The Spy Chiefs on Camera

:00:00. > :00:07.Thank you. Good afternoon. You are watching BBC News. In just a few

:00:08. > :00:11.minutes, we will be following an unprecedented event. The heads of

:00:12. > :00:13.all three of Britain's intelligence agencies will be making that

:00:14. > :00:18.appearance before a committee of MPs and it is of course all televised

:00:19. > :00:23.which means we will be following it here.

:00:24. > :00:27.There is a two minute delay, just in case any matters of national

:00:28. > :00:30.security are mentioned, so we are two minutes behind in terms of what

:00:31. > :00:39.we are going to be showing you but the GCHQ director, Sir Iain Lobban,

:00:40. > :00:46.the MI5 director Sir Andrew Parker and the MI6 director will be quizzed

:00:47. > :00:50.by a committee of MPs. There has been some criticism in the past that

:00:51. > :00:54.the security agencies have not been held to account but Sir Malcolm

:00:55. > :01:01.Rifkind says that new rules mean that, for example, members of the

:01:02. > :01:02.ISC can send investigators into the intelligence agencies to carry out

:01:03. > :01:22.spot checks. Certainly a moment of theatre. On

:01:23. > :01:29.the other side of the Atlantic there is sometimes a snooze con ``

:01:30. > :01:32.problem, but there are serious questions here. We have to get to

:01:33. > :01:37.the bottom of where is the right balance in the spectrum between

:01:38. > :01:40.those who inhabit the world of secrecy and intelligence, that

:01:41. > :01:44.nothing should be revealed, and they should have maximum powers to

:01:45. > :01:49.investigate everything, and snoop and eavesdrop. On the other side,

:01:50. > :01:55.there are those who would say no, you can have maximum openness.

:01:56. > :01:58.Somewhere within that spectrum is the right part of the pendulum, and

:01:59. > :02:03.I hope we will get some kind of answer on that. I think the meeting

:02:04. > :02:06.was planned before the revelations by Edward Snowden came out in the

:02:07. > :02:13.Guardian and the New York Times, so it's been in the diary, but it has a

:02:14. > :02:17.new and more potent boost. When you look at the other two of the three

:02:18. > :02:24.people giving evidence today, is it perhaps Iain Lobban who we don't

:02:25. > :02:28.know much about, from GCHQ, who will be under more pressure in terms of

:02:29. > :02:35.what intelligence was shared with the prison programme? Definitely. He

:02:36. > :02:45.and his agency are the most secretive. They hardly give anything

:02:46. > :02:50.out the press. Yet they have 58,000 secret files missing that Snowden

:02:51. > :02:54.has taken with him. A vast amount of their operation, their tactics,

:02:55. > :03:01.names, all sorts of things are out there. Do you remember Mission

:03:02. > :03:06.impossible, the list in the opening, the secret list of

:03:07. > :03:12.operatives. It's a bit like that. But times 1000. People are very

:03:13. > :03:16.concerned about this. Supporters of Edward Snowden would say, look, he

:03:17. > :03:21.has started a valid debate because we have a right to know what is

:03:22. > :03:27.being eavesdropped on, why they are listening in on potentially your

:03:28. > :03:34.e`mails and conversations, because the extent of it, what was not known

:03:35. > :03:37.even to MPs, I would expect that we would see tough questions from the

:03:38. > :03:42.committee, because they have been a bit toothless in the past. They are

:03:43. > :03:47.still perceived as being a bit too close to the establishment. The

:03:48. > :03:50.chairman of the committee used to have authority over MI6 and GCHQ,

:03:51. > :03:59.Malcolm Rifkind when he was Foreign Secretary. They answered to him.

:04:00. > :04:05.Albeit in a different role now, he was a creature of the establishment.

:04:06. > :04:08.We will see whether it measures up to that robustness that people are

:04:09. > :04:12.searching for. It will be beginning very shortly, so Frank, talk is

:04:13. > :04:20.through the three men we see behind this. People may know less or more

:04:21. > :04:24.about all of them. Over in the left corner, overworked because his

:04:25. > :04:33.jacket is off, is Sir Iain Lobban, director of GCHQ in Cheltenham. It

:04:34. > :04:40.is basically a big round doughnut of a building. They are conducting the

:04:41. > :04:45.Britain `` British defence against cyber espionage, but also proactive

:04:46. > :04:50.cyber operations as well. In the middle is Andrew Parker, the only

:04:51. > :04:53.one without a knighthood, and he has become the general director of MI5,

:04:54. > :04:59.the Security service, at Thames house in London. He has been in the

:05:00. > :05:05.service for over 30 years and was formerly deputy director. On the

:05:06. > :05:09.right is Sir John Sawers, the chief of MI6, the secret intelligence

:05:10. > :05:17.service, also with headquarters in London. They do the overseas spying.

:05:18. > :05:22.He is a former diplomat. He has book ended it. He started in MI6, then

:05:23. > :05:25.moved quickly. We will interrupt, Buddhist has just started. ``

:05:26. > :05:34.because it has just started. This session, which has a committee

:05:35. > :05:40.we first considered a year ago, is a significant step forward in the

:05:41. > :05:44.transparency of our intelligence agencies. Having an open

:05:45. > :05:51.parliamentary evidence session will be, I believe, a real dash of real

:05:52. > :05:54.value. We will not be asking witnesses to reveal secret

:05:55. > :05:58.information published `` of real value. Nor will we be able to

:05:59. > :06:03.discuss the current investigation into the tragic death of Lee Rigby

:06:04. > :06:06.in Woolwich, in May, because we cannot prejudice the trials of the

:06:07. > :06:12.accused taking place in the near future. The intelligence and

:06:13. > :06:15.Security committee with its new powers investigates the operations

:06:16. > :06:20.and scrutinises the capabilities of the intelligence agencies. Those

:06:21. > :06:24.sessions are held behind closed doors and must remain secret. This

:06:25. > :06:30.evidence session is being broadcast with a short time delay. This is a

:06:31. > :06:35.safety mechanism to allow us to pause the broadcast if anything is

:06:36. > :06:38.inadvertently mentioned which might endanger national security, or the

:06:39. > :06:43.safety of those involved in safeguarding it. I don't expect we

:06:44. > :06:48.shall need to use it, but as with the Iraq enquiry, this is a

:06:49. > :06:53.precaution. If I do need to suspend the session, we will resume as

:06:54. > :06:58.quickly as we can. Today's open session, being the first`ever

:06:59. > :07:04.Wimbledon examination of a number of issues in `` being the first ever

:07:05. > :07:08.will involve examination of a number of issues. It will include

:07:09. > :07:11.controversies, the threats the agency 's work to counter, the

:07:12. > :07:15.threats faced in the performance of duties. The legal and policy

:07:16. > :07:19.framework in which they operate. Whether they need special legal

:07:20. > :07:24.powers, and whether it is right and necessary for them to receive each

:07:25. > :07:30.year ?2 billion of public funding to carry out their work. After a short

:07:31. > :07:35.introductory comment, let's move straight to the questions and

:07:36. > :07:41.answers part of proceedings. My first question is do you, Sir John.

:07:42. > :07:44.During the Cold War, the threat to the United Kingdom was pretty

:07:45. > :07:48.clear. There was the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union on one side, NATO

:07:49. > :07:52.on the other. Who poses the biggest threat to national security now?

:07:53. > :07:56.Thank you, chairman, for the opportunity to give evidence. We are

:07:57. > :08:01.conscious of the unprecedented nature of the occasion. We will do

:08:02. > :08:07.our best to answer the committee's questions as best we can. You ask

:08:08. > :08:11.about the threats to the UK. It's not like it was in the Cold War.

:08:12. > :08:16.There are not states out there trying to destroy our government and

:08:17. > :08:21.way of life. But there are a very wide range of diverse threats that

:08:22. > :08:27.we face. The biggest is terrorism, the threat from Al`Qaeda and its

:08:28. > :08:31.many branches. There are also states out there that are trying to do us

:08:32. > :08:35.harm through cyber attacks, acquiring nuclear weapons, or

:08:36. > :08:40.involved in generating instability in parts of the world that are

:08:41. > :08:46.important to us. Of course, we work in support of the armed forces,

:08:47. > :08:49.especially GCHQ and ourselves, and the Armed Forces have been acting in

:08:50. > :08:52.the last decade, and we have been very supportive of them in helping

:08:53. > :08:59.shape their operations and protecting soldiers lives. It is a

:09:00. > :09:02.very volatile and changing world we live in, and we have do have the

:09:03. > :09:07.skills and people and capabilities to be able to support and defend

:09:08. > :09:14.this country's security interests where the threats arrive. Thank you

:09:15. > :09:17.very much. This leads me to want to ask something supplementary. Andrew

:09:18. > :09:20.Parker, maybe you can answer it. At the end of the Cold War people

:09:21. > :09:23.thought we could reduce the size and cost of the intelligence agencies,

:09:24. > :09:28.and it's gone the other way, they are larger and more expensive than

:09:29. > :09:32.ever. As the head of one of the secret agency, but also as a

:09:33. > :09:38.citizen, do you sometimes get nervous that the agencies are too

:09:39. > :09:43.strong and powerful? You are asking both about scale and power, and I

:09:44. > :09:47.will take them in that order. In scale, ?2 billion is a substantial

:09:48. > :09:49.amount of taxpayers money and we take our responsibilities in

:09:50. > :09:53.spending it seriously, which is closely overseen by the committee

:09:54. > :09:56.and audited by the National Audit Office. The scale is set by

:09:57. > :10:01.ministers against the backdrop of the whole of public spending. That

:10:02. > :10:08.?2 billion is the equivalent of roughly 6% of the nation's defence

:10:09. > :10:12.budget. At that scale, we would content and believe, and ministers

:10:13. > :10:18.have been persuaded, that that is a proportion as investment against the

:10:19. > :10:22.threats we face. As far as the power question, the question that somehow

:10:23. > :10:27.what we do is somehow compromising freedom and democracy, of course we

:10:28. > :10:36.believe the opposite to be the case. It is that this committee to oversee

:10:37. > :10:39.the work. That is against threats to this country, the way of life, the

:10:40. > :10:43.country and the people who live here. The work we do is

:10:44. > :10:52.proportionally judged against the necessity of protecting against

:10:53. > :10:53.those threats. The threats from terrorism and cyber terrorism

:10:54. > :10:57.increasingly involved countries and players from across the globe. What

:10:58. > :11:07.has that meant for the ways in which all agencies now work? The threats

:11:08. > :11:11.we face are more complex, as you describe. We need to work more

:11:12. > :11:15.closely together, and there is an unprecedented level of collaboration

:11:16. > :11:20.between the three agencies. For example, for MI6, there is scarcely

:11:21. > :11:24.an operation we do that is not supported by either GCHQ or MI5, or

:11:25. > :11:30.both. And by partners overseas as well. In a resource scarce world,

:11:31. > :11:37.and one where taken all `` technology has a greater part in our

:11:38. > :11:40.work, we collaborate closely on developing the technological systems

:11:41. > :11:47.we need in order to deliver on our responsibilities. Over the last 25

:11:48. > :11:50.years there have been three significant events which have had

:11:51. > :11:57.implications for national security, namely the end of the Cold War, 911

:11:58. > :12:00.and the Arab uprisings, none of which were foreseen by the

:12:01. > :12:02.intelligence community. Would you accept now that you could and should

:12:03. > :12:08.have done more to have predicted these? We are not crystal ball

:12:09. > :12:17.gazers, we are intelligence agencies. We need to understand

:12:18. > :12:21.other `` foreign countries. We could all see the fault lines in Arab

:12:22. > :12:25.society, to take the Arab Spring as an example, but no one predicted

:12:26. > :12:29.when the earthquake would strike. There was not a secret in

:12:30. > :12:34.somebody's safe in Cairo saying the Arab Spring was going to start in

:12:35. > :12:38.January 2011. It was not something that was out there that we missed.

