:00:17. > :00:21.NATO was founded to defend Western Europe from the Soviet Union, with
:00:21. > :00:24.the US and enthusiastic member. You could say that Ivo Daalder is
:00:24. > :00:30.perfect as Washington's representative at the headquarters
:00:30. > :00:33.in Belgium. He is European by birth and American by choice. But are
:00:33. > :00:38.those two outlooks becoming increasingly difficult to
:00:38. > :00:41.reconcile? --? There is tension that could affect European citizens
:00:41. > :00:45.and a division characterised by a former US Defence Secretary as
:00:45. > :00:50.between those who pay, the Americans, and those who enjoy the
:00:50. > :00:55.benefits, the Europeans. With divisions over money and philosophy,
:00:55. > :01:05.as Ivo Daalder with -- prepares to return home, does he keep it is
:01:05. > :01:29.
:01:29. > :01:33.time that this 64-year-old Security Ivo Daalder, welcome to HARDtalk.
:01:33. > :01:40.And thank you for hosting a pass at NATO's studio. To keep the
:01:40. > :01:46.Russian's out, the Americans in and Germans down. That is how the first
:01:46. > :01:52.Secretary General of NATO described now? What is NATO for in the 21st
:01:52. > :01:57.century? For three things. At the Lisbon summit in November, 2010,
:01:57. > :02:03.when we adopted a new strategic concept, we made that clear.
:02:03. > :02:09.Firstly, collective defence. To in today and tomorrow, when one of
:02:09. > :02:14.us is attack, whether armies coming through the skies for a
:02:14. > :02:19.cyber attack on a computer network, we are they collectively to help
:02:19. > :02:23.defend that country. Secondly, it is about crisis management. The
:02:23. > :02:30.ability of 28 countries using an integrated command structure,
:02:30. > :02:35.having common capabilities, being reach out in crisis and hopefully
:02:35. > :02:39.prevent and if not bring it to an end as soon as possible. Finally
:02:39. > :02:44.what we call co-operative security. Working with other countries,
:02:44. > :02:49.stressing the importance of arms control. Expanding our partnerships
:02:49. > :02:55.across the globe, as well as with countries that are not members in
:02:55. > :03:00.Europe, in order to be a hard for security relations. In Europe and
:03:00. > :03:03.beyond. -- be a centre. He talked about 28 countries sharing and
:03:03. > :03:13.operating together. But you have acknowledged that there are
:03:13. > :03:14.
:03:14. > :03:16.practical difficulties in achieving last year that NATO's neglected to
:03:16. > :03:20.cultivate an intelligence surveillance reconnaissance,
:03:20. > :03:25.despite nearly two decades of experience going back to the
:03:25. > :03:31.Balkans intervention. Why can't the organisation get its act together
:03:31. > :03:36.in fundamental ways? It is in the end its 28 members. You do have a
:03:36. > :03:43.constant tension between what it is that one needs to require
:03:43. > :03:46.nationally and what it is that one wants as an alliance. It is not a
:03:46. > :03:51.question of too big, it is to reverse in some sense. If you hurry
:03:51. > :03:56.smaller country, the only way you can have a strategic lift is to
:03:56. > :04:00.contribute to a common capability. The Dutch for example bought half a
:04:00. > :04:04.C 17. Not necessarily useful unless somebody buys the other half and
:04:04. > :04:07.that is what NATO allows you to do. Bigger countries like the UK or
:04:07. > :04:11.France are making National Investment and capabilities and say
:04:11. > :04:15.they can't afford to pay twice. Once for NATO and once for
:04:15. > :04:19.themselves. That is where the tension comes in and we succeed on
:04:19. > :04:22.some points and the push in order to succeed down the road on others.
:04:22. > :04:27.I want to come on to the Britain and America question because that
:04:27. > :04:32.is interesting. But staying for now with recent NATO activities. Libya
:04:32. > :04:36.last year. You wrote that by any measure Major succeeded. The UN was
:04:36. > :04:40.the vehicle by which this intervention was authorised.
