:00:22. > :00:30.It is frustrating when the FBI refuses to answer this committee's
:00:31. > :00:33.questions. But leaks relevant information to the media. In other
:00:34. > :00:38.words, they don't talk to us, but somebody talks to the media.
:00:39. > :00:44.Director Comey, have you ever been an anonymous source in news reports
:00:45. > :00:55.about matters relating to the Trump investigation or the Clinton
:00:56. > :00:59.investigation? Never. Question two on relatively related... Have few
:01:00. > :01:05.other authorised somebody else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in
:01:06. > :01:11.news reports about the Trump investigation or by investigation?
:01:12. > :01:19.No. Has any classified information relating to President Trump or his
:01:20. > :01:29.associates being declassified and shared with the media? Not to my
:01:30. > :01:34.knowledge. You testified the four by House intelligence committee --
:01:35. > :01:38.before the House intelligence committee that a lot of classified
:01:39. > :01:42.matters have ended up in the media recently. Without getting into any
:01:43. > :01:47.particular article, and I want to emphasise that, without getting into
:01:48. > :01:52.any particular article, is there an investigation of any leaks of
:01:53. > :01:58.classified information relating to Mr Trump or his associates? I don't
:01:59. > :02:04.want to answer that question, Senator, for reasons I think you
:02:05. > :02:08.know. There have been a variety of leaks, leaks are always a problem,
:02:09. > :02:12.but especially in the last 3-6 months. And where there is a league
:02:13. > :02:16.of classified information, the FBI, if that is our information, makes a
:02:17. > :02:20.referral to the Department of Justice, or if it is another
:02:21. > :02:25.agency's information, they do the same, and the DOJ authorises an open
:02:26. > :02:29.of an investigation. I don't want to confirm if there are any
:02:30. > :02:32.investigations open. I want to challenge you on that. The
:02:33. > :02:38.Government regularly acknowledges when it is investigating classified
:02:39. > :02:41.leaks. You did that in the Valerie plane case, what is the difference
:02:42. > :02:45.here? The most important difference is that I don't have authorisation
:02:46. > :02:48.from the Department to confirm any of the investigations they have
:02:49. > :02:51.authorised. It may be that we can get that at some point, but I'm not
:02:52. > :02:56.going to do that in the open setting without having talked to them. You
:02:57. > :03:03.can expect me to follow up on that offer. Sure. There are several
:03:04. > :03:06.senior FBI officials who would have had access to the classified
:03:07. > :03:13.information that was leaked, including yourself and the deputy
:03:14. > :03:17.director. So how can the Justice Department guarantee the integrity
:03:18. > :03:24.of the investigations without designating an agency of than the
:03:25. > :03:28.FBI to gather the facts and illuminate senior FBI officials?
:03:29. > :03:31.Well, I'm not going to once about any particular investigations, but I
:03:32. > :03:37.know of situations in the past where if you think the FBI or its
:03:38. > :03:39.leadership are suspect, you have another investigative agencies abort
:03:40. > :03:44.the investigation by federal prosecutors. It could be done, and
:03:45. > :03:48.it has been done in the past -- support the investigation. Moving on
:03:49. > :03:53.to another subject. The New York Times recently reported that the FBI
:03:54. > :04:00.had found a crumbling e-mail among the ones -- a troubling e-mail among
:04:01. > :04:04.the ones found from Democratic operatives. The e-mail reportedly
:04:05. > :04:11.provided assurances that Attorney General Lynch would project academic
:04:12. > :04:13.written by making sure that -- would protect Secretary Clinton by making
:04:14. > :04:18.sure that the investigation did not go too far. How and when did you
:04:19. > :04:22.first learn of this document? Also, who sent it and who received it?
:04:23. > :04:27.That is not a question I can answer in this forum, Mr Chairman, it would
:04:28. > :04:29.call for a classified response. I have briefly to ship the
:04:30. > :04:33.intelligence committees on that particular issue, but I cannot talk
:04:34. > :04:36.about it here so I have briefed leadership. You can expect me to
:04:37. > :04:43.follow up with you on that point. Sure. What is that that did the FBI
:04:44. > :04:51.take to determine -- what steps did the FBI take to determine if
:04:52. > :04:56.Attorney General Lynch had... Did the FBI interview the person who
:04:57. > :05:00.wrote the e-mail? I cannot talk about that in an unclassified
:05:01. > :05:05.setting. OK, then you can expect me to follow up on that. I asked the
:05:06. > :05:10.FBI to provide this e-mail to the committee before today's hearing.
:05:11. > :05:14.Why haven't you done so? And were you provided by the end of this
:05:15. > :05:18.weeks -- will you provide it? To react to that, I have to give a
:05:19. > :05:25.classified answer, and I can't give it sitting here. So that means you
:05:26. > :05:30.called give me the e-mail? I'm not confirming there was an e-mail,
:05:31. > :05:33.surf. The subject is classified. In an appropriate forum, I would be
:05:34. > :05:39.happy to brief you on it, but I can't do it in an open hearing. I
:05:40. > :05:43.issue that other members of the committee can have access to that
:05:44. > :05:50.briefing if they want -- I assume. I want to talk about going dark, a few
:05:51. > :05:54.years ago you testified before the committee about going dark problem
:05:55. > :05:59.and the inability of law enforcement to access encrypted data despite the
:06:00. > :06:06.existence of a lawfully issued court order. You continue to raise this
:06:07. > :06:10.issue in your public speeches, most recently at Boston College. My
:06:11. > :06:15.question, you mentioned at the beginning in your testimony briefly,
:06:16. > :06:19.but can you provide the committee with a more detailed update on the
:06:20. > :06:24.status of the going dark problem, and how it has affected the FBI's
:06:25. > :06:28.ability to access encrypted data. Has there been any progress
:06:29. > :06:33.collaborating with the technology sector to overcome any problems, at
:06:34. > :06:37.our hearing in 2015 you said you didn't think legislation was
:06:38. > :06:42.necessary. At that time. Is that still your view? Thank you, Mr
:06:43. > :06:45.Chairman. The shadow created by the problem we call going dark continues
:06:46. > :06:54.to fall across more and more of our work. Take devices, for example. The
:06:55. > :06:58.ubiquitous default for this encryption devices is affecting now
:06:59. > :07:03.about half of our work. The first it's months of this fiscal year, FBI
:07:04. > :07:07.examiners were presented with over 6000 devices, forward we have lawful
:07:08. > :07:11.authority, search warrant a court order to open, and 46% of those
:07:12. > :07:16.cases we could not open those devices with any technique. That
:07:17. > :07:21.means half of the devices that we encounter in terrorism cases, in
:07:22. > :07:25.counterintelligence cases, in gang cases, cannot be opened with any
:07:26. > :07:30.technique. That is a big problem. And so the shadow continues to fall.