:12:39. > :12:42.It was an analytical issue, which, frankly, governments, think tanks,

:12:43. > :12:46.foreign services and intelligence agencies, we were all looking at it

:12:47. > :12:50.and we could all see that there were tensions in the societies, but you

:12:51. > :12:53.cannot say that this particular trigger would happen at this

:12:54. > :12:57.particular time. It was the same with the collapse of the Cold War

:12:58. > :13:01.and the same with 9/11. We identified Al`Qaeda is a serious

:13:02. > :13:06.threat and we have learned a huge amount since then. `` as a serious

:13:07. > :13:09.threat. But we need to understand what intelligence agencies do. We

:13:10. > :13:13.acquire the secrets that other countries don't want us to know or

:13:14. > :13:19.other organisations don't want us to know. We are not all knowing

:13:20. > :13:26.specialist in what will happen next month or next year. There is surely

:13:27. > :13:31.nothing new about this at all. If you look back at the history of the

:13:32. > :13:35.20th`century conflicts, a majority of those rows entirely unexpectedly,

:13:36. > :13:42.sometimes unexpectedly even by the people later as aggressors. That is

:13:43. > :13:47.why we put a premium on agility and flexibility. We did not expect at

:13:48. > :13:51.the beginning of 2011 we'd be engaged in military conflict in

:13:52. > :13:54.Libya. All three services had to direct effort towards supporting

:13:55. > :13:59.government policy, supporting the Armed Forces at very short notice.

:14:00. > :14:03.That is why agility, flexibility and capability are the watchwords of

:14:04. > :14:07.what we do. Let's move on to the issue of technology.

:14:08. > :14:16.Changes in the type of technology available have obviously had a major

:14:17. > :14:20.impact on the work that you do. Can you explain, perhaps, how it has

:14:21. > :14:25.changed your role? Has it made your job harder or easier? And who does

:14:26. > :14:37.it help most? The agencies or the terrorist? The global information

:14:38. > :14:41.communication technology is a $3 trillion industry per year. It is

:14:42. > :14:45.relentless and we have to focus our efforts. To take your question in

:14:46. > :14:49.two parts, the first set of challenges we have is simply around

:14:50. > :14:54.the Internet. It's a fantastic place for business, life and study. It is

:14:55. > :14:57.global, diverse and complex. But there are threats to our security

:14:58. > :15:01.and prosperity within that and I will come back to terrorism in a

:15:02. > :15:05.moment, if I may. The point about discovering subjects of interest,

:15:06. > :15:08.the intelligence targets within the soup of the Internet is difficult,

:15:09. > :15:14.and there is an issue around people. We need good, innovative,

:15:15. > :15:16.highly skilled people to keep up with that technological challenge.

:15:17. > :15:20.In terms of what it means the business, it means we have to

:15:21. > :15:23.anticipate, Discover, analyse, investigate and respond, and we have

:15:24. > :15:29.to do so globally, because the threat comes out as globally and we

:15:30. > :15:34.need a global, agile, flexible array of security capabilities. Therefore

:15:35. > :15:37.we need global partnerships. On your questions about terrorists, I think

:15:38. > :15:41.it has helped the terrorist. I think our job has got harder and is

:15:42. > :15:47.getting harder. If you think about what the Internet does for

:15:48. > :15:49.terrorists, it gives them a myriad ways to communicate covertly. It

:15:50. > :15:53.gives them the opportunity to radicalise and spread propaganda. It

:15:54. > :15:58.gives them the opportunity to planned, command and control. It

:15:59. > :16:01.gives them the opportunity to spread and exhort violence. We have had

:16:02. > :16:05.successes in turning that against them, and those are the best kept

:16:06. > :16:10.secret. It's not just about terrorism, it's also about serious

:16:11. > :16:16.crime. I could mention the work we do with a child exploitation agency

:16:17. > :16:22.in terms of working with them to uncover the identities and track

:16:23. > :16:25.down some of those who are involved in online sexual exploitation of

:16:26. > :16:30.children in the UK, including overseas, where there was a recent

:16:31. > :16:34.case that we managed to do that and used intelligence capabilities to

:16:35. > :16:45.identify those and bring them to justice, and two people are now in

:16:46. > :16:48.jail. There are two things that define the future before us. What is

:16:49. > :16:52.the diversifying threat landscape that I spoke of recently and

:16:53. > :16:56.publicly. The second is the technology issue. It is an

:16:57. > :17:00.accelerating technology race which is defined by the changes and

:17:01. > :17:04.advances in the Internet. This is not about the world of security and

:17:05. > :17:08.intelligence alone. All of our lives are moving onto the Internet, and

:17:09. > :17:12.it's important we are able to operate there, because the

:17:13. > :17:16.terrorists do so as well. We need to have capability that lets us track

:17:17. > :17:24.them and monitor their communications in the modern world.

:17:25. > :17:29.If a junior clerk with a memory stick can copy and publish on the

:17:30. > :17:33.internet, tens of thousands of highly classified documents, what

:17:34. > :17:38.measures can be put in place to prevent such huge breaches of

:17:39. > :17:42.security in the future? If I have a go at that one. The answer on

:17:43. > :17:47.security is the range of security measures we take. It is tempting to

:17:48. > :17:53.think that security relating to IT must have an IT solution, of course

:17:54. > :17:57.that is part of it. We have tightly controlled IT access and

:17:58. > :18:02.arrangements for who can download what, but those within the whole

:18:03. > :18:05.range of security arrangements that we have, the security of our

:18:06. > :18:09.facilities and the personnel security that we apply to the

:18:10. > :18:14.vetting that our people have to the highest level, the way that they are

:18:15. > :18:17.managed and the way that all of this majors together, make it very

:18:18. > :18:21.difficult and extremely unlikely to have the breaches.

:18:22. > :18:25.So, whaps what happened in America, you think could not happen here it

:18:26. > :18:32.has happened there twice? For the UK, I cannot comment on the US. We

:18:33. > :18:39.have stringent security arrangements, of course nothing is

:18:40. > :18:45.ever possible, but there has only been one instance of one individual

:18:46. > :18:47.attempting on a small scale this infiltration and he was sent to

:18:48. > :18:51.jail. What about the hundreds of thousands

:18:52. > :18:56.of people who appear to have access to your information in the United

:18:57. > :19:00.Kingdom? All three of us are involved in those discussions.

:19:01. > :19:06.We have returned to the use of technology, we shall return to that

:19:07. > :19:11.later. We now move to a sensitive subject, working with foreign

:19:12. > :19:16.subjects. Now the flair of your work is more

:19:17. > :19:21.international. You have to work with equivalence overseas. This carries

:19:22. > :19:26.risk, especially if the other countries don'ted a mere to the high

:19:27. > :19:30.standards of human rights that we do in this country. Why don't you link

:19:31. > :19:33.your relationships to the organisations that have the same

:19:34. > :19:37.standards as we have in this country? We have good partnerships

:19:38. > :19:41.with the European and the Americaned other Western partners. We work

:19:42. > :19:47.closely with them against all of the issues we have described.

:19:48. > :19:49.I'm not concerned about those countries it is the countries that

:19:50. > :19:53.don't. The problem is that the threat does

:19:54. > :19:57.not come from those countries. It comes from the countries which are

:19:58. > :20:03.either secretive states or where there is ungoverned territory, where

:20:04. > :20:08.terrorists can operate or countries which are pursuing nuclear weapons

:20:09. > :20:14.programmes for example. If you wish to work in the areas you are talking

:20:15. > :20:18.about, in the Middle East, south Asia, Africa, so on, we have to work

:20:19. > :20:22.with the local security partners. They are often powerful and

:20:23. > :20:26.important players. They carry weight. My agency carries the main

:20:27. > :20:32.responsibility for our partnerships with those organisations. If there

:20:33. > :20:37.is a terrorist, say a British extremist has gone to a foreign

:20:38. > :20:45.country, it is important for our security in the UK that an eye is

:20:46. > :20:50.kept on him. That he is sure veiled and monitored. And maybe he may need

:20:51. > :20:54.to be detained at some point. We don't have the powers to do that.

:20:55. > :20:59.The locals do. So we have to work in partnership in order to be able to

:21:00. > :21:07.do things lawfully overseas. If that is the case, how are you

:21:08. > :21:10.sure that the action you take is not as a resulting in somebody being

:21:11. > :21:14.mistreated because of that relationship? That is important for

:21:15. > :21:17.us. We are clear that we only operate within the framework of the

:21:18. > :21:22.law. There are some countries that we

:21:23. > :21:27.cannot work with at all. Take Syria, there is no rule of law, no partner.

:21:28. > :21:32.We could not operate with a partner in that country in the Syrian

:21:33. > :21:38.regime. There are other countries which have mixed human rights

:21:39. > :21:42.records. With countries like that, we then seek clear assurances that

:21:43. > :21:48.when we provide intelligence, it is used lawfully and if anybody is

:21:49. > :21:55.detained or questioned as a consequence of our intelligence,

:21:56. > :21:59.that it is done to our standards. Now the, there are sometimes some

:22:00. > :22:05.fine balancing to be drawn here. Where there is a fine balance, we

:22:06. > :22:08.submit the issue and compile the risks and seek the guidance of

:22:09. > :22:12.ministers on that. There have been allegations in

:22:13. > :22:17.relation to specific incidents that your organisation has been complice

:22:18. > :22:21.it in torture taken against people. How can you be sure because of the

:22:22. > :22:25.close relationships, you have talked about the guidance, that the fact

:22:26. > :22:31.that you have this close relationship, does it not mean that

:22:32. > :22:35.you may well be explicit or responsible in some way for some of

:22:36. > :22:40.the dreadful events that have occurred? I don't accept the

:22:41. > :22:45.allegations made against us. With the benefit of hindsight we were not

:22:46. > :22:49.configured in 2001 for the scale of the terrorist threat that this

:22:50. > :22:54.country faced after 9/11. Our people were not trained for it, we did not

:22:55. > :22:59.have the experience nor the resources for it. It took time to

:23:00. > :23:05.adapt. It took time to adapt to the scale of the threat we faced, but we

:23:06. > :23:11.learned quickly. We have had glidance in place for seven or eight

:23:12. > :23:15.years now. In 2010 it was pulled across the three agencies, across

:23:16. > :23:19.the military. We have consolidated guidance, published by the

:23:20. > :23:23.Government. That is giving clear direction to us as the heads of

:23:24. > :23:28.agencies and to our staff in the field about what they can and cannot

:23:29. > :23:34.do. If there is doubt we put it to ministers. There is a former High

:23:35. > :23:38.Court judge, who is directed to oversea the implementation of the

:23:39. > :23:45.guidance to ensure that what we are doing is in accordance with the law

:23:46. > :23:50.and that guidance. The situations in which officers may

:23:51. > :23:57.find themselves operating may be dynamic indeed, what kind of audit

:23:58. > :24:01.do you perform in relation to circumstances where an officer may

:24:02. > :24:05.come back and say that this was difficult but he made his decision

:24:06. > :24:10.in a particular direction, for example not to have any part in what

:24:11. > :24:17.was going on. Don't you need assessment of the effectiveness of

:24:18. > :24:21.this? We do. I think, that it is more die thamic than you suggest.

