John Limbert - US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran (2009- 2010)

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:00:10. > :00:16.Welcome to HARDtalk. For the second time in his presidency Barack Obama

:00:16. > :00:23.is eyeing the 'reset button' in his diplomatic toolkit. With Russia it

:00:23. > :00:30.misfired, so when it comes to Iran, what are the chances of overcoming

:00:30. > :00:33.three decades of hostility? HARDtalk speaks to John Limbert, the state

:00:33. > :00:37.department's point man on Iran in Obama's first term, and one of the

:00:37. > :00:43.US diplomats held hostage in Tehran 34 years ago. Are the US and Iran

:00:43. > :01:14.ready for the difficult decisions that would truly reset relations?

:01:14. > :01:25.Ambassador John Limbert in Washington, DC, welcome to HARDtalk.

:01:25. > :01:35.I think it is fair to say that few officials have the intimate

:01:35. > :01:45.knowledge of Iran that you have. It is potentially very, very exciting.

:01:45. > :01:53.This is the first time we see a crack in the deep freeze. A

:01:54. > :02:01.relationship based described lack of Narnia. Always winter, never

:02:01. > :02:09.Christmas. You say it hasn't happened in 34 years, there have

:02:09. > :02:12.been moments of excitement before. Lots of people thought that would

:02:12. > :02:21.introduce a thaw in relations and it didn't. So why should we be so much

:02:21. > :02:29.more excited this time? Perhaps we shouldn't be. For exactly the reason

:02:29. > :02:30.you said. There have been opportunities, there have been

:02:30. > :07:16.Neither of us want to see Sunni openings, you mentioned

:07:16. > :07:19.Neither of us want to see Sunni fundamentalists, jihadists, Al-Qaeda

:07:19. > :07:46.group come to power. Neither of us want to see nuclear weapons used.

:07:46. > :07:49.Let's not go there right now. Let's stick with the real substance of

:07:49. > :08:05.this relationship. More than anything it is about Iran's nuclear

:08:05. > :08:09.ambitions. If the nuclear issue is too difficult, let's put it to one

:08:09. > :08:12.side. The problem is, when the Iranians talk about the nuclear

:08:12. > :08:26.issue, we are talking about legal issues, technical issues, additional

:08:26. > :08:30.protocols. The Iranians are talking about something different. They are

:08:30. > :08:41.talking about national pride, their national rights, their status in the

:08:41. > :08:53.world. This kind of asymmetric negotiation can only lead to

:08:53. > :09:03.frustration. When you are talking to the Iranians over oil, 60 years ago,

:09:03. > :09:21.it was the same thing. Its rights to control its own destiny. Their

:09:21. > :09:25.acquisition of nuclear weapons. I just want to know whether you as a

:09:25. > :09:28.diplomat with extraordinary power and knowledge of this country, a

:09:28. > :09:43.long-time diplomat and servant of the State Department, I am yet to

:09:44. > :09:53.encounter... That Hassan Rouhani... He doesn't believe it, do you? I

:09:53. > :10:04.don't know and I don't know if anyone knows. What I do know is

:10:04. > :10:11.this. What is the Iranians core interest in all of these exchanges?

:10:12. > :10:19.It seems to me it is the survival of the regime. The main threat to their

:10:19. > :10:21.survival are not foreign armies or ships or planes but the internal

:10:21. > :10:36.rebellion, internal disturbance, what they call the sedition inside

:10:36. > :10:47.Iran. What does a nuclear weapon do to ensure the continuation of the

:10:47. > :10:59.regime? I don't want to tell you things you already know because you

:10:59. > :11:02.know this better than anyone. The nuclear programme has been woven in

:11:02. > :11:06.to their regime strategy for so long that it seems to me that it has

:11:06. > :11:14.become an integral part of who they are and what they are. Has served

:11:14. > :11:37.the regime in many different senior capacities ever since. H e is a man

:11:37. > :11:40.far from being a liberal or a moderate in that cliched language,

:11:40. > :11:44.again, woven into the senior decision-making that has let us to

:11:44. > :11:49.this place. I think on this case, we are in violent agreement. I am and

:11:49. > :11:53.what others have said, if you want to get to the nuclear issue, which

:11:54. > :12:01.is a central issue, what you have to do is at least build some confidence

:12:01. > :12:11.between the two sides. To go directly to the issue is not going

:12:11. > :12:14.to build that confidence. You need to broaden the discussion to areas

:12:15. > :12:17.like Afghanistan, perhaps Syria, and where these two sides discover that

:12:18. > :12:21.if they say yes to something, but the sky doesn't fall and that in

:12:21. > :12:25.fact the other side might not always be out to cheat them, having

