:00:00. > :00:17.Time for HARDtalk. A warm welcome to a special edition of HARDtalk from
:00:18. > :00:21.New York City. My guest is this form are US Defence Secretary Robert
:00:22. > :00:25.Gates who has published his memoirs which are remarkably candid. He
:00:26. > :00:30.gives us the inside story on tensions and arguments inside the
:00:31. > :00:37.Obama White House. Especially on Afghanistan. He calls his book Duty.
:00:38. > :00:56.Are some of his revelations an act of disloyalty?
:00:57. > :01:02.Robert Gates, welcome to HARDtalk. Before we get into questions,
:01:03. > :01:13.because you're wearing a neck brace, I have to ask a while? I wish I
:01:14. > :01:20.could say it playing while playing rugby, but I fell in my home. It was
:01:21. > :01:26.a New Year's Day. They broke the first vertebrae, so I have to be in
:01:27. > :01:35.this instrument, this collar, for a total of 12 weeks. I get on with
:01:36. > :01:39.life. Unfortunate timing because you are at the centre of so much
:01:40. > :01:42.political strategic discussion in the United States right now as a
:01:43. > :01:50.result of the publication of your memoirs. You have called it Duty. I
:01:51. > :01:56.wonder what your sense of duty and public surface squares with what you
:01:57. > :02:00.have done, which is, reveal inside stories from the Obama White House,
:02:01. > :02:08.some of which are embarrassing, when he is in office. I think the basic
:02:09. > :02:14.narrative of the book, if you will, was hijacked by some of the early
:02:15. > :02:19.press accounts of the book. I think the people who read the whole book
:02:20. > :02:25.will see that it is not hostile or negative to President Obama at all.
:02:26. > :02:31.It is a book that I wrote for our troops. A book dedicated to the men
:02:32. > :02:37.and women of the armed forces. I wrote it for them and their families
:02:38. > :02:43.in America who sent them to war for 11 or 12 years. To give them a
:02:44. > :02:48.flavour of the internal deliberations in Washington on these
:02:49. > :02:54.wars. In both ironic and Afghanistan. We will talk a lot
:02:55. > :02:58.about the book. You talk about going behind-the-scenes, and they come
:02:59. > :03:06.back to this point about the way in which you have decided to publish.
:03:07. > :03:11.Barack Obama sits there with 40,000 troops still in Afghanistan, and you
:03:12. > :03:16.are revealing confidential inside stories about the relationship
:03:17. > :03:20.between him and the military. You characterise it as a very
:03:21. > :03:26.problematic relationship at times. Are you not challenging the notion
:03:27. > :03:33.of collective responsibility inside the US government? No. One of the
:03:34. > :03:40.features of the book is that I am as critical of myself and the role they
:03:41. > :03:48.played in certain instances as I am of anyone else. Most of the personal
:03:49. > :03:53.conversations, in fact bought most of them, show them in a positive
:03:54. > :04:00.light in terms of pushing back and asking tough questions. They were
:04:01. > :04:07.willing to challenge their commanders and assumptions. It is
:04:08. > :04:15.reassuring to people that presidents are not just doing what the generals
:04:16. > :04:22.think should be done. You categorise the Obama White House as being full
:04:23. > :04:25.of people who are deeply political and bring that political sense to
:04:26. > :04:32.all of the military discussions. You describe a vice president who is
:04:33. > :04:37.central to discussions and who has been wrong in every stance he has
:04:38. > :04:42.taken on Security affairs in his career. He describe a president who
:04:43. > :04:47.quote, didn't trust his commander on Afghanistan. Couldn't stand the
:04:48. > :04:52.president of Afghanistan. Didn't believe his own strategy. Didn't
:04:53. > :04:58.believe the war to be his. That is profoundly damaging. I don't think
:04:59. > :05:03.it is damaging. I also don't think it is a surprise. These conclusions
:05:04. > :05:12.have been widely publicised. Having me say it, it does lend some
:05:13. > :05:15.credibility and authority to it. US Defence Secretary you sat in a room
:05:16. > :05:20.with him. You felt his advisers were wrong on most of the issues. The
:05:21. > :05:26.President himself didn't have the courage of his own convictions. No.