:24:22. > :24:27.The idea of sending an agent off into the field like James Bond and

:24:28. > :24:30.he comes back to report... Or referring to ministers.

:24:31. > :24:34.It does not work that way. Our people in the field have constant

:24:35. > :24:44.communication with us through stations or directly to head office.

:24:45. > :24:47.They communicate rapidly we have a 24/7 system. If something is

:24:48. > :24:51.happening there is system to enable guidance from head office. If we

:24:52. > :24:57.feel it does not fall clearly on one side of the line or the other, or

:24:58. > :25:01.the facts are uncertain, then we all wake up the affect and ask him for a

:25:02. > :25:05.view, one way or the other. Do you feel, Sir John, you can

:25:06. > :25:11.guarantee, not to the Committee but to the public as well, that your

:25:12. > :25:16.agency, is beyond reproach now in these matters and will not be

:25:17. > :25:21.explicit? What I can say is that we have learned a huge amount over the

:25:22. > :25:25.last 12 years. I am satisfied with the rigorous compliance procedures

:25:26. > :25:32.that we have in place. There is no way that our members of

:25:33. > :25:36.staff could be drawn into situations at this stage where there is doubt

:25:37. > :25:43.about what they should be doing. There is a very strong ethical

:25:44. > :25:48.standard in all of our services. When you are working in a secret

:25:49. > :25:51.organisation, having a strong ethical and disciplined approach is

:25:52. > :25:56.really, really important. That is one of the basis on which we recruit

:25:57. > :26:01.people. I am confident to be able to answer your question, yes.

:26:02. > :26:06.And you are happy that the large`scale pay`offs that have been

:26:07. > :26:12.upsetting constituents that have been paid out to foreign prisoners

:26:13. > :26:17.held under questionable circumstances, that those days are

:26:18. > :26:22.past us? I wanted also to ask on a practical level, really, if you are

:26:23. > :26:26.dealing on a day`to`day issue, what goes through your mind if you have

:26:27. > :26:33.been made aware of someone overseas who had vital information and being

:26:34. > :26:37.held by an overseas government, perhaps by a state we don't have

:26:38. > :26:44.day`to`day relationships with, how do you feel and how would you

:26:45. > :26:49.operate with that person, that there could be a eminent terrorist attack

:26:50. > :26:56.on UK soil? We would do what we could to disrupt any such threat. As

:26:57. > :26:59.I say, if he is held in a country, if this person is held in a country

:27:00. > :27:04.where we have a partnership relationship, then we will seek with

:27:05. > :27:07.that partner to ensure that the right questions are put to the rson

:27:08. > :27:14.but in a lawful way. If there is a serious risk that our questions

:27:15. > :27:18.would prompt the maltreatment or the torture of a detainee, we would

:27:19. > :27:25.consultant the ministers about that. If we knew that was going to happen,

:27:26. > :27:29.we would not even think of it in the first place, but we have been able

:27:30. > :27:34.to find other ways to disrupt the threats.

:27:35. > :27:40.I think that the record that we have, especially with MI5's lead of

:27:41. > :27:45.disrupting threats in the UK with a footprint seas has been commendable.

:27:46. > :27:49.Andrew will talk about that with more authority, but about the

:27:50. > :27:53.pay`offs you mentioned Mr Field, it was not just your constituents but

:27:54. > :27:58.our members of staff who were sickened about it. On many occasions

:27:59. > :28:02.we had a strong defence to the allegations made against us but the

:28:03. > :28:10.court system did not allow us to make the defences. We are glad to

:28:11. > :28:14.see the Justice and the Security Act passed that will enable us to defend

:28:15. > :28:19.ourselves against the allegations. I am not saying that all allegations

:28:20. > :28:23.are manufactured or whatever, and there may be some cases that a court

:28:24. > :28:29.should hear, where there is a case to be heard but now the courts can

:28:30. > :28:34.hear. That is because of the Justice and the Security Act.

:28:35. > :28:38.I appreciate this is a hypothetical question, where you are pushing to

:28:39. > :28:43.the extremes of the policy but if your question is would we pursue a

:28:44. > :28:48.situation that led and we knew it would lead to mistreatment or

:28:49. > :28:51.torture of an individual to get intelligence, the answer is

:28:52. > :28:55.absolutely not. There is a clear Government policy that applies

:28:56. > :29:02.across the agencies and underpins the guidance, that is that we do not

:29:03. > :29:04.participate in encouraging or condoning mistreatment or torture.

:29:05. > :29:08.That is absolute. Thank you very much. The Committee

:29:09. > :29:13.will be wanting to keep a close interest in this area. Now let's

:29:14. > :29:19.move to the changing nature of the threat from Al`Qaeda and its allies.

:29:20. > :29:23.After 9/11, the attention of the intelligence community was focussed

:29:24. > :29:27.in Island in south Asia and Afghanistan but more recently that

:29:28. > :29:31.attention seems to have shifted to the Middle East, to the Horn of

:29:32. > :29:36.Africa. Over the last five years, what proportion of the plots that

:29:37. > :29:40.have been uncovered have been linked to Al`Qaeda as opposed to

:29:41. > :29:46.Al`Qaeda`affiliated groups in the other areas, including the Maghreb

:29:47. > :29:49.areas as well? If you permit me, I take a step back to answer the

:29:50. > :29:54.question. I would have to position it against the whole terrorist

:29:55. > :29:58.threat landscape. Since 9/11, of course that appalling attack on the

:29:59. > :30:03.United States in which almost 3,000 people were killed by Al`Qaeda,

:30:04. > :30:08.began what seems to be the modern chapter of terrorism, though we have

:30:09. > :30:14.had terrorism as an issue for much longer than that. Afghanistan, you

:30:15. > :30:19.mentioned, of course throughout the time since 9/11 that we have had

:30:20. > :30:23.coalition troops and British Forces included in Afghanistan, there has

:30:24. > :30:28.been no terrorism projected against this country from there, due to the

:30:29. > :30:34.work of our armed forces. As we are approaching arm city day and wearing

:30:35. > :30:40.poppies, I would like to pay tribute to the 456 British serviceman who

:30:41. > :30:44.have given their lives to that end. There has been no terrorism in this

:30:45. > :30:48.country in that time. Now to the time, the period of after 9/11, in

:30:49. > :30:57.terms of threat to this country, it has been dominated by threats from

:30:58. > :31:02.south Asia, an almost monolithic phenomena, from people living here,

:31:03. > :31:07.how the two have interacted, I can explain more on that later. That led

:31:08. > :31:13.to a series of plots. Including the dreadful attack on the 7th of July

:31:14. > :31:19.in 2005 in which 52 members of the public were murdered.

:31:20. > :31:23.Now that moment signalled a shift in counterterrorist work in this

:31:24. > :31:29.country. Much stronger resourcing was added by the Government and

:31:30. > :31:33.counterterrorist work stepped up and it started to take the shape it is

:31:34. > :31:39.today, the joint work of our agencies and of MI5.

:31:40. > :31:44.Could you bring your answer together more quickly... Absolutely. The

:31:45. > :31:48.threat since that time has started to bread out `` spread out, but the

:31:49. > :31:53.diversecation of threat is not a shift or displacement from one area

:31:54. > :31:58.to another it is the growth of the Al`Qaeda phenomena in the areas you

:31:59. > :32:06.are referring to. In the north and the west of Africa. In East Africa,

:32:07. > :32:11.in Syria and in Yemen, and in Syria, where the ideal ideal ology started

:32:12. > :32:15.to take root there with the national and extremist groupings, we have

:32:16. > :32:23.seen threats from all areas, and also still from south Asia.

:32:24. > :32:27.As Al`Qaeda is seeking to exploit the vacuums, you mentioned Syria,

:32:28. > :32:32.and Somalia, other countries of that kind, is there not a real risk that

:32:33. > :32:36.the challenging terrain you are getting coverage on, that you are

:32:37. > :32:48.spread too thinly, that you are missing things? We are deployed

:32:49. > :32:54.overseas, and as Andrew says, we are having to deal with Al`Qaeda

:32:55. > :32:58.emerging, forming and multiplying in a new range of countries. Of course

:32:59. > :33:05.that poses extra challenges and extra threats to us. There is no

:33:06. > :33:09.doubt, especially in the last 12 months, really, that threat has

:33:10. > :33:18.emerged. More British citizens have been killed overseas in 2013 than in

:33:19. > :33:24.the previous seven years combined. In Nairobi, the hostage killed in

:33:25. > :33:30.Nigeria, and the events in Woolwich. There's no doubt that the

:33:31. > :33:34.threat is rising. Now, deployed overseas, we work primarily with

:33:35. > :33:37.partners in response to MI5 priorities about where the threat to

:33:38. > :33:41.the UK is coming from, and we do what we can to disrupt terrorist

:33:42. > :33:48.attacks overseas, and we foil a good number, but some get through. The

:33:49. > :33:52.threat overseas is getting greater. Just picking up on the question of

:33:53. > :33:59.threat, what is your assessment of the impact of what people might

:34:00. > :34:04.describe as terrorist tourism, the fact there are people who go from

:34:05. > :34:07.the UK to abroad, acquire capabilities, and then if they come

:34:08. > :34:14.back to this country suitably motivated have the opportunity of

:34:15. > :34:17.using what they learned abroad? It is a very important strand of the

:34:18. > :34:24.threat we face, the way various interaction between people who live

:34:25. > :34:29.in this country who sympathise with the Al`Qaeda authorities ``

:34:30. > :34:32.ideology, and they travel to meet the groupings, either Al`Qaeda

:34:33. > :34:36.itself in South Asia, or some of the other groupings I spoke about across

:34:37. > :34:40.other regions. Because the attractiveness to these groupings is

:34:41. > :34:45.that they meet British citizens willing to engage in terrorism, and

:34:46. > :34:52.they tasked them to do so back at home where they have higher impact

:34:53. > :35:01.than in this country, and we have seen it played out in various plots,