:07:31. > :07:33.I'm determined to continue to make sure the American people and
:07:34. > :07:37.Congress know about it. I know this is important to the president and
:07:38. > :07:40.the new Attorney General. I don't know yet how the new administration
:07:41. > :07:45.intends to approach it, but it is something we have to talk about,
:07:46. > :07:48.because like you, I care a lot about privacy, I also care a lot about
:07:49. > :08:00.public safety. And there continues to be a huge collision between those
:08:01. > :08:01.two things we care about. I look forward to continuing that
:08:02. > :08:04.conversation, Mr Chairman. You didn't respond to the part about you
:08:05. > :08:07.still have the view that legislation is not needed? I don't know the
:08:08. > :08:09.answer yet. I hope I said last time I talked about this, it may require
:08:10. > :08:12.a legislative solution at some point. The Obama administration was
:08:13. > :08:15.not in a position where they were seeking legislation. I don't know
:08:16. > :08:18.yet how President Trump intends to approach this. I know he spoke about
:08:19. > :08:25.it during the campaign and he cares about it, but it is per for me to
:08:26. > :08:30.say. -- it is premature for me to say. Director, I have one question
:08:31. > :08:35.regarding my opening comment. And I view it as the most important
:08:36. > :08:42.question. And I hope you will answer it. Why was it necessary to announce
:08:43. > :08:46.11 days before a presidential election that you were opening an
:08:47. > :08:53.investigation on a new computer without any knowledge of what was in
:08:54. > :08:57.that computer? Why didn't you just do the investigation, as you would
:08:58. > :09:04.normally, with no public announcement? A great question,
:09:05. > :09:06.Senator, thank you. October 27, the investigative team that had finished
:09:07. > :09:13.the investigation into life focused on Secretary Clinton's e-mail, I met
:09:14. > :09:18.with them later that morning in my conference room. They laid out to me
:09:19. > :09:22.what they could see from the meta data on Anthony Weiner's laptop,
:09:23. > :09:25.that had been seized in an unrelated case. What they could see from the
:09:26. > :09:30.meta data was that there were thousands of Secretary Clinton's
:09:31. > :09:33.e-mails on that device. Including what they thought might be the
:09:34. > :09:37.missing e-mails from her first three months as Secretary of State. We
:09:38. > :09:41.never found any e-mails from her first three months. She was using
:09:42. > :09:45.Akers and blackberry then, that is very important. If there was
:09:46. > :09:53.evidence that she was acting with intent, that is where it would be.
:09:54. > :09:55.But they were not there? , I finish my answer, Senator? They said, we
:09:56. > :09:58.can see thousands of e-mails from the Clinton e-mail domain, including
:09:59. > :10:04.many from the rise and blackberry domain. They said, we think we have
:10:05. > :10:08.to get a search warrant. -- from the Verizon. The Department of Justice
:10:09. > :10:12.agrees, and by authorised them to seek a search warrant, I faced my
:10:13. > :10:16.choice. I have lived my entire career by the solution that you can
:10:17. > :10:20.possibly avoid it, you avoid any action in the run-up to an election,
:10:21. > :10:24.why you might have an impact, but I sat there that morning and I could
:10:25. > :10:28.not see a door labelled no action here. I could see two doors, and
:10:29. > :10:32.they were both actions. One was labelled speaks, the other was
:10:33. > :10:37.labelled conceal. Here is how I thought about it, I want you to know
:10:38. > :10:42.my thinking. Having repeatedly told this Congress, we are done, there is
:10:43. > :10:47.nothing there, there is no case there, to restart in a hugely
:10:48. > :10:51.significant way, potentially finding the e-mails that would like to her
:10:52. > :10:56.intent from the beginning, and not speak about it, that would acquire
:10:57. > :10:59.an active concealment, in my view. I stared at speak and conceal. Speak
:11:00. > :11:04.would be really bad, there is an election in 11 days, that would be
:11:05. > :11:08.bad. Concealing in my view would be catastrophic, not just to the FBI
:11:09. > :11:16.but well beyond. And honestly, between really bad and catastrophic,
:11:17. > :11:18.I said to my team, we've got to walk into the world of really bad, I've
:11:19. > :11:21.got to tell Congress that we are restarting this. Not in some
:11:22. > :11:25.burglars way, in a hugely significant way. -- not in a
:11:26. > :11:30.frivolous way. The team worked night after night and they filed thousands
:11:31. > :11:34.of new e-mails. They found classified information on Anthony
:11:35. > :11:38.Weiner, somehow her e-mails had been forwarded to Anthony Weiner,
:11:39. > :11:41.including classified information, by her assistant, Huma Abedin. They
:11:42. > :11:45.found thousands of new e-mails, they called me the Saturday night before
:11:46. > :11:50.the election and said, thanks to the wizardry of our technology, we have
:11:51. > :11:57.only had to personally read 6000. We think we can finish tomorrow
:11:58. > :12:00.morning, Sunday. I met with them and they said, we found a lot of new
:12:01. > :12:03.stuff. We did not find anything that changes our view of her intent. We
:12:04. > :12:07.are in the same place we were in July. It hasn't changed our view. I
:12:08. > :12:11.asked them lots of questions. I said, OK, if that's where you are I
:12:12. > :12:15.have to tell Congress this is done. This is terrible, it makes me
:12:16. > :12:19.nauseous to think that we might have had impact on the election, but it
:12:20. > :12:22.would not change the decision. Everybody who disagrees with me has
:12:23. > :12:31.to come back to October the 28th with me and stare at this and tell
:12:32. > :12:33.me what you would do. Would you speak or would you conceal? I could
:12:34. > :12:36.be wrong, but we honestly made a decision between those two choices
:12:37. > :12:38.that even in hindsight, this has been one of the world's painful
:12:39. > :12:42.experiences, I would make the same decision, I would not conceal it on
:12:43. > :12:46.October 28 from the Congress. I sent a letter to Congress, I did not make
:12:47. > :12:49.a public announcement, I send a private letter to the chairs on the
:12:50. > :12:52.rankings of the oversight committees. I know it is a
:12:53. > :12:55.distinction without a difference in the world of leaks, but it was very
:12:56. > :13:04.important that I tell them instead of consuming. Reasonable people can
:13:05. > :13:07.disagree, but that is the reason that I made that choice, and it was
:13:08. > :13:09.a hard choice. I still believe in retrospect it was the right choice,
:13:10. > :13:12.as painful as this has been. I'm sorry for the long answer. That you
:13:13. > :13:15.respond, on the letter it was just a matter of minutes before the world
:13:16. > :13:19.knew about it. Secondly, my understanding and the staff has just
:13:20. > :13:20.said to me that you didn't get a search warrant before making the
:13:21. > :13:28.announcement. That is right. We are going to seek
:13:29. > :13:39.a search warrant. I don't see it as a meaningful distinction. It is very
:13:40. > :13:43.hard. You took an enormous gamble, the gamble was that there was
:13:44. > :13:52.something there that would invalidate her candidacy and there
:13:53. > :13:57.wasn't. So one has to look at that action in and say did it affect the
:13:58. > :14:02.campaign? I think most people who have looked at this say, yes it did
:14:03. > :14:09.affect the campaign, why would he do it? Was there any conflict among
:14:10. > :14:15.your staff, people saying do it, people saying don't do it, as has
:14:16. > :14:19.been reported? No. There was a great debate. I have a fabulous staff at
:14:20. > :14:27.all levels and one of my junior lawyers said should you consider
:14:28. > :14:33.that what you are about to do elect Donald Trump president. Hanky for
:14:34. > :14:39.raising that, but I can't consider for a second whose political
:14:40. > :14:44.fortunes will be affected in which way. I had to ask what is the right
:14:45. > :14:48.thing to do. I am proud of the way debated it and everyone on my team
:14:49. > :14:53.agreed that we have to tell Congress that we are restarting this in a
:14:54. > :14:57.hugely significant way. There is a way to do that. I don't know whether
:14:58. > :15:00.it would work, but certainly in a classified way, carrying out your
:15:01. > :15:09.tradition of not announcing investigations. I look at this
:15:10. > :15:17.exactly the opposite way you do. Everybody knew it would influence
:15:18. > :15:21.the investigation before. But there was a very large percentage of
:15:22. > :15:27.chance that it would. And that percentage of chance was taken.
