0:00:24 > 0:00:26Good evening everybody. It is good to be with you and it is
0:00:26 > 0:00:33particularly good to see so many friendly faces in the audience. In
0:00:33 > 0:00:36Parliament last week, the Defence Secretary explained that the
0:00:36 > 0:00:41analysis and threats of the 2015 strategic defence and security
0:00:41 > 0:00:45review remain... What he did observe is that these threats have a
0:00:45 > 0:00:49diversified and become more serious. And at a faster pace than we
0:00:49 > 0:00:53expected. Hence of the Government initiated the national security
0:00:53 > 0:00:59capability review last July which, for defence, remains ongoing.
0:00:59 > 0:01:02Contrary to speculation, no decisions had yet been made. I am
0:01:02 > 0:01:06very grateful therefore to be given the chance is evening to elaborate
0:01:06 > 0:01:11on the threats and what I believe we should be doing about it. Hopefully,
0:01:11 > 0:01:19to create some debate. A particular thanks to our USI for hosting us. In
0:01:19 > 0:01:23terms of that, I should start with international terror prison. It
0:01:23 > 0:01:26seems to me that significant progress has been made against a
0:01:26 > 0:01:34Daesh in Iraq and Syria the prospects of pants that, and
0:01:34 > 0:01:42prospects of the caliphates on the ground has... We've seen the
0:01:42 > 0:01:44phenomenon that Daesh represents emerging in other parts of the
0:01:44 > 0:01:49world. Of course, we have learned, sadly, over the last few years, that
0:01:49 > 0:01:54anyone can become terrorist these days simply by renting a vehicle or
0:01:54 > 0:02:01wielding a machete. Terrorism is clearly a very significant factor to
0:02:01 > 0:02:06our country. In the short term, it is vital that we protect our
0:02:06 > 0:02:09population while recognising that the long-term solution is to fix the
0:02:09 > 0:02:15causes of it which are invariably a lack of education, lack of
0:02:15 > 0:02:20opportunity and a growing feeling of exclusion and isolation. Often, I
0:02:20 > 0:02:23suspect, coupled with a lack of opportunity and therefore a sense of
0:02:23 > 0:02:29impotence. This is a sense of worry in many European countries, but in
0:02:29 > 0:02:34the Middle East and North Africa, when local politics, regional
0:02:34 > 0:02:38dynamics and the geopolitical situation are overlaid, it becomes a
0:02:38 > 0:02:43book a problem. Resulting, I suspect, in a complicated tapestry
0:02:43 > 0:02:47of factors with extremist groups exploiting the chaos to seize
0:02:47 > 0:02:53territory and carve out an even larger foothold for themselves to
0:02:53 > 0:02:56launch attacks, including recruiting and inspiring our own citizens to of
0:02:56 > 0:03:04terror. The next threat I will touch on, I think, are the longer-term
0:03:04 > 0:03:08implications of population movements and how that might affect his
0:03:08 > 0:03:11ability and the cohesion of our society.
0:03:11 > 0:03:11ability and the cohesion of our society. Looking
0:03:12 > 0:03:12ability and the cohesion of our society. Looking
0:03:12 > 0:03:12ability and the cohesion of our society. Looking
0:03:12 > 0:03:13ability and the cohesion of our society. Looking specifically at
0:03:13 > 0:03:17Africa, according to the United Nations, Africa is expected to
0:03:17 > 0:03:22account for more than half of the world's population growth between
0:03:22 > 0:03:242015 and 2050. Nearly all of
0:03:24 > 0:03:24world's population growth between 2015 and 2050. Nearly all of this
0:03:24 > 0:03:28growth will be among the 49 countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
0:03:28 > 0:03:34Some two billion people by 2025. By then more than half of Africans will
0:03:34 > 0:03:43be living in cities. People will be connected by mobile devices. Without
0:03:43 > 0:03:46economic growth matching population growth, it is inevitable that we
0:03:46 > 0:03:52will see more movement. But I think it is the rising threats are from
0:03:52 > 0:03:58states and the consequences that stem from this for the military that
0:03:58 > 0:04:02is of the most immediate concern and particularly, to me, as the head of