:35:02. > :35:06.including 7/7. So the threat from abroad is less obvious than it might

:35:07. > :35:13.have been in the past? It is a complex interaction. You anticipated

:35:14. > :35:16.my next question. What about attacks on British citizens in public places

:35:17. > :35:22.at home and abroad? What about the taking of British citizens as

:35:23. > :35:27.hostages, at home and abroad? How do you assess the credibility of the

:35:28. > :35:32.threats? To describe a threat as credible does not necessarily make

:35:33. > :35:36.it so. What factors do you use in assessing the extent and credibility

:35:37. > :35:40.of a particular threat in a particular area, geographically for

:35:41. > :35:45.example? The responsibility for assessing threat in areas of the

:35:46. > :35:51.world, and including the UK, setting the threat levels is part of my

:35:52. > :35:56.service but is a multi`agency body that looks at the full range of

:35:57. > :35:58.intelligence from all sources and is connected to international

:35:59. > :36:02.intelligence agencies around the world, and they form a picture based

:36:03. > :36:06.on all the available intelligence, balancing it, assessing it, and

:36:07. > :36:15.coming out with rigorous judgements about threat levels. But as the

:36:16. > :36:21.account holder, that ?2 billion, they will have the responsibility

:36:22. > :36:26.for deciding on which way capabilities must go, and that must

:36:27. > :36:29.rest with the heads of the agencies? So do you exercise your own

:36:30. > :36:36.independent judgement based on this, or do you accept the ruling? This is

:36:37. > :36:39.a collective effort. John and Ian might want to say something in a

:36:40. > :36:43.minute. The way in which we work against counterterrorism is an

:36:44. > :36:50.endeavour between the three of us as intelligence agencies, between

:36:51. > :36:54.myself and the police, particularly the police national network, who are

:36:55. > :36:57.excellent partners, who we work with toward arrest and prosecutions the

:36:58. > :37:05.decisions we make around this based on the threat picture. This is led

:37:06. > :37:08.by MI5, but it is a team effort in which the people in all of the

:37:09. > :37:12.agencies who lead the counterterrorist work at the

:37:13. > :37:18.operational level plan together the deployments and priorities

:37:19. > :37:22.necessary. In answer to Sir Menzies Campbell, you are talking about

:37:23. > :37:27.terrorist tourism, is it your assessment that that is growing or

:37:28. > :37:30.decreasing? It is growing at the moment because of Syria. Syria has

:37:31. > :37:37.become an attractive place for people to go for that reason, those

:37:38. > :37:43.who support or sympathise with the Al`Qaeda ideological message that I

:37:44. > :37:47.mentioned. We see low hundreds of people in this country go to Syria

:37:48. > :37:52.for a period, then come back. There are some large numbers are still ``

:37:53. > :37:55.still there, and they get involved in fighting. This is because of the

:37:56. > :37:59.proximity and ease of travel, but also because it is attractive

:38:00. > :38:06.because of what they see as the jihadist cause. Moving to the

:38:07. > :38:07.home`grown threat, we have seen acts of terrorism and attempted in this

:38:08. > :38:16.country. In the last decade, over 50 people

:38:17. > :38:21.in the UK have been killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Do you

:38:22. > :38:25.accept that as many people would argue that this represents a

:38:26. > :38:28.significant failure of intelligence, and perhaps you could say a word

:38:29. > :38:33.about the number of plots that have been uncovered during the course of

:38:34. > :38:37.the last ten years, and to what extent does luck play a part in the

:38:38. > :38:44.work that you do to try and cover them? You won't be surprised that I

:38:45. > :38:49.reject the term intelligence failure in this area. The principal attack

:38:50. > :38:53.that the UK suffered in terms of numbers of loss of life, and there

:38:54. > :39:00.have been attacks this year, goes back to 2005 the 52 deaths I spoke.

:39:01. > :39:03.Committee examined `` this committee examined what this agency and the

:39:04. > :39:08.police did and concluded the actions we took were reasonable at the time.

:39:09. > :39:14.I think I would adhere from that that that's not judged as a failure,

:39:15. > :39:20.and I don't judge that it was. Since then there have been persistent

:39:21. > :39:26.attempts of attacks in this country. You ask about the last ten years, so

:39:27. > :39:31.if I go back to 2005, rather than ten years, the number since 7/7,

:39:32. > :39:37.there have been 34 plots towards terrorism that have been disrupted

:39:38. > :39:41.in this country, of all sizes and at all stages. I have referred

:39:42. > :39:45.publicly, previously, and my predecessors have, that one of those

:39:46. > :39:50.`` one or two of those are major plots aimed at mass casualties which

:39:51. > :39:55.have been attempted each year. Of the 34, most of them, the vast

:39:56. > :39:59.majority, have been disrupted by active detection and intervention by

:40:00. > :40:06.the agencies and the police. One or two of them, a small number, have

:40:07. > :40:13.failed because they just failed. The plans did not come together. But the

:40:14. > :40:18.vast majority were by intervention. 7/7 came as a complete shock to the

:40:19. > :40:21.nation's psyche, to think that people born and raised in Britain

:40:22. > :40:25.could want to commit acts of terrorism. Clearly the best way to

:40:26. > :40:30.protect the country is to prevent these plots being formed in the

:40:31. > :40:33.first place. How important do you think the prevention programme is,

:40:34. > :40:38.and do you think there is enough emphasis on trying to make sure

:40:39. > :40:42.people are not radicalised and do not go down the path of home`grown

:40:43. > :40:48.terrorism? Is the committee is aware, the bulk of the work that MI5

:40:49. > :40:52.and the bulk of the agencies do in this area is stopping people who are

:40:53. > :40:56.supporting terrorism and working toward it, stopping plots, and that

:40:57. > :41:02.is where the bulk of the effort is. But as you rightly say, Prevent is

:41:03. > :41:06.also an important pillar as part of the strategy, and it is one that

:41:07. > :41:09.gets at the point of dealing with the problem of vulnerable

:41:10. > :41:14.individuals who are exposed to these toxic and twisted message of

:41:15. > :41:18.violence. It is certainly part of what we do with the police, to refer

:41:19. > :41:21.people into that programme, wherever we can and wherever it offers a

:41:22. > :41:31.sensible way for dealing with the problem. So, between 7/7 and the

:41:32. > :41:36.murder of Lee Rigby, there were 34 thwarted attacks? Out of the 34, how

:41:37. > :41:42.many were being plotted by home`grown terrorists? Could we say

:41:43. > :41:46.the vast majority? And how many were by foreigners, and how many by

:41:47. > :41:55.people living here that were relatively recently `` recent

:41:56. > :41:58.arrivals? The vast majority of the plots come from people who live

:41:59. > :42:01.here. There are several thousand individuals in this country who are

:42:02. > :42:07.described as supporting violent extremism or engagement in some

:42:08. > :42:11.way, that we are aware. The terrorist plots we have dealt with

:42:12. > :42:17.over the years have almost all come from amongst those people. Of the

:42:18. > :42:23.two categories that live here, how many is it? Is it the vast majority

:42:24. > :42:26.that are home`grown, people who have grown up here? Or is a significant

:42:27. > :42:31.proportion of people who have recently come into the country? I go

:42:32. > :42:35.back to the comment we almost got to a few moments ago. I'm not sure that

:42:36. > :42:40.the term home`grown is a helpful one here in getting up the phenomenon ``

:42:41. > :42:45.getting at the phenomenon because of the complex and rich links between

:42:46. > :42:49.the individuals here and the Al`Qaeda group overseas. In almost

:42:50. > :42:55.every instance of a plot, there are those links. It almost anticipates

:42:56. > :43:01.what I was going to ask next. You have seen the shift from the

:43:02. > :43:08.so`called spectacular plots, to the lone wolf attacks, so`called. Would

:43:09. > :43:13.you say that that is a serious shift of reorientation of the terrorist

:43:14. > :43:19.threat away from networks towards individuals making these attacks,

:43:20. > :43:24.and planning to kill people on a low`level, individual basis? Or is

:43:25. > :43:29.it, as I think you are saying to us now, more that the lone wolves have

:43:30. > :43:33.some sort of outside influence? The answer to the first question is that

:43:34. > :43:39.no, it's not so much a shift, that we seek `` but that we see different

:43:40. > :43:44.methods of terrorism added to over the years. I go back to a case

:43:45. > :43:52.earlier this year. 11 individuals were convicted in a case we called

:43:53. > :43:57.Operation Examined, in which the terrorists were picked up on covert

:43:58. > :44:05.microphones talking about a plot to exceed victims in terms of the

:44:06. > :44:09.number of 7/7. Big casualties are still in the minds of the

:44:10. > :44:12.terrorists, and we can expect that to persist. Amongst that, we've seen

:44:13. > :44:15.a small rise in the cases of the number of individuals who have

:44:16. > :44:20.become radicalised and sometimes move to violent action. This happens

:44:21. > :44:23.because at the rise of the Internet and the presence of all kinds of

:44:24. > :44:29.violent material that they can connect with. And also because some

:44:30. > :44:33.of the linkages I spoke of, the complex linkages, particularly with

:44:34. > :44:37.South Asia, are harder for the terrorists to have, so there is a

:44:38. > :44:41.little bit more autonomy amongst some groupings and individuals than

:44:42. > :44:46.we have seen in the past. But this is an added phenomenon rather than a

:44:47. > :44:50.shift from one to another. Mr Parker, the Home Secretary on Monday

:44:51. > :44:54.made a statement to the house, where he said that the Security service

:44:55. > :44:58.had always advised her that there had been no substantial increase in

:44:59. > :45:02.the overall risk since the introduction of terrorist prevention

:45:03. > :45:05.and investigation measures. Now that we have two suspects on the run and

:45:06. > :45:08.the prospect of a number of the order is coming to an end in

:45:09. > :45:15.January, is that assessment still valid? I know you take a close

:45:16. > :45:19.interest in this in the House, as do other members of the committee. I

:45:20. > :45:22.listened to the Home Secretary speak in the debate on Monday and I think

:45:23. > :45:26.she covered the issue is quite fully, but on the specifics of your

:45:27. > :45:35.question, going back to what my predecessors said about this, and

:45:36. > :45:38.the increase in risk, that is a judgement made against the whole of

:45:39. > :45:41.the risk, so when I referred a few minutes ago to the several thousand

:45:42. > :45:45.individuals who support violent extremism in one way or another, it

:45:46. > :45:50.is a judgement about the whole target set, including these

:45:51. > :45:57.individuals, not just on their own. And it remains true. Are you able to

:45:58. > :46:03.tell us a trend of operations within your service in relation to counter

:46:04. > :46:08.terrorism? Over the period since 7/7, has the number of operations

:46:09. > :46:14.which you have had to carry out increased? In particular, was that

:46:15. > :46:20.the case in and around the period of the Olympic games? The level of

:46:21. > :46:24.counterterrorist operations that goes on has been even in recent

:46:25. > :46:29.years. For the Olympics we put extra effort into it in case there were

