The Iraq Inquiry

:00:00. > :00:00.judgment than there was in the run-up to the Iraq war. We wait now

:00:00. > :00:15.for Sir John Chilcot to deliver his findings in the next few minutes.

:00:16. > :00:20.I'm Ben Brown in Westminster - where Sir John Chilcot will finally

:00:21. > :00:22.deliver his long-awaited report into the Iraq War

:00:23. > :00:27.It will pass judgement on Britain's decision to join the war to topple

:00:28. > :00:31.Saddam Hussein more than 13 years ago.

:00:32. > :00:35.179 Britons lost their lives in the Iraq War -

:00:36. > :00:40.the families of those killed will be giving their reaction

:00:41. > :00:42.Individuals and institutions are expected to be criticised,

:00:43. > :00:50.among them the then Prime Minister Tony Blair.

:00:51. > :00:55.Sir John Chilcot will set out his findings in full in a moment -

:00:56. > :00:58.last night he said he hoped greater care would be taken before

:00:59. > :01:04.the country goes to war again in the future.

:01:05. > :01:07.This is the scene now inside the building behind me -

:01:08. > :01:14.where Sir John Chilcot is about to speak.

:01:15. > :01:29.outside is a demonstration by Stop the War, who always opposed the war

:01:30. > :01:49.and they are protesting now outside Westminster.

:01:50. > :01:51.More than 13 years after the Iraq war began -

:01:52. > :01:59.Sir John Chilcot is preparing to deliver his report into how

:02:00. > :02:04.the decision was taken for Britain to join the the United States

:02:05. > :02:05.in intervening against Saddam Hussein.

:02:06. > :02:09.Tens of thousands of Iraqis died - along with 179 UK service personnel.

:02:10. > :02:11.Claims that the Iraqi leader had weapons of mass destruction proved

:02:12. > :02:14.unfounded - but the then Prime Minister Tony Blair has said

:02:15. > :02:25.he does not regret removing a brutal dictator.

:02:26. > :02:35.It was one of the most controversial and the size of wars or the British

:02:36. > :02:38.yesterday. Perhaps not since the Suez conflict has a conflict so

:02:39. > :02:40.controversial. My colleague Annita McVeigh

:02:41. > :02:42.is at the start of the Stop the War Demonstration

:02:43. > :02:54.in Parliament Square. I'm just either the opposite Central

:02:55. > :02:58.Hall in Westminster where the Stop the War coalition is holding this

:02:59. > :03:04.demonstration to coincide with the publication of the Chilcot Report.

:03:05. > :03:09.Behind me on that platform there has been a naming of the dead ceremony

:03:10. > :03:15.with each speaker reading out the names of ten people killed in the

:03:16. > :03:23.Iraq war, five but soldiers as well as five Iraqi nationals. -- five

:03:24. > :03:28.British soldiers. In 2000 when Stop the War organised the biggest

:03:29. > :03:34.demonstration in history to try and oppose the UK becoming involved in

:03:35. > :03:38.the Iraq war as now, 13 years later, 70 years since the then Prime

:03:39. > :03:43.Minister Gordon Brown ordered the Chilcot Report they are waiting for

:03:44. > :03:46.its findings and asking the question is will this be a moment of truth?

:03:47. > :03:58.-- seven years since. Very noisy here at Westminster as we

:03:59. > :04:06.wait to hear from Sir John chilcot. Let's talk to Doctor John Davies.

:04:07. > :04:11.You have specialised in studying the Blair Government. There has been

:04:12. > :04:16.such a long wait for this report, seven years, and we will finally

:04:17. > :04:22.hear it. A momentous day. It is the third of the big investigations into

:04:23. > :04:31.Iraq and layer. Butler, half-hearted about this is by far the biggest.

:04:32. > :04:35.2.5 million words. Some people will see almost too comprehensive. Very

:04:36. > :04:40.different to the inquest into the Falklands War which was more to the

:04:41. > :04:48.points and more in lessons to learn exercise. And the families have huge

:04:49. > :04:54.expectations, many of whom are very angry and have said this could be a

:04:55. > :04:59.whitewash and Tony Blair is a war criminal. They have high

:05:00. > :05:04.expectations. Sir John chilcot has said he will try to give them some

:05:05. > :05:08.of the answers they are looking for. And hotter and hotter and were very

:05:09. > :05:15.good at Newport but this is much bigger. I am looking for -- Butler

:05:16. > :05:23.and hotter. I am looking for a focus on the UK and US relationship and

:05:24. > :05:27.also, we heard in the enquiry civil servant versus civil servant so it

:05:28. > :05:33.will be intriguing to find out how much resistance that was within the

:05:34. > :05:38.system. And the intelligence received in the build up that

:05:39. > :05:44.convinced Tony Blair there were weapons of mass destruction. That is

:05:45. > :05:47.crucial because the failures of that intelligence and to check and

:05:48. > :05:54.double-check the sources of what proved to be wrong intelligence. I

:05:55. > :05:58.do not question the integrity of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet or the

:05:59. > :06:05.intelligence services. But they got things wrong. There will be greater

:06:06. > :06:08.focus on the intelligence failures. It is very interesting to see the

:06:09. > :06:13.division in the intelligence services. As one intelligence

:06:14. > :06:19.officer in this room said secret intelligence or what underdelivered.

:06:20. > :06:28.It will be interesting to see the nuts and bolts. -- overpromised and

:06:29. > :06:34.underdelivered. Was not getting a second resolution from the UN

:06:35. > :06:39.critical? It'll very surprising if a man who was on the Butler enquiry,

:06:40. > :06:46.Sir John Chilcot, comes to a different conclusion. The report

:06:47. > :06:51.will look at the aftermath and the failures and planning and the

:06:52. > :06:55.quagmire we are still in Iraq. But also the feelings of equipment for

:06:56. > :06:59.British troops which is one of the things the families are very

:07:00. > :07:06.interested in. Such as the land Rovers are so many British service

:07:07. > :07:11.person died in. Questions need to be asked and people aren't responsible

:07:12. > :07:18.for these things... I think Sir John Chilcot is walking in now to deliver

:07:19. > :07:30.his comments. We expect it to last roughly half an hour. Us listen in.

:07:31. > :07:35.We would like to welcome you to the Queen Elizabeth II centre. I should

:07:36. > :07:40.record how much we appreciate the support provided by the Centre and

:07:41. > :07:47.its staff during our public hearings and again today. Before I begin my

:07:48. > :07:52.statement perhaps we should all recall the continuing suffering of

:07:53. > :07:56.innocent people in Iraq. And those who have been killed and injured in

:07:57. > :08:05.terrorist attacks, including the latest attack last Sunday, which

:08:06. > :08:12.killed more than 250 people. We were appointed to consider the UK's

:08:13. > :08:19.policy on Iraq from 2001 until 2009. And to identify lessons for the

:08:20. > :08:26.future. Our report will be published on enquiry's website after I have

:08:27. > :08:31.finished speaking. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World

:08:32. > :08:37.War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and a full-scale

:08:38. > :08:43.occupation of a sovereign states. That was the decision of the utmost

:08:44. > :08:47.gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who

:08:48. > :08:52.have attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed until many of his own

:08:53. > :08:57.people and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN

:08:58. > :09:04.security council. But the questions for the enquiry work, whether it was

:09:05. > :09:12.right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003? And whether the UK

:09:13. > :09:17.could and should have been better prepared for what follows? We have

:09:18. > :09:25.concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the

:09:26. > :09:33.peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at

:09:34. > :09:36.that time was not a last resort. We have also concluded that the

:09:37. > :09:42.judgment about the severity of the threats posed by Iraq's weapons of

:09:43. > :09:48.mass destruction is, WMD, were presented with the certainty that

:09:49. > :09:52.was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the

:09:53. > :09:57.invasion were underestimated, the planning and preparation for Iraq

:09:58. > :10:05.after Saddam Hussein were very inadequate. The Government fails to

:10:06. > :10:13.achieve its stated objectives. I want to set out some of the key

:10:14. > :10:18.point in the report. First, the formal decision to invade Iraq, if

:10:19. > :10:25.Saddam did not accept the US ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48

:10:26. > :10:29.hours was taken by Cabinet on March the 17th 2003. Parliament voted the

:10:30. > :10:35.following day to support the decision. The decision was shaped by

:10:36. > :10:41.key choices made by Mr Blair's Government over the previous 18

:10:42. > :10:47.months. I will now briefly set these out. After the attacks on September

:10:48. > :10:54.11 2001 Mr Blair urged President Bush not to take hasty action on

:10:55. > :11:01.Iraq. By early December US policy had begun to shift and Mr Blair

:11:02. > :11:07.suggested the US and the UK should work on what he described as, a

:11:08. > :11:14.clever strategy for regime change in Iraq which would build over time.

:11:15. > :11:22.When Mr Blair met President Bush in Texas in early April 2002 the formal

:11:23. > :11:29.policy was still to contain Saddam Hussein. By then there have been a

:11:30. > :11:33.profound change in the UK's thinking. The joint intelligence

:11:34. > :11:40.committee has concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without

:11:41. > :11:46.an invasion. The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that

:11:47. > :11:51.had to be dealt with, it had to disarm or be disarmed. That implied

:11:52. > :11:57.the use of force if Iraq did not comply. An internal contingency

:11:58. > :12:05.planning for a large contribution to a military invasion had begun. At

:12:06. > :12:09.Crawford, Mr Blair sought a partnership as our way of

:12:10. > :12:17.influencing Mr Bush. He proposed a UN ultimatum to Iraq to readmit

:12:18. > :12:22.inspectors or face the consequences. On July the 28th Mr Blair wrote to

:12:23. > :12:29.President Bush with an assurance that he would be with him, whatever.

:12:30. > :12:34.But if the US wanted the coalition for military action changes would be

:12:35. > :12:43.needed in three key areas, these were, progress on the middle east

:12:44. > :12:51.peace process, UN authority and a shift in public opinion in the UK,

:12:52. > :12:55.Europe and the Arab world. Mr Blair also pointed out there would be a

:12:56. > :13:04.need to come at to Iraq for the long-term. That -- comics to Iraq.

:13:05. > :13:10.Mr Blair and Mr Straw urged the US to take the issue back to the UN. On

:13:11. > :13:17.September the 7th President Bush decided to to do so. On November the

:13:18. > :13:23.8th of resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by the security Council.

:13:24. > :13:29.It gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face serious consequences.

:13:30. > :13:35.It provided for any further breaches by Iraq to be reported to the

:13:36. > :13:42.security Council for assessment. The weapons inspectors returned to Iraq

:13:43. > :13:46.later that month. During December, however, President Bush decided that

:13:47. > :13:54.inspectors would not achieve the desired result and the US would take

:13:55. > :13:58.military action in early 2003. At the end of January Mr Blair accepted

:13:59. > :14:08.the US timetable for military action by mid March, having also concluded

:14:09. > :14:14.the likelihood was war. To help Mr Blair President Bush agreed to seek

:14:15. > :14:17.a further UN resolution, the second resolution. Determining Iraq have

:14:18. > :14:24.failed to take its final opportunity to comply with its obligations. By

:14:25. > :14:28.March the 12th it was clear there was no chance of securing a majority

:14:29. > :14:38.support for a second resolution before the US military action.

:14:39. > :14:42.Without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the

:14:43. > :14:47.inspectors that Iraq was failing to cooperate, and they could not carry

:14:48. > :14:50.out the task, most members of the security Council could not be

:14:51. > :14:54.convinced that peaceful options to disarm Iraq had been exhausted for

:14:55. > :15:03.them and military action was justified. . Mr Blair and Mr Straw

:15:04. > :15:08.blamed France for the impasse in the UN and claimed the UK Government was

:15:09. > :15:11.acting on behalf of the international community to uphold

:15:12. > :15:19.the authority of the security Council. In the absence of a

:15:20. > :15:23.majority in support of military action we consider the UK was in

:15:24. > :15:30.fact undermining the security council's authority. Second, the

:15:31. > :15:37.enquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was illegal.

:15:38. > :15:41.That could only be resolved by a properly constituted an

:15:42. > :15:47.internationally recognised court. We however have concluded the

:15:48. > :15:51.circumstances in which it was decided there was a legal basis for

:15:52. > :16:00.UK military action were far from satisfactory. In mid-January 2003

:16:01. > :16:04.Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair that a further security Council resolution

:16:05. > :16:10.would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action. He

:16:11. > :16:16.did not advise number ten and told the end of February that while a

:16:17. > :16:19.second resolution would be preferable, a reasonable case could

:16:20. > :16:28.be made that resolution 1441 was sufficient. He said that out and

:16:29. > :16:33.written advice on March the seven. -- heat set that out. The military

:16:34. > :16:39.and the civil servant both asked for more clarity of force would be

:16:40. > :16:46.legal. Lord Goldsmith advised the better view was there was, on

:16:47. > :16:52.balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further

:16:53. > :16:58.security Council resolution. On March the 14th he asked Mr Blair to

:16:59. > :17:02.confirm that Iraq had committed further material breaches, as

:17:03. > :17:08.specified in a resolution 1441. Mr Blair did so the next day. However,

:17:09. > :17:15.the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear.

:17:16. > :17:19.Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been

:17:20. > :17:24.asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a

:17:25. > :17:30.majority in the security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision. This

:17:31. > :17:34.is one of a number of occasions identified by the enquiry when a

:17:35. > :17:43.policy should have been considered by a cabinet committee and then

:17:44. > :17:47.discussed by Cabinet itself. I want to address the assessment of Iraq's

:17:48. > :17:53.weapons of mass destruction and how they were presented to support the

:17:54. > :17:59.case for action. There was an ingrained belief in the UK policy

:18:00. > :18:04.and intelligence communities that Iraq had retained some chemical and

:18:05. > :18:09.biological capabilities. It was determined to preserve and if

:18:10. > :18:16.possible enhance and in the future to acquire a nuclear capability. And

:18:17. > :18:22.it was able to conceal its activities from the UN inspectors.

:18:23. > :18:28.In the House of Commons on September the 24th 2002, Mr Blair presented

:18:29. > :18:32.Iraq's past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the

:18:33. > :18:39.security than the Mac said ability of the potential threat from Iraq's

:18:40. > :18:46.WMD. He said, at some point in the future that Britain would become a

:18:47. > :18:50.reality. The judgments -- that threat would become a reality. The

:18:51. > :18:53.judgments about the dossier published in the statement were

:18:54. > :18:58.presented with a certainty that was not justified. The joint

:18:59. > :19:03.intelligence committee should have made clear to Mr Blair the assessed

:19:04. > :19:08.intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq had

:19:09. > :19:12.continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts

:19:13. > :19:21.to develop nuclear weapons continued. The committee has also

:19:22. > :19:25.judged that as long as sanctions remain effective Iraq could not

:19:26. > :19:33.develop a nuclear weapons and it would take several years to develop

:19:34. > :19:39.and deploy long-range missiles. Any House of Commons the 18th 2003 Mr

:19:40. > :19:44.Blair stated he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in

:19:45. > :19:50.possession of WMD was, in real and present danger to Britain and its

:19:51. > :19:55.national security. And the threat from Saddam Hussein's Arsenal could

:19:56. > :20:02.not be contained and it posed a clear danger to British citizens. Mr

:20:03. > :20:06.Blair had been warned that military action would increase the threat

:20:07. > :20:14.from Al-Qaeda to the UK and UK interests. He had also been warned

:20:15. > :20:16.that an invasion might lead to Iraq's weapons and capabilities

:20:17. > :20:23.being transferred into the hands of terrorists. The Government's

:20:24. > :20:26.strategy reflected its confidence in the joint intelligence committee's

:20:27. > :20:34.assessments. Those assessments provided the benchmark against which

:20:35. > :20:41.Iraq's conduct and denials and the reports of the inspectors were

:20:42. > :20:47.judged. As late as March the 17th 2003 Mr Blair was being advised by

:20:48. > :20:49.the chairman of the joint intelligence committee that Iraq

:20:50. > :20:56.possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them

:20:57. > :21:01.and the capacity to produce them. He was also told the evidence pointed

:21:02. > :21:09.to Saddam Hussein's view that the capability was military to neglect

:21:10. > :21:14.-- militarily significant and letters on devices are built up

:21:15. > :21:18.further. It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of

:21:19. > :21:27.flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged and they

:21:28. > :21:33.should have been. The findings on Iraq's WMD capabilities set out in

:21:34. > :21:37.the report of the Iraq survey group in October 2004 were significant.

