where at its heart.
0:36:39 > 0:36:41The Catholic minority had for years
0:36:41 > 0:36:45dominated the government of an overwhelmingly Buddhist country.
0:36:47 > 0:36:50That spring, in the city of Hue,
0:36:50 > 0:36:53Christian flags had been flown to celebrate
0:36:53 > 0:36:57the 25th anniversary of the ordination of Diem's older brother
0:36:57 > 0:36:59as a Catholic bishop.
0:37:02 > 0:37:07But when the Buddhists of the city flew their flags
0:37:07 > 0:37:11to celebrate the 2,527th birthday of Lord Buddha,
0:37:11 > 0:37:13police tore them down.
0:37:14 > 0:37:16Protesters took to the streets.
0:37:19 > 0:37:21The Catholic Deputy Province Chief
0:37:21 > 0:37:24sent security forces to suppress the demonstration.
0:37:25 > 0:37:27The soldiers opened fire.
0:37:28 > 0:37:30Eight protesters died.
0:37:31 > 0:37:34The youngest was 12.
0:37:34 > 0:37:36The oldest was 20.
0:37:38 > 0:37:43My mother was convinced that Diem was destroying the Buddhist faith.
0:37:44 > 0:37:49She would go to the pagodas and listen to the monks' speeches,
0:37:49 > 0:37:52and she was just extremely upset.
0:37:53 > 0:37:56She was not alone, there was a lot of people like her.
0:37:58 > 0:38:02American officials urged Diem and his brother Nhu
0:38:02 > 0:38:05to make meaningful concessions to the Buddhists
0:38:05 > 0:38:08for the sake of maintaining unity
0:38:08 > 0:38:10in the struggle against communism.
0:38:10 > 0:38:13They refused.
0:38:14 > 0:38:17On June 10th, 1963,
0:38:17 > 0:38:19Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press
0:38:19 > 0:38:22received an anonymous tip -
0:38:22 > 0:38:26something important was going to happen the next day
0:38:26 > 0:38:28at a major intersection in Saigon.
0:38:29 > 0:38:31He took his camera.
0:38:39 > 0:38:43To protest the Diem regime's repression,
0:38:43 > 0:38:47a 73-year-old monk named Quang Duc set himself on fire.
0:39:06 > 0:39:11As a large, hushed crowd watched him burn to death,
0:39:11 > 0:39:15another monk repeated, over and over again
0:39:15 > 0:39:18in English and Vietnamese,
0:39:18 > 0:39:21"A Buddhist monk becomes a martyr.
0:39:21 > 0:39:23"A Buddhist monk becomes a martyr."
0:39:30 > 0:39:33I remember they held the ashes of
0:39:33 > 0:39:36the monk who burned himself to death,
0:39:36 > 0:39:38or it was kept in one of the main pagodas.
0:39:39 > 0:39:43And lines of people came to pass by it.
0:39:43 > 0:39:45And I saw these women, not rich women,
0:39:45 > 0:39:48ordinary Vietnamese women,
0:39:48 > 0:39:51take off the one piece of gold they had on them, their wedding ring,
0:39:51 > 0:39:55and drop it in the bottle to contribute to the struggle.
0:39:57 > 0:40:00And I thought to myself, "This regime is over.
0:40:00 > 0:40:01"It's the end."
0:40:05 > 0:40:08Soon, other monks would become martyrs.
0:40:11 > 0:40:16Fresh outbursts by Madame Nhu only made things worse.
0:40:17 > 0:40:20Burning monks made her clap her hands, she said,
0:40:20 > 0:40:23if more monks wanted to burn themselves,
0:40:23 > 0:40:25she would provide the matches.
0:40:26 > 0:40:31The only thing they have done, they have barbecued
0:40:31 > 0:40:34one of their monks
0:40:34 > 0:40:40whom they have intoxicated, whom they have abused the confidence.
0:40:40 > 0:40:46Even that barbecuing was done not even with self-sufficient means
0:40:46 > 0:40:50because they use imported gasoline.
0:40:51 > 0:40:55They felt she was arrogant, she was power hungry,
0:40:55 > 0:40:59they suspected her and her husband of being corrupt.
0:40:59 > 0:41:04Nhu ran the secret police, which arrested and tortured people.
0:41:06 > 0:41:08People feared the Diem regime,
0:41:08 > 0:41:12perhaps more than they feared it, they really hated it.
0:41:14 > 0:41:17Students, including many Catholics,
0:41:17 > 0:41:20rallied to the Buddhist cause.
0:41:20 > 0:41:21So did some army officers.
0:41:23 > 0:41:27People among the military had to ask the question,
0:41:27 > 0:41:30"Can we continue with this kind of situation like that
0:41:30 > 0:41:33"when the whole country was almost burning
0:41:33 > 0:41:37"with the protests from the Buddhists?"
0:41:40 > 0:41:44I first became aware of Vietnam because of a burning monk.