0:04:02 > 0:04:08the Army. We now live in a much more competitive multipolar world. The
0:04:08 > 0:04:11complex nature of the global system has created the conditions in which
0:04:11 > 0:04:17states are able to compete in new ways short of what we would have
0:04:17 > 0:04:23defined as war in the past. It is quite US defence Secretary Mattis
0:04:23 > 0:04:28described last week has great power competition. I quote, "We will
0:04:28 > 0:04:33continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists that we are
0:04:33 > 0:04:38engaged in today, but great power competition, not terrorism, is now a
0:04:38 > 0:04:44primary focus of US national security." And I think viewed from
0:04:44 > 0:04:49his perspective, with increasing competition in the South China Sea,
0:04:49 > 0:04:53the potential grave consequences of North Korea's nuclear programme, the
0:04:53 > 0:04:58arms race in a proxy wars that you see playing out in Yemen and Syria
0:04:58 > 0:05:04that perhaps stem from Iran's regional aspirations, with Russia,
0:05:04 > 0:05:07the most complex and capable security challenge we have faced
0:05:07 > 0:05:12since the Cold War superimposed on much of it, it would be difficult to
0:05:12 > 0:05:17think on that basis not to agree with Jim Mattis's assessment. We
0:05:17 > 0:05:23reading, though, all of the states have become masters at exploiting
0:05:23 > 0:05:30the scenes between peace and war. What constitutes a weapon in this
0:05:30 > 0:05:34grey area no longer has to go Bango. Energy, cash, as bribes, corrupt
0:05:34 > 0:05:39business practises, cyber attacks, assassinations, fake news,
0:05:39 > 0:05:42propaganda, and military intimidation are all examples of the
0:05:42 > 0:05:49weapons used to gain advantage in this era of constant competition.
0:05:49 > 0:05:53The rules a base international architecture that has assured our
0:05:53 > 0:05:58stability and prosperity since 1945 is, I suggest, therefore threatened.
0:05:58 > 0:06:05This is not a crisis. Or a series of crises. Which we face. Rather, it is
0:06:05 > 0:06:09a strategic challenge and I think it requires a strategic response. The
0:06:09 > 0:06:15deduction that we should draw from this is that there is no longer to
0:06:15 > 0:06:20clear distinct states of peace and war. We now have several forms.
0:06:20 > 0:06:26Indeed, the character of war and peace is different for each of the
0:06:26 > 0:06:32contexts in which the weapon systems are applied. At the risk we run in
0:06:32 > 0:06:37not defined as clearly and acting accordingly is that rather like a
0:06:37 > 0:06:41chronic contagious disease, it will creep up on us and our ability to
0:06:41 > 0:06:44act will be markedly constrained and we will be the losers of this
0:06:44 > 0:06:53competition. The arts exponent of this is Russia, has described as the
0:06:53 > 0:06:59Prime Minister in her speech at last autumn. I said earlier I believe it
0:06:59 > 0:07:02represents the most complex and capable state the based at the to do
0:07:02 > 0:07:07our country since the end of the Cold War. My fellow chiefs of staff
0:07:07 > 0:07:11from the United States, France and Germany, shared this view at
0:07:11 > 0:07:17Leicester's land warfare conference. -- at last year's land warfare
0:07:17 > 0:07:22conference. We analyse threats on the basis of capability and intent.
0:07:22 > 0:07:24Let's examine Russian capability for a moment and how they are applying
0:07:24 > 0:07:30it. We mustn't interpret what we see as a revival of Russian Cold War
0:07:30 > 0:07:42practise, of course. Nor look at the Crimean operation alone. They use a
0:07:42 > 0:07:45multimodal approach. Utilising conventional, unconventional and
0:07:45 > 0:07:52nuclear domains. A hybrid version that might involve little green men,
0:07:52 > 0:08:00big green tanks and huge green... They are it -- in their thinking is
0:08:00 > 0:08:06possible. The staff is able to change and evolve. They know that
0:08:06 > 0:08:10demography is not on their side. So they are developing a capability
0:08:10 > 0:08:16that needs fewer men. For example, missiles, drones and two-man tanks.
