0:00:31 > 0:00:34APPLAUSE
0:00:34 > 0:00:36In October 1989,
0:00:36 > 0:00:40the Conservative Party celebrated Margaret Thatcher's 64th birthday
0:00:40 > 0:00:44and her tenth anniversary as Prime Minister at the party conference...
0:00:44 > 0:00:47# Happy birthday, dear Margaret... #
0:00:47 > 0:00:51Yet, just over a year later, those same colleagues who clapped
0:00:51 > 0:00:55and cheered her in public would force her from office.
0:00:55 > 0:00:59For some time, many in the party had been wishing to get rid of her.
0:00:59 > 0:01:02They felt that Margaret Thatcher had lost her way, that she
0:01:02 > 0:01:06was dictatorial in Cabinet and out of touch with the country.
0:01:06 > 0:01:09They feared her policies, especially on the poll tax and Europe,
0:01:09 > 0:01:12would lose them the next election.
0:01:12 > 0:01:15But Margaret Thatcher was determined that SHE would decide
0:01:15 > 0:01:18the timing and the manner of her going.
0:01:21 > 0:01:24MARGARET THATCHER: I knew that the time would come when I had to go.
0:01:24 > 0:01:26I felt that I should fight one more election
0:01:26 > 0:01:31and then the time would be best about two years after that election.
0:01:31 > 0:01:36Also, I was really grooming several people to run for the leadership,
0:01:36 > 0:01:38so it was really all worked out, but, of course,
0:01:38 > 0:01:41the best-laid plans "gang aft agley."
0:01:42 > 0:01:47Margaret correctly analysed the situation
0:01:47 > 0:01:50that she was unpopular in the polls,
0:01:50 > 0:01:53that a large number of her colleagues were
0:01:53 > 0:01:56frightened that she would lose an election or,
0:01:56 > 0:01:59more particularly, that they might lose their seats.
0:01:59 > 0:02:03But, after all, we'd been through that in '81
0:02:03 > 0:02:07and we'd been through it in '85-'86
0:02:07 > 0:02:10and on each occasion she'd shown her resilience
0:02:10 > 0:02:14and her ability to come back and win an election.
0:02:14 > 0:02:16So she was very confident.
0:02:16 > 0:02:20Perhaps she may have been overconfident because of that.
0:02:22 > 0:02:26As Margaret Thatcher celebrated ten years with her closest admirers,
0:02:26 > 0:02:30senior Conservatives began to plan a dignified departure for the leader.
0:02:32 > 0:02:35The men in grey suits had decided that the time had come
0:02:35 > 0:02:38for a gracious handover, but it was not to be.
0:02:42 > 0:02:44- LORD WHITELAW:- I think probably her greatest mistake
0:02:44 > 0:02:46was not to make up her mind
0:02:46 > 0:02:49to give up before the 1992 election.
0:02:49 > 0:02:53I think ten years was a remarkable achievement
0:02:53 > 0:02:57and it would have been wise probably to have given up at that stage.
0:02:57 > 0:03:00Difficult but I think probably wise.
0:03:01 > 0:03:05Shortly after her tenth anniversary in power, Margaret Thatcher
0:03:05 > 0:03:08was invited to Bledlow, Lord Carrington's country seat.
0:03:11 > 0:03:14Carrington, a party grandee and a former Foreign Secretary,
0:03:14 > 0:03:17had taken on the difficult task of telling Margaret Thatcher
0:03:17 > 0:03:20the time had come for her to leave office.
0:03:21 > 0:03:24It was quite clear really that Peter wanted to talk to me
0:03:24 > 0:03:27about when I would go.
0:03:27 > 0:03:31Quite clear that I think he was speaking for other people too.
0:03:31 > 0:03:35That was the impression I got, that he thought the party wanted me to go.
0:03:35 > 0:03:39They wanted me to go at a time of my own choosing and with dignity...
0:03:39 > 0:03:44but that I had the impression that he wanted me
0:03:44 > 0:03:47to go rather sooner than had been in my mind.
0:03:47 > 0:03:52I think it happens to everybody. They stay too long.
0:03:53 > 0:03:57Particularly when you're in a position of that authority.
0:03:57 > 0:04:00You know so much more than your advisers know
0:04:00 > 0:04:04because if you've been there 11 years or 12 years maybe
0:04:04 > 0:04:09you've had three or four advisers and you think you know everything.
0:04:10 > 0:04:13There was alarm at the Prime Minister's tendency
0:04:13 > 0:04:15to appear regal in public.
0:04:15 > 0:04:18We have become a grandmother
0:04:18 > 0:04:22of a grandson called Michael.
0:04:22 > 0:04:26She was, I thought, starting to show some of the signs of metal fatigue.
0:04:26 > 0:04:28Not very surprising.
0:04:28 > 0:04:33She'd been in office as Prime Minster for a decade.
0:04:33 > 0:04:38She worked incredibly hard but I think she was starting to portray
0:04:38 > 0:04:42some signs of, um, tiredness
0:04:42 > 0:04:45and not always being on top of the subject.
0:04:47 > 0:04:50And many of Margaret Thatcher's colleagues were concerned that she
0:04:50 > 0:04:52was ignoring the advice of her Cabinet,
0:04:52 > 0:04:54whose support she needed above all,
0:04:54 > 0:04:58and was becoming dangerously self-sufficient.
0:04:58 > 0:05:01In 1988, she lost an important restraining influence
0:05:01 > 0:05:04when Willie Whitelaw retired as Deputy Prime Minister.
0:05:05 > 0:05:09- NIGEL LAWSON:- He was a tremendous stabilising force.
0:05:09 > 0:05:10A force for sanity.
0:05:10 > 0:05:15And it was a great loss when he went.
0:05:15 > 0:05:18Then there was really no restraint on her at all.
0:05:21 > 0:05:24From his retirement, Whitelaw cautioned
0:05:24 > 0:05:28the Prime Minister against provoking a split with her senior colleagues.
0:05:28 > 0:05:30He warned her that her Chancellor, Nigel Lawson,
0:05:30 > 0:05:34and her Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, were increasingly angered
0:05:34 > 0:05:38by her style and her policies, but the Prime Minister ignored him.
0:05:41 > 0:05:47I think I wasn't far wrong. I think that was a problem for her by then.
0:05:47 > 0:05:51I think it was a great problem that she wasn't getting on with Nigel
0:05:51 > 0:05:55by that stage and that, evidently,
0:05:55 > 0:05:58she wasn't getting on really with Geoffrey Howe either.
0:05:58 > 0:06:01But it had become bigger than that.
0:06:01 > 0:06:05The Prime Minster depended on the backing of her Foreign Secretary
0:06:05 > 0:06:08and her Chancellor for her authority in Cabinet.
0:06:08 > 0:06:12If she dared alienate these two torchbearers of Thatcherism,
0:06:12 > 0:06:14she risked everything.
0:06:14 > 0:06:16She did and she lost.
0:06:24 > 0:06:27In the early days of her government, Margaret Thatcher
0:06:27 > 0:06:30and Geoffrey Howe had been close allies on economic policy,
0:06:30 > 0:06:34but now, in Mrs Thatcher's view, Sir Geoffrey had become dangerously
0:06:34 > 0:06:38pro-European and had fallen under the influence of the community.
0:06:39 > 0:06:42I think Geoffrey was much more of a compromiser
0:06:42 > 0:06:46and a consensus man than I was so he, in fact,
0:06:46 > 0:06:51in negotiations would move more towards their position while I wanted
0:06:51 > 0:06:55to keep far more of the sovereignty as a matter of principle,
0:06:55 > 0:06:57and that really was the difference.
0:06:57 > 0:07:00Well, she'd never been lacking in egocentricity,
0:07:00 > 0:07:05and that may be attributed as a criticism, but when she became
0:07:05 > 0:07:09engaged in hand-to-hand combat, as it were,
0:07:09 > 0:07:12around the European Council table, I think
0:07:12 > 0:07:17her manner then became more strident than her colleagues liked
0:07:17 > 0:07:19and actually became counterproductive
0:07:19 > 0:07:23and led to our losing tricks that we might otherwise have won.
0:07:23 > 0:07:25MARGARET THATCHER: 'Now I did point out that we had
0:07:25 > 0:07:26'all foreign ministers here
0:07:26 > 0:07:29'and if they could agree in two or three weeks' time,'
0:07:29 > 0:07:32we could have had a special meeting here tonight
0:07:32 > 0:07:34so that they could have agreed then.
0:07:34 > 0:07:39This obvious factor did not escape them. They merely refused to have it.
0:07:39 > 0:07:40You were ready to go, weren't you?
0:07:40 > 0:07:42LAUGHTER
0:07:42 > 0:07:45Really, it's an absolutely... I can't tell you.
0:07:45 > 0:07:49Only a Frenchman could have done that. Absolutely unbelievable.
0:07:49 > 0:07:54She was completely confrontational with them on everything.
0:07:54 > 0:07:56The result was twofold.
0:07:56 > 0:07:59First of all, they were not prepared,
0:07:59 > 0:08:02after they realised what the game was that she was playing,
0:08:02 > 0:08:06they were not prepared to give her anything on any issue
0:08:06 > 0:08:09because they could see they would get nothing in return.
0:08:09 > 0:08:11So we achieved nothing as a nation.
0:08:11 > 0:08:14And what we did do
0:08:14 > 0:08:18was unite all the other Europeans
0:08:18 > 0:08:20in a way that was totally counterproductive
0:08:20 > 0:08:24because they were united against us, against Britain.
0:08:24 > 0:08:28No, Britain's interests were never damaged in my time.
0:08:28 > 0:08:31Don't forget, I took over a declining Britain,
0:08:31 > 0:08:34a Britain that was accepting decline,
0:08:34 > 0:08:37a Britain whose voice meant nothing in the world.
0:08:37 > 0:08:40And I finished up with a Britain whose voice meant
0:08:40 > 0:08:42something in Europe.
0:08:42 > 0:08:44And if they were against what I said,
0:08:44 > 0:08:47they should have done it by argument,
0:08:47 > 0:08:49not by the attempted bulldozer.
0:08:52 > 0:08:55Margaret Thatcher had come to rely on the advice of Charles Powell,
0:08:55 > 0:08:57her private secretary.
