:00:06. > :00:15.in the violence. Those are the headlines. Now on BBC News it's
:00:15. > :00:18.time for HARDtalk. The security challenges facing nation states are
:00:18. > :00:20.changing fast, so too are the strategic responses of today's
:00:20. > :00:23.military chiefs. In this age of militant insurgency, robotic
:00:23. > :00:33.weaponry and cyber-warfare, threats are unpredictable, unseen and
:00:33. > :00:34.
:00:34. > :00:40.global. My guest is recently retired British Army General
:00:40. > :00:44.Jonathan Shaw. He began his career fighting a traditional, bloody war
:00:44. > :00:45.in the Falklands, he ended it in charge of the British military's
:00:45. > :00:55.cyber-warfare strategy. Conventional armed forces must
:00:55. > :01:17.
:01:17. > :01:22.adapt or wither, which will it be? Jonathon Shaw, welcome to HARDtalk.
:01:22. > :01:28.Good afternoon. You recently retired as one of Britain's highest
:01:28. > :01:35.ranking officers, were you finally relieved to be going? There is a
:01:35. > :01:40.question. Yes, I was. I have had a great career. I do not regret a day
:01:40. > :01:48.of it. I have met a lot of good people in the military. It is in
:01:48. > :01:52.good hands. I am in -- looking forward to the future. It seems to
:01:52. > :01:58.be a challenging time for the British military at the moment.
:01:58. > :02:05.it is. One of the exciting things during my 32 years in the job, it
:02:05. > :02:12.has always been challenging. That is what makes it fun. If you like
:02:12. > :02:17.change, that is what makes it quite exciting. My last job inside the
:02:17. > :02:22.cyber security programme was completely new to me. It was a
:02:22. > :02:27.fabulous chance. I loved it. I want to talk about such as security and
:02:27. > :02:35.money. Before that, I want to talk about the nature of recent warfare.
:02:35. > :02:41.During your latter decades in the British Army, it was dominated by
:02:41. > :02:46.long-term deployment. Long-term war fighting in Iraq, you were involved,
:02:46. > :02:52.in Afghanistan as well. Do you think the British military when it
:02:53. > :02:58.embarked on those deployment in 2001-2002, had any idea what they
:02:58. > :03:05.were getting into? No, I do not think it did. They were looking at
:03:05. > :03:11.the military fighting bid. The big surprise, if there is a lesson to
:03:11. > :03:17.be learned from the past 10.5 years, we have over militarised these
:03:17. > :03:20.campaigns. campaigns. ve seen through my career, a shift from traditional
:03:20. > :03:26.war-fighting to top end political support and support of the
:03:26. > :03:30.political process. That is what we have seen. There is a question of
:03:30. > :03:35.over the last 15 years, since 9/11. I'm not sure that Whitehall has
:03:36. > :03:40.fully adapted to the change. A lot of the problems the military has
:03:40. > :03:46.had, it has felt the need to move from civil fighting and opposition
:03:46. > :03:50.to the creative role of making nation-states and nation-building.
:03:50. > :03:59.Should military has ever be asked to get into that potentially
:03:59. > :04:06.political world? The outcome of the military clash is itself decisive.