:05:27. > :05:33.They make it clear that except for Afghanistan, the Obama national
:05:34. > :05:39.security team, at least until the decision on how to deal with the
:05:40. > :05:44.Arab spring in Egypt's, was remarkably unified. On Afghanistan,
:05:45. > :05:48.there was a debate, but it was a civil debate. There was a debate in
:05:49. > :05:53.which personal relationships remained cordial. There was a lot of
:05:54. > :05:59.tension on those. What a mate clear in the book is that I agreed with
:06:00. > :06:03.the President on every decision in Afghanistan. I have continued to
:06:04. > :06:08.agree with his policy. What a neck clear is that what troubles me above
:06:09. > :06:13.all was the suspicion in the White House on the motives of some of the
:06:14. > :06:20.senior generals and their recommendations for the Afghan
:06:21. > :06:23.troops. We are talking about a time where Obama over many months had to
:06:24. > :06:28.make a decision about whether or not to sanction a surge of 30,000
:06:29. > :06:34.troops. Eventually he did, but it took nine months before he made the
:06:35. > :06:37.final decision. You describe a dysfunctional relationship between
:06:38. > :06:41.the President and his military commanders. At one point you quote
:06:42. > :06:45.in the same of his commanders, do they resent that I never served in
:06:46. > :06:49.the military? Do they think that because I am young I don't see what
:06:50. > :06:57.they're doing? He did not trust Petraeus and the others. With
:06:58. > :07:01.respect to the Afghan surge, he thought that the senior military
:07:02. > :07:09.leaders were trying to box him in and force them to add significant
:07:10. > :07:16.numbers of troops in Afghanistan. I tracked to convince him it was never
:07:17. > :07:21.an orchestrated plan or plot to try and force him to do that, but he
:07:22. > :07:25.series of unrelated events. That there was no plot. I was
:07:26. > :07:32.unsuccessful in that. He did not enjoy many of these meetings. You
:07:33. > :07:35.describe them as making you boil and having to sit on your hands so you
:07:36. > :07:44.would not have to lose your temper. I think one word used was detesting
:07:45. > :07:49.elements of the job. If you detested the job, was because that times, to
:07:50. > :07:55.be frank about it, you did not have faith in the people you are working
:07:56. > :07:58.with and for? No. The people I was working with, I enjoyed and
:07:59. > :08:05.respected them. I say that in the book. I liked and respected
:08:06. > :08:10.virtually everybody I worked with including the Vice President.
:08:11. > :08:15.Certainly the President. What a detested about the job, I would use
:08:16. > :08:22.the loan, anyone who enjoys this job should be asked to step down. I was
:08:23. > :08:30.secretary of defence for a four years. We were taught every day in
:08:31. > :08:36.two places. Every day, I had to send men and women in harm 's way. I
:08:37. > :08:41.visited them in hospitals, went to funerals. It was that part of the
:08:42. > :08:46.job that I detested. But talk about Afghanistan today. The US is in
:08:47. > :08:53.negotiations still with the government trying to persuade him to
:08:54. > :08:58.allow up to 8000 troops to remain, but all combat troops out. That
:08:59. > :09:03.agreement has not been done. How important you believe it to be for
:09:04. > :09:09.the United States to have a significant military residence in
:09:10. > :09:15.Afghanistan beyond 2014? I believe it is critically important. The more
:09:16. > :09:23.allies, the better. Again, I commend the administration. They have
:09:24. > :09:27.negotiated this with the Afghans. We sat to get them to sign the
:09:28. > :09:36.agreement that has been negotiated. Does it help that you have revealed
:09:37. > :09:44.that Obama cannot stand him? That is then used to anybody. Right? It has
:09:45. > :09:53.been an amply reported. This isn't breaking new ground. Hamid Karzai
:09:54. > :09:58.has been difficult to deal with four to American presidents and countless
