:00:03. > :00:09.politician with a Ph.D. In traffic management became a personality to
:00:10. > :00:19.be reckoned with on the international stage.
:00:20. > :00:29.
:00:29. > :00:39.himself into one of the most famous and provocative Iranianss in modern
:00:39. > :00:47.
:00:47. > :00:57.history? Who is this man? His extreme views are almost unbalanced
:00:57. > :01:05.
:01:05. > :01:10.views. He was warm, extroverted, religious and pretty nice, actually.
:01:10. > :01:17.Did the worst over estimate the threat posed by an opportunist with
:01:17. > :01:27.little actual power? Did we ever really understand him? No, we
:01:27. > :01:27.
:01:27. > :02:26.Apology for the loss of subtitles for 58 seconds
:02:26. > :02:36.appear to be of little interest. Here, he even has to be prodded into
:02:36. > :02:48.
:02:48. > :02:58.on meeting the crowd. -- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad insists on meeting the
:02:58. > :03:05.
:03:05. > :03:13.crowd, a populist meeting his enjoys the stage he has spent the
:03:13. > :03:21.last eight years building. I see him as a man of heroism who
:03:21. > :03:24.stands against any act of oppression and suppression. That is how I see.
:03:24. > :03:34.He stands not for an Islamic Republic but the liberation of
:03:34. > :03:53.
:03:53. > :04:03.mankind. We love him A&E we live in supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
:04:03. > :04:05.
:04:05. > :04:14.Khamenei. But every four years, the country chooses a president. It is
:04:15. > :04:17.an office with plenty of exposure but little ultimate power. In 2005,
:04:17. > :04:27.the mayor of Tehran decided that he could make more of this job than
:04:27. > :04:45.
:04:45. > :04:55.like a potential president. He wore a cheap jacket instead of a road.
:04:55. > :04:55.
:04:55. > :06:06.Apology for the loss of subtitles for 58 seconds
:06:06. > :06:12.His final campaign events were of Iran's new president. The Bush
:06:12. > :06:18.administration found itself with a simple question. Who was Mahmoud
:06:18. > :06:24.Ahmadinejad? What you get when you are in the White House is a lot of
:06:24. > :06:29.different views and a lot of different strands of who this man
:06:30. > :06:35.is. It is very difficult, even with someone that American officials
:06:35. > :06:38.might have spent a lot of time with, to make judgements. This was a thug,
:06:38. > :06:48.of course, which for a variety of reasons the American teachers not
:06:48. > :06:52.
:06:52. > :07:01.spent any time with. The answer is, one stronger early clue, here at
:07:01. > :07:08.Ahmadinejad's endorsement. Ayatollah Khamenei embraces his new president.
:07:08. > :07:14.Then he chooses to leave. He has little need for attention. But
:07:14. > :07:24.Ahmadinejad does not follow him. The leader's bodyguards try to force the
:07:24. > :07:52.
:07:52. > :07:58.new president of the stage. -- off uranium president debases support on
:07:58. > :08:05.the working class. -- the first Iranians president to base his
:08:05. > :08:08.support on the working class. In his first term, he decided that he could
:08:08. > :08:18.not defy the clerics who had helped to put him in office, but he could
:08:18. > :08:36.
:08:36. > :08:39.way of getting everyone's attention. He had inherited a uranium in
:08:39. > :08:46.Richmond freeze negotiated with European politicians. By the time of
:08:46. > :08:56.his election, this deal was already in trouble. Just some months before
:08:56. > :08:57.
:08:57. > :09:02.the election in 2005, I personally told him very clearly and openly to
:09:02. > :09:09.my three EU intellects uses, regardless of who would be elected
:09:09. > :09:17.as president, Iran would restart enrichment.
:09:17. > :09:21.Days after Ahmadinejad took office, Iran ended the deal. The president
:09:21. > :09:25.may have jumped on board something that was about to happen anyway. He
:09:25. > :09:34.may not have made the final decision himself, but he got Washington's
:09:34. > :09:40.attention. The negotiated solution which through the EU leadership we
:09:40. > :09:49.had obtained, he basically reversed it. He came within the Iranian
:09:49. > :09:53.political system, possibly the most visible advocate of the nuclear
:09:53. > :10:01.programme as somehow the essence of Iranians sovereignty. We were
:10:01. > :10:03.dragged along -- initially, the supreme leader was dragged along
:10:03. > :10:09.reluctantly, and the supreme leader may have learned from that example
:10:09. > :10:13.that the nuclear programme could be, in some sense, an element of support
:10:13. > :10:21.for the supreme leader among the population, because Ahmadinejad was
:10:21. > :10:31.really the one he made that programme somehow the essence of
:10:31. > :10:35.