0:41:47 > 0:41:49We had watched the
0:41:49 > 0:41:52civil rights movement in the south,
0:41:52 > 0:41:56and it had set the standard for us,
0:41:56 > 0:41:58to stand up against injustice.
0:41:59 > 0:42:02To allow yourself to be beaten up,
0:42:02 > 0:42:05to allow yourself to be attacked by a dog, or hit by a police truncheon.
0:42:05 > 0:42:09And we had enormous respect for people
0:42:09 > 0:42:11who were willing to go that far.
0:42:16 > 0:42:21And then, one day in 1963, we saw on television
0:42:21 > 0:42:24a picture of a monk in Saigon.
0:42:24 > 0:42:26This was an extraordinary act.
0:42:29 > 0:42:34Why was a Buddhist monk burning himself on the streets of Saigon?
0:42:38 > 0:42:40The protests continued.
0:42:40 > 0:42:44Tensions between Washington and Saigon steadily worsened.
0:42:45 > 0:42:49The more the Kennedy administration demanded change,
0:42:49 > 0:42:52the more Diem and his brother Nhu seemed to resist.
0:43:01 > 0:43:04Martial law was imposed.
0:43:04 > 0:43:06Public meetings were forbidden.
0:43:06 > 0:43:09Troops were authorised to shoot anyone
0:43:09 > 0:43:13found on the streets after nine o'clock.
0:43:13 > 0:43:17When college students protested in support of the monks,
0:43:17 > 0:43:19Diem closed Vietnam's universities.
0:43:20 > 0:43:24High school students then poured into the streets.
0:43:24 > 0:43:26He shut down all the high schools,
0:43:26 > 0:43:28and the grammar schools too.
0:43:28 > 0:43:31And arrested thousands of schoolchildren,
0:43:31 > 0:43:35including the sons and daughters of officials in his own government.
0:43:36 > 0:43:39Henry Cabot Lodge took over as US Ambassador
0:43:39 > 0:43:40in the midst of the turmoil,
0:43:40 > 0:43:43and he is reported to have demanded that President Diem's brother, Nhu,
0:43:43 > 0:43:46be ousted, or US aid to Vietnam will be cut.
0:43:50 > 0:43:53A small group of South Vietnamese generals
0:43:53 > 0:43:55contacted the CIA in Saigon.
0:43:56 > 0:43:57Diem's brother, Nhu,
0:43:57 > 0:44:02was now largely in control of the government, they said.
0:44:02 > 0:44:05What would Washington's reaction be if they mounted a coup?
0:44:07 > 0:44:12President Kennedy and his senior advisers happened to be out of town.
0:44:12 > 0:44:14So Roger Hilsman Jnr,
0:44:14 > 0:44:18Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
0:44:18 > 0:44:20and a critic of the Diem regime,
0:44:20 > 0:44:23took it upon himself to draft a cable
0:44:23 > 0:44:26with new instructions for Ambassador Lodge.
0:44:28 > 0:44:32The US Government could no longer tolerate a situation
0:44:32 > 0:44:35in which power lay in Nhu's hands, it said.
0:44:35 > 0:44:39Diem should be given a chance to rid himself of his brother.
0:44:40 > 0:44:42If he refused,
0:44:42 > 0:44:44Lodge was to tell the generals,
0:44:44 > 0:44:47"Then we must face the possibility that Diem himself
0:44:47 > 0:44:49"cannot be preserved."
0:44:51 > 0:44:55The president was vacationing at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.
0:44:55 > 0:44:58Under Secretary of State George Ball
0:44:58 > 0:45:01read part of the cable to him over the phone.
0:45:02 > 0:45:07Since the early 1950s, the United States Government had encouraged,
0:45:07 > 0:45:13and even orchestrated, other Cold War coups in Iran, Guatemala,
0:45:13 > 0:45:14The Congo and elsewhere.
0:45:17 > 0:45:21Kennedy decided to approve Hilsman's cable.
0:45:21 > 0:45:27In part, because he thought his top advisers had already endorsed it.
0:45:27 > 0:45:28They had not.
0:45:30 > 0:45:33And, somehow, because of a cable
0:45:33 > 0:45:36that came out from Washington, Lodge decided,
0:45:36 > 0:45:40that the only solution was to get rid of not just Ngo Dinh Nhu,
0:45:40 > 0:45:44the bad brother, but also of Diem himself,
0:45:44 > 0:45:49and that started us on this whole business of promoting a coup.
0:45:49 > 0:45:51And it was not a good idea.
0:45:53 > 0:45:55I just had a feeling of impending disaster.
0:45:57 > 0:46:00On September 2nd, 1963, Labor Day,
0:46:00 > 0:46:03Walter Cronkite of CBS News
0:46:03 > 0:46:06interviewed President Kennedy.
0:46:06 > 0:46:08The president used the opportunity
0:46:08 > 0:46:12to deliver a message to President Diem.
0:46:12 > 0:46:15President, hasn't every indication from Saigon been
0:46:15 > 0:46:19that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?