0:08:57 > 0:08:59He shared her hostility to Europe.
0:09:02 > 0:09:04But the pomp of state affairs brought the Foreign Secretary
0:09:04 > 0:09:07and the Prime Minister into frequent contact.
0:09:07 > 0:09:10Sir Geoffrey Howe had become one of the most influential
0:09:10 > 0:09:14opponents of Margaret Thatcher's stance on Europe.
0:09:14 > 0:09:19But the disagreement between the two politicians went far beyond policy.
0:09:19 > 0:09:20I think as the years wore on,
0:09:20 > 0:09:23they got on each other's nerves to an increasing degree.
0:09:23 > 0:09:25One of the problems seemed to me
0:09:25 > 0:09:30that Geoffrey Howe has a rather roundabout way of expressing things
0:09:30 > 0:09:33and when he came over to Number 10,
0:09:33 > 0:09:36he used very circumlocutory language.
0:09:36 > 0:09:39He would start from the middle, as it were, rather than the beginning.
0:09:39 > 0:09:41Most people know the one thing you have to do with Mrs Thatcher
0:09:41 > 0:09:44is to get to your point in the first half of the first sentence because
0:09:44 > 0:09:49that may well be the only sentence you're ever allowed to speak.
0:09:49 > 0:09:52- GEOFFREY HOWE:- 'We achieved that because we've been able,
0:09:52 > 0:09:54'during the two terms in office...'
0:09:54 > 0:09:55Even in public,
0:09:55 > 0:09:58Margaret Thatcher found it difficult to hide her impatience with
0:09:58 > 0:10:02Sir Geoffrey's determination to cover the ground thoroughly.
0:10:04 > 0:10:07MRS THATCHER: Geoffrey's personal style was very different from mine.
0:10:07 > 0:10:10He has a lovely speaking voice, quiet speaking voice.
0:10:10 > 0:10:14But at Cabinet we always reported on foreign affairs.
0:10:14 > 0:10:15This quiet voice was
0:10:15 > 0:10:19so quiet sometimes that people couldn't hear and I had to say,
0:10:19 > 0:10:24"Speak up." And then he gave it, in a way, which wasn't exactly
0:10:24 > 0:10:28scintillating, and foreign affairs, you know, are interesting.
0:10:28 > 0:10:33They affect everything that happens to our own way of life
0:10:33 > 0:10:35and they are exciting.
0:10:36 > 0:10:38And so we just diverged.
0:10:40 > 0:10:44From 1983, when Geoffrey Howe became Foreign Secretary,
0:10:44 > 0:10:46colleagues had been first embarrassed
0:10:46 > 0:10:48and later appalled by the Prime Minister's public
0:10:48 > 0:10:52humiliation of this senior politician.
0:10:52 > 0:10:57- NIGEL LAWSON:- I think because he is very polite and didn't answer back,
0:10:57 > 0:11:00it was almost as if he was being treated as a cross
0:11:00 > 0:11:04between a doormat and a punchbag.
0:11:04 > 0:11:06She would delight in front of others.
0:11:06 > 0:11:09What she said to him in private was her own business, but in front of
0:11:09 > 0:11:12others, in front of colleagues, she would, er,
0:11:12 > 0:11:15treat what he said in the most dismissive way,
0:11:15 > 0:11:18be extremely discourteous to him, trample all over him,
0:11:18 > 0:11:23and it was very embarrassing for others to witness.
0:11:24 > 0:11:26- JOHN WHITTINGDALE:- Mrs Thatcher would always be
0:11:26 > 0:11:29very critical of Geoffrey, sometimes almost rudely.
0:11:29 > 0:11:31I mean, I felt uncomfortable
0:11:31 > 0:11:34as a relatively junior member of her staff to be present
0:11:34 > 0:11:38to hear her talking pretty sternly to
0:11:38 > 0:11:41a minister as senior as Geoffrey Howe.
0:11:41 > 0:11:45I think one of the things that she had never fully absorbed is
0:11:45 > 0:11:49that it's bad management as well as bad manners
0:11:49 > 0:11:53to reproach, as it were, officers in front of other ranks.
0:11:53 > 0:11:56If you want to tick people off or have arguments with them,
0:11:56 > 0:12:00then you should, as a matter of courtesy, do it first in private.
0:12:00 > 0:12:05But I think that she had then become increasingly reckless, if you like,
0:12:05 > 0:12:08of the way in which she conducted personal relationships of that kind.
0:12:10 > 0:12:12I wish he'd come and said.
0:12:12 > 0:12:14Why not?
0:12:14 > 0:12:18Other people didn't fear to come and discuss, although I did have
0:12:18 > 0:12:22discussions with Geoffrey as Foreign Secretary, usually once a week.
0:12:23 > 0:12:26What a pity
0:12:26 > 0:12:27he didn't say.
0:12:30 > 0:12:33Margaret Thatcher was unable to get on with her Foreign Secretary.
0:12:33 > 0:12:36She came to find it almost unbearable to be with him
0:12:36 > 0:12:40in the same room. Her respect for the Chancellor was greater.
0:12:40 > 0:12:43She was said to fear his intellect, but the split with him was,
0:12:43 > 0:12:47if anything, more damaging and went to the heart of policy.
0:12:50 > 0:12:52For some time, Nigel Lawson and Margaret Thatcher had
0:12:52 > 0:12:55been at odds over the management of the economy.
0:12:55 > 0:13:00In 1985, both Lawson and Howe concluded that a stable pound
0:13:00 > 0:13:02with the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the ERM,
0:13:02 > 0:13:07was the best way of controlling inflation and helping industry.
0:13:07 > 0:13:08The Prime Minister disagreed.
0:13:11 > 0:13:14But in 1987, Lawson decided that if she wouldn't let him
0:13:14 > 0:13:18join the ERM, he would at least peg sterling to the German currency,
0:13:18 > 0:13:22a policy called "Shadowing The Deutschmark."
0:13:22 > 0:13:27I first found out about that entirely by accident.
0:13:27 > 0:13:30I used to do an annual, more or less annual,
0:13:30 > 0:13:33interview with the Financial Times and one of the questions
0:13:33 > 0:13:37they put to me on that particular day when they came was,
0:13:37 > 0:13:40"Why are you shadowing the Deutschmark?"
0:13:40 > 0:13:44And I vigorously denied it. I said, "We're not."
0:13:44 > 0:13:48Not only is it absurd to suggest that
0:13:48 > 0:13:51I could have carried out that policy secretly
0:13:51 > 0:13:54when everybody in the markets, let alone the Prime Minister, knew
0:13:54 > 0:13:59it had been carried out, but she was given every day, every evening,
0:13:59 > 0:14:03a piece of paper which showed how much we had intervened,
0:14:03 > 0:14:05what the rate was and so on.
0:14:05 > 0:14:09And I spoke to her every week and discussed it with her every week.
0:14:09 > 0:14:12The Prime Minster always felt that Lawson was secretive.
0:14:12 > 0:14:15On many occasions, she'd been frustrated that he didn't
0:14:15 > 0:14:19inform her of the details of his budgets in advance.
0:14:19 > 0:14:23Indeed, by her own admission, she was forced to telephone spies in the
0:14:23 > 0:14:27Treasury and at the Bank of England to find out what he was doing.
0:14:27 > 0:14:30It was even rumoured that she had bugged Number 11.
0:14:31 > 0:14:37Nigel did play his own cards very much close to his chest
0:14:37 > 0:14:40and when I found out accidentally
0:14:40 > 0:14:42and then said to my own treasury secretary,
0:14:42 > 0:14:45"Look, find out what's going on," we rang up the Treasury and said,
0:14:45 > 0:14:49"If he's shadowing it, what's the range in which he's shadowing it?"
0:14:49 > 0:14:52They said, "We don't know." They couldn't tell us.
0:14:52 > 0:14:58She was slightly paranoid by that time and was, I think,
0:14:58 > 0:15:00afraid that I may be up to something that she didn't know about.
0:15:00 > 0:15:02In fact, that was never the case.
0:15:02 > 0:15:05Although we had a disagreement on exchange rate policy,
0:15:05 > 0:15:08that was always entirely open.
0:15:08 > 0:15:10I was always completely open with her
0:15:10 > 0:15:12throughout my time as Chancellor.
0:15:13 > 0:15:15As First Lord of the Treasury,
0:15:15 > 0:15:18the Prime Minister was responsible for economic policy.
0:15:18 > 0:15:23In March 1988, she ordered Lawson to stop shadowing the Deutschmark.
0:15:23 > 0:15:24Reluctantly, he obeyed.
0:15:26 > 0:15:29But an unbridgeable gulf had opened up between the Prime Minister
0:15:29 > 0:15:32and her neighbour next door in Downing Street.
0:15:32 > 0:15:35Policy drifted, inflation climbed.
0:15:35 > 0:15:39Each side blamed the other for the return of economic malaise.
0:15:42 > 0:15:44Inevitably, Conservative backbenchers
0:15:44 > 0:15:46became aware of the schism.
0:15:47 > 0:15:51Certainly I realised that the split between Nigel Lawson
0:15:51 > 0:15:53and Mrs Thatcher was irreparable.
0:15:53 > 0:15:56No bridge could be flung across that chasm and I saw in it
0:15:56 > 0:16:00the seeds of ultimate destruction of her leadership.
0:16:04 > 0:16:08On 24th June 1989, Margaret Thatcher was at Chequers
0:16:08 > 0:16:11preparing for a European summit in Madrid.
0:16:11 > 0:16:14The economy was now overheating and inflation was rising
0:16:14 > 0:16:17but the Prime Minister still could not agree with her
0:16:17 > 0:16:20Chancellor about economic policy.
0:16:20 > 0:16:23She was also at loggerheads with Geoffrey Howe, who,
0:16:23 > 0:16:27with Nigel Lawson, had long been urging Britain's entry into the ERM.
0:16:30 > 0:16:35MARGARET THATCHER: I was at Chequers for the Saturday working on my speech
0:16:35 > 0:16:37for the Madrid summit.
0:16:37 > 0:16:40I suddenly received a message from Number 10 -
0:16:40 > 0:16:42"Both Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson want to see you together
0:16:42 > 0:16:44"before you go to Madrid."
0:16:44 > 0:16:47And I was pretty cross. I had so much work to do.