:09:59. > :10:02.other foreign leaders. We will get the deal done, but what we cannot do
:10:03. > :10:07.it is repeat what we did after the Soviets left Afghanistan, which is
:10:08. > :10:14.to turn our backs on the country. Martin Dempsey has said that he is
:10:15. > :10:22.worried that if there is no deal on the troops, that by 2017, any gains
:10:23. > :10:30.made in the war Afghanistan will fade. That the Taliban forces will
:10:31. > :10:35.again have control over significant parts of the country. If that is
:10:36. > :10:40.true, what has the massive US military commitment which you were
:10:41. > :10:50.so closely involved with, achieved? I would say that the chances of
:10:51. > :10:57.keeping the Caliban at bay is in a security problem has been improved
:10:58. > :11:00.by the actions we have taken in our own efforts to diminish their
:11:01. > :11:06.military capability, but also in our efforts to train an Afghan army,
:11:07. > :11:13.that is performing better than I think is being reported. I think our
:11:14. > :11:21.enduring presence in Afghanistan, and that message of support, is
:11:22. > :11:25.important to long-term success. Whether it's absence will lead to
:11:26. > :11:31.everything going back to the way it was, I think people can't know. The
:11:32. > :11:38.Afghan people now have a stake in a non- Caliban government that they
:11:39. > :11:42.did not have before. Millions of kids including girls are now going
:11:43. > :11:48.to school. Women are treated in a different way. I'm not sure they
:11:49. > :11:52.would want to go back to the way it was when the Taliban were in charge.
:11:53. > :11:57.They have the highest respect for general Dempsey. I'm not prepared to
:11:58. > :12:02.say that in the absence of a continuing presence this will all
:12:03. > :12:07.fall apart. But I believe the continuing presence will give
:12:08. > :12:14.successor better chance. In this context, it seems relevant to talk
:12:15. > :12:17.about Iraq. In a ruck there was no deal to keep forces stationed in the
:12:18. > :12:24.country after the fall back. What we see today it is Al Qaeda taking
:12:25. > :12:33.significant towns and Territory including Fallujah. Al Qaeda and our
:12:34. > :12:38.dominance for the moment. Again, it raises the question, what on earth
:12:39. > :12:51.has the United States achieved in a ruck? I think that end 2008 and
:12:52. > :12:57.2009, we handed the Iraqis a different kind of future on a silver
:12:58. > :13:02.platter. A country that was stable with the security situation under
:13:03. > :13:07.control, and where they were the foundations of a democracy. A
:13:08. > :13:13.multi-ethnic democracy. Two things have happened subsequently. In the
:13:14. > :13:20.last couple of years, the Prime Minister has been as antagonistic to
:13:21. > :13:23.the sunnis in Iraq as he can be. He has tracked to arrest his senior
:13:24. > :13:38.vice president and other senior officials. A lot think, what is in
:13:39. > :13:44.us for a us to this government. Let me continue. The question is whether
:13:45. > :13:53.what has happened in Fallujah has served as a wake-up call for him.
:13:54. > :13:56.There are signs it is beginning to do this, and we will have to our
:13:57. > :14:01.fingers crossed. The other factor has been the civil war in Syria, and
:14:02. > :14:09.the spillover of that conflict into a ruck. And into western Iraq. He
:14:10. > :14:17.can do much about that, but I think these two things have created the
:14:18. > :14:26.circumstances. We are not yet seen a re-emergence of extreme militia.
:14:27. > :14:33.Should the US government now be providing a Maliki with hellfire
:14:34. > :14:40.missiles, groans, and the scale of military support that he says he
:14:41. > :14:45.needs to vanquish Al Qaeda? I think yes, but it needs to be conditioned
:14:46. > :14:50.on Maliki reaching out to the Sunni Muslims and trying much harder to
:14:51. > :14:56.make them and integral part of the Iraqi government and Iraqi society.
