:00:05. > :00:15.It is time for our world. We chart the rise to power of the Soviet
:00:15. > :00:16.
:00:16. > :00:22.Union's last leader, Mikhail A man forged by Communism who then
:00:22. > :00:25.destroyed it. An enemy of the West welcomed as a friend. 20 years
:00:25. > :00:35.since he helped to transform the world, Mikhail Gorbachev tells his
:00:35. > :00:36.
:00:36. > :00:46.In this first of two programmes, the untold tale of his rise to
:00:46. > :00:52.
:00:52. > :01:02.TRANSLATION: Perestroika did win. We got democracy, we got freedom of
:01:02. > :01:31.
:01:31. > :01:33.speech and political pluralism. And The bustling heart of St Petersburg.
:01:33. > :01:43.Few today probably remember the significance of this spot for
:01:43. > :01:47.It was here that Soviet citizens first grasped that the whole world
:01:47. > :01:54.was about to be turned upside down, right here in this square in May
:01:54. > :01:58.1985. Mikhail Gorbachev broke with tradition and did what Soviet
:01:58. > :02:06.leaders had never done before - he bridged the gap with ordinary
:02:06. > :02:16.people. It was unheard of. He was relaxed, accessible, even prepared
:02:16. > :02:22.
:02:22. > :02:26.The television pictures electrified the country. Here was the Kremlin
:02:26. > :02:29.leader - all right, a bit more energetic than those who had come
:02:29. > :02:32.before, but still apparently a loyal Communist who had come up
:02:32. > :02:42.through the ranks. How come the system had suddenly thrown up this
:02:42. > :03:00.
:03:00. > :03:10.Gorbachev started out a typical product of the Soviet system. His
:03:10. > :03:10.
:03:10. > :03:14.childhood was spent here in a sleepy village in southern Russia.
:03:14. > :03:21.His parents were peasants. In the harsh post-war years, he embraced
:03:21. > :03:25.Stalinism without question. TRANSLATION: I was a loyal citizen.
:03:25. > :03:30.For my final exams at that age, I chose Stalinism as my subject. My
:03:30. > :03:34.subject was Stalinism and glory in battle. Stalinism was the subject
:03:34. > :03:41.of my youth. It wasn't that someone inculcated Gorbachev into the
:03:41. > :03:51.Communist Party. Not that my father or grandfather insisted. Not at all.
:03:51. > :03:52.
:03:52. > :04:02.And it was the system that broadened his horizons by sending
:04:02. > :04:05.
:04:05. > :04:15.him to Moscow, to the top Soviet Then Stalin died. A political thaw
:04:15. > :04:16.
:04:16. > :04:20.took hold and Gorbachev began to My doubts began towards the end of
:04:20. > :04:30.my time at Moscow University. Being a student in Moscow opened my eyes
:04:30. > :04:33.to many things. So much was bound up with Stalin. When I went back
:04:33. > :04:37.home to southern Russia and went into politics, I began to see how
:04:37. > :04:47.people really had to live. And I started questioning, questioning
:04:47. > :04:48.
:04:48. > :04:56.the whole system. This much-vaunted system was putting so much into the
:04:56. > :05:06.arms race while human beings fell behind, living in poverty. Millions
:05:06. > :05:15.
:05:15. > :05:25.Gorbachev wasn't alone. Critical thinking was in the air, especially
:05:25. > :05:29.after the Soviet leader Nikita TRANSLATION: He provided the main
:05:29. > :05:35.impetus. There was a new sense of freedom, a feeling it was time for
:05:35. > :05:42.new ideas. And he was the one to strike the first blow against
:05:42. > :05:45.The reform mood didn't last but in private Gorbachev's doubts
:05:45. > :05:55.continued, shared above all with his wife, Raisa, for nearly 50
:05:55. > :05:57.
:05:57. > :06:00.years his political confidante, One friend in particular stood out,
:06:01. > :06:08.Alexander Dubcek, a Czech student who later became the architect of
:06:08. > :06:13.the Prague Spring, Czechoslovakia's attempt to reform socialism. He was
:06:13. > :06:17.my dearest friend. He was closer to me than anyone else, Soviet,
:06:17. > :06:26.Russian or otherwise, and it stayed like that until he was sent home
:06:26. > :06:36.and the link was broken. He was so clever and it was my luck to be
:06:36. > :06:39.