:15:28. > :15:35.There was no information and the election was lost. It seems to me
:15:36. > :15:47.that before your department does something like this, you really
:15:48. > :15:50.ought to... Because another senator began to talk about other
:15:51. > :15:57.investigations and this theory does not hold up when you look at other
:15:58. > :16:00.investigations. Let me go on to 702 because you began your comments
:16:01. > :16:13.saying how important it is and coming yes, it is,. We've got a
:16:14. > :16:18.problem the issue that we need to address as the FBI's practice of
:16:19. > :16:27.searching 702 data using you as person identifiers as query terms
:16:28. > :16:34.and some have called this a unconstitutional back door search.
:16:35. > :16:36.Others see it as essential in ensuring terrorists don't slip
:16:37. > :16:41.through the cracks as they did before. Could you give us your views
:16:42. > :16:47.on that and how it could be handled to avoid the charge which may bring
:16:48. > :16:52.down 702? Thank you, Senator. An important issue. The way 702 works
:16:53. > :16:58.is that under the provision of the statute, the Pfizer Court, federal
:16:59. > :17:07.judges, authorised us as US agencies to collect information overseas if
:17:08. > :17:10.they are using American infrastructure. The criticism we
:17:11. > :17:14.have got since 911 is you have to make sure you are in a position to
:17:15. > :17:23.connect the dots. You can't have stove piped information. We have
:17:24. > :17:28.responded to that, mostly the great work of my process, we collect
:17:29. > :17:32.information under 702, it does not sit in a separate stovepipe. It sits
:17:33. > :17:37.on a single cloud type environment, so that if I am opening an
:17:38. > :17:43.investigation in the United States on a terrorism, criminal matter and
:17:44. > :17:48.I have the name of the suspect, telephone, e-mail addresses, I
:17:49. > :17:51.searched the FBI databases. That search necessarily will also touch
:17:52. > :17:56.the information that is collected by 702 so that we don't miss a dot, but
:17:57. > :18:00.nobody gets access to the information that sits in the 702
:18:01. > :18:05.database unless they have been trained correctly. If there is,
:18:06. > :18:08.let's imagine that terrorists overseas were talking about a
:18:09. > :18:16.suspect in the knighted States, or were Connacht someone's --... We
:18:17. > :18:21.open the case in the United States and put in that name that e-mail
:18:22. > :18:25.address, it will touch that data and tell us that there is information in
:18:26. > :18:32.the 702 database that is relevant. If the agent doing the query is
:18:33. > :18:37.properly trained, they can see that information. If they are trained,
:18:38. > :18:42.they will be alerted and they will have to get the appropriate training
:18:43. > :18:46.to see it. To do it otherwise is to risk asked where it matters most in
:18:47. > :18:51.the United States failing to connect dots. My view is that the
:18:52. > :18:54.information that is the 702 database has been lawfully collected,
:18:55. > :19:02.carefully overseen and checked and our use of it is also appropriate
:19:03. > :19:09.and overseen and checked. You are an masking the data. -- unmasking. I
:19:10. > :19:17.don't know what that means in this context. We collect data collected
:19:18. > :19:21.from a lawful source all on place and we don't miss a dot. What we
:19:22. > :19:27.make sure is that no one can see the information unless they have the
:19:28. > :19:34.appropriate training and oversight. My time is up. Thank you. Senator
:19:35. > :19:49.Hatch. In January I introduced the rapid DNA act. It is bipartisan.
:19:50. > :19:53.Chairman, I want to thank you for putting this bill on the agenda for
:19:54. > :19:58.tomorrow's business meeting. This is the same build that the Senate
:19:59. > :20:02.unanimously passed last year and this technology allows developing a
:20:03. > :20:09.DNA profile and performing database comparisons in less than two hours.
:20:10. > :20:14.The following standards and procedures will allow law
:20:15. > :20:17.enforcement to solve crimes and innocent advocates to exonerate the
:20:18. > :20:22.wrongfully accused. You came before this committee in December 2015 and
:20:23. > :20:25.I asked you then about this legislation. You said it would help
:20:26. > :20:31.us change the world in a very exciting way. Is that still your
:20:32. > :20:36.view of the value of this legislation and do you believe that
:20:37. > :20:39.Congress should act on this without getting tangled up another criminal
:20:40. > :20:45.justice reform issues? I agree very much. Rapid DNA will materially
:20:46. > :20:50.advance the safety of the American people. If the police officer in the
:20:51. > :20:53.United States has in their custody someone who is a rapist, before
:20:54. > :20:56.letting them go on some lesser offence, they will be able to
:20:57. > :21:00.quickly check the DNA database and get a hit that will save lives, that
:21:01. > :21:05.will protect all kinds of people from pain. It is a great thing.
:21:06. > :21:10.Thank you. You're prepared statement touches on what the FBI is doing to
:21:11. > :21:14.protect children from predators. Personnel and youth serving
:21:15. > :21:21.organisation such as employees, coaches, volunteers, often work with
:21:22. > :21:31.unsupervised use. That magnifies the need for a thorough evaluating when
:21:32. > :21:35.they join. I introduced a child protection improvement act which
:21:36. > :21:40.gives youth serving organisation greater access to the nationwide FBI
:21:41. > :21:45.fingerprint background checks system. Do you believe that
:21:46. > :21:48.providing organisations like the YMCA and the Girl Scouts of America
:21:49. > :21:53.greater access to the FBI fingerprint background checks is an
:21:54. > :22:01.important step in keeping child predators and violent criminal away
:22:02. > :22:05.from our children. I do. I think the more information you can put in the
:22:06. > :22:08.hands of the people who are vetting the better. We have an exciting new
:22:09. > :22:14.feature of the FBI's fingerprint system called wrap back, once you
:22:15. > :22:17.check someone was Mike identification, check they have no
:22:18. > :22:23.record. They later develop one, you can be alerted to it if it happens
:22:24. > :22:25.later. That makes a big difference. Thank you for sub is broken at
:22:26. > :22:32.length about the so-called going dark programme. Strong encryption
:22:33. > :22:36.technology enters the ability of law enforcement to access the personal
:22:37. > :22:41.data on smartphones and similar devices. You're prepared testimony
:22:42. > :22:48.for today's hearing addresses this issue. I have expressed significant
:22:49. > :22:50.concern about proposals that would require devices or software
:22:51. > :22:57.manufacturers to build a back door into their programming to allow law
:22:58. > :23:01.enforcement to access a cryptic data in the course of investigations. I
:23:02. > :23:08.remain convinced that such back doors can be created without
:23:09. > :23:13.seriously compromising the security of cryptic devices. I believe this
:23:14. > :23:18.is an issue where law enforcement and stakeholders need to work
:23:19. > :23:22.together to find solutions rather than coming to Congress with one
:23:23. > :23:27.size fits all legislative fixes. What are you doing to engage with
:23:28. > :23:30.stakeholders in this issue and what kind of progress are you making if
:23:31. > :23:35.you can tell us? Thank you. Good news on that front. We have had very
:23:36. > :23:40.open and productive conversations with the private sector over the
:23:41. > :23:44.last 18 months. Everybody realises that we care about the same things.