0:08:16 > 0:08:23They have developed coherent concepts for training that are
0:08:23 > 0:08:26focused on her vulnerabilities. For example, our dependency on
0:08:26 > 0:08:33communications and IT. Our lack of masked files and perhaps our lack of
0:08:33 > 0:08:37investment in your defence. They apply the ruthless focus on
0:08:37 > 0:08:40defeating their opponents, not seizing ground for the sake of it,
0:08:40 > 0:08:44but making sure that our vital ground is denied to us and I should
0:08:44 > 0:08:50return to missile capability in a moment. Since 2016, we have seen a
0:08:50 > 0:08:57marked shift to cyber, to subversion and into coercion, as well as
0:08:57 > 0:09:01sophisticated use of Samir campaigns and fake news. Whether you believe
0:09:01 > 0:09:06in interference and that democratic process in United States or that
0:09:06 > 0:09:11coup in Montenegro, they are examples of this. Chris Donnelly, at
0:09:11 > 0:09:14the Institute for statecraft, suggest they are creating new
0:09:14 > 0:09:19strategic conditions. Their current influence and disinformation
0:09:19 > 0:09:26campaign is a form of the system warfare that seeks to delegitimize
0:09:26 > 0:09:28the physical and social system on which our military strengths is
0:09:28 > 0:09:35based. This undermines our centre of gravity, which they rightly assessed
0:09:35 > 0:09:44as our political cohesion Tama cohesion. -- political cohesion.
0:09:44 > 0:09:49This systemic worker has to be defeated. One has to recognise the
0:09:49 > 0:09:53importance of messaging ones intent and the importance of deterrence.
0:09:53 > 0:09:57The doctrine for war utilises all of the instruments of national power,
0:09:57 > 0:10:02not just the military. They believe that any shooting war must be
0:10:02 > 0:10:07finished quickly if it is to be successful. Their instinct will be
0:10:07 > 0:10:12to escalate and to speed up the tempo of operations. To avoid being
0:10:12 > 0:10:17surprised, they believe in preemption without log
0:10:17 > 0:10:21neutralisation. They will do something that their opponent least
0:10:21 > 0:10:26expects. They have used Syria to develop in expeditionary capability
0:10:26 > 0:10:30to give a very large numbers of their officers behind and were
0:10:30 > 0:10:40fighting experience -- give their large numbers of officers were
0:10:40 > 0:10:47fighting experience. Their conventional military posture gives
0:10:47 > 0:10:51them a calculable military advantage. They operate on interior
0:10:51 > 0:10:55lines with a very capable rail and transportation network. We saw that
0:10:55 > 0:11:02during Leicester's exercise and how effective it is. And they believe in
0:11:02 > 0:11:06connecting to strategic zones, the West, the Arctic, the Black Sea and
0:11:06 > 0:11:12the far east. And rapidly switching forces between them. In the last
0:11:12 > 0:11:18five years, the number of air, maritime and land based platforms
0:11:18 > 0:11:21for longer-range missiles has increased by a factor of 12. That is
0:11:21 > 0:11:31in the last five years. Gerasimov spoke last year about how they
0:11:31 > 0:11:37increased the range of missiles by a factor of 30. This gives them the
0:11:37 > 0:11:41capability to create mobile missile domes, shields which they can assure
0:11:41 > 0:11:47their freedom to manoeuvre and to deny us the ability to act. This is
0:11:47 > 0:11:53what we call anti-access area denial. We've seen this interior
0:11:53 > 0:11:58with a capacity to seal airspace over significant distances. The use
0:11:58 > 0:12:02of electronic warfare at the scale two Q precise targeting by large
0:12:02 > 0:12:09numbers of drones. That enable very accurate and instantaneous fires.
0:12:09 > 0:12:12Including thermal baric warheads to destroy opponents's forces. We have
0:12:12 > 0:12:20seen this in Ukraine. During last year's exercises, debuts the
0:12:20 > 0:12:23opportunity to suppress and, more worryingly, to distort the GPS
0:12:23 > 0:12:30signal across much Scandinavia. Now, a vivid indication of the skill of
0:12:30 > 0:12:32the modernisation is clear from three minute video clip I am now
0:12:32 > 0:12:36going to show you. This was run on Russian TV a couple of years ago.
0:12:36 > 0:12:41You don't need to understand the Russian, to simply listen to the
0:12:41 > 0:12:46tone of the commentary. The key point is that what you will see is
0:12:46 > 0:12:49all new stuff and at the 20 17th state plan that shows even more has
0:12:49 > 0:13:59followed since this.