:06:40. > :06:43.friends with him. Our positions The reforms in the Prague Spring
:06:43. > :06:52.ended in disaster, crushed by Soviet tanks in 1968 on Moscow's
:06:52. > :06:59.Gorbachev, by now a rising star in the Communist Party, endorsed the
:06:59. > :07:07.Kremlin line that the invasion was justified. But, on a visit to
:07:07. > :07:15.Czechoslovakia a year later, he was in private turmoil. TRANSLATION: We
:07:15. > :07:18.arrived and it was shocking. People didn't want to talk to us. We had
:07:18. > :07:24.assumed they had wanted our support, including military action - that's
:07:24. > :07:34.what we had been told, but it was misinformation. We visited a
:07:34. > :07:44.factory and people turned their backs on us. It really hit me hard.
:07:44. > :07:44.
:07:44. > :07:49.We had insulted and humiliated a nation that was close to our hearts.
:07:49. > :07:52.Prague's crushed uprising left a lasting impression. Above all,
:07:52. > :07:59.Gorbachev concluded that any future reform must move slowly to avoid
:07:59. > :08:09.the danger of a backlash. Moscow's response to the Prague Spring had a
:08:09. > :08:12.
:08:12. > :08:15.huge knock-on effect for the Soviet Union. All the party meetings,
:08:15. > :08:19.where there were harsh punishments for anyone who dared to deviate
:08:19. > :08:22.from the party line or raise doubts about the policy. In other words, a
:08:22. > :08:32.backlash and a clampdown. So, when it came to perestroika, I bore the
:08:32. > :08:55.
:08:55. > :09:01.Moscow today is a far cry from the stifling control of the Soviet era.
:09:01. > :09:06.For Gorbachev, it was dangerous to voice criticism aloud. Instead, he
:09:06. > :09:10.spent the next decade climbing the party ladder. But he did confide in
:09:10. > :09:14.another young leading Communist, his future Foreign Minister.
:09:14. > :09:23.TRANSLATION: I said to him, "Everything is rotten and we need
:09:23. > :09:28.to change it all from top to bottom. We need to start a new life." He
:09:28. > :09:35.said, "Everything is rotten." He was very emotional. I said, "I
:09:35. > :09:38.agree". But the main thing is, the next morning we woke up and
:09:38. > :09:48.discovered Soviet troops had entered Afghanistan and we had not
:09:48. > :09:54.
:09:54. > :09:58.Yet Gorbachev was playing two games. Private criticism, but publicly an
:09:58. > :10:01.ambitious and loyal party functionary. This one-time farm boy
:10:01. > :10:06.and provincial politician from southern Russia did not leapfrog
:10:07. > :10:16.into the Kremlin. He was head- hunted by powerful patrons in the
:10:17. > :10:23.
:10:23. > :10:31.The encounter that sealed his fate was at this railway station where
:10:31. > :10:35.Leonid Brezhnev was arriving on Gorbachev, the regional party boss,
:10:35. > :10:45.was asked to welcome him. It turned out to be an informal vetting
:10:45. > :10:46.
:10:46. > :10:50.It was Brezhnev who summoned him to Moscow at the tender age of 47, but
:10:50. > :11:00.he wasn't the only one who hoped Gorbachev's youth and energy would
:11:00. > :11:17.
:11:17. > :11:20.Andropov, the feared KGB chief, had taken early interest in him. When
:11:20. > :11:24.he became leader after Brezhnev died, he earmarked him as his
:11:24. > :11:27.successor. TRANSLATION: Is said to me, "I know you are in charge of
:11:27. > :11:30.agriculture, but don't forget a Politburo member should be able to
:11:30. > :11:32.deal with all subjects, including foreign as well as domestic policy.
:11:32. > :11:35.Because who knows what responsibilities might land on your
:11:35. > :11:45.shoulders today or tomorrow?" He said, "Do you understand?" I said
:11:45. > :11:53.
:11:53. > :11:56.yes. He said, "Good, off you go, The next Kremlin leader was 73-
:11:56. > :12:06.year-old Konstantin Chernenko, so sick he looked like a living corpse
:12:06. > :12:06.
:12:06. > :12:12.as he tottered through his duties. Gorbachev saw it as a blessing,
:12:12. > :12:18.trying to strengthen his position. TRANSLATION: If Chernenko had not
:12:18. > :12:25.been there, as Voltaire said, we would have had to invent him. I
:12:25. > :12:29.wasn't ready to take over, and I wasn't in the right frame of mind.
:12:29. > :12:39.It gave me time to get practical experience of being leader and to
:12:39. > :12:49.