:12:25. > :12:48.established that, you can go back to the nuclear issue. Pause and

:12:48. > :13:01.consider, if you would, how what you just said might be received in

:13:01. > :13:10.Israel? I do not speak for the Israeli government. What I do know

:13:10. > :13:13.is during my visits to Israel and in conversation with Israeli friends,

:13:14. > :13:29.the opinion - this is not just on the left - but much of the opinion

:13:29. > :13:32.is strongly divided on this issue. There is a vigorous debate within

:13:33. > :13:41.Israel as there are on many subjects on the question of Iran. And the

:13:41. > :13:50.kind of rhetoric we hear here on Israel represents just a segment of

:13:50. > :13:56.opinion. Unfortunately, here in the US, we do not hear all sides of the

:13:56. > :14:00.story. To quote an Israeli newspaper, they said AIPAC - the

:14:00. > :14:11.lobbying group in the US - is not Israel. I did not know whether you

:14:11. > :14:19.can call the government one voice. Netanyahu is the most important

:14:19. > :14:25.voice. The government have dismissed everything that Hassan Rouhani has

:14:25. > :14:27.said. The minister of intelligence said the nuclear project is

:14:27. > :14:30.galloping forward, if they continue to advance they could have nuclear

:14:30. > :14:38.weapon capabilities within six months. Right now, Benjamin

:14:38. > :14:42.Netanyahu is pleading with Barack Obama pleading that they do not take

:14:42. > :14:52.at face value what the Iranians are saying. The problem is the extremist

:14:52. > :15:13.party within Israel had the gift that kept on giving. Khomeini. Now

:15:13. > :15:23.he is gone. His absence, after 34 years, has created a serious

:15:23. > :15:26.problem. I am sorry to interrupt but this is not about language, it is

:15:26. > :15:30.not even about personality, it is about the fact that according to the

:15:30. > :15:38.IAEA, there are at least 17 different nuclear facilities inside

:15:38. > :15:44.Iran. There is a sophisticated enrichment programme. The IAEA says

:15:44. > :15:50.it cannot confirm it is for peaceful purposes. These are realities which

:15:50. > :15:53.Israelis see and which leads them to conclude that unless things change

:15:53. > :16:08.very quickly, something will have to be done, albeit perhaps by them if

:16:08. > :16:10.nobody else will do it. Again, it is interesting you mention the word

:16:10. > :16:14.quickly, because that was exactly what we heard some of the Iranian

:16:14. > :16:16.representatives in New York, I believe including Hassan Rouhani and

:16:16. > :16:38.his delegation, say about the nuclear negotiations, saying we need

:16:38. > :16:41.to reach some agreement quickly. What the Iranians have been saying

:16:41. > :16:45.and, whether you believe that or not is another issue, if you do not

:16:45. > :16:57.believe them, then there is no answer. It is difficult to make any

:16:57. > :17:01.kind of progress. Someone said at some point in the negotiations -

:17:01. > :17:05.someone has to trust someone. But what the Iranians say is that they

:17:05. > :17:07.do not... They are not seeking a nuclear weapon for various reasons -

:17:08. > :17:11.ideological and political and so forth - but they do not want to be

:17:11. > :17:21.told what to do, bullied, intimidated, as they call it, by

:17:21. > :17:29.some outside power. Or politically could they be seen to knuckle under

:17:29. > :17:32.threat. As another former State department colleague of yours,

:17:32. > :17:41.Nicholas Burns, wrote not so long ago, oftentimes diplomacy requires

:17:41. > :17:43.the threat of force. You seem to be advocating a move towards relaxation

:17:43. > :17:52.of sanctions, sending warmer signals to Tehran before they have done

:17:52. > :17:55.anything. Surely the sanctions are the reason why Hassan Rouhani is

:17:55. > :18:05.talking openly about making concessions. You keep the sanctions

:18:05. > :18:21.until they pack their words with specific actions? I have great

:18:21. > :18:25.respect for ambassador Burns. Smart diplomacy without some backing of

:18:25. > :18:34.force is a little bit like a smile without any teeth - it does not

:18:34. > :18:37.carry much weight. But to say that sanctions, for example, had this

:18:37. > :18:40.effect, made the Iranians become more reasonable, made the Iranians

:18:40. > :18:54.change their policy, may be true but I have not seen the evidence for it.