0:15:54 > 0:15:58Of course we have to accept that this is information warfare at its
0:15:58 > 0:16:04best that you can agree it is an eye watering quantity of capability. The
0:16:04 > 0:16:10other part of the threat is how one assesses intent. I'm not in any way
0:16:10 > 0:16:13going to suggest that what Russia wants to go toward the traditional
0:16:13 > 0:16:16definition of the term but there are factors that bear on the question of
0:16:16 > 0:16:19intent and one needs to understand Russian psyche, their culture and
0:16:19 > 0:16:24their philosophy of preemption. Brush I think could initiate
0:16:24 > 0:16:30hostilities sooner than we expect and sooner than we would in similar
0:16:30 > 0:16:36circumstances. Must likely they will use nefarious, Sabin Merino article
0:16:36 > 0:16:43Article five actions to erode the capability of Nato and erode... This
0:16:43 > 0:16:47is a divide and rule which the international order is designed to
0:16:47 > 0:16:50prevent. I don't think we'll start with little green men in will start
0:16:50 > 0:16:53with something we don't expect, we should not take what we have seen so
0:16:53 > 0:16:58far as a template for the future. There are some who might ask if
0:16:58 > 0:17:02Russia sees itself in decline and more able now to go to war than in
0:17:02 > 0:17:09the future does this encourage them to think of war? Perhaps compare the
0:17:09 > 0:17:12situation today 21912 when the Russian Imperial cabinet assessed
0:17:12 > 0:17:18that it be better to fight now because by 1925 Russia would be too
0:17:18 > 0:17:23weak in comparison to a modernized Germany and of course depend to a
0:17:23 > 0:17:29similar conclusion in 1941. Russia worries I think that the West will
0:17:29 > 0:17:33achieve technological offset in the next decade. I suspect though that
0:17:33 > 0:17:37the greatest risk is the risk of miscalculation. The recent false
0:17:37 > 0:17:42alert in Hawaii that warned of an incoming missile is an indication of
0:17:42 > 0:17:48how easy would be to miscalculate. Particularly when the level of
0:17:48 > 0:17:51militarization is significant and we saw this only to vividly with the
0:17:51 > 0:18:00downing of flight MH 17 over Ukraine in 2014. Speaking recently the
0:18:00 > 0:18:03secretary of defence under Bill Clinton was all-too-familiar with
0:18:03 > 0:18:08false alerts, having been awakened by a call from a night watch officer
0:18:08 > 0:18:11in 1979I thought he was about to experience the Holocaust, and of
0:18:11 > 0:18:19course he also presided over the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in
0:18:19 > 0:18:271990s he warned that it is back. Because the US and Russia are
0:18:27 > 0:18:31retraining the geopolitical dangers of the Cold War and because US and
0:18:31 > 0:18:35Russia are rebuilding their nuclear arsenals that is retreating the
0:18:35 > 0:18:41military dangers of the Cold War. Now you can argue about the extent
0:18:41 > 0:18:47to which the camera and -- Kremlin is disinformation has influenced
0:18:47 > 0:18:51Western countries but the main impact has been to convince ordinary
0:18:51 > 0:18:55Russians that the West as a threat. We've been made to appear as an
0:18:55 > 0:19:00enemy whether we like it or not and whatever the real situation.
0:19:00 > 0:19:04Moreover, we are sided don't have the same level of understanding that
0:19:04 > 0:19:08we had of each other in the Cold War. And the tried and tested
0:19:08 > 0:19:11systems and diplomatic instruments are not what they once were.
0:19:11 > 0:19:17Confidence building measures, arms reduction negotiations, public
0:19:17 > 0:19:22monitoring and inspection of each other's military activity etc. So
0:19:22 > 0:19:25when the ante was upped following the Russian intervention in Ukraine,
0:19:25 > 0:19:29conversation became difficult. Now of course it doesn't have to be like
0:19:29 > 0:19:36that. We now have to worry not about asymmetric Lingfield, as once on the
0:19:36 > 0:19:40Cold War, but an asymmetric one in which there are far more players. So
0:19:40 > 0:19:45we should not assume that evens in the Pacific would not draw more US
0:19:45 > 0:19:50attention than those in Europe. And we should be careful of complacency.
0:19:50 > 0:19:57The parallels of 1914 are stark. Our generation has been used towards the
0:19:57 > 0:20:01choices the Cold War we may not have a choice about conflict with Russia.
