:00:00. > :00:10.declared the city a disaster zone. Now it's time for HARDTalk.
:00:11. > :00:20.Welcome to HARDtalk Mac with me, Stephen Sackur. The British military
:00:21. > :00:23.pullout from Afghanistan will soon be completed. They jesting the
:00:24. > :00:28.painful lessons from a 12 year deployment, that will take a whole
:00:29. > :00:35.lot longer. My guess today, Richard Streatfeild, was an officer in
:00:36. > :00:38.Helmand during some of the toughest fighting with the Taliban. He kept
:00:39. > :00:41.an upbeat audio diary back then of life on the front line. Now, he
:00:42. > :00:45.takes a more jaundiced view of Britain's Afghan commitment. Is it
:00:46. > :01:20.time to acknowledge failure? Richard Streatfeild, welcome to
:01:21. > :01:25.HARDtalk. Thank you. Has an interest free `` infantry officer you had
:01:26. > :01:30.experience from the Balkans to Northern Ireland. When you got to
:01:31. > :01:36.Helmand Mac, do you feel you are properly prepared? I felt that on
:01:37. > :01:41.arrival, we were properly prepared. It was the longest period of
:01:42. > :01:46.training I had ever undertaken as an army officer. I have had my company
:01:47. > :01:54.with me for six months. We had done five or six exercises. Compare that
:01:55. > :01:59.to Bosna in 1998 when we had six weeks and one exercise before we
:02:00. > :02:03.ended up there. Six months old at the time like a long period. ``
:02:04. > :02:10.Bosnia. What about the nature of the theatre of operations in Helmand. It
:02:11. > :02:17.is an difficult place for a Western soldier to get their head around,
:02:18. > :02:21.isn't it? It is. At the time, I felt that we were not going to
:02:22. > :02:24.necessarily the most difficult place. The company that had been
:02:25. > :02:30.there before me had been spared the worst excesses of the IED 's. They
:02:31. > :02:38.had fought a reasonably conventional type of counter insurgency ``IEDs.
:02:39. > :02:41.They were on the periphery of Sangin. They had been able to
:02:42. > :02:47.dictate the pace of their operations. We did things slightly
:02:48. > :02:52.differently and the situation changed during the summer of 2009.
:02:53. > :02:56.The IED threat became suddenly far more prevalent than it had
:02:57. > :03:01.previously been. On a wider horizon, do you feel, looking back,
:03:02. > :03:07.that you understood what your mission was? NATO forces had gone
:03:08. > :03:14.into Afghanistan to eradicate the jihadi militant Al Qaeda threat to
:03:15. > :03:17.Western civilisation. And yet, when you talk about IED is and when you
:03:18. > :03:22.talk of the nature of the conflict is based, I was a conflict with the
:03:23. > :03:28.Taliban, not Al Qaeda. I wonder whether, even then, you were puzzled
:03:29. > :03:32.about what you are doing. I wasn't puzzled, I knew it had changed,
:03:33. > :03:36.because we were briefed on it before we went that this change from
:03:37. > :03:41.rooting out I Al Qaeda to nationbuilding in Helmand was a
:03:42. > :03:48.considerable change to the mission. You saw yourself as a nation builder
:03:49. > :03:57.? I was trying to win the hearts of the people and extent of the writ of
:03:58. > :04:05.government over the area we were in, meaning government security. All of
:04:06. > :04:09.it was aimed at trying to help the government of Afghanistan. You were
:04:10. > :04:14.in command of a bunch of blokes with guns, infantrymen, from the British
:04:15. > :04:17.Army, none of whom I dare say spoke Pashtun, the local language, and yet
:04:18. > :04:28.you thought you were a credible nation force? We had a number of
:04:29. > :04:37.speakers, we had (CROSSTALK). They weren't your men. Guess, we did. ``
:04:38. > :04:45.yes, we did. It is a difficult language. We weren't alone in that
:04:46. > :04:51.difficulty. When you are trying to win the hearts and minds of people,
:04:52. > :04:54.it is a very basic thing that needs to happen, and that is, you need to
:04:55. > :04:57.get yourself in between the insurgent of the population. Once
:04:58. > :05:00.you have inserted yourself into that gap, you need to defend the
:05:01. > :05:06.population with everything you've got. Quickly, after that, you
:05:07. > :05:09.realise you are on their site and you are not putting them in between
:05:10. > :05:16.the enemy and yourselves. That is the crucial difference `` side. That
:05:17. > :05:23.is how to do counterinsurgency. The governor of Helmand province and the
:05:24. > :05:32.Americans all said that the British forces in Helmand failed to win over
:05:33. > :05:36.the people, get them on their side. I'm not in a position to know in
:05:37. > :05:43.every area how that turned out. In hindsight, I can see there were
:05:44. > :05:48.considerable difficulties. The reason why I have written the book
:05:49. > :05:52.is because we were approached at the end of the tour by the Taliban and
:05:53. > :05:57.their exact words were, you have been honourable warriors and we wish
:05:58. > :06:00.to talk. They realised that we had succeeded in our area in getting
:06:01. > :06:08.between them and the population and they wanted to negotiate, because
:06:09. > :06:13.they had their kinsfolk were part of the population and they had forced
:06:14. > :06:16.them to fight and they now realised that there was only the possibility
:06:17. > :06:21.of a negotiated settlement. You mention this book. You have written
:06:22. > :06:24.a frank, reflective walk on what you went through and what your men went
:06:25. > :06:29.through in a couple of years in Afghanistan. What makes us think
:06:30. > :06:41.that you could maintain Helmand with a few thousand troops was, hubris.