0:16:47 > 0:16:50And so I said, "All right, they can do it at 11.15 tonight
0:16:50 > 0:16:52"or at 8.15 tomorrow morning."
0:16:52 > 0:16:54They chose 8.15 Sunday morning.
0:16:54 > 0:16:56I returned to Number 10.
0:16:59 > 0:17:01Early on Sunday, 25th June,
0:17:01 > 0:17:03the Foreign Secretary went to Downing Street to meet
0:17:03 > 0:17:05the Chancellor and with him
0:17:05 > 0:17:09demand the Prime Minister set a date for entry to the ERM.
0:17:09 > 0:17:13The Prime Minister had banned the matter from Cabinet discussion.
0:17:14 > 0:17:17LORD RIDLEY: I thought it was absolutely disgraceful.
0:17:17 > 0:17:18I was horrified.
0:17:18 > 0:17:21They did it behind the backs of the colleagues in the Cabinet.
0:17:21 > 0:17:24We had no idea that anything of this sort was going on.
0:17:24 > 0:17:29The ERM wasn't on the agenda for the Madrid summit and I just don't
0:17:29 > 0:17:32think these are the tactics you should use however strongly
0:17:32 > 0:17:33you feel about something.
0:17:34 > 0:17:39- NIGEL LAWSON:- If a prime minister is about to go to a major international
0:17:39 > 0:17:44meeting to discuss with heads of government from other countries
0:17:44 > 0:17:47the monetary affairs of Europe,
0:17:47 > 0:17:50you would think that she would want to have a meeting with her
0:17:50 > 0:17:52Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer, even if
0:17:52 > 0:17:54she doesn't want to take their advice.
0:17:54 > 0:17:58She regarded this request for a meeting as, itself,
0:17:58 > 0:18:00almost an act of treachery.
0:18:02 > 0:18:04I was the minister to be with her at the Madrid summit.
0:18:04 > 0:18:07Nigel Lawson was the minister in charge of economic policy.
0:18:07 > 0:18:10If we had not had that meeting with her then what should history
0:18:10 > 0:18:13have said then? It was our duty.
0:18:13 > 0:18:15I should have welcomed the chance to present the same
0:18:15 > 0:18:19case in the context of a larger group of ministers because we should
0:18:19 > 0:18:22once again have secured the support of the larger group.
0:18:22 > 0:18:24The fact that we were arguing at two-to-one was
0:18:24 > 0:18:27because we were not able to mobilise a larger army.
0:18:27 > 0:18:29That wasn't our choice.
0:18:29 > 0:18:32They both came in in a rather self-conscious way,
0:18:32 > 0:18:37but, um, clearly just a little bit pleased with themselves, holding
0:18:37 > 0:18:43a document and they sat down opposite me, the other side of the fire.
0:18:43 > 0:18:46Geoffrey started
0:18:46 > 0:18:50and said he and Nigel had decided,
0:18:50 > 0:18:52both of them,
0:18:52 > 0:18:57they were not going merely to ask me to set a date
0:18:57 > 0:18:59and specify a date at Madrid as to when we'd go into the
0:18:59 > 0:19:05Exchange Rate Mechanism, but if I did not do so, they would resign.
0:19:06 > 0:19:11Geoffrey Howe reiterated what we had suggested in our paper
0:19:11 > 0:19:15and said, you know, that...
0:19:15 > 0:19:20if you're not prepared to accept my advice,
0:19:20 > 0:19:26then I will have to consider my position, or whatever...
0:19:28 > 0:19:32..the appropriate formulation is for saying that he'd have to resign.
0:19:33 > 0:19:37And, er, so I said,
0:19:37 > 0:19:40I did say at that meeting,
0:19:40 > 0:19:43a much shorter meeting, that you should know, Prime Minister,
0:19:43 > 0:19:46that if Geoffrey goes I would have to go too.
0:19:46 > 0:19:50They got up looking rather smug...
0:19:51 > 0:19:53..and left.
0:19:53 > 0:19:57It had been a grubby little meeting.
0:20:00 > 0:20:02On the plane journey to the Madrid summit,
0:20:02 > 0:20:06Margaret Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe maintained an icy silence.
0:20:08 > 0:20:11Their relationship was permanently damaged.
0:20:11 > 0:20:15That Sunday afternoon, the Prime Minister and Charles Powell
0:20:15 > 0:20:16set to work on her response
0:20:16 > 0:20:19to Lawson and Howe's ultimatum on the ERM.
0:20:20 > 0:20:24Later, Margaret Thatcher announced for the first time
0:20:24 > 0:20:26specific conditions for Britain's entry,
0:20:26 > 0:20:28most importantly, the reduction of domestic inflation.
0:20:28 > 0:20:30No date was set.
0:20:32 > 0:20:33But Geoffrey Howe was convinced
0:20:33 > 0:20:36that Margaret Thatcher had bowed to his wishes
0:20:36 > 0:20:39by setting out conditions for Britain's joining the ERM.
0:20:40 > 0:20:43Although Margaret Thatcher had set no date for entry,
0:20:43 > 0:20:45he did not resign.
0:20:46 > 0:20:47We achieved our objective,
0:20:47 > 0:20:50which was Britain remaining part of the continuing debate
0:20:50 > 0:20:54on the future of the European Monetary System.
0:20:54 > 0:20:56We were perceived to have achieved our objective
0:20:56 > 0:21:00by the press, by Parliament and by our partners in Europe.
0:21:00 > 0:21:02It would have been entirely futile to resign
0:21:02 > 0:21:04having achieved an important advance.
0:21:06 > 0:21:08Strangely enough, the briefing I saw,
0:21:08 > 0:21:11which had been given to the press, not from us,
0:21:11 > 0:21:14can only have come from Geoffrey or from Nigel,
0:21:14 > 0:21:16was they had had a great victory.
0:21:16 > 0:21:19In fact, it had a great defeat.
0:21:19 > 0:21:21Such is presentation.
0:21:21 > 0:21:23How different from reality.
0:21:23 > 0:21:25She called their bluff.
0:21:25 > 0:21:30And then the most despicable thing of all was that when she got back,
0:21:30 > 0:21:32and it was all over, they didn't resign.
0:21:32 > 0:21:36Having threatened to resign and not got what they wanted,
0:21:36 > 0:21:37they didn't resign.
0:21:38 > 0:21:42The following day, Margaret Thatcher confronted her colleagues.
0:21:42 > 0:21:46Normally, I'm just sitting in my place in the Cabinet room
0:21:46 > 0:21:49and they all come in and take their places.
0:21:49 > 0:21:52In view of what they had attempted to do to me
0:21:52 > 0:21:56on the Sunday, I went to the door of the Cabinet room,
0:21:56 > 0:21:59saw each minister in, just waited as they passed me.
0:21:59 > 0:22:02Geoffrey came and went straight past.
0:22:02 > 0:22:04Nigel came...
0:22:05 > 0:22:06..and he said...
0:22:08 > 0:22:12..in his rather nice way, "Went rather well, didn't it?"
0:22:12 > 0:22:14I said, "Yes, no date."
0:22:16 > 0:22:17And that was that.
0:22:19 > 0:22:23Oh, I think that that was one of those little things
0:22:23 > 0:22:25which was characteristic of her.
0:22:25 > 0:22:27I don't think I took that very seriously.
0:22:27 > 0:22:32What I was much more concerned about was the bad blood that
0:22:32 > 0:22:37that occasion had created.
0:22:37 > 0:22:42And there's no doubt about it, it had created very bad blood
0:22:42 > 0:22:46between us and, of course, between Geoffrey and herself.
0:22:50 > 0:22:53Margaret Thatcher had won a battle with her colleagues
0:22:53 > 0:22:55but she'd not won the war.
0:22:55 > 0:22:58Her enmity with Lawson and Howe persisted.
0:22:58 > 0:23:00It was to poison her last year in office.
0:23:01 > 0:23:04Now she decided that Sir Geoffrey Howe must be punished.
0:23:09 > 0:23:13It seemed as if he felt he had a right to anything he wanted.
0:23:13 > 0:23:17And he seemed as if he felt he should be Foreign Secretary for ever
0:23:17 > 0:23:23and I think perhaps he had come to enjoy the trappings of office.
0:23:23 > 0:23:25Always, perhaps, a fatal temptation.
0:23:25 > 0:23:28The trappings of office never appealed to me at all.
0:23:29 > 0:23:33In July 1989, Margaret Thatcher had her revenge
0:23:33 > 0:23:35and demoted Sir Geoffrey Howe.
0:23:35 > 0:23:37Although he remained in the Cabinet,
0:23:37 > 0:23:41she gave him the junior post of Leader of the House of Commons.
0:23:41 > 0:23:46For a change of that kind to happen, as it were, out of the blue
0:23:46 > 0:23:51and thought through with such apparently careful thought
0:23:51 > 0:23:55did come as an immense shock, as a great thunderbolt.
0:23:55 > 0:23:58No doubt Prime Ministers are entitled to proceed like that
0:23:58 > 0:24:01and if they do approach decisions in that way,
0:24:01 > 0:24:04it says something about relationships.
0:24:04 > 0:24:06It's very difficult to suddenly ask somebody
0:24:06 > 0:24:09to give up being Foreign Secretary all of a sudden.
0:24:09 > 0:24:11It undoubtedly was all of a sudden
0:24:11 > 0:24:14that he was asked to give up being Foreign Secretary.
0:24:14 > 0:24:16And I think he'd done a very considerable job
0:24:16 > 0:24:19and I don't think he had any idea that that was going to happen.
0:24:19 > 0:24:23So, I suppose, if you have no idea it's going to happen,
0:24:23 > 0:24:25in a way you must feel humiliated, mustn't you?
0:24:27 > 0:24:31John Major replaced Sir Geoffrey Howe as Foreign Secretary.
0:24:31 > 0:24:34- What would you like me to do? - INDISTINCT RESPONSE
0:24:34 > 0:24:36Major's lack of experience and the fact
0:24:36 > 0:24:39that he was nearly 20 years younger than the outgoing Foreign Secretary
0:24:39 > 0:24:42seems to have compounded Sir Geoffrey's humiliation.
0:24:44 > 0:24:49Clearly he felt that obviously John's experience
0:24:49 > 0:24:51was nothing like his, which was true.