0:46:19 > 0:46:22If he doesn't change it, of course, that's his decision.
0:46:22 > 0:46:25He's been there ten years. As I say, he has carried this burden when
0:46:25 > 0:46:27he's been counted on a number of occasions.
0:46:27 > 0:46:30Our best judgement is that can't be successful on this basis.
0:46:30 > 0:46:33But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw.
0:46:33 > 0:46:35That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake.
0:46:35 > 0:46:36I know people don't like
0:46:36 > 0:46:39Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort,
0:46:39 > 0:46:4147 Americans have been killed.
0:46:42 > 0:46:46We are in a very desperate struggle against the Communist system
0:46:46 > 0:46:49and I don't want Asia to pass into the control of the Chinese.
0:46:49 > 0:46:53Do you think this government still has time to
0:46:53 > 0:46:54regain the support of the people?
0:46:54 > 0:47:00Yes, I do. With changes in policy, and perhaps in personnel,
0:47:00 > 0:47:03I think it can. If it doesn't
0:47:03 > 0:47:05make those changes,
0:47:05 > 0:47:08I would think the chances of winning it would not be very good.
0:47:10 > 0:47:11Despite the cable,
0:47:11 > 0:47:15Kennedy and his advisers were sharply divided about a coup.
0:47:16 > 0:47:21Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, Vice President Lyndon Johnson,
0:47:21 > 0:47:26and the head of the CIA all cautioned against it.
0:47:26 > 0:47:29Because, while none of them especially admired Diem,
0:47:29 > 0:47:33they did not believe there was any viable alternative.
0:47:35 > 0:47:38In the end, Kennedy instructed Lodge
0:47:38 > 0:47:41to tell the renegade generals that
0:47:41 > 0:47:45while the United States does not wish to stimulate a coup,
0:47:45 > 0:47:46it would not thwart one either.
0:47:48 > 0:47:50The generals laid their plans.
0:47:58 > 0:48:01On November 1st, 1963,
0:48:01 > 0:48:03troops loyal to the plotters
0:48:03 > 0:48:06seized key installations in Saigon
0:48:06 > 0:48:09and demanded Diem and Nhu surrender.
0:48:12 > 0:48:14The battle for the city went on for 18 hours,
0:48:14 > 0:48:18and most of it was centred on the presidential palace.
0:48:18 > 0:48:21Just after 6.30 in the morning, Saturday, the shootings ceased.
0:48:30 > 0:48:35Diem and Nhu escaped, took sanctuary in a church,
0:48:35 > 0:48:38and agreed to surrender to the rebels
0:48:38 > 0:48:42in exchange for the promise of safe passage out of the country.
0:48:42 > 0:48:46They were picked up in an armoured personnel carrier.
0:48:46 > 0:48:48GUNSHOT
0:48:48 > 0:48:51And murdered soon after they climbed inside.
0:48:51 > 0:48:53GUNSHOT
0:48:57 > 0:49:00Madame Nhu survived the coup.
0:49:00 > 0:49:03She was on a goodwill tour in the United States.
0:49:07 > 0:49:11Monday, November 4th, 1963.
0:49:11 > 0:49:14Over the weekend, the coup in Saigon took place,
0:49:14 > 0:49:17culminated three months of conversation
0:49:17 > 0:49:21which divided the Government here and in Saigon.
0:49:23 > 0:49:26I feel that...
0:49:26 > 0:49:28..for it,
0:49:28 > 0:49:32beginning with our cable of August, in which we suggested a coup.
0:49:34 > 0:49:36..to it,
0:49:36 > 0:49:38without a round table conference.
0:49:42 > 0:49:46I was shocked by the death of Diem and Nhu.
0:49:46 > 0:49:49The way he was killed made it particularly abhorrent.
0:49:49 > 0:49:53The question now is whether the generals can stay together
0:49:53 > 0:49:55and build a stable government,
0:49:55 > 0:49:58or whether public opinion in Saigon will turn on this government
0:49:58 > 0:50:02as repressive and undemocratic, in the not-too-distant future.
0:50:08 > 0:50:13Kennedy would not live to see the answer to the question he had asked.
0:50:13 > 0:50:16He was murdered in Dallas 18 days later.
0:50:17 > 0:50:21There were now 16,000 American advisers in South Vietnam.
0:50:23 > 0:50:27Their fate, and the fate of that embattled country,
0:50:27 > 0:50:33rested with another American president, Lyndon Baines Johnson.
0:50:50 > 0:50:55We thought we were the exceptions to history, the Americans.
0:50:55 > 0:50:57History didn't apply to us.
0:50:57 > 0:50:59We could never fight a bad war.
0:50:59 > 0:51:01We could never represent the wrong cause.
0:51:01 > 0:51:03We were Americans.
0:51:04 > 0:51:07Well, in Vietnam, it proved that we were not an exception to history.
0:51:24 > 0:51:29MUSIC: Mean Old World By Sam Cooke