:00:35. > :00:37.Can then be a negotiated way out. Iran's enrichment programme gets
:00:37. > :00:39.ever more sophisticated, international sanctions on Tehran
:00:40. > :00:42.bite deeper and the warnings from the West grow darker. Stephen
:00:42. > :00:52.Sackur's guest on HARDtalk is a former Iranian negotiator on the
:00:52. > :01:15.
:01:15. > :01:19.nuclear issue, Hossein Mousavian. Hossein Mousavian, welcome. We have
:01:19. > :01:22.seen pretty much a decade of stalemate between Iran and the
:01:22. > :01:27.international powers on this question of the Iranian nuclear
:01:27. > :01:36.programme. The new meat is scheduled in Kazakhstan. The see
:01:37. > :01:42.any reason for optimism? Yes. other reasons? First of all, it's
:01:42. > :01:51.important to recognise that we have a great opportunity to bring
:01:51. > :01:56.diplomacy to the success. That's is when you were an active negotiator
:01:56. > :02:02.up on the part of the Iranian Government. At that time, we co-
:02:02. > :02:07.operated with the EU and the authorities, the authorities for
:02:07. > :02:14.the Atomic Energy Authority's, on implementation of that protocol
:02:14. > :02:18.which they were asking as the main item. The X B clear about this. The
:02:18. > :02:26.Additional Protocol essentially an powers the nuclear watchdog
:02:26. > :02:29.inspectors from the swooping into the country to swoop on suspect
:02:29. > :02:37.sites to give them a range of powers which otherwise they would
:02:37. > :02:39.not have. Exact way. We don't have any other international protocol be
:02:40. > :02:46.on additional protocol for intrusive inspections. They speak
:02:46. > :02:53.clear. Having accepted the additional protocol for what was 22
:02:53. > :03:02.months, Iran then chose to walk away. I'll tell you the reason.
:03:02. > :03:07.Even the implementation of those arrangements which gives more
:03:07. > :03:12.possibilities for transparency between Iran and the authorities.
:03:12. > :03:22.Even those suspended and Richman says a confidence-building measure
:03:22. > :03:30.for about 1.5 years. They were not in a position to make a deal. That
:03:30. > :03:39.was because they were supposed to respond on goodwill with
:03:39. > :03:47.recognition of their Iranian rights for enrichment with the non-
:03:47. > :03:56.proliferation treaty. The reason was the US, at that time, the US
:03:56. > :04:04.position was zero in Richmond for Iran, no centrifuge. No enrichment.
:04:04. > :04:10.Germany and France were faking. cannot go through every particular
:04:10. > :04:17.detail of the ten years. It gets to the nub of this issue. What we see
:04:17. > :04:21.in the west is a fundamental lack of trust in Iran with their good
:04:22. > :04:29.intentions. The reason is because for decades, we have seen Iran
:04:29. > :04:31.being deceitful operating with centrifuges and having I have
:04:31. > :04:34.significant nuclear programme behind the backs of the
:04:34. > :04:44.international community and the trust is not there. I agree with
:04:44. > :04:45.
:04:45. > :04:50.you. The west does not trust Iran. But it's important for the west to
:04:50. > :05:00.understand the mistrust is mutual. Iran also has its own reasons not
:05:00. > :05:08.
:05:08. > :05:13.first question. Now we are at 1230. Canon has been any negotiations. --
:05:13. > :05:22.we were supposed to meet in February. Is there a possibility
:05:22. > :05:28.for a solution? I would strongly say yes. Because the fight demands
:05:28. > :05:30.of the authorities. We doubt using this jargon, p 5 is the permanent
:05:30. > :05:39.five members of the Security Council negotiating on behalf of
:05:39. > :05:46.the internet community along with Germany. They have five demands.
:05:46. > :05:51.Firstly, additional protocols to give I A E the possibility for
:05:51. > :05:57.intrusive inspections. That is fundamentally important. Extreme
:05:57. > :06:01.important, it's a major demand for the resolution and also the United
:06:01. > :06:06.Nations Security Council. respect, you're involved in the
:06:06. > :06:12.team for negotiations for a few years but then he fell out with
:06:12. > :06:18.Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now you're in the US. Now we see a regime and
:06:18. > :06:22.these negotiations and they are frankly much more hardline than you
:06:22. > :06:28.were and they are not interested in offering any concessions such as
:06:28. > :06:31.signing up to additional protocols or not interested in talking about
:06:31. > :06:37.suspending the enrichment of uranium. In that context, it's hard
:06:37. > :06:44.for me to see why you can be optimistic. What you said, this is
:06:44. > :06:49.the understanding of 99% of the people in the west. I will give you
:06:49. > :06:58.my reasons. Not right. Let's go to these
:06:58. > :07:04.demands. The second demand of the P five plus Germany is the
:07:04. > :07:13.implementation of the arrangements -3.1 for more transparency in Orion.