0:24:52 > 0:24:55I think there was really something else,
0:24:55 > 0:24:57again which one could understand.
0:24:57 > 0:25:01All of a sudden, it came to him
0:25:01 > 0:25:05that the possibility of being Prime Minister
0:25:05 > 0:25:07was slipping from his grasp
0:25:07 > 0:25:10as others came up and would rival his claim.
0:25:12 > 0:25:14Still in Cabinet,
0:25:14 > 0:25:16with the courtesy title of Deputy Prime Minister,
0:25:16 > 0:25:18Sir Geoffrey brooded on his treatment
0:25:18 > 0:25:22and became ever more incensed at the Prime Minister's attitude to Europe.
0:25:26 > 0:25:30Despite the celebration of ten glorious years,
0:25:30 > 0:25:33the party conference of 1989 was held in an atmosphere of gloom
0:25:33 > 0:25:34and recrimination.
0:25:34 > 0:25:38Inflation and interest rates were high. Recession loomed.
0:25:38 > 0:25:41While Lawson and Howe dutifully clapped their leader,
0:25:41 > 0:25:43the intensity of her look betrayed for an instant
0:25:43 > 0:25:45their mutual mistrust.
0:25:48 > 0:25:52The Prime Minister's breach with her Chancellor was beyond repair.
0:25:52 > 0:25:54Despite a public show of unity,
0:25:54 > 0:25:58she now openly blamed Lawson for the return of inflation.
0:25:58 > 0:26:01And she turned once more to her adviser Alan Walters, who,
0:26:01 > 0:26:05like her, had little faith in Nigel Lawson or the ERM.
0:26:07 > 0:26:10It's like that immortal line of Dickens',
0:26:10 > 0:26:13he was the best of chancellors and the worst of chancellors.
0:26:13 > 0:26:16Er...
0:26:16 > 0:26:20As a person, he was intelligent...
0:26:22 > 0:26:26..hard-working, devoted and so on.
0:26:27 > 0:26:31But he was also arrogant...
0:26:32 > 0:26:33..self-centred,
0:26:33 > 0:26:38completely convinced that there was nobody cleverer than he was.
0:26:38 > 0:26:42And alas, there was somebody cleverer than he was,
0:26:42 > 0:26:43Mrs Thatcher.
0:26:44 > 0:26:47Alan Walters was a frequent visitor to Number Ten,
0:26:47 > 0:26:50where, in contrast to Nigel Lawson, his views were welcomed.
0:26:50 > 0:26:54His opposition to the Chancellor's policy soon became public.
0:26:55 > 0:26:58In October 1989, the Financial Times
0:26:58 > 0:27:00published an article about Alan Walters
0:27:00 > 0:27:02which repeated Walters' view
0:27:02 > 0:27:05that the Exchange Rate Mechanism was half-baked.
0:27:05 > 0:27:09For the beleaguered Chancellor, this was too much.
0:27:09 > 0:27:12I felt really that it is quite impossible for me
0:27:12 > 0:27:16to carry on my job...
0:27:17 > 0:27:18..effectively.
0:27:18 > 0:27:22Impossible for any Chancellor to carry on the job effectively
0:27:22 > 0:27:26if his authority is being undermined all the time,
0:27:26 > 0:27:28in the way that mine was being undermined,
0:27:28 > 0:27:31apparently with the authority of the Prime Minister.
0:27:31 > 0:27:34He came on very sensitive, I must say.
0:27:34 > 0:27:37I was never expected to be sensitive but all of the rest of them were.
0:27:37 > 0:27:39There was only one woman in the Cabinet.
0:27:39 > 0:27:42Believe you me, there were a lot more prima donnas than that.
0:27:42 > 0:27:44Oh, they came round. Goodness me, their reputation.
0:27:44 > 0:27:46Never mind about mine,
0:27:46 > 0:27:48never mind all the briefing that was going on
0:27:48 > 0:27:50against my viewpoint, in the background.
0:27:50 > 0:27:52Goodness me, they were touchy.
0:27:52 > 0:27:54Oh, you had to smooth them down.
0:27:56 > 0:27:59As the economy deteriorated, the Daily Mail accused Lawson
0:27:59 > 0:28:02of betraying his party and the people of Britain.
0:28:02 > 0:28:05It reflected Mrs Thatcher's views.
0:28:05 > 0:28:08The Chancellor retreated to his country home,
0:28:08 > 0:28:10where he was besieged by journalists.
0:28:10 > 0:28:13With the return of inflation and interest rates high,
0:28:13 > 0:28:15his position had become precarious.
0:28:15 > 0:28:16- JOURNALIST:- ..ask about your speech?
0:28:16 > 0:28:19Are you considering another rise in interest rates, Mr Lawson?
0:28:19 > 0:28:21As the Chancellor fled back to London,
0:28:21 > 0:28:23he decided he could no longer tolerate
0:28:23 > 0:28:26Mrs Thatcher's preference for Alan Walters.
0:28:31 > 0:28:33Early in the morning, on the 26th of October,
0:28:33 > 0:28:37Nigel Lawson came to Number Ten to confront the Prime Minister.
0:28:38 > 0:28:42He told her that if she didn't sack Alan Walters, he would resign.
0:28:44 > 0:28:47Now, you could have knocked me down with a feather.
0:28:47 > 0:28:49The Chancellor of the Exchequer,
0:28:49 > 0:28:55with all of the importance and reputation of that position,
0:28:55 > 0:28:58to come to me and say,
0:28:58 > 0:29:03"Unless you sack one of your most loyal advisers, I will resign."
0:29:03 > 0:29:06I couldn't believe it.
0:29:06 > 0:29:10She said, "Well, if Alan goes, that would destroy my authority."
0:29:10 > 0:29:13So I said, "That is nonsense, Prime Minister.
0:29:13 > 0:29:16"Your authority is in no way dependent on Alan Walters.
0:29:16 > 0:29:21"It would not be destroyed. But I realise that it...
0:29:23 > 0:29:28"..you might well want the current hullabaloo to die down.
0:29:28 > 0:29:30"And then I could carry on,
0:29:30 > 0:29:35"certainly carry on as your Chancellor if you wish me to,
0:29:35 > 0:29:38"provided he goes at the end of the year."
0:29:38 > 0:29:41And she refused even that.
0:29:42 > 0:29:46The Prime Minister ignored Lawson's warning that he intended to resign.
0:29:48 > 0:29:50At 2.30 that afternoon,
0:29:50 > 0:29:53she went across to the Commons to prepare for Question Time.
0:29:53 > 0:29:58As she did so, Nigel Lawson sent a message, repeating his ultimatum.
0:30:00 > 0:30:02Now, it was a pretty nasty thing
0:30:02 > 0:30:04to have to go into the House of Commons...
0:30:04 > 0:30:06It reminded me, I suppose,
0:30:06 > 0:30:09of the things they had tried to do to me
0:30:09 > 0:30:12just before going to the Madrid summit.
0:30:12 > 0:30:16In retrospect, I think Nigel was looking for an excuse to resign
0:30:16 > 0:30:20because of the inflation he had created.
0:30:20 > 0:30:23And I think he was pestering me to get the information out...
0:30:25 > 0:30:29..because he feared that I might otherwise ring up Alan
0:30:29 > 0:30:32and Alan would say, "Well, of course I will go."
0:30:32 > 0:30:35And then his excuse would have been no longer valid
0:30:35 > 0:30:38and he would have had to have stayed on
0:30:38 > 0:30:40and deal with the inflation himself.
0:30:40 > 0:30:41To suggest that I resigned
0:30:41 > 0:30:44because the economy was in a desperate state
0:30:44 > 0:30:46and I couldn't face the responsibility is ludicrous.
0:30:46 > 0:30:49First of all, although the economy was going through a bad patch
0:30:49 > 0:30:51it wasn't in a desperate state.
0:30:51 > 0:30:56And I knew perfectly well that my resigning would inevitably
0:30:56 > 0:31:01cause me to be made the scapegoat for whatever happened afterwards.
0:31:03 > 0:31:06By this time, it was nearly seven.
0:31:06 > 0:31:11I thought, "The press are going to get on to Alan. I must tell him."
0:31:11 > 0:31:14And I telephoned him. He was utterly dismayed.
0:31:17 > 0:31:20All he'd done was to give sound advice.
0:31:20 > 0:31:23And said...I said, "You're not going, Alan.
0:31:24 > 0:31:26"You've been absolutely wonderful."
0:31:26 > 0:31:28He said, "But I am in an intolerable position.
0:31:28 > 0:31:29"I will have to go."
0:31:31 > 0:31:33And he decided to go.
0:31:33 > 0:31:38But I had stayed loyal to someone who'd been loyal to me.
0:31:38 > 0:31:41And again, I wasn't going to be blackmailed
0:31:41 > 0:31:44by such appalling tactics.
0:31:45 > 0:31:48I had not been disloyal to her at any time.
0:31:48 > 0:31:50I had been extremely loyal to her.
0:31:50 > 0:31:54In fact, one of the problems with Margaret Thatcher towards the end
0:31:54 > 0:31:57was that she saw loyalty as a one-way street.
0:31:57 > 0:32:00I mean, she expected all her ministers to be totally loyal to her
0:32:00 > 0:32:03and by and large they were.
0:32:03 > 0:32:07She didn't feel a similar obligation to be loyal to them.
0:32:08 > 0:32:12Nigel Lawson's resignation damaged the Prime Minister
0:32:12 > 0:32:14and made her vulnerable in Parliament.
0:32:14 > 0:32:17She'd lost the support of the two men, Lawson and Howe,
0:32:17 > 0:32:21who many regarded as her standard-bearers.
0:32:21 > 0:32:24And the manner of Lawson's departure triggered a backbench challenge
0:32:24 > 0:32:26to Mrs Thatcher's leadership.
0:32:28 > 0:32:31Sir Anthony Meyer, a pro-European Conservative MP,
0:32:31 > 0:32:34stood against Margaret Thatcher in November 1989
0:32:34 > 0:32:35as a stalking-horse,
0:32:35 > 0:32:39in the vain hope that a more substantial candidate would emerge.
0:32:41 > 0:32:43Even so, in the secret leadership ballot,
0:32:43 > 0:32:4733 Conservative MPs voted for Sir Anthony Meyer,
0:32:47 > 0:32:4827 abstained.
