:00:11. > :00:19.Welcome to HARDtalk. World leaders at the G20 Summit in Turkey have
:00:20. > :00:24.said efforts to combat terrorism must be intensified after the tragic
:00:25. > :00:27.events in Paris, which were the latest in a series of horrific
:00:28. > :00:35.attacks claimed by the so-called Islamic State. Indeed, on Sunday,
:00:36. > :00:42.France launched massive airstrikes on ISIS strongholds in Syria. My
:00:43. > :00:47.guess is retired Nato Supreme Allied Commander, James Stavridis, who
:00:48. > :00:52.believes there should be meaningful action on a significant scale by
:00:53. > :00:53.Nato. But are there not limits to what military operations can achieve
:00:54. > :01:27.in fighting terror? Admiral James Stavridis in
:01:28. > :01:29.Massachusetts, welcome to HARDtalk. Are the attacks in Paris a game
:01:30. > :01:36.changer for the international community? I think they are, and we
:01:37. > :01:42.have to acknowledge it is really not just Paris, it of course began with
:01:43. > :01:46.the downing of the Russian aircraft than cost more lives than thus far
:01:47. > :01:50.have been costing Paris, almost immediately followed by the horrific
:01:51. > :01:57.bombing in Beirut, and now the Paris attacks. Put those together, 1000
:01:58. > :02:04.dead, over 5000 seriously injured, and on a population adjustment basis
:02:05. > :02:09.this is an 9/11 level event. President Hollande says there will
:02:10. > :02:13.be a war without mercy. David Cameron, it has become more clear
:02:14. > :02:17.that our safety and security depends on the grading and ultimately
:02:18. > :02:21.destroying ISIS. We will be safer right across Europe if we destroy
:02:22. > :02:26.this death cult once and for all. Frankly, we have been here before,
:02:27. > :02:29.haven't we? We have heard these kinds of statements since September
:02:30. > :02:37.11, and yet the attacks keep coming. Indeed they do, although I
:02:38. > :02:40.would point out that it is all a matter of case-by-case, and I think
:02:41. > :02:45.when you look at the Islamic State it is not just the events in the
:02:46. > :02:48.past three weeks, it is the horrific pattern of selling women and
:02:49. > :02:53.children into slavery, of torture, of the heading, it really is at a
:02:54. > :02:56.different level than what we have seen from any terrorist
:02:57. > :03:01.organisation. Secondly, they are making a huge amount of money doing
:03:02. > :03:08.it, so they are extremely well-financed. Thirdly, they are
:03:09. > :03:12.experts at branding, recruiting, proselytising, it is a different
:03:13. > :03:16.level of threat. It demands a response. What is the level of
:03:17. > :03:20.threat in your view? You could argue that these actions we have seen,
:03:21. > :03:25.particularly in Paris, whereby innocent, unarmed civilians are
:03:26. > :03:31.targeted in this way, is it in some sense an act of desperation? I do
:03:32. > :03:35.not think so at all, I think it is a building crescendo of activity,
:03:36. > :03:39.which will get larger and larger, and frankly, as we look at the
:03:40. > :03:46.potential of the time for the US of weapons of mass destruction, we
:03:47. > :03:49.ought to be very concerned. We see Lucy Reni for sale in Eastern
:03:50. > :03:55.European markets, picture that in the hands of the Islamic State. It
:03:56. > :04:00.is often said, why did Al Qaeda kill all those people on 9/11, and the
:04:01. > :04:06.answer is because they did not have the means to kill more -- loose
:04:07. > :04:11.uranium. President Obama has said that they have made progress in
:04:12. > :04:15.reducing the amount of territory that the so-called Islamic State
:04:16. > :04:20.hold in both Syria and Iraq, and indeed in the past couple of days we
:04:21. > :04:27.have seen Kurdish forces retake Sinjar in northern Iraq, although
:04:28. > :04:44.Rucker, up a mirror in Syria, and Mosul in Iraq are still in the hands
:04:45. > :04:51.of Islamic State. -- Raqqa, Palmira. They haven't made it to
:04:52. > :04:53.Damascus or Beirut, but on the other hand what has grown as their
:04:54. > :04:57.capability to reach across international borders and
:04:58. > :05:02.boundaries. The President is correct in saying they have been contained
:05:03. > :05:08.territorially, but I think their capability unfortunately is growing.