:23:45. > :23:51.We all love and care about privacy and public safety. None of us want
:23:52. > :23:55.back doors. We don't want access to devices built in in some way. What
:23:56. > :23:59.we want to work with the manufacturers on is to figure out
:24:00. > :24:03.how can we accommodate both interests in a sensitive way? How
:24:04. > :24:05.can we optimise the privacy, security features of their devices
:24:06. > :24:11.and allow court owners to be complied with? We are having good
:24:12. > :24:15.conversations. I don't know where they will end up. If you're going to
:24:16. > :24:29.make devices of the United States is, you figure out how to sort it
:24:30. > :24:38.out. We now have almost a decade of experience using a statute so we
:24:39. > :24:45.have more to go on. The gamut intelligence value of 702 is
:24:46. > :24:49.documented and it has never been intentionally misused or abused.
:24:50. > :24:56.Every federal court has addressed the issue has concluded that 702 is
:24:57. > :24:59.lawful and that both parties have strongly supported it. Describe the
:25:00. > :25:07.targeting and minimisation procedures or section 702 and how
:25:08. > :25:11.each agency's procedures oversee the executive branch. They said my
:25:12. > :25:16.opening, 702 is a critical tool to protect this country. The way it
:25:17. > :25:22.works is we are allowed to conduct surveillance under the supervision
:25:23. > :25:25.of the foreign intelligence court on non-US persons who are outside the
:25:26. > :25:33.net United States if they are using American infrastructure. It does not
:25:34. > :25:37.involve US persons or activity in the United States. Each agency as
:25:38. > :25:42.you said has detailed procedures as to how we will handle this
:25:43. > :25:47.information. It is approved by the Pfizer court. Not only will we
:25:48. > :25:53.overseen the Pfizer court, we are being overseen by the US general.
:25:54. > :25:59.There have been no abuses. Every court that has used this has said
:26:00. > :26:05.this is appropriate under the fourth Amendment, under the statute, it was
:26:06. > :26:09.an act passed by a democratically controlled Congress and then renewed
:26:10. > :26:12.by a Republican-controlled Congress and upheld by every court that has
:26:13. > :26:15.looked at it. I am telling you what the rest of the intelligence
:26:16. > :26:19.community has said, we need this to protect the country. This should be
:26:20. > :26:22.an easy conversation to have, but often people get confused about the
:26:23. > :26:28.details and mix it up with other things. It is our job to make sure
:26:29. > :26:40.we expend it clearly. My time is up. I will turn to you. Welcome back.
:26:41. > :26:45.You mentioned you like the annual meeting. We didn't have one last
:26:46. > :26:53.year. Last year was the first one in 15 years that the FBI did not
:26:54. > :27:02.testify for this committee. A lot has happened in the last year and a
:27:03. > :27:08.half. Senator Feinstein noted that Americans across the country have
:27:09. > :27:13.been confused and disappointed by your judgment in having an
:27:14. > :27:18.investigation into Secretary Clinton's e-mails. On a number of
:27:19. > :27:21.occasions, you chose to comment rectally and extensively on that
:27:22. > :27:32.investigation. You even released internal FBI memos and notes. I have
:27:33. > :27:36.missed this may be, but I have never seen anything like this. You said
:27:37. > :27:49.nothing about the investigation into the Trump campaign into Russia. Was
:27:50. > :27:55.it appropriate for you to comment on one investigation repeatedly and not
:27:56. > :27:59.say anything about the other? I think so. Can I explain? I only have
:28:00. > :28:11.so much time. People forget, we would not confirm
:28:12. > :28:14.the existence of the Hillary Clinton e-mail investigation until three
:28:15. > :28:18.months after it began, even though it began with a public referral and
:28:19. > :28:23.the candidate herself talked about it. In October of 2015, we confirmed
:28:24. > :28:28.it existed and then said not another word, not a peep about it until we
:28:29. > :28:32.were finished. It was a critical time, a couple of weeks before the
:28:33. > :28:40.election. I think there are other things involved in that election.
:28:41. > :28:43.But there is no question that that had a great effect. Historians can
:28:44. > :28:57.debate what kind of an effect it was. But you did do it. In October,
:28:58. > :29:01.the FBI was investigating the Trump campaign's connection to Russia. You
:29:02. > :29:05.sent a letter informing the Senate House that you were reviewing
:29:06. > :29:09.additional e-mails. It could be relevant to this. But both
:29:10. > :29:14.investigations were open but you still only commented on one. I
:29:15. > :29:18.commentated, as I explained earlier, in a letter I sent to the chair and
:29:19. > :29:21.rankings of the oversight committees that we were taking additional steps
:29:22. > :29:25.in the Clinton e-mail investigation because I had passed the fight under
:29:26. > :29:31.oath repeatedly that we were done, that we were finished. -- I had
:29:32. > :29:34.testified under oath. We treated the Trump investigation like the Clinton
:29:35. > :29:38.investigation, we didn't say a word about it until months into it, and
:29:39. > :29:42.we only confirmed that we were investigating. We are not going to
:29:43. > :29:45.say anything about it until we are done, and I don't know when that
:29:46. > :29:50.will be, but that is the way we handled the Clinton investigation as
:29:51. > :29:56.well. That we ask you this, during the investigation into Hillary
:29:57. > :30:01.Clinton's e-mail, a number of people like Rudy Giuliani claimed to have a
:30:02. > :30:06.pipeline to the FBI. Numerous agents talk to them all the time, and I
:30:07. > :30:12.quote. Regarding the investigation. He even said that he had insinuated
:30:13. > :30:18.he had advanced warning about the e-mails described in your October
:30:19. > :30:26.letter. A former FBI agent made similar claims. Either they are
:30:27. > :30:33.lying, or this is a serious problem within the bureau. The FBI during
:30:34. > :30:40.this 2016 campaign have contact with Rudy Giuliani about the Clinton
:30:41. > :30:46.investigation -- did anybody from the FBI? I don't know yet. But if I
:30:47. > :30:51.found out that people were making information about our investigation
:30:52. > :30:56.there will be severe consequence -- that people were leaking. I don't
:30:57. > :31:00.know yet. Do you know anything about other former agents? I don't know
:31:01. > :31:05.yet. But it is a matter that I am very, very interested in. But you
:31:06. > :31:08.are looking into it? Correct. And once you have found that answer,
:31:09. > :31:13.will be provide it to ask was young I will provide it to the committee
:31:14. > :31:19.in some form. I don't know whether I will be able to say it publicly, but
:31:20. > :31:21.I will let you know. There are reports that senior officials in the
:31:22. > :31:26.Trump campaign of penetration are connected to the Russian
:31:27. > :31:34.investigation. Like the Attorney General. Many members of this
:31:35. > :31:39.committee have urged the deputy Attorney General, and he has that
:31:40. > :31:43.authority, to appoint a special console to protect the independence
:31:44. > :31:50.of the investigation. I recall, and I was here in December 2003 shortly
:31:51. > :31:56.after you were confirmed as Deputy Attorney General, then Attorney
:31:57. > :32:00.General Ashcroft accused himself in the investigation of the Valerie
:32:01. > :32:06.plainly. You immediately appointed a special council, I think you
:32:07. > :32:12.appointed... What led you to that decision? In that particular
:32:13. > :32:16.investigation, my judgment was that the appearance of fairness and
:32:17. > :32:19.independence required that it be removed from the political chain of
:32:20. > :32:23.command within the Department of Justice because, as you recall, it
:32:24. > :32:25.seems like a lifetime ago, but that involved the conduct of people,
:32:26. > :32:34.senior level people in the White House. And my judgment was that even
:32:35. > :32:37.I, as an independent minded person, was a political appointee, and I
:32:38. > :32:42.should give it to a career person like Pat Fitzgerald. What about the
:32:43. > :32:45.situation now? We have a Deputy Attorney General, I voted for his
:32:46. > :32:52.confirmation, but should he be not the one to be investigating campaign
:32:53. > :32:56.contacts when his boss, the Attorney General, was a central figure in
:32:57. > :33:01.that campaign? That is a judgment you will have to make. He is, as I
:33:02. > :33:06.hoped I was as deputy Attorney General, is very independent minded
:33:07. > :33:11.career oriented person. It would be premature for me to comment on that.