:07:13. > :07:19.The third demand is Iranian Corporation corporations with
:07:19. > :07:23.military dimensions. This is called PMB. I am trying to make this
:07:23. > :07:27.understandable forever one watching up. The fear is that such is the
:07:27. > :07:36.scale of the Iranian enrichment programme out in Iran, the ability
:07:36. > :07:39.to deliver 20% enrichment of uranium, very refined, the only
:07:39. > :07:44.objective can be for weapons. Granted, the west is yet to find
:07:44. > :07:50.any compelling irrefutable evidence of weapons programme but they
:07:50. > :07:57.believe all the circumstances suggest that ultimately that's the
:07:58. > :08:06.ambition for the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad mac regime. The 20%
:08:06. > :08:10.enrichment is for giving the possibility for break-up. National
:08:10. > :08:15.Security Studies analysis days ago said that Iran has all have the
:08:15. > :08:20.necessary ingredients to make a bomb. But it appears to be holding
:08:20. > :08:28.off to stave off military action. Would you agree with that? No. We
:08:28. > :08:34.will discuss that but let's finish the first question. The 4th demand,
:08:34. > :08:38.let me explain also, for Iran to co-operate with the authorities,
:08:38. > :08:45.with the possibility of the dimensional issues, Iran should
:08:45. > :08:50.give access to the authorities be on the additional protocol.
:08:50. > :08:57.not? You are making it sound as though perhaps some of the demands
:08:57. > :09:01.are going to far. I'll tell you exactly why not. You should know
:09:01. > :09:07.that to access that they should give access to the authorities be
:09:07. > :09:12.warned additional protocols. 70 countries today have not accepted
:09:12. > :09:20.these additional protocols. respect, it's not about the other
:09:20. > :09:25.70. It's about Iran. When you pointed out recently that Iran now
:09:25. > :09:32.has 10,000 centrifuge machines and 6,000 kilograms of uranium and 150
:09:32. > :09:39.kilograms which is 20% enriched. Now they boast about doubling or
:09:39. > :09:46.tripling the capacity in the main plant. The west has very good
:09:46. > :09:53.reason to worry. Does it not? the west is really worried,
:09:53. > :10:00.therefore they should calm and should be serious for this. The 4th
:10:00. > :10:06.demand from the west is that Iran stops 20% of enrichment and has a
:10:06. > :10:11.cat at 5:00%. They will ensure that if this was done, 20 % will be
:10:11. > :10:18.supplied to enable it to produce fuel rods to produce energy.
:10:18. > :10:23.fifth and final demand is for Durant to accept a limited
:10:23. > :10:30.stockpile of enriched uranium. Iranians also have two other
:10:30. > :10:37.demands. For the P five plus one to recognise the rights of around four
:10:37. > :10:45.enrichment like other members of that group. Also to lift sanctions
:10:45. > :10:50.gradually. The reason the negotiations have failed up to now,
:10:50. > :11:00.and Niamh 100% Shaw, they will fail at the next round of Nicosia
:11:00. > :11:00.
:11:00. > :11:07.Nations in February, because the P five plus one has not been ready to
:11:07. > :11:17.put all of its five major demands plus the Iranian demands. We think
:11:17. > :11:21.a package to be implemented step- by-step with a proportion of
:11:21. > :11:26.reciprocation. This is the deal. Were it respect, this is not at the
:11:26. > :11:31.moment an issue which can be rendered too complicated. It seems
:11:31. > :11:35.quite simple. Because of the scale of the Iranian nuclear programme
:11:35. > :11:42.right now, of all the worries that I have expressed and quoted from
:11:42. > :11:48.the Australians and the US people, we know that the clock is ticking.
:11:48. > :11:55.Unless Iran makes real concessions now on enrichment question, the
:11:55. > :12:01.west may be led by Israel and it will have to take action. This is
:12:01. > :12:09.very urgent. I believe that if the west is ready for considering the
:12:09. > :12:14.Iranian demands, Iran will be serious and ready to consider and
:12:14. > :12:19.to co-operate with the west on but barons. Almost five demands.
:12:19. > :12:24.like a direct answer from you. You're no longer involved in these
:12:24. > :12:27.negotiations but she watched very closely. You believe that Mahmoud
:12:27. > :12:32.Ahmadinejad have made their decision to press ahead with
:12:32. > :12:35.construction programmes underneath the mountains which has frightened
:12:35. > :12:45.Israel and the west and they see this as a facility which can enrich
:12:45. > :12:48.