:18:54. > :18:57.People have made the statements. I have seen statements that Hassan

:18:57. > :19:09.Rouhani owes his election to the sanctions. Again, that may be true

:19:09. > :19:12.but where is the evidence? The same people who are making these claims,

:19:12. > :19:20.excuse me, are the same people who were the strongest advocates of

:19:20. > :19:23.sanctions in the first place. Isn't that self-evident that an economy

:19:23. > :19:27.which has seen, they say, around $1 billion squeeze out of it because of

:19:27. > :19:31.the strict sanctions, including the loss of output in oil of roughly a

:19:31. > :19:34.million barrels per day, is it not self-evident that that is the sort

:19:34. > :19:38.of terrible damage being done to the Iranian economy that is going to

:19:38. > :19:41.force the regime to start to think very carefully about whether it

:19:41. > :19:50.wants to push ahead with its nuclear programme? Iran's economy is in

:19:50. > :19:58.terrible shape - there is no doubt about that. With its oil resources,

:19:58. > :20:05.with its well educated population, it should be a paradise. It is not.

:20:06. > :20:09.That question, the open question that remains - and I have never had

:20:09. > :20:13.a satisfactory answer to this - is, how much do these problems come from

:20:13. > :20:19.the sanctions, how much from chronic mismanagement? A problem that has

:20:20. > :20:22.gone back a long way and a problem and issue that was raised during

:20:22. > :20:29.Hassan Rouhani's presidential campaign. You are a diplomat and you

:20:29. > :20:35.can learn lessons from recent diplomatic negotiation - I'm

:20:35. > :20:40.thinking of North Korea. The West and the US decided to reach out to

:20:40. > :20:45.North Korea. An agreement was done in which Pyongyang promised to

:20:45. > :20:48.abandon its nuclear programme. What happened less than two years later?

:20:48. > :20:57.North Korea launched its first nuclear device. The Israelis point

:20:57. > :21:01.to North Korea and state if you back off the pressure on Tehran now, that

:21:01. > :21:07.is precisely what you will see in Iran. Within a year or two they will

:21:07. > :21:17.be releasing their first bomb. I wish I had the power of prediction

:21:17. > :21:20.that the source you quote has. I will say this about my predictions

:21:20. > :21:30.about Iran - my predictions have almost always been wrong in the

:21:30. > :21:33.past. I will say that but also, if you look at other people's

:21:33. > :21:39.predictions, I say they are equally wrong. You ask yourself, statements

:21:39. > :21:46.like "a bomb in six months" - how long has that timeline been out

:21:46. > :21:51.there? I heard someone mention it going back to 1997. I think we have

:21:51. > :21:54.to be very sceptical and very suspicious about predictions like

:21:54. > :22:03.that that say that because North Korea did X therefore in Iran we

:22:03. > :22:09.must do Y. I appreciate your frankness and your personal history

:22:09. > :22:12.with Iran. It is fascinating to think of you 34 years ago tripped up

:22:12. > :22:18.in the American embassy, taken hostage by the regime, the fledgling

:22:18. > :22:21.regime of the republic. I wonder if it is fair to say that from then

:22:21. > :22:24.until now, despite your personal experience, you have consistently

:22:24. > :22:30.underestimated the durability of the hostility felt in Iran toward the

:22:30. > :22:43.West and the US in particular. Perhaps I have. As I said to you,

:22:43. > :22:52.Stephen, I have been wrong a lot but I cannot help seeing the irony of

:22:52. > :22:55.all this. I mean, 34 years ago, almost to the day, the foreign

:22:55. > :22:59.ministers of the two countries met in New York on the margins of the

:22:59. > :23:02.General Assembly and in those days it was the Secretary of State Cyrus

:23:02. > :23:11.Vance and the Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi meeting in October

:23:11. > :23:14.1979 and the meeting was a disaster. All the Iranians could do was to

:23:14. > :23:19.recite their list of grievances. They had nothing constructive to

:23:19. > :23:23.bring. Unfortunately, that has been the case for the past 34 years - 95%

:23:23. > :23:33.of Iranian diplomacy has been exactly that - reciting their list

:23:34. > :23:38.of grievances. No, I would not have thought that we would have been

:23:38. > :23:41.estranged for so long. We have been estranged longer than the US from

:23:41. > :23:51.China or from Bolshevik Russia after the revolution. It is unprecedented

:23:51. > :23:57.in our diplomatic history. If you think about it. And I will make one

:23:57. > :24:01.prediction, Stephen, and that is if we do start talking, if this

:24:01. > :24:04.particular opening does go somewhere and contacts are established and

:24:04. > :24:07.officials are able to talk to each other, not necessarily as friends

:24:07. > :24:16.but as States with things to talk about. Both sides are going to ask

:24:16. > :24:24.themselves this question - what was all the fuss about? Why did we waste

:24:24. > :24:27.so much time bashing each other? With that question hanging in the

:24:27. > :24:29.air, I thank you very much Ambassador Limbert for being on

:24:30. > :24:35.HARDtalk. Thank you, Stephen.