:00:03. > :00:13.develop the disease. Those are the headlines. Now it is
:00:13. > :00:18.
:00:18. > :00:22.Ali Soufan is a man apart. A Muslim and an Arabic-speaker, he became
:00:22. > :00:25.the FBI's lead investigator on Al- Qaeda, before and after the 9/11
:00:25. > :00:28.attacks, attacks which he said could have been prevented had some
:00:28. > :00:32.key intelligence been shared. In his own work for the FBI, he
:00:32. > :00:35.pursued and interrogated some of Al-Qaeda's top people. Now he has
:00:35. > :00:39.gone public with the story of his fight against Islamist militants
:00:40. > :00:44.and his struggle within the American intelligence community.
:00:44. > :00:54.Indeed, he says he's been a marked man, not from Al Qaeda, so much as
:00:54. > :01:09.
:01:09. > :01:15.Ali Soufan, will come to HARDtalk. You came to the United States from
:01:15. > :01:19.Lebanon as an immigrant. -- welcome. You ended up applying to the FBI
:01:19. > :01:28.pressure to university almost as a joke, as a bet with friends. Tell
:01:28. > :01:32.me how that happened. When I was in college, an administrator at the
:01:32. > :01:40.University suggested that I applied to the FBI. It became a joke. It
:01:40. > :01:48.was a very long application process. You were not of the usual FBI stock.
:01:48. > :01:53.That is what I thought. Surprisingly, when I finished
:01:53. > :02:01.graduate school, I was accepted as an FBI agent. You were unusual
:02:01. > :02:09.because you were one of fully eight Arabic-speaking people in the FBI.
:02:09. > :02:15.-- one of only. You were one of the first to say a Osama Bin Laden is
:02:15. > :02:24.posing in a greater threat to the United States, back in the 1990s.
:02:24. > :02:30.Yes. I was involved with one of the premier terrorist Task forces. I
:02:30. > :02:36.spoke with some supervisors at the head of the task force about this
:02:36. > :02:46.man I had been reading about, Osama Bin Laden. I had read his
:02:46. > :02:46.
:02:46. > :02:52.declaration of G hand in 1996. -- Jihad. I was surprised that we
:02:52. > :02:57.already knew about him. People were working on it. Soon after, I was
:02:57. > :03:04.assigned to that team. By the time of the East African embassy
:03:04. > :03:09.bombings, I was full time. There was still an astonishing level of
:03:09. > :03:13.ignorance in the FBI about how the structure of Al-Qaeda worked. In
:03:13. > :03:17.your book, you said that when you were translating a manual of
:03:17. > :03:22.terrorism which British officers had recovered that looked at high
:03:22. > :03:29.cell structures work, you were translating, cell numbers are told
:03:29. > :03:36.not to recognise one another in public, that's amazing, declared an
:03:36. > :03:42.FBI colleague. Abbas have thought that was elementary. -- I would
:03:42. > :03:48.have thought. It was amazing that we found that manual. It is amazing
:03:48. > :03:52.that now we have got a document that would encompass the law
:03:52. > :04:02.enforcement channels and that describes the or been warfare rules
:04:02. > :04:05.
:04:05. > :04:08.and regulations for an organisation like Al-Qaeda. -- urban. The FBI
:04:08. > :04:16.and the Department of Justice indicted Osama Bin Laden in June of
:04:16. > :04:20.1998. A lot of people do now know that. That was before the first
:04:20. > :04:27.overt act that Al-Qaeda did against the United States. The embassy
:04:27. > :04:33.bombings. That was August 1998. the wake of that, due ended up in
:04:33. > :04:38.Yemen investigating the attack into a US naval ship. You claim that
:04:38. > :04:42.there was a chief of staff for a member of the Senate intelligence
:04:42. > :04:48.committee who took you and your colleague to one side and said to
:04:48. > :04:53.you that the White House, this is a quad, cannot have Al-Qaeda lent to
:04:53. > :05:01.the attack because President Bush felt he was too politically weak to
:05:01. > :05:06.do anything like that, to go after Al-Qaeda. That is extraordinary.
:05:06. > :05:16.were very shocked when that happened, myself and my colleagues.
:05:16. > :05:17.
:05:17. > :05:23.Later on, if you look at De 9/11 Commission report, many people have
:05:23. > :05:29.made similar claims. The Secretary of Defence called the whole
:05:29. > :05:35.investigation stale. When we started trying to explain to the
:05:35. > :05:39.Attorney-General, the first Attorney-General assigned under
:05:39. > :05:49.Bush, that there was something called terrorism, be sure that his
:05:49. > :05:49.
:05:49. > :05:56.side. -- they pushed it to one side. That came back to haunt us.
