:00:00. > :00:16.Welcome to HARDtalk, I'm Stephen Sackur.
:00:17. > :00:23.Germany is indisputably the most powerful nations. But does it have
:00:24. > :00:25.the will and the means to prevent the EU being undermined by division
:00:26. > :00:27.and fragmentation? The migration crisis and the Greek
:00:28. > :00:33.debt disaster have posed challenges that Angela Merkel is struggling to
:00:34. > :00:41.overcome. Well, my guest today is
:00:42. > :00:53.a senior figure in the Norbert Rottgen, a chairman in the
:00:54. > :01:14.Committee in the German parliament. Can German leadership rescue
:01:15. > :01:15.the European project? Norbert Rottgen, in Berlin,
:01:16. > :01:28.welcome to HARDtalk. Hello. Hello. I think it is fair to
:01:29. > :01:34.say a sense of existential crisis hangs over the European Union. First
:01:35. > :01:39.it was the Greek debt crisis, now it is the massive migration challenge.
:01:40. > :01:46.In Berlin, is the breakup of the European Union seen as a serious
:01:47. > :01:53.possibility? I at least very much agree with your analysis that we are
:01:54. > :01:57.facing an existential crisis as never before. It is a crisis of
:01:58. > :02:06.solidarity. Everybody is talking the national talk, and thus paralysing
:02:07. > :02:11.the European Union and its ability to currently act so this could be
:02:12. > :02:15.and is the new situation and new experience, that failure of Europe
:02:16. > :02:18.as possible, and I think we have even more awareness of this new
:02:19. > :02:24.possibility which hasn't been there since World War Two. That is quite a
:02:25. > :02:31.thought. Is that shared widely in Berlin? You are a senior figure, a
:02:32. > :02:34.minister in Angela Merkel's Cabinet for a while, now you chair the
:02:35. > :02:38.Foreign Affairs Committee. Would you say that what you have just told me
:02:39. > :02:47.as a fair reflection of the way many senior German steel? This is always
:02:48. > :02:52.difficult to say, if your own analogies are shared by so many. In
:02:53. > :02:56.general I would say that there is the continuity bias. And we are used
:02:57. > :03:04.to saying that in European integration, crisis is the mode of
:03:05. > :03:09.progress. And there was always the talk, that never waste a crisis,
:03:10. > :03:12.because after the crisis we were better off than before. So I think
:03:13. > :03:18.we are perhaps a little bit misled by this experience of the past. We
:03:19. > :03:25.are seeing now, and have experienced, a turning point. And I
:03:26. > :03:31.am afraid that the new quality that, as I mentioned, failure is possible,
:03:32. > :03:36.because there is so many... There are so many threats which are really
:03:37. > :03:42.in danger the foundations of the European Union, has to be increased
:03:43. > :03:47.because I see not adequate action in comparison to the threats we are
:03:48. > :03:53.facing. Let us go through it in some detail them. This phrase of yours,
:03:54. > :03:57.failure is possible, is fascinating. So let's talk specifics and let's
:03:58. > :04:00.begin with the migration challenge. I think it's fair to say that your
:04:01. > :04:04.government was instrumental in pushing through the deal with Turkey
:04:05. > :04:09.to try and stem the flow of refugees and migrants from Turkey across the
:04:10. > :04:13.Aegean into Greece, and therefore into the European Union. This
:04:14. > :04:18.so-called one for one deal. It took a long time to thrash out. It now
:04:19. > :04:25.looks as though it might collapse. Do you fear it will? We don't want
:04:26. > :04:31.to see this deal collapsed, and we don't want to see a development in
:04:32. > :04:38.Turkey which goes in the direction of more and authoritarian style of
:04:39. > :04:49.political system. But we have two C the symptoms, the resignation of the
:04:50. > :04:51.Prime Minister is a clear sign that now president Erdogan wants to have
:04:52. > :05:00.a streamlined government with no political figure which has the power
:05:01. > :05:06.to pursue different goals. So we will see the determination of the
:05:07. > :05:09.Turkish President Erdogan to transform Turkey into a
:05:10. > :05:15.presidential, authoritarian political system. And this is very
:05:16. > :05:20.much beyond the question of the migration deal challenge, and the
:05:21. > :05:25.threat for Europe. Because we want to have good relations with Turkey.