0:20:01 > 0:20:06And we should remember trustees to him that you may not be interested
0:20:06 > 0:20:11in more but war is interested in you. So what should we be doing
0:20:11 > 0:20:18differently? First of all I think we should recognise that Russia
0:20:18 > 0:20:22respects strength and people who stand up to them. The original plan
0:20:22 > 0:20:26for Ukraine had been to acquire significantly more terrain however
0:20:26 > 0:20:31Russia was surprised I Ukrainian resistance and had to settle for
0:20:31 > 0:20:37less. We should identify Russian weaknesses and then manoeuvre
0:20:37 > 0:20:42asymmetrically against them. First of all we should be in the business
0:20:42 > 0:20:45of building real institutional capacity in neighbouring states so
0:20:45 > 0:20:50that they have the strength and confidence to stand up to Russia and
0:20:50 > 0:20:53the internal resilience to withstand pressures designed to bring them
0:20:53 > 0:20:58down from within. We should be making more progress on reducing
0:20:58 > 0:21:03energy dependency on Russia. We should retain the Russian population
0:21:03 > 0:21:08what is really going on. We should be protecting our critical
0:21:08 > 0:21:14capabilities, hence the importance of cyber. Bush ability to identify
0:21:14 > 0:21:18our own lawn abilities to Russian disinformation and act to reduce
0:21:18 > 0:21:25them. Next I think we need to demonstrate our preparedness to
0:21:25 > 0:21:29commit boots on the ground is not a positive term at the moment what our
0:21:29 > 0:21:34allies on Nato's eastern flank absently do appreciate that a
0:21:34 > 0:21:39platoon of infantry is worth this squadron of F is that F-16s when it
0:21:39 > 0:21:43comes to commitment. The importance we attach to alliance cohesion, that
0:21:43 > 0:21:50is vital to us that is our centre of gravity. And hence I think the words
0:21:50 > 0:21:53about international by design are actually right. Everything the
0:21:53 > 0:21:58bridge Army is doing at the moment is to work out how we can implement
0:21:58 > 0:22:01international by design. We recognise that our communications
0:22:01 > 0:22:04systems have to be extrovert so that our allies can plug into them. Hence
0:22:04 > 0:22:13the vital importance of the high interoperability -- interoperability
0:22:13 > 0:22:19means that the a level not just a you kill. It is important to have
0:22:19 > 0:22:23shared situational awareness and to be able to control fires digitally
0:22:23 > 0:22:29in support of each other. For me therefore the ability to bring into
0:22:29 > 0:22:34service a new form of environment, tactical communications is vital.
0:22:34 > 0:22:40Our relationship with the UK IT sector to deliver is also vital. It
0:22:40 > 0:22:44is also vital that our human relationships are maximised and for
0:22:44 > 0:22:50example the combined engineering Regiment that Weise share with
0:22:50 > 0:22:55Germany is a very good example of how you can burden share and deliver
0:22:55 > 0:22:58war capability by a partnership. As indeed we do with our French allies
0:22:58 > 0:23:05through the see Jeff. We have to be keyed to improving Nato. We have to
0:23:05 > 0:23:11recognise the readiness is about speed of recognition. Speed of
0:23:11 > 0:23:16decision-making and speed of assembly. I will say that again.
0:23:16 > 0:23:21It's about speed of recognition, speed of decision-making, and speed
0:23:21 > 0:23:28of assembly. Our contributions to the very high readiness joint task
0:23:28 > 0:23:34force way and a Nato and the enhanced forward resins to light in
0:23:34 > 0:23:37Poland but more in Estonia are starting points. I may are good ways
0:23:37 > 0:23:43also of all the national development in terms of our French involvement
0:23:43 > 0:23:48in one and the Dean's in the other. Their starting point because I would
0:23:48 > 0:23:54suggest that we need the ability to reinforce them rapidly. And to be
0:23:54 > 0:24:00able to out manoeuvre the potential anti-access area denial missile dome
0:24:00 > 0:24:05that will be put in place as we seek to reinforce them. We therefore need
0:24:05 > 0:24:10I would suggest to be a will to deploy overland by road and by rail.