:33:12. > :33:15.President Trump said that the hacking on the DNC and other efforts
:33:16. > :33:19.to influence the election could have been a lot of different groups. Is
:33:20. > :33:24.that contrary to what the intelligence community has said? The
:33:25. > :33:27.intelligence community with high confidence concluded it was Russian.
:33:28. > :33:31.In many circumstances it is hard to do attribution of a hack. But
:33:32. > :33:37.sometimes the intelligence is there. We have high confidence that the
:33:38. > :33:41.North Koreans hacked Sony, and that the Russians that the hacking of the
:33:42. > :33:49.DNC and other organisations. I have a lot of other questions that I will
:33:50. > :33:59.submit. I want to praise the response of the FBI and South
:34:00. > :34:05.Burlington, for -- Vermont. We had anonymous e-mails coming in,
:34:06. > :34:11.threatening serious action against students at a high school.
:34:12. > :34:15.Escalating cyber threats, including detailed death threats, multiple
:34:16. > :34:21.lockdowns and all. The FBI were close to the college for digital
:34:22. > :34:24.investigation, which you visited a number of years ago. It was a
:34:25. > :34:28.textbook example collaboration between state, local and federal
:34:29. > :34:34.authorities. And I want to thank all of those, it turned out to be very
:34:35. > :34:38.disturbed young man who was doing it. But you only had to turn on the
:34:39. > :34:42.TV and see what happens in different parts of the country, how worried we
:34:43. > :34:47.were in Beaumont. I just want to thank you FBI agents for their help.
:34:48. > :34:56.Thank you, Senator. Senator Graham will be next. Good morning, director
:34:57. > :35:00.Comey. I'm disappointed to see that former Secretary of State Hillary
:35:01. > :35:02.Clinton was in the news yesterday, essentially blaming you and blaming
:35:03. > :35:09.everything other than herself for her loss on November the 8th. I find
:35:10. > :35:14.it ironic, because you're not the one who made the decision to handle
:35:15. > :35:20.classified information on a private e-mail server. You're not the one
:35:21. > :35:24.who decided to have a private meeting with Secretary Clinton's
:35:25. > :35:28.husband in the of the Justice Department's ongoing investigation
:35:29. > :35:31.into Secretary Clinton's server. I use the word investigation here
:35:32. > :35:34.because according to a recent piece in the New York Times you were
:35:35. > :35:38.forbidden from using the word investigation and were instead told
:35:39. > :35:42.to refer to the investigation, which it was, as a matter. Of course, it
:35:43. > :35:47.was the former Attorney General Loretta Lynch who up until that
:35:48. > :35:52.meeting with President Clinton was the person responsible for making
:35:53. > :35:55.the decision of whether to convene a grand jury involved in key
:35:56. > :35:59.allegations against Secretary Clinton. It was former Attorney
:36:00. > :36:03.General Loretta Lynch who apparently forbade you from using the word
:36:04. > :36:07.investigation. Indeed, if the New York Times' story is true, a
:36:08. > :36:10.Democratic operative expressed confidence that the former Attorney
:36:11. > :36:17.General would keep that investigation from going very far. I
:36:18. > :36:21.think you were given an impossible choice to make. And you did the best
:36:22. > :36:28.you could in light of the situation that you were presented with. And it
:36:29. > :36:31.strikes me as somewhat sad for people here and elsewhere to condemn
:36:32. > :36:42.the queue for notifying Congress shortly before the election -- to
:36:43. > :36:46.condemn you. Secretary Clinton had made the decision to use a private
:36:47. > :36:49.e-mail server. And I think it is important to remind folks that you
:36:50. > :36:54.are not the one who decided to do business this way and keep State
:36:55. > :36:57.Department e-mails on a computer of someone suspected of child
:36:58. > :37:03.pornography. Again, I believe you were placed in and incredibly
:37:04. > :37:07.difficult position and did the best you could. I was one of those who
:37:08. > :37:10.felt that given the nature of the investigation and concerns that a
:37:11. > :37:13.special council should have been appointed to conduct the
:37:14. > :37:18.investigation, but of course the Attorney General Lynch and the Obama
:37:19. > :37:25.administration opposed that effort. So I just wanted to express to you
:37:26. > :37:29.my disappointment that this continued seeking of a reason, any
:37:30. > :37:32.reason, other than the flawed campaign of the candidate herself
:37:33. > :37:38.for Secretary Clinton losing the presidential election. If I can turn
:37:39. > :37:44.to a couple of other substantive items here. You have mentioned 702,
:37:45. > :37:50.the reauthorisation. I believe you referred to this is the Crown Jewels
:37:51. > :37:56.of the FBI and counterterrorism investigations. Could you explain
:37:57. > :38:00.why this provides such a unique to all, and why you regard it as
:38:01. > :38:06.literally the Crown jewels of the FBI -- unique to all. Thank you,
:38:07. > :38:09.Senator. Every time I talk about this publicly and went a little bit
:38:10. > :38:12.because I don't want bad people around the world to focus on this
:38:13. > :38:17.team at. It really bad people around the world, because of the genius of
:38:18. > :38:22.American innovation, use our products and infrastructure, for
:38:23. > :38:31.their e-mails and communications. What 702 allows us to do is quickly
:38:32. > :38:35.target terrorists, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, spies,
:38:36. > :38:38.cyber hackers, non-Americans who are using our infrastructure to
:38:39. > :38:42.communicate, target than quickly and collect information on them. It is
:38:43. > :38:46.vital to all parts of the intelligence community because of
:38:47. > :38:49.its agility, its speed and its effectiveness. Again, in an open
:38:50. > :38:51.setting we can't explain what you worried you know from classified
:38:52. > :38:56.briefings about what a difference this makes. -- what you already
:38:57. > :39:00.know. Because America is the mother of this innovation, they use a lot
:39:01. > :39:04.of our agreement and that works to communicate with each other. If we
:39:05. > :39:07.were ever required to establish the normal warrant process for these
:39:08. > :39:10.non-Americans while not in our country, just because the photons
:39:11. > :39:17.they are using to plan attacks across our country's runs, we would
:39:18. > :39:23.be tying ourselves in not -- for reasons that make no sense at all.