:21:38. > :21:43.But they did not support the invasion statements by the UK

:21:44. > :21:51.Government which are focused on Iraq's current capabilities --

:21:52. > :21:55.summit-mac invasion statement. The work described as vast stocks and an

:21:56. > :21:58.urgent and growing effect. In response to those findings Mr Blair

:21:59. > :22:02.told the House of Commons that although Iraq might not have had

:22:03. > :22:11.stockpiles of deployable weapons Saddam Hussein retained the intent

:22:12. > :22:16.and capability and was in breach of United Nations obligations. That was

:22:17. > :22:22.not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before

:22:23. > :22:27.the conflict. In our report we have identified a number of lessons to

:22:28. > :22:34.inform the way in which intelligence may be used publicly for in the

:22:35. > :22:38.future to support Government policy. Fourth, I want to address the

:22:39. > :22:47.shortcomings in planning and preparation. The British military

:22:48. > :22:54.contribution was not settled in 2003 when Mr Blair and Mr hoon agreed the

:22:55. > :22:59.proposals for the increase in the number of brigades to be deployed

:23:00. > :23:05.and they would operate in southern, not northern Iraq. There was little

:23:06. > :23:08.time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly

:23:09. > :23:12.identified not for the exposed to ministers. The resulting in

:23:13. > :23:22.Quack-mac shortfalls are addressed in the report. -- resulting

:23:23. > :23:29.equipment shortfalls. Despite saying the Cabinet would discuss the

:23:30. > :23:33.military contributions they did not discuss their implications. In early

:23:34. > :23:39.January 2003 when the Government published its objectives for

:23:40. > :23:44.post-conflict Iraq it intended the interim post-conflict administration

:23:45. > :23:50.should be UN legs. By March 2003 were having failed to persuade the

:23:51. > :23:55.US of the advantages of the UN led administration, the Government had

:23:56. > :24:00.set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN

:24:01. > :24:07.organisation of a coalition led interim administration. When the

:24:08. > :24:14.invasion began UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a

:24:15. > :24:17.well executed US led and UN authorised operation in the

:24:18. > :24:24.relatively benign security environments. Mr Blair told the

:24:25. > :24:27.enquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the

:24:28. > :24:35.invasion could not have been knowing in advance. We do not agree that

:24:36. > :24:43.hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active

:24:44. > :24:48.everyday in pursuit of its interests, regional instability and

:24:49. > :24:55.Al-Qaeda activity were each explicitly identified. -- Iranians

:24:56. > :25:01.pursuit of interests. Ministers were aware of the inadequacy of US plans

:25:02. > :25:07.and concern about the inability to exert significant influence on US

:25:08. > :25:12.planning. Mr Blair eventually succeeded only in the narrow goal of

:25:13. > :25:18.securing President Bush's agreement that there should be UN

:25:19. > :25:23.authorisation of the post-conflict role. Furthermore, he did not

:25:24. > :25:31.establish clear ministerial oversight of UK planning and

:25:32. > :25:38.preparation. He did not ensure there was a flexible, realistic and fully

:25:39. > :25:45.resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions

:25:46. > :25:49.and addressed the known risks. The failures in the planning and

:25:50. > :25:58.preparation continued to have an effect after the invasion. That

:25:59. > :26:03.brings me to the Government's failure to achieve the objectives it

:26:04. > :26:09.set itself in Iraq. The Armed Forces fought a successful military

:26:10. > :26:13.campaign which took Basra and help to achieve the departure of Saddam

:26:14. > :26:21.Hussein and the fall of Baghdad is in less than one month. Service

:26:22. > :26:28.personnel, said were deployed to Iraq, and Iraqis who worked for the

:26:29. > :26:36.UK showed great courage in the face of considerable risk. -- civilians

:26:37. > :26:41.deployed to Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of

:26:42. > :26:46.the conflict in Iraq, many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish

:26:47. > :26:55.for many families, including those here today. The invasion and

:26:56. > :27:03.subsequent instability in Iraq had by July 2009 also resulted in the

:27:04. > :27:09.deaths of at least 150,000 Iraqis and probably many more. Most of them

:27:10. > :27:18.civilians. More than 1 million people were displaced. The people of

:27:19. > :27:25.Iraq have suffered greatly. The vision for Iraq and its people

:27:26. > :27:31.issued by the US, UK, Spain and Portugal at the summit on March the

:27:32. > :27:35.16th 2003 included a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people

:27:36. > :27:42.build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours. The

:27:43. > :27:48.declaration look forward to a united Iraq in which its people would enjoy

:27:49. > :27:52.security, freedom, prosperity and equality. But a Government that

:27:53. > :28:00.would uphold human rights and the rule of law. They would be

:28:01. > :28:06.cornerstones of democracy. We have considered the post-conflict period

:28:07. > :28:11.in Iraq in great detail. Including efforts to reconstruct the country

:28:12. > :28:18.and rebuild the security services. In this short statement I can only

:28:19. > :28:24.address a a few key points. After the invasion the UK and the US

:28:25. > :28:26.became joint occupying powers. For the year that followed Iraq was

:28:27. > :28:37.governed by the Cornish and provisional authority -- coalition

:28:38. > :28:41.provisional authority. The UK struggle to have a decisive effect

:28:42. > :28:45.on policy. The Government's reparations bill to take account of

:28:46. > :28:52.the magnitude of the task of stabilising and ministering and

:28:53. > :29:01.reconstructing Iraq and of the responsibilities which were likely

:29:02. > :29:06.to fall to the UK. The UK to particular responsibility for four

:29:07. > :29:12.provinces in the south-east. It did so without a formal ministerial

:29:13. > :29:15.decision and without ensuring acts had the necessary military and

:29:16. > :29:23.civilian capabilities to discharge its obligations, including,

:29:24. > :29:27.crucially, to provide security. The scale of the UK effort in

:29:28. > :29:34.post-conflict Iraq never match the scale of the challenge. Whitehall

:29:35. > :29:40.departments and their ministers failed to put collective weight

:29:41. > :29:45.behind the task. In practice, the UK's most consistent strategic

:29:46. > :29:52.objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed

:29:53. > :29:59.forces. The security situation in both Baghdad and the south-east

:30:00. > :30:05.began to deteriorate soon after the invasion. We have found the Ministry

:30:06. > :30:10.of Defence was slow in responding to the threat from improvised explosive

:30:11. > :30:13.devices and that delays in providing adequate medium which protect the

:30:14. > :30:19.patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated. It is not clear which

:30:20. > :30:23.person or department within the Ministry of Defence was responsible

:30:24. > :30:25.for identifying and articulating such capability gaps, but it should

:30:26. > :30:41.have been. in all from 2006, the United Kingdom

:30:42. > :30:47.military was conducting two distinct military campaigns in Iraq and

:30:48. > :31:01.Afghanistan. It did not have significant resources to do such.

:31:02. > :31:07.For example, the employment to Afghanistan without essential

:31:08. > :31:19.equipment, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance. By

:31:20. > :31:23.2007, militia dominance in Basra meant United Kingdom commanders were

:31:24. > :31:37.unable to challenge, led to the United Kingdom exchanging detainee

:31:38. > :31:45.releases in exchange for non-targeting of its personnel. It

:31:46. > :31:53.was a humiliating outcome, but one which the military decided was the

:31:54. > :31:59.best option. We have sought to set out the government actions in Iraq.

:32:00. > :32:07.The evidence is there for all to see. The account of an intervention

:32:08. > :32:14.which went badly wrong. The consequences of that are still felt

:32:15. > :32:20.today. It is the unanimous view that military action in Iraq may have

:32:21. > :32:29.been necessary at some point, but in March 2003, there was no imminent

:32:30. > :32:34.threat. The strategy of containment could have been continued for some

:32:35. > :32:41.time. The majority of the Security Council supported continuing United

:32:42. > :32:47.Nations inspections. Military intervention elsewhere may be

:32:48. > :32:53.required in the future. A vital purpose of the enquiry is to find

:32:54. > :33:03.out what lessons has to be learned from this experience and Eric.

:33:04. > :33:14.Someone about the management of relations with other countries,

:33:15. > :33:21.particularly the United States. The United Kingdom 's relationship with

:33:22. > :33:27.the United States has to be the weight of honest disagreement. It

:33:28. > :33:36.not offer unconditional support where our interests differ. Other

:33:37. > :33:40.interests also are collecting the material discussion, which ask for

:33:41. > :33:47.Frank and informed debate and challenge. Risks need to be a cysts

:33:48. > :33:56.and a realistic strategy has to be set out. It is vital that there is

:33:57. > :34:05.also ministerial leadership. There is also the need to ensure both

:34:06. > :34:14.civilian and military arms of government are we are of the tasks.

:34:15. > :34:24.Above all, all aspects need to be calculated, debated and challenge.

:34:25. > :34:32.When decisions are made commonly need to be implemented thoroughly.

:34:33. > :34:36.Sadly, this was not always the case with the conflict in Iraq. In

:34:37. > :34:42.conclusion, I would like to thank my colleagues. I would like to thank

:34:43. > :34:49.them for their commitment to this difficult task. I also want to pay

:34:50. > :34:55.tribute to Sir Martin Gilbert, who died last year. He was one of the

:34:56. > :35:07.pre-eminent historians. He brought perspective to our work. We have

:35:08. > :35:19.missed him greatly. We miss him as a colleague and a friend.

:35:20. > :35:27.There was the delivery of the long-awaited report. Seven years it

:35:28. > :35:34.has taken him and his team. They have come up with the final verdict

:35:35. > :35:41.on the British involvement in the conflict in Iraq. The delay was

:35:42. > :35:50.severely criticised. But he cannot be criticised for not being fun. 2.6

:35:51. > :35:58.million warrants in the report. We can talk to our assistant political

:35:59. > :36:02.editor. The report has been embargoed until this point. But you

:36:03. > :36:09.have been reading it since eight o'clock this morning. A stronger

:36:10. > :36:22.criticism of the Tony Blair government than maybe some people

:36:23. > :36:25.were expecting? It seems to be the pronunciation of virtually every

:36:26. > :36:36.aspect of the war. Going from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, the

:36:37. > :36:44.idea that he had weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence

:36:45. > :36:50.provided by the security services. Right up until the point we're the

:36:51. > :36:53.troops were sent into Iraq without the proper equipment, to the

:36:54. > :37:00.post-war planning. But what a thing is most striking is one central

:37:01. > :37:07.figure driving through all of this is Tony Blair. It is of a man who

:37:08. > :37:24.was convinced many months before the conflict that Saddam Hussein had to

:37:25. > :37:30.be removed. In the report, it says in September 2001 he is already

:37:31. > :37:38.sending memos to President Bush about the need for change in Iraq.

:37:39. > :37:45.At that point, he is looking at possibly the idea of assisting some

:37:46. > :37:54.sort of raising the country. He then met the president in April 2002 were

:37:55. > :38:03.the two men basically from up the military options. Then, we see this

:38:04. > :38:07.memo that Tony Blair sent to him. He is talking directly to the president

:38:08. > :38:23.and says we will be with you whatever. He says they will be with

:38:24. > :38:34.you whatever. This is where the planning and in most difficult.

:38:35. > :38:37.He goes on to say, "This is the moment to assess

:38:38. > :38:40.The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet.

:38:41. > :38:42.This is not Kosovo, this is not Afghanistan.

:38:43. > :38:56.In three months before the war, Tony Blair, it's too flying if necessary

:38:57. > :39:02.three divisions to the south of Iraq and he says to President Bush that

:39:03. > :39:09.the military option is now the likeliest Op option. The report

:39:10. > :39:23.suggests that Tony Blair was driving this process. Although it does not

:39:24. > :39:28.blame Tony Blair, it certainly has the ammunition, in many peoples eyes

:39:29. > :39:30.for it to do that. Thank you for picking out some of the most

:39:31. > :39:39.important wanes. Given the sheer size of the report,

:39:40. > :39:42.it is going to take days, maybe even weeks, to digest its full

:39:43. > :39:45.contents, but here are some Sir John Chilcot has concluded

:39:46. > :39:49.that the circumstances in which it was decided

:39:50. > :39:51.that there was a legal basis for UK military action

:39:52. > :39:56.were far from satisfactory. It also says that the judgements

:39:57. > :39:58.about the severity of threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass

:39:59. > :40:01.destruction were presented with With regard to the options

:40:02. > :40:09.on the table for dealing with Iraq, the report says that the UK chose

:40:10. > :40:12.to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament

:40:13. > :40:16.had been exhausted and that military action at that time

:40:17. > :40:26.was not a last resort. Also released in the report

:40:27. > :40:30.is a memo, written by Tony Blair to President Bush, on the 28 July,

:40:31. > :40:32.2002, eight months In the memo, entitled

:40:33. > :40:40.Note On Iraq, Tony Blair says, He goes on to say, "This

:40:41. > :40:48.is the moment to assess The planning on this and

:40:49. > :40:51.the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo,

:40:52. > :40:53.this is not Afghanistan. Further down the six-page memo,

:40:54. > :41:08.he goes on to say how he feels that, "Getting rid of Saddam

:41:09. > :41:10.is the right thing to do". He says that, while he could be

:41:11. > :41:13.contained, the containment could be risky, as they had already

:41:14. > :41:29.learned with Al-Qaeda. It is fascinating just read that one

:41:30. > :41:36.memo alone from 2002. We can now discuss this with Doctor John

:41:37. > :41:42.Davidson from Kings College and an expert on international law. What is

:41:43. > :41:50.your view about the findings in terms of the legal basis for the

:41:51. > :42:02.conflict itself? I have just seen the summary. He is basically seeing

:42:03. > :42:07.that the way in which legal advice was given was unsatisfactory. He

:42:08. > :42:11.said the always fitted around the policy rather than the other way

:42:12. > :42:17.around than there serious concerns. It was pretty strong. Some of the

:42:18. > :42:25.protesters jeer want Tony Blair to be prosecuted by some sort of war

:42:26. > :42:34.crimes tribunal? Is there anything which make an ammunition to that? He

:42:35. > :42:41.has not addressed the legality or otherwise of the conflict. They were

:42:42. > :42:46.not in a position to do that is the not lawyers. It is the question as

:42:47. > :42:58.to whether the way in which Tony Blair got advice was satisfactory.

:42:59. > :43:07.He has concluded that was not. It is how Sir John explains the changes

:43:08. > :43:11.which took place. At first, it was totally illegal without a United

:43:12. > :43:19.Nations resolution. A few months later, that seems to have changed. A

:43:20. > :43:25.total change of position. I will build looking for the detail of that

:43:26. > :43:33.position. You are an expert on the Tony Blair government. This memo

:43:34. > :43:39.that he wrote in 2002 with the President Bush, I will be with you

:43:40. > :43:46.whatever. It suggests it was a personal decision, as opposed to a

:43:47. > :44:00.Cabinet decision. One man cannot take a country to war. That Wayne, I

:44:01. > :44:11.will be with you forever -- whatever, it is not anything new.

:44:12. > :44:14.The Parliamentary vote for a mistaken, something which no

:44:15. > :44:26.previous Prime Minister would have themselves through. The Foreign

:44:27. > :44:30.Secretary at the time, none of them seem to be particularly surprised. I

:44:31. > :44:36.got the impression they all knew exactly where Tony Blair

:44:37. > :44:41.Ystradgynlais. For me, there is nothing new in that particular line.

:44:42. > :44:50.It is something we suspected all along. What is different is that you

:44:51. > :45:00.are expressing a view and a system which is not presidential. Those

:45:01. > :45:07.memo should have been shared with the Cabinet and whatnot. The legal

:45:08. > :45:15.advice given was not shared with the Cabinet, which it should have been.