:04:40. > :04:45.Germany abstained in the Security Council. A big NATO member saying
:04:45. > :04:49.they were not sure if they should do this. Half of NATO's members did
:04:49. > :04:53.not take part. 14 said know. The other 14 said yes in various
:04:53. > :04:58.measures. Then the US had to step in because NATO could not sustain
:04:58. > :05:04.the operation. A strange definition of success. Let's unpacked that.
:05:04. > :05:10.The US is part of NATO. It did not step in, it provided the key
:05:10. > :05:13.capabilities that it uniquely possessed in order to allow the
:05:13. > :05:18.alliance's of those countries who participated, as well as partners
:05:18. > :05:22.of the Alliance, to conduct the operation. Compare that to Kosovo,
:05:22. > :05:27.the last big campaign other than Afghanistan. 90% of the targets
:05:27. > :05:33.were struck by American airplanes and American bombs. In Libya, 90%
:05:33. > :05:40.was struck by Belgium, the Danish, Canadian, Norwegian, and of course
:05:40. > :05:44.British and French planes. That is a big change. Only 11 weeks into an
:05:44. > :05:48.operation, a poorly armed regime in a sparsely Coppock -- sparsely-
:05:48. > :05:52.populated country and yet the US was once more required to make up
:05:52. > :05:57.the difference. The then US Secretary of Defence said that. He
:05:57. > :06:04.did not sound as if, though, we are part of NATO, it is fine, we fill
:06:04. > :06:09.the gaps. Clearly, as I wrote, when we did our evaluation the Libyan
:06:09. > :06:14.operation showed both the strengths and weaknesses. The strengths were,
:06:14. > :06:17.he was an alliance where ten days after the UN Security Council
:06:17. > :06:21.resolution decide to take over this operation and four days afterwards
:06:22. > :06:25.was in charge. There's no place in any organisation in the world that
:06:25. > :06:28.could have done that and frankly, aside from the US, there's no
:06:28. > :06:34.country in the world that could have done that. But clearly there
:06:34. > :06:39.are gaps. We have not invested in Europe enough in a critical defence
:06:39. > :06:43.capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, drone capabilities,
:06:43. > :06:46.aerial refuelling. We did not stockpile enough ammunition. Some
:06:46. > :06:50.of the countries that were in the bombing campaign were doing so for
:06:51. > :06:56.the first this time since World War II. It was a wake-up call.
:06:56. > :07:03.Therefore, if this alliance wants to be able to do this kind of thing
:07:03. > :07:07.again, as we wrote, they will have to invest. We will come on to
:07:07. > :07:13.budget. That is important. You mentioned drones. Could that be
:07:13. > :07:20.part of NATO's future? Yes. For 20 years, we have been trying to get
:07:20. > :07:26.an aerial ground surveillance system. After Libya when we showed
:07:26. > :07:32.the West's gap, NATO bought this system. Five Global Hawk drones
:07:32. > :07:35.that would be able to operate and are owned by this alliance.
:07:35. > :07:39.Secretary General of NATO said earlier this year... His
:07:39. > :07:43.explanation for Libya was that NATO's function was to protect the
:07:43. > :07:47.Libyan population against attacks from its own government. But NATO
:07:47. > :07:52.is not there to protect Syrians from attacks by their own
:07:52. > :07:57.government. Does that trouble you? Every case will have to be judged
:07:57. > :08:02.by its own unique characteristics. In the Libyan case, we had three
:08:02. > :08:08.criteria for NATO to be part of that operation. First, they had to
:08:08. > :08:13.be a demonstrable need. There is one in Syria, isn't there? That is
:08:13. > :08:20.something that needs to be done there. Secondly, they had to be
:08:20. > :08:25.regional support. There's no regional support in Syria by NATO.
:08:25. > :08:30.But there is clearly regional intervention from other countries.