:05:09. > :05:16.And you want to see Nato play a much more active role, to take over the
:05:17. > :05:21.US coalition bombing operations, and perhaps up to 15,000 Nato troops on
:05:22. > :05:26.the ground, but does Nato have the political will to do all of that?
:05:27. > :05:35.One influential voice in this debate, Professor Michael Clarke,
:05:36. > :05:41.thinks that there isn't. I do, and I would point to historical precedent.
:05:42. > :05:45.If we go back to the 1990s, Nato found a political will to go into
:05:46. > :05:49.the Balkans, a situation not terribly different from what we see
:05:50. > :05:56.in Syria today. Huge numbers killed, 8000 people killed in
:05:57. > :06:01.Srebrenica, millions pushed across borders, an area of Europe that was
:06:02. > :06:09.breaking apart. Not unlike Syria. Nato put 60,000 troops in,
:06:10. > :06:12.Afghanistan after 9/11, Nato was there with 140,000 troops. I think
:06:13. > :06:18.the political will will come as a result of the horrific behaviour of
:06:19. > :06:25.the Islamic State. We didn't see any indication of Article five, in which
:06:26. > :06:29.an attack on one Nato member is an attack on all, after the London
:06:30. > :06:34.transport bombings in 2005, or the Madrid train bombings in 2004. It
:06:35. > :06:39.has only been applied once in Nato's history, and that was after
:06:40. > :06:43.the 9/11 attacks. It is not necessarily true that it will be
:06:44. > :06:52.that simple to get Nato to take over these operations. I agree, I think
:06:53. > :06:57.that in the coming week or two, we will start probably not with an
:06:58. > :07:01.immediate conversation about Article five, but with an Article four
:07:02. > :07:05.consultation, which is when a particular member nation comes to
:07:06. > :07:09.that council and asks for a consultation, a conversation about
:07:10. > :07:14.events. That would be the key to driving toward an Article five
:07:15. > :07:18.declaration. I would say there is a slightly better than even chance at
:07:19. > :07:23.this point that events will push us towards an Article five. Certainly
:07:24. > :07:27.the way President Hollande and the PM of Great Britain are speaking, as
:07:28. > :07:32.well as the American President, would give me the sense that we will
:07:33. > :07:36.probably end up Article five, but perhaps not. If we don't this will
:07:37. > :07:41.become another coalition of the willing activity as opposed to an
:07:42. > :07:47.official Nato operation. Let's fast forward and imagine that perhaps we
:07:48. > :07:53.have had Article five, what kind of Nato operation are you actually
:07:54. > :07:56.advocating? Morte intensified air strikes? We have seen that in the
:07:57. > :08:01.past year they haven't had that much impact on the ground. What kind of
:08:02. > :08:09.combat troops are you talking about the go into Syria and Iraq? Spell at
:08:10. > :08:12.40 think would work. I think we would need to add a significant
:08:13. > :08:18.component of special Ops troops immediately to go on the ground.
:08:19. > :08:20.This could come from all of the Nato nations working through the Nato
:08:21. > :08:26.special operations headquarters, which is located in Belgium and has
:08:27. > :08:29.global capabilities. Secondly, we could ramp up the intelligence
:08:30. > :08:34.collection and intelligence sharing. Burt, we would increase our presence
:08:35. > :08:37.in the cyber world, using all of our Nato members who have that
:08:38. > :08:42.capability. Fourth, we would increase the bombing campaign.
