Ali Khedery - Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to Iraq, 2003-2009

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:00:00. > :00:00.aid convoy heading the Ukraine. As heavy fighting continues. It is now

:00:00. > :00:15.time for HARDtalk. Welcome to HARDtalk. American

:00:16. > :00:18.warplanes are once again attacking targets in Iraq ` ordered into

:00:19. > :00:27.action by a president who made it his business to end US military

:00:28. > :00:30.involvement in Iraq. To Barack Obama's critics, it is one more

:00:31. > :00:33.piece of evidence pointing to an incoherence of strategy in a region

:00:34. > :00:45.becoming ever more unstable and dangerous. My guest today is Ali

:00:46. > :00:47.Khedery, a former adviser to a string of American ambassadors in

:00:48. > :00:49.Baghdad. Does the United States have the ability to impose its will on

:00:50. > :01:28.the Middle East? Ali Khedery, welcome to HARDtalk.

:01:29. > :01:31.Thank you for having me. I just referred to the Middle East being

:01:32. > :01:36.more unstable, more dangerous than it has been in many decades. How

:01:37. > :01:45.much of the responsibility for that, do you think, rests with the

:01:46. > :01:49.United States? Obviously it is a very complicated situation. The

:01:50. > :01:54.situation we see today across the Middle East is partially due to

:01:55. > :02:01.American intervention like the war in 1991 in Iraq and again in 2003.

:02:02. > :02:05.But a lot of the variables are extremely complicated, owing to the

:02:06. > :02:12.poor leadership under the lakes of Saddam Hussein. And then there are

:02:13. > :02:18.broader religious, social, economic trends that are all colliding

:02:19. > :02:23.WriteNow across the Middle East and creating a dangerous situation for

:02:24. > :02:27.global stability. Nobody would disagree that it is great complex.

:02:28. > :02:30.But is it not true to say that looking at the span of

:02:31. > :02:35.administrations covering George W Bush and Barack Obama, there is a

:02:36. > :02:41.lesson to be learned, and that is whenever the United States tries to

:02:42. > :02:46.intervene actively, whether diplomatically or a militarily in a

:02:47. > :02:52.country like Iraq, it tends to backfire? I do not think you can

:02:53. > :02:57.draw that lesson. The lesson you can do instead is we have to be very

:02:58. > :03:02.careful, either as the United States for the international community,

:03:03. > :03:06.when intervening abroad. Particularly in distant lands were

:03:07. > :03:13.original speak the language for a nosy religion or the history. `` or

:03:14. > :03:19.know the. One example of positive liberation is the liberation of

:03:20. > :03:26.Kuwait. There was a dark lining when resident Bush called for the Shia

:03:27. > :03:32.and the Kurds to rise up against Saddam Hussein. You left them out to

:03:33. > :03:38.dry. The lesson we have learnt is that intervention without proper

:03:39. > :03:45.planning was not especially wise. And then a more isolationist posture

:03:46. > :03:54.under Barack Obama was equally unwise. It has resulted in even more

:03:55. > :04:02.of a mess than before Saddam Hussein fell. I want to get to the day's

:04:03. > :04:07.mess shortly. I want to tease out recent history a bit more. It seems

:04:08. > :04:19.to me that you yourself have a case to answer. I talked about recent

:04:20. > :04:22.interventions backfiring. You in fact have made a claim that you were

:04:23. > :04:27.instrumental in deciding that the Prime Minister was the key Shia

:04:28. > :04:33.Iraqi politician who Americans should invest in to promote as the

:04:34. > :04:40.leader capable of uniting Iraq from 2006 onwards. Are you prepared to

:04:41. > :04:47.say sorry for that? I am prepared to detail exactly what occurred in 2006

:04:48. > :04:51.and 2010. I did so in a recent piece in the Jewish and in post. `` in the

:04:52. > :04:59.Washington Post. You have to understand the position

:05:00. > :05:05.we were in in 2006. Iraq was in a civil war. The current Prime

:05:06. > :05:11.Minister was utterly feckless, indecisive" variant. It was very

:05:12. > :05:17.clear that Congolese Rice and the British Foreign Minister explicitly

:05:18. > :05:24.asked the prime minister to step down. As we learned in 2003, when

:05:25. > :05:32.you ask one leader to step down, you need somebody to fill the vacuum.