:06:42. > :06:48.It was. The lessons of history were there for everyone to see. In 1880,
:06:49. > :06:57.a force of 15 hundred was wiped out near where we were based. A British
:06:58. > :07:02.force. The local Afghans, through their honour code, believed we were
:07:03. > :07:14.there for one reason only, to take revenge for our dead in 1880. We
:07:15. > :07:20.went in there believing we would be on their side, when all they could
:07:21. > :07:25.see was an invading army coming to take back for the defeat Andre Dias
:07:26. > :07:30.before. The beauty of what you have done is try to give an assessment of
:07:31. > :07:41.what it is like on the front line in a place like Afghanistan in this
:07:42. > :07:48.case, from the UK. `` the defeat 100 years before. You were convinced
:07:49. > :07:54.that they were the bad guys. We know that he mentality developed, which
:07:55. > :07:59.was all about nailing the bad guys, you have talked about revenge, and
:08:00. > :08:05.on both sides it became a war of attrition. Then you told me that the
:08:06. > :08:11.job was nationbuilding and you had to reach out to the people. That
:08:12. > :08:15.simply wasn't happening. When we first got to Helmand and we began to
:08:16. > :08:20.try to understand the situation that we had arrived in, and the first
:08:21. > :08:27.three weeks of patrols saw as many IED is against us as our
:08:28. > :08:34.predecessors had had in six months, we realised we were in a very
:08:35. > :08:36.different and much more dangerous kind of fight than the Taliban had
:08:37. > :08:45.constricted around the British camps, laying a minefield. Is on the
:08:46. > :08:48.import of that, because the Taliban don't wear were uniforms and because
:08:49. > :08:51.they'd melt in and out of communities, that you and your men
:08:52. > :08:55.come to see the entire community within which you operate as a
:08:56. > :09:05.potential threat, a potential killer, a bad guy. That I am very
:09:06. > :09:12.lucky that my company were absolutely clinical `` I am very
:09:13. > :09:16.lucky. One of the things we tried to do was to make sure we were more
:09:17. > :09:21.than 100 is uncertain not only that the person we were looking out
:09:22. > :09:24.through the sights of our weapons was an insurgent, but also that he
:09:25. > :09:28.was an insurgent who, the only way could stop him doing that particular
:09:29. > :09:34.thing, carrying out that particular threat to life, was to kill him in
:09:35. > :09:38.turn. By being that clinical in their contact, we were able to
:09:39. > :09:42.clearly demonstrate to the locals that we were only going to kill
:09:43. > :09:47.people who were in the process of trying to kill either of them us.