:08:43. > :08:45.Believe me, adding all of Nato's capabilities to what is already in
:08:46. > :08:52.place would be a significant increase. This, we would move to
:08:53. > :08:58.train the Kurdish forces. Thereof 150,000 Peshmerga operating in the
:08:59. > :09:02.North. We would re-energise the training programme with the Iraqi
:09:03. > :09:04.security forces, recognising the frustrations and failures there.
:09:05. > :09:10.Ultimately, when you put Peshmerga from the North, Iraqi security
:09:11. > :09:13.forces from the south, you have a significant capability to
:09:14. > :09:21.co-ordinate with the bombing campaign. Seventh, I would say that
:09:22. > :09:27.Turkey's army, the seventh-largest in Nato, would to step up. I would
:09:28. > :09:29.say about 15,000 Nato troops, excluding Turkey, which I would hope
:09:30. > :09:35.would have a larger land contribution to make. I think when
:09:36. > :09:41.you put all that together you have the means to take on the Islamic
:09:42. > :09:45.State in a significant way. You mentioned special operations from
:09:46. > :09:52.Nato, but look at the fuss we have had already, the mere 50 that the US
:09:53. > :09:58.has sent in, one example, saying they were not authorised by
:09:59. > :10:02.Congress. Criticisms that America could be dragged into Syria because
:10:03. > :10:07.of the deployment of 50 special operations forces. You are
:10:08. > :10:11.advocating that Nato's biggest army, the US, should be thinking of
:10:12. > :10:17.sending many more. You can find different voices on all sites of
:10:18. > :10:20.this debate, and recently we heard Senator John McCain, the chairman of
:10:21. > :10:26.the Senate armed services committee, one of the most powerful voices in
:10:27. > :10:32.the Senate, talking about the need for a much larger force the nine
:10:33. > :10:38.advocating. You will find others who have immense Middle East fatigue
:10:39. > :10:43.after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the tragic events
:10:44. > :10:47.of the last three weeks, I think the movement is towards a more activist
:10:48. > :10:54.role in the region. President Obama, of course, a very influential voice
:10:55. > :10:58.if not the most influential voice, he has said if 50,000 troops were
:10:59. > :11:05.sent into Syria, what would happen if there was an attack in Yemen or
:11:06. > :11:09.Libya? I think as I mentioned earlier each of these are
:11:10. > :11:16.case-by-case set of decisions for our leaders. I think that the
:11:17. > :11:21.Islamic State has managed to vault themselves to the top of the greasy
:11:22. > :11:25.pole of enemies that we face. Each of the other cases we mention would
:11:26. > :11:30.have to be examined. By the way, it is not just Nato, we need Russia
:11:31. > :11:38.involved in this, the Sunni Arabs, and I'm confident that over time we
:11:39. > :11:43.will see a confluence of all those powers working together, just as
:11:44. > :11:46.happened in the Balkans. Putting to one side the fact that Russia has
:11:47. > :11:53.been engaged in bombing operations in Syria on behalf of the President
:11:54. > :11:58.Bashar Al-Assad, leading to the indiscriminate killing of
:11:59. > :12:01.civilians. I am not saying they are targeting civilians, but their
:12:02. > :12:05.operations have inevitably meant that civilians have been killed,
:12:06. > :12:09.that is one point. A former American Ambassador to Nato also says that
:12:10. > :12:15.some would worry that too much cooperation with Russia would be at
:12:16. > :12:22.the expense of Ukraine. Are we to forget all that business over
:12:23. > :12:29.Crimea? No, the world is compensated place, but the essence of leadership
:12:30. > :12:32.is prioritise in challenges. -- prioritising. I think Islamic State
:12:33. > :12:37.is at the top of the list at the moment. I for one would say that we
:12:38. > :12:41.should get the Russians involved in the military hard power campaign
:12:42. > :12:46.against the Islamic State. The Bashar Al-Assad situation must and
:12:47. > :12:50.ultimately will be sold in the political, diplomatic way. That
:12:51. > :12:56.effort is under way, as you know, in talks in Vienna. I think over time
:12:57. > :13:01.we will see a political diplomatic solution on that site. On the side
:13:02. > :13:04.of attacking Islamic State, I think we can, will ensure that all operate
:13:05. > :13:11.together against them. That is the point, will everyone operate against
:13:12. > :13:19.them in this coalition of the willing, Nato, and Saudi Arabia,
:13:20. > :13:23.Turkey. Saudi Arabia is implacably opposed to Bashar Al-Assad, will
:13:24. > :13:26.they really come in with this coalition where you put the fight
:13:27. > :13:32.against Bashar Al-Assad on the back burner it was you deem that Islamic
:13:33. > :13:38.State is the bigger enemy? Two months ago I would have said
:13:39. > :13:44.probably not. Today I would say they probably will. Simply because of the
:13:45. > :13:48.changing perceptions of the scale and capability of the Islamic State.