:04:06. > :04:12.1982 was exactly that type of war. The Falkland War, in which you're a
:04:12. > :04:17.young officer, a lot of traditional, bloody battles. Correct. Those sort
:04:17. > :04:25.of bloody battles, which in the end were decisive to the outcome, have
:04:25. > :04:33.been rare. The goal for the 91, the original overthrow of the Al-Qaeda,
:04:33. > :04:39.Taliban government, Saddam Hussein's government, those were
:04:39. > :04:46.traditional was. After that it has been politics. The Bradman's it has
:04:46. > :04:52.created across Whitehall and all coalition countries, we have not
:04:52. > :04:57.fully learned the lessons. -- the problems. There is a subtext,
:04:57. > :05:01.soldiers, you included, have been deployed to fight in conflicts
:05:01. > :05:06.which are not winnable in the traditional sense. I do not like
:05:06. > :05:10.that language. You are using the language of war. Why do not think
:05:11. > :05:15.we should use the language of war. To call it a global war on terror
:05:15. > :05:21.was ridiculous. Michael Howard wrote about this one week after
:05:22. > :05:26.9/11. If you read it now it is absolutely cogent. To be specific
:05:26. > :05:32.about your role. You were a very senior commanding officer in
:05:32. > :05:37.southern Iraq for a while. Around 2007. You were leading men and they
:05:37. > :05:44.were facing real danger and they were laying their lives on the line,
:05:44. > :05:52.which you had to regard as not winnable. I do not like it. It was
:05:52. > :05:56.a political conflict. You are a soldier, not a politician. I know I
:05:56. > :06:02.am. The criteria for military action is not military effect but
:06:02. > :06:06.political affect. If it is fascinating to cast our minds back
:06:07. > :06:13.to 2007. In the end, it is now a matter of record, you got involved
:06:13. > :06:22.in very delicate and sensitive negotiations with the so-called
:06:22. > :06:26.army led by a Shia Muslim cleric supported by Iran. You were talking
:06:26. > :06:32.to him about an understanding, which would allow his men to move
:06:32. > :06:39.in and your men to move out of the city of Basra. It was a direct
:06:39. > :06:44.negotiation with the enemy. When you did that. If you are involved
:06:44. > :06:48.in an operation like this and you are looking towards a timed
:06:48. > :06:52.withdrawal, you know you'll have to hand the country back to the locals.
:06:52. > :06:58.You have to start thinking... the people characterise as the
:06:58. > :07:03.enemy. I am disputing your whole language. You are looking at it
:07:03. > :07:08.through a black and white, good and bad guys. That is completely
:07:09. > :07:12.inappropriate. Afghanistan right now, we have to look to the post
:07:12. > :07:18.coalition presence there and see who is going to be powerful enough
:07:18. > :07:22.to hold this place together. For the fact that they are shooting you
:07:22. > :07:28.at the moment, that does not mean they were not be a power base after
:07:28. > :07:32.you have gone. -- they will. Those are the difficult political
:07:33. > :07:39.negotiations that need to take place. You make a cogent case for a
:07:39. > :07:49.different way of looking at what counter-insurgency is all about. It
:07:49. > :07:50.
:07:50. > :07:54.is not even shared by people on the same side. If we go back to Iraq,
:07:54. > :07:59.you were criticised for what you did. The Americans believed you
:08:00. > :08:05.betrayed the cause. They believe he accepted defeat and ran away.
:08:05. > :08:14.is a lot of political spin in that. If you look at what the Americans
:08:14. > :08:22.did in Saada city they made an accommodation as well. Let me just
:08:22. > :08:26.quote you. I want to substantiate this. A presidential adviser in
:08:26. > :08:31.Iraq, he said, it was a huge mistake for the Brits to pull out
:08:31. > :08:38.of Basra and leave the population to be brutalised by Iranian
:08:38. > :08:43.surrogates. He is accusing the British Government of pulling out.
:08:43. > :08:48.As a soldier I was following orders to pull out. You are a serving
:08:48. > :08:51.soldier. One of the most senior in Britain. At what point did you feel
:08:51. > :08:58.the orders you were receiving from your political masters were just
:08:58. > :09:07.plain wrong? What I think of my orders is irrelevant. Orders are
:09:07. > :09:12.orders and you carry on with them. The fact that I did not like them
:09:12. > :09:20.is irrelevant. You take them and you crack on. You have quit now.
:09:20. > :09:26.You can tell me. Did you like them? If you wind the clock back, it is
:09:26. > :09:32.about if we went to Iraq in the first place. It is about original
:09:32. > :09:38.sin. I do not think we should have done it. For my sake, it seemed to
:09:38. > :09:42.me worrying that we did not answer any of the questions that George
:09:43. > :09:47.Bush senior had asked about why he did not go on to Baghdad in 1991. I
:09:47. > :09:52.was always worried about what happened after the invasion.