:09:48. > :09:51.You can say, hand on heart, that is every true in every case of all the
:09:52. > :09:54.men your command? We know it is not the case in other theatres of
:09:55. > :09:59.operation for British forces. I can say that while there were a couple
:10:00. > :10:04.of accidental deaths where, unfortunately, towards the end of
:10:05. > :10:12.the two, a young girl was killed by a stray grenade, that the soldier in
:10:13. > :10:22.question was aiming at the time at a known insurgent who was trying to
:10:23. > :10:29.kill him ``tour. And that was only rectified, the only way to rectify,
:10:30. > :10:34.by paying your due immediately. The family came to us, asked for
:10:35. > :10:39.compensation, we paid immediately and nine, the important point,
:10:40. > :10:43.honour was satisfied. Do you feel it was an honourable war? One British
:10:44. > :10:45.soldier is currently serving a prison sentence in a British
:10:46. > :10:49.military jail after being convicted of murdering an Afghan Taliban
:10:50. > :10:56.fighter who was grievously wounded.. We don't know that. We
:10:57. > :11:00.don't know what? We don't know he was a Taliban fighter. He was
:11:01. > :11:04.wounded on the title field and captured. He was in the middle of a
:11:05. > :11:10.contact situation. `` the battlefield. You no matter what
:11:11. > :11:14.other instances of engagement we have learned about there is the
:11:15. > :11:25.suggestion that the way the war work in Afghanistan, honour was lost. At
:11:26. > :11:32.least, on occasion. The first casualty of all is that. You can get
:11:33. > :11:39.yourself in a situation where you come to believe that everyone is the
:11:40. > :11:42.enemy. They are clearly not. The failure of the sergeant Blackman
:11:43. > :11:49.Case in my eyes is a personal failure on his part, on undoubtedly.
:11:50. > :11:53.It is also a failure of leadership. It happened in my company and
:11:54. > :11:58.elsewhere. People reach a point where they are fragile because of
:11:59. > :12:02.what they have gone through. It is clear that Blackman was in that
:12:03. > :12:06.situation as well. It is not my judgement whether he was guilty, I
:12:07. > :12:11.haven't seen the evidence, but that he definitely did wrong, has
:12:12. > :12:15.committed murder and needs to pay his due for that. We need to know
:12:16. > :12:20.the circumstances that led to it. Let's talk of another element of
:12:21. > :12:25.leadership. You commanded a good number of men in a difficult
:12:26. > :12:30.situation. It seems now, again, with hindsight and on reflection, that
:12:31. > :12:34.you were gravely worried about the lack of the right equipment and the
:12:35. > :12:37.right training, given to your men. What did you, as a leader, a
:12:38. > :12:47.commander, do about that at the time? I did a number of things. When
:12:48. > :12:53.you are part of the chain of command and you get into a situation and
:12:54. > :12:57.realise the threat is as it was, as I have mentioned already with a
:12:58. > :13:00.number of IED devices, what you need to defeat that his armoured
:13:01. > :13:07.vehicles, good communications and good intelligence. We had neither,
:13:08. > :13:14.or none of those on arrival in Afghanistan. All of my reports to my
:13:15. > :13:22.commanding officer and up the chain of command requested more radios,
:13:23. > :13:24.more armoured vehicles and we were working on the intelligence picture
:13:25. > :13:30.ourselves in the local area so we could defeat that threat. May stop
:13:31. > :13:33.you for a second. This is important. You had been in the theatre, in
:13:34. > :13:40.command, for several months when Michael Prichard was shot dead by a
:13:41. > :13:47.fellow British soldier, friendly fire incident on December 20, 2009
:13:48. > :13:51.in the course of investigations it seemed beyond doubt there were
:13:52. > :13:58.problems with the lack of radios, lack of training of the sniper who,
:13:59. > :14:00.unfortunately, was responsible for the killing and had never worked
:14:01. > :14:08.with the nightvision equipment before ``May I stop you. You felt a
:14:09. > :14:14.sense of responsibility for that. Yes, certainly. I was company
:14:15. > :14:19.commander. I had ordered the standing patrol that Michael was
:14:20. > :14:24.part of into that area. I had to set the inter` platoon boundary and I
:14:25. > :14:27.was in charge. It seems that the death happened because of
:14:28. > :14:34.shortcomings which you tolerated. I had previously identified and tried
:14:35. > :14:38.my utmost to rectify and has had others I know in the chain of
:14:39. > :14:44.command. It was only when we reached a situation that appeared in
:14:45. > :14:57.tolerable, that those things actually came to us. The fact is a
:14:58. > :15:00.soldier died. Michael Prichard died before anyone decided it was
:15:01. > :15:04.intolerable. That is of course too late for him and his family. On
:15:05. > :15:10.record, I said his family deserved an apology from the MoD. They
:15:11. > :15:14.certainly got one from me at the time of the inquest and
:15:15. > :15:22.subsequently. You have spoken to the family? Yes. Have you expressed what
:15:23. > :15:25.you wrote about in the book, a sense of shame at the way it was handled
:15:26. > :15:32.by senior officials at the Ministry of Defence? In particularly your
:15:33. > :15:34.unhappiness with the official assurance that all of the
:15:35. > :15:41.shortcomings identified had been righted? That was not true?