:13:49. > :13:53.I agree with you, it is going to be a close call for the Turks, it will
:13:54. > :14:01.be a close call for the Saudis, but I think our position, the US, Great
:14:02. > :14:05.Britain, Nato, is to try to prioritise, go after the Islamic
:14:06. > :14:08.State first and pursue the diplomatic political solution to the
:14:09. > :14:12.Assad regime and the civil war broadly, we will have to try to pick
:14:13. > :14:14.our way through some very tricky choices, but that is how I would
:14:15. > :14:21.score it from where we sit right now.
:14:22. > :14:32.Tricky choice, Nicolas Henin, a French journalist who had been held
:14:33. > :14:37.hostage by Islamic States said Islamic State have killed hundreds
:14:38. > :14:41.of people, and Bashar al-Assad's forces 250,000 dead, one way or
:14:42. > :14:47.another. The numbers are far greater. So the point I am putting
:14:48. > :14:51.to you is, are you getting exercised by Islamic State because the
:14:52. > :14:54.hundreds they have killed have include Europeans whereas the
:14:55. > :14:59.quarter million killed by Bashar al-Assad are by and large Syrians?
:15:00. > :15:02.No, I think both are horrific challenges and I think the Assad
:15:03. > :15:08.regime is utterly illegal, and I hope that Bashar al-Assad ends his
:15:09. > :15:16.days like the loss of each from Serbia in a jail cell in The Hague
:15:17. > :15:20.-- Milosevic. But the real threat at the moment is the potential on the
:15:21. > :15:23.side of the Islamic State. And of course it is not just their killing
:15:24. > :15:31.of Christians and NATO members and Europeans, it is also blowing up
:15:32. > :15:34.Russians as well as the Hezbollah in Beirut. It is unacceptable behaviour
:15:35. > :15:39.across the spectrum and the potential on that side of the
:15:40. > :15:42.equation, I think, is worse. In terms of Assad, again, I think that
:15:43. > :15:48.is going to be a political, diplomatic settlement just because,
:15:49. > :15:52.as you raise, Zeinab, of the implacable support that Russia has
:15:53. > :15:57.afforded to them. The reality is we are going to have to settle that
:15:58. > :16:03.diplomatically. But if, indirectly by focusing on Islamic State at the
:16:04. > :16:08.expense of Assad, I put you a quote by a leading French security expert
:16:09. > :16:12.which you that the more you support Bashar al-Assad, the more you are
:16:13. > :16:18.getting on the wrong side of the Sunnis and giving them one option
:16:19. > :16:20.only, to support Isil. So actually a strategy could backfire because you
:16:21. > :16:26.could actually get more recruits were Islamic State. -- your
:16:27. > :16:30.strategy. Indeed, that would be a possibility. However, I would argue
:16:31. > :16:35.that the way in which we are pursuing the diplomatic, political
:16:36. > :16:39.solution on the Assad side of the equation, which is creating a big
:16:40. > :16:45.tent, ringing the Saudis, the Russians, the Americans, NATO
:16:46. > :16:48.players including the Iranians, into that conversation, at this point is
:16:49. > :17:01.the best bet of settling it -- bringing. Let's face the fact,
:17:02. > :17:03.Zeinab, that the overlay on all of this is the Sunni-Shia situation,
:17:04. > :17:07.reminiscent of the wars in Europe which killed a quarter of the
:17:08. > :17:09.population. So there is an enormous strategic challenge that has to be
:17:10. > :17:13.resolved within the region. The flashpoint at the moment is that
:17:14. > :17:19.Syria. We have a very dangerous entity in the Islamic State. We
:17:20. > :17:24.should destroy it, then we can solve the larger construct of civil war in
:17:25. > :17:30.Syria. Although of course the Islamic State are Sunnis, and as you
:17:31. > :17:35.point out they are killing lots of Sunnis including the Kurds, who are
:17:36. > :17:37.Sunnis themselves. But just looking at the impact of military