:46:30. > :46:32.extra threats, or attempts by Al`Qaeda or other groups to attack

:46:33. > :46:38.the games or mount attacks during the games. As it happens, there were

:46:39. > :46:41.some threats. But there were no serious ones that came forward

:46:42. > :46:46.during the period. We were ready in case that there were, but they

:46:47. > :46:51.didn't happen. Setting the Olympics aside for a moment, in terms of the

:46:52. > :46:55.trends, we have seen more and more new methods added. We are dealing

:46:56. > :47:01.with a diversifying source of threats from a range of different

:47:02. > :47:05.countries now. As it broadens out, its year by year and it becomes a

:47:06. > :47:10.more complex task. In terms of the numbers, maybe the best guide his

:47:11. > :47:16.prosecution through the court, and since 7/7, that is 330 in cases to

:47:17. > :47:22.do with international terrorism. In the first part of this year there

:47:23. > :47:25.were 25 convictions in four major investigations that the police were

:47:26. > :47:33.involved in and brought forward as operations, one of which was the

:47:34. > :47:36.plot I mentioned. Terrorism is also to Northern Ireland. Let's move to

:47:37. > :47:40.that situation. Has the prominence of the threat of

:47:41. > :47:46.#14r578ist terrorism on the mainland, indeed, emanating from

:47:47. > :47:50.abroad, has that meant you have taken your eye from Northern

:47:51. > :47:53.Ireland? Not at all. We have a substantial commitment of effort in

:47:54. > :47:57.Northern Ireland. It is based there, it is not distracted by the rest of

:47:58. > :48:00.our work. We took over the intelligence lead for work against

:48:01. > :48:04.terrorism in Northern Ireland six years ago. We have a heavy

:48:05. > :48:09.commitment of resources there. It is partnered with PSNI. The situation

:48:10. > :48:13.in Northern Ireland is one in which we see from time to time tragic

:48:14. > :48:16.terrorism, a year ago the murder of a prison officer, David Black over

:48:17. > :48:21.there. I think it was a disgraceful act.

:48:22. > :48:26.The people we are talking about, the terrorists there, are a small number

:48:27. > :48:31.of people. A residue of terrorism from what I would call a by`gone

:48:32. > :48:36.era. Nearly, as you know very well, moved on 15 years ago with the Good

:48:37. > :48:41.Friday Agreement. With the decision to move forward in a democratic way.

:48:42. > :48:46.It has done so. Northern Ireland is now a modern and a conservativic

:48:47. > :48:49.society where terrorism has no place.

:48:50. > :48:53.You describe them as a residue but you mentioned the murder of David

:48:54. > :48:58.Black. The Northern Ireland Secretary herself warned yesterday

:48:59. > :49:03.of continuous planning and targeting by dissident Republicans. What are

:49:04. > :49:07.the factors that lie behind the renewed level of threat in Northern

:49:08. > :49:13.Ireland? I would `` I'm not sure I accept it is a renewed level of

:49:14. > :49:16.threat. The number of attacks is diminishing. And the number of

:49:17. > :49:21.people convicted in the courts is going up as we bring these people

:49:22. > :49:24.before the courts. The threat persists in the way that the

:49:25. > :49:29.Secretary of State said, I think she said: Likely for the foreseeable

:49:30. > :49:34.future. I would agree with that assessment but it will not last

:49:35. > :49:39.forever. These people will over time, either give up, or put before

:49:40. > :49:43.the courts and put in jail. So you think there are prospects for

:49:44. > :49:49.change? That this will not go on indefinitely? Over time it is

:49:50. > :49:53.diminishing year on year. There will be a Northern Ireland without this

:49:54. > :49:55.sort of terrorism. I am committed to working there with the police until

:49:56. > :49:58.we see that day. Thank you very much. A short

:49:59. > :50:04.discussion has been had on technology. Now let's move to the

:50:05. > :50:08.cyber threat, in particular how GCHQ uses the internet. Can we begin with

:50:09. > :50:12.a question on the general cyber threat? Could we start on the

:50:13. > :50:19.international aspects of sieb I threat? We have been familiar for a

:50:20. > :50:24.long time with state attacks on the Government and the attempt to get

:50:25. > :50:29.military secrets. We now have corporate attacks. There are also

:50:30. > :50:35.attacks on personal individuals to get their private information.

:50:36. > :50:41.How do you assess the proportion of those and could you give us a again

:50:42. > :50:47.ral description of how you see the cyber threat developing? It is

:50:48. > :50:51.multi`facetted. Let me talk about the actors and impact. Hostile

:50:52. > :50:56.intelligence services, it is important to remember that.

:50:57. > :51:01.Organised groups stealing industrial secrets, academic secrets.

:51:02. > :51:07.Terrorists, activists and criminals. It is seen that there has been

:51:08. > :51:15.increasingly sophisticated criminal access. I would call out the

:51:16. > :51:21.non`stage actors, at the top level, is the engagement by some states,

:51:22. > :51:27.less sophisticated states in terms of strategic weaponry, using cyber

:51:28. > :51:32.as an over the horizon means of projecting disruption. In terms of

:51:33. > :51:36.the impact, I think that I would focus on that industrial espionage

:51:37. > :51:43.aspect. We are seeing attacks against the

:51:44. > :51:47.businesses that keep Britain going. So finances, transport,

:51:48. > :51:52.communications, energy, we are seeing theft from over 20 industrial

:51:53. > :52:00.sectors, research and invasion is targeted. Trade secrets, academic

:52:01. > :52:02.research. Industrial espionage on an industrial scale stealing

:52:03. > :52:08.intellectual property. The response to that has to be a cross`Government

:52:09. > :52:12.one and even beyond Government. So working closely for the centre for

:52:13. > :52:15.the protection of national infrastructure, with the business

:52:16. > :52:21.and invasion and skills department. With the new National Crime Agency

:52:22. > :52:25.and with the Cabinet Office, of course. If we get that team play

:52:26. > :52:31.right, we can be world`class in terms of cyber for the UK. It is

:52:32. > :52:35.about working with industry about building capability so that industry

:52:36. > :52:41.can help. If they can cover some of the territory at home and in an

:52:42. > :52:45.overseas market, we are helping by giving certain services and working

:52:46. > :52:48.with academia to build a cyber generation, to build more skills

:52:49. > :52:59.across the economy. Some would say that the real cyber

:53:00. > :53:04.threat comes from GCHQ, not just from others, seeking to collecting

:53:05. > :53:08.everyone's data and communications. Can I ask you why you think it

:53:09. > :53:16.necessary to collect information on the majority of the public in order

:53:17. > :53:19.to protect us from the minority of potential evil`doers.

:53:20. > :53:25.Thank you. I will work up to that, if I may! To clarify we do not spend

:53:26. > :53:30.our time listening to the telephone calls or reading the e`mails of the

:53:31. > :53:37.vast majority. That would not be legal. We do not do it. It would be

:53:38. > :53:40.nice if serious criminals use a particular method of communication

:53:41. > :53:45.and everybody used something else. That is not the case. It would be

:53:46. > :53:50.nice if we knew who the terrorists or the serious criminals were but

:53:51. > :53:54.the internet is a great way to avoid identification. So we have to do

:53:55. > :53:59.detective work. I will give an analogy. It has been used in the

:54:00. > :54:03.press, but think of the internet as a huge hey field. What we are trying

:54:04. > :54:09.to do is to collect hey from those parts of the field that we can get

:54:10. > :54:14.access to and which may be Luke tif in terms of containing the fromming

:54:15. > :54:19.ms of needles that we may be interested in to help us. When we

:54:20. > :54:23.gather the haystack. It is not from the home field but from a tiny

:54:24. > :54:28.proportion of that field, we are well aware in the haystack that

:54:29. > :54:31.there is lots of hey that is innocent communications from

:54:32. > :54:36.innocent people, not just British but foreign people as well. We have

:54:37. > :54:41.to design the queries to draw out the needles. We do not intrude on

:54:42. > :54:46.the surrounding hey. So we look at the content of the communications,

:54:47. > :54:49.where there are specific legal thresholds and requirements that

:54:50. > :54:55.have been met. That is the reality. We don't want to delve into innocent

:54:56. > :55:00.e`mails and phone calls, and I don't employ the type of people who would

:55:01. > :55:06.do. My people are motivated by saving lives on the lives of those

:55:07. > :55:11.on the battlefield. By preventing terrorists and serious criminals,

:55:12. > :55:14.and if they were asked to snoop, I would not have the workforce, they

:55:15. > :55:19.would leave the building. You have given a very full response.

:55:20. > :55:24.Can I ask if you are able to give that response today, why would the

:55:25. > :55:28.British public not entitled to know you were sifting large amounts of

:55:29. > :55:35.communications data for the kind of purpose that you have just

:55:36. > :55:39.described? Well, I believe a Government's first duty is to

:55:40. > :55:46.protect its people. In some ways it does it that a secret. I don't think

:55:47. > :55:54.that secret manies unaccountable. I think that the affect appointed by

:55:55. > :55:58.an elected government, authorses or operations. There is a Committee

:55:59. > :56:06.that gives oversight. There are the interception of the communications

:56:07. > :56:10.minister and... That is all... That is all within secrecy.

:56:11. > :56:15.I am asking why the British public are not entitled to share with us

:56:16. > :56:20.what you have shared this after noon? I believe that certain

:56:21. > :56:24.information should be secret. I don't think secret means sinister. I

:56:25. > :56:28.would like to hammer that home. It feels strange to say that we have

:56:29. > :56:34.nothing to hide, given we work within the ring of secrecy but that

:56:35. > :56:39.has the oversight, the safeguards in terms of the parliamentary

:56:40. > :56:44.Committee, the minister eel masters, the commissioners and the

:56:45. > :56:47.investigatory powers tribunal to exercise that on behalf of the

:56:48. > :56:51.British public. Are you giving thought as to whether

:56:52. > :56:55.the line you have drawn between the aspects of the way that you operate

:56:56. > :57:01.which have to be kept secret and those that could be shared with the

:57:02. > :57:06.wider public, not just with intelligence`related activities, are

:57:07. > :57:12.you giving thought to whether or not the line can be redrawn, safely?

:57:13. > :57:18.That has been an active debate even before the recent revelations.

:57:19. > :57:22.When the Committee reviews us, with we give evidence, when you produce

:57:23. > :57:34.your report, you seek to produce it in an unredakted report as possible.

:57:35. > :57:39.That has happened over time. Some serious allegations have have

:57:40. > :57:44.been made, many of them directed at GCHQ. Earlier there was an

:57:45. > :57:50.allegations that you were using your relationships with the US services

:57:51. > :57:54.in order to circumvent British law. We did an inquiry, we found it

:57:55. > :57:58.unfounded. I think it important to be clear with the public. Can you

:57:59. > :58:03.give us a guarantee that you do not conduct operations which are out

:58:04. > :58:09.with the British legal framework? Yes, I can give you that guarantee.

:58:10. > :58:14.I belief that is true with we are subject to the law. I am sure that

:58:15. > :58:18.is true of my sister agencies as well.