:45:16. > :45:20.It brings even more uncertainty and the Cabinet could see that they

:45:21. > :45:33.voted on the basis of insufficient evidence. This is of huge magnitude,

:45:34. > :45:40.taking a country to war. Every Prime Minister decides whether to release

:45:41. > :45:49.information hold it back. While we can debate this, it is not new for

:45:50. > :45:56.Prime Minister to act on their own. And keel laying is that during the

:45:57. > :46:04.invasion, if only peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted,

:46:05. > :46:14.it would be understandable, but this gives rise to the idea that this was

:46:15. > :46:22.a last resort. The report says it was certainly not a last resort. It

:46:23. > :46:28.underwent the United Nations Security Council. It brings back to

:46:29. > :46:38.question as to what the Prime Minister shared with the Cabinet. We

:46:39. > :46:44.have a ministerial system which says they will provide a certain amount

:46:45. > :46:53.of information and that was information was not provided. The

:46:54. > :46:56.ministerial code, the Prime Minister should share everything? But every

:46:57. > :47:03.Prime Minister chooses what they want to share them what they do not.

:47:04. > :47:09.We will just pause a moment to see pictures of some of the families of

:47:10. > :47:15.the 179 servicemen and women killed in Iraq. We will hear the reaction

:47:16. > :47:20.to the report. They are going to have a news conference in just a few

:47:21. > :47:25.minutes. There will be interesting to hear their reaction. Some of them

:47:26. > :47:28.had already said they feared it would be a whitewash. Many of the

:47:29. > :47:33.journalists went through some of the findings and believe it is stronger

:47:34. > :47:39.than mate been expected. Very interesting to hear what the family

:47:40. > :47:46.'s reaction to this is. As far as delays in providing military

:47:47. > :47:51.equipment to replace the controversial snatch land Rovers.

:47:52. > :47:55.The report said the delays could not have been tolerated.

:47:56. > :47:58.My colleague Annita McVeigh is at the start of the Stop The War

:47:59. > :48:17.You have probably been able to hear the protesters in the background.

:48:18. > :48:21.What is the scene. The demonstrators are saying they want to make

:48:22. > :48:35.themselves heard. They are outside the enquiry. They are accusing Tony

:48:36. > :48:41.Blair of being a war criminal. As lanes from the enquiry started to

:48:42. > :48:45.come out, they said it was fairly significant and a very significant

:48:46. > :48:58.day for British democracy. They are calling for sanctions against Tony

:48:59. > :49:05.Blair. We also hear from the Green party, Caroline Lucas, who said that

:49:06. > :49:17.Tony Blair had been cavalier in his attitude towards war. The report

:49:18. > :49:22.confirmed the code 's worst fears. They said Tony Blair had made

:49:23. > :49:30.commitments to George Bush a number of months before the invasion. She

:49:31. > :49:39.told the code that he should not have been doing that. On Beaver of

:49:40. > :49:45.all those who were injured and all other relatives who were affected.

:49:46. > :49:51.Never again must so many mistakes be allowed to sacrifice British lives.

:49:52. > :49:59.And read to the destruction of our country for no positive end. We were

:50:00. > :50:04.proud of our husbands, sons and daughters when they signed up to

:50:05. > :50:11.serve our country. But we cannot be proud of the way our government has

:50:12. > :50:18.treated them. We must use this report to make sure that all aspects

:50:19. > :50:28.of the Iraq fiasco are not repeated again. Novell and the theatre of war

:50:29. > :50:32.ordering the seat of Westminster and Whitehall. We call on the British

:50:33. > :50:44.government to follow the findings of the report and ensure that the

:50:45. > :50:54.legality of going to war is never again twisted. Democracy cannot be

:50:55. > :51:03.trampled over. And to ensure that the internal politics of Whitehall,

:51:04. > :51:05.from the Ministry of Defence to security and intelligence services

:51:06. > :51:11.are never allowed to feel so legally. After sufficient time of

:51:12. > :51:21.analysis of the report, we reserve the right to call specific parties

:51:22. > :51:28.to answer for their actions if such a process is found to be viable. We

:51:29. > :51:36.thank Sir John for such a detailed report. It is truly an exhausting

:51:37. > :51:47.and exhaustive process. In honour of the memory of our loved ones, we

:51:48. > :51:59.trust that all parties will learn the lessons of the Iraq war. We have

:52:00. > :52:08.only had 180 minutes, one minute for every gift, today suggest these

:52:09. > :52:12.findings. If such a process is found to be viable, we will call for

:52:13. > :52:23.people to account for themselves in court if the is viable. The families

:52:24. > :52:29.have waited a long time. We have acted with patience, courage and

:52:30. > :52:37.dignity throughout this time. Those who the report has criticised had

:52:38. > :52:42.been warned of the criticism in advance. We knew what was coming.

:52:43. > :52:48.The CI was the family were given this morning is not long enough for

:52:49. > :52:52.them to take into account over two and a half million warrants. Today

:52:53. > :52:59.is the day the family should be at the forefront of everyone's minds.

:53:00. > :53:04.We should be remembering those who died there, the thousands who were

:53:05. > :53:12.injured in fear and those who've died in that country since. The

:53:13. > :53:19.families are delighted that the report delivers without fear of,

:53:20. > :53:23.fever or prejudice. But it confirms that many of them died unnecessarily

:53:24. > :53:28.without just cause or purpose. In the coming days and weeks, the

:53:29. > :53:34.families will take a fool and forensic review of the report and

:53:35. > :53:40.its conclusions. Estate of festivals are shown to have acted unlawfully,

:53:41. > :53:43.the families will then decide whether to take any necessary or

:53:44. > :53:52.appropriate action. All options will be open. Just as importantly, as

:53:53. > :53:56.well as examining the culpability of individual state of visuals, we have

:53:57. > :53:59.to also look at the process which led to the conflict, so we do not

:54:00. > :54:18.make such tragic mistakes in the future. Thank you. You talk about

:54:19. > :54:22.certain people, state officials, can you tell us, having heard three

:54:23. > :54:30.horse to read the summary, who these people may be? The difficulty is we

:54:31. > :54:37.have just heard the executive summary. The executive summary does

:54:38. > :54:44.not name names at the moment. I am not really in a position, therefore,

:54:45. > :54:48.to actually see who. With the exception of the former Prime

:54:49. > :55:02.Minister, of course, Tony Blair, who is mentioned in the report. Did your

:55:03. > :55:10.son die in vain? When I look at Iraq on my television screen today, I can

:55:11. > :55:22.only conclude that, unfortunately, my son did die in vain.

:55:23. > :55:35.Can I ask if you regard Tony Blair has been ultimately responsible for

:55:36. > :55:42.all of this? We need to have a proper assessment of what is

:55:43. > :55:52.available to as. There needs to be a fool and forensic analysis of the

:55:53. > :55:56.report first. We have the report today, that is what is important. In

:55:57. > :56:08.the coming weeks and months, the families will decide what is

:56:09. > :56:18.necessary. Could I ask Selah and Rose what you're upgrading emotions

:56:19. > :56:25.have been through this? What we have been reading has been really hard. I

:56:26. > :56:35.have seen a lot of the families in tears today. Of them have killed it

:56:36. > :56:43.back for a long time. Sadness, anger, that healing. All those years

:56:44. > :56:52.I have worked for, I have gone back to that time. I know that my brother

:56:53. > :57:02.had been killed and there was one terrorist that the world needs to be

:57:03. > :57:12.aware of and that is Tony Blair. What changes with the publication of

:57:13. > :57:20.this report? What does it mean in practical terms? It is difficult.

:57:21. > :57:28.The government itself has to look at itself if it wants to change the way

:57:29. > :57:33.it does this kind of business. This must never happen ever again. It is

:57:34. > :57:40.how you actually achieve the changes which are required to make sure it

:57:41. > :57:50.does not happen again. Perhaps, we do not know yet, and will not know

:57:51. > :57:56.for some time, but if we go into court to have some sort of sanction,

:57:57. > :58:08.maybe that could motivate government into making sure that the change

:58:09. > :58:17.their way they do business. They're all this constitutional issues with

:58:18. > :58:28.regard to how one goes to war. Governments have two recognise that

:58:29. > :58:37.we have voices and we will be the voices of those who are no longer

:58:38. > :58:41.rustlers. And we be here. I think this is a sad that are very thorough

:58:42. > :58:47.enquiry of which is confront many of the things that we thought. We have

:58:48. > :58:57.no had the backing of St John. It has been documented. But we want to

:58:58. > :59:05.find more answers and bring those who are responsible need to be

:59:06. > :59:07.brought to boot. We will look at what is appropriate after we have

:59:08. > :59:21.thoroughly looked out all the findings. We need to see if we have

:59:22. > :59:29.the evidence to go forward with. It seemed indelicate language, that Sir

:59:30. > :59:38.John was almost pointing someone towards court. He was pretty clear

:59:39. > :59:43.that there was an indication that someone probably should have a look

:59:44. > :59:48.at it. He did explain that the process of going to war was

:59:49. > :59:53.unsatisfactory. We will look at this and decide what is necessary and

:59:54. > :00:05.appropriate, given the reception to the findings. Is there an idea that

:00:06. > :00:08.you should maybe be getting someone on the phone, seeing someone with

:00:09. > :00:19.the legal brain should be looking at this? If appropriate, that would be

:00:20. > :00:27.appropriate for a court, to look at the actions of individuals. Whatever

:00:28. > :00:34.is appropriate. We need to take the time to look at these findings, what

:00:35. > :00:40.the content is and what is appropriate in the future.

:00:41. > :00:51.Do you think Mr Mr Blair believed he knew what he was doing? I believed

:00:52. > :01:02.he knew he was misleading and that has become clear from the 150 page

:01:03. > :01:09.summary. He has misled the people, he obviously had a previous view.

:01:10. > :01:16.Over the past few weeks he has been covering his back. He made a

:01:17. > :01:22.decision and he made... As everybody else has said I only got this this

:01:23. > :01:26.morning and I will have to sit down and read it properly but from what I

:01:27. > :01:36.have read he knew exactly what he was doing. And averaged out to Tony

:01:37. > :01:41.Blair's reaction. I will take full responsibility for any mistakes,

:01:42. > :01:47.without exception or excuse and none I believe it was better to remove

:01:48. > :01:53.Saddam Hussein. I pay tribute to our Armed Forces and express my profound

:01:54. > :02:05.regret at the loss of life and set out the lessons of future leaders

:02:06. > :02:11.can learn. That is just a PR patter. We have talked for a long time about

:02:12. > :02:20.the legal decision to go to war and one of the things that, wouldn't

:02:21. > :02:31.that legal advice, you cannot go to war for regime change. Out of his

:02:32. > :02:45.own mouth he condemns himself. Hopefully this is the evidence we

:02:46. > :02:46.need. But he has condemned himself. The fact that

:02:47. > :02:55.these enquiries and we have been through several, no blame as a

:02:56. > :03:02.portion from any one of them, it is likely get out of free card. They

:03:03. > :03:12.have to look at these things in the future and point fingers at the

:03:13. > :03:17.people responsible. Mr Blair also says today that he

:03:18. > :03:23.took his decisions in good faith and there was no falsification or

:03:24. > :03:28.improper use of intelligence or deception and no secret commitment

:03:29. > :03:37.to war. Do you accept his observations? Why is he not you're

:03:38. > :03:43.looking at us? If he is so sure of his decision why is he not here

:03:44. > :03:49.looking at us and seeing our faces. We ask to meet him and he walked

:03:50. > :03:55.away. This is his opportunity. He thinks he is the puppet master

:03:56. > :04:03.pulling the strings. We approved and wrong because everything we have

:04:04. > :04:09.said from the start has came out today. What would you say to him if

:04:10. > :04:18.he was here? Exactly what I have been saying to the world. Look me in

:04:19. > :04:25.the eye? Are you responsible for the murder of my son. Would say look me

:04:26. > :04:33.in the eye and tell me you did not mislead the nation. And the response

:04:34. > :04:40.of the gentleman there, what we must bear in mind is the intelligence

:04:41. > :04:43.reports were coming back which were sporadic, and thrive, untested and

:04:44. > :04:49.not to be relied upon and by the time saw it Blair and Alastair

:04:50. > :04:53.Campbell had finished with it it was detail, authoritative, and available

:04:54. > :04:58.to be deployed within 45 minutes. I believe Tony Blair knew that was a

:04:59. > :05:04.lie and that was perpetrated on the British public and he knew it was

:05:05. > :05:11.manufactured and he was massaging the intelligence reports. He changed

:05:12. > :05:18.it from F, but maybe to get it up and running now. The report says as

:05:19. > :05:33.much, when you actually start reading into it. If it is found

:05:34. > :05:40.appropriate to take that further, legally, what is the process for

:05:41. > :05:44.doing so? I will not comment at this stage on that. I am not been

:05:45. > :05:50.difficult, I promise you, in answering that is what this is such

:05:51. > :05:57.a matter of great seriousness and gravity, not only 40 families but

:05:58. > :06:03.the nation that it requires a proper period of reflection. -- not only

:06:04. > :06:11.for the families. Legal actions are possible. The report is full,

:06:12. > :06:15.comprehensive. If you take those two things together you can speculate

:06:16. > :06:24.but we need days, if not weeks, to come to a final conclusion. Thank

:06:25. > :06:27.you. There have been a fair of criticism that Sir John Chilcot and

:06:28. > :06:33.his team were taking a long time and they were not focused on doing their

:06:34. > :06:38.job properly. Do you think, now you have seen, however shortly, in

:06:39. > :06:42.detail this report, the weights was worth it and you have had a

:06:43. > :06:48.comprehensive report you can now address and I? It still took too

:06:49. > :06:55.long, there is no question about that. But, from what we have seen

:06:56. > :06:59.today, and we have not seen much, we have not had a great deal of time to

:07:00. > :07:04.really dig into it and you need to be locked away in a room by yourself

:07:05. > :07:10.in order to do that, but from what we have seen, it is a very thorough.

:07:11. > :07:21.Therefore, in that sense, worth the wait.

:07:22. > :07:30.Can I ask one more question of Matthew? A simple yes or no. Is a

:07:31. > :07:35.legal action against one or more people, Tony Blair and others, more

:07:36. > :07:38.or less likely after a two-day? It's possible.

:07:39. > :07:50.LAUGHTER Same question, different words. Who

:07:51. > :08:09.are you from? Sky News. I do not have sky at home.

:08:10. > :08:17.That was a news conference they are of some of the family members of

:08:18. > :08:24.some of the 179 but a service men and women who lost their lives in

:08:25. > :08:31.the Iraq conflict between 2003 and 2009. Interesting to hear Roger

:08:32. > :08:35.Bacon, whose son was killed in Iraq, saying, he thought the Chilcot

:08:36. > :08:39.enquiry published today has been extremely thorough and has been

:08:40. > :08:45.worth the wait. Huge controversy over the seven years it took the

:08:46. > :08:51.report to be published but that father saying it was worth the wait.

:08:52. > :08:57.Another relative saying Tony Blair was the terrorist. In parent saying

:08:58. > :09:03.my son died in vain. It was at times a very emotional news conference.

:09:04. > :09:07.Roger Bacon also saying he had been proud of our troops in Iraq cannot

:09:08. > :09:16.be proud of how our Government behaved towards our troops. The

:09:17. > :09:21.solicitor for that family, Matthew, Judy, all options on legal action

:09:22. > :09:26.against state officials, Government ministers and so on, will be

:09:27. > :09:31.considered. Interesting that lawyers for some of the families talking

:09:32. > :09:34.about the need over the next few days, when they have read through

:09:35. > :09:40.the report, to consider if legal action should be taken against

:09:41. > :09:45.Government ministers, state officials. Let's go to Baghdad,

:09:46. > :09:53.where there is still violent chaos and we saw that car on Sunday, the

:09:54. > :10:02.deadliest car bomb since the invasion, with 250 people killed. As

:10:03. > :10:07.I say, the repercussions of what happens back when Tony Blair and

:10:08. > :10:14.George Bush were considering to go to war is still being felt in Iraq

:10:15. > :10:27.today. Yes indeed. Many Iraqis or the Iraq

:10:28. > :10:32.war responsible for their agony and the deteriorating security and

:10:33. > :10:37.economic conditions. And even at the political level because they say,

:10:38. > :10:41.had it not been for the invasion, the Iraqi politicians who used to

:10:42. > :10:47.live in exile, would not have gone to Iraq and they hold them

:10:48. > :10:54.responsible for their misery, the Iraqi politicians, according to many

:10:55. > :11:01.Iraqis, have lost touch with the people. So the repercussions and

:11:02. > :11:12.consequences are quite felt 13 years after the US led war on Iraq.