:08:30. > :08:35.I did is not something that NATO is being asked to do, as it was in
:08:35. > :08:39.Libya. And there has to be a sound basis and we did have a UN secluded
:08:39. > :08:43.Council resolution in Libya, that enabled us to intervene. As a
:08:44. > :08:48.result, until we get that international consensus, that is so
:08:48. > :08:52.necessary for us to move forward, I don't think there is a role for
:08:52. > :08:58.NATO. You have clearly discussed it. Something you can't turn a blind
:08:58. > :09:02.eye to? I of course. Not only do we talk about how we can use military
:09:02. > :09:05.means, it's a political organisation. The only place in the
:09:06. > :09:09.world where Europeans and North Americans sit together and talk
:09:09. > :09:15.about security issues. We do exchange information and discuss
:09:15. > :09:21.what can be done. You discuss what can be done? What can be and is
:09:21. > :09:25.being done. But importantly... We already have done something, very
:09:25. > :09:31.importantly, which is protecting Turkey from the spill over of Syria.
:09:31. > :09:35.As I mentioned, we are first and foremost about the defence.
:09:35. > :09:40.Turkey... This his last October when there was a bomb attack that
:09:40. > :09:46.killed some villagers and NATO condemned it. But under article 4,
:09:46. > :09:54.not article 5, there was no promise he would step in. To the contrary.
:09:54. > :09:56.Because of that attack, the Turks then formally asked for NATO to
:09:56. > :10:00.increase its air defence capabilities through the deployment
:10:01. > :10:07.of Patriot missiles. The US, together with Germany and the
:10:07. > :10:12.Netherlands, under a NATO umbrella, have now deployed six to defend
:10:12. > :10:16.Turkey. Under the terms of NATO's charter, are you saying you can
:10:16. > :10:20.conceive of circumstances where, if Syria were foolhardy enough to
:10:20. > :10:23.continue any kind of aggressive action against Turkey, that NATO
:10:24. > :10:29.would feel it was duty bound and indeed able politically to
:10:29. > :10:36.intervene? No doubt that if NATO territories attack anywhere, in
:10:36. > :10:41.this case if Turkey were to be attacked from Syria, NATO would
:10:41. > :10:46.respond. This would be an attack against all. We have done that
:10:46. > :10:49.before. When Al-Qaeda struck the US, this council in this building voted
:10:49. > :10:53.to invoke article 5. There's no doubt in my mind in every
:10:53. > :10:57.discussion we have had about this, if there is an attack on a major
:10:57. > :11:01.country, all countries will stand ready to help defend that country
:11:01. > :11:06.and make sure it does not... Aggression can't succeed. I am
:11:06. > :11:10.intrigued by your interpretation of nature's position. I notice the
:11:10. > :11:14.Secretary General in February was quoted by Foreign Policy magazine
:11:14. > :11:18.as saying we have not had any discussions about a NATO role in
:11:18. > :11:21.Syria. It raises an interesting question about if it came to it,
:11:21. > :11:25.how different members of the council and organisation might
:11:25. > :11:30.perceive its role. If the time comes in which it is judged that
:11:30. > :11:34.NATO needs to do something beyond being a form for discussion and
:11:34. > :11:39.dialogue and beyond protecting Turkey, then I have no doubt we
:11:39. > :11:44.will have the kind of debate that we usually have and, as we usually
:11:44. > :11:48.do, we will come out with a consensus. You mentioned 9/11 and
:11:48. > :11:54.the attack that led to the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. What
:11:54. > :11:58.about Afghanistan's sustainability? We expect combat troops, the NATO-
:11:58. > :12:03.led ISAF fours, to end its role next year along with the American
:12:03. > :12:06.troops to operate there. But the man in charge of the operation has
:12:06. > :12:09.just told the BBC that although they have made significant progress,
:12:09. > :12:15.they are not yet completed sustainable, which is why they have
:12:15. > :12:20.to start talking about 2018, not 2014. That would allow the gains to
:12:20. > :12:29.be sustainable. Will that be tolerated by public opinion? Never
:12:29. > :12:33.mind in 80 countries in Europe, but the US? We agreed in Lisbon and we
:12:33. > :12:37.reaffirmed in Chicago when we had another important summit in 2012
:12:37. > :12:42.and just in the last defence ministry again, that our mission is
:12:42. > :12:47.to prepare the Afghan forces to take full responsibility for
:12:47. > :12:52.security throughout the country by the end of 2014. And by the end of
:12:52. > :12:57.2014, this mission that we have been engaged in since 2004, will
:12:57. > :13:06.end. Combat troops will come home. That will not change. But another
:13:06. > :13:16.four years of America watching? After the combat mission ends,
:13:16. > :13:17.