:12:48. > :12:57.uranium that will be very hard to reach by military. It's about
:12:57. > :13:07.Israeli policy. Netanyahu continues to threaten around with a military
:13:07. > :13:07.
:13:07. > :13:14.strike. The US also, very clearly, either by Bolshaw Obama, they have
:13:14. > :13:23.mentioned other options. This was built in secret. Now another plant
:13:23. > :13:33.is being developed. There is no access. This is not the case.
:13:33. > :13:34.
:13:34. > :13:39.take seriously these proposals. When they threatened Iran to attack
:13:39. > :13:48.all the nuclear facilities, they left no option for Iran to go to
:13:48. > :13:54.build a site under the mountains to save its facilities. If they had
:13:54. > :13:59.not threatened with a military strike, around would not have made
:13:59. > :14:04.that plant. Secondly, around is not a member of the additional
:14:04. > :14:10.protocols. Their have withdrawn. Yeah, but they are remember other
:14:10. > :14:17.another agreement. Legally, to be a member of the NPT, a member of the
:14:17. > :14:23.safeguard agreement, you need to inform I A E eight just 180 days
:14:23. > :14:27.before the introduction of the centrifuge. You do not need to
:14:27. > :14:33.inform them about the construction or assembly of these centrifuge
:14:33. > :14:38.machines. Only when you want to introduce to them these centrifuge
:14:38. > :14:48.machines. Let's be simple. These facilities, they are worried about
:14:48. > :14:56.
:14:56. > :15:03.them and they want to inspect them. We are at risk of missing the big
:15:04. > :15:06.picture. This is the same propaganda atmosphere as we had in
:15:06. > :15:09.2004 and 2005. We gave the International Atomic Energy Agency
:15:09. > :15:18.the opportunity to visit to that place and it was clean. All
:15:18. > :15:27.allegations relating to that area were false. Today, they want to
:15:27. > :15:31.visit that place again. Iran has given no objection. The visitation
:15:31. > :15:35.can only take place within the framework of additional protocol,
:15:35. > :15:44.of which Iran is not a member. However, we are willing to adhere
:15:44. > :15:50.to that additional protocol if the West is prepared for proportional...
:15:50. > :15:56.If Iran does this, what will be the Western action in return as
:15:56. > :15:59.proportional reciprocation? Let us try to keep things as simple as we
:15:59. > :16:04.can. What is it in your view, given that you have some optimism about
:16:04. > :16:10.the next round of talks, what can act as a carrot that would appeal
:16:10. > :16:15.to the Iranians enough to get them to make concessions on the question
:16:15. > :16:21.of how they enriched uranium and how much concentrated uranium they
:16:21. > :16:26.do in rich? I am optimistic. What is the carrot? What is it the West
:16:26. > :16:32.should be offering in your opinion? I believe that the Western
:16:32. > :16:42.countries should go to the negotiation table, they should very
:16:42. > :16:47.clearly, without any ambiguity, tell the Iranians: We would respect
:16:47. > :16:54.your rights, we would not discriminate against Iran, we would
:16:54. > :17:00.not victimise Iran. Ultimately, we will lift the sanctions. Ultimately.
:17:00. > :17:06.This should be done within a gradual process. No-one is going to
:17:06. > :17:16.believe sanctions will be lifted overnight. It takes time. If Iran
:17:16. > :17:21.is prepared to accept the maximum level of transparency,
:17:21. > :17:24.internationally, on its nuclear programme... If this is chicken and
:17:24. > :17:30.egg, surely that is what must come first given the record of deception
:17:30. > :17:35.and subterfuge over so many years. It is incumbent on Iran first, is
:17:35. > :17:41.it not, to show they can be utterly transparent and open? To let the
:17:41. > :17:50.inspectors in and let them go where they will? Iran has done this. In
:17:50. > :17:57.February, 2010, the current Foreign Minister who was at that time the
:17:57. > :18:02.head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran publicly told
:18:02. > :18:10.the international community that we were now in reaching at 3.5%. We
:18:10. > :18:16.want fuel rods Forte round. If you give us fuel rods for at Tehran, we
:18:16. > :18:22.will not increase the level of enrichment beyond 5%. This was the
:18:22. > :18:26.first offer made by Iran. Unfortunately,... Well, things have
:18:26. > :18:31.changed. Is it not be true that Iran is in a weak position now
:18:31. > :18:37.because sanctions have been tightened so much that the Iranian
:18:37. > :18:42.economy is teetering? If we are talking about powerful positions
:18:42. > :18:45.all week positions, I can tell you that both parties are in powerful
:18:45. > :18:49.positions and both positions -- both parties are in a weak
:18:49. > :18:55.positions. But we are talking about a US President to as convincingly
:18:55. > :19:02.won an election. In Iran, we have the lame duck President Ahmadinejad,
:19:02. > :19:12.who seems to be at war with the Supreme Leader. Where is the
:19:12. > :19:13.
