0:00:00 > 0:00:01Now on BBC News, time for HARDtalk.
0:00:08 > 0:00:11Welcome to HARDtalk, I'm Stephen Sackur.
0:00:11 > 0:00:14We've all had bad days at the office and been embarrassed
0:00:14 > 0:00:18by our mistakes, but my guest today took terrible workplace decision
0:00:18 > 0:00:21making to a different level.
0:00:21 > 0:00:25Kweku Adoboli was a successful young trader for the Swiss bank,
0:00:25 > 0:00:30UBS, based in London, when his world fell apart in 2011.
0:00:30 > 0:00:32In a series of disastrous trades, many hidden from view,
0:00:32 > 0:00:37he ran up losses totals a staggering $2.3 billion.
0:00:37 > 0:00:40He was eventually imprisoned for almost
0:00:40 > 0:00:44four years for fraud.
0:00:44 > 0:00:45Now he's free.
0:00:45 > 0:00:48So how does he explain blowing a great big hole in his bank?
0:01:15 > 0:01:18Kweku Adoboli, welcome to HARDtalk.
0:01:18 > 0:01:20Thank you for having me.
0:01:20 > 0:01:23Let's begin at the beginning in terms of your career in banking
0:01:23 > 0:01:25in the City of London.
0:01:25 > 0:01:28You joined UBS pretty much as a graduate trainee in the back
0:01:28 > 0:01:33office, and yet within just a very few years you were one
0:01:33 > 0:01:38of their hotshot traders making millions for the bank.
0:01:38 > 0:01:42What skills, what talent did you bring to that job?
0:01:42 > 0:01:47I came into the bank as an intern in my penultimate
0:01:47 > 0:01:49year at university.
0:01:49 > 0:01:51I never wanted to work in an investment bank.
0:01:51 > 0:01:58Didn't know much about the finance industry, but the skills I brought
0:01:58 > 0:02:01were a combination of the skills I was learning as a student
0:02:01 > 0:02:03at university - computer science and management.
0:02:03 > 0:02:06What I wanted to do was learn something about the way
0:02:06 > 0:02:09organisations work, which is why I ended up applying to work
0:02:09 > 0:02:11in operations at the bank.
0:02:11 > 0:02:15My job was to help the risk-takers in the institution to solve
0:02:15 > 0:02:18My job was to help the risk-takers in the institution to solve
0:02:18 > 0:02:20the problems that they faced on a day-to-day basis
0:02:20 > 0:02:21in the institution.
0:02:21 > 0:02:23You talk about the risk-takers.
0:02:23 > 0:02:24You talk about the risk-takers.
0:02:24 > 0:02:26You became one of the risk-takers very quickly.
0:02:26 > 0:02:29Was that because you had a predilection for gambling,
0:02:29 > 0:02:32for taking risks?
0:02:32 > 0:02:32Absolutely not.
0:02:32 > 0:02:40I thought ultimately my progression through the institution was driven
0:02:40 > 0:02:43by the way in which I went about doing my work.
0:02:43 > 0:02:46Always I was trying my best to contribute as best I could.
0:02:46 > 0:02:47I will give you an example.
0:02:47 > 0:02:50I started off my professional, my full-time career in settlements
0:02:50 > 0:02:54in the back office.
0:02:54 > 0:02:57My job was basically to find exceptions in the way
0:02:57 > 0:02:58a trade is settled.
0:02:58 > 0:03:01The way it would normally happen is you would get a spreadsheet
0:03:01 > 0:03:05and a bunch of trades and then you would find out what was wrong
0:03:05 > 0:03:08with them and send them back to the sales people and the traders.
0:03:08 > 0:03:12I realised I would help the sales people and the traders by helping
0:03:12 > 0:03:14them understand what mistakes and what patterns there
0:03:14 > 0:03:17were in the mistakes they were making, which would reduce
0:03:17 > 0:03:18the number of exceptions.
0:03:18 > 0:03:21That kind of going the extra mile meant I kept being given
0:03:21 > 0:03:24new opportunities to do new things in the institution.
0:03:24 > 0:03:27I guess what I'm picking away at is whether you got one heck
0:03:27 > 0:03:30of a kick, an adrenaline rush, from the fact that very quickly
0:03:30 > 0:03:33you were making more money for the bank than many
0:03:33 > 0:03:34of your colleagues.
0:03:34 > 0:03:37In fact I know that bosses were so pleased with you that
0:03:37 > 0:03:41from time to time they would bring other employees to the sort of well
0:03:41 > 0:03:43of the trade floor and they would say,
0:03:43 > 0:03:45take a look at Kweku, learn from Kweku.
0:03:45 > 0:03:48Did that give you one heck of a buzz?
0:03:48 > 0:03:49No, it did not.
0:03:49 > 0:03:51I think there was always a responsibility.
0:03:51 > 0:03:54There was a sense of responsibility in what we were doing.
0:03:54 > 0:03:57It needs to be remembered that we had a $50 billion book,
0:03:57 > 0:04:00in fact one of the biggest books in the entire bank.
0:04:00 > 0:04:03The function of the book was to provide protection
0:04:03 > 0:04:05to our clients and to provide protection to the bank itself
0:04:05 > 0:04:08and to allow the bank to undertake proprietary trading.
0:04:08 > 0:04:11Because of the relative size of the book, the profits that came
0:04:11 > 0:04:13with that were in relative size.
0:04:13 > 0:04:16So if we were making, say, $5 million or $10 million
0:04:16 > 0:04:19in a given day, for example, relative to someone who had a $100
0:04:19 > 0:04:22million book or a $50 million book, they might be making
0:04:22 > 0:04:25?500,000 or ?50,000.