:14:57. > :15:00.You think the reaction to the Arab Spring in his early days was wrong,
:15:01. > :15:06.and now we see it with Syria in absolute chaos, not just one war in
:15:07. > :15:13.Syria, but several wars. Many of the fighters in the conflict are extreme
:15:14. > :15:22.Jihadi Islamists, which runs counter to the US. What does it say about
:15:23. > :15:27.the strategy followed by Barack Obama, from yours years in office
:15:28. > :15:32.and beyond, that US influence and ability to shape events in the
:15:33. > :15:39.Middle East seems at a lower bed now than it has been in living memory? I
:15:40. > :15:47.think a big part of that is that it is simply the fact that after 12
:15:48. > :15:50.years of war in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that American political
:15:51. > :15:56.leaders, not just the President, and the American people, are tired of
:15:57. > :16:04.armed conflict. They are tired of war. So, the odds of American
:16:05. > :16:11.military force being introduced in combat in any of those countries, I
:16:12. > :16:17.think is the likelihood -- the likelihood of that is at an
:16:18. > :16:20.extremely low level. So, there is no possibility of US military
:16:21. > :16:26.intervention, whether it be in Syria, or even Iran. That is off the
:16:27. > :16:30.table? In Iran, it would depend on the outcome of these negotiations,
:16:31. > :16:35.but I think the likelihood of military intervention in Syria is
:16:36. > :16:42.very low. Because of that, are you saying that Americans simply can't
:16:43. > :16:48.be the influence than it used to be. Is it so that the US no longer
:16:49. > :16:55.has the willingness, the resources and capability, to intervene? We do
:16:56. > :16:58.have the capability. We still have a significant military presence,
:16:59. > :17:05.particularly navy and air force, but I think what has been lacking is a
:17:06. > :17:09.broader strategy to deal with the broader conflict in the Middle East,
:17:10. > :17:20.because there are several going on across the region. Sony versus Shia,
:17:21. > :17:28.authoritarians versus... Then there is the issue whether states like
:17:29. > :17:36.Libya, Iran, and Syria, can be held together without adversaries. We
:17:37. > :17:41.have touched upon Iran, and talked about US influence in the region.
:17:42. > :17:44.Right now, the US is at the forefront of efforts to negotiate a
:17:45. > :17:51.deal with Iran which would curb its nuclear programme in return for
:17:52. > :18:00.reduced sanctions. There are powerful voices in the US Senate who
:18:01. > :18:06.want to impose new punitive sanctions on Iran right now. If they
:18:07. > :18:12.win that argument, if they do it, is that in the US interest? I think to
:18:13. > :18:17.impose additional sanctions right now would be a serious mistake. I
:18:18. > :18:24.believe that to enact additional sanctions that would become a fact
:18:25. > :18:28.is at the end of the six months if the negotiations fail, actually
:18:29. > :18:39.would strengthen the President's hand in the negotiations. -- become
:18:40. > :18:44.effective. It is not just about producing the status quo, but it
:18:45. > :18:48.would lead to conditions in Iran becoming more difficult. I would
:18:49. > :18:54.attributed with the failure of the negotiations. How close during your
:18:55. > :19:02.time at the Pentagon to the US come to making a decision to strike Iran?
:19:03. > :19:08.I don't think and President Bush for President Obama we were close to
:19:09. > :19:15.that decision. Dick Cheney believed the US would need to make and
:19:16. > :19:25.military intervention, or would a list want to support Israel in a
:19:26. > :19:32.military strike. I think Dick Cheney was an outlier in the defence team.