:39:24. > :39:28.We talked last year about the meta data database, that is a useful
:39:29. > :39:34.tool. It does not compare in importance to 702. We cannot lose
:39:35. > :39:38.702. I agree. It is a bit difficult to talk about things that are
:39:39. > :39:44.involved classified matters in public. But I think the public needs
:39:45. > :39:48.to know that there are multiple oversight layers, including the
:39:49. > :39:52.Pfizer court. Congressional oversight, internal oversight within
:39:53. > :39:59.the FBI and intelligence community that protect Americans under their
:40:00. > :40:04.privacy rights whilst targeting terrorists and people who are trying
:40:05. > :40:07.to kill us. I want to talk a minute about the electronic communication
:40:08. > :40:13.transactional records, something that you and I have discussed before
:40:14. > :40:18.as well. The FBI can use national Security letters, I believe, to get
:40:19. > :40:21.financial information and telephone numbers now in the conduct of a
:40:22. > :40:28.terrorist investigation. But because of a type of in the law the FBI has
:40:29. > :40:32.not been allowed access to the meta data and national security cases --
:40:33. > :40:38.because of a type of. To the extent that is necessary. Can you talk to
:40:39. > :40:41.us about the importance of that particular fix, the electronic
:40:42. > :40:46.Communications and transactional records six? Thank you so much,
:40:47. > :40:51.Senator. This seems like a boring deal but it makes a big impact on
:40:52. > :40:53.our work. In counterterrorism cases and counterintelligence cases, we
:40:54. > :40:58.can issue with all kinds of layers of approval in the FBI, a national
:40:59. > :41:03.Security letter to find out the subscriber to a particular telephone
:41:04. > :41:07.number and to find out what numbers that telephone number was in contact
:41:08. > :41:09.with. Not the content of those communications, but just the
:41:10. > :41:19.connection. Because of what I believe is a typo in the law, and if
:41:20. > :41:24.I'm wrong Congress will tell me they intended this, they say they do not
:41:25. > :41:27.have the statutory authority to serve an NSL national Security
:41:28. > :41:30.letter defined by subscriber to a particular e-mail handle or what
:41:31. > :41:34.addresses were in contact with what addresses. Although we can do the
:41:35. > :41:40.same with telephone communications. I don't think Congress intended that
:41:41. > :41:44.distinction, but what it does us in our most important investigations is
:41:45. > :41:47.that if we want to find out the subscriber to repeatedly e-mail
:41:48. > :41:51.handle to go and get an order from a federal judge in Washington as part
:41:52. > :41:55.of the Pfizer court, and incredibly long and difficult process. And I'm
:41:56. > :41:58.worried about that slowing us down, and I'm also worried about it
:41:59. > :42:02.becoming a disincentive for our investigators to do it at all.
:42:03. > :42:06.Because of you are working a case in San Antonio or Seattle, you are
:42:07. > :42:13.moving very, very quickly. If I have to go to get subscriber information
:42:14. > :42:16.on in e-mail address to a federal court in Washington, I'm probably
:42:17. > :42:18.going to try and find some other way around it. If that is what Congress
:42:19. > :42:21.wants, we will follow the law. I don't think that was ever intended,
:42:22. > :42:25.so I hope the West will fix what I believe was a typo. Thank you. I
:42:26. > :42:35.have other questions for the record. Thank you.
:42:36. > :42:41.We are going over to vote. I would also like to have both Democrat and
:42:42. > :42:48.Republicans notify me they want a second round. So I can get in
:42:49. > :42:53.inventories of that. Thank you, welcome back, director Comey. As you
:42:54. > :42:56.are well aware, Russia is actively working to undermine our democracy
:42:57. > :43:01.and hurt American businesses at the same time. Now more than ever
:43:02. > :43:05.Americans are looking to Congress for the leadership, and we must be a
:43:06. > :43:09.united front. And I'm appreciative of some of the members of this
:43:10. > :43:14.committee on the Republican side who have spoken out about this. We must
:43:15. > :43:18.be united as we seek information from the administration. Last month
:43:19. > :43:22.during a hearing at the House intelligence committee, you confirm
:43:23. > :43:27.that the FBI is investigating the Russian government's efforts to
:43:28. > :43:30.interfere in the 2016 presidential election. Including any links
:43:31. > :43:40.between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. I know that you
:43:41. > :43:42.cannot discuss that ongoing investigation. But just one question
:43:43. > :43:44.to clarify - you commit to ensuring that the relevant to national
:43:45. > :43:45.committees receive a full and timely briefing on that investigation's
:43:46. > :43:55.findings? In general I can, Senator, I need
:43:56. > :43:59.Department of Justice's approval to brief on particular people. We've
:44:00. > :44:03.briefed in the rankings, including this committee, on who we have cases
:44:04. > :44:09.on and what we are doing and how we are using various sources of
:44:10. > :44:16.information. I doepted be know if the department will approve that for
:44:17. > :44:22.the entire committees. And do you now go to Rod Rosen Steyn, given the
:44:23. > :44:25.other person is recuesed? Yes I briefed him in his first day in
:44:26. > :44:29.office. He would be the person to make that decision. In your
:44:30. > :44:32.testimony, you note that the Justice Department brought charges against
:44:33. > :44:37.Russian spies and criminal hackers in connection with the 2014 Yahoo
:44:38. > :44:43.cyber attack in February. An example of a cyber attack in our economy. In
:44:44. > :44:47.December of 2016, the FBI and theent dove homeland security released --
:44:48. > :44:52.the Department of homeland security released a 13-page report, providing
:44:53. > :44:55.technical details on how federal investigators linked Russia to the
:44:56. > :45:00.hacks against UK political organisations. Does Russia use the
:45:01. > :45:03.same military and civilian tools it used to hack our political
:45:04. > :45:07.organisations, in order to do things like hack into US companies, steal
:45:08. > :45:12.identities and sell the credit card information of Americans on the
:45:13. > :45:15.black market? And how is the FBI working to fight against hackers,
:45:16. > :45:19.supported by foreign governments like Russia? ? The answer is yes,
:45:20. > :45:25.both their government organisations and then they have a relationship
:45:26. > :45:32.that is he a often difficult to define with criminals. The Yahoo
:45:33. > :45:35.hack is an example. You had so. Greatest hackers and intelligence
:45:36. > :45:39.agencies there working together so the answer is yes, what we are doing
:45:40. > :45:46.is trying to see if we can impose costs on that behaviour in different