:11:13. > :11:16.What are people there saying specifically about Tony Blair and

:11:17. > :11:28.has a role that has been under the spotlight with this Chilcot Report

:11:29. > :11:34.two-day? There is a hostile sentiments here in Baghdad and in

:11:35. > :11:38.Iraq, not just for the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony

:11:39. > :11:49.Blair, but for also George W Bush, the former US presidents and the

:11:50. > :11:56.Iraqi politicians who took part, as many Iraqis here say, in misleading

:11:57. > :12:05.the international community and the Iraqis themselves and the

:12:06. > :12:11.neighbouring countries in misleading them into justifying this war.

:12:12. > :12:18.However, some Iraqis, and there are a lot, believe that the Americans or

:12:19. > :12:25.the US Administration of George W Bush and his closest ally Tony Blair

:12:26. > :12:33.were resolved and determined to invade Iraq no matter what. As we

:12:34. > :12:43.heard from Sir John Chilcot today, he said that Tony Blair, he

:12:44. > :12:47.mentioned some of the memos and correspondence between Tony Blair

:12:48. > :12:54.and George W Bush, and from these memos it is evident and clear that

:12:55. > :13:01.the suggestion to go to war with Iraq -- in Iraq dates back to 2001.

:13:02. > :13:07.The first male mentions in this report is -- the first memo dated

:13:08. > :13:14.December 2001 suggesting to go to Iraq. Many Iraqis are convinced that

:13:15. > :13:19.the US administration and the UK Government at that time were

:13:20. > :13:27.resolved to go to war and topple Saddam the matter what.

:13:28. > :13:37.Thank you very much indeed for being with us. Let us give you the

:13:38. > :13:41.response from Tony Blair. He says, I will take full responsibility for

:13:42. > :13:48.any mistakes, without exception or excuse. He says he took the decision

:13:49. > :13:54.on going to war in Iraq in good faith" what I believe to be the best

:13:55. > :13:59.interests of the country. He also says the Chilcot Report should lay

:14:00. > :14:07.to rest allegations against him of bad faith, lies and deceit. And Tony

:14:08. > :14:11.Blair saying he does not believe that the decision to remove Saddam

:14:12. > :14:17.Hussein from power in Iraq is the cause of terrorism today in the

:14:18. > :14:23.Middle East and elsewhere. Those just some early reactions from Tony

:14:24. > :14:28.Blair himself to the Chilcot Report which is generate a creed is pretty

:14:29. > :14:34.damning of the way he and his Government conducted themselves --

:14:35. > :14:38.it is generally agreed is a pretty damning of heaven. We can top the

:14:39. > :14:46.former member of this Government, Clare Short, Labour MP. -- damning

:14:47. > :14:53.of his Government. Clare, what is your initial reaction to the report?

:14:54. > :14:58.The report gives the damning list of all the criticisms the critics are

:14:59. > :15:04.made and says they are all true. Blair gave his word long before,

:15:05. > :15:10.there was no need to hurry, the diplomatic options were not

:15:11. > :15:16.exhausted, we did not have to go on a US timetable, preparations were

:15:17. > :15:21.not properly made. It is all there and damning but the situation in

:15:22. > :15:28.Iraq and the Middle East remains terrible at making the criticism

:15:29. > :15:33.does not put any of that right. One thing the report highlight is how

:15:34. > :15:39.presidential the Blair Government was. For example, that memo to

:15:40. > :15:45.George Bush in July of 2002, saying, I will be with you, whatever. I,

:15:46. > :15:50.will be with you. He did not show back to you or other cabinet

:15:51. > :15:57.members. What do you make of that? It does not surprise me. He did not

:15:58. > :16:03.even decide things at the Cabinet, he had a few people in his room with

:16:04. > :16:06.no minutes taken and then normally in Whitehall that the Prime Minister

:16:07. > :16:11.talks to another country in Norton is taken and it is circulated. But

:16:12. > :16:16.when we went into Iraq everything froze up. -- eight notes is taken.

:16:17. > :16:21.That helped to create the confusion of planning for afterwards. We did

:16:22. > :16:27.not know if we would properly go through the UN and that's meant, I

:16:28. > :16:32.have been reading over the years the confusion and mess and worthy of its

:16:33. > :16:39.as I read the description of how the events unfolded. It is a damning

:16:40. > :16:42.indictment of the British system of Government. The informality of its

:16:43. > :16:47.means this thing can be done and what must be learned is to tighten

:16:48. > :16:51.up conditions for decision-making, if that is to be another war because

:16:52. > :16:56.this way of doing things, but how many lives are destroyed, countries

:16:57. > :17:02.destroyed. We must never do this again. You were a member of the

:17:03. > :17:08.Government. Do you have regrets about your role in Government? I

:17:09. > :17:17.regret massively we went to war when we dead and everything that

:17:18. > :17:23.unfolded. -- when we did. I tried as a Cabinet member to try a hold on

:17:24. > :17:33.the Tony Blair's and ankles and we might find a better way of dealing

:17:34. > :17:37.with Iraq. I know I tried my damnedest but for wide Field and for

:17:38. > :17:44.that I feel terrible. Do you think you should have resigned earlier. I

:17:45. > :17:52.EDF place to make my resignation speech before the vote but then -- I

:17:53. > :17:56.booked my place. That was not much fighting any very early invasion and

:17:57. > :18:01.a lot of people in Iraq hoped for something better for them and if

:18:02. > :18:06.there had been an international leads and more trust and not an

:18:07. > :18:11.occupation Iraq might be in a much better place so that is why I stayed

:18:12. > :18:15.until it was clear that promise would not be kept. It drew a lot of

:18:16. > :18:21.flack on to me but it was good to try for that and in the end it

:18:22. > :18:26.didn't help. Some of the family members of British troops who died

:18:27. > :18:31.in Iraq are been saying they reserve the right to think about whether to

:18:32. > :18:36.take legal action against members of the then British Government. What do

:18:37. > :18:41.you think about that? I think they have a right to do that but I think

:18:42. > :18:46.it unlikely they will find the roots to get the kind of legal

:18:47. > :18:56.accountability they would like. If I am proved wrong, that is fine. Clare

:18:57. > :18:58.Short, thank you very much indeed. Clare Short, International

:18:59. > :19:06.Development Secretary in the Blair Government. Prime Minister's

:19:07. > :19:10.Questions is underway. We can hear from the SNP's Westminster leader

:19:11. > :19:17.Angus Robertson a short time ago. The Chilcot Report confirms that on

:19:18. > :19:23.the 28th of July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush saying, I

:19:24. > :19:26.will be with you whatever. Does the Prime Minister understand Whitely

:19:27. > :19:33.families of the dead and injured UK service personnel -- why the

:19:34. > :19:35.families of the dead and hundreds of thousands Iraqis feel they were

:19:36. > :19:44.deceived about the reasons for going war? Let me join the Right

:19:45. > :19:48.Honourable gentleman in wishing... In terms of the report dribble

:19:49. > :19:54.discussed it in detail later and I don't want to pre-empt all other

:19:55. > :19:59.things I want to say but we need to learn the lessons, study it

:20:00. > :20:03.carefully. It is millions of words, thousands of pages and I think we

:20:04. > :20:16.should save our remarks for debating it after the statement in the house.

:20:17. > :20:19.The Chilcot is sport -- Chilcot disport -- Chilcot Report concludes

:20:20. > :20:26.the UK did not achieve its objectives. That lack of planning

:20:27. > :20:31.has also been evident in relation to Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and, most

:20:32. > :20:36.recently, with no plan whatsoever for Brexit. When will the UK

:20:37. > :20:43.Government actually start learning from the mistakes of the past so we

:20:44. > :20:47.are not condemned to repeat them? He is right that what Sir John

:20:48. > :20:51.Chilcot says about the failure to plan is clear and I can read from

:20:52. > :20:54.his statement because he says when the invasion began UK policy

:20:55. > :21:01.arrested on an assumption that would be a well executed... Security

:21:02. > :21:05.environment. Mr Blair told the enquiry the difficulties encountered

:21:06. > :21:09.after the invasion could not have been known in advance. He says, we

:21:10. > :21:14.do not agree hindsight is required and he is clear on that point. What

:21:15. > :21:19.I would say, in terms of planning, what I put in place as Prime

:21:20. > :21:25.Minister following Iraq is proper legal advice pop-up reconstituted

:21:26. > :21:30.meetings -- properly constituted meetings. All those things including

:21:31. > :21:33.the proper listening to expert advice on the security Council, all

:21:34. > :21:40.of that is designed to avoid the problems the Government had in the

:21:41. > :21:45.case of Iraq. The only point I would make if there is actually no set of

:21:46. > :21:49.arrangements and plans that can provide protection in any of these

:21:50. > :21:54.cases. Military intervention, we can argue whether it is ever justified,

:21:55. > :21:58.I believe it is. It is always difficult. Planning for the

:21:59. > :22:03.aftermath is always difficult and I do not believe we should be naive

:22:04. > :22:06.that is a perfect set of plans an arrangement that can solve these

:22:07. > :22:13.problems in perpetuity. There are not.

:22:14. > :22:20.That was the Prime Minister and the Westminster leader of the SNP Angus

:22:21. > :22:29.Robertson in the Commons. You can see pictures of some of the families

:22:30. > :22:35.giving their reaction already. One of those family members describing

:22:36. > :22:39.Tony Blair, emotionally, as a terrorist. And the lawyer for that

:22:40. > :22:44.group saying they will be reading the report in detail and seeing

:22:45. > :22:48.whether they think there is a case for taking legal action against what

:22:49. > :22:51.they called State officials, in other words members of the Blair

:22:52. > :23:01.Government. Let's get some more reaction. I am joined here by a

:23:02. > :23:06.leading expert on international law, Tim Ripley, an expert in the

:23:07. > :23:13.military and military strategy and also David Godfrey, father of Daniel

:23:14. > :23:20.who guides in Iraq. -- who died in Iraq. Let me ask you, David, we had

:23:21. > :23:36.some of the family's reaction, tell your reaction to what Sir John said?

:23:37. > :23:40.Just my grandson. My reaction... I've got to the end of a journey and

:23:41. > :23:49.the start of another one. The journey started with the loss of

:23:50. > :23:56.Daniel in Basra in February 2007. The next stage of my journey started

:23:57. > :24:08.at the launch of the Chilcot enquiry report. It has been a journey of

:24:09. > :24:12.heart ache, pain, not just bought my family but every other family you

:24:13. > :24:18.have seen here today. For modular scene of the report are you

:24:19. > :24:24.satisfied with the findings? I said to one of your colleagues

:24:25. > :24:33.previously, I had come here with the possibility and woods probably Dev

:24:34. > :24:41.Sir John -- get Sir John Chilcot have a stick but I must say, I owe

:24:42. > :24:47.him an apology. -- give him have a stick. The report was well made out.

:24:48. > :25:01.Was it worth the wait is? I cannot say... Yes, I would think so, but

:25:02. > :25:09.the report has not gone far enough and I have not seen the report

:25:10. > :25:17.statement from Tony Blair earlier on, but from a brief glimpse from

:25:18. > :25:23.one of your colleagues, ... I totally disagree with some of the

:25:24. > :25:28.things he said in that statement. Tim Ripley, you are a military

:25:29. > :25:31.expert. In terms of what the report says about British equipment, and

:25:32. > :25:37.that is one of the key issues for the families of those who died, for

:25:38. > :25:42.example the land Rovers in which a lot of British troops died in Basra

:25:43. > :25:46.and in the south of Iraq, they were not replaced quickly enough by the

:25:47. > :25:53.MOD. What does the report tell us about that? The report is one of the

:25:54. > :25:59.most damning indictments of the British military campaign since

:26:00. > :26:01.1916. It is damning endpaper the preparedness of the Armed Forces and

:26:02. > :26:10.their leadership during the campaign. -- it is damning of the

:26:11. > :26:17.military preparedness. It says this was a military failure. There is a

:26:18. > :26:22.lot of blame for arounds and talk about the preparations, but in terms

:26:23. > :26:27.of the leadership of the British Armed Forces, they are accused of

:26:28. > :26:32.being more interested in leaving Iraq than ensuring mission success.

:26:33. > :26:37.The land Rover incident you spoke about, the report identifies a

:26:38. > :26:42.four-year delay in identifying and selecting and procuring

:26:43. > :26:46.replacements. It claims that on the leadership of the British Army being

:26:47. > :26:53.more interested in business as usual back home in their barracks. It is

:26:54. > :26:56.very damning of the direction of the campaign and says they did not

:26:57. > :27:00.achieve what they set out to do which is very damning and has not

:27:01. > :27:06.been seen in a British military report campaign for 100 years.

:27:07. > :27:11.Let me take you back to what Tony Blair has been saying in response.

:27:12. > :27:16.We just had that statement in the last few minutes. He says, the

:27:17. > :27:21.report should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies and

:27:22. > :27:24.deceit. Whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take

:27:25. > :27:30.military action against Saddam Hussein, I took it in good faith and

:27:31. > :27:33.in what I believe to be the best interests of the country.

:27:34. > :27:39.That was Tony Blair with his immediate response to the Chilcot

:27:40. > :27:41.enquiry. He also says he does not believe the removal of Saddam

:27:42. > :27:48.Hussein is the cause of terrorism in the middle East today or elsewhere.

:27:49. > :27:54.Tony Blair with his immediate reaction to the Chilcot enquiry.

:27:55. > :27:57.Let's talk to them develop Sands, international law expert. What do

:27:58. > :28:07.you make of the report and Tony Blair's response. The legal planning

:28:08. > :28:13.was found to be unsatisfactory. The security Council was undermined. It

:28:14. > :28:19.was not a situation of last resort. It is pretty devastating stuff. Is

:28:20. > :28:25.that stronger than you expected? I did my best to keep an open mind. I

:28:26. > :28:29.was concerned about the level of the questioning in the hearings and if

:28:30. > :28:35.he had the capacity to assess the evidence. From what I have read so

:28:36. > :28:39.far up my concerns are misplaced. It appears to be thorough and fair and

:28:40. > :28:43.balanced. In relation to what Mr Blair said, it isn't about good

:28:44. > :28:47.faith of bad faith, what we are bidding here is a document

:28:48. > :28:53.essentially making an allegation of gross recklessness. Going to a war,

:28:54. > :28:59.the more serious than a Government can do. When war is not needed off

:29:00. > :29:06.the back of unsatisfactory legal advice. That is pretty devastating.

:29:07. > :29:14.What is your view of what why Tony Blair took that course? What drove

:29:15. > :29:20.him to that? I have studied this for ten years and wrote a book in 2006

:29:21. > :29:24.and he had decided very early in 2002 and that is now established

:29:25. > :29:30.beyond any doubt. He took a decision and did not share it with cabinets

:29:31. > :29:35.and in fact repeatedly told them no decision had been taken and we now

:29:36. > :29:41.see in black and white evidence that shows Mr Blair writing to President

:29:42. > :29:45.Bush saying, I am with you whatever. When you are in that situation as

:29:46. > :29:49.Prime Minister and you have in your back pocket legal advice from the

:29:50. > :29:54.Attorney General which says you cannot do this, you need a second

:29:55. > :29:58.resolution and you tell the president of the United States I am

:29:59. > :30:02.still with you, despite that legal advice, you have got a problem in

:30:03. > :30:08.decision-making. It is not a good faith of bad faith but not relying

:30:09. > :30:12.on the legal advice we had in taking the country in a direction his own

:30:13. > :30:18.legal adviser told him he could not do.