:09:52. > :09:58.must have been tough for you in that situation, intellectually, you
:09:58. > :10:03.felt the deployment was misguided. You had to follow orders. I am
:10:03. > :10:09.thinking of Afghanistan. You have a lot of friends still in the
:10:09. > :10:13.military, it must be very difficult for them to make sense of a poll on
:10:13. > :10:18.the front line, many of them being killed by Afghan security forces
:10:18. > :10:23.supposed to be their allies, at a time when they know the policy is
:10:23. > :10:28.one of retreat. We are supposed to be out by 2014. They know the
:10:28. > :10:32.politicians want to bring them out sooner. If it is very difficult. I
:10:32. > :10:37.think it is fantastic out the soldiers are loyal to the mission.
:10:37. > :10:42.They see themselves as making a difference. Most of the Afghans
:10:42. > :10:49.they deal with like them being there. That is what bolsters them.
:10:49. > :10:53.You are right. To be front, do you think your colleagues in arms in
:10:53. > :10:59.your form in Afghanistan today, respect the decisions being made by
:10:59. > :11:05.the politicians? I think they understand them. They understand
:11:05. > :11:09.what is going on and the political direction they are getting. It is
:11:09. > :11:14.not conducive to great morale to have this much mat between what the
:11:14. > :11:20.soldiers think they are doing and the feeling of, pointlessness about
:11:20. > :11:26.much of the military operation. does not seem pointless... Let me
:11:26. > :11:35.ask you about a different aspect of the same declining in Afghanistan
:11:35. > :11:39.and Iraq. -- deployment. Both have pitched US, UK soldiers into
:11:39. > :11:44.situations where they are bound to see many of the resident local
:11:44. > :11:48.population as potential enemies. It is one of those in certain
:11:48. > :11:52.operations where there is a fundamental, sort of lack of
:11:52. > :11:56.affinity between the incoming soldier and the people on the
:11:56. > :12:01.ground. That seems to have been corrosive to morale amongst troops
:12:01. > :12:05.and to standards of behaviour. Would you accept that? Can you
:12:05. > :12:10.repeat the question? About the way in which these are counter-
:12:10. > :12:14.insurgency operations seem to have been corrosive to morale in the
:12:14. > :12:19.British military and have produced behaviour which falls far short of
:12:19. > :12:24.what is expected. I do not recognise that. I do not think it
:12:24. > :12:33.has been bad for morale. My experience, more -- morale is very
:12:33. > :12:40.high. I would not, I have not got any evidence to show it is bad for
:12:40. > :12:45.morale. In terms of behaviour. The challenge we face of fighting,
:12:45. > :12:55.soldiers fighting in warlike conditions, yet judged against
:12:55. > :12:57.
:12:57. > :13:01.criteria which are piece like, that poses Royal -- real challenges. I
:13:02. > :13:06.think the discipline of soldiers has been remarkable. You are
:13:06. > :13:16.implying there is a pressure on the sake of sausages in Afghanistan
:13:16. > :13:16.
:13:16. > :13:22.which is unbearable? -- psyche of soldiers. There is enormous
:13:22. > :13:27.pressure. How they keep their self discipline is a credit to them.
:13:27. > :13:33.now know that discipline was not always maintained. We have
:13:33. > :13:37.inquiries in Iraq, looking at video evidence of abusive interrogation
:13:37. > :13:41.techniques, you must have been aware of the sort of interrogation
:13:42. > :13:45.techniques being employed in southern Iraq? I was aware there
:13:45. > :13:50.was an interrogation centre. We checked the processes and
:13:50. > :13:57.everything was clear. I know of no specific allegation that occurred
:13:57. > :14:02.during my time. I have nothing to add on that. They were filming the
:14:02. > :14:09.interrogation. You were responsible. I did not watch any of the videos.
:14:09. > :14:12.I am not sure they did videos. inquiry team has seen some of them.
:14:12. > :14:18.Maybe you are talking about something I do not know anything
:14:18. > :14:22.about. It is a little surprising given you were in command. None of
:14:22. > :14:27.the incidents happened during my time. They would have asked me some
:14:27. > :14:37.questions. No-one has ever approached me. I do not know
:14:37. > :14:38.
:14:38. > :14:43.The British military has been very stretched by Iraq and Afghanistan.