:45:47. > :45:53.ways in different ways but what I mentioned in ply opening, lock up
:45:54. > :45:59.people. Russia is not too great working with us outside their
:46:00. > :46:05.borders but if we can put handcuffs on them to send a message that's in
:46:06. > :46:09.the a free by. You said that transnational organised crime poses
:46:10. > :46:13.a challenge to our security. Russia has vast criminal networks that the
:46:14. > :46:18.Kremlin uses to sew instability around the world I heard this first
:46:19. > :46:22.hand when I was in the balance particulars, Ukraine and Georgia
:46:23. > :46:25.with other senators there have been concerns that Russians are using the
:46:26. > :46:30.luxury real estate market to launder money. The Treasury department has
:46:31. > :46:32.noted a significant rise in the use of shell companies and real estate
:46:33. > :46:37.transactions because foreign buyers use them as a way to hide their
:46:38. > :46:41.identity and find a safe haven for their money in the such. In fact
:46:42. > :46:46.nearly half of all homes in the US, worth at least $5 million are
:46:47. > :46:50.purchased using shell companies. Does the anonymity associated with
:46:51. > :47:00.the use of shell companies, to buy real estate, hurt the FBI's ability
:47:01. > :47:05.to trace the flow illicit money and fight organised crime and do you
:47:06. > :47:10.need more transparency in these transactions? Yes and yes. Very
:47:11. > :47:14.good. It is a huge problem when you hear that over $5 million homes,
:47:15. > :47:19.half purchased by shell companies, that is a major problem. In March
:47:20. > :47:25.this committee's subcommittee on crime and terrorism held it first
:47:26. > :47:30.hearing, I think Senator Graham and Senator White House for that. I
:47:31. > :47:33.raised the issue of proecting it election infrastructure with former
:47:34. > :47:39.bush official Ken wine Steyn. He agreed it is an important issue. As
:47:40. > :47:41.the rapging member of the rules committee I'm particularly concerned
:47:42. > :47:46.about ensuring our elections are safe from foreign interference. I
:47:47. > :47:49.recently led a group of 26 Senators in calling for a fall account of the
:47:50. > :47:53.election assistance commission's efforts to address Russian cyber
:47:54. > :47:57.security threats in the 2016 election. I'm also working on
:47:58. > :48:04.legislation in thisser why. Can you discuss how the if. BI has
:48:05. > :48:06.co-ordinated with the election assistance commission, Department of
:48:07. > :48:09.Homeland Security and state and local election officials to help
:48:10. > :48:14.protect the integrity of our election process? Thank you N short
:48:15. > :48:20.what we have done with DHS is share the tools, tactics and techniques we
:48:21. > :48:25.see hackers, especially from the 2016 election season using to attack
:48:26. > :48:29.bored voter registration databases and engage in other hacks. We have
:48:30. > :48:31.pushed that out to all the states and election assistance commission
:48:32. > :48:35.for harden their networks. That's one of the most important thing we
:48:36. > :48:38.can to, equip them with the information to make their systems
:48:39. > :48:42.tighter. Very good. You know we have different equipment all over the
:48:43. > :48:46.country, there's some advantage to that, I think, I think it's good
:48:47. > :48:49.when we have paper ballot back-ups, of course but we have to be prepared
:48:50. > :48:54.for this and this certainly isn't about one political party or one
:48:55. > :49:01.candidate. The last time you will came before the committee in
:49:02. > :49:05.December, 2015, just one week after the San Bernadino attacks, since
:49:06. > :49:13.then as was noted by the chir we have seen other attacks in our
:49:14. > :49:18.country. We had a tragedy in a shopping malin St Carmen, minute sow
:49:19. > :49:21.too, ten wounded at a shopping mal. Thankfully brave off-duty cop was
:49:22. > :49:27.there. He was able to stop further damage from being done. And I would
:49:28. > :49:31.also like to thank you, and the FBI for your investigation, having
:49:32. > :49:36.talked to the chief up there, Senator Franklin and I from briefed
:49:37. > :49:41.by him, as well as congressman Emmer, right after this attack the
:49:42. > :49:46.local Police Department, a mid-size department and they had to do a will
:49:47. > :49:49.the with working with the community, they have a figure Somali community
:49:50. > :49:52.there, that is a big part of their community that they are proud to
:49:53. > :49:56.have there. So they are working with them, they are working with the
:49:57. > :50:01.community, they are helping but the FBI really stood in and did the
:50:02. > :50:06.investigation and I guess I want to thank thank you with that and end
:50:07. > :50:10.with one question. It's been reported that Isis has encouraged
:50:11. > :50:15.loan wolf attacks like we saw in Orlando. What chal eggs do these
:50:16. > :50:18.type of ak at thats present for law enforcement and what is the FBI
:50:19. > :50:26.doing to prevent these strategies? Thank you. The central challenges,
:50:27. > :50:29.not just finding needles in a nationwide haystack but trying to
:50:30. > :50:33.find out which pieces of hay might become a needle and that is which of
:50:34. > :50:38.the troubled young people or sometimes older people are consuming
:50:39. > :50:42.poisonous prop began ga, some Isis, some other sources and are moving
:50:43. > :50:45.towards an act of violence, like a stabbing at a shopping malis some
:50:46. > :50:48.way it achieve meaning in their lives. A huge part is building
:50:49. > :50:52.relationships with the communities you mentioned. Because those folks
:50:53. > :50:56.do not want anyone committing vile he is, committing violence in the
:50:57. > :51:01.name of their faith so they have the same inp sentives we do in making
:51:02. > :51:07.sure they see us that way and we see them that way is at the heart of our
:51:08. > :51:10.response. We are not going to see some troubled kid going side ways
:51:11. > :51:13.and thinking he should stab people, anywhere near as easily as the
:51:14. > :51:15.people around that kid are going to see it. So getting into a position
:51:16. > :51:18.where they feel comfortable in telling us or telling local law
:51:19. > :51:21.enforcement is at the heart of our responsibility, to to find the
:51:22. > :51:26.needles, evaliate the pieces of hay and stop this. Thank you, director
:51:27. > :51:30.Comey could you pass on to our agents and support personnel how
:51:31. > :51:34.much we appreciate their efforts to defend the country. We are going to
:51:35. > :51:39.set a record for a questions asked and answers r answered in six
:51:40. > :51:44.minutes and 54 seconds, if I can. Do you agree with me if is he quest
:51:45. > :51:50.racial comes into effect it would be devastating to the FBI? Yes. And it
:51:51. > :51:55.is due to do so, unless congress straining it. I have been told that.