:30:19. > :30:25.Do you think the report is stronger or more devastating with regard to

:30:26. > :30:33.the Tony Blair government than you might have been expecting? The most

:30:34. > :30:41.devastating thing as there is no glimmer of hope that anything was

:30:42. > :30:46.achieved in this war. He was pretty clear that the situation in Iraq is

:30:47. > :30:53.abysmal. It is not going anywhere soon. It is soon -- still a

:30:54. > :30:56.nightmare for the people of Iraq for many years to come. And our

:30:57. > :31:03.intervention certainly did not make things any better. Would you like to

:31:04. > :31:08.see some sort of legal action in the courts against members of the

:31:09. > :31:16.government at that time, including Tony Blair? It has to happen. I

:31:17. > :31:30.agree with your colleagues here that we were ill-equipped and Tony Blair

:31:31. > :31:35.took the decision with President Bush to go together, to force the

:31:36. > :31:43.role on the British government. They did that without proper legal

:31:44. > :31:50.backing. We did not go back to the United Nations, because they should

:31:51. > :32:00.have given that time to the weapons inspectors. They were pushed to get

:32:01. > :32:12.this sorted. One thing that sticks in my mind is the weapons

:32:13. > :32:14.inspectors. The supposedly said of Doctor David Kelly. Sorry we have

:32:15. > :32:17.two interrupt you. We can go live now to the House

:32:18. > :32:20.of Commons, where a statement will be made, in response

:32:21. > :32:30.to the Chilcot Inquiry This is a difficult day for all of

:32:31. > :32:35.those who have lost loved ones. This has been far too long coming. I hope

:32:36. > :32:40.we can draw some solace from the depth and vigour of this report and

:32:41. > :32:48.some solace that we will not forget the incredible sacrifice. 179

:32:49. > :32:53.British servicemen and women. They give everything for our country. We

:32:54. > :33:02.must never forget the thousands who suffered life changing industry --

:33:03. > :33:08.injured injuries. This report would have begun sooner if it had begun

:33:09. > :33:14.sooner French people on the side of the host first goal for it back in

:33:15. > :33:21.2006. But a fool everyone will join me in thanking St John and also Mr

:33:22. > :33:31.Gilbert, who passed away recently. Government ministers did not see the

:33:32. > :33:37.report until yesterday. He gave Sir John fool access to government

:33:38. > :33:46.papers. This has been an unprecedented access and insight. It

:33:47. > :33:53.also took into account 31 personal memos from the then Prime Minister

:33:54. > :34:00.Tony Blair to President Bush. It amounts to 2.6 million words. It

:34:01. > :34:05.cost nearly ?10 million to produce. Everyone in the host will love the

:34:06. > :34:11.chance to study it in debt. We will have two full days of the beat next

:34:12. > :34:19.week. And on a number of key questions were asked. Did we go to

:34:20. > :34:24.war on a false promise? Was legal advice properly taken? Was the

:34:25. > :34:30.operation well planned? Where are we prepared for the aftermath? And did

:34:31. > :34:34.our forces have adequate funding and equipment? I will try and summarise

:34:35. > :34:38.the key findings and lessons that I believe have to be levelled. Another

:34:39. > :34:48.of reasons were put forward for going to war in Iraq. Including the

:34:49. > :34:53.danger that Saddam Hussein posed to his people and the region. Central

:34:54. > :34:57.to the argument was the issue of weapons of mass disruption. Sir John

:34:58. > :35:04.said there was an ingrained belief, genuinely held in the United Kingdom

:35:05. > :35:08.and elsewhere, that Saddam Hussein possessed a biological capability

:35:09. > :35:14.and that he wanted to redevelop its nuclear capabilities. He was

:35:15. > :35:18.actively pursuing that. He had built up chemical weapons in the past and

:35:19. > :35:26.had used them against Kurdish militants and the Iranians military.

:35:27. > :35:32.The advice given to the government by the international policy

:35:33. > :35:36.community that Saddam Hussein did possess these capabilities. As we

:35:37. > :35:48.know Noel, by 2003, this long-held belief that all longer reflected the

:35:49. > :35:54.reality. St John says, at no stage was the belief that Saddam Hussein

:35:55. > :36:04.continued to have weapons of mass destruction. This was not fully

:36:05. > :36:06.examined. It was possible to come to a different conclusion about the

:36:07. > :36:15.existence of fuel that other intelligence. The results of the

:36:16. > :36:19.worry about weapons of mass destruction finding a reason to the

:36:20. > :36:26.hands of terrorists. Roll St John agrees that that was the worry, but

:36:27. > :36:32.the original one basis to suggest that Iraq represented such a threat.

:36:33. > :36:42.On the question of intelligence, the report says intelligence was

:36:43. > :36:47.improperly concluded. He does say that the use of the joint

:36:48. > :36:50.intelligence committee material in the public presentation did not make

:36:51. > :36:57.reading of the limitations of the assessments. He says the

:36:58. > :37:01.intelligence had not established beyond doubt that either that Saddam

:37:02. > :37:07.Hussain was producing chemical or biological weapons. It says the

:37:08. > :37:13.joint in kelp intelligence committee should have made that very clear to

:37:14. > :37:17.the Prime Minister. They could of conveyed more certainty than the

:37:18. > :37:22.joint intelligence committee assessments. There was a lack of

:37:23. > :37:30.clarity between what they said and what Tony Blair believed. With

:37:31. > :37:35.regard to the 2002 last year, the famed difference between the

:37:36. > :37:48.inspection the judgment. But he does not question the belief of Mr lawyer

:37:49. > :37:52.that they had. There is no legality expressed with regard to the

:37:53. > :37:58.involvement of the United Kingdom in the war. But the dude talk about the

:37:59. > :38:06.legal advice the government was given. St John is highly critical of

:38:07. > :38:10.the process by which legal advice was arranged that and discussed. He

:38:11. > :38:14.said the circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there

:38:15. > :38:21.was a legal basis for military action were far from satisfactory.

:38:22. > :38:29.He also finds that the diplomatic options had not been exhausted. He

:38:30. > :38:33.says military action was therefore not the last resort. He said the

:38:34. > :38:37.second resolution of the United Nations, the United Nations --

:38:38. > :38:42.kingdom should have done more to exhaust all options, including

:38:43. > :38:50.allowing weapons inspectors to conclude the work in Iraq. He then

:38:51. > :38:56.looks at the processor which was then forward. A number of ministers

:38:57. > :39:08.were involved in the decision-making. He then looks at

:39:09. > :39:11.the process of decision-making. He says the idea of military action was

:39:12. > :39:18.never properly discussed that Cabinet level. It inevitably reduced

:39:19. > :39:26.the small group of people, often without records being kept. He also

:39:27. > :39:29.says that Tony Blair made important commitments to President Bush, which

:39:30. > :39:39.had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. But he says at no stage

:39:40. > :39:46.the sea was nearly killed a attempt to mislead people. The initial

:39:47. > :39:58.invasion proceeded rapidly and we should be proud of what our Armed

:39:59. > :40:06.Forces achieved. This is despite not been planning to take part in an

:40:07. > :40:09.invasion from the south, which came at short notice after the Turkish

:40:10. > :40:29.gunmen refused access from the North. It says satisfactory plans

:40:30. > :40:34.had not been made for the challenges and risks in Iraq. He says the

:40:35. > :40:42.government lacked clear ministerial oversight in planning and

:40:43. > :40:51.coordination and field to manage the risks adequately. The government and

:40:52. > :40:56.ministers remained to fixed on the idea that the United States had a

:40:57. > :41:08.plan and that the United Kingdom rule would take part for 34 months

:41:09. > :41:17.after the conflict ended. He concludes that the anticipated that

:41:18. > :41:23.the post-war problems did not require the benefits of hindsight.

:41:24. > :41:29.On the issue of equipment and troops, the government feel to

:41:30. > :41:36.provide adequate patrol vehicles, feel your to meet the needs of

:41:37. > :41:43.United Kingdom forces should not have been tolerated. He says the

:41:44. > :41:52.Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat posed by

:41:53. > :41:55.improvised explosive devices. The sole many opportunities for a

:41:56. > :42:02.strategic reappraisal to have taken place with regard to the resources.

:42:03. > :42:07.He phoned that no such reappraisal of took place. During the first four

:42:08. > :42:13.years there was no clear statement of policy setting out exactly the

:42:14. > :42:18.acceptable amount of risk and who was at responsible for managing the

:42:19. > :42:26.risk. He says the military were too focused on withdrawing from Iraq and

:42:27. > :42:31.focused on the deployment to Afghanistan. He concludes that

:42:32. > :42:36.although Tony Blair succeeded in persuading the United States to go

:42:37. > :42:42.back to the United Nations in 2002, he was unsuccessful in changing the

:42:43. > :42:48.United States position. The absence of a majority in the Security

:42:49. > :42:51.Council of military action, at that point, the united kingdom was

:42:52. > :43:01.therefore undermining the authority of the Security Council. He said it

:43:02. > :43:04.was clear that there was a worry that the relationship between the

:43:05. > :43:12.United States and the United Kingdom may be damaged if support was not

:43:13. > :43:15.given. But there was a gap between the ambitious United Kingdom

:43:16. > :43:27.objectives and the equipment for the trips that that would allow. On the

:43:28. > :43:30.territorial integrity of Iraq remained, thousands of innocent

:43:31. > :43:36.Iraqi citizens lost their lives. While these conditions were not

:43:37. > :43:43.created by the coalition, they were exacerbated by it. They were not

:43:44. > :43:50.addressed by a effective programme. He says the policy of the United

:43:51. > :44:01.Kingdom government failed to meet its achieved objectives and. Those

:44:02. > :44:07.who voted for military action will have to take the fear share of

:44:08. > :44:15.responsibility. We cannot turn the clock back, but we can make sure

:44:16. > :44:22.that these aspects of the report are taken into account for the future.

:44:23. > :44:26.Getting all these things rate do not guarantee the success of the

:44:27. > :44:37.military intervention. I believe it was great to intervene in Libya to

:44:38. > :44:44.stop the slaughter there. We did have a United Nations mandate the.

:44:45. > :44:50.But getting these things rate does not make the challenges any less

:44:51. > :44:54.formidable. The difficulties in Libya today at playing for everyone

:44:55. > :44:59.to see. As the Prime Minister for the last six years, I believe there

:45:00. > :45:04.are lessons need to be learnt. First, taking the country to war

:45:05. > :45:08.should always be a last resort and should only be done when all other

:45:09. > :45:17.credible alternatives have been exhausted. On my first year of

:45:18. > :45:19.office I established the National Security Council so that

:45:20. > :45:23.decision-making would be taken across the whole of that group. The

:45:24. > :45:32.council was not just a meeting of ministers. It has the chief of the

:45:33. > :45:39.defence staff, the head of the intelligence staff and other

:45:40. > :45:42.relevant officials. I also appointed the first National Security adviser

:45:43. > :45:48.with a properly constituted team and the cabinet so that all aspects of

:45:49. > :45:52.the National security are joined up. They also tap into the experience

:45:53. > :45:58.and knowledge of experts and with government. This helps us

:45:59. > :46:05.confidently challenge problems. It is inconceivable today that we could

:46:06. > :46:17.take a premeditated decision to boot, trips in any free without a

:46:18. > :46:24.National Security Council agreement. I would argue that the culture

:46:25. > :46:29.established by the Prime Minister matters. It is crucial that the

:46:30. > :46:34.decision-making meat establishes a climate so that ministers can

:46:35. > :46:42.challenge existing policy and question the Cabinet and the Prime

:46:43. > :46:45.Minister without fear or favour. Everyone at that table is genuinely

:46:46. > :46:50.free to speak their mind. If we are to take difficult decisions,

:46:51. > :46:59.planning for what follows is fatal. We know the task of rebuilding

:47:00. > :47:05.effectively is so important. That is why we created the stabilisation

:47:06. > :47:09.fund so that experts are able to deploy at short notice any freer in

:47:10. > :47:17.the world. None of this would be possible without those decisions

:47:18. > :47:24.were points of our gross national product not spent on overseas aid.

:47:25. > :47:28.We also want to plan for the aftermath of conflicts, but just as

:47:29. > :47:34.importantly, prevent these conflicts taking place in the first place. We

:47:35. > :47:41.know conduct a regular strategic security review so that the

:47:42. > :47:47.consistent with our review strategy. We plan to invest at least ?117

:47:48. > :47:56.billion in new equipment over the next decade. We have also enshrine

:47:57. > :48:02.the Armed Forces covenant in the law so that Armed Forces receive the

:48:03. > :48:05.respect they deserve. Sending troops onto the battlefield without the

:48:06. > :48:09.proper equipment was unacceptable and that should never happen again.

:48:10. > :48:16.There will be further lessons to be learnt. That is what we will do. Mr

:48:17. > :48:22.Speaker, on reflecting on this, there are also some lessons that

:48:23. > :48:27.they do not think we should draw. It would be wrong to conclude that we

:48:28. > :48:31.should not stand with our American allies when our common interests are

:48:32. > :48:36.threatened. We should never be afraid to speak frankly and

:48:37. > :48:40.honestly. When we commit our troops together, there needs to be a

:48:41. > :48:45.structure so that our opinions can be properly conveyed. But Britain

:48:46. > :48:53.and America share the same fundamental allies and our

:48:54. > :48:57.partnership remains as it has been in the last decade as it has ever

:48:58. > :49:03.been. It would be wrong to conclude that we cannot rely on the judgments

:49:04. > :49:09.of brilliant and hard-working intelligence agencies. Since

:49:10. > :49:16.November 2014, they have enabled us to foil seven terrorist attacks on

:49:17. > :49:20.the streets of Great Britain. The needs to be proper separation

:49:21. > :49:26.between the process of assessing intelligence and the policy-making

:49:27. > :49:32.that comes from that. That is what we know have in place. It would be

:49:33. > :49:35.wrong to conclude that our military are not capable of intervening

:49:36. > :49:43.successfully around the world. Many of the feelings were not related to

:49:44. > :49:48.the fielders of the soldiers going into Iraq, but the feelings of

:49:49. > :49:55.post-war planning after those initial shot had been fired.

:49:56. > :49:58.Finally, we should not conclude that intervention is always wrong. There

:49:59. > :50:09.are unquestionably times when it is right to intervene as this country

:50:10. > :50:13.did successfully and Kosovo. There are times that we should maybe have

:50:14. > :50:26.intervened and did not. The likes of the genus Aidan the Balkans. Often

:50:27. > :50:32.it is the state building after watch which is the biggest challenge, as

:50:33. > :50:36.opposed to the initial conflict itself. Just because intervention is

:50:37. > :50:40.difficult, it does not mean there are not things when it is not rate

:50:41. > :50:47.and necessary. We will need to learn the lessons of this report and with

:50:48. > :50:56.our interventions in the Middle East at the moment, we will not treat all

:50:57. > :51:03.without always thinking of trying to protect the people. Before

:51:04. > :51:09.addressing the issues raised in the report I would like to remember and

:51:10. > :51:14.honour the 179 British service men and women killed and the thousands

:51:15. > :51:18.maimed and injured during the Iraq war and their families as well as

:51:19. > :51:27.the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have died. Yesterday,

:51:28. > :51:34.I had the private meeting with some of the families. I have done over

:51:35. > :51:38.the past 12 years. It is always a humbling experience to witness the

:51:39. > :51:40.resolve and resilience of these families and their unwavering

:51:41. > :51:52.commitment to seek truth and justice. They have waited seven

:51:53. > :52:00.years for this report. It was right that the enquiry took evidence from

:52:01. > :52:04.such a wide range of origins and that the conduct of the war and its

:52:05. > :52:09.aftermath should have been examined in full detail. But the

:52:10. > :52:23.extraordinary length of time this has taken as a matter of regret. I

:52:24. > :52:27.was only given access this morning meaning today's response can only be

:52:28. > :52:36.a provisional one. To invade and occupy Iraq in 2003 was the biggest

:52:37. > :52:41.foreign policy decision taken by a British government in modern times.

:52:42. > :52:45.It divided the size and said the government of the day against the

:52:46. > :52:52.majority of the British people as well as the weight of global

:52:53. > :52:59.opinion. The war was not in anyway last resort. It was a military

:53:00. > :53:05.intervention launched on a false pretext. It has long been regarded

:53:06. > :53:09.as illegal by the overwhelming weight of international opinion. It

:53:10. > :53:13.led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the

:53:14. > :53:19.displacement of millions of refugees. It devastated the

:53:20. > :53:26.infrastructure in Iraq and its society. It forced deal with all

:53:27. > :53:30.sectarianism that turned into a civil war. Instead of protecting

:53:31. > :53:38.security at home and abroad, it fuelled terrorism across the region.