0:24:10 > 0:24:14And our strict concept, Street tube project land keep Billy over
0:24:14 > 0:24:21distances of up to 2000 km. That brings with it questions about
0:24:21 > 0:24:24logistics, sustainability as well as well as combat and combat service
0:24:24 > 0:24:29support. However we are testing at the moment of a programme of
0:24:29 > 0:24:33experimentation and we are learning very good lessons. For example, we
0:24:33 > 0:24:39are copying what the Germans do very well and did very well in 1940 when
0:24:39 > 0:24:42all of their prime movers in terms of their tanks and armoured vehicles
0:24:42 > 0:24:47had trainers and by doing that it reduces your logistics tail. Those
0:24:47 > 0:24:49sort of old-fashioned lessons brought forward are definitely
0:24:49 > 0:24:54improving our ability to deploy. We will test this concept I driving to
0:24:54 > 0:24:58the Nato exercise Trident juncture which is taking place in Norway this
0:24:58 > 0:25:05autumn. It's also important thing to stress the need for a forward
0:25:05 > 0:25:08mounting base and therefore we are actively examining the retention our
0:25:08 > 0:25:21infrastructure in Germany where we store our vehicles.
0:25:23 > 0:25:27Next I think it is important to get back to my point of speed of
0:25:27 > 0:25:31recognition and speed of decision-making that we give policy
0:25:31 > 0:25:35makers the opportunity to exercise with military leaders as we need
0:25:35 > 0:25:38during the cold war. This goes to the heart of speed of recognition
0:25:38 > 0:25:42and goes back to the point about how it would be little green men next
0:25:42 > 0:25:47time and when you think about how difficult it is in this era of
0:25:47 > 0:25:51constant competition, where is this grey area between peace and war, the
0:25:51 > 0:25:55first hostile act will be freight difficult to wreck guys. What is a
0:25:55 > 0:25:59young officer I said my trench AUMA on the West German plane, it was
0:25:59 > 0:26:03very clear to me what that very first hostile act or look like I
0:26:03 > 0:26:07always imagined a soldier from the Soviet Union with wire cutters
0:26:07 > 0:26:13cutting the fence before his tanking here. How we exercise the next time
0:26:13 > 0:26:18there and making decisions they may need to make is vital. And a thing
0:26:18 > 0:26:23to do all this we need to return to an annual or biannual Nato exercise
0:26:23 > 0:26:28rhythm in which all levels play from the grand strategic level to the
0:26:28 > 0:26:34tactical level. This would allow for our resources to be properly use
0:26:34 > 0:26:37targeted at for front-line countries to act as mobilisation indeed allow
0:26:37 > 0:26:42us to act train on private land and to understand some of the
0:26:42 > 0:26:45constraints associated with Job points and bridges and railway
0:26:45 > 0:26:51traffic and all that goes with it. -- choke points. We need to prepare
0:26:51 > 0:26:55ourselves to fight the war we might have to fight. I think it is an
0:26:55 > 0:26:59important point because in being prepared to fight the war we might
0:26:59 > 0:27:01have to fight there is a sporting chance that we will prevent it from
0:27:01 > 0:27:07happening. And I think the one of anniversary of World War I gives us
0:27:07 > 0:27:11a great chance to actually think about what that war might look like.
0:27:11 > 0:27:15Therefore in the Army at the moment we have a project under way styled
0:27:15 > 0:27:19as logic Henry Wilson. For the historians amongst youth you'll know
0:27:19 > 0:27:22that Henry Wilson was the Major General who was the director of
0:27:22 > 0:27:27mature operations in 1914 was able to pull a mobilisation plan off the
0:27:27 > 0:27:31shelf and send the British expeditionary force to Flanders. To
0:27:31 > 0:27:37be able to again I think is important.
0:27:37 > 0:27:40If it's important to understand where we maximise the potential of
0:27:40 > 0:27:45all of our manpower. That's why we have invested significant effort in
0:27:45 > 0:27:50a reserve component, but increasingly, also, a regular
0:27:50 > 0:27:54reserve component. I hasten to add that a reserve component is not a
0:27:54 > 0:27:59substitute for the regular component, but it is the means to
0:27:59 > 0:28:02all connected with particularly specialists inasmuch that we are
0:28:02 > 0:28:07doing in drawing pad talent from the medical area, from cyber, and from
0:28:07 > 0:28:12information warfare. It also, of course, about augmenting the mass.