0:32:50 > 0:32:52The party managers were worried,
0:32:52 > 0:32:55despite the Prime Minister's confidence in her party's backing.
0:32:55 > 0:32:58Ladies and gentlemen, just a brief word.
0:32:58 > 0:33:02I'd like to say how very pleased I am with this result
0:33:02 > 0:33:05and very pleased I am to have had the overwhelming support
0:33:05 > 0:33:07of my colleagues in the House
0:33:07 > 0:33:10and of people from the party, in the country.
0:33:15 > 0:33:17Late one evening, following the Meyer challenge,
0:33:17 > 0:33:21the Deputy Chief Whip paid a secret visit to Downing Street.
0:33:21 > 0:33:24He warned the Prime Minister that many of her backbenchers
0:33:24 > 0:33:26felt she'd become regal and isolated.
0:33:26 > 0:33:28They were out for her blood.
0:33:30 > 0:33:33Using the rather, sort of, graphic imagery that I do, I said,
0:33:33 > 0:33:36"Look, there are about 100 more people,"
0:33:36 > 0:33:39that is in addition to those who had abstained
0:33:39 > 0:33:41or voted against, at Meyer.
0:33:41 > 0:33:44"They're lurking in the bushes, they've got daggers in their hands
0:33:44 > 0:33:47"and they want to engage in the daylight assassination
0:33:47 > 0:33:49"of a sitting prime minister."
0:33:51 > 0:33:53After the Meyer challenge,
0:33:53 > 0:33:58one of the messages which came back from her campaign team was
0:33:58 > 0:34:01that there was great dissatisfaction among the backbenchers.
0:34:01 > 0:34:04And that was something which certainly we recognised
0:34:04 > 0:34:05had to be put right.
0:34:05 > 0:34:07And so after the Meyer challenge,
0:34:07 > 0:34:10we set up a series of meetings with backbenchers
0:34:10 > 0:34:12to allow them to come in, in groups,
0:34:12 > 0:34:16and to tell her, raise with her, anything which they wished to do so.
0:34:17 > 0:34:21During one of those meetings, one backbench MP said,
0:34:21 > 0:34:24"Don't you think, Mrs Thatcher, it's time for you to go?"
0:34:24 > 0:34:27And I didn't, I still had so much to do.
0:34:27 > 0:34:30And I felt that at that time we had
0:34:30 > 0:34:32changed president in the United States, as well.
0:34:32 > 0:34:35And I felt that at that time,
0:34:35 > 0:34:39to get the continuity of policy and to go forward
0:34:39 > 0:34:43and to reap the full benefit of the changes we had brought about,
0:34:43 > 0:34:46both at home and overseas,
0:34:46 > 0:34:50I still was the person to complete that task.
0:34:53 > 0:34:55Like many powerful leaders before her,
0:34:55 > 0:34:58Margaret Thatcher could see no suitable successor.
0:34:58 > 0:34:59She was grooming John Major,
0:34:59 > 0:35:02whom she'd rapidly promoted to Chancellor.
0:35:02 > 0:35:06But even he, she began to think, had his drawbacks.
0:35:06 > 0:35:08He came up very quickly.
0:35:08 > 0:35:11After all, to jump from being Chief Secretary to Foreign Secretary
0:35:11 > 0:35:14and then back to Chancellor of the Exchequer
0:35:14 > 0:35:19meant that there were several years' experience missing
0:35:19 > 0:35:22and I think that was probably the difference between us.
0:35:22 > 0:35:26Don't forget, I came into the House of Commons in 1959.
0:35:26 > 0:35:29So, there are a number of things, John, that come out of the...
0:35:29 > 0:35:32The Prime Minister became suspicious of what she saw
0:35:32 > 0:35:34as Major's yielding nature.
0:35:34 > 0:35:36In private, she said that John Major
0:35:36 > 0:35:38had an India rubber attitude to Europe
0:35:38 > 0:35:41and that he played the same cracked record as Lawson
0:35:41 > 0:35:42on exchange rates.
0:35:43 > 0:35:48John is much more a consensus man and will much more compromise.
0:35:48 > 0:35:51That seems to be very agreeable.
0:35:51 > 0:35:54I had noticed that perhaps he tended to go with the crowd
0:35:54 > 0:35:56and the conventional wisdom.
0:35:56 > 0:35:58But therefore he needed to be tested
0:35:58 > 0:36:01to see how he would perform in other roles.
0:36:03 > 0:36:06And she came to think that he lacked both the vision
0:36:06 > 0:36:09and the mental agility necessary for a senior politician.
0:36:11 > 0:36:15If you don't have a really great intellectual background,
0:36:15 > 0:36:17you can acquire that.
0:36:17 > 0:36:20But what is important is that you require
0:36:20 > 0:36:23a political instinct for what the people think.
0:36:23 > 0:36:27Now, people liked John very much. You couldn't not like John.
0:36:27 > 0:36:30But it's quite different from liking a person
0:36:30 > 0:36:34from having a political instinct of the right direction
0:36:34 > 0:36:36in which to go, in the long run.
0:36:36 > 0:36:40Perhaps I had developed that over the years.
0:36:40 > 0:36:42There was no doubt that Margaret Thatcher promoted
0:36:42 > 0:36:46John Major to be Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer
0:36:46 > 0:36:50because she'd identified him as her successor.
0:36:50 > 0:36:55If she had believed then what she now says she believed about him
0:36:55 > 0:36:56she would not have promoted him.
0:36:56 > 0:36:59She promoted him, identified him as the heir
0:36:59 > 0:37:02and gave him her wholehearted support
0:37:02 > 0:37:04when he stood for the leadership.
0:37:04 > 0:37:07Anything else, I'm afraid, is a change of recollection
0:37:07 > 0:37:10that's come from looking back over those events,
0:37:10 > 0:37:12which I have no doubt Margaret has.
0:37:14 > 0:37:16There were few others whom she considered
0:37:16 > 0:37:18might take her chair in the Cabinet.
0:37:18 > 0:37:22She'd either sacked, lost or sidelined those senior politicians
0:37:22 > 0:37:24who shared her experience and political outlook.
0:37:26 > 0:37:29Like a medieval monarch, as a colleague once observed,
0:37:29 > 0:37:32she wondered fearfully who might have eyes on her crown.
0:37:33 > 0:37:36I think that's one of the weaknesses that
0:37:36 > 0:37:40shadowed the Government as the years went by -
0:37:40 > 0:37:43that older statesmen, for one reason or another,
0:37:43 > 0:37:45fell by the wayside.
0:37:45 > 0:37:47And it increasingly became a Cabinet
0:37:47 > 0:37:50with the Prime Minister towering above people who were younger than,
0:37:50 > 0:37:52less experienced than herself.
0:37:52 > 0:37:54I think it would have been better,
0:37:54 > 0:37:56from her point of view and the country's point of view,
0:37:56 > 0:38:01had she retained a broader band of equally mature colleagues.
0:38:07 > 0:38:09- NORMAN TEBBIT:- Over a period of time,
0:38:09 > 0:38:13she found fewer and fewer people in her government
0:38:13 > 0:38:15who were of her view.
0:38:19 > 0:38:22That was what happened to Margaret Thatcher.
0:38:22 > 0:38:26And progressively, after 1987, in consequence,
0:38:26 > 0:38:28she lost control of her Cabinet.
0:38:28 > 0:38:30SHOUTING
0:38:30 > 0:38:33The Prime Minister was further isolated by
0:38:33 > 0:38:35her dogged attachment to the poll tax.
0:38:35 > 0:38:37It was almost universally unpopular
0:38:37 > 0:38:41and led to some of the worst rioting witnessed on the streets of London.
0:38:42 > 0:38:43Conservative backbenchers,
0:38:43 > 0:38:46fearing the community charge might lose them their seats,
0:38:46 > 0:38:48talked openly about a change of leader.
0:38:48 > 0:38:51But it was simply not in Mrs Thatcher's character
0:38:51 > 0:38:54to change policy, even in the face of disaster.
0:38:55 > 0:38:58What one picked up very quickly was that
0:38:58 > 0:39:02some of those who were suggesting that it was time for me to go
0:39:02 > 0:39:06wanted to relax the very policies that had been successful.
0:39:06 > 0:39:10In Truman's phrase, they couldn't stand the heat in the kitchen.
0:39:11 > 0:39:14I, of course, was used to the heat in the kitchen.
0:39:17 > 0:39:20The Prime Minister seemed curiously out of step
0:39:20 > 0:39:22with the tide of world events.
0:39:22 > 0:39:26When the Berlin Wall came down and German reunification became inevitable,
0:39:26 > 0:39:28hers was a lone voice in opposition.
0:39:34 > 0:39:37Even Saddam Hussein's invasion of the Gulf
0:39:37 > 0:39:40failed to revive her fortunes as a war leader.
0:39:40 > 0:39:42The Conservative Party remained consistently
0:39:42 > 0:39:44ten points behind Labour in the polls.
0:39:46 > 0:39:48After years of resistance,
0:39:48 > 0:39:51Margaret Thatcher did finally give way on one matter,
0:39:51 > 0:39:52she bowed to John Major and agreed
0:39:52 > 0:39:56that Britain should join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
0:39:56 > 0:39:59But by now, inflation was rising to 10%
0:39:59 > 0:40:01and interest rates were punitively high.
0:40:05 > 0:40:08But the concession of sterling's entry into the ERM
0:40:08 > 0:40:12seemed to make her more, not less, hostile to the community.
0:40:12 > 0:40:16At a summit in Rome, late in October 1990, she hit out
0:40:16 > 0:40:20at her Italian hosts, accusing them of living in cloud cuckoo land.
0:40:22 > 0:40:26On her return to London, she departed from a neutral statement
0:40:26 > 0:40:29to denounce the European Commission and its president.
0:40:32 > 0:40:35The chairman or the president of the Commission, Mr Delors,
0:40:35 > 0:40:38said at a press conference the other day that he wanted
0:40:38 > 0:40:42the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the Community,
0:40:42 > 0:40:45he wanted the Commission to be the Executive
0:40:45 > 0:40:47and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the Senate.
0:40:47 > 0:40:50No. No. No.