:05:33. > :05:37.After a series of interviews with various Iraqi leaders, Nouri Alma

:05:38. > :05:43.Key was seen to be the least worst option. In 2006 to thought you were

:05:44. > :05:48.doing the right thing by promoting him. Right now Barack Obama and his

:05:49. > :05:54.team think there are doing the right thing by promoting Haider al`Abadi

:05:55. > :06:02.as the right politician. As they may well find it is simply making

:06:03. > :06:06.matters worse. It is very well made. But the reality is when George W

:06:07. > :06:10.Bush undertook the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, many of us,

:06:11. > :06:17.including myself, were against that decision. But he as the President of

:06:18. > :06:21.United States conjunction with Tony Blair decided to do so. All of us

:06:22. > :06:26.collectively had to deal with the fallout. One could have stood on the

:06:27. > :06:31.sidelines and complained about it, or one could have volunteered to

:06:32. > :06:36.serve and try and affect things from the inside. That is the position I

:06:37. > :06:41.took. Those who knew me personally will tell you that I am not an

:06:42. > :06:48.apologist for America's foreign policy. Either the positive or a

:06:49. > :06:53.negative things we have seen. I tried to give the best counsel I

:06:54. > :06:59.could provide two successive ambassadors and generals in Baghdad.

:07:00. > :07:03.When you are faced with thousands of decisions on a daily basis,

:07:04. > :07:07.inevitably some of the decisions made are correct and some are

:07:08. > :07:14.incorrect. I will tell you, it is important to emphasise this, he

:07:15. > :07:21.proved to be exactly the right Prime Minister during his first term.

:07:22. > :07:32.Militias for running rampant across Iraq. When he took power, he crushed

:07:33. > :07:36.al`Qaeda and the militias. The civil war was reduced and violence was

:07:37. > :07:42.reduced by 90%. That takes us to 2010. By 2010, I stood firmly and

:07:43. > :07:51.virtually alone in opposing his return for a second term. Having

:07:52. > :07:56.known him since 2003, it is clear to me that he was taking advantage of

:07:57. > :07:59.the successes of the search and was cementing a dictatorship, a

:08:00. > :08:08.theocracy and was increasingly beholden to Iran. You had misjudged

:08:09. > :08:11.him. You called him a friend. He said the Obama Administration in

:08:12. > :08:20.recent years has made some key mistakes because they are not versed

:08:21. > :08:25.in the Middle East. But the fact is, you were very experienced. You

:08:26. > :08:34.misjudged him. You have to admit it now. We did not misjudged him. If

:08:35. > :08:41.you look at the 2006 episode against the 2010 episode, the violence was

:08:42. > :08:46.reduced by 90%. We needed a security minded prime minister in 2006 to

:08:47. > :08:53.restore order and stability. That is what happened. It is due to a wide

:08:54. > :08:57.variety of things, including the Sunni awakening and the coalition

:08:58. > :09:02.efforts. Like the British military intelligence services. But also

:09:03. > :09:06.owing a lot to the Iraqi unity themselves. But it was clear that

:09:07. > :09:13.Nouri al`Maliki had a plan to hijack Iraq's democracy. O to the more

:09:14. > :09:20.specific criticisms you have made of the Obama Administration in the

:09:21. > :09:25.years since you left it. You say that they have adopted an

:09:26. > :09:32.isolationist strategy and they have failed to appreciate their friends

:09:33. > :09:39.and confront their real enemies. I want you to explain, briefly as you

:09:40. > :09:43.can, you mean about that. When I failed to convince the White House

:09:44. > :09:49.to oppose Nouri al`Maliki's returning to thousands and, I put my

:09:50. > :09:53.money where my mouth is. I resigned in protest. Detailing exactly why I

:09:54. > :09:57.believe that Iraq was set on a path towards civil war, perhaps a

:09:58. > :10:03.regional holy war, going back to Nouri al`Maliki's policies. Today we

:10:04. > :10:10.have seen those predictions become a reality. By campaigning on a winning

:10:11. > :10:17.election, two elections, promising to end the war is across Iraq and

:10:18. > :10:21.Afghanistan, the president has closed those wars in an

:10:22. > :10:26.irresponsible manner. He has left our friends across the region

:10:27. > :10:35.feeling alone and abandoned. Increasingly, emboldened our

:10:36. > :10:48.strategic allies, even a site in Syria. Thereby giving birth to very