:17:38. > :17:40.intervention, it can be counter productive for a different reason
:17:41. > :17:46.and actually encourage acts of terror. For example before mom
:17:47. > :17:50.London Mayor Ken Livingstone, who was mayor during the bombings, has
:17:51. > :17:53.expressed a view held by others that some European Muslims are actually
:17:54. > :18:00.encouraged to carry out attacks in Europe when they see what they see
:18:01. > :18:04.as western interventions in Muslim lands. They often cite that is a
:18:05. > :18:07.reason as to why they are carrying out these attacks. So that is
:18:08. > :18:13.another very difficult side-effect of the kind of strategy you are
:18:14. > :18:17.advocating. Indeed it is. And here I point you to a marvellous book that
:18:18. > :18:23.really unpacks that idea, it is called the Accidental guerrilla. And
:18:24. > :18:27.it further makes the point that even when we conduct the attacks in these
:18:28. > :18:35.Islamic states, for every terrorist that we kill we create three or four
:18:36. > :18:39.more of the Accidental Guerillas who decide to become terrorists. It is a
:18:40. > :18:42.terrible and difficult part of the equation. And that is why hard power
:18:43. > :18:46.is necessary but it is not sufficient. We need to use the hard
:18:47. > :18:51.power to go after it a group like the Islamic State. The long game is
:18:52. > :18:55.on the soft power side, what some have called Smart Power, finding the
:18:56. > :19:00.balance between hard and soft. That is education, jobs, integration,
:19:01. > :19:03.assimilation, cultural understanding. All of those are
:19:04. > :19:06.important in the long game but at the moment we are in the short game
:19:07. > :19:11.and that is why we need to apply hard power to the Islamic State. So
:19:12. > :19:14.the implication of what you say, then, is that part of the reason why
:19:15. > :19:20.we are seeing attacks in Europe and possibly even in France is as a
:19:21. > :19:23.result of a sense of alienation and a sense of economic deprivation or
:19:24. > :19:29.exclusion on the part of some of these young men who turn to these
:19:30. > :19:34.ghastly acts of terror. There is no question, that is a part of it.
:19:35. > :19:39.Another part of it is the interpretation of part of the
:19:40. > :19:44.Islamic faith by some radicalised elements. Another part of it is
:19:45. > :19:48.economic deprivation. Another part of it is the recent wars in the
:19:49. > :19:52.Middle East. All of those things I think are contributory. All of those
:19:53. > :19:57.things need to be addressed. And they are being addressed in many
:19:58. > :20:01.different fora. But since we are here today to talk about the Islamic
:20:02. > :20:05.State, unfortunately we are going to need an application of lethal hard
:20:06. > :20:08.power against them. There is no compromise, there is no sense that
:20:09. > :20:15.we can create a soft power solution to the Islamic State. But the long
:20:16. > :20:20.game of soft power, bringing all of the remedies to the issues we just
:20:21. > :20:23.discussed, Zeinab, that together I think will solve this problem as
:20:24. > :20:29.best we can. Are you not putting perhaps too much emphasis, Admiral,
:20:30. > :20:33.on what hard power can achieve. When we look at some of the operatives of
:20:34. > :20:37.Islamic states, these young men who are European nationals, these men
:20:38. > :20:41.who go and fight in Syria and then come back, that is not about hard
:20:42. > :20:45.power, that is about good human intelligence, about good border
:20:46. > :20:49.control, cyber... Making sure you've got good regulation of what's being
:20:50. > :20:54.said on internet and that kind of thing. And that is not, you know,
:20:55. > :21:00.putting your tanks on the lawn, is? No, and I would argue again, the
:21:01. > :21:03.long game here involves all the things you just discussed.