:13:17. > :13:26.after what we call the ICE staff -- the Eye staff forced N's, NATO will
:13:26. > :13:30.be prepared to launch a new mission. -- ISAF force. That could last till
:13:30. > :13:36.2018? You agree? The time frame is in determine. We have not made any
:13:36. > :13:42.decisions about the size, scope or duration. He's clearly trying to
:13:42. > :13:45.pressure you to go for 2018. will have his view. And his few
:13:45. > :13:48.will weighed very heavily in any discussion when the military
:13:48. > :13:58.commander comes in and says, this is what we think. But no decision
:13:58. > :14:08.
:14:08. > :14:12.The former British ambassador to Afghanistan since that what we are
:14:12. > :14:20.dealing as cultivating a garden in the jungle. The question is what
:14:20. > :14:23.happens when the gardeners leave? Used it to me so long as there is a
:14:23. > :14:32.healthy paving in Pakistan, there is nothing we can do to secure
:14:32. > :14:39.Afghanistan. -- safe haven in. is not about gardening, this is
:14:39. > :14:44.about security. It is an analogy between a cultivated part and when
:14:44. > :14:50.you disappear, there will be encroachment. We will not disappear.
:14:50. > :15:00.We are leaving behind a very strong, very capable, well armed peace
:15:00. > :15:02.
:15:02. > :15:10.force. That is already taking care of problems. They will be in a
:15:10. > :15:20.position to take responsibility for security. We have it in more months
:15:20. > :15:24.
:15:24. > :15:32.in which NATO will stand ready to sector. The jungle will remain
:15:32. > :15:37.receded. That is the main sustainability question. People
:15:37. > :15:41.worry about what is left behind. People are looking for alternative
:15:42. > :15:50.models. Britain and France have been increasingly core operating
:15:50. > :15:54.over the past few years. In Mali, French troops around the ground and
:15:54. > :16:04.the British are providing logistics. People are saying that we do not
:16:04. > :16:06.
:16:06. > :16:11.really needs mater. -- to NATO. In Mali it is not just Britain and
:16:11. > :16:19.France. There are many neighbouring countries who are either on a
:16:19. > :16:28.bilateral basis, including the United States. In this case, France
:16:28. > :16:38.decided to intervene in this way. Why? Why did they think may to Rees
:16:38. > :16:38.
:16:38. > :16:44.to difficult? That is a question you should ask Paris. It was a very
:16:44. > :16:53.courageous and important strategic move. Sometimes it takes too long
:16:53. > :17:01.to make decisions. It is easy to do it unilaterally. But why did they
:17:01. > :17:09.do this rotten than going through NATO. They get the general support,
:17:09. > :17:18.which includes common funding for parts of the operation. This is a
:17:18. > :17:28.balancing act. It because to me that they might have reflected a
:17:28. > :17:32.bit when you said that there were serious gaps in the two. -- NATO.
:17:32. > :17:37.In a sense, it is easier for them to do it together than go through
:17:37. > :17:43.the organisation that is not up to speed. The question is whether they
:17:44. > :17:53.can do it without the United States. Can they do it bilaterally, in the
:17:54. > :17:54.
:17:54. > :17:59.case of Mali for example. What you get from a command structure is a
:17:59. > :18:08.greater degree of legitimacy. France was able, and rightly so to
:18:08. > :18:11.appeal to the UN. It got strong United Nations support. NATO is not
:18:12. > :18:19.the only organisation. It does not have to be in every place
:18:19. > :18:29.everywhere at every turn. It is far more appropriate for and 82 Act
:18:29. > :18:31.
:18:31. > :18:37.when it is far away from home. -- may tattoo. Are you torn by the
:18:38. > :18:46.current debate over American civilians? There is no debate in
:18:46. > :18:51.the United States about this, in the sense that the NSA surveillance
:18:51. > :18:55.issue is an issue that is about intelligence gathering. It is about
:18:55. > :19:01.intelligence gathering in a war for manner. We have three branches of
:19:01. > :19:11.government. -- will fall. But Boris some Europeans, not least political
:19:11. > :19:15.