:53:39. > :53:45.To the sandy suicide bombing attack in Baghdad which killed over 250

:53:46. > :53:49.people, it was carried out by the people whose origins lie in the

:53:50. > :54:01.aftermath of the invasion. By any measure, the occupation of Iraq has

:54:02. > :54:09.been catastrophic. The decision to invade Iraq on flawed intelligence

:54:10. > :54:15.has had a devastating impact. It has led to a fundamental breakdown in

:54:16. > :54:19.the trust of politics and the institutions of government. The

:54:20. > :54:30.tragedy is that probably government got horrifically wrong, many people

:54:31. > :54:38.actually got it right. In February 2003, when 1.5 million people and

:54:39. > :54:43.millions of others across the world marched against the impending

:54:44. > :54:51.conflict. It was the biggest demonstration in British study. It

:54:52. > :54:58.was not that those of us who opposed the war and the brutality or the

:54:59. > :55:04.claims of Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship. Indeed, many of

:55:05. > :55:08.campaigned against the Iraqi regime during its most bloody period when

:55:09. > :55:18.the British government and the United States administration

:55:19. > :55:27.actually supported that resume. -- regime. The weapons of mass

:55:28. > :55:33.destruction evidence was flimsy at best. We went to war without United

:55:34. > :55:40.Nations authorisation and that was profoundly dangerous. We knew it

:55:41. > :55:44.would be resisted by force and set off a series of uncontrollable and

:55:45. > :55:48.destructive events. Only this house had been able to listen to the

:55:49. > :55:54.wisdom of many of our members of Parliament when he voted against

:55:55. > :56:00.waiting for United Nations authorisation. The course of events

:56:01. > :56:04.may have been different. All but 16 members of the official opposition

:56:05. > :56:09.supported the conflict while many in my party voted against that as did

:56:10. > :56:15.others in other opposition parties. The members here today on all

:56:16. > :56:26.benchers who voted against the conflict but none others should take

:56:27. > :56:31.any satisfaction in this report. All offers. We cannot have a running

:56:32. > :56:36.commentary on statements made from the front bench. Members of this

:56:37. > :56:42.house know me well enough that I want all opinions to be expressed.

:56:43. > :56:48.The Prime Minister gets a lot of time he is accustomed to that. The

:56:49. > :56:53.Right Honourable gentleman is quite entitled to be here. If you want to

:56:54. > :57:01.talk away, please leave the chamber. We have to be saddened and no

:57:02. > :57:13.reflect on that. In addition to the British servicemen and civilians

:57:14. > :57:19.killed, those who voted against the war have not lived long enough to be

:57:20. > :57:29.vindicated. First, let us remember Robin Cook. He stood up 13 years ago

:57:30. > :57:35.and said in a few hundred words, he foresaw the tragedy to come. The

:57:36. > :57:41.report has rightfully dug deep into the litany of feel your of the

:57:42. > :57:49.occupation, the calamitous decision to stand down the Iraqi army and to

:57:50. > :57:54.dissolve the entire Iraqi state. The reality is that it was the original

:57:55. > :58:01.decision to follow the United States president into this war in the most

:58:02. > :58:12.volatile region in the world. This is what led to every other disaster.

:58:13. > :58:14.This government dossier that Iraq possessed weapons of mass

:58:15. > :58:22.destruction which could be deployed in 45 minutes is one of the most

:58:23. > :58:29.notable of the deceptions. As we helped in the enquiry, we knew that

:58:30. > :58:34.the claim of the dossier was to make the case for war rather than set out

:58:35. > :58:43.the case for requiring more intelligence. It not only sparked

:58:44. > :58:50.off the disaster in Iraq, but also in the surrounding region. We have

:58:51. > :59:02.seen a rise in the region of warring militias and terrorist groups. The

:59:03. > :59:08.former head of MI5 me clear to the enquiry, there are many other

:59:09. > :59:14.lessons which need to be learned by our government, our Parliament, as

:59:15. > :59:19.well as my party in every other party. We need to be more open and

:59:20. > :59:26.independent relationship with the united nations -- states. We need to

:59:27. > :59:32.uphold international law and the authority of the United Nations. It

:59:33. > :59:38.always seeks peaceful solutions to international problems. We also need

:59:39. > :59:45.a much stronger oversight of security and intelligence services.

:59:46. > :59:51.We need Parliament APSAC over future decisions to go to war based on

:59:52. > :00:00.information, not just that given at the government 's discretion. In the

:00:01. > :00:11.wake of Iraq, our own and other Western governments increasingly

:00:12. > :00:15.resort to hybrid forces, we need to ensure that the use of the likes of

:00:16. > :00:22.drones is subject to proper Parliamentary scrutiny. There are no

:00:23. > :00:23.more important decisions that a member of Parliament would get asked

:00:24. > :00:34.to make. The very least the country should

:00:35. > :00:40.expect that a vigorous and objective evidence on which to base decisions.

:00:41. > :00:44.We know the house was misled in the run-up to war and the house must now

:00:45. > :00:49.decide how it shall deal with it. Just as all those who took the

:00:50. > :00:53.decision is laid bare in a Chilcot Report must face up to the

:00:54. > :00:57.consequences of their actions. Later today I will meet a group of

:00:58. > :01:03.families of military service men and women who lost loved ones, Iraqi

:01:04. > :01:12.veterans and Iraqi citizens who lost loved ones during the war. I will be

:01:13. > :01:17.discussing with them the decisions taken by the Government that led the

:01:18. > :01:21.country to war with the terrible consequences. Quite bluntly, there

:01:22. > :01:27.are huge lessons for every single one of us. We make decisions that

:01:28. > :01:31.have consequences that don't just go on for the immediate years, they go

:01:32. > :01:36.on for decades and decades afterwards. We need to reflect

:01:37. > :01:41.seriously before we take any decisions again to take military

:01:42. > :01:45.action without realising the consequences of those will live with

:01:46. > :01:51.all of us for many decades to come and have often incalculable

:01:52. > :01:54.consequences. Let me briefly respond. I want to

:01:55. > :01:59.leave as much time for colleagues to make the points. He is right to

:02:00. > :02:03.praise the families for the dignity. I understand the regret of the time

:02:04. > :02:08.taken and we all feel that. The point I would be is when you have an

:02:09. > :02:12.independent report you must allow it to be independent and let the German

:02:13. > :02:18.make their own decisions so while it has been frustrating the frustration

:02:19. > :02:22.is better than intervention. -- let the chair man make their own

:02:23. > :02:27.decisions. In terms of the timer read to make the report that I can

:02:28. > :02:31.really the bought and did not want politicians to be given more time

:02:32. > :02:38.than the families themselves which is why the ATM deadline was set. He

:02:39. > :02:44.is right to say -- 8am deadline. He is like to see the report finds that

:02:45. > :02:54.the intervention MySpace or Al-Qaeda. But violent Islamist

:02:55. > :03:01.extremism -- intervention left space for. It is important for us to

:03:02. > :03:06.remember that. In terms of the litany of failures I urge him, I

:03:07. > :03:10.have been able to read the executive summary and some other bits and I'm

:03:11. > :03:15.sure colleagues well and there are litany of failures such as the

:03:16. > :03:21.disbanding of the Army, the failure to plan for the aftermath. I think

:03:22. > :03:26.they are powerful point made by Sir John Chilcot. In terms of lessons to

:03:27. > :03:32.learn, I thought many of his points we have already put in place. Proper

:03:33. > :03:36.Cabinet discussion, parliamentary votes, oversight of the intelligence

:03:37. > :03:40.agency. I would urge him, before calling up with even more ways to

:03:41. > :03:47.oversee our intelligence agencies, I urged colleagues from around the

:03:48. > :03:50.house to look at the way the intelligence and security --

:03:51. > :03:54.intelligence and security committee now works. We do need to read, I

:03:55. > :04:00.think, our intelligence services was a clear set of instructions rather

:04:01. > :04:05.than change them every five minutes. The War Powers act, I think this is

:04:06. > :04:08.something discussed in the two day debate. I have looked at it

:04:09. > :04:13.carefully and have concluded that is not the right thing to do and I

:04:14. > :04:19.believe we would get into a legal mess. Clearly, the house should be

:04:20. > :04:26.beat it. On the issue of the US, he calls for an open partnership --

:04:27. > :04:31.should debate it. I do not believe the USA is always right but our

:04:32. > :04:35.partnership with them is vital to national security and I feel his

:04:36. > :04:38.approach is the USA is always wrong and while they are not always right

:04:39. > :04:47.they are our best partner and we should work with them. I don't think

:04:48. > :04:52.any of us will have time for 3.8 million words but it is very

:04:53. > :04:55.carefully judged and thought through and you should read it in

:04:56. > :05:02.conjunction with this statement Sir John get a date which is a birdie at

:05:03. > :05:09.the of this 200 page summary. -- which is an articulate. We all need

:05:10. > :05:13.time to study the many damning conclusions in this report and what

:05:14. > :05:17.how this catastrophic decision was reached. But the Prime Minister

:05:18. > :05:21.doesn't say we should read it and the light of future lessons for the

:05:22. > :05:31.machinery of Government. -- the Prime Minister doesn't say. What I

:05:32. > :05:33.know my next -- does say. What I know the introduction of the

:05:34. > :05:36.security Council was a good innovation and his successor should

:05:37. > :05:43.be recommended whether or not we should return to the pre-Blair time

:05:44. > :05:48.of fool collective Cabinet responsibility. With proper time for

:05:49. > :05:53.meetings proper information and studied conclusions and whether we

:05:54. > :05:56.should not also look at whether parliamentary accountability of

:05:57. > :06:02.these things should be reconsidered so there are full and properly

:06:03. > :06:08.informed debate is here held in good time for, in this case, the military

:06:09. > :06:15.are deployed and everything is set and the position is irreversible. We

:06:16. > :06:20.need to go back to a much more collective and accountable form of

:06:21. > :06:23.Government. Might right honourable friend make

:06:24. > :06:26.some good points. In terms of Cabinet responsibility you need to

:06:27. > :06:34.have a Cabinet meeting and discussion but I would not try and

:06:35. > :06:38.substitute that for what the work the security Council does. Having

:06:39. > :06:42.sitting around you the head of MI5, MI6, chief of the defence staff,

:06:43. > :06:47.they are sitting there as equal members, able to tell you what they

:06:48. > :06:52.think. That debate is more valuable than simply listening to other

:06:53. > :06:56.secretaries of state, although they are also there as well. I still

:06:57. > :07:01.think that is the best place to do that. In terms of the parliamentary

:07:02. > :07:06.debate, we should happen and it is good to have a reasonable time. One

:07:07. > :07:10.of the issue with Iraq was it was so close to the point of decision many

:07:11. > :07:14.colleagues felt to vote in a different weight was somehow to let

:07:15. > :07:21.down our troops on the eve of the going vitally important decision. --

:07:22. > :07:26.a vitally important decision. You can I thank the Prime Minister for a

:07:27. > :07:29.fast sight of his statements and a a few short hours this morning to look

:07:30. > :07:34.at the millions of words in the report. Today we remember the

:07:35. > :07:39.hundreds of thousands of people who died in Iraq, Iraqi civilians, and

:07:40. > :07:45.of course the 179 UK service personnel who lost their lives. It

:07:46. > :07:50.is a sombre day for their families and our hearts go out to them. The

:07:51. > :07:55.report we are considering now will be pored over in the days and weeks

:07:56. > :07:59.and months ahead is and it should be the first step in learning the

:08:00. > :08:08.lessons from the UKbut most shameful foreign policy action in decades. In

:08:09. > :08:14.paragraph 416 of the executive summary the Chilcot Report confirms

:08:15. > :08:22.on the 28th of July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush saying, I

:08:23. > :08:30.will be with you whatever. Frankly, it is remarkable that the primer

:08:31. > :08:35.Minister did not think that was even noteworthy to mention in his

:08:36. > :08:42.statement to the house. My first question to the primer Minister is

:08:43. > :08:46.why? Given much of the debates rests about the rationale of the Prime

:08:47. > :08:50.Minister of the time signing up to whatever course of action in the

:08:51. > :08:57.United States was prepared to pursue. On intelligence, the report

:08:58. > :09:02.concludes, paragraph 807, the assessed intelligence had not

:09:03. > :09:07.established beyond doubt either Saddam Hussein had continued to

:09:08. > :09:10.produce chemical and biological weapons or efforts to develop

:09:11. > :09:15.nuclear weapons continued. I completely understand why the

:09:16. > :09:21.families of dead and injured UK service personnel and hundreds of

:09:22. > :09:28.thousands of Iraqis will feel they were deceived about the reasons for

:09:29. > :09:31.going to war. I completely understand why they also feel let

:09:32. > :09:37.down when it came to the post-conflict situation and the

:09:38. > :09:44.Chilcot Report catalogues in graphic detail the fielders in planning for

:09:45. > :09:48.post-conflict Iraq. In paragraph 630 of the executive summary, when Mr

:09:49. > :09:53.Blair set out the UK's vision for the future of Iraq and the House of

:09:54. > :09:57.Commons on the 18th of March 2003, nor assessment had been made of

:09:58. > :10:00.whether that vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with

:10:01. > :10:06.the United States only workable post-conflict plan, you are in

:10:07. > :10:15.opposition had not been secured and there had been no decision on the UN

:10:16. > :10:19.role in post-conflict Iraq. Paragraph 814 says Mr Blair, who

:10:20. > :10:23.recognise the significance of the post-conflict phase, did not press

:10:24. > :10:28.President Bush for definite assurances about US plans and he did

:10:29. > :10:31.not consider or seek advice on whether the absence of a

:10:32. > :10:35.satisfactory plan called for reassessment of the terms of the

:10:36. > :10:40.UK's engagement and did not make agreement on such a plan at

:10:41. > :10:46.condition of UK participation in militant action. In fact, the

:10:47. > :10:55.Chilcot Report concludes, I quote from paragraph 857, the UK did not

:10:56. > :11:00.achieve its objectives. The lack of planning has also been evident since

:11:01. > :11:08.in relation to Afghanistan, to Libya, Syria and most recently with

:11:09. > :11:15.absolutely no plan whatsoever in regards to Brexit. The web at UK

:11:16. > :11:19.governments of either Tory or Labour issue actually start learning from

:11:20. > :11:24.the mistakes of the past so we are not condemned to repeat them? I hope

:11:25. > :11:29.and I expect in the months ahead there will be the opportunity to

:11:30. > :11:35.hold to account those who are associated and responsible for

:11:36. > :11:40.taking the UK to war in Iraq. There is -- that has only caused hundreds

:11:41. > :11:42.of thousands of deaths. Not just that, it has undermined people's

:11:43. > :11:47.faith in Parliament and Government in the UK and left an indelible

:11:48. > :11:51.stain on Britain's standing in the world.

:11:52. > :11:54.But the fact the right honourable gentlemen for his remarks. He

:11:55. > :12:00.rightly says it is a sombre P and Q is correct to do that. He

:12:01. > :12:07.highlighted -- a sombre day and he is correct. He highlighted that...

:12:08. > :12:14.He asked me specifically about why I did not mention the specific Tony

:12:15. > :12:19.Blair notes to President Bush. I was trying to be careful in my statement

:12:20. > :12:23.to accurately summarise what Sir John Chilcot has said and I did have

:12:24. > :12:28.a whole section in my statement saying about the processes and

:12:29. > :12:35.Senator John Fiennes, crucial point where made personal commitments to

:12:36. > :12:39.Mr Bush that had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. It is worth

:12:40. > :12:45.reading Sir John Chilcot's statement this morning about that. He focuses

:12:46. > :12:49.on paragraph 630 which says Mr Blair said that the UK's vision for the

:12:50. > :12:56.future of the back though assessment had made if that was achievable and

:12:57. > :13:00.no plan that I post-conflict plan with the USA. That is what of the

:13:01. > :13:08.most powerful passages in the report and he's right to draw attention to

:13:09. > :13:12.it. I do not accept that all the same failures are apparent in some

:13:13. > :13:16.weight when it comes to planning in Afghanistan. I do not accept that.