0:28:12 > 0:28:15That recognises that the regular components has never been as small
0:28:15 > 0:28:20as this ugly since Napoleonic times. But it also does for us is to
0:28:20 > 0:28:24provide the basis for regeneration and reconstitution. I have been very
0:28:24 > 0:28:28impressed with the talent that has come forward to join the Army
0:28:28 > 0:28:33reserve, particularly on what he called a terms of service. In our 77
0:28:33 > 0:28:37brigade, which I should come back too, we have some remarkable talent
0:28:37 > 0:28:41when it comes to social media, production design and indeed Arabic
0:28:41 > 0:28:46poetry. Those skills we can't afford to retain an regular components, but
0:28:46 > 0:28:49there is elements of us delivering capability in a much more
0:28:49 > 0:28:53imaginative way then we might have been able to do in the past. We now
0:28:53 > 0:28:57have over 30,000 on the books in terms of the reserve and they are
0:28:57 > 0:29:02available to deploy the regular components if they have got the time
0:29:02 > 0:29:06and their employers can release them whenever they want to. Turning to
0:29:06 > 0:29:14the regular reserve potentially, we have some 25-30,000 would make up
0:29:14 > 0:29:19the regular reserve. This recognises that 50% of the Army beefs before
0:29:19 > 0:29:27the age of 30. Hence much of them are younger and will qualify. At the
0:29:27 > 0:29:32statutory reliability to be... The trick is in retaining contact with
0:29:32 > 0:29:38this force and we are working, at the moment, to the data protection
0:29:38 > 0:29:42issues to make sure that we reinforce that. The goal, I think,
0:29:42 > 0:29:48will be to build on a piloted that we ran last year and to conduct a
0:29:48 > 0:29:52full-blown mobilisation exercise for all of the reserve and the regular
0:29:52 > 0:29:55reserve just like we used to do in the Cold War sometime in the middle
0:29:55 > 0:30:02of next year. As part of this, we were clearly is a priority of the
0:30:02 > 0:30:04regular reserve on skis capabilities like, for example, attack helicopter
0:30:04 > 0:30:12pilots. It is a means of maximizing the potential of all the manpower we
0:30:12 > 0:30:17haven't it will potentially deliver a total armed force of their winter
0:30:17 > 0:30:1940,000 post mobilisation. Quite clearly, if were going to do this,
0:30:19 > 0:30:24we need to have support from the policy level through lawyers to the
0:30:24 > 0:30:28general public as a whole. I think people can understand that perhaps
0:30:28 > 0:30:33for a day in the year, it is logical to be able to retain this
0:30:33 > 0:30:37capability. Next observation I would make is that we need to be able to
0:30:37 > 0:30:41fight differently. Against the sorts of stuff that I set out there. First
0:30:41 > 0:30:49of all, we need a reversion, to counter... And potentially having
0:30:49 > 0:30:56the GPS system taking down. Good night navigation and map reading
0:30:56 > 0:30:59that I was possibly should clearly be a feature of what we're talking
0:30:59 > 0:31:04about here. Next, we have got to be able to fight a more dispersed with
0:31:04 > 0:31:10the ability to concentrate a rapidly to achieve the mass you need. Next,
0:31:10 > 0:31:14we have got to invest in junior leadership, hence I talk much about
0:31:14 > 0:31:19maximizing talent. I thought about our command philosophy that enables
0:31:19 > 0:31:25initiative and tactical habitation at the lowest levels. And have
0:31:25 > 0:31:28centre to further orders, enables people to seize the initiative. That
0:31:28 > 0:31:33is why we are investing in a brain so based a general staff to
0:31:33 > 0:31:37challenge, to think flexibly and to place a premium on adaptability.
0:31:37 > 0:31:41Recognising, of course, that's when we go to war, we definitely will get
0:31:41 > 0:31:45it right on day one and it is that sense of adaptability and agility
0:31:45 > 0:31:57which will give us a chance to prevail.