:05:56. > :06:03.were in Yemen Brendan 9/11 attacks happened. -- when they are.
:06:03. > :06:08.Suddenly, the CIA, with whom you had been working with, you had been
:06:08. > :06:12.sharing intelligence, stuffy had been after four months, you say it
:06:12. > :06:20.could have had a material impact perhaps in preventing the 9/11
:06:20. > :06:25.attacks. What did you mean by that. Does? We were able to find a link
:06:25. > :06:29.between people who were involved with the suicide bombers and a
:06:29. > :06:37.meeting that took place in south- east Asia. An Al-Qaeda member crew
:06:37. > :06:42.was spotted at that meeting delivered $36,000 to that meeting.
:06:42. > :06:51.Be sure that information with the intelligence community at the time.
:06:51. > :07:00.-- we shared that. This was November, 2000. We continued to
:07:00. > :07:08.fall some Leeds. In April, 2000 and June, 2000, we were told the
:07:08. > :07:15.intelligence community knew nothing about this. One day after a 9/11, I
:07:15. > :07:21.was passed a file that included photographs of people we had been
:07:21. > :07:30.asking about for many months. It included surveillance photos,
:07:30. > :07:35.photos of two hijackers were were on Flight 77. Why do you think you
:07:35. > :07:42.did not get that intelligence? not have any answer for that. I
:07:42. > :07:52.just put the facts in my book. The facts come to the same conclusion
:07:52. > :07:57.that where made by the inquiries. Could it be that the CIA was trying
:07:57. > :08:01.to protect its own sources? There was this thing called the Wall,
:08:01. > :08:05.where the FBI wants to protect its own potentially criminal
:08:05. > :08:14.investigations by not having evidence that can be used in the
:08:14. > :08:21.court of law. I am not buying that theory. When you have 17 sailors
:08:21. > :08:25.murdered and people who are lent to the modders -- all linked to the
:08:25. > :08:32.modders being in the United States and you do not tell investigations
:08:32. > :08:40.about that, you have a problem. If the information is passed to the
:08:40. > :08:45.FBI in a timely basis, even if the names of the two hijackers are put
:08:45. > :08:50.on the list, it could have been a different thing. This is a
:08:50. > :08:55.conclusion. The danger of all the us is that you could perhaps
:08:55. > :09:00.inadvertently play into the hands, there are great swathe of opinion
:09:00. > :09:05.he believed there is a conspiracy. People think there is US
:09:05. > :09:13.governmental complicity. I do not believe in conspiracy theories,
:09:13. > :09:20.personally. What I tried to do is to put their human face of that
:09:20. > :09:25.disaster. The disaster steps that cause 9/11. I think that the
:09:26. > :09:29.conclusion that the commission reached, if this information was
:09:29. > :09:36.shared with the FBI team investigating, these would be the
:09:36. > :09:40.findings. 9/11 could have been stopped at many stages. I am trying
:09:40. > :09:45.to put a human face on it. Usually conspiracy theories come because
:09:45. > :09:53.you do not have an answer. People are looking for an answer. Do you
:09:53. > :09:58.think that as a result of 9/11, that President Bush started a war
:09:58. > :10:06.on terror. Was that the inevitable consequence? But it would become a
:10:06. > :10:12.war? Absolutely. A war rather than a criminal investigation. Yes. The
:10:12. > :10:17.way 9/11 happened, crashing planes in two buildings, into the Pentagon,
:10:17. > :10:23.that is more than an act of war. I believe that that war should have
:10:23. > :10:27.been focused and limited to Al- Qaeda. It is interesting because
:10:27. > :10:32.British counter-terrorism chiefs have said that the use of the World
:10:32. > :10:38.War has not been helpful. Your counterparts, your colleagues in
:10:38. > :10:47.Britain, they have said that the use of the World War is responsible
:10:47. > :10:52.for taking us in the wrong direction. -- the word. Many people
:10:52. > :10:59.agreed with a war against Al-Qaeda. I believe that the war against Al-
:10:59. > :11:04.Qaeda, the one against their command and control in Afghanistan
:11:04. > :11:09.was a legitimate war. I don't think anyone opposed that at the very
:11:09. > :11:13.beginning. One of the by-products of the self declared war was new
:11:13. > :11:19.rules of engagement, particularly but it comes to interrogation.
:11:19. > :11:24.There was this thing called enhanced interrogation. Stress
:11:24. > :11:30.preciousness, sleep deprivation, waterboarding. You interviewed lots
:11:30. > :11:36.of pop Al-Qaeda people. Reid did not agree with enhanced
:11:36. > :11:40.interrogation. -- Top. You did not agree. I do not agree with that.