:12:49. > :12:59.In London, Mrs Thatcher may have bossed him about but she also met
:12:59. > :13:05.her match in Gorbachev. TRANSLATION: I had a good
:13:05. > :13:08.impression of her. I said to her, "Mrs Thatcher, I know you are a
:13:08. > :13:16.person of strong conviction, but bear in mind you have another such
:13:16. > :13:19.person sitting in front of you. The most important thing I want to tell
:13:19. > :13:23.you is that I did not have instructions from the Politburo to
:13:23. > :13:28.invite you to join the Communist Party." She burst out laughing. It
:13:28. > :13:32.broke the tension, and we had an open and frank discussion. I saw in
:13:32. > :13:42.her someone with a broad and very good education, but definitely an
:13:42. > :13:49.
:13:49. > :13:59.In March 1985, Gorbachev's predecessor died and he moved
:13:59. > :14:07.
:14:07. > :14:14.They accepted he should give the funeral oration, a symbol that he
:14:14. > :14:17.would become the next leader of the Soviet Union. We were there for a
:14:17. > :14:20.good long while and Gorbachev seemed fresh and energetic, even
:14:20. > :14:28.though he had been through this long process of the funeral and all
:14:29. > :14:37.the arrangements and all these people. So we could see right away
:14:37. > :14:41.that he had stamina. He was like no other Soviet leader I have met with.
:14:41. > :14:46.So I remember saying when we left, saying to the delegation, this is a
:14:46. > :14:51.very different human being. He is quicker, he is smart. He is going
:14:51. > :15:01.to be a much more agile adversary. So we are going to have to be on
:15:01. > :15:17.
:15:17. > :15:20.It was a pivotal moment and a daunting task ahead. Just before
:15:20. > :15:25.taking over power, well away from KGB eavesdroppers, Gorbachev and
:15:25. > :15:35.his wife, Raisa, agonised over the huge risks they were taking.
:15:35. > :15:44.TRANSLATION: Mikael said it would be highly likely he would be made
:15:44. > :15:47.the next Soviet leader, leader of the Communist Party. Then he said,
:15:47. > :15:57."We all know perfectly well that if you want anything done in Russia
:15:57. > :16:00.
:16:01. > :16:10.you have to do it from the top downwards." Then he said that March
:16:11. > :16:29.
:16:29. > :16:32.night,"We cannot go on living like this any longer. TRANSLATION: I
:16:32. > :16:35.said to her, her,"With the way things stand, they might be about
:16:36. > :16:39.to ask me to be the leader of the Communist Party." I always remember
:16:39. > :16:49.her reaction. Are you sure you want to, she asked. If they ask me, I
:16:49. > :17:00.
:17:00. > :17:10.will say yes, I said. Gorbachev did not want to destroy the Soviet
:17:10. > :17:14.Union, he just wanted to correct it. After all, he relied on his
:17:14. > :17:17.Politburo chief to get everyone to obey him. For his first big speech
:17:17. > :17:23.on perestroika he came here to St Petersburg, to the sacred spot
:17:23. > :17:33.where in 1917 Lenin launched the Bolshevik revolution. Now Gorbachev
:17:33. > :17:37.
:17:37. > :17:39.told Russia's officials that it was time for another change.
:17:39. > :17:49.Perestroika was about changing the system. There was also glasnost,
:17:49. > :17:53.
:17:53. > :18:00.ending censorship. TRANSLATION: We were in desperate need of
:18:00. > :18:04.perestroika and glasnost. We could feel the need for it but we thought
:18:04. > :18:14.that the person who came up with these new concepts would be able to
:18:14. > :18:14.
:18:14. > :18:17.lead the process through to the end. It did not turn out like that.
:18:17. > :18:27.Moscow today is a consumers' paradise and a shrine to rampant
:18:27. > :18:28.
:18:28. > :18:37.capitalism. To this day there is a debate whether this is what
:18:37. > :18:42.Gorbachev intended. There was no hint at first that he wanted to get
:18:42. > :18:45.rid of the police state he rolled over. Today Gorbachev defends his
:18:45. > :18:53.or early caution as his only way to take opponents with him and says
:18:53. > :18:56.his reform plan never faltered. TRANSLATION: Perestroika and
:18:56. > :19:04.glasnost gave people the chance to breathe freely and speak freely. It
:19:04. > :19:07.was euphoric. Along with that euphoria, we had to tread carefully
:19:07. > :19:17.so everything had to be done gradually to make sure people took
:19:17. > :19:18.
:19:18. > :19:22.part and appreciated that it was necessary. Many think Gorbachev did
:19:22. > :19:29.not foresee what he was unleashing and for far too long relied on the
:19:29. > :19:33.party, forced to improvise as things took on their own momentum.
:19:33. > :19:37.His ideas were a moving train. I think he started out genuinely
:19:37. > :19:47.thinking changes in management would suffice. Still he thought he
:19:47. > :19:51.