0:32:00 > 0:32:02Finally, in terms of fighting differently, we need to recognise
0:32:02 > 0:32:04that how and where we train and to retrain with should be a surrogate
0:32:04 > 0:32:07for warfare, as well, given the nature of messaging that comes in
0:32:07 > 0:32:09this era of constant competition that I described. And then, last, in
0:32:09 > 0:32:12terms of help we should do things differently, we need to acknowledge
0:32:12 > 0:32:14that we have some capability issues that have to be addressed. I think
0:32:14 > 0:32:17first, we have to recognise that deterrence needs a set of graduated
0:32:17 > 0:32:23responses to enable escalation. That means that for me, as the CTS, it is
0:32:23 > 0:32:27important that we recapitalize much of the Army's of equipment. You have
0:32:27 > 0:32:33to go back to 1985 the last time we had a major recapitalization
0:32:33 > 0:32:41programme and the capabilities we see not, tank, the armoured fighting
0:32:41 > 0:32:43vehicle, the attacking helicopter vehicle, the South Dakota artillery
0:32:43 > 0:32:47system, were all systems that came in under him and under his thinking
0:32:47 > 0:32:51with this concept at the front end of it. Of course, what is happened
0:32:51 > 0:32:56over the last 15 years is yet been focused on counter urgency and
0:32:56 > 0:33:01civilization. By the end of the Afghan campaign -- counter
0:33:01 > 0:33:07insurgency. Our challenge now is to leap forward given the threats one I
0:33:07 > 0:33:13described. I sense that involves upgrading our armoured infantry.
0:33:13 > 0:33:19Looking at active protection, greater range for our Challenger
0:33:19 > 0:33:23tank. Looking at upgrading Arborg or armoured vehicle. Looking at
0:33:23 > 0:33:28maximizing the potential of the Ajax vehicle that looks like a medium
0:33:28 > 0:33:33tank entry service at the moment. Thinking to service a mechanized
0:33:33 > 0:33:36vehicle to cover lamented. This will be a transformation for the British
0:33:36 > 0:33:40Army and will gets us to manoeuvre in a very different way and to
0:33:40 > 0:33:45protect power over land in a different way. We need to improve
0:33:45 > 0:33:54our... Recognizance. To be able to target the fires because we have to
0:33:54 > 0:34:00divert to an ever we are able to focus on any enemy's uncommitted
0:34:00 > 0:34:03forces, to do battle in which we spoke about. Boss for doing that, to
0:34:03 > 0:34:07protect ourselves from the air and inbound missiles. I touched on
0:34:07 > 0:34:19connectivity. We invest in our ability. We also, then, need to
0:34:19 > 0:34:22continue to improve our ability to fight on this new battlefield. I
0:34:22 > 0:34:26think it is important that we build on the excellent foundation we have
0:34:26 > 0:34:31created for information warfare to our 77 brigade, which is now giving
0:34:31 > 0:34:36us the capability to compete in the war of narratives and the tactical
0:34:36 > 0:34:42level. And as David Patrick care costs put it in his recently
0:34:42 > 0:34:45published book, were an hundred 40 characters, in which she observes on
0:34:45 > 0:34:51the Wharton Ukraine, I was caught up in two wars, one that was fight on
0:34:51 > 0:34:56the ground with tanks and artillery, and in information work for largely,
0:34:56 > 0:35:02though not exclusively, to social media. Counterintuitively, it
0:35:02 > 0:35:09mattered more who won the war of words and narratives than who had
0:35:09 > 0:35:13the most important weaponry. He also reports that social media is
0:35:13 > 0:35:17covering up digital Superman, hyper connected and hyper empowered online
0:35:17 > 0:35:23individuals and I would like a few of those in the 77 brigade, please.
0:35:23 > 0:35:28So, in sum, I have inevitably looked at this through a land of prism, but
0:35:28 > 0:35:33you should recognise that what I am describing is part of the joint
0:35:33 > 0:35:41force. So, to conclude, I believe our the -- our ability to respond
0:35:41 > 0:35:46will be eroded if we don't take enough or not. Weber present a clear
0:35:46 > 0:35:50and present danger. They're not thousands of miles away. They are
0:35:50 > 0:35:55now on Europe's doorstep. The character of warfare is making it
0:35:55 > 0:35:59much harder for us to recognise true intentions and thus distinguish
0:35:59 > 0:36:05between what is peace and what is bore. -- and what just one. Of
0:36:05 > 0:36:08course, he doesn't have to be like this. But we cannot afford to sit
0:36:08 > 0:36:13back. We need to recognise that credible deterrence must be
0:36:13 > 0:36:17underpinned by a genuine capability and genuine commitment that earns
0:36:17 > 0:36:20the respect of potential opponents. Thank you very much.
0:36:20 > 0:36:21CHEERING AND