:11:40. > :11:48.do not think there is any justification for it. Not
:11:48. > :11:53.operationally. As appalling as these things are to you and me,
:11:53. > :11:56.they are nothing compared to bodies detain these are expected to
:11:57. > :12:00.receive and some deals in the Middle East for example. Why did
:12:00. > :12:05.you want to go down a path were eventually you will have to glass
:12:05. > :12:11.ceiling? You will hit a water more of a Jew cannot cross. Do you think
:12:11. > :12:18.it is torture? It depends on how it is being carried out. We all know
:12:18. > :12:24.but waterboarding is. That is the simulation of drowning. Enhanced
:12:24. > :12:28.interrogation is not only waterboarding. It is techniques
:12:28. > :12:38.that evolved into waterboarding. Waterboarding as a technique itself
:12:38. > :12:39.
:12:39. > :12:44.is by US law considered torture. Who bears the responsibility? For
:12:44. > :12:49.the use of waterboarding? The fact that the sanction that the top?
:12:49. > :12:57.goes to the top. Do you think there should be legal redress against
:12:57. > :13:02.people like President Bush? Won the top? Yes? -- yes. I am asking the
:13:02. > :13:09.opinion, whether it should be. There should be accountability.
:13:09. > :13:13.That accountability shouldn't be only for the CIA officers. The way
:13:13. > :13:19.to follow that logically is to say that there should be a follow-up.
:13:19. > :13:24.It depends how it came down and what happened and to approve it.
:13:24. > :13:31.Which channels did it come down? I think we should have some kind of
:13:31. > :13:36.accountability for what happened. In terms of ethnicity, Peter King
:13:36. > :13:40.denies what you say. He said that for those who say waterboarding
:13:40. > :13:44.does not work and that it should be stopped and not used again, they
:13:44. > :13:54.got vital information through waterboarding that directly led
:13:54. > :13:57.
:13:57. > :14:07.them to Bin Laden. I disagree with that. People denied facts on the
:14:07. > :14:08.
:14:08. > :14:13.waterboarding that we later found out were important. People were
:14:13. > :14:18.lying after 183 sessions of waterboarding. It must have been
:14:18. > :14:25.important. That is not an indication of the technique.
:14:25. > :14:33.Everything else we have been told about de effectiveness of
:14:33. > :14:43.waterboarding is proving to be wrong. The man in question,
:14:43. > :14:48.
:14:48. > :14:52.waterboarding did not stored until I believe so. I believe that is not
:14:52. > :14:57.an accurate assessment. I believe the President was not told the
:14:57. > :15:03.truth about this. How certain are you now that the technique is no
:15:03. > :15:06.longer used? Pretty certain. I think we did something as a
:15:06. > :15:12.government that very few governments in the world will do.
:15:12. > :15:22.We declassified these issues regarding enhance interrogation
:15:22. > :15:24.
:15:24. > :15:34.techniques. We included the CIA, not one immense threat worse start
:15:34. > :15:35.
:15:35. > :15:42.because of was a boarding. -- was stopped because of water boarding.
:15:42. > :15:47.The former Secretary of General Defence told me, there is obviously
:15:47. > :15:51.a legal limit to what you can do, you do not want to go beyond that,
:15:51. > :16:01.but if you want to use tougher measures, it may be justified to
:16:01. > :16:05.
:16:05. > :16:10.save in media -- immediate lives. It is an absolute principle that
:16:10. > :16:16.you have to do whatever you can to save lives. I believe in the
:16:16. > :16:20.efficacy of the interrogation techniques. It is not justified
:16:20. > :16:29.from and efficacy perspective. I gave so many reasons in the book
:16:29. > :16:39.Where did not work. This was something from Hollywood. He does
:16:39. > :16:42.
:16:42. > :16:51.not exist in reality. All my years in the FBI... If we are talking
:16:52. > :17:01.about the ticking clock ferry. Enhance interrogation techniques do
:17:02. > :17:08.
:17:08. > :17:14.not deal with the ticking bomb. It is one step that evolved into water
:17:14. > :17:24.boarding. Sleep deprivation is a week. Where is the ticking bomb
:17:24. > :17:28.
:17:28. > :17:35.theory in a Which? -- week. These techniques are to be used over time,
:17:35. > :17:43.not immediately. The limits that he is talking about are not designed
:17:43. > :17:46.to deal with that theoretical magic theory of ticking bomb theory.
:17:46. > :17:52.me ask you about another instant decision that has been taking more
:17:52. > :17:59.and more frequently over recent times, drone attacks. You have said
:17:59. > :18:07.that the killing of the Yemeni based cleric was legal, he was
:18:07. > :18:13.killed in Yemen. Why was that legal but enhance interrogation throws up
:18:13. > :18:18.different questions? You have to look at the act itself.