0:40:52 > 0:40:54Or... Or...
0:40:54 > 0:41:00Well, I thought that "No. No. No." had a stridency about it
0:41:00 > 0:41:03that was not calculated to
0:41:03 > 0:41:07impress our partners, with whom we had to live for the rest of time,
0:41:07 > 0:41:10it was the language of the battlefield,
0:41:10 > 0:41:12rather than the language of the partnership.
0:41:14 > 0:41:17Criticising the mood she'd struck on Europe,
0:41:17 > 0:41:21Sir Geoffrey resigned from the Cabinet on 1st November 1990.
0:41:22 > 0:41:25Having lost his voice, he was unable to speak out,
0:41:25 > 0:41:28but he bided his time and when the power of speech returned
0:41:28 > 0:41:32a few days later, he was to use it to devastating effect.
0:41:32 > 0:41:35Margaret Thatcher had now lost the man who ten years before
0:41:35 > 0:41:37had been her most loyal ally.
0:41:38 > 0:41:41Geoffrey had been a believer, right from the beginning,
0:41:41 > 0:41:42and so had Nigel Lawson,
0:41:42 > 0:41:45and my trouble was the believers had fallen away.
0:41:45 > 0:41:48They hadn't had the perseverance and the persistence to take it through,
0:41:48 > 0:41:50and it's not whether you start a task,
0:41:50 > 0:41:53it's whether you can take it through to completion.
0:41:53 > 0:41:56On 13th November, Sir Geoffrey came to the House to
0:41:56 > 0:41:58explain his resignation.
0:41:58 > 0:42:00Not since Neville Chamberlain, 50 years before,
0:42:00 > 0:42:03had a sitting Prime Minister been subjected to such
0:42:03 > 0:42:06an attack by a senior member of the same party.
0:42:06 > 0:42:10Order. I remind the House that a resignation statement is
0:42:10 > 0:42:14heard in silence and without interruption. Sir Geoffrey Howe.
0:42:16 > 0:42:20Mr Speaker, Sir, I find to my astonishment that
0:42:20 > 0:42:22a quarter of a century has passed
0:42:22 > 0:42:25since I last spoke from one of these backbenches.
0:42:25 > 0:42:30'I clearly was wrestling with a conflict of conscience which was'
0:42:30 > 0:42:33very difficult and very important.
0:42:33 > 0:42:35I had to get that view across quite clearly
0:42:35 > 0:42:38and explain why I was doing it, to convince people it wasn't just
0:42:38 > 0:42:42personal bitterness, that it was for real reasons of substance.
0:42:42 > 0:42:43And I suppose the only judgment
0:42:43 > 0:42:46I made was that a speech of that kind could either be
0:42:46 > 0:42:51a damp squib or could make an impact that it deserved to make.
0:42:51 > 0:42:53And I was anxious that it shouldn't be a damp squib
0:42:53 > 0:42:55and I seem to have succeeded in that.
0:42:55 > 0:42:56I have to say, Mr Speaker,
0:42:56 > 0:43:00that I find Winston Churchill's perception a good deal more
0:43:00 > 0:43:04convincing and more encouraging for the interests of our nation than the
0:43:04 > 0:43:08nightmare image sometimes conjured up by my Right Honourable Friend,
0:43:08 > 0:43:13who seems sometimes to look out upon a continent that is
0:43:13 > 0:43:16positively teeming with ill-intentioned people, scheming,
0:43:16 > 0:43:19in her words, to extinguish democracy.
0:43:19 > 0:43:22'I was just amazed'
0:43:22 > 0:43:26at the mixture of bile and treachery
0:43:26 > 0:43:30that poured out in a speech, every word of which
0:43:30 > 0:43:34had clearly been carefully drafted
0:43:34 > 0:43:36and in a speech which he delivered, if I might say so,
0:43:36 > 0:43:39better than any other speech I'd ever heard him deliver.
0:43:40 > 0:43:44This perhaps was his feeling coming to the fore.
0:43:45 > 0:43:48Mr Speaker, I believe that both the Chancellor
0:43:48 > 0:43:51and the Governor are cricketing enthusiasts.
0:43:51 > 0:43:54So I hope there's no monopoly of cricketing metaphors.
0:43:54 > 0:43:58It's rather like sending your opening batsmen to the crease,
0:43:58 > 0:44:02only for them to find, the moment the first balls are bowled,
0:44:02 > 0:44:06that their bats have been broken before the game by the team captain.
0:44:06 > 0:44:08LAUGHTER
0:44:08 > 0:44:13I had to sit, my back to him. I could turn around and see him,
0:44:13 > 0:44:15but I didn't particularly wish to,
0:44:15 > 0:44:18and I knew that the press were facing me in the gallery opposite.
0:44:18 > 0:44:25I knew therefore that I must keep my features very much composed and calm.
0:44:25 > 0:44:29At the same time, I was trying to assess the effect that that
0:44:29 > 0:44:34speech would have, because I knew by this time some of the discussion
0:44:34 > 0:44:36and rumours that were taking place.
0:44:39 > 0:44:42It was an experience I would not wish to go through again.
0:44:44 > 0:44:46The tragedy is, and it is for me,
0:44:46 > 0:44:51personally, for my party, for our whole people
0:44:51 > 0:44:55and for my Right Honourable Friend herself, a very real tragedy,
0:44:55 > 0:44:58that the Prime Minister's perceived attitude towards Europe is
0:44:58 > 0:45:02running increasingly serious risks for the future of our nation.
0:45:02 > 0:45:04The wielding the knife.
0:45:06 > 0:45:09Cleverly. So very cleverly.
0:45:12 > 0:45:14Too cleverly.
0:45:14 > 0:45:19Because, in the end, it was not my record it assassinated.
0:45:22 > 0:45:25He assassinated his own character.
0:45:25 > 0:45:29I've done what I believe to be right for my party and my country.
0:45:29 > 0:45:33The time has come for others to consider their own response
0:45:33 > 0:45:35to the tragic conflict of loyalties with which
0:45:35 > 0:45:38I have myself wrestled for perhaps too long.
0:45:41 > 0:45:45The idea that anyone should take the decisions that
0:45:45 > 0:45:49I took or make the speech that I made for grounds of personal bitterness
0:45:49 > 0:45:51is quite frankly grotesque.
0:45:51 > 0:45:55I devoted a large chunk of my adult life to membership
0:45:55 > 0:45:57of the House of Commons - to membership of Ted Heath's
0:45:57 > 0:45:59and Margaret Thatcher's Cabinet -
0:45:59 > 0:46:03to support of our economic and foreign policies and I was
0:46:03 > 0:46:06deeply dismayed to see that going awry,
0:46:06 > 0:46:09that I felt the time had come when I could no longer suppress
0:46:09 > 0:46:13those anxieties, and I expressed them and it was plain, from what
0:46:13 > 0:46:16happened subsequently, that I was far from being alone.
0:46:17 > 0:46:21'Quite obviously, someone would be standing against me
0:46:21 > 0:46:23'in the leadership stakes.
0:46:23 > 0:46:24'Quite obviously,
0:46:24 > 0:46:28'his speech was an open invitation to Michael Heseltine to stand.'
0:46:28 > 0:46:32And therefore I realised we were in for a rough ride.
0:46:33 > 0:46:39I have accordingly informed the Chief Whip and the Chairman of the 1922 Committee
0:46:39 > 0:46:41that I intend to let my name go forward.
0:46:43 > 0:46:44Thank you very much.
0:46:44 > 0:46:48Michael Heseltine's high-profile campaign began immediately.
0:46:48 > 0:46:52By contrast, Margaret Thatcher's team seemed overcome by inertia.
0:46:52 > 0:46:56People speak of a Margaret Thatcher campaign.
0:46:56 > 0:46:59In truth, there was no campaign.
0:46:59 > 0:47:02Only one person was running a campaign
0:47:02 > 0:47:04and that was Michael Heseltine.
0:47:04 > 0:47:06And it was a very good campaign.
0:47:06 > 0:47:10He'd been building up to it for a long time, he had made
0:47:10 > 0:47:16friends with a lot of backbenchers and he pursued people. I mean,
0:47:16 > 0:47:20I had friends who were rung up in their bath by Michael Heseltine.
0:47:20 > 0:47:22It was a very, very busy period
0:47:22 > 0:47:26and we agreed right at the beginning that it really wouldn't be
0:47:26 > 0:47:29right for me to go around and canvas people myself,
0:47:29 > 0:47:32to go through the tea rooms and say, "Please, will you support me?"
0:47:32 > 0:47:35If, by the time you've been eleven and a half years as Prime Minister,
0:47:35 > 0:47:37they don't know what you've done
0:47:37 > 0:47:40and what wouldn't have happened unless you'd been there...
0:47:40 > 0:47:43I didn't feel it would make that much difference to say,
0:47:43 > 0:47:45"Will you support me?"
0:47:46 > 0:47:49On Sunday 18th November, Mrs Thatcher travelled to France to
0:47:49 > 0:47:53join world leaders formally celebrating the end of the Cold War.
0:47:54 > 0:47:57The Prime Minister herself was beginning to feel the strain.
0:47:57 > 0:48:01And, in her absence, her support in Parliament continued to fall away.
0:48:01 > 0:48:04But her team, as if paralysed, did nothing.
0:48:08 > 0:48:11Early in the evening on Tuesday 20th November,
0:48:11 > 0:48:14the Prime Minister hurried back to the British Embassy.
0:48:14 > 0:48:18As press and television gathered in the courtyard, Mrs Thatcher
0:48:18 > 0:48:22and her staff, closeted inside, awaited the results of the first ballot.
0:48:27 > 0:48:31Under the leadership election rules, the winner had to have a majority
0:48:31 > 0:48:35plus 15% of the MPs' votes cast to prevent a second ballot.
0:48:37 > 0:48:41The ambassador had made ready a room with a telephone
0:48:41 > 0:48:44so that I could be there to receive the telephone call, and
0:48:44 > 0:48:46Peter Morrison had come over.
0:48:46 > 0:48:49Charles Powell was there and Crawfie was with me, as always.
0:48:49 > 0:48:52So that we would take the telephone call in that room.
0:48:53 > 0:48:55We did.
0:48:56 > 0:48:58Peter took it.