:51:56. > :51:59.Do you agree if Isil loses the caliphate these people will go out
:52:00. > :52:02.throughout the world and welcome terrorist agents and the terrorism
:52:03. > :52:06.threat to the homeland will get greater over time, not smaller? Yes,
:52:07. > :52:10.it'll diminish in their power to put out their media to the troubled
:52:11. > :52:13.people in the country will decrease but the hardened killers thrown out
:52:14. > :52:17.of the caliphate will be a big problem. So from a funding point of
:52:18. > :52:22.view, terrorism is not going to get better, probably worse? I think
:52:23. > :52:26.that's fair to say. Did you ever talk to Sally Yates about her
:52:27. > :52:32.concerns about General Flynn being compromised? I did. I don't know
:52:33. > :52:38.whether I can talk about it in this forum. But, the answer is yes. That
:52:39. > :52:43.she had concerns about General Flynn and she expressed those concerns to
:52:44. > :52:46.you? Correct. OK. We'll talk about that later. Do you stand by your
:52:47. > :52:49.House testimony on March 20th that there was no surveillance of the
:52:50. > :52:54.Trump campaign that you are aware of? Correct. You would know about it
:52:55. > :53:02.if there were is that correct? Think so, yes. Carter Paige was there a
:53:03. > :53:08.warrant issued regarding his activity with the Russians? I cannot
:53:09. > :53:11.answer that here. Did you consider carteder Paige an agent of that
:53:12. > :53:18.campaign? Same answer, can't answer it here. Do you stand by your
:53:19. > :53:19.testimony that there is a counterintelligence investigation,
:53:20. > :53:22.regarding Trump campaign, individuals and the Russian
:53:23. > :53:25.Government as to whether or not they collaborate? To see if there was any
:53:26. > :53:29.coordination between the Russian evident and peoples... Is that still
:53:30. > :53:34.going on? Yes. Nothing has changed, you stand by those two statements?
:53:35. > :53:38.Yes. But you won't tell me about Carter Paige? Not here I won't. The
:53:39. > :53:44.Chairman mentioned that Fusion, are you familiar with Fusion? I know the
:53:45. > :53:50.name. Are they part of the Russian intelligence apparatus? I can't say.
:53:51. > :53:54.OK. Do you agree with me that Fusion was involved in preparing a dossier
:53:55. > :53:57.against Donald Trump, if they z that would be interfering in our election
:53:58. > :54:07.by the Russians? I don't want to say. OK. Do you agree with me that
:54:08. > :54:09.Anthonie Weiner of 2016, should not have access to classified
:54:10. > :54:14.information? Yes, that's a fair statement. Would you agree with me
:54:15. > :54:20.that if that's in the illegal we've got really bad laws? Well, if he
:54:21. > :54:24.hadn't -... Well, he got it somehow? It would be illegal if he didn't
:54:25. > :54:27.have appropriate clearance. Do you agree with me he didn't have
:54:28. > :54:32.appropriate clearance or if he did, that would even be worse I don't
:54:33. > :54:35.believe at the time we found that on his laptop he had any kind of
:54:36. > :54:41.clearance. I agree. So for him to get it should be a crime. Somebody
:54:42. > :54:44.should be prosecuted for letting him have access to classified
:54:45. > :54:50.information. Does that make general sense? It could be a crime it would
:54:51. > :54:54.depend upon... Do you agree with me that it should be, that anybody who
:54:55. > :54:58.let him have the information probably should have been
:54:59. > :55:05.prosecuted. If our law doesn't cover that, it probe should. There is no
:55:06. > :55:11.Anthony Weiner statute. Well perhaps there should be. I wonder how you
:55:12. > :55:20.can get information and it is notal crime. Unmasking, are you familiar
:55:21. > :55:24.with that? Familiar with the term. Has the bureau asked for the
:55:25. > :55:30.unmasking of a citizen... Oh, yes, I did it this week. Before I
:55:31. > :55:34.reauthorise 702, and I'm a hawkish guy, I want to know how it works.
:55:35. > :55:38.Are you aware of any request by the White House, anybody in the Obama
:55:39. > :55:43.administration to unmask American citizens that were caught up in
:55:44. > :55:47.incidental surveillances in 2015-16? I'm in the I'm in the aware of any
:55:48. > :55:51.request to the FBI. Would you know? Who would they make the request to?
:55:52. > :55:56.Well, they could make it to anyone in the FBI who was... What about the
:55:57. > :56:01.NSA? Wouldn't you make it to them? Sure, if it was an NSA report. I
:56:02. > :56:06.have read in the media and heard about NSA reports but I don't
:56:07. > :56:12.know... Who do you sk, do you go to the NSA it ask somebody be unmasked.
:56:13. > :56:15.I give you an example. I got a report that said that US company
:56:16. > :56:21.number 1 had been removed. I said I believe I need to know the name of
:56:22. > :56:25.that cop. Who do you ask? I ask my briefer who works for the PDB staff,
:56:26. > :56:29.I would like to know, she goes and asks the owner of the information.
:56:30. > :56:33.The NSA? In this case I think it was CIA. Does the owner of the
:56:34. > :56:39.information, record, request for unmasking? I believe the NSA does, I
:56:40. > :56:43.don't know about CSA. But there should be a record, somewhere in our
:56:44. > :56:47.Government for a request to unmask regardless of who made the request?
:56:48. > :56:50.I think that's right. Is it fair to say that very few people can make
:56:51. > :56:56.requests for unmasking? I mean I can't go and make that request as a
:56:57. > :57:02.Senator, can I? Sure, it is a fairly small group - the consumers, which I
:57:03. > :57:05.am, of that small set of... The National Security Council, within
:57:06. > :57:08.that group can make this request or do you know? I don't know for sure.
:57:09. > :57:14.The national security advisor certainly can. When it comes to
:57:15. > :57:16.Russia s it fair to say that the Government rf Russia actively
:57:17. > :57:21.provides safe haven to cyber criminals? Yes. Is it fair to say
:57:22. > :57:26.that the Russian government is still involved in American politics? Yes.
:57:27. > :57:30.Is it fair to say we need to stop them from doing it? Yes. Fair to
:57:31. > :57:35.say. Do you agree with me the only way they are going to stop is for
:57:36. > :57:39.them to pay a price for interfering in our political process? I think
:57:40. > :57:42.that's a fair statement. So what we're doing today is not working,
:57:43. > :57:47.they are still doing it. They are doing it all over the world, aren't
:57:48. > :57:51.they? Yes. So what kind of threat do you believe Russia represents to our
:57:52. > :57:56.democratic process, given what you know about Russia's behaviour of
:57:57. > :58:00.late? Well certainly in my view the greatest threat of any nation on
:58:01. > :58:05.earth, given their intention and capability. Do you agree that they
:58:06. > :58:11.did not change the actual vote tally but one day they might? I agree, we
:58:12. > :58:16.found no information of any change in vote tallies. There was efforts
:58:17. > :58:20.aimed at voter registration systems but I spokes in theory, the part of
:58:21. > :58:24.the United States, the beauty of our system is that it is a bit of a
:58:25. > :58:29.hairball and all different kinds of systems... Have they done this in
:58:30. > :58:32.other countries, tampered with the vote? My attempt is they have
:58:33. > :58:35.attempted to. And there is no reason they won't attempt it here if we
:58:36. > :58:39.don't stop them, over time Think think that's fair. Thank you V --
:58:40. > :59:31.thank you V 100 years ago, when women were
:59:32. > :59:39.battling to win the vote in the United Kingdom, this place was on
:59:40. > :59:42.the front line. Campaigners known as suffragettes had been fighting for
:59:43. > :59:48.decades to secure the vote, but to no avail. So, one group decided to
:59:49. > :59:49.take direct action. The women's social and political union was led
:59:50. > :59:51.by Emily