:18:18. > :18:25.Interrogation techniques I have got a problem with. Your strategy and
:18:25. > :18:34.laws have to beat in sink together. Unita get reliable information and
:18:34. > :18:40.what you want to do with it... You need to get. Yes, I believe that
:18:40. > :18:44.drone attacks are illegal. We are at war with Al-Qaeda. You have got
:18:44. > :18:52.Al-Qaeda leaders sitting together, meeting together, conspiring
:18:52. > :19:00.together. He was involved in every plot against the US since 2009.
:19:00. > :19:07.Just because the US has declared war on Al-Qaeda, it does not
:19:07. > :19:12.automatically turn half the world into a battle zone, does it? We are
:19:12. > :19:17.not taking the battle around the world. Al-Qaeda is taking the
:19:17. > :19:22.battle around the world. You have individuals plotting to bomb London.
:19:22. > :19:32.What do you want to do about it? Send special forces to the mill of
:19:32. > :19:32.
:19:32. > :19:42.a trouble zone just to arrest them? Or is it better to deal with that
:19:42. > :19:45.
:19:45. > :19:51.target? This is an American citizen's right to judicial process.
:19:51. > :19:55.I do not discriminate on terrorist based on their nationality. If
:19:55. > :19:58.someone is trying to kill innocent people around the world and to have
:19:58. > :20:05.the opportunity to take them out, I believe it is legitimate to take
:20:05. > :20:12.them out. The drone attacks do not change the overall outcome of the
:20:12. > :20:18.war. We have to think beyond these tactical wins for a strategy to
:20:18. > :20:25.deal with the incubators that generate and caused terrorism.
:20:25. > :20:35.did you decide to leave the FBI? was involved in a lot of things in
:20:35. > :20:35.
:20:35. > :20:45.the bureau, I reached a time... What do you mean a lot of things. -
:20:45. > :20:46.
:20:46. > :20:56.-? Around the 9/11 Commission, what I described in the book about
:20:56. > :20:59.
:20:59. > :21:04.enhanced interrogation techniques, absolutely among some groups... But
:21:05. > :21:11.I always go the support of the leadership of the FBI. I felt that
:21:11. > :21:15.it was time for me to get out of the way. I decide are the best
:21:15. > :21:20.thing for me and for my team and for the bureau is to get the heck
:21:20. > :21:30.out of the way. There are remarkably few agents like you in
:21:30. > :21:33.
:21:33. > :21:40.the FBI. There are eight native Arabic speakers when you joined,
:21:40. > :21:45.now there are nine. Remarkably few. Why is that? The FBI need to do a
:21:45. > :21:52.better job to reach out to people in communities that can help the
:21:52. > :22:00.national security of the US. The woeful thing about it is that if
:22:00. > :22:07.you try to work in the FBI now, you could not get security clearance.
:22:07. > :22:10.Is that right? I have not been in the government for a while. My
:22:10. > :22:14.relationship with the people I used to know in the government is still
:22:14. > :22:21.phenomenal. I know what he's talking about, it is more difficult
:22:21. > :22:25.for people from some ethnic origins to join the intelligence community.
:22:25. > :22:30.That is not just about the effectiveness of the fight, it is a
:22:30. > :22:33.pretty bad indictment of the state of American intelligence, about the
:22:34. > :22:43.state of the American establishment? Do you agree with
:22:44. > :22:46.
:22:46. > :22:55.it? I said I do not. Tell me about the fight against Islamist terror,
:22:55. > :23:04.given the death of Osama Bin Laden, how strong tea think Al-Qaeda is? -
:23:05. > :23:10.- do you think. A different Al- Qaeda exist today. It shifted from
:23:10. > :23:20.being chief operator to be in chief motivator. You have an organisation
:23:20. > :23:21.
:23:21. > :23:27.that is a franchise. It has remnants of Algerian extremists
:23:27. > :23:34.operating on the border. You have Al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsular.
:23:34. > :23:39.That is Saudi Al-Qaeda and the Yemen side. Fractured, does that
:23:39. > :23:43.mean it is more difficult to fight against? Yes, I think it is. You
:23:43. > :23:48.have to focus your strategy on different regional areas. There are
:23:48. > :23:52.different incubators for each one of these areas. A strategy that can
:23:52. > :23:57.work in Yemen is very difficult -- very different from a strategy that
:23:57. > :24:04.can work in Iraq or Algeria. These are the things that we have to chat
:24:04. > :24:10.-- take into account. The threat is greater or a smaller? The threat is
:24:10. > :24:19.different. Al-Qaeda has been diminished greatly. Bin Laden's
:24:19. > :24:25.death was a mortal blow. His importance in Al-Qaeda, he knows