:58:19. > :58:25.I am aware of your capabilities in the past but not to the int cassis

:58:26. > :58:31.to which Hazel Blears has referred. While we appreciate the co`operation

:58:32. > :58:37.you have with the overseas agencies, can you give assurance that at the

:58:38. > :58:46.earliest time of the closed session, you can give us an update of all

:58:47. > :58:51.with whom you kol abrate with? I think so.

:58:52. > :58:55.I think that the public, the vast majority think that you have the

:58:56. > :59:02.right amount of powers or indeed some think you need more. As usual,

:59:03. > :59:05.the public... That is not necessarily the view of this

:59:06. > :59:09.Committee! I think that the public are sensible around this area, but

:59:10. > :59:14.what the polling shows also is that yes, they support you having the

:59:15. > :59:18.powers but they do want more transparency about the way that the

:59:19. > :59:21.powers are exercised. This is the chairman's point about is there the

:59:22. > :59:24.possibility that whilst maintaining security, absolutely but to have

:59:25. > :59:31.perhaps a more informed dialogue with the public, who often exhibit

:59:32. > :59:36.good common sense on the issues that provide people with the extra degree

:59:37. > :59:42.of reassurance about what all of you are undertaking? Let me help now.

:59:43. > :59:46.The pack answer is that there are good safeguards in place. I believe

:59:47. > :59:52.that to be the truth, but if you are a terrorist, a serious criminal, a

:59:53. > :59:56.prolife rare, a foreign intelligence target or if your activities pose a

:59:57. > :00:02.genuine threat to the national or the economic security of the United

:00:03. > :00:06.Kingdom, there is a possible that your communication will be

:00:07. > :00:09.monitored. We will seek to listen to you. If not, if you are not in

:00:10. > :00:15.contact with one of those people, you will not be. We are not entitled

:00:16. > :00:20.to. That is true whether you are British, foreign and ever are in the

:00:21. > :00:23.world. Would your colleagues like to add to

:00:24. > :00:29.the points raised in this area so far? Andrew Parker? I think that

:00:30. > :00:34.openness is something we are moving down the road of. It is now over 20

:00:35. > :00:40.years we have been open in increasing ways as agencies. The

:00:41. > :00:46.issue about balancing powers and transparency and openness and

:00:47. > :00:49.intrusion versus privacy, so on, all of the balances that are important

:00:50. > :00:55.in a free society, in a domestic like the United Kingdom, these are

:00:56. > :00:59.matters that mainly are for ministers to lead on and for

:01:00. > :01:05.Parliament to set law about, that we then abide by and are overseen in

:01:06. > :01:10.the work that we do. So, these are all live issues now. Of course they

:01:11. > :01:14.are. So there is more openness. That is true for a Parliament and

:01:15. > :01:19.for a Government to decide the matters but often the agencies seem

:01:20. > :01:23.nervous about insisting that something cannot be said in public

:01:24. > :01:27.because of the damage it may do. Do you feel you have taken that

:01:28. > :01:31.argument too far? The reason things are secret is not because we are

:01:32. > :01:35.embarrassed about them or wish to keep them from the public, it is

:01:36. > :01:39.because we need to keep them from the people we are investigating or

:01:40. > :01:44.carrying out operations against, the terrorists, the spies and the pro

:01:45. > :01:49.life rares. If we make it public it is public to them too. Then we lose

:01:50. > :01:54.important operational advantage. That can be fragile. That would

:01:55. > :01:58.leave the UK less safe. The task we are paid to do is to keep the

:01:59. > :02:04.country safe it is a challenging and a difficult work to do. The

:02:05. > :02:10.techniques that we have, if they are compromised. It makes our work then

:02:11. > :02:15.harder. There are always secrets. So the oversight mechanisms can operate

:02:16. > :02:29.on behalf of Parliament and on behalf of the public. I would like

:02:30. > :02:33.to support what they have just said. Every successful company in this

:02:34. > :02:43.country is mastering modern technology. The Internet is an

:02:44. > :02:49.important part of this. We are all trying to use technology to take

:02:50. > :02:59.full advantage of the opportunities to achieve our goals. The safeguard

:03:00. > :03:05.in place are very good. It would be bizarre to think the one area to be

:03:06. > :03:11.excluded from taking full advantage of modern technology is keeping this

:03:12. > :03:17.country safe. We have an extraordinarily difficult task, as

:03:18. > :03:21.Andrew has described. We have to identify and recruit agents in the

:03:22. > :03:26.most exposed places. In countries which are trying to do our country

:03:27. > :03:33.harm. Secret states that are trying to do damage to others. We need to

:03:34. > :03:37.have the possibility of examining intelligence, drawing on information

:03:38. > :03:49.our partner agencies have been ordered to be able to identify those

:03:50. > :03:55.very brave individuals. If you end up diminishing our ability to use

:03:56. > :04:05.technology, you will be less able to have that advantage. You are

:04:06. > :04:13.currently under some criticism. If babies a terrorist incident, you

:04:14. > :04:28.will no doubt be under criticism for not having enough. ` ` if there is a

:04:29. > :04:36.terrorist incident. I wonder whether you have any comments on where you

:04:37. > :04:44.strike that very difficult balance. I think fundamentally, the resonant

:04:45. > :04:57.denture of an organisation like MI5 is to protect the sort of country we

:04:58. > :05:02.live in ` ` rasion d'etre. We pride our individual liberty and privacy.

:05:03. > :05:15.They are extremely important values to the people who work in our

:05:16. > :05:25.agency. Our job is to keep the balance. Sometimes I find MI5 and

:05:26. > :05:36.other agencies being spoken of as if we were on the side of the seesaw.

:05:37. > :05:42.We are trying to help government make balances. It is about keeping

:05:43. > :05:47.this country the sort of country it is. There have been times when

:05:48. > :05:52.successive governments have offered my service greater powers, and we

:05:53. > :05:56.have said they were disproportionate and turned away from them. Making

:05:57. > :06:05.the balances is critically important. Been no recent speech, he

:06:06. > :06:08.said, it causes enormous damage to make public the reach and

:06:09. > :06:17.limitations of GCHQ's techniques, and that such information to the

:06:18. > :06:25.terrorists. You then, it, the gift they need to invade as an strike at

:06:26. > :06:29.will. We appreciate you may be limited in the detail you can go

:06:30. > :06:40.into today. I think the public are entitled to know more about this

:06:41. > :06:46.enormous damage you talked about. Can you give examples, specific

:06:47. > :06:58.examples of how it has been a gift to terrorist? It will be difficult

:06:59. > :07:16.to give in a public session. We can do it in a private session later if

:07:17. > :07:21.you like. It leads to was finding terrorist plots we would not

:07:22. > :07:26.otherwise find, which we can them for walks and that leads to lies

:07:27. > :07:40.being saved. There are real instances of that. If we lose it, we

:07:41. > :07:47.are making a difficult task harder. That is what I meant in the speech.

:07:48. > :07:57.I would like to come in. Going back to the Second World War and beyond,

:07:58. > :08:10.they depend on our terrorist targets being unaware. If sources are

:08:11. > :08:19.revealed, it is inexorable. What we have seen over the last five months

:08:20. > :08:25.is nearly daily discussion. We have seen terrorist groups in the Middle

:08:26. > :08:35.East discussing the revelations of specific terms in terms of

:08:36. > :08:46.communications they use. Do you mean this is online? We have seen chat

:08:47. > :08:50.around specific terrorist groups discussing how to avoid what they

:08:51. > :08:58.now perceived to be communication methods, or how to select

:08:59. > :09:08.communication methods. I will not compound damage by being specific in

:09:09. > :09:12.public. We will ask you in private. Are you saying this is information

:09:13. > :09:17.which refers to the revelations that have appeared in the press in the

:09:18. > :09:25.last 12 months? Absolutely. It is a direct consequence. Bekele to have

:09:26. > :09:43.effect of the media coverage, global media coverage, will make things

:09:44. > :09:56.more difficult. It uncovers terrorist cells. It allows us to

:09:57. > :10:03.reveal the identities of those involved in online sexual

:10:04. > :10:09.exploitation of children. That mosaic is in a far week and place

:10:10. > :10:25.and it was. I think most reasonable people would accept that if people

:10:26. > :10:29.are using these kind of meetings for planning or whatever, we should have

:10:30. > :10:56.access to it. I do not think we have got to the point that people feel

:10:57. > :11:02.reassured. It might have been intercepted. We will not look at it

:11:03. > :11:06.without specific authorisation. Going back to what has appeared in

:11:07. > :11:22.the press here and abroad, it is sometimes argued that if people

:11:23. > :11:37.responsible for these publications, is there any validity? I am not sure

:11:38. > :11:41.the journalists who are managing this very sensitive information are

:11:42. > :11:48.particularly well placed to make those judgements. What I can tell

:11:49. > :11:52.you is that the leaks from Edward Snowden have been very damaging.

:11:53. > :12:00.They have put our operations at risk. It is clear that our

:12:01. > :12:07.adversaries are rubbing their hands in glee. Al`Qaeda is lapping it up.

:12:08. > :12:12.I think we need to hear why you think you are entitled to say that.

:12:13. > :12:15.Why do you believe that to be true? I do not want to repeat what my

:12:16. > :12:23.colleagues have said. They have clearly set out how the alert enough

:12:24. > :12:31.targets to our capabilities means it becomes more difficult to acquiring

:12:32. > :12:35.intelligence we need. Is there any additional information you can share

:12:36. > :12:42.with us is too hard evidence that terrorists or potential terrorists

:12:43. > :12:47.have been looking at these reports or change these plans as a result?

:12:48. > :12:51.Not in this public forum. You will be willing to share that with the

:12:52. > :13:04.committee in a private session? Of course. We have had some discussion

:13:05. > :13:14.about balance already. There was the ability to intervene, and their

:13:15. > :13:19.anxiety about privacy in the public has become greater. One way it can

:13:20. > :13:23.be dealt with is for the public to be satisfied there is a robust legal

:13:24. > :13:30.framework. In that respect, is it the view of any of you that the

:13:31. > :13:38.existing legal framework is adequate to deal with the enormous

:13:39. > :13:42.consequences of the revolution in technology, and if there is to be a

:13:43. > :13:46.public debate as to where the balance will be struck, is that a

:13:47. > :13:56.debate you would be willing to participate in publicly? On that

:13:57. > :14:03.last point, subject to administration, yes. We are not

:14:04. > :14:13.lawmakers. There are strict criteria that provide safeguards to protect

:14:14. > :14:22.privacy. I think it is a false choice. Our job is to provide

:14:23. > :14:33.intelligence around security. Our internal rules reflect what is in

:14:34. > :14:43.the laugh. The laws were drafted to be technology neutral. I think they

:14:44. > :14:48.did a pretty good job. It insists upon necessity and proportionality.