:10:49. > :10:50.global threats like ISIS. The strategic view of yours is

:10:51. > :10:57.important, but it does not make much sense. You say Obama has failed to

:10:58. > :11:02.realise the real enemy, the head of the snake, is Iran. But it is not

:11:03. > :11:08.Iran that is responsible for the rise of this extreme Sunni, jihadist

:11:09. > :11:14.a movement that we call Islamic State. That is not Iran. The money

:11:15. > :11:23.for that sweeping extremism is coming from the Gulf, from cacti,

:11:24. > :11:30.Kuwait, Saudi Arabia. I could not disagree with you more. Here is why.

:11:31. > :11:36.ISIS did not exist three years ago. What we were faced with was al`Qaeda

:11:37. > :11:48.Central in Afghanistan, Pakistan and some franchises in Yemen, North

:11:49. > :11:55.Africa. ISIS was the direct result of Asad's genocide campaign in

:11:56. > :12:05.Syria. Who has helped him? It is his own militarily, Hezbollah, Iraqi

:12:06. > :12:09.militias and also Iran's Revolutionary guard. By killing

:12:10. > :12:13.hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians, by displacing millions

:12:14. > :12:20.more, that created that disillusioned and disenfranchised

:12:21. > :12:26.Sunni Arabs. And Nouri al`Maliki was doing the same, creating an

:12:27. > :12:35.environment where we saw al`Qaeda, an entity that was supercharged,

:12:36. > :12:41.welcomed or created. That is why it it is important not to address the

:12:42. > :12:48.symptoms, but to address the underlying causes. A recent

:12:49. > :12:55.investigation by the New York Times which concluded ISIS has the pocket

:12:56. > :13:03.donors in places like Kuwait and Qatar, Turkish brokers who do

:13:04. > :13:08.business with these groups. If we are saying that Islamic State

:13:09. > :13:12.represents a long`term strategic threat to the United States, this is

:13:13. > :13:14.not really about Iran, it is about some of the countries which we call

:13:15. > :13:31.partners. about both. It is about Iran, Bashar

:13:32. > :13:35.al`Assad, Hezbollah, the Shia militia and radicalisation. It is

:13:36. > :13:40.also about the rude funders of some of these jihadis like wealthy

:13:41. > :13:46.individuals in the Gulf states or regional allies or individuals in

:13:47. > :13:50.Turkey. I absolutely conquer that Moore has got to be done. That is

:13:51. > :13:55.why I recently called for President Obama to appoint a Middle East

:13:56. > :14:00.co`ordinator to work with both regional allies, with allies like

:14:01. > :14:04.the UK, the EU, and even pull in potential foes like Russia and

:14:05. > :14:10.China, because really, this has become a global pandemic that is

:14:11. > :14:13.spreading, that is becoming uncontrollable. And unless the

:14:14. > :14:17.international community moves quickly to work together, this

:14:18. > :14:21.problem will only missed us decides further and endangered the global

:14:22. > :14:31.Middle East, global energy supplies and the global economy. `` Rob will

:14:32. > :14:36.only metastasise. You talk about a Middle East tsar to bring about

:14:37. > :14:40.policy`making in the US. It seems to me that you think that man should be

:14:41. > :14:44.a senior general to have the heft and the weight to push through

:14:45. > :14:49.coherent policy`making. Does that suggest you believe there are

:14:50. > :14:55.military solutions to this? Obama has sent the warplanes back in.

:14:56. > :14:57.There is some discussion in some quarters contemplating American

:14:58. > :15:05.troops back on the ground in Iraq. Are you an advocate of that? I'm not

:15:06. > :15:11.at all an advocate of boots on the ground in the Middle East. I'm very

:15:12. > :15:15.sceptical even of American air intervention in the Middle East,

:15:16. > :15:18.even in Iraq. The recommendation I have made in the appointment of a

:15:19. > :15:23.5`star general is rooted very deep in American bureaucracy. Basically,

:15:24. > :15:27.having worked for five American ambassadors in Iraq and three.