:19:13. > :19:19.strength in Iran? I will tell you now. The Western countries did not
:19:19. > :19:25.buy uranium... They said that Iran is bluffing. They said Iran did not
:19:25. > :19:31.have the capacity to enrich the under 5%. In December, 2011,
:19:31. > :19:35.President Ahmadinejad said that now they are enriching. If you give us
:19:36. > :19:40.the fuel rods for the Tehran research reactors, we will stop
:19:40. > :19:46.enriching at 20% and we will go back to fight beside. If you give
:19:46. > :19:50.us. But based on this calculation, the Europeans and Americans
:19:51. > :19:56.believed this was a bluff and that Iran could not make fuel rods.
:19:56. > :20:01.Within three months, Iran made the fuel rods. Therefore, if, from the
:20:01. > :20:07.beginning the West had except it to provide fuel rods for Tehran's
:20:07. > :20:14.research reactor, we would not have today's situation. Neither 20% of
:20:14. > :20:18.all this stockpile. Now, who is... I have to ask, it is interesting
:20:18. > :20:22.that having left the country and fallen out with President
:20:22. > :20:29.Ahmadinejad, you seem to be loyally defending the position taken by the
:20:29. > :20:38.Iranian government. I just what -- wonder whether you think he has
:20:38. > :20:48.made a terrible mistake in his demonisation of Israel? I believe
:20:48. > :20:49.
:20:49. > :20:54.his statements on the Holocaust, on wiping his rail off the map. --
:20:54. > :20:58.Israel. He says he will remove the Zionist black stain from society. A
:20:58. > :21:03.Supreme Leader has said the sinus regime is a cancerous tumour in the
:21:03. > :21:07.region that should be cut off and definitely will be cut off --
:21:07. > :21:14.Zionist. In the context of this language, is it any surprise that
:21:14. > :21:22.Israel, the international powers led by the US, I'm not prepared to
:21:22. > :21:31.take Iran on trust? Trust is not only a nuclear issue. Mistrust on
:21:31. > :21:37.many other issues. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, human
:21:37. > :21:43.rights. I am asking you if with his language, how they made terrible
:21:43. > :21:47.mistakes in the way they have presented Iran's case. When
:21:47. > :21:52.President Ahmadinejad made the statement on the Holocaust, I
:21:52. > :21:58.believe he made a big mistake. about the Supreme Leader who said
:21:58. > :22:02.that the Zionist regime is a cancer that should be removed? He would
:22:03. > :22:12.never have made this statement during his leadership. Since 1988,
:22:13. > :22:14.
:22:14. > :22:18.he has always emphasised just the state and -- statement: We are in
:22:18. > :22:21.favour of free elections in Israel where all Muslims, Jews and
:22:21. > :22:26.Christians can participate and whatever they decide about the
:22:26. > :22:32.destiny, we will support. A let us not go down that track. Let us talk
:22:32. > :22:35.more about the internal workings of Iran. You live in exile and do you
:22:36. > :22:41.want to return to Iran. You have some very good friends who may one
:22:41. > :22:48.day run for President. I wonder if you believe there is any prosperity
:22:48. > :22:54.-- prospect of moderation, pragmatism, were former coming from
:22:54. > :23:02.Iran in the next election? -- reform. We have experienced 16
:23:03. > :23:12.years of moderate policies in Iran. I believe the moderate policies of
:23:13. > :23:13.
:23:13. > :23:17.Iran failed because of this treatment of the West. In the past,
:23:17. > :23:25.Iran had moderate policies. The West continued to pressure and
:23:25. > :23:30.section Iran, to increase its isolation. This is the result.
:23:30. > :23:34.There are more pressures on Iran -- putting more pressure on Iran would
:23:34. > :23:39.radicalise the rain in domestic politics more and more. This is the
:23:39. > :23:42.equation. -- Iranian domestic politics. In that case, the Supreme
:23:42. > :23:47.Leader may continue to feel that continuing to ratchet up the
:23:47. > :23:51.tension on the nuclear issue serves his purpose best. So, why believe
:23:51. > :23:57.anything will change? I do not believe Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is
:23:57. > :24:01.after the radicalisation of domestic politics. He permitted
:24:02. > :24:06.President Ahmadinejad to write a letter to President Bush. He
:24:06. > :24:09.permitted Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to congratulate President Obama has
:24:09. > :24:15.elected President. He permitted him to write another letter to
:24:15. > :24:19.President Obama. This was unprecedented during the history of