:10:35. > :10:40.Iranians sovereignty and pride. has no fear. No fear. He said, we
:10:40. > :10:50.will start and they will be able to do nothing. That's it. That's it.
:10:50. > :10:51.
:10:51. > :11:00.This is your mistake. They cannot do anything. I was really shocked. He
:11:00. > :11:10.was so brave. He was inexperienced about international equation
:11:10. > :11:30.
:11:30. > :11:38.politics and relations. He clearly United Nations General assembly that
:11:38. > :11:46.year determines to be noticed. European follow ministers -- foreign
:11:46. > :11:56.ministers arranged to meet him. But the meeting produced no agreement.
:11:56. > :12:01.In later years, sanctions would follow. I think that the West,
:12:01. > :12:05.particularly the United States, egged on by Israel, has made a major
:12:05. > :12:14.strategic mistake in a way it has handled Iran. It has done so since
:12:14. > :12:21.the beginning of 2002. The lack of cooperation from the Americans
:12:21. > :12:24.thereafter in terms of the nuclear dossier begat Ahmadinejad. The
:12:24. > :12:34.neoconservatives got what they wished for, and so did the Israeli
:12:34. > :12:36.
:12:36. > :12:40.right wing. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad know that his -- knew that his job came
:12:40. > :12:46.with a stage but little else. So he worked out a simple plan. The more
:12:46. > :12:56.he spoke, the more he succeeded in provoking a reaction, the bigger his
:12:56. > :13:27.
:13:27. > :13:31.Ahmadinejad had no immediate power to put these words into action. He
:13:31. > :13:41.did not control Iran's Armed Forces, nor did he have the final say on the
:13:41. > :13:42.
:13:42. > :13:45.country's nuclear programme. But his enemies listened anyway. Iran has
:13:45. > :13:49.made clear that it seeks the destruction of Israel. We can only
:13:49. > :13:58.imagine how much more dangerous this conflict could be if Iran had
:13:58. > :14:06.nuclear weaponss it seeks. I think we have to consider it very
:14:06. > :14:11.seriously. The same things were said when Churchill warned against
:14:11. > :14:16.Hitler. People said, he doesn't mean it, it is just for domestic
:14:16. > :14:26.purposes. It is just rhetoric. I think we have to take it very
:14:26. > :14:26.
:14:26. > :14:33.seriously. Here, the president found a platform in London on and made
:14:33. > :14:39.much of Iran's alliance with Hezbollah. But to one US diplomat,
:14:39. > :14:46.the closer he looked at Ahmadinejad, the less there really was.
:14:46. > :14:56.I really do believe that he has taken him far more seriously than he
:14:56. > :14:59.
:14:59. > :15:08.deserves and he loves it. He loves being I don't think it counts for
:15:08. > :15:14.very much in the Irani and policies. During the Ahmadinejad years, Ryan
:15:14. > :15:21.Crocker led the gradations with the Islamic Republic. I served as an
:15:21. > :15:30.ambassador to Lebanon and I think I have some sense of how policy is
:15:30. > :15:39.formulated and executed in Syria as well as in Lebanon. The policy is in
:15:39. > :15:45.the hands of the Iranian Revolutionary guard force with
:15:45. > :15:55.General Soleimani, of course, reporting directly to the supreme
:15:55. > :16:08.
:16:08. > :16:13.Mahmoud Ahmadinejad needed to find ways to build up his profile. His
:16:13. > :16:23.most reliable technique was to provoke the United States, or better
:16:23. > :16:37.
:16:37. > :16:47.Notice the handshake with the police Here, the president enjoys posting
:16:47. > :16:51.
:16:51. > :16:58.and American wrestling team in Tehran, and make In 2006, he decided
:16:58. > :17:02.to send an 18 page letter to President Bush. My recollection is
:17:02. > :17:07.that it was a rambling letter. When the question came up, shall we reply
:17:07. > :17:17.to the letter, one of the questions is that it is hard to know what to
:17:17. > :17:18.