:15:28. > :15:33.Amanda is that US Central command, which is the US entity in charge of

:15:34. > :15:37.the Middle East and South Asia, what I have seen first hand is that the

:15:38. > :15:43.US military is vastly more resourced than its civilian counterparts. For

:15:44. > :15:54.example, when I General David Petraeus, he had his own 737, secure

:15:55. > :15:57.phone lines and so on. The US ambassador, if he was lucky, all he

:15:58. > :16:05.could rely on was a working blackberry. You are on the record as

:16:06. > :16:08.saying that the US should develop an overarching coherent Middle East

:16:09. > :16:12.strategy that must be front and centre of all foreign policy`making.

:16:13. > :16:17.Given the complexity of the individual challenges in Iraq,

:16:18. > :16:22.Syria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, it is simply superficial now to say that

:16:23. > :16:28.this must be one coherent Middle East strategic direction. It is not

:16:29. > :16:32.possible. I think it is imperative that we have a regional strategy in

:16:33. > :16:37.the Middle East and the reason why is because right now, again,

:16:38. > :16:42.particularly deep inside the bureaucracy, there are silos. We

:16:43. > :16:47.deal with Libya as an isolated problem. Egypt and its neighbours.

:16:48. > :16:51.We deal with the problems in Yemen as isolated problems. Same as Syria

:16:52. > :16:56.and Iraq. Especially when it comes to Syria and Iraq. What we have seen

:16:57. > :17:03.is the fusion of those two conflicts into one. Throughout the Iraq War,

:17:04. > :17:05.we received messages from the commander of the Iranian

:17:06. > :17:11.Revolutionary guards. He repeatedly told me he was in charge of Iranian

:17:12. > :17:16.policy from Gaza to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan and

:17:17. > :17:20.in the Gulf countries. What we were seeing was that the Iranians were

:17:21. > :17:24.manipulating events across the region, so they would pressure us in

:17:25. > :17:28.one area where they were not happy and they would reward us in another

:17:29. > :17:33.area when it was in their interest. What we need again is, whether it is

:17:34. > :17:37.the US or someone from the UK, what we really need is a global alliance

:17:38. > :17:41.to confront this transnational phenomenon called ISIS or archived

:17:42. > :17:45.because throughout the Western world, bureaucracies are geared

:17:46. > :17:50.towards confronting sovereign actors like the former Soviet Union as

:17:51. > :17:56.opposed to transnational non`state actors like ISIS or Al`Qaeda.

:17:57. > :18:00.Frankly, 9/11 and the assassination of Ambassador Chris Stephen in 2012

:18:01. > :18:05.and more recent events have proven that the current structures are not

:18:06. > :18:12.capable of handling and addressing those threats. Let me return to the

:18:13. > :18:16.issue of Iraq, if I may. The administration 's position is can

:18:17. > :18:20.happen unless there is a government in Baghdad committed to maintaining

:18:21. > :18:26.the unity of the nation and including all of the different sects

:18:27. > :18:31.and communal groups in a political future. It seems to me that raises

:18:32. > :18:34.another awkward question for you. In a different life not so long ago,

:18:35. > :18:41.just three or four years ago, you worked for Exxon. You pushed Exxon

:18:42. > :18:45.to draw up specific deals with the Kurdish regional government and oil

:18:46. > :18:50.into Turkey, to make lots of money for Exxon and the Kurds as well.

:18:51. > :18:53.That sort of deal is thoroughly disapproved of in Baghdad and

:18:54. > :19:01.actually is again contributing to the fragmentation of Iraq, not its

:19:02. > :19:07.unity. Do you agree? I do not agree. In fact, I view that very much as a

:19:08. > :19:13.glass half empty argument. This is why. Very few individuals can claim

:19:14. > :19:18.to have helped bring in the world's largest company, literally and

:19:19. > :19:25.encouraged it to invest $1 billion in Iraq. If we look at Iraq as one

:19:26. > :19:28.country... With respect, you were not. You were working with the

:19:29. > :19:32.Kurdish regional government and what we see right now is that the Kurds,

:19:33. > :19:38.more and more, are exploiting the access to the oil well to develop a

:19:39. > :19:46.completely independent strategy. Right, again. I completely disagree.