:13:17. > :13:23.Afghanistan there was a very clear connection between a Caliban regime

:13:24. > :13:27.that was playing host to Al-Qaeda that a Caliban. And the goal of

:13:28. > :13:33.Government policy which I supported which was to make sure that conflict

:13:34. > :13:37.could not become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and there was some

:13:38. > :13:41.considerable success in pursuing that. There was a huge amount of

:13:42. > :13:46.planning into the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan and we are

:13:47. > :13:50.still engaged in that. There is a plan, it UK an officer training

:13:51. > :13:54.academy to strengthen the army. As I said earlier, you can all be planned

:13:55. > :13:58.in the world but these are very difficult things to get right. These

:13:59. > :14:02.saying there is no point in ever taking part in these interventions

:14:03. > :14:06.are trying to help these countries that is a different position and he

:14:07. > :14:12.should be honest and say that. But I would argue that with Afghanistan,

:14:13. > :14:18.Libya and Brexit we have set out what the alternatives are, that does

:14:19. > :14:24.not mean they are easy. The Foreign Affairs Committee stage

:14:25. > :14:29.an enquiry into the conduct and Libya to take into the -- into

:14:30. > :14:33.account the conclusions into the Iraq enquiry. Given the central

:14:34. > :14:41.conclusions could be said to apply to some degree on the other to

:14:42. > :14:44.Libya, not least the central stabilisation planning been

:14:45. > :14:57.described by a colleague as danceable rot and as under desktop

:14:58. > :15:00.exercise -- rot. So the reaching of the analysis of machinery of

:15:01. > :15:10.Government changes he outlined earlier to the member for Angus can

:15:11. > :15:14.be properly assessed. I think the Foreign Secretary will

:15:15. > :15:18.be giving evidence. The Prime Minister is always asked to give

:15:19. > :15:22.evidence to every select committee and I try to stick to answering

:15:23. > :15:25.questions here and the Liaison Committee and also the national

:15:26. > :15:29.security committee because that brings together a number of

:15:30. > :15:32.committees so I do not think it will be possible but I always consider

:15:33. > :15:35.any requests. Can I first wholeheartedly endorse

:15:36. > :15:42.the game at the Prime Minister needs about those who lost their lives --

:15:43. > :15:47.wholeheartedly endorse. But I wholeheartedly endorse the remark.

:15:48. > :15:52.Does he agree each of us in Cabinet or in this house who are responsible

:15:53. > :15:56.and who should take responsibility for our individual decisions,

:15:57. > :16:01.albeit, taken in good faith on the basis of evidence before us.

:16:02. > :16:08.Equally, does he agree the men of hatred and death in Al-Qaeda and

:16:09. > :16:12.Isil should take responsibility for their actions and the hall art they

:16:13. > :16:19.inflict on others? The honourable lady is right. I

:16:20. > :16:22.speak as someone who was a relatively new backbencher listening

:16:23. > :16:26.to the arguments and I think everyone who voted for the conflict

:16:27. > :16:32.has to take their share of responsibility. I do not choose to

:16:33. > :16:36.go back and see if I knew now what I know now that I knew then what are

:16:37. > :16:42.you now and all the rest of it. I believe you must take responsibility

:16:43. > :16:48.and liberty consequences. She makes a good point about the evil of his

:16:49. > :16:53.violent extremists that I live with the consequences. This problem and

:16:54. > :16:58.are worlds -- love with the consequences. The problem existed

:16:59. > :17:03.before the Iraq and we are doing all sorts of things to combat it. While

:17:04. > :17:08.the debate about Iraq is vital we must not let it sapped our energy

:17:09. > :17:13.for dealing with this cancer in our world which is killing us and our

:17:14. > :17:20.own country. The Prime Minister referred to the

:17:21. > :17:23.aim of this war as weapons of mass destruction but if I can for his

:17:24. > :17:33.attention back to the document from Tony Blair to the American

:17:34. > :17:38.president, it goes on later to say, the reason for this is getting a bit

:17:39. > :17:46.of Saddam Hussein is the right thing to do. Regime change, not WMD. This

:17:47. > :17:51.fact and the fact that, as Sir John Chilcot said, player's, Smith made

:17:52. > :17:59.it difficult for the UK to withdraw support later on. -- player's

:18:00. > :18:05.commitment. This leads to a deceit of the House of Commons. Sir John

:18:06. > :18:09.has been careful about avoiding accusing the previous Prime Minister

:18:10. > :18:15.of lying to the house but this evidence suggests he did. What

:18:16. > :18:19.action can he take about that? He makes an important point. I have had

:18:20. > :18:24.longer than anyone else to do this report but it is trying to get to

:18:25. > :18:28.the bottom of this particular issue is difficult. What Sir John Chilcot

:18:29. > :18:33.seems to say if British Government had a policy of coercive diplomacy

:18:34. > :18:37.and wanting to use the threat of military action to get Saddam to

:18:38. > :18:42.comprehensively asylum. Everyone will have to read the report and

:18:43. > :18:48.come to their own conclusions. -- comprehensively disarm. From my

:18:49. > :18:54.reading, Sir John Chilcot is not accusing anyone of deliberate

:18:55. > :18:59.deceit. But everyone got the wrong conclusions. Today today we stand

:19:00. > :19:09.alongside -- their own conclusions. We stand alongside the British

:19:10. > :19:14.servicemen and women died and many more who suffered injuries serving

:19:15. > :19:18.their country. We are proud of them and honour them. The Chilcot Report

:19:19. > :19:22.makes clear the absolute determination of the former Prime

:19:23. > :19:26.Minister to pursue war in Iraq no matter the evidence. There is a

:19:27. > :19:31.stark contrast between that single-minded determination to go to

:19:32. > :19:37.war and the reckless and complete absence of any plan for what would

:19:38. > :19:42.come next. What came next is 179 but the service men and women killed.

:19:43. > :19:50.What came next is 100,000 or more Iraqi civilians killed. And what

:19:51. > :19:55.came next is the fuelling of what is now Isis which threatens the safety

:19:56. > :20:00.of all of us. The much missed Charles Kennedy said in this house

:20:01. > :20:03.in 2003, the big fear many of us have is this will simply agree to

:20:04. > :20:07.further generations of suicide bombers. When the Prime Minister now

:20:08. > :20:12.take the opportunity because of party and is house to acknowledge

:20:13. > :20:15.Charles Kennedy was right all along in ridding the opposition across

:20:16. > :20:25.this country against the culpable dog of war and should not those who

:20:26. > :20:27.accuse Charles Kennedy of appeasement apologised to his

:20:28. > :20:33.family, our servicemen and women and the people of Iraq.

:20:34. > :20:36.My recollection of the debates as there were honest disagreements

:20:37. > :20:40.between colleagues and making the decisions. I do not think anyone

:20:41. > :20:46.should be accused of appeasement for voting against the war, not sure

:20:47. > :20:50.people who voted in favour of it, in good faith, and evidence they had,

:20:51. > :20:59.be subject to unfair criticism either. People who voted for the

:21:00. > :21:05.four, like me, must it was sure of responsibility but it is not right

:21:06. > :21:08.to accuse people of appeasement. I was Shadow International

:21:09. > :21:11.Development Secretary and asked 91 written questions of the Government

:21:12. > :21:16.culminating in an opposition they debate on the 30th of January 2003

:21:17. > :21:23.because I had not received any satisfactory answers. With the Prime

:21:24. > :21:28.Minister, for the sake of the many, many victims are the house we have

:21:29. > :21:33.truly learnt a lesson on a failure to plan for contingency.

:21:34. > :21:37.I remember how affected might honourable friend was an holding

:21:38. > :21:41.those debates, many debates. People say we did not be great post-war

:21:42. > :21:52.reconstruction but we did a debate it endlessly. -- people say we did

:21:53. > :21:56.not debate. There was an assumption the UN with moving compounds of late

:21:57. > :21:59.when it did not or the US had a plan when it didn't order the assumption

:22:00. > :22:07.British troops would be out in a three or four months. It is one of

:22:08. > :22:11.the cleanest areas of criticism and should be accepted most clearly and

:22:12. > :22:18.won for any future conflict we must plan for most carefully.

:22:19. > :22:23.I thank the Prime Minister for summing up the main findings

:22:24. > :22:30.although, unlike him, I have not had the opportunity to read the summary.

:22:31. > :22:34.Would he agree that in 2003 when I voted for before and he voted for

:22:35. > :22:41.the war and many of our colleagues voted for the war, we did it on the

:22:42. > :22:52.basis of the we had. Iraq was in breach of 17 UN resolutions in 2003.

:22:53. > :22:58.Saddam Hussein in 1988, already had killed 500,000 of his own people. He

:22:59. > :23:12.went on to kill more and more, this year and the South, the currents in

:23:13. > :23:18.the north -- Shai in the south. If you stood by the mass grave were

:23:19. > :23:22.many thousands of Iraqi bodies lie undiscovered, those of us who

:23:23. > :23:27.campaign for human rights over many years in Iraq and myself for over 30

:23:28. > :23:32.years, were well aware of the torture and horrors happening in

:23:33. > :23:38.that country and I wish people would ask Iraqis what they think of the

:23:39. > :23:44.invasion. Because many Iraqis are grateful, Mr Speaker, we took the

:23:45. > :23:48.action we did at that time. I hope we have greater opportunity to

:23:49. > :23:55.discuss these matters because that was sought planning, not enough, I

:23:56. > :24:00.agree, but there was some. -- some planning. The horrors of Saddam

:24:01. > :24:07.Hussein and what he did to his own people were clearly documented and I

:24:08. > :24:11.think we will -- we were right to take part in that invasion.

:24:12. > :24:16.I well remember the speeches of the right honourable lady. She made very

:24:17. > :24:22.powerful speeches about the appalling things Saddam Hussein did

:24:23. > :24:26.to his own people. That is a fair point. I also think, when the case

:24:27. > :24:30.was made and people were acting on the knowledge in front of them and

:24:31. > :24:33.it was not just on weapons of mass destruction but a sense we were

:24:34. > :24:37.trying to uphold the position of the United Nations and the massive

:24:38. > :24:45.danger he posters on people. But we must be frank, the consequences of

:24:46. > :24:50.what follows have been truly very poor and that is what Sir John

:24:51. > :24:53.finds. And in this section when he talks about the objectives of the

:24:54. > :24:58.Government not being met and that far from dealing with the problem of

:24:59. > :25:03.potential the linking up with terrorists which Tony Blair talked

:25:04. > :25:06.about at this dispatch box, this dead end up creating a space for

:25:07. > :25:12.Al-Qaeda. We must learn all of the lessons. -- this dead end up

:25:13. > :25:16.creating. Would my right honourable friend

:25:17. > :25:20.agree there are lessons for every member of this house and every

:25:21. > :25:24.member of the media as to how we assess evidence. We can no longer

:25:25. > :25:31.take refuge in the pretence we did not know the evidence about the

:25:32. > :25:34.nonexistence weapons of mass destruction the report says the

:25:35. > :25:38.incest intelligence did not established beyond doubt Saddam

:25:39. > :25:41.Hussein continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or

:25:42. > :25:46.efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. But evidence was set out

:25:47. > :25:50.in the dossier and as I showed in evidence to the Chilcot Report, if

:25:51. > :25:54.you read the dossier line by line you could not fail to reach the same

:25:55. > :25:59.conclusion as Robin Cook, that they were no weapons of mass destruction.

:26:00. > :26:03.The fact we did not or are very largely did not reach that

:26:04. > :26:11.conclusion is because we ceased to look at evidence and rely on

:26:12. > :26:14.briefings from spin doctors and front benches. If this house is to

:26:15. > :26:18.get a grip of issues in the future it must go back to looking at the

:26:19. > :26:20.evidence itself and so do journalists.

:26:21. > :26:25.What I would say to my right honourable friend is a lot of things

:26:26. > :26:29.have changed since that evidence was produced in the way it was an one of

:26:30. > :26:36.the most important things is the renewed independence of the joint

:26:37. > :26:41.intelligence committee. Ministers do still see individual pieces of

:26:42. > :26:46.intelligence and one wants to have a regular updates, but the process of

:26:47. > :26:50.producing reports and assessments is incredibly rigorous so I do not

:26:51. > :26:55.think that what happens could happen again in the same way because the

:26:56. > :27:01.report you would get from the joint intelligence committee, I think, are

:27:02. > :27:04.now much clearer about what they do know and what they think and what

:27:05. > :27:10.they conjecture, rather than anything else. That does not solve

:27:11. > :27:15.the problem for the house because it is impossible to share all of that

:27:16. > :27:20.information widely with every Member of Parliament.

:27:21. > :27:24.Can I join others in paying tribute to the ex-service personnel who died

:27:25. > :27:29.in Iraq and the hundreds of thousands of civilians. One of the

:27:30. > :27:33.greatest scandals out of this whole episode is the lack of resources for

:27:34. > :27:39.our troops sent into battle without the equipment is the needed and this

:27:40. > :27:44.was never -- must never be allowed to happen again. Can the Prime

:27:45. > :27:47.Minister set out why he believes the National security machinery he has

:27:48. > :27:52.established would have forced all the evidence mistakes made in

:27:53. > :27:59.Whitehall -- forestalled the mistakes in the run-up to Iraq.

:28:00. > :28:03.On the issue of equipment, the money for our armed services is not

:28:04. > :28:08.infinite but what we have done is get rid of the black hole in the

:28:09. > :28:11.defence budgets and resources and commitment are more in balance and

:28:12. > :28:17.also by having a security and defence review every five years.

:28:18. > :28:22.Means you are matching what you spend to the things your forces and

:28:23. > :28:28.security actually require. That is a big improvement but it depends on

:28:29. > :28:31.having the resources. I try to explain by the National security

:28:32. > :28:35.Council architecture helps solve some of these problems but I am not

:28:36. > :28:39.saying you can completely reduce any risk of mistake or planning because

:28:40. > :28:46.these things are very complicated by their nature.

:28:47. > :28:52.Human institutions will never be perfect nor are the perfect role.

:28:53. > :28:57.But the conclusions of the Chilcot enquiry as to the way in which legal

:28:58. > :29:01.advice was processed, intelligence was processed and intelligence was

:29:02. > :29:08.used to inform policy are pretty damning. Mr Speaker, my right

:29:09. > :29:13.honourable friend has rightly highlighted that much has changed

:29:14. > :29:21.since then and certain I can vouch for the fact that the processes are

:29:22. > :29:26.rather different from those that Sir John identified. When it comes to

:29:27. > :29:32.the coalition of intelligence which is an extremely difficult skill, is

:29:33. > :29:39.my right honourable friend satisfied this is subject to enough scrutiny

:29:40. > :29:43.and review, subsequent, to ensure lessons can be learned when mistakes

:29:44. > :29:49.in intelligence assessment and made? Because this seems to me to be one

:29:50. > :29:50.of the key areas in which future decision-making is capable of

:29:51. > :30:04.continuing improvement. Firstly, there we legal advice is

:30:05. > :30:07.produced is very different to the then it was. We have the National

:30:08. > :30:24.Security Council. Before decisions are made, written legal advice has

:30:25. > :30:36.to be produced. With regard to the collation of evidence is difficult

:30:37. > :30:43.to answer. They are incredibly rigorous about reaching judgments

:30:44. > :30:58.and not pretending to know things it does not know. How do we test that?

:30:59. > :31:03.There is maybe a rule for the IOC end that. But with all the

:31:04. > :31:09.intelligence and briefings in the world, you have to make a decision.

:31:10. > :31:19.You clearly really have perfect information. You are weighing up a

:31:20. > :31:25.balance of risks. In the end, you have to do this defend yourself on

:31:26. > :31:29.the grounds of the decision you have made. The epitaph on Robin Cook 's

:31:30. > :31:41.headstone in Edinburgh reads as follows, I mean not have stopped the

:31:42. > :31:55.war, but I did manage to get the parliament to decide on it. Does the

:31:56. > :32:03.Prime Minister agree that the main element in the debate in which

:32:04. > :32:13.Parliament decided was not the 45 minute claim. It was the fact that

:32:14. > :32:21.Saddam Hussein and his murderous regime had spent 13 years running

:32:22. > :32:26.rings around the United Nations, ignoring 17 resolutions. Including

:32:27. > :32:33.those calling for all necessary means to stop him. Was that not the

:32:34. > :32:42.main issue? As the Prime Minister found any evidence whatsoever of any

:32:43. > :32:48.lies told to Parliament on that day? My name any of the debate is that it

:32:49. > :32:52.was about the balance of risk between action and inaction and a

:32:53. > :32:59.case made by the then Prime Minister was that there was a real risk of

:33:00. > :33:03.inaction. You had someone denying the United Nations who had done

:33:04. > :33:07.terrible things to his own people. That coming together with a

:33:08. > :33:15.potential programme for weapons of mass destruction and this is all

:33:16. > :33:24.taking place in a climate -- claim that of post 9/11. Weapons of mass

:33:25. > :33:30.destruction was part of the picture, but not the whole picture. With

:33:31. > :33:37.regard to deceit, I do not see in here he accusation of the audit the

:33:38. > :33:40.seat but there is information that was not properly presented,

:33:41. > :33:44.different justifications given before for the action that was taken

:33:45. > :33:55.and another of other criticisms of the processors. I do not think the

:33:56. > :34:07.Prime Minister who voted for this war should in any way feel ashamed

:34:08. > :34:18.of what the dead. The factors that we believe the Prime Minister at the

:34:19. > :34:22.time. Frankly, some others walked into the no lobby and it was a

:34:23. > :34:26.neural decision. But there is no point having recriminations know.