:05:26. > :05:29.Yes, but is it not the truth when it comes to the hard realities of the
:05:30. > :05:35.migration crisis, and Germany and Europe's stance on Turkey, that
:05:36. > :05:39.President Erdogan holds all the cards? You desperately, desperately
:05:40. > :05:43.need him to implement that deal and to stop the many, many thousands of
:05:44. > :05:47.people getting into boats and crossing into Greece. You are
:05:48. > :05:51.desperate for that deal to stick, and therefore whatever you say about
:05:52. > :05:57.his authoritarianism, in the end you are going to give him a past. I
:05:58. > :06:05.don't share your analysis. What we are in desperate need for is a
:06:06. > :06:10.European solution. And as long as Europe fails to forge a European
:06:11. > :06:15.response to the refugee crisis, you are right. We are to a certain
:06:16. > :06:21.degree dependent. But it is not that way that Turkey is the key to
:06:22. > :06:25.resolve our refugee crisis. First of all, on geographical reasons there
:06:26. > :06:33.are different ways, more ways than through Turkey to come to Europe. In
:06:34. > :06:37.spring and summertime we will see that the Mediterranean Sea will be
:06:38. > :06:42.used as a way from Africa and the Middle East to come to Europe. And
:06:43. > :06:48.there is no, from the beginning has not been, a political will in Turkey
:06:49. > :06:52.and in the person of the Turkish President, that he wants to make a
:06:53. > :06:58.fair deal. He wants to exploit his new tool of power with regard to
:06:59. > :07:03.Europe. So it only demonstrates and underlines the necessity that we
:07:04. > :07:07.have to find... You may say desperately, a European solution.
:07:08. > :07:13.And Turkey will not solve, instead of Europeans, this European problem.
:07:14. > :07:17.Well, we will get to the European end of this and the EU end of this
:07:18. > :07:22.in the second, in terms of Schengen and everything else and determining
:07:23. > :07:24.borders. Before we get there, one last question on Turkey. This is
:07:25. > :07:29.perhaps for Germany more than any other nation. If Erdogan continues
:07:30. > :07:32.on his present course, with his government locking up journalists,
:07:33. > :07:36.attempting to redefine the anti- terror laws, doing a whole lot of
:07:37. > :07:39.things the Europeans don't like, are you saying that the European Union
:07:40. > :07:44.will walk away from the deal which required Europe to promise, you
:07:45. > :07:48.know, these are free travel for Turks, speeding up of the accession
:07:49. > :07:56.talks for Turkey, will that deal be torn up, yes or no? We will not walk
:07:57. > :08:02.away. We are determined to engage with Turkey, but I can't exclude
:08:03. > :08:06.that President Erdogan has other priorities, and that he will walk
:08:07. > :08:09.away. This will be for the disadvantage for Turkey, but also
:08:10. > :08:16.for Europe. We can't exclude this possibility. Like mailing is not...
:08:17. > :08:23.Is not a possibility to co-operate between countries -- blackmailing.
:08:24. > :08:26.Let's turn out to the internal dynamics inside the European Union
:08:27. > :08:30.caused by the migration challenge. Would you, on reflection, accept
:08:31. > :08:38.that Angela Merkel's decision to offer the welcome mat for last Year
:08:39. > :08:42.1 millionplus people, migrants, refugees, to enter Germany, would
:08:43. > :08:45.you accept that that unilateral decision she took is at the root of
:08:46. > :08:54.the divisions within the EU over migration? No, I definitely reject
:08:55. > :09:01.this point of view. Because the root cause is that there are refugees
:09:02. > :09:09.fleeing their desperation, fleeing chaos, fleeing war, fleeing hatred.