:19:47. > :19:48.You have to go back to the Iraqi constitution, which explicitly grant

:19:49. > :19:59.the Kurds the authority, for example, to sign contracts when new

:20:00. > :20:02.oilfields. It is in the new Iraqi constitution. The entry of the likes

:20:03. > :20:09.of Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Gazprom and total, former energy giants, into

:20:10. > :20:14.Kurdistan and Basra in southern Iraq, are a great thing for all of

:20:15. > :20:19.Iraq because any revenue produced from any part of Iraq, again going

:20:20. > :20:23.back to the constitution, belong to the population of the entire country

:20:24. > :20:28.and are to be divided based on the population of each province. And the

:20:29. > :20:33.Kurds have not to my knowledge ever demanded anything separately. What

:20:34. > :20:36.they have demanded is the implementation of the Constitution.

:20:37. > :20:40.May I interrupt because that is obviously not the way it is seen in

:20:41. > :20:45.Baghdad. They are deeply unhappy with it. But before we finish, I

:20:46. > :20:49.want to bring things back to where we are today. People around the

:20:50. > :20:53.world right now are being exposed to the most gruesome video, where an

:20:54. > :20:58.American citizen, a journalist, James Foley, is beheaded, executed

:20:59. > :21:03.by a member of the Islamic State movement. It brings home the degree

:21:04. > :21:10.to which right now, events are spiralling completely out of control

:21:11. > :21:18.in Iraq. Do you see that the Obama administration has a strategy for

:21:19. > :21:25.exerting some sort of control? Not at all. And as I have said recently,

:21:26. > :21:31.President Obama calling ISIS the junior varsity team, which roughly

:21:32. > :21:34.on global terms means a grade school sports team, in January and then

:21:35. > :21:40.last week, his deputy national security adviser said that ISIS does

:21:41. > :21:44.not pose a threat to the American homeland more to American

:21:45. > :21:54.interests, those statements are astounding frankly and I hope that

:21:55. > :22:00.events like this vicious murder will help to wake up the White House and

:22:01. > :22:03.will help to wake up the American population and our global allies

:22:04. > :22:08.that we have a very serious problem on our hands. Again, you cannot

:22:09. > :22:15.address Iraq's problems without addressing Syria's Robbins, for

:22:16. > :22:18.example. And without stopping the genocide being perpetuated by Bashar

:22:19. > :22:23.al`Assad, Hezbollah, Iran and the Revolutionary Guards, you will never

:22:24. > :22:27.be able to get hold of ISIS. These tactical pinpoint strikes against

:22:28. > :22:34.ISIS in Iraq will do nothing towards solving the problems of ISIS and the

:22:35. > :22:38.region. A full on intervention was tried by George W Bush and many

:22:39. > :22:43.would argue that did not work. This is my last point. Maybe it is time

:22:44. > :22:47.to think of what a Harvard professor said the other day: Strategic

:22:48. > :22:52.disengagement may write now be the best option for the Middle East, for

:22:53. > :22:58.the United States in the Middle East. Absolutely not. Could not

:22:59. > :23:03.disagree with him more. Strategic disengagement would result in the

:23:04. > :23:07.following: It would result in the unravelling of Syria and the death

:23:08. > :23:10.of potentially millions after the couple of hundreds of thousands who

:23:11. > :23:15.have already died, it would result in the genocide in Iraq as well, it

:23:16. > :23:18.would spill over and become a full regional war between major Shia

:23:19. > :23:23.powers like Iran and the government in Baghdad, between major Sunni

:23:24. > :23:28.powers like the government in Turkey and potentially Saudi Arabia, and it

:23:29. > :23:30.would destabilise the entire Middle East and the entire Middle East

:23:31. > :23:35.would become a breeding ground for transnational jihadi 's, pulling in

:23:36. > :23:40.further Western citizens who are disaffected youths from London or

:23:41. > :23:44.New York or purse or other cities from around the world. The absolute

:23:45. > :23:48.last then you should do is continue to say that this problem does not

:23:49. > :23:53.exist and ignore it. In an age when you can get on a plane and fly to

:23:54. > :23:59.New York in 12 hours from somewhere like Istanbul, disengagement is not

:24:00. > :24:23.an option. We have to end it there. Thank you. Thank you.

:24:24. > :24:28.The bank holiday weekend for Northern Ireland, England and Wales

:24:29. > :24:31.is fast approaching and I will give you an indication of what is to come

:24:32. > :24:33.in just a moment. For today, it will