:21:04. > :21:12.Intelligence, surveillance, cyber, a la -- our ability to integrate, all
:21:13. > :21:15.of those things are important but occasionally there comes a time when
:21:16. > :21:18.you need to fire a bullet. And I think we are at that time in regard
:21:19. > :21:22.to the Islamic State. We do need to do the other things, but we need to
:21:23. > :21:28.pick up the focus of the Islamic State as well. And if you do achieve
:21:29. > :21:33.would you say that you want... To destroy, degrade Islamic State, are
:21:34. > :21:37.you not... You know, is it possible that something else will emerge,
:21:38. > :21:39.re-emerge? You know, we have had Al Qaeda, then we have had Islamic
:21:40. > :21:45.State, they will just be something else that comes up in time? I think
:21:46. > :21:49.that is a possibility, and that is why, as we were just discussing, the
:21:50. > :21:53.long game of all the other things we have talked about as important. But
:21:54. > :21:57.lets look at the Libyan operation, which appeared and felt very
:21:58. > :22:02.successful in the territory. We applied hard power. We saved the
:22:03. > :22:06.population from Colonel Gaddafi. But then the State has since fallen into
:22:07. > :22:13.chaos, and is followed up with both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State there
:22:14. > :22:17.as well. The lesson is, we can't simply go in, apply hard power and
:22:18. > :22:20.then abruptly leave. We need to play the long game. That is being
:22:21. > :22:25.involved economically, diplomatically, politically, and
:22:26. > :22:30.that is very challenging in this part of the world. But I think that
:22:31. > :22:34.we start with a hard power, and then we followed the long game with the
:22:35. > :22:41.soft power. It is our best set of opportunities. Admiral James
:22:42. > :22:46.Stavridis, you have been a military man for all of your life, and you
:22:47. > :22:49.have served in most of the world's trouble hotspots, Afghanistan, you
:22:50. > :22:53.name it. But you yourself have said you cannot deliver security through
:22:54. > :22:57.the barrel of a gun. You have been talking now about how you need hard
:22:58. > :23:02.power as well as soft power, Smart Power, a mix of the two. Now you
:23:03. > :23:06.have retired, you are teaching at university in Massachusetts. But
:23:07. > :23:10.when you reflect on your career and what military power can actually
:23:11. > :23:14.achieve, here we are talking about Syria. There's got to be a political
:23:15. > :23:18.solution in the end, talk to Bashar al-Assad, negotiate, whatever that
:23:19. > :23:24.turns out to be in the end. Do you now think to yourself hmm, I might
:23:25. > :23:28.have done better if I had been a politician or a diplomat, rather
:23:29. > :23:34.than a military man? No, I have never felt I would be better as a
:23:35. > :23:36.politician. But I'd like to think of myself as a military man who
:23:37. > :23:40.understands the importance of diplomacy and development alongside
:23:41. > :23:47.defence. And if we look at places like the Balkans, like Colombia in
:23:48. > :23:51.South America, and we see that we have been able to meld those three
:23:52. > :23:56.things together, defence, development, economic aid, and
:23:57. > :24:01.diplomacy, that is where we will be the most effective. Unfortunately at
:24:02. > :24:06.this moment in time with the Islamic State, we need that hard power
:24:07. > :24:10.instrument. But the bigger game, the long game, really is to bring those
:24:11. > :24:15.three things together. And that, to the degree I have had an impact in
:24:16. > :24:19.my life and career, I hope that is what people will remember. Admiral
:24:20. > :24:22.James Stavridis, thank you very much indeed for coming on HARDtalk.