:14:49. > :14:51.They are as relevant now as when the drawers were drafted. They guide the

:14:52. > :14:58.way we work, they guide the way we think. They are within our DNA. If

:14:59. > :15:08.Parliamentary wants to have a debate, fine by me. Proportionality

:15:09. > :15:25.necessarily involves value judgements. They may change. Is it

:15:26. > :15:41.not necessary now to believe the public anxiety? I want to stress the

:15:42. > :15:48.role of the commissioners. We talk to them about our methods, about the

:15:49. > :15:52.way that we work, and this idea that technology has moved on beyond the

:15:53. > :16:00.law, there are few will be important on that. These are the intelligence

:16:01. > :16:07.commissioners who look at the specific legality of processes. Yes,

:16:08. > :16:14.I am sorry. The commissioners, two former senior judges. Unlike us,

:16:15. > :16:22.they do not sit in public. They produce a public report. There

:16:23. > :16:29.is clearly a big debate going on in the united states. I think there is

:16:30. > :16:34.evidence there is a change in behaviour from some of the global

:16:35. > :16:39.communications companies. Are you concerned about the long`term

:16:40. > :16:46.consequences, given the close partnership with the Americans?

:16:47. > :16:57.Yes, I am concerned in terms of cooperation that we might receive. I

:16:58. > :17:04.am concerned about the access that we can lawfully require of

:17:05. > :17:08.communications companies, which is very difficult if they are based

:17:09. > :17:12.overseas. Could I just come back to Sir

:17:13. > :17:16.Menzies Campbell's point full stop people who work for us are public

:17:17. > :17:23.servants. We are committed to working in accordance with the law

:17:24. > :17:27.and of remarkable. We will certainly give some advice about what

:17:28. > :17:32.implications of certain changes might be. But you said the law and

:17:33. > :17:36.we will work within the framework of the law. There was an absolutely

:17:37. > :17:40.clear commitment. When people refer to the legal basis

:17:41. > :17:42.on which you operate, they are normally referring to the

:17:43. > :17:46.intelligence services act, but the results of the Human Rights Act.

:17:47. > :17:49.Could you say something to the extent to which that impacts on the

:17:50. > :17:55.way you carry in your responsibilities? How do you make

:17:56. > :18:00.sure you are complying with that? The founding statutes that our

:18:01. > :18:02.services operate to the intelligence services act and the security

:18:03. > :18:07.services act, are themselves based on the Human Rights Act, Article

:18:08. > :18:11.eight of the right to privacy, but we are talking about for the

:18:12. > :18:15.citizen. Which can only be transgressed for reasons of national

:18:16. > :18:20.security and some other arrangements which are less central to what we're

:18:21. > :18:23.talking about today. But the acts that we want to based on that, and

:18:24. > :18:28.so the Human Rights Act is at the centre and at the foundation of our

:18:29. > :18:31.work. It forms the guiding principles.

:18:32. > :18:38.Before relieved this area of questioning, Lord Butler?

:18:39. > :18:44.One final question on that. Can you see why it is that the public feel

:18:45. > :18:47.that when the last bit of legislation on this was passed in

:18:48. > :18:51.the year 2000, and technology has moved on so fast, and your

:18:52. > :18:56.capabilities have developed so hugely, it is hardly credible that

:18:57. > :19:03.that legislation is still fit for purpose for the modern world.

:19:04. > :19:07.I can see why the question comes up, Lord Butler, of course. But the

:19:08. > :19:14.real issue for us is whether the work we do is sufficiently covered

:19:15. > :19:18.by the law, that it is lawful and we can be sure, there are staff can be

:19:19. > :19:21.sure that what they do is lawful. That is properly overseen and that

:19:22. > :19:27.is rigorous, and as you know, niche of arrangements there are Parliament

:19:28. > :19:31.of the oversight of this committee and our Secretary of State reported

:19:32. > :19:36.to Parliament, the judicial, through the commissioners have spoken of and

:19:37. > :19:41.of course through these editors to ministers do we are accountable.

:19:42. > :19:47.Sometimes it might be helped to bring to life a bit especially

:19:48. > :19:50.publicly because on behalf of Parliament and the public, the

:19:51. > :19:55.report to the public in various ways, but somehow it doesn't get

:19:56. > :20:01.into the public mind that that operates. I can say for six months

:20:02. > :20:02.as a director, this is my fourth formal appearance before the

:20:03. > :20:09.committee giving evidence across a range of subjects, operational,

:20:10. > :20:13.policy, finance, administration. As you all know, I have submitted to

:20:14. > :20:18.you hundreds of pages of material about our work, you have received

:20:19. > :20:20.briefings, I have three visits from the commissioners would have spoken

:20:21. > :20:25.of in that period. I see the Home Secretary is her role as Secretary

:20:26. > :20:29.of State, sometimes two or three times a week. This is very active

:20:30. > :20:34.and rigorous oversight in this collection of arrangements.

:20:35. > :20:39.Sometimes a dozen projected well to the public that this goes on.

:20:40. > :22:16.Could we just switch to another aspect of If part of the role of MI6

:22:17. > :22:19.is to stop would`be terrorists joining organisations, what are you

:22:20. > :22:23.doing to try to deal with this issue, especially because of the

:22:24. > :22:28.risk of these people coming back to the United Kingdom? The agencies

:22:29. > :22:36.work extremely closely together. We don't have the authority, we rely on

:22:37. > :22:40.our partners in MI5 to notify those of individuals of concern. We work

:22:41. > :22:46.with foreign partners in south`east Europe and the Arab world who may be

:22:47. > :22:51.able to help us identify where people are moving to. We have our

:22:52. > :22:55.own connections into the Syrian opposition, where we try to identify

:22:56. > :23:01.where people might have gone to inside Syria. It is a very difficult

:23:02. > :23:05.environment within which to operate. Our strategy to prevent

:23:06. > :23:11.terrorism here in this country is to break the links between potential

:23:12. > :23:18.extremists here and Al`Qaeda ranches overseas. We need a whole range of

:23:19. > :23:31.partnerships to achieve that. Syria is particularly difficult. We have

:23:32. > :23:40.got no partner there. To have any liable intelligence ` ` reliable

:23:41. > :23:51.intelligence about the number of UK citizens who have returned from

:23:52. > :24:02.Syria who have potentially fought in the Syrian war? I think we have a

:24:03. > :24:07.reasonable understanding of that. Low hundreds is the number I think I

:24:08. > :24:10.would use publicly. That is the total number of people who we

:24:11. > :24:14.believe are have are now fighting and people who have come back. Those

:24:15. > :24:19.who have been involved in fighting and combat, we need to take some

:24:20. > :24:23.degree of interest in to check they are not intending to become involved

:24:24. > :24:36.in violence here. Most of them will not put some might. When I asked

:24:37. > :24:41.about the programme before, you said it was not necessarily your consent,

:24:42. > :24:46.but isn't it the case at some of these people coming back from Syria,

:24:47. > :24:50.will have a great kid of kudos in the country and will find it easy to

:24:51. > :24:55.draw vulnerable young people to them and possibly radicalise them? Isn't

:24:56. > :25:03.it really important your service has a role in interface with the present

:25:04. > :25:08.programme? They will be looked up by others in

:25:09. > :25:12.the community. That increases the threat. That may happen, and we have

:25:13. > :25:16.discussed prevent threat matters in the past.

:25:17. > :25:22.I think what you're saying is right in some cases. As far as our

:25:23. > :25:26.interface with the event programme, it is more than that, we overlap

:25:27. > :25:32.into it because these two pillars of contest, the counterterrorist

:25:33. > :25:37.strategy that the government has, or overlapped of prevent and pursue.

:25:38. > :25:39.They are overlapped because of the very phenomenon that you have

:25:40. > :25:46.identified. There are radicalise his around. People who spend time trying

:25:47. > :25:50.to persuade people of the arcade ideology and cause. Where there are

:25:51. > :25:57.vulnerable people to that message, sometimes the joint because of

:25:58. > :26:02.followers. Full to the prevent programme is designed at preventing

:26:03. > :26:07.that. We refer numbers of people into the programme, sometimes with

:26:08. > :26:10.success. Some of those who go to Syria will

:26:11. > :26:18.go because of self`motivation, but others may have been recruited. Do

:26:19. > :26:28.you exercise any surveillance over possible recruiting agents with any

:26:29. > :26:31.more disrupting their activities. Of course we do, because these are

:26:32. > :26:35.some of the people we need to be concerned about is a priority, those

:26:36. > :26:40.are trying to recruit others to violence and terrorism whether

:26:41. > :26:45.overseas or home. Let us move to Iran and North Korea.

:26:46. > :26:50.Lord Butler. Last summer, you said publicly that

:26:51. > :26:53.your assessment was that Iran was two years away from obtaining

:26:54. > :26:59.nuclear weapons. We have now seen some advances and that, and

:27:00. > :27:06.President Rohani saying he is prepared to discuss the programme.

:27:07. > :27:08.That is a dramatic success. Do you regard the intelligence committee as

:27:09. > :27:14.having made a contribution to that advance?

:27:15. > :27:17.Yes, I do. I be careful of what I say because the negotiators are

:27:18. > :27:22.going on in Geneva today as we speak. But I think that the

:27:23. > :27:28.intelligence community has contributed to an understanding of

:27:29. > :27:32.Iran's nuclear programme. It has given our politicians and our

:27:33. > :27:38.negotiators a clear sense of what is actually happening. Some of it is

:27:39. > :27:42.over and reported upon by the international atomic energy

:27:43. > :27:46.authority for stop some of it is done in secret. We don't have a

:27:47. > :27:50.complete picture, but our intelligence is certainly informed

:27:51. > :27:53.that picture. Secondly, the reason why Iran has come back to

:27:54. > :27:58.negotiations is because of the impact of sanctions. We have played

:27:59. > :28:03.an important role in monitoring the sanctions and ensuring that the

:28:04. > :28:11.attempt by Iran to evade the sanctions by using false flag

:28:12. > :28:17.companies or false user certificates for technical equipment, but we are

:28:18. > :28:21.able to disrupt that and work with foreign partners to do so. Thirdly,

:28:22. > :28:26.we have a lot of expertise in the intelligence community, perhaps

:28:27. > :28:29.especially in MI6 about Iran, and that expertise is available to

:28:30. > :28:34.government to understand what is happening in terms of the politics.

:28:35. > :28:38.Very conjugated politics between resident Rohani, the supreme leader,

:28:39. > :28:44.the IR GC, and the various other elements in the complex uranium

:28:45. > :28:50.picture. On Iran, if I may, one of the issues

:28:51. > :28:55.is a serious lack of trust on the international community towards Iran

:28:56. > :28:59.and the reverse. From the point of view of the intelligence agencies,

:29:00. > :29:05.and not just the kingdom, your international allies in this matter,

:29:06. > :29:08.how confident can you be that any commitments Iran might give arising

:29:09. > :29:13.out of successful negotiations would be commitments that could be relied

:29:14. > :29:16.upon? As we all know, the history of the intelligence assessments on

:29:17. > :29:20.weapons of mass destruction elsewhere in the Middle East turned

:29:21. > :29:22.out not to be good. I'm not just referring to the United Kingdom, but

:29:23. > :29:28.the net states and other countries. Is there any reason to be confident

:29:29. > :29:34.that commitments given by Iran to be seen to be enforceable?