:09:10. > :09:12.They flee their desperate... That is true, but with respect they would
:09:13. > :09:15.not have headed in the Europe and into Germany in particular had they
:09:16. > :09:19.not known that Angela Merkel had made a promise, made a very early
:09:20. > :09:26.promise, to receive all those who arrived? This is not true. Because
:09:27. > :09:31.more than 100,000 refugees were in Europe, they were in Hungary,
:09:32. > :09:36.strolling around and trying to cross the borders. So there was an Immonen
:09:37. > :09:40.situation and Angela Merkel responded to an existing problem and
:09:41. > :09:46.challenge, and she demonstrated a practical, or she practised a
:09:47. > :09:49.practical solution, and of course also humanitarian solution, and I
:09:50. > :09:54.would ask what is the identity of Europe when we are facing a new
:09:55. > :10:02.geopolitical situation? A huge area from northern Africa over Syria,
:10:03. > :10:06.Iraq to Afghanistan, an area of desperation. We have to deal with
:10:07. > :10:14.this. Orders, to a wrecked borders, it cannot be a sustainable solution
:10:15. > :10:19.to that -- to erect borders. And what is simply lacking is European
:10:20. > :10:23.solidarity. The others are backing away, this is a problem. It is
:10:24. > :10:26.interesting to hear your view but you are very much out of sync with
:10:27. > :10:34.the former boss of your own party, and the leader for many, many years,
:10:35. > :10:42.Kohl. He made a point of going to meet the Hungarian Prime Minister
:10:43. > :10:46.Viktor Orban, and Kohl said it is true that Europe cannot become a
:10:47. > :10:49.home for millions in need from all over the world, most of whom have a
:10:50. > :10:52.belief that is different from our Judaeo-Christian beliefs which are
:10:53. > :10:57.the foundation of our European social order and values. NACRO three
:10:58. > :11:06.is essentially saying, I think in not very coded terms, that Angela
:11:07. > :11:12.Merkel's policy was irresponsible. Everybody agrees, including, of
:11:13. > :11:19.course, the German Chancellor, agrees on that, that we are not able
:11:20. > :11:26.to take millions of refugees in each of the European countries. I think
:11:27. > :11:30.500 million Europeans are able to integrate some million, a decent
:11:31. > :11:34.proportion of those who are fleeing their desperation. So everybody
:11:35. > :11:38.agrees on the necessity that there have to be limitations. But on the
:11:39. > :11:43.other side you have to face the facts. You have the pressure of
:11:44. > :11:49.people fleeing their situation, because you have war-torn Syria, and
:11:50. > :11:56.we cannot... You don't have to face the facts, if you live in Hungary,
:11:57. > :12:01.Slovakia, Poland, they are led by governments which say we don't care
:12:02. > :12:04.what the Germans say about burden sharing, or indeed the EU
:12:05. > :12:08.commission. We are simply not going to take thousands of these people,
:12:09. > :12:13.because we believe that is not our national interests, not in the
:12:14. > :12:18.security interests of Europe. But then you are back to the question of
:12:19. > :12:21.solidarity. There are always questions which are more important
:12:22. > :12:26.for one country or the other country. In France and Italy, the
:12:27. > :12:29.question of youth unemployment is very, very important. For Poland,
:12:30. > :12:35.the Baltic states, the relationship and the perception of pressure and
:12:36. > :12:40.threat from Russia is very, very important. So we have to compromise
:12:41. > :12:43.and find solutions to all of these dividing issues by forging
:12:44. > :12:49.compromise and bringing up solidarity. It cannot be a question
:12:50. > :12:54.that the refugees and terrorism are spilling over, and you have to
:12:55. > :12:58.address it. The search for consensus and compromises and solidarity, you
:12:59. > :13:03.captured in those terms for the European Union as a whole, but I
:13:04. > :13:07.wonder how you about Germans and Germany in particular? There is no
:13:08. > :13:11.consensus inside your own country. If we look at the most recent
:13:12. > :13:17.regional election results, a big rise in support for the Alternative
:13:18. > :13:22.for Deutschland party, which is deeply opposed to what Angela Merkel
:13:23. > :13:28.has done. Your own country has been polarised and divided by this. Of
:13:29. > :13:32.course. Because we are facing a new reality. And this is partly the
:13:33. > :13:36.cause or the routes for the new reality, which means refugees, the
:13:37. > :13:41.roots are very ugly. This is to repeat it. It is war, it is
:13:42. > :13:44.conflict, it is chaos, in this region, and this is our
:13:45. > :13:51.neighbourhood. So of course, people are following the temptation, the
:13:52. > :13:55.illusion, that we can back away, that we can ignore the reality. But
:13:56. > :14:02.if we continued to ignore reality, the reality will come to ask. We see
:14:03. > :14:05.terrorism all over in Europe, and the pressure of migrants will
:14:06. > :14:12.sustain and will remain. So we have to find political answers, and
:14:13. > :14:16.ducking away, ignoring reality, is a very, very dangerous approach to
:14:17. > :14:20.reality and the facts. But talking about ducking away from reality, do
:14:21. > :14:24.you in your own party, the Christian Democrats in Germany, not stand
:14:25. > :14:29.accused of that in a different aspects of this crisis, and that is
:14:30. > :14:31.your stance on Greece? Greece is ultimately the EU's frontline
:14:32. > :14:36.country when it comes to the migration challenge. And yet your
:14:37. > :14:40.own country, Germany, is the toughest on Greece when it comes
:14:41. > :14:44.to, for example, negotiations over the third tailor package. When
:14:45. > :14:52.Greece desperately need economic help and support to allow it to cope
:14:53. > :14:58.with the refugee crisis it still has, Germany remains of zest with
:14:59. > :15:00.exporting an austerity ideology and forcing it upon the great people --
:15:01. > :15:12.of zest. Germany has combined a tough stance
:15:13. > :15:16.on Greece, you are right, we have a tough stance on Greece and I think
:15:17. > :15:21.everybody agrees that there is a necessity to beast -- to be tough
:15:22. > :15:27.with Greece. You know that is not true. Sorry to enter up, but the IMF
:15:28. > :15:31.in particular, right now, today, we know that the German government is
:15:32. > :15:34.at loggerheads with the IMF over the approach to Greece, because
:15:35. > :15:39.Christine Lagarde has made it plain that the IMF believes that debt
:15:40. > :15:43.relief has to be some octane is part of the package of measures for
:15:44. > :15:46.Greece, -- simultaneous part of the package of measures for Greece, and
:15:47. > :15:53.your finance minister simply refuses. I just wanted to say that
:15:54. > :15:59.on the reform side, we have to be tough with Greece. The IMF wants to
:16:00. > :16:05.be tougher with Greece when it comes to delivering on economic reforms.