:17:18. > :17:23.reply to. It was a rambling stream This was a man who was already
:17:23. > :17:26.embodying policies that were very abhorrent to us and the rest of the
:17:26. > :17:31.international community, so our response was to try and respond to
:17:31. > :17:41.the letter by speaking to the Irani and people, and President Bush did
:17:41. > :17:41.
:17:42. > :17:49.that on several occasions. -- Irani and people. It was the Irani and
:17:49. > :17:54.President to read the letter. I always complain to Americans that
:17:54. > :17:59.they made a big mistake. He was the president and he took the
:17:59. > :18:06.initiative. He came to you and you should have responded. You should
:18:06. > :18:12.not have humiliated him. Ahmadinejad never appeared to suffer
:18:12. > :18:22.from humiliation or doubt. The greater the controversy, the bigger
:18:22. > :18:28.
:18:28. > :18:38.During his 2009 reelection campaign, Ahmadinejad tried to present himself
:18:38. > :18:55.
:18:55. > :19:05.around his house. He even did the gardening. He ran for reelection as
:19:05. > :19:37.
:19:37. > :19:42.a populist and an Irani and Mousavi. But that year, many Irani
:19:43. > :19:52.and were up to something more profound. The opposition Green
:19:53. > :19:54.
:19:54. > :20:03.Movement and its leaders wanted real reform. We want freedom. We want
:20:03. > :20:13.freedom. But the supreme leader did not. He ruled that Ahmadinejad had
:20:13. > :20:17.
:20:17. > :20:26.won the reelection. The leader's forces crushed opposition protests.
:20:26. > :20:29.Ayatollah Khomeini made sure that Ahmadinejad got his second term. But
:20:29. > :20:38.that the endorsement ceremony, the two men could barely organise a
:20:38. > :20:44.simple embrace. At the start of his second term, Ahmadinejad decided to
:20:44. > :20:54.take the most dangerous decision of his presidency. He would defy his
:20:54. > :21:04.own supreme leader. He completely changed in 2009, because he realised
:21:04. > :21:08.
:21:08. > :21:13.that he needed the support of the people. He has no resemblance to the
:21:13. > :21:21.man who became the mayor of Tehran and then a president of Iran.
:21:21. > :21:29.Everything changed. His defiance began with his decision to appoint
:21:29. > :21:33.his close friend Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as vice president. Clerics
:21:34. > :21:37.use Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as a threat. -- reviewed Esfandiar Rahim
:21:38. > :21:42.Mashaei as a threat. They believed he wanted to subvert the system of
:21:42. > :21:52.religious rule in Iran. The Ayatollah vetoed Esfandiar Rahim
:21:52. > :21:52.
:21:52. > :22:02.Mashaei's appointment. He began to go after Ahmadinejad's supporters.
:22:02. > :22:04.
:22:04. > :22:08.That year, Ahmadinejad family fronts -- a family friend of the
:22:08. > :22:16.Ahmadinejad family was arrested. Some new and surprising arrivals
:22:16. > :22:26.were noticed. I figured out that these people were supporters of
:22:26. > :22:30.
:22:30. > :22:35.Ahmadinejad and they have been They were surprised to be in prison
:22:35. > :22:39.because they were supporters of Ahmadinejad. During his second term,
:22:39. > :22:49.Ahmadinejad found that he was the president and leader of the
:22:49. > :23:01.
:23:01. > :23:11.opposition to declare acts. -- to the clerics. As far himself. We have
:23:11. > :23:15.been told that Ahmadinejad asked to free the political prisoners and
:23:15. > :23:25.remove the house arrest of the opposition leader. We do not know.
:23:25. > :23:26.
:23:26. > :23:35.Is that right or wrong? Said of the man elected as a loyal -- so could
:23:36. > :23:40.the man elected as a loyal conservative... I do not for a
:23:40. > :23:48.moment by the notion that Ahmadinejad is a secret reformist
:23:48. > :23:52.standing steadfast against these wild eyed clerics. It is hard to see
:23:52. > :24:02.Ahmadinejad in the wild eyed department. His statements make
:24:02. > :24:19.
:24:19. > :24:29.to question the president directly. and with the supreme leader. What
:24:29. > :24:29.
:24:29. > :25:10.Apology for the loss of subtitles for 58 seconds
:25:10. > :25:20.would you say you have achieved in Mahmoud He provoked the West and the
:25:20. > :25:22.
:25:22. > :25:32.clerics, but he won without a fight. Long-lived Ghana. Long live Africa.
:25:32. > :25:46.