:34:27. > :34:33.Can we draw a lesson for the future, should we distinguish between

:34:34. > :34:41.authoritarian regimes that we must can tear declare and contain them

:34:42. > :34:51.and totalitarian and terrorist regimes which we must be prepared to

:34:52. > :35:00.destroy? On this argument, I think he is absolutely right. That is a

:35:01. > :35:07.difference between pre-emptive action when there is a direct

:35:08. > :35:12.threat. It is very important that we distinguish when we are thinking of

:35:13. > :35:25.the sort of interventions. There is also a third option. There is also

:35:26. > :35:32.the situation with regards to a resume running out of control, which

:35:33. > :35:40.is why I voted for us to take action in Libya. Many of us do not regret

:35:41. > :35:47.the fact that Saddam Hussein was no longer in power. As was powerfully

:35:48. > :35:53.set out a moment ago, does the Prime Minister recognise that one of the

:35:54. > :36:00.wider lessons is that we need a United Nations that is capable of

:36:01. > :36:03.giving effect to the responsibility to protect so that brutal dictators

:36:04. > :36:11.who modelled and terrorise their own people can and will be held to

:36:12. > :36:16.account? The rate honourable gentleman speaks with great clarity

:36:17. > :36:22.on these issues. We need the United Nations to be able to do that. That

:36:23. > :36:27.is why be sometimes end up in a situation with a right to take

:36:28. > :36:39.action because of easy tool in the United Nations Council are some

:36:40. > :36:41.things becomes morally right. We need to keep informing the United

:36:42. > :36:47.Nations so we bring these two things together. We all agree that war is a

:36:48. > :36:55.last resort once other options have been exhausted, the publication of

:36:56. > :37:00.the report, will the Prime Minister now do something which no government

:37:01. > :37:05.has done since 2003 finely and unequivocally admit that the

:37:06. > :37:12.intervention was wrong and the mistake. I think we need to beat the

:37:13. > :37:17.report and come to our own conclusions. The aftermath of the

:37:18. > :37:23.conflict was profoundly disastrous in so many ways. I do not move away

:37:24. > :37:28.from that. I take the view that if you fought it, you cannot turn the

:37:29. > :37:44.clock back and the best you can do is learn the lessons of what went

:37:45. > :37:50.wrong. At .20, in March 2003, diplomatic options had not been

:37:51. > :38:07.exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort. We are

:38:08. > :38:10.going to leave the House of Commons. They are responding to a statement

:38:11. > :38:19.from the Prime Minister on the Chilcot Report. It is a report

:38:20. > :38:26.backing codes there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein before

:38:27. > :38:36.the war. The decision to take military action was taken before all

:38:37. > :38:42.other options have been exhausted. The documents in the report were

:38:43. > :38:47.previously classified. One of the important memos is that Tony Blair

:38:48. > :38:57.rates to President Bush saying I will be with you whatever. He also

:38:58. > :39:10.says that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction capability. It goes on

:39:11. > :39:18.to say any link to 9/11 is tenuous. In another, he rates this is the

:39:19. > :39:29.moment when you can define international politics and the new

:39:30. > :39:35.post-cold war world order. A lot of criticism of Tony Blair and his

:39:36. > :39:41.government. Reading it very carefully this morning or at least

:39:42. > :39:45.part of it, many of the relatives of the 179 service personnel from the

:39:46. > :39:47.United Kingdom who died in Iraq. I am joined by a couple of the

:39:48. > :39:58.relatives. You famously stood relatives. You famously stood

:39:59. > :40:05.against Tony Blair in his constituency back in 2005. Are you

:40:06. > :40:11.pleased by the report. We have waited seven years for it? We have

:40:12. > :40:21.waited too long but it is well worth the wait. It is decisive. I was

:40:22. > :40:29.expecting a lightweight report. But Sir John Chilcot a sunny thoroughly

:40:30. > :40:39.good job. The first dozen pages says it all. There was put intelligent,

:40:40. > :40:46.cultivation between Tony Blair and President Bush, equipment problems.

:40:47. > :40:49.Nor planning in place for the post-war Iraq. He has done a

:40:50. > :41:00.thoroughly good job. I am pleasantly surprised. Roger, we are waiting for

:41:01. > :41:03.Tony Blair to give a statement. We have here at he will take

:41:04. > :41:08.responsibility for any mistakes without exception or excuse. We are

:41:09. > :41:18.expecting a press conference with them in a few minutes. But did you

:41:19. > :41:30.think of the report, will you impressed, as well? Yes, I did come

:41:31. > :41:35.in with reservations, as well. One would like to have been locked in a

:41:36. > :41:42.little room with it by oneself about whale. That was not possible

:41:43. > :41:45.obviously. But I think he has done a very thorough job. There are all

:41:46. > :41:53.sorts of criticisms about intelligence gathering, the decision

:41:54. > :41:59.to go to wear, the lack of planning in the aftermath. What struck you

:42:00. > :42:08.most? The one thing that stood out and he made a point of it in his

:42:09. > :42:19.speech, was over the snatch Land Rover. The failure to replace it. To

:42:20. > :42:26.explain to viewers, this was the tape of Land Rover that British

:42:27. > :42:36.troops used to patrol Basra. They did not have adequate protection.

:42:37. > :42:50.When a bomb goes off, it was like a knife through butter. You could not

:42:51. > :42:57.prevent a hit on a snatch Land Rover. The two of done something

:42:58. > :43:01.about it. As soon as they get out there and realise we are being

:43:02. > :43:03.attacked by these improvised explosive devices and people are

:43:04. > :43:12.being killed, something needs to be done about it. They did far too

:43:13. > :43:19.little and too late. That was the thing for me which really came out.

:43:20. > :43:23.That was the standout product. What happens though? In terms of the

:43:24. > :43:29.families, you have said that everyone really needs to digest the

:43:30. > :43:35.report. It will take your foil to do that. What do you do know as

:43:36. > :43:43.families going ahead? Do you want to pursue legal action against members

:43:44. > :43:50.of the Tony Blair government? We cannot ever be taken into war on

:43:51. > :44:00.this sort of situation. Needs to be accountability before these are

:44:01. > :44:04.taken. It was a shambolic episode. We know who all these people are and

:44:05. > :44:14.we want them to see some sort of accountability. We want action which

:44:15. > :44:21.is appropriate. It has been passed over to lawyers. Can I just draw

:44:22. > :44:29.your attention to one area where Sir John Chilcot alludes to the fact

:44:30. > :44:35.that we have concluded that the circumstances in which it was

:44:36. > :44:42.justified that there was a legal basis for action are far from

:44:43. > :44:49.satisfactory. That is the sort of thing we have to address. Thank you

:44:50. > :44:55.both very much for your time. We can talk to the former weapons inspector

:44:56. > :44:59.who was a key player at the time. This was at the time when they were

:45:00. > :45:05.trying to decide whether Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass

:45:06. > :45:09.destruction. He was the former chief weapons inspector for the United

:45:10. > :45:13.Nations. I do not know if you have managed to see some of the key

:45:14. > :45:21.findings in the report, but I wonder what your reaction is to it? It is

:45:22. > :45:32.very good at is finally been made public. It is being compiled by a

:45:33. > :45:38.very respected person. I have only had a chance to see the highlights.

:45:39. > :45:44.At the time, in the build-up to the war, I remember being in Iraq

:45:45. > :45:48.following some of your inspectors as they try to find these weapons of

:45:49. > :45:57.mass destruction but could not find any. At the time, did you think

:45:58. > :46:01.Saddam Hussein still had some? We carried out about 700 inspections at

:46:02. > :46:09.various sites in Iraq. We did not find any. We told Tony Blair and

:46:10. > :46:24.they security council that we had not found any. I had conversation on

:46:25. > :46:33.the telephone with Tony Blair and I talked about this intelligence they

:46:34. > :46:37.were referring to. I said we had found very little but he was

:46:38. > :46:45.convinced that the weapons existed, which turned out to be wrong. Do you

:46:46. > :46:59.have do you think Tony Blair and George Bush were intent on going to

:47:00. > :47:06.war, regardless of the evidence? I do not have any evidence that they

:47:07. > :47:11.were acting in bad faith. But it was remarkably bad political judgment.

:47:12. > :47:18.When you're weapons inspectors were looking for the weapons, they were

:47:19. > :47:29.following reports from British and American intelligence. We now know

:47:30. > :47:36.that these were flawed. Yes, they give as many dozens of different

:47:37. > :47:45.sites and we carried out the inspections at these places without

:47:46. > :47:53.finding anything. The inspectors on the ground did not find what these

:47:54. > :47:57.reports at Taunton. Was your advice to the British and American

:47:58. > :48:03.governments that the need to take more time and not invade when

:48:04. > :48:12.needed. Perhaps postpone it until the end of the year of the following

:48:13. > :48:18.year? Really guarded ourselves as international civil servants. We

:48:19. > :48:21.just carried out the inspections. It was for the Security Council and the

:48:22. > :48:32.governments to work out the future action. You cannot prove a negative.

:48:33. > :48:34.We could see was we have carried out all the inspections as

:48:35. > :48:48.professionally as possible and have not found anything. The majority of

:48:49. > :48:57.the sick Security Council did not want to accept a second resolution

:48:58. > :49:03.accepting the war. I think that was the major flaw with that. If the

:49:04. > :49:10.Security Council had authorised the war, everyone would've been very

:49:11. > :49:18.critical of the United Nations. Thank you very much for joining us.

:49:19. > :49:21.The former chief weapons inspector for the United Nations. We are

:49:22. > :49:26.expecting to hear from Tony Blair in the next few minutes. We can go over

:49:27. > :49:34.to the House of Commons to join Vicky Young. David Cameron has had

:49:35. > :49:39.more time than most read this huge report. He has been laying out the

:49:40. > :49:45.findings. He has been talking about the lessons which need to be a way.

:49:46. > :49:49.He says changes have already been made. The implementation of the

:49:50. > :49:52.National Security Council. The needs to be a climate where officials can

:49:53. > :50:03.challenge what politicians are saying. He says the legacy of the

:50:04. > :50:10.report should not be that people should feel unable to trust security

:50:11. > :50:18.or intelligence services. Having made the decision, do you feel

:50:19. > :50:27.deceived at all of what was put in front of you as evidence? No, I do

:50:28. > :50:30.not. It says very clearly was that what the Prime Minister said to the

:50:31. > :50:37.Cabinet was what he genuinely believed. That is what we believe

:50:38. > :50:42.that the team. David Davis came closest to seeing the Prime Minister

:50:43. > :50:50.lied and deceived the House of Commons. I was sorry to hear that.

:50:51. > :50:56.He was assuming that the Chilcot Report would back him up and it did

:50:57. > :51:06.not. It is about time he acknowledged it. Jeremy Corbyn of

:51:07. > :51:11.course, we know his strong views. But some MPs while he was speaking

:51:12. > :51:21.without telling him to sit down. They were calling him a disgrace. He

:51:22. > :51:27.repeated what his views and he is perfectly entitled to do that. What

:51:28. > :51:33.will be the legacy of the Iraq war and the report? Two things, that is

:51:34. > :51:38.no doubt he highlights the devastating effects which up arose

:51:39. > :51:48.after works. Also, he makes it plain that, actually, there was no attempt

:51:49. > :51:55.to deceive. There was no interference with intelligence. I

:51:56. > :52:01.hope that people will, to a degree, accept that. People have taken it

:52:02. > :52:07.for granted that there was a different outcome. He also said

:52:08. > :52:13.there was no collusion with President Bush. He does not find

:52:14. > :52:22.that to be the case. The way decisions were made? He is sceptical

:52:23. > :52:25.about that. My own view is that the Cabinet was kept much better

:52:26. > :52:30.informed than perhaps you get the flavour of the report. I have not

:52:31. > :52:36.had a chance to beat it quite in-depth. We had a number of the key

:52:37. > :52:44.conversations about that, but I accept there was not the degree of

:52:45. > :52:51.formality you might normally expect. The House of Commons will have the

:52:52. > :53:01.two-day debate on this next week. Thank you very much, that is Vicky

:53:02. > :53:07.Young, our political correspondent. We can go to our Sheffield studio.

:53:08. > :53:17.How much of the report have you been able to take on? I am extremely

:53:18. > :53:25.disappointed and demoralised from the bits I can pick up. In force

:53:26. > :53:31.since? Other relatives seem actually that Sir John Chilcot has done the

:53:32. > :53:43.family is proud. Many of them are very positive about it. I am not

:53:44. > :53:49.arguing that he has done a thorough job, but I am concerned that people

:53:50. > :53:56.who took inappropriate decisions at the time were not up to the job.

:53:57. > :54:05.People in government at the time and people in intelligence, taking the

:54:06. > :54:12.decision to go to war based on that. They did not even plan for the

:54:13. > :54:19.future beyond that. Pilot is good that is exposed, it is disappointing

:54:20. > :54:25.to me that none of the people involved appear to actually have

:54:26. > :54:34.been exposed. There are a lot of silly 12 take time to read the

:54:35. > :54:41.report and, but I'm not rule out taking action against Tony Blair in

:54:42. > :54:52.court. No one has actually stated that Tony Blair acted illegally. But

:54:53. > :54:59.I need time for this to sink in. As for going to court, I have no time

:55:00. > :55:10.or interest in that. Tell us about how your son died. Also, the huge

:55:11. > :55:19.grief you have heard since then. He was supporting a convoy and a sniper

:55:20. > :55:28.hit him under the arm. Because he was wearing armour, the shell and

:55:29. > :55:38.say post and did not leave much. Everything changes. To me

:55:39. > :55:45.personally, it getting intensified as the shortcomings with regard to

:55:46. > :55:52.the military action which has been highlighted in the report. Thank you

:55:53. > :56:04.very much for joining us. We can speak to the Cabinet member who was

:56:05. > :56:09.culture Minister back then. There are some very strong criticism of

:56:10. > :56:18.the Tony Blair government. With regard to the legality of the war

:56:19. > :56:25.and the aftermath, in relation really to the scale of the Tony

:56:26. > :56:27.Blair government. It seems to be a very presidential style of

:56:28. > :56:42.government. Is that how you remember that? I would say two things. It is

:56:43. > :56:47.a very long report. Before making a judgment, those of us who were part

:56:48. > :56:52.of it will need to read it thoroughly. I hope the publication

:56:53. > :56:57.brings some comfort to the families who lost their loved ones. Going

:56:58. > :57:09.back to your point about judgment, the important thing, although I have

:57:10. > :57:15.not read the report, I have seen the major points, there is no accusation

:57:16. > :57:27.of falsification of intelligence. There is a judgment that the war was

:57:28. > :57:38.legal and the Cabinet was not misled. There was feel your in the

:57:39. > :57:46.aftermath. The team who compiled the report have highlighted that. This

:57:47. > :57:53.has cast a long shadow over military policy. I am very glad this has been

:57:54. > :58:00.published. I hope it will set out a constructive framework in the future

:58:01. > :58:05.in areas of conflict where Britain may be involved. This is a

:58:06. > :58:09.devastating critique of the Tony Blair government. Let me read the

:58:10. > :58:20.report. I think it rests on judgments made. Not an illegal war,

:58:21. > :58:25.no deception of Cabinet and no question of there being a war plan

:58:26. > :58:35.with President Bush. Indeed, Tony Blair and the whole Cabinet saw the

:58:36. > :58:41.engagement of the United Nations and try to set up peace negotiations as

:58:42. > :58:48.part of it. Thank you for joining us. Tony Blair is going to be giving

:58:49. > :58:53.a news conference very shortly. We will bring you the live. In the

:58:54. > :58:55.meantime, letters take a look at the weather.