0:49:00 > 0:49:07And he wrote it down on a piece of paper and said to me,
0:49:07 > 0:49:09"Not quite as good as we'd hoped."
0:49:09 > 0:49:11I looked quickly and said,
0:49:11 > 0:49:14"We haven't got enough to be through the first ballot."
0:49:16 > 0:49:19I felt at that moment that it was all over.
0:49:19 > 0:49:22I don't say that just with hindsight, it's very easy to invent
0:49:22 > 0:49:24that sort of thing after the event.
0:49:24 > 0:49:26I'd gone over it in my mind so many times -
0:49:26 > 0:49:29I felt that this was it.
0:49:29 > 0:49:31Looking at her eyes and her expression,
0:49:31 > 0:49:33I think she knew, as well.
0:49:33 > 0:49:38Of course, as is Mrs Thatcher's wont, when she has a job to do,
0:49:38 > 0:49:40she does it and doesn't stop for anything.
0:49:40 > 0:49:42And she charged out
0:49:42 > 0:49:45and I charged down and tried to rescue the central microphone.
0:49:45 > 0:49:49- Mrs Thatcher, could I ask you to comment?- Good evening. Good evening.
0:49:49 > 0:49:51- Where's the microphone? - It's here, this is the microphone.
0:49:51 > 0:49:54I'm actually very pleased that I got more than half
0:49:54 > 0:49:56the parliamentary party
0:49:56 > 0:50:00and disappointed that it's not quite enough to win on the first ballot.
0:50:00 > 0:50:03So, I confirm it is my intention to let my name go forward
0:50:03 > 0:50:05- for the second ballot. - Isn't the..? Isn't the...?
0:50:05 > 0:50:12'I think she'd been pretty badly advised during the first ballot.'
0:50:12 > 0:50:15And in the run-up to that,
0:50:15 > 0:50:19I don't think she'd campaigned as she should have done.
0:50:19 > 0:50:22And, I think, if I thought at the time that if that
0:50:22 > 0:50:25statement reflected advice that she was getting,
0:50:25 > 0:50:29it wasn't very sensible advice, it would have been at least,
0:50:29 > 0:50:33I think, better to have come back to London before saying anything.
0:50:33 > 0:50:35It didn't seem to me
0:50:35 > 0:50:39that an extra two or three votes were that difficult to obtain.
0:50:39 > 0:50:46And we might, on a second round, have got more, a lot more than that.
0:50:46 > 0:50:51What really went wrong was I was away when the vote was announced
0:50:51 > 0:50:54and not therefore able to say to people,
0:50:54 > 0:50:57"Now, come on, we must go out and campaign and get those extra...
0:50:57 > 0:51:00"I want an extra 10 to 20 votes before the next count.
0:51:00 > 0:51:02"Go out and start tonight."
0:51:02 > 0:51:03I was away.
0:51:03 > 0:51:07And it was while I was away,
0:51:07 > 0:51:10in those few hours
0:51:10 > 0:51:15and overnight, that I think people lost their nerve.
0:51:15 > 0:51:17And the plotting began.
0:51:22 > 0:51:25At 8.30 in the evening, Margaret Thatcher left the British Embassy.
0:51:29 > 0:51:32Her failure to prevent a second ballot was a severe,
0:51:32 > 0:51:33if not mortal, blow.
0:51:36 > 0:51:39The result of the ballot had made her untypically late
0:51:39 > 0:51:41for the ballet and dinner at Versailles
0:51:41 > 0:51:43with her fellow world leaders.
0:51:43 > 0:51:46By that time, all the other heads of government had been
0:51:46 > 0:51:49out at the ballet for a long time.
0:51:49 > 0:51:52And then I got there, the last to arrive,
0:51:52 > 0:51:55and President Mitterrand was still waiting for me in the reception.
0:51:55 > 0:52:00I said, "I'm so sorry, I did send a message not to wait."
0:52:00 > 0:52:04He said, "We wouldn't have dreamed of starting without you.
0:52:04 > 0:52:06"Now, how are you?"
0:52:07 > 0:52:10Isn't it nice that when you were going back to face people who were
0:52:10 > 0:52:14far from kind or thoughtful that we had some friends at the top
0:52:14 > 0:52:17who knew what life at the top was like
0:52:17 > 0:52:18and felt for you?
0:52:29 > 0:52:31While Mrs Thatcher endured the ballet in Versailles,
0:52:31 > 0:52:34a group of Cabinet colleagues, ministers and backbenchers
0:52:34 > 0:52:37had gathered in the Westminster home of a former whip.
0:52:39 > 0:52:43The consensus was clear - the Prime Minister was finished by
0:52:43 > 0:52:45her poor showing in the first ballot.
0:52:45 > 0:52:49The conclusion was arrived at before the meeting began,
0:52:49 > 0:52:52because everybody came to the meeting, carrying on their backs
0:52:52 > 0:52:54their experiences of being
0:52:54 > 0:52:57in the House that afternoon and that evening.
0:52:57 > 0:53:00So, there was very little discussion about
0:53:00 > 0:53:02whether the position was sustainable.
0:53:02 > 0:53:06I think that conclusion was arrived at more or less on arrival.
0:53:06 > 0:53:11There was every sort of objective evidence that she was
0:53:11 > 0:53:14unlikely to win a second ballot,
0:53:14 > 0:53:20that if she did win a second ballot, it would be after a huge shedding
0:53:20 > 0:53:26of blood and by a margin so narrow that it would be difficult,
0:53:26 > 0:53:31subsequently, for her or the Government to regain its authority.
0:53:31 > 0:53:35And I've never heard a convincing argument against that.
0:53:36 > 0:53:39Still in Paris at nine o'clock the following morning,
0:53:39 > 0:53:41Wednesday 21st November,
0:53:41 > 0:53:45Margaret Thatcher signed a treaty ending the Cold War.
0:53:45 > 0:53:48She was unaware at this stage that most of her Cabinet colleagues
0:53:48 > 0:53:50had decided that her career was over.
0:53:52 > 0:53:56Mrs Thatcher had the first hint of the gravity of her position
0:53:56 > 0:53:59as she travelled to the airport to fly home.
0:53:59 > 0:54:02She asked her staff whether her protege Peter Lilley,
0:54:02 > 0:54:04the Trade and Industry Secretary,
0:54:04 > 0:54:06had agreed to help a Parliamentary speech.
0:54:08 > 0:54:12I just said, "Charles, did you get on to Peter?"
0:54:14 > 0:54:16He said, "Yes."
0:54:16 > 0:54:20Something in his tone which made me say,
0:54:20 > 0:54:21"Is he going to do the speech?"
0:54:23 > 0:54:28He said, "Peter said, 'There's no point. She's finished.'"
0:54:33 > 0:54:37That turned a knife in my heart.
0:54:37 > 0:54:39Peter was a real friend.
0:54:39 > 0:54:41He was a believer.
0:54:42 > 0:54:50And I think that was the first real inkling I had
0:54:50 > 0:54:52that all was far from well.
0:54:54 > 0:54:56At twelve o'clock in the morning,
0:54:56 > 0:54:58Margaret Thatcher arrived back in London.
0:54:58 > 0:55:01She was still determined to stand in the second ballot as she sped
0:55:01 > 0:55:03home to Downing Street.
0:55:04 > 0:55:06And we went in
0:55:06 > 0:55:10and Denis was waiting, just standing by the fireplace...
0:55:12 > 0:55:19And he just said, almost before I had spoken, "Don't go on, love.
0:55:19 > 0:55:20"Don't go on."
0:55:22 > 0:55:26I think he was more, even more hurt, than I was.
0:55:27 > 0:55:31I went down to my study, where Norman Tebbit
0:55:31 > 0:55:34and John Wakeham were waiting for me.
0:55:34 > 0:55:37And we discussed things together.
0:55:37 > 0:55:41Norman said he thought that the support on the backbenches
0:55:41 > 0:55:43was good enough to get through
0:55:43 > 0:55:47and that we could win and we'd have to fight for it.
0:55:47 > 0:55:51John Wakeham said he thought the area of weakest support
0:55:51 > 0:55:53was my own Cabinet.
0:55:53 > 0:55:55Which was a bit of a shaker.
0:55:55 > 0:55:57At 2.30 in the afternoon,
0:55:57 > 0:56:00Mrs Thatcher left Downing Street to go to the House of Commons.
0:56:00 > 0:56:04Despite her husband's advice, she was still determined to carry on.
0:56:04 > 0:56:07I fight on. I fight to win.
0:56:09 > 0:56:12John Wakeham, her new campaign manager, had counselled her to meet
0:56:12 > 0:56:16her Cabinet colleagues one by one that evening to gauge their support.
0:56:20 > 0:56:21At Question Time,
0:56:21 > 0:56:26she responded with typical gusto to taunts about her waning career.
0:56:26 > 0:56:28The first eleven and a half years haven't been so bad
0:56:28 > 0:56:32and with regard to twilight, please remember there are 24 hours in a day.
0:56:35 > 0:56:38At four o'clock, she swallowed her pride and canvassed the votes of her
0:56:38 > 0:56:41backbenchers in the parliamentary tea rooms.
0:56:44 > 0:56:48And as I went through, I saw so many of one's loyal supporters.
0:56:49 > 0:56:51And even they said to me,
0:56:51 > 0:56:55"Look, Mike Heseltine's been and asked us for our votes
0:56:55 > 0:56:57"three times.
0:56:57 > 0:57:01"This is the first time you've been to ask us."
0:57:01 > 0:57:03And I was a bit upset about that.
0:57:03 > 0:57:08And gradually, as I got this message, it dawned on me that what they
0:57:08 > 0:57:13were saying was, "Look, why haven't you had a vigorous enough campaign?
0:57:13 > 0:57:16"We're concerned for you, we're concerned that you haven't."
0:57:16 > 0:57:19And I began then to realise the magnitude of the task
0:57:19 > 0:57:25and how much I would need, not only a few helpers, but need to
0:57:25 > 0:57:29mobilise all of Cabinet to be the spearhead of the attack.
0:57:32 > 0:57:35The chastened Prime Minister immediately approached
0:57:35 > 0:57:37those colleagues whom she thought most loyal.
0:57:37 > 0:57:39She started with John Major,
0:57:39 > 0:57:42who was recovering from dental treatment at home in Huntingdon.