:19:51. > :19:59.could use the Communist Party to push a new agenda. Moving fast on
:19:59. > :20:01.foreign policy was simpler. Both he and President Reagan wanted to end
:20:02. > :20:11.dangerous superpower hostility. Gorbachev also needed to reduce the
:20:11. > :20:14.Soviet Union's crippling burden of military spending. The two leaders
:20:14. > :20:17.hit it off at their first summit in Geneva, though, as Gorbachev
:20:17. > :20:27.recalled recently at a dinner with former colleagues, there were
:20:27. > :20:28.
:20:28. > :20:32.tensions. TRANSLATION: I said to Reagan, "You're not the teacher and
:20:32. > :20:39.I am not your pupil. You are not the prosecutor and I am not be
:20:39. > :20:49.accused. We are equal. If you agree, we can go quite far together."
:20:49. > :20:53.
:20:53. > :20:57.ice was often broken by a shared sense of humour. President Reagan
:20:57. > :21:00.used to say that he said to Gorbachev, "We in the United States
:21:00. > :21:05.enjoy freedom and free speech and someone can come right in here in
:21:05. > :21:10.his Oval Office and tell me how I should run the United States."
:21:10. > :21:14.Gorbachev said it is no different in Russia. People can walk into my
:21:14. > :21:20.house and say I do not like the way of Ronald Reagan is running the
:21:20. > :21:30.United States. For the people of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev was a
:21:30. > :21:30.
:21:30. > :21:33.political superstar. In Poland, he and Raisa were literally serenaded.
:21:33. > :21:38.Far from crushing reforms, here was a Kremlin leader who actively
:21:38. > :21:47.wanted to encourage them. He appealed to Eastern Europe's
:21:47. > :21:57.leaders in private. TRANSLATION: I could see he approved of what was
:21:57. > :21:57.
:21:57. > :22:01.going on in Poland. It was a kind of laboratory for his reforms.
:22:01. > :22:11.turns out he signalled they could go their own way as soon as he took
:22:11. > :22:19.
:22:19. > :22:22.office. TRANSLATION: Reform should happen in Poland in a Polish way,
:22:22. > :22:32.in Russia in a Russian way, in Hungary in a Hungarian way. All
:22:32. > :22:42.different for a different situation. Today on visits to Berlin Gorbachev
:22:42. > :22:48.
:22:48. > :22:54.is greeted as a hero. Without his nod, Germany could not have been
:22:54. > :23:04.reunited. Unlike the East German Communist leader whose embrace of
:23:04. > :23:06.Brezhnev still adorns the Berlin Wall. He ignored Gorbachev's
:23:06. > :23:16.warning to embrace reform at East Germany's 40th anniversary party,
:23:16. > :23:18.
:23:18. > :23:22.just before the Berlin Wall came down. TRANSLATION: we met on the
:23:22. > :23:32.eve of the celebration and he said everything was fine. I could see he
:23:32. > :23:34.
:23:34. > :23:37.was not up to it. History always punishes those who are late. He was
:23:37. > :23:47.in a lively mood and kept singing songs but I felt sorry for him. He
:23:47. > :23:58.
:23:58. > :24:01.had lost. Within weeks, the Berlin Wall fell and while Gorbachev could
:24:01. > :24:04.accept that and the collapse of Communist power in Eastern Europe,
:24:04. > :24:08.inside the Soviet Union it was a different story. He still wanted to
:24:08. > :24:15.keep a firm grip from the centre. TRANSLATION: He wanted a Russian
:24:15. > :24:20.democracy bit by bit. He did not understand that, having taken one
:24:20. > :24:23.step - glasnost, democracy, human rights - you cannot stop there. You
:24:23. > :24:32.have to take the next steps, right up to the complete destruction of
:24:32. > :24:41.the old system. He wanted to keep the old system and remained the
:24:41. > :24:44.sole person in charge but that just was not possible. Gorbachev, the
:24:44. > :24:54.dissident from within, had used his supreme power to drive reforms from
:24:54. > :25:02.
:25:02. > :25:05.the top down. His revolution was nearing crisis point and he felt
:25:05. > :25:07.trapped by those pressuring him for more freedom and those who wanted
:25:07. > :25:17.him to turn the clock back. TRANSLATION: They realised it would
:25:17. > :25:18.
:25:18. > :25:21.be hard to win back power if there was still democracy. The battle for
:25:21. > :25:26.power began, led by the party elite, including some people from my own
:25:26. > :25:36.inner circle. First they plotted quietly and in secret but later
:25:36. > :25:43.