:15:42. > :15:49.Absolutely not true. The situation at the inquest was that the money
:15:50. > :15:55.that had been identified, to be able to identify every individual on the
:15:56. > :15:59.battlefield, had been put into... We won't allow to spend it because it
:16:00. > :16:05.was about to be decided six weeks later and it was decided that the
:16:06. > :16:10.money was not going to be spent on that particular set of equipment.
:16:11. > :16:12.Michael Prichard's mother has spoken to us in preparation of this
:16:13. > :16:19.interview and wants to know two things. Firstly, do you believe the
:16:20. > :16:23.military officials lied at the inquest into her son's death? She
:16:24. > :16:28.also wants to know whether you believe that what happened to her
:16:29. > :16:36.son could happen again. Because the problems haven't been addressed. The
:16:37. > :16:42.officials did not lie. They told... It was a very carefully worded
:16:43. > :16:49.statement, that the army had identified the lessons to be
:16:50. > :16:52.learnt. And righted shortcomings? And plans were in place to write
:16:53. > :17:01.shortcomings. Those plans still exist. `` right. As plans. It could
:17:02. > :17:09.happen again? One of the reasons why I am happy to call for the apology
:17:10. > :17:13.and to campaign with Michael's mother for an apology is because I
:17:14. > :17:15.absolutely believe that this is an intolerable situation for soldiers
:17:16. > :17:22.going into the next set of operations. I have used the word
:17:23. > :17:28.Frank many times and what you have said is frank but what is not frank
:17:29. > :17:31.perhaps is what you chose to say as a public military spokesman,
:17:32. > :17:35.broadcasting on BBC radio some months after the killing of Michael
:17:36. > :17:41.Prichard, when you chose to say, quote, as an infantry man I have
:17:42. > :17:44.never been better equipped in the army. We will not fail here in
:17:45. > :17:47.Afghanistan for lack of personal equipment. Given what you've just
:17:48. > :17:53.told me about your grave misgivings, you're calling up the problems up
:17:54. > :17:56.the chain of command, how could you say that month later after one of
:17:57. > :18:04.your men had been killed because, as you saw it, he didn't have the right
:18:05. > :18:11.equipment and training? It's a very paradoxical view. People equate
:18:12. > :18:16.taking casualties in whatever circumstance as the mission failing.
:18:17. > :18:23.Michael Prichard's death was the worst moment of the tour by a long
:18:24. > :18:28.way. But the lack of radios and the lack of equipment did not mean we
:18:29. > :18:36.failed in our mission. What I said at that point... I've never been
:18:37. > :18:44.better if clicked, you said. Why did you choose to be a tool, if I may
:18:45. > :18:48.say so, for army propaganda and positive spin when you felt anything
:18:49. > :18:54.but positive about this equipment issue yourself? `` better equipped.