0:57:45 > 0:57:48There must have been things going on that I didn't know of.
0:57:50 > 0:57:55And I rang John and said, "I have decided to stand again."
0:57:55 > 0:58:01And Douglas was going to sign my nomination paper. Would he second it?
0:58:03 > 0:58:06And there was a moment's silence
0:58:06 > 0:58:10and you're super sensitive in these circumstances.
0:58:10 > 0:58:13However, I assumed that he might be in some pain
0:58:13 > 0:58:16from the dental treatment.
0:58:16 > 0:58:20And he said, "Yes, if that's what you want."
0:58:24 > 0:58:27At six o'clock in the evening, the Prime Minister was in her
0:58:27 > 0:58:31rooms in the House of Commons, waiting to see her colleagues.
0:58:31 > 0:58:33She was badly rattled.
0:58:33 > 0:58:36Even John Major, the man who in her view owed her everything,
0:58:36 > 0:58:39seemed to be lukewarm in his support.
0:58:40 > 0:58:44At half past six, the Cabinet parade began.
0:58:44 > 0:58:47That evening, only four Cabinet colleagues
0:58:47 > 0:58:50offered their unqualified support.
0:58:50 > 0:58:52The rest advised her that she was unlikely to win.
0:58:54 > 0:58:59Ken Clarke came in in his usual robust, rather bruising, style,
0:58:59 > 0:59:04sat down and said, "The whole process was farcical,"
0:59:04 > 0:59:08that he personally could support me for another five or ten years.
0:59:08 > 0:59:11But most of the Cabinet thought I would lose
0:59:11 > 0:59:18and therefore I should stand down and let John Major or Douglas Hurd stand,
0:59:18 > 0:59:21either of whom had a better chance of winning than I did.
0:59:29 > 0:59:32After that, Peter Lilley came in.
0:59:35 > 0:59:39I already had had an inkling of what he would say.
0:59:39 > 0:59:42He came in clearly uncomfortable
0:59:42 > 0:59:45and spoke very carefully.
0:59:46 > 0:59:51Yes, if I chose to stand, he would support me.
0:59:51 > 0:59:55But it was inconceivable that I would win.
0:59:57 > 1:00:02And if I lost, everything I'd achieved would be put at risk.
1:00:02 > 1:00:04Therefore, I should stand down.
1:00:09 > 1:00:12Then Chris Patten, the same message.
1:00:12 > 1:00:18And I somehow thought that Chris would have some different formula,
1:00:18 > 1:00:22some greater insight, some magical words.
1:00:24 > 1:00:26No.
1:00:28 > 1:00:31"If you wish to stand, I will support you.
1:00:31 > 1:00:34"But I don't think you can win."
1:00:36 > 1:00:40The most difficult of all was Malcolm Rifkind.
1:00:42 > 1:00:45Again, very much on the left of the party.
1:00:47 > 1:00:50And I'd had problems with Malcolm before.
1:00:51 > 1:00:55He came in, didn't think I could possibly win,
1:00:55 > 1:00:58and therefore I should stand down.
1:00:58 > 1:01:00And I said to him,
1:01:00 > 1:01:05"Malcolm, if I choose to stand, will you support me?"
1:01:07 > 1:01:11He turned his eyes away and said he would have to think about that.
1:01:12 > 1:01:15But he wouldn't campaign against me.
1:01:16 > 1:01:20By that time, I was thankful for small mercies.
1:01:28 > 1:01:30The candid friend, Ken Clarke.
1:01:33 > 1:01:38Candid minister, Malcolm Rifkind.
1:01:40 > 1:01:44The candid, loyal friends.
1:01:44 > 1:01:47All with the same message.
1:01:49 > 1:01:55What hurt most of all was that this was treachery while
1:01:55 > 1:02:00I had been away at an international conference,
1:02:00 > 1:02:05signing treaties on behalf of my country for the end of the Cold War.
1:02:09 > 1:02:13It was treachery with a smile on its face.
1:02:15 > 1:02:18Perhaps that was the worst thing of all.
1:02:26 > 1:02:29There was no treachery against her, there was a pattern of events which
1:02:29 > 1:02:34was what it appeared to be, and a Cabinet that was prepared to
1:02:34 > 1:02:38support her gave her wholly sensible advice - that she had
1:02:38 > 1:02:43been defeated, that she must now withdraw. That was good advice.
1:02:43 > 1:02:45She had been defeated.
1:02:45 > 1:02:48She had no chance of winning in the second ballot
1:02:48 > 1:02:50and that was nothing to do with the Cabinet.
1:02:50 > 1:02:53It was the parliamentary party where she'd suffered the defeat.
1:02:53 > 1:02:57By 8.30 in the evening, the Prime Minister knew that without
1:02:57 > 1:03:00Cabinet support, she could not continue.
1:03:00 > 1:03:03The meetings with colleagues had left her emotionally devastated.
1:03:05 > 1:03:07I came into the room
1:03:07 > 1:03:13and she broke down in tears.
1:03:13 > 1:03:16I said "Good luck, we're all with you."
1:03:16 > 1:03:21And she said, "I'm afraid it's all drifting away."
1:03:21 > 1:03:23And so I tried to reassure her.
1:03:23 > 1:03:27I squeezed her arm and said, "Well, look, don't worry, we're behind you."
1:03:27 > 1:03:28You know, just trying to be helpful.
1:03:30 > 1:03:35That really summed up the unreal world, to me,
1:03:35 > 1:03:39of the Number 10 court or the Number 10 bunker,
1:03:39 > 1:03:43the idea that she didn't need to worry
1:03:43 > 1:03:46about her parliamentary colleagues, about the party...
1:03:46 > 1:03:48that somehow all that mattered was
1:03:48 > 1:03:52the court and the courtiers remaining loyal to her and
1:03:52 > 1:03:56that this could be any comfort to her was...
1:03:56 > 1:03:59It seemed to me to epitomise the state in which
1:03:59 > 1:04:02she'd allowed herself to become.
1:04:06 > 1:04:12You wouldn't have believed it could have happened, but it had.
1:04:15 > 1:04:21And I knew that I would have to decide, finally,
1:04:21 > 1:04:26the next morning, as I always do, but at that moment,
1:04:26 > 1:04:30I dictated a statement that I would make,
1:04:30 > 1:04:34if the following morning I had decided to go.
1:04:37 > 1:04:42At nine o'clock the next morning, Thursday 22nd November 1990,
1:04:42 > 1:04:45Margaret Thatcher's colleagues arrived for her last Cabinet.
1:04:45 > 1:04:47She'd now decided finally to resign.
1:04:51 > 1:04:54My study was upstairs, I came down the stairs
1:04:54 > 1:04:57and all members of the Cabinet usually would have been
1:04:57 > 1:05:01scattered around the anteroom and I would have just gone through them
1:05:01 > 1:05:02and walked in.
1:05:02 > 1:05:09They were all, kind of, over the far side and not meeting my eyes.
1:05:09 > 1:05:13And I just walked past and went in. And they followed me in.
1:05:13 > 1:05:16She was sitting at the table, she was clearly upset.
1:05:16 > 1:05:19She clearly had been crying.
1:05:19 > 1:05:23But she was all right at that moment.
1:05:23 > 1:05:29And she said, "Before Cabinet begins,
1:05:29 > 1:05:35"I want to read you a statement which will be issued to the public
1:05:35 > 1:05:38"at the end of Cabinet."
1:05:38 > 1:05:40And she started to read the statement,
1:05:40 > 1:05:42saying that she was going to resign.
1:05:43 > 1:05:46And after reading a few words,
1:05:46 > 1:05:53she broke down and then she started again and she broke down.
1:05:53 > 1:05:55Because I looked at them all.
1:05:56 > 1:05:58They had brought it about.
1:06:00 > 1:06:04They looked a bit sheepish, some of them, and that was the time,
1:06:04 > 1:06:06I'm afraid, when I did break down, because I realised then,
1:06:06 > 1:06:09for the first time,
1:06:09 > 1:06:12the full impact of what I was doing.
1:06:12 > 1:06:16And I said, "Oh, for God's sake, James," meaning James Mackay,
1:06:16 > 1:06:19the Chancellor, who sat next to her.
1:06:19 > 1:06:20"You read it."
1:06:20 > 1:06:25And there was a bit of an argument and people said, "No, no, no."
1:06:25 > 1:06:29It only took seconds, but in those seconds,
1:06:29 > 1:06:34she recovered her composure and she read the statement out
1:06:34 > 1:06:41and then one or two people started to say nice things about her.
1:06:41 > 1:06:47And she said something like, "I'm much better at handling
1:06:47 > 1:06:50"business than sympathy.
1:06:50 > 1:06:51"Let's get on with the Cabinet."
1:06:53 > 1:06:58And after it was over, there was a look on their faces,
1:06:58 > 1:07:00some of them,
1:07:00 > 1:07:03"What have we done?"
1:07:03 > 1:07:06But it had been done. There was no turning back.
1:07:10 > 1:07:14Margaret Thatcher left office reluctantly and unhappily.
1:07:14 > 1:07:18She remains bitter about her downfall to this day.
1:07:18 > 1:07:19In her 11 years in office,
1:07:19 > 1:07:23she grew in stature and became enormously powerful.
1:07:23 > 1:07:25Her impact on Britain was undeniable.
1:07:27 > 1:07:31Now it's time for a new chapter to open
1:07:31 > 1:07:35and I wish John Major all the luck in the world.
1:07:35 > 1:07:39He'll be splendidly served and he has the makings
1:07:39 > 1:07:41of a great prime minister,
1:07:41 > 1:07:44which I'm sure he'll be in very short time.
1:07:44 > 1:07:47Thank you very much. Goodbye.
1:07:49 > 1:07:51In her going, she discovered, to her cost,
1:07:51 > 1:07:54that a British prime minister cannot govern without the consent
1:07:54 > 1:07:57and support of colleagues and that her downfall
1:07:57 > 1:08:01was the inevitable result of a tragic sense of self-sufficiency.
1:08:03 > 1:08:07As the political philosopher Edmund Burke wrote,
1:08:07 > 1:08:10"Those who've been once intoxicated with power
1:08:10 > 1:08:12"can never willingly abandon it."
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