:14:43. > :14:48.What we now see is a covenant which faces of the pressures on public
:14:48. > :14:53.finances, which has declared there will be severe cuts in military
:14:53. > :14:58.personnel and the army. It will bring the regular force down to
:14:58. > :15:02.just over 80,000. As somebody just out of the army, are you worried it
:15:02. > :15:07.will leave the army incapable of doing the jobs that, in the last
:15:07. > :15:12.few years, it has been asked to do? The government's aspiration is that
:15:12. > :15:18.the British Army does not have to do those jobs. But that is
:15:18. > :15:27.unknowable. Absolutely. The problem he faced during a defence review is
:15:27. > :15:31.there is no... They have taken the risk. Taken the risk of the policy
:15:31. > :15:35.of not getting into any more messy entanglement. That is the risk they
:15:35. > :15:40.have taken. But they claim to still be able to deploy it on a
:15:40. > :15:44.rotational basis at brigade strength. We will have to wait and
:15:44. > :15:50.see. But I sense a lessening of political appetite to get engaged
:15:50. > :15:55.in those kind of studies. We talked about your experience in the
:15:55. > :15:59.Falklands. We have talked about Afghanistan and Iraq. These are
:15:59. > :16:04.surprising and unpredictable military commitments. Nobody knew
:16:04. > :16:09.how will any of them would last. It seems in the future we may not be
:16:09. > :16:13.able to respond in the way we have done in the past. That is right. We
:16:13. > :16:17.will have to respond differently. But with forces that are still
:16:17. > :16:22.capable. We will have to hope that the future does not pan out as
:16:22. > :16:27.pessimists would wish. If you don't have a concrete reality, on which
:16:27. > :16:32.to judge how many troops you need, it is just an insurance policy.
:16:32. > :16:38.has the government gone too far? will not judge the Government on
:16:38. > :16:42.that. Many others have. We had former military chiefs right into
:16:42. > :16:47.the Times, saying that on the current plan we could only deploy
:16:47. > :16:51.the grade -- brigade for six or seven ships and aircraft for six
:16:51. > :16:56.months, beyond that it would be difficult. They say Britain falls
:16:56. > :17:00.short of the capability the US requires of remain alive. Villa I
:17:00. > :17:04.have never seen that in writing. I have never see Americans put that
:17:04. > :17:09.down into writing. But one suspects they would look at Britain and
:17:09. > :17:14.think it would back them, back them with real force, as we have seen in
:17:14. > :17:17.Iraq and Afghanistan. In the future, you seem to be saying that is
:17:17. > :17:22.questionable. There is little appetite at the moment to get
:17:22. > :17:26.engaged in long-term engagement. That is the hope of Whitehall and
:17:26. > :17:33.we should create a force that is more likely to comply with that
:17:33. > :17:37.kind of vision. If they are forced to do get engaged, that is a risk,
:17:37. > :17:41.but that is what governments do. talk about visions of the future
:17:41. > :17:45.and they are promised on less likelihood of the sort of
:17:45. > :17:49.engagements we have seen. Let's talk about the vision of the future.
:17:49. > :17:54.As the senior officer, you have been paid to do lots of strategic
:17:54. > :17:57.thinking about armed forces and what they are for. One thing which
:17:57. > :18:07.the British military and British politicians seem to still believe
:18:07. > :18:13.is absolutely a cooler about offences is the independent nuclear
:18:13. > :18:17.missile. -- absolutely appear lot of our defences. Do you think that
:18:17. > :18:20.should be on the table as something we may need? It is always on the
:18:20. > :18:24.table but it is something they have decided strongly in the
:18:24. > :18:30.Conservative Party that we should keep. The Lib Dems take a different
:18:30. > :18:35.view and there is another review going on. What is your view? That
:18:35. > :18:41.it should be considered but I will not go public on that. I have not
:18:41. > :18:47.got a hard and fast you on it myself. In that it should be
:18:47. > :18:51.considered so that, des mac, it may be time to say, given the
:18:51. > :18:56.constraints, given the public deficit, we can no longer afford
:18:57. > :19:06.the massive expense, �20 billion, to renew it? Are you saying there
:19:06. > :19:12.should be an option? Villa that is being considered all the time. It's