:19:33. > :19:38.So you do not foresee intervention in Iran, even if the negotiation
:19:39. > :19:42.fails? I don't see any military action while the negotiations going
:19:43. > :19:48.on, but if the negotiations were to fail, I think all options have to
:19:49. > :19:50.remain the table. I want to speak briefly about Naples. I was in
:19:51. > :19:59.Brussels will valedictory speech when you are leading, leaving --
:20:00. > :20:06.when you were leaving the defence department. You said, there will be
:20:07. > :20:09.eight dwindling appetite to expend precious funds on behalf of nations
:20:10. > :20:13.that are willing to devote the necessary resources in their own
:20:14. > :20:21.defence. You are saying NATO is passed. I am saying that if most of
:20:22. > :20:30.the nations are willing to spend any money... Many of those nations just
:20:31. > :20:36.don't have money. On defence, then NATO is no longer a secure military
:20:37. > :20:40.alliance. Maybe it becomes a political alliance of some sort, but
:20:41. > :20:48.the basis for creating the alliance is essentially underlined. Do you
:20:49. > :20:51.think Europeans get that? That America is no longer interested in
:20:52. > :20:58.providing all the resources and doing all of the spadework was back
:20:59. > :21:06.I worry that other nations. I worry that other nations will assume that
:21:07. > :21:11.the US will always be there. I am the last official who remembers the
:21:12. > :21:14.role of NATO in the Cold War. There will be a new generation of
:21:15. > :21:19.politicians in America who are going to ask the question that you quoted.
:21:20. > :21:24.Which is, why are we doing this? Why is it worth it? You are already
:21:25. > :21:27.hearing significant voices in the US Congress calling for the withdrawal
:21:28. > :21:33.of the US military presence in Europe. Tell me, look ahead. Will
:21:34. > :21:40.NATO as a military alliance effectively be dead? Well, I gave up
:21:41. > :21:48.my crystal ball when I left the CIA in 1983. All I will say is that I
:21:49. > :21:53.hope it is. Hope it is alive? And an effective military alliance.
:21:54. > :22:02.Suggesting that you think it may not be. It may not be. You, in the book,
:22:03. > :22:07.in a very candid way, talk about the ugliness of congressional politics
:22:08. > :22:11.in the US. You talk about the over bureaucratic, dysfunctional at times
:22:12. > :22:20.Pentagon operation. You talk about eight disaffected American public,
:22:21. > :22:26.tired, weary, and cynical after so many years of warfare. Given all of
:22:27. > :22:31.that. Do you believe that America has lost its ability to project
:22:32. > :22:40.power in the way it used to? Well, it is an interesting ad in the way
:22:41. > :22:50.it used to. It has been doing that ever since the 1950s, and of -- as
:22:51. > :22:54.other nations have become stronger, China has become stronger, and other
:22:55. > :23:08.countries emerge from the war, as our global GDP has reduced as other
:23:09. > :23:11.countries have become stronger. This way that we have had over the rest
:23:12. > :23:17.of the world is clearly in the past. Why do you insist that America is
:23:18. > :23:22.still in your view the world's indispensable nation? Because, I
:23:23. > :23:27.have yet to see a major international problem that can be
:23:28. > :23:32.dealt with effectively without American involvement, if not
:23:33. > :23:35.American leadership. The point is, America is looking at the Middle
:23:36. > :23:41.East and is not doing anything to re-engage and end the chaos. This is
:23:42. > :23:46.an international problem, not just an American problem. I do think we
:23:47. > :23:52.need to be in a leadership role, but I think the Geneva talks in respect
:23:53. > :24:00.to Syria, the talks in respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, we
:24:01. > :24:03.have just seen people trying to get greater co-ordination, and they
:24:04. > :24:07.think the US is involved in these issues, but they are very big and
:24:08. > :24:12.very difficult issues. They are not going to be solved overnight. We
:24:13. > :24:22.have two end there, but thank you for being on HARDtalk. -- we have
:24:23. > :24:45.to. It looks like the weather is going
:24:46. > :24:46.to stay unsettled for the next few days. Today looked like