:29:35. > :29:36.One thing we can learn from the Iraq experience is that when the

:29:37. > :29:40.International atomic and your authority are involved, that gives a

:29:41. > :29:46.good framework on which to build an understanding. In terms of how you

:29:47. > :29:51.monster sincerity with which commitments are made, we will rely

:29:52. > :29:57.upon organisations like the IEEE to visit, inspect and track what the

:29:58. > :30:04.Iranians are doing. We can do that with issues like the feel cycle. In

:30:05. > :30:09.Richmond facilities, for example. It is more difficult with secret

:30:10. > :30:13.military programmes. Both previous governments like South Africa in

:30:14. > :30:16.1990 or Libya in 2003 dismantled their nuclear weapons programme, we

:30:17. > :30:21.have very clear visibility about what was going on. It will be more

:30:22. > :30:24.difficult in Iran. What is the main lessons you learn

:30:25. > :30:30.from the failures of Iraqi intelligence?

:30:31. > :30:36.The Butler is an expert on this. It is you are asking.

:30:37. > :30:40.We have taken Lord Butler 's report, and it is a bible for us in the way

:30:41. > :30:43.they manage intelligence, assess intelligence, evaluate our agents.

:30:44. > :30:50.There were clearly shortcomings back in 2002, and we have learnt

:30:51. > :30:54.enormously from that. Actually, you point to the Iraq failing, which is

:30:55. > :30:59.very real, but when we look at Syria, Libya, North Korea, the

:31:00. > :31:05.international network of proliferating concerns, the business

:31:06. > :31:13.of proliferation, the record is very good. North Korea, Sir Menzies

:31:14. > :31:18.Campbell. North Korea's nuclear ambitions and

:31:19. > :31:25.ability to provide delivery systems, all that seems unabated. I'm not at

:31:26. > :31:30.asking what resources you devote to North Korea, but may I ask, can I

:31:31. > :31:34.take it it is a country of concern? And it is a country of concern in

:31:35. > :31:43.which cooperative arrangements with other allies are extremely important

:31:44. > :31:48.in allowing judgements to be made? You choose your words with care. Of

:31:49. > :31:53.course North Korea is a very great concern to us and our partners,

:31:54. > :31:59.especially close partners like Japan or the act states, Canada, Australia

:32:00. > :32:07.in that part of the world. North Korea, is not as high and

:32:08. > :32:11.operational priority as us other parts of the world, but we can play

:32:12. > :32:16.a role, we do so, and we share that with the partners must concern.

:32:17. > :32:22.Thank you. The final here are questioning, espionage in the UK.

:32:23. > :32:26.A touch of nostalgia here from an old cold warrior. Does traditional

:32:27. > :32:33.espionage, for example from Russia, still posed a threat that it once

:32:34. > :32:37.did? And bearing in mind one of the more controversial revelations in

:32:38. > :32:44.the press recently, and be true to say that everyone is still spying on

:32:45. > :32:49.everybody else? I'll answer this one fairly briefly.

:32:50. > :32:55.Roundabout 10% of my service's work is devoted to dealing with the

:32:56. > :32:59.security threats that arrive from foreign states, that includes

:33:00. > :33:05.espionage and a bit on counter proliferation and that is relevant

:33:06. > :33:08.in the UK. Most of it is on espionage is by a range of foreign

:33:09. > :33:11.states. It is still a lively business year because there are

:33:12. > :33:15.plenty of countries around the world that take a close interest and an

:33:16. > :33:21.improper one in a security sense, in military affairs here in stealing

:33:22. > :33:26.technology and stealing economic advantage where they can. This is a

:33:27. > :33:27.lively business will stop you mentioned Russia, but there are

:33:28. > :33:52.range countries involved in this. Is there scope for cooperation with

:33:53. > :34:08.Russia? Has that been impeded? Perhaps I could take that one. The

:34:09. > :34:13.government took the series of measures. We have not had the

:34:14. > :34:18.cooperation we sought for. There has been a gap. We have not altered the

:34:19. > :34:45.Russians and they haven't talked to us. We have passed the Olympic flame

:34:46. > :34:51.on from London to so chewy I didn't quite hit an answer about whether F1

:34:52. > :35:05.of spies on others. Question ` ` I didn't quite hear an answer about

:35:06. > :35:11.whether others spy on us. This is the vast bulk of what we deal with.

:35:12. > :35:13.Everything we do is in response to priorities laid down by

:35:14. > :35:19.governments, authorised by government. We have limited

:35:20. > :35:26.resources. There are very few countries where we actually have

:35:27. > :35:31.operations. I am not going to go into detail. What I can tell you is

:35:32. > :35:35.we are targeted against the highest priority challenges this government

:35:36. > :35:40.and this country faces. Everything we do is authorised by ministers.

:35:41. > :35:50.Thank you very much indeed. We are conscious we have not covered

:35:51. > :35:54.everything I would like to thank our three witnesses for the evidence

:35:55. > :35:58.they have given and the manner in which they have given it. We look

:35:59. > :36:04.forward to further the liberations. Can we just one last word?

:36:05. > :36:14.Certainly. You asked about the value of our services. We get great value

:36:15. > :36:21.from the men and women who work for us. These are dedicated, loyal

:36:22. > :36:30.people. They do this work because they believe in protecting the

:36:31. > :36:34.values we have. These people are the backbone of what we do. I am sure we

:36:35. > :36:50.can all happily endorse what you have said. I would be grateful if

:36:51. > :36:54.the audience can remain seated. Remarkable to see Sir Iain Lobban,

:36:55. > :37:04.Andrew Parker and Sir John Sawers giving evidence at Westminster. That

:37:05. > :37:11.session has now finished at Westminster. Frank Gardner was

:37:12. > :37:15.listening to that alongside us. It is a vast area to tackle in 90

:37:16. > :37:26.minutes, Frank. What stood out for you? On the surface of it, it was

:37:27. > :37:31.fairly turgid. There were some very serious issues in there. One of the

:37:32. > :37:38.most important being, let us get to the bottom of Edward Snowden. They

:37:39. > :37:45.were pressed to justify that allegation that the leaks have

:37:46. > :37:48.caused all this damage. They were reluctant to go into detail, at

:37:49. > :37:53.least in front of the cameras. One thing they did give away was they

:37:54. > :37:59.said they have effectively intercepted terrorist communications

:38:00. > :38:05.in, to use their words, the Middle East, South Asia and Afghanistan,

:38:06. > :38:09.work their targets are discussing ways of how to use different

:38:10. > :38:14.communications. They say that is making their job that much harder.

:38:15. > :38:27.The committee was, I think, more robust than it has been in the past.

:38:28. > :38:33.One of the things they said, the GCHQ boss, a man we have never seen

:38:34. > :38:38.in public before, he said, we don't want to delve into innocent e`mails

:38:39. > :38:43.and phone calls, I don't think secret means a sinister. The problem

:38:44. > :38:48.is, they are so secretive, and they have put a lid on everything, they

:38:49. > :38:53.have almost cried wolf and people are not sure how much of this to

:38:54. > :38:58.believe and trust. There was a fascinating insight from Sir John

:38:59. > :39:01.Sawers, the MI6 boss, when he was being asked about difficult

:39:02. > :39:04.decisions working with foreign governments and cooperating with

:39:05. > :39:12.governments that have got perhaps not the same human rights standards

:39:13. > :39:15.as this country, and he said agents overseas will wake up the Foreign

:39:16. > :39:21.Secretary in the middle of the night. You make the point they did

:39:22. > :39:27.not want to go into much detail about the impact of Edward

:39:28. > :39:31.Snowden's leaks. Is it safe to a shame there will be plenty of

:39:32. > :39:34.discussion behind closed doors about that? Will a career to be told more

:39:35. > :39:40.about what they perceive to be the damage? They will. Whether it will

:39:41. > :39:48.be enough to satisfy critics, I am not sure. The committee had been

:39:49. > :39:57.accused of missing quite a few things in the past. They did not put

:39:58. > :40:13.deeply enough about the 7/7 bombings. They had to go back and do

:40:14. > :40:20.more questions. There were more times when more questions should

:40:21. > :40:26.have been asked. The IOC committee now has new powers. It is no longer

:40:27. > :40:36.pointed just by Number Ten. That is a good thing. It is still perceived

:40:37. > :40:42.as a creature of the establishment. Sir Malcolm Rifkind was trying very

:40:43. > :40:49.hard to be robust. He was Foreign Secretary, the man who had overall

:40:50. > :40:54.responsibility under Sir John Major. He had responsibility for GCHQ. He

:40:55. > :40:59.is not like a judge who comes in from outside. Still a lot of

:41:00. > :41:03.questions. I hope they do ask them. I can understand why they do not

:41:04. > :41:10.want to say some things in public. What we take away from this? They

:41:11. > :41:17.kept saying they were public servants, and people are doing it to

:41:18. > :41:27.defend this country. That is their message. And also the fact this was

:41:28. > :41:34.not a fishing exercise. The big question is, is the legal framework

:41:35. > :41:41.adequate, bearing in mind what they are up against now? We did not get

:41:42. > :41:45.an answer. I will give you an answer, and the answer is no, it

:41:46. > :41:54.clearly isn't, because technology is moving so fast. It is a $3 trillion

:41:55. > :42:02.business. The head of GCHQ said the Internet is a challenge for them.

:42:03. > :42:06.There are always going to be prone to people wanting to work outside

:42:07. > :42:17.once they have worked there. MI5 was asked, what about all these links.

:42:18. > :42:22.He said it was much less likely to happen here than in the United

:42:23. > :42:27.States. They were asked, can you give a guarantee that your

:42:28. > :42:34.operations are conducted within the British legal framework, and I think

:42:35. > :42:41.it was the head of GCHQ who said yes, and I speak for the agencies.

:42:42. > :42:43.Only they know that. `the problem is the legal framework has not caught

:42:44. > :42:49.up with technology, and there is still a way to go on that. They need

:42:50. > :42:59.to review it. Frank, thank you very much. Fascinating. It was really

:43:00. > :43:08.interesting. Did you see Judi Dench at the back? I did, it was Margaret

:43:09. > :43:11.Beckett, wasn't it? It was. We will turn our attention and take a look

:43:12. > :43:15.at everything else that has been happening in the news today. And the

:43:16. > :43:19.literary jury is considering its verdict in the court`martial of

:43:20. > :43:23.three Royal Marines. All three deny murdering an Afghan insurgent as he

:43:24. > :43:32.lay badly wounded in a field two years ago. Duncan, explain what has

:43:33. > :43:37.been happening. What we are waiting for, Jane, other

:43:38. > :43:43.verdicts to come back. All three Marines face murder charges. The

:43:44. > :43:50.military board went out this morning. We do not know whether they

:43:51. > :43:51.will come back today or tomorrow. Seven members on that panel deciding