:19:12. > :19:16.a political decision, not a military one. I am going to duck
:19:16. > :19:21.fat. Let's see if this is one you will not duck. In the last couple
:19:21. > :19:25.of years in uniform, you were spending a lot of time on cyber
:19:25. > :19:29.security and so are the threats. Here is something the defence
:19:29. > :19:36.secretary in the US said recently. -- cyber threat. He said enemies in
:19:36. > :19:40.the US are going to launch site the strikes that could paralyse the
:19:40. > :19:47.nation. Do you feel the same way about the side the threads in the
:19:47. > :19:51.UK? The potential of cyber attacks are huge. -- cider threats. But it
:19:51. > :19:54.is just the latest way... It is the connection between computers and
:19:54. > :20:00.therefore this space is the latest medium through which to achieve
:20:00. > :20:04.perfect and competition. Nations are competing in cyberspace, as
:20:04. > :20:09.they have in others. The biggest threat is espionage. We shouldn't
:20:09. > :20:15.be surprised by espionage, we shouldn't be surprised by hacking,
:20:15. > :20:20.by intelligence, by a tax. It is just the latest avenue to which to
:20:20. > :20:24.achieve effect. -- attacks. If -- we should be planning to see what
:20:24. > :20:29.we can do to other people. That is exactly the sort of activity that
:20:29. > :20:33.might give an indication... Do you mean the virus that was -- that
:20:33. > :20:37.attacked the Iranian nuclear facility? That right. And that is
:20:37. > :20:44.the sort of thing the British military should be looking at?
:20:44. > :20:48.you look conceptually at the way... At cyberspace activity, there is no
:20:48. > :20:52.hard and fast defence. You can't build a firewall that will protect
:20:52. > :20:56.you in cyberspace. So if you want to get protection, you have to
:20:56. > :21:00.build as strong protection as you can and be active in your defence.
:21:00. > :21:03.But also, you have to go out and stop the person attacking you.
:21:03. > :21:08.we on top of this particular challenge in the British military?
:21:08. > :21:12.We are looking at it. But this is more than a military challenge,
:21:12. > :21:20.this is not a military challenge, it's a national challenge and the
:21:20. > :21:25.lead is held by other agencies, G C x Q Our World experts. You said not
:21:25. > :21:32.long ago, my generation is too old for this. It is crucial to get the
:21:32. > :21:36.kids on the streets on side with this counter strategy. Correct.
:21:36. > :21:40.can you be sure these kinds of people you want to get involved
:21:40. > :21:45.have the motivation and commitment to be reliable as part of a defence
:21:45. > :21:49.strategy? That is the real question and it's a big challenge. How does
:21:49. > :21:57.the UK Hymas these people? The military's role in this is limited.
:21:57. > :22:01.It's a big national talent. -- harness. Obviously there is a big
:22:01. > :22:05.financial element to this. We need to be careful we have the
:22:05. > :22:10.inducements to get people to work for us, rather than criminal people.
:22:10. > :22:14.A final thought on finances. You have left the military -- military
:22:14. > :22:21.and you are involved in a digital company that works inside the
:22:21. > :22:24.security. That company say they support the operations of
:22:24. > :22:29.government and law enforcement agencies. Does that mean you will
:22:29. > :22:37.now work for other guns? No, I do not work for other governments but
:22:37. > :22:41.I give my advice to this company. But absolutely. It's a grey area,
:22:41. > :22:45.where what we regard as the enterprises of states in defence
:22:45. > :22:50.and security are entwined with private contractors, private
:22:50. > :22:54.consultancies, such as the one you work for. It's a very grey area.
:22:54. > :22:58.would not say it is grey. Other government's whose money you would
:22:58. > :23:02.not take? I am not working for the government. But the government can
:23:02. > :23:08.turn to a company like yours and take its advice. But this company
:23:08. > :23:11.works in accordance with UK export laws. So, there are states and
:23:11. > :23:16.governments you couldn't work for? Absolutely, yes. But some that
:23:16. > :23:23.perhaps aren't friends of UK governments, you could work for?
:23:23. > :23:30.There are prohibition there. As far as I understand, there are clearly
:23:30. > :23:33.parts they can and can't do business with. Would you apply any
:23:33. > :23:38.kind of personal ethics and morality to this, as well as