:19:16. > :19:19.leaders, is that it's much not protect Europeans. Programmes such
:19:19. > :19:29.as prison could have grave, and for its consequences for the
:19:29. > :19:29.
:19:29. > :19:33.fundamental rights of the citizens. All I can say is that these
:19:33. > :19:41.programmes have been conducted by United States, as the President and
:19:41. > :19:51.members of Congress have said, they are legally authorised. We fully
:19:51. > :19:52.
:19:52. > :19:56.authorised by the US. This is the problem for Europeans. We live in
:19:56. > :20:01.the world in which gathering of information takes place across
:20:01. > :20:05.borders by definition. I cannot comment on any particular
:20:05. > :20:11.information that is being davit. But this is something that all
:20:11. > :20:14.countries to, including Europeans. Therefore, as a result, that is a
:20:14. > :20:20.gathering of intelligence information. That is something that
:20:20. > :20:25.we do in a world where we are still faced with countries and people,
:20:25. > :20:33.particularly individuals, who are pinned on her destruction. But we
:20:33. > :20:37.are partners in NATO. But we are not being treated as pounds. There
:20:37. > :20:46.is a standard that is different for US citizens and citizens in
:20:46. > :20:50.European countries. There is concern that there should be a
:20:50. > :20:56.common standard. This is a discretion that is worth having. --
:20:56. > :21:03.discussion. The reason I raised this question, it is a question
:21:03. > :21:09.about potential tensions between Europe and the United States. The
:21:09. > :21:14.former US Defence Secretary, he gave a strongly-worded appearance
:21:14. > :21:18.before he left office, when he said that there was a two-tier
:21:18. > :21:22.membership to structure. Those willing to pay the price and bear
:21:22. > :21:26.the Britons of commitment, and a couple of European countries, and
:21:26. > :21:32.those who enjoy the benefits but do not want to share the risks and
:21:32. > :21:38.costs. He went on to complain about national cabinets that European
:21:38. > :21:44.soldiers do not do so and things. Sometimes infuriating for Allied
:21:44. > :21:54.commanders. Are you beginning to wonder whether there is a common
:21:54. > :21:54.
:21:54. > :22:02.outlook? It is very much a debate that we had when he was making that
:22:02. > :22:07.case. The Germans are in combat in Afghanistan. Soon nobody will be
:22:07. > :22:14.engaging in combat in Afghanistan. There is the division between those
:22:14. > :22:20.who pay and those who do not. more concerned about an alliance in
:22:20. > :22:27.the sense of how much we are investigating in capabilities. The
:22:27. > :22:34.United States has a different outlook. Everyone has a different
:22:34. > :22:40.outlook on the world. That is the reality of international politics.
:22:40. > :22:45.But the most important reality is that despite those differences, we
:22:45. > :22:51.have the same values. We do not question that we are willing to
:22:51. > :22:57.invest in protecting those values. If we do not invest, we do not have
:22:57. > :23:02.the capabilities. If we rely on one country to march, then indeed the
:23:02. > :23:10.value of this alliance provokes a question on my side as much as it
:23:10. > :23:18.does yours. I am particularly interested on research. - Make your
:23:18. > :23:25.side. Maybe the United States does not feel that attachment any more.
:23:25. > :23:29.Some say maybe that America does not need forces in Europe any more.
:23:29. > :23:39.The chairman of the house and services committee said that NATO
:23:39. > :23:41.
:23:41. > :23:48.is a drain on the Treasury and so it's no strategic purposes. This is
:23:48. > :23:54.a different generation. A few days ago, the last World War II veteran
:23:54. > :24:01.died. There are none were world were to veterans in the US Congress.
:24:01. > :24:08.We are rapidly moving away from the Cold War generation. It becomes
:24:08. > :24:12.important that we explain not only wife United States has an interest
:24:12. > :24:17.in being an arbiter, which can be explained by the fact that these
:24:17. > :24:23.are valued allies and we have a strong strategic partnership. We
:24:23. > :24:27.knew that we can count on Europe. But also it is important for Europe
:24:27. > :24:37.to demonstrate that this partnership still exists, is