:18:55. > :18:58.At that stage that was true. The biggest threat was the operational
:18:59. > :19:07.security of the company and the cohesion of the company. Those two
:19:08. > :19:12.things need explaining. Operational security... If you are in a
:19:13. > :19:17.desperate fight, you do not tell the enemy where your critical weaknesses
:19:18. > :19:21.are. I don't say I have about me or I can't... But you don't necessarily
:19:22. > :19:29.tell the British public or give them the impression that everything is
:19:30. > :19:33.just fine, we are the best equipped we have ever been, we will not fail
:19:34. > :19:37.for lack of equipment. You chose to use those words and signalled to the
:19:38. > :19:41.public that there wasn't a problem. ? needs to be put into context
:19:42. > :19:50.because I also go on to say in that quote that we do need more and
:19:51. > :19:58.better equipment as we go on. `` that quote needs to. Also, the
:19:59. > :20:03.critical point is that if as a commander on the ground and having a
:20:04. > :20:07.public voice you say... You tell the whole truth and nothing but the
:20:08. > :20:10.truth at that stage, then that would have had a critical impact on the
:20:11. > :20:14.cohesion of the company. Maybe that might have been a good thing because
:20:15. > :20:19.it might have saved a life. It would not have, it would have cost more
:20:20. > :20:22.lives, undoubtedly. The last point, moving on to more general matters,
:20:23. > :20:30.the last point on this is maybe a moral issue. You have slammed senior
:20:31. > :20:34.British army officers who conducted themselves through operations like
:20:35. > :20:38.Afghanistan and, your words, upon retirement on comfortable pensions,
:20:39. > :20:43.they burst into print. They should stand up you say for the right thing
:20:44. > :20:51.when it matters, not bleat about it afterwards. Isn't that precisely
:20:52. > :20:59.what you ended up doing? No, it's not. I was a major. A company
:21:00. > :21:03.commander. I am seven ranks of the most senior position in the armed
:21:04. > :21:10.forces. But the moral code still applies to you? I resigned in order
:21:11. > :21:15.to be able to speak my mind. What I would say, and I wrote the chain of
:21:16. > :21:19.command upon my resignation saying this is what I would do. What I
:21:20. > :21:22.don't see amongst the senior leadership of the army is anyone who
:21:23. > :21:26.is prepared to resign on this matter of principle and then speak their
:21:27. > :21:33.mind, when they know exactly what I know, that one of the things that
:21:34. > :21:40.has come out of all of this is that when the story... When the facts
:21:41. > :21:47.were put to the MOD, there was no rebuttal and the journalist said for
:21:48. > :21:54.the first time he had broken the story that was true. That's a
:21:55. > :21:58.damning indictment to all of those people who are more senior than I am
:21:59. > :22:00.because I at least have told the truth. A final question hangs over
:22:01. > :22:03.the British commitment in Afghanistan, as almost 450 service
:22:04. > :22:07.men and women lost their lives there. That is the question of what
:22:08. > :22:15.is it worth it? Use a that question is the crucial question that I would
:22:16. > :22:18.`` I was never prepared to answer. I find that extraordinary given you
:22:19. > :22:25.were in command of people putting their lives on the line. Why would
:22:26. > :22:30.you prepared to answer it? I have answered it in the book. At the time
:22:31. > :22:36.I had a mission and I was putting my best effort into securing a
:22:37. > :22:44.particular area and trying to exert the rule of law onto a fairly
:22:45. > :22:50.lawless area. You felt disinclined to be honest with yourself at the
:22:51. > :22:56.time, what about now? What is your answer now? At the time I didn't
:22:57. > :23:06.know if it was going to be worth it. I didn't know. You were telling your
:23:07. > :23:17.men to lay down their lives or at least risk laying down their lives
:23:18. > :23:21.when you didn't know... It wasn't a particularly dangerous mission.
:23:22. > :23:30.Wasn't it difficult to live yourself `` live with yourself? You are
:23:31. > :23:42.asking people to put their lives on the line and you didn't know if it
:23:43. > :23:46.was worth it? I wasn't asking them to do anything that I wasn't
:23:47. > :23:53.prepared to do myself. Therefore I was able to ask it. That was a very
:23:54. > :23:57.clear line to cross for me. And now? Now it will only be worth it if we
:23:58. > :24:02.truly learned the lessons. In the book, I have said that Afghanistan
:24:03. > :24:05.in many ways has the elements of the tragedy, both on a personal level
:24:06. > :24:12.and... Some very good friends lost lives, lost limbs. For the army, it
:24:13. > :24:15.has lost 20,000 people. Not for the reason of Afghanistan but it is
:24:16. > :24:18.difficult to say we have been successful there, then we wouldn't
:24:19. > :24:21.have lost 20,000 in the cuts. We need to learn those lessons. That's
:24:22. > :24:24.important at the level of learning lessons for Michael Prichard all the
:24:25. > :24:27.way through to learning lessons in the institutions and other country.
:24:28. > :24:41.Major Richard Streatfeild, we have to end there. Thank you.
:24:42. > :24:45.This week is looking decent weatherwise. Plenty of sunshine
:24:46. > :24:51.around because of the high pressure, establishing itself across the UK.
:24:52. > :24:56.It will be dry for most. Warm sunshine by day. But, at night, it
:24:57. > :25:01.will feel chilly under the clear skies. Patchy frost likely in
:25:02. > :25:07.places. Sunday was disappointing across Scotland. It was windy and
:25:08. > :25:08.cold, with outbreaks of