:16:06. > :16:08.On the other side, to deliver supply and bailouts and so on, eventually
:16:09. > :16:19.Germany has brought up Solidarity with Greece as the major contributor
:16:20. > :16:23.to the Greek rescue and bailouts. So, always in the past, and we are
:16:24. > :16:30.dealing with Greece now four years, we have brought up votes. -- brought
:16:31. > :16:34.up both. We have tried to nudge reforms, and we have brought up this
:16:35. > :16:39.official part to the bailout programmes and since we have had the
:16:40. > :16:43.IMF on board, we have also listen to the expertise. But the IMF is quite
:16:44. > :16:46.clear that it is the German government more than any other which
:16:47. > :16:51.is blocking the talk of real debt relief, a hack at one Greece's
:16:52. > :16:56.massive mountain of debt. -- hack at. So I do not do what you are
:16:57. > :17:03.talking about. It is the Germans who are blocking that. Yes, Germany is
:17:04. > :17:09.blocking that, and our best argument and our first argument is that first
:17:10. > :17:18.of all, we have to review the reform steps which are agreed upon, they
:17:19. > :17:22.have been taken by Greece, they have just made a parliamentary motion on
:17:23. > :17:33.that, but not all the reform targets are met up until now. I think that
:17:34. > :17:41.first we have to review the reform steps, and then we can talk further
:17:42. > :17:44.about how to help Greece. We need a sustainable rescue plan for Greece
:17:45. > :17:50.so that Greece has an economic and political future. Very briefly,
:17:51. > :17:53.because we have to rush through a couple of other subjects, but if the
:17:54. > :17:58.IMF walks away from the bailout package, and essentially leaves the
:17:59. > :18:04.Troika, leaves the rescue of Greece, Germany will be held responsible.
:18:05. > :18:12.You accept that? We want the IMF on board. We want to practise the
:18:13. > :18:18.European virtue of solidarity and compromise. All of these things are
:18:19. > :18:23.required, and we will deliver on it. Well, we will see. Let's talk about
:18:24. > :18:27.Germany on the world stage, because you are the chairman of the Foreign
:18:28. > :18:35.Affairs Committee. Do you believe that Germany has figured out how to
:18:36. > :18:39.project power on the world stage? I am particularly thinking about Syria
:18:40. > :18:45.and Middle Eastern diplomacy. Do you think that Germany is acting
:18:46. > :18:52.effectively? I would answer no, but we are on a learning curve. We have
:18:53. > :18:59.just entered from a German, perhaps from a European perspective, the
:19:00. > :19:03.third chapter of a war. First chapter was the Cold War, then we
:19:04. > :19:07.had the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, and we seem to have,
:19:08. > :19:15.but only for 25 years, the eternal peace in Europe. All of this has
:19:16. > :19:19.decayed. Foreign policy, the proactive, leading role of Germany,
:19:20. > :19:26.it was not required. Nobody wanted us to have, or to aspire to, such a
:19:27. > :19:29.role. So we have been learning for only two years and I think we have
:19:30. > :19:34.adapted. We still have to do some work. We still have 2 really
:19:35. > :19:39.understand what international responsibility means. But we are
:19:40. > :19:43.learning, and I would like to underline, it is only for two years.
:19:44. > :19:47.We have made some progress. But we have not reached the level that we
:19:48. > :19:52.have do. I must say, you are very frank about that. In the past you
:19:53. > :19:56.have referred to Germany's "spectator role" in Syria, for
:19:57. > :20:00.example. You have suggested that if we are serious about playing a
:20:01. > :20:03.bigger and more serious role in global security we must set new
:20:04. > :20:07.priorities, we must expand the defence budget. Do you see any sign
:20:08. > :20:16.that that is what the German people really want? Of course, as with any
:20:17. > :20:20.people, they do not want that, but of course it is more popular to talk
:20:21. > :20:25.about additional social spending or something like that. I think the two
:20:26. > :20:31.years now, we are making a new experience. For two years, the
:20:32. > :20:33.public debate in Germany has absolutely been focused on
:20:34. > :20:42.international crises, security policy and foreign policy. So with
:20:43. > :20:51.the time passing by, we learn that a neighbourhood is in a complicated
:20:52. > :20:54.shape, and that if we are not prepared for preventative foreign
:20:55. > :21:01.policy action, problems will come to us. The refugee crisis and
:21:02. > :21:11.terrorism. I think we are in a phase where we will have to recalibrate
:21:12. > :21:14.our priorities from political tools and diplomatic tools, up to
:21:15. > :21:20.financial resources. But it takes leadership. Well, that is a great
:21:21. > :21:25.point. It takes leadership, and we will get to that. At just one point
:21:26. > :21:29.on security. You have expressed quite strongly your support for
:21:30. > :21:32.Britain staying inside the European Union, when the British people come
:21:33. > :21:37.to vote in June on the referendum, in or out. David Cameron, the
:21:38. > :21:43.British Prime Minister, has just said that in his view, this vote is
:21:44. > :21:47.all about the security of Europe, of peace in Europe, and that if Britain
:21:48. > :21:53.leaves it could risk a new war in Europe. It could risk the end of the
:21:54. > :21:59.year of peace in Europe. Too many in Britain that sounds like a massive
:22:00. > :22:05.exaggeration. Would you agree? I couldn't agree more. I think he hit
:22:06. > :22:10.the nail, and this is the crucial point. The legitimacy of keeping
:22:11. > :22:16.together is that we are in a real dangerous neighbourhood. We have
:22:17. > :22:21.war, we have war in the Ukraine. It is not a member of the European
:22:22. > :22:25.Union, but it is part of Europe. If I may, sticking to Britain leading
:22:26. > :22:28.the European Union, what difference will it make, really, to the
:22:29. > :22:32.long-term future of European security of Britain is in or out? I
:22:33. > :22:36.mean, Britain is still going to be the same nation, the same Western
:22:37. > :22:39.democracy. It is not going to threaten European peace if the
:22:40. > :22:46.British people decide to leave the European Union. A precondition for
:22:47. > :22:54.preserving peace in Europe and its neighbourhood is strength. It is as
:22:55. > :22:58.simple as that. Unity, and the precondition for European strength,
:22:59. > :23:05.is unity. If we fall apart we will be weakened. This is true about Mr
:23:06. > :23:10.Putin, this is true about President Erdogan, and about the entire Middle
:23:11. > :23:17.East region. Unity is strength, and strength is the crucial factor of
:23:18. > :23:21.power, of influence, and it is in our interests to preserve stability,
:23:22. > :23:25.order and peace. A final question for you, and this comes to your
:23:26. > :23:30.point about leadership. For the last few years Angela Merkel has
:23:31. > :23:36.undoubtedly been the prime European leader, but she is in her 60s now.
:23:37. > :23:39.She is not as popular as she used to be, according to German opinion
:23:40. > :23:44.polls. And there is a younger generation of attentional German
:23:45. > :23:48.leaders on the scene. -- potential. You have been named as one of them
:23:49. > :23:53.in the past, although you fell out with her in 2012. Do you think it is
:23:54. > :23:59.time to Germany to look beyond the era of Angela Merkel? No, we are in
:24:00. > :24:03.an imminent era where we are challenged and where we have to
:24:04. > :24:08.lack, and where we have to be united and strong. -- have to act. Angela
:24:09. > :24:15.Merkel is, and remains, the strongest political figure in the
:24:16. > :24:20.EU, in Germany and in Europe. We have 2 ended there. Norbert Rottgen,
:24:21. > :24:24.thank you very much for being a HARDtalk. Thank you.