0:04:25 > 0:04:26It is relative.
0:04:26 > 0:04:28I get that.
0:04:28 > 0:04:32What you're saying is that the scale of your operations was huge,
0:04:32 > 0:04:35and therefore the sorts of profits you could make were pretty huge too.
0:04:35 > 0:04:38In a way that leads me to the obvious question,
0:04:38 > 0:04:42if you could make very big money anyway on the desk you were working
0:04:42 > 0:04:43at, why did you decide to cheat?
0:04:43 > 0:04:46We weren't cheating and this is what people don't understand.
0:04:46 > 0:04:49In 2007-08 we were faced with a situation where the manager
0:04:49 > 0:04:52of our book, who had five years experience,
0:04:52 > 0:04:56would help to build the book, to increase the size of the book
0:04:56 > 0:05:04from a $200 million to a $50 billion footprint within a space of three
0:05:04 > 0:05:05or four years suddenly left the bank.
0:05:05 > 0:05:08The bank had the option of replacing him.
0:05:08 > 0:05:10Replacing him with someone of the requisite experience
0:05:10 > 0:05:13would have cost the bank a lot of money, so they left
0:05:13 > 0:05:15myself and the person who became my supervisor...
0:05:15 > 0:05:16In your mid 20s.
0:05:16 > 0:05:19In my mid 20s.
0:05:19 > 0:05:20The age is not that relevant.
0:05:20 > 0:05:25But it may be.
0:05:25 > 0:05:28We are into an area of judgment here and wisdom.
0:05:28 > 0:05:31What you did was you began to do some to many observers totally
0:05:31 > 0:05:32unacceptable things.
0:05:32 > 0:05:34You created a secret under the desk account.
0:05:34 > 0:05:38I think you called it the umbrella account, which you could dip into
0:05:38 > 0:05:40and out of and people wouldn't know.
0:05:40 > 0:05:43You started to log some phoney trades to make it look as though
0:05:43 > 0:05:45hedges were made an they hadn't.
0:05:45 > 0:05:47You were doing stuff that was completely wrong.
0:05:47 > 0:05:50The reason that happened was because, having been left
0:05:50 > 0:05:53without a manager, with the experience that we had,
0:05:53 > 0:05:56what would happen is we would go to our managers, and you've got
0:05:56 > 0:05:59to remember this was they beginning of the great financial crisis.
0:05:59 > 0:06:02Unprecedented times, when we were running a book
0:06:02 > 0:06:17of unprecedented in size at UBS, and complexity.
0:06:17 > 0:06:18we face these problems right now.
0:06:18 > 0:06:20What can we do to resolve them?
0:06:20 > 0:06:22They would say, you are the experts.
0:06:22 > 0:06:26You are the ones who need to find a way to make it work.
0:06:26 > 0:06:30You are the ones who need to find a way to make it work.
0:06:30 > 0:06:32Do what you can to make it work.
0:06:32 > 0:06:34You're skirting around the key point here.
0:06:34 > 0:06:37You protect the rules and you knew you were breaking the rules.
0:06:37 > 0:06:40The problem with the challenge we faced was that they were
0:06:40 > 0:06:41intractable problems.
0:06:41 > 0:06:44Why after all this time, we are going to go through the story.
0:06:44 > 0:06:45You've served time.
0:06:45 > 0:06:46You were done for fraud.
0:06:46 > 0:06:47Two charges.
0:06:47 > 0:06:49Seven years in prison, you served four.
0:06:49 > 0:06:52Why can't you now acknowledge to me, I did wrong, I'm sorry,
0:06:52 > 0:06:54and this on reflection is why I did it.
0:06:54 > 0:06:57It would be interesting for people to know so we can
0:06:57 > 0:06:59perhaps learn some lessons.
0:06:59 > 0:07:01In terms of accepting my responsibility and the fact
0:07:01 > 0:07:04I was found guilty of a crime, I do accept my responsibility
0:07:04 > 0:07:06in what happened, and I have consistently apologised.
0:07:06 > 0:07:09In fact the first thing I did in court was apologise
0:07:09 > 0:07:11through my lawyers - "beyond all words"
0:07:11 > 0:07:13was the words we used.
0:07:13 > 0:07:15And you accept it was a crime?
0:07:15 > 0:07:18I accept that it was a crime, because in the end, unfortunately,
0:07:18 > 0:07:38some parts of the bank knew what we were doing and some did not.
0:07:38 > 0:07:40Unfortunately that meant that the bank was exposed to a risk
0:07:40 > 0:07:42of loss that it wasn't fully aware.
0:07:42 > 0:07:46The bank had a criminal in its midst and that criminal was you.
0:07:46 > 0:07:49Unfortunately it needs to be put into the context of the environment
0:07:49 > 0:07:52Unfortunately it needs to be put into the context of the environment
0:07:52 > 0:07:53we were working in.
0:07:53 > 0:07:56I have to resile from some of the words you use,
0:07:56 > 0:07:58because we were faced with an intractable challenge.
0:07:58 > 0:07:59No you weren't.
0:07:59 > 0:08:00No you weren't.
0:08:00 > 0:08:03You were faced with a challenge of how much money you wanted
0:08:03 > 0:08:06to make, and you were at the absolutely greedy
0:08:06 > 0:08:07end of the spectrum.
0:08:07 > 0:08:09You wanted your desk to be top dog.
0:08:09 > 0:08:12You wanted the biggest bonus, and as far as the prosecution
0:08:12 > 0:08:14were concerned, you were, to use their phrase,
0:08:14 > 0:08:16a sophisticated liar and a master fraudster.
0:08:16 > 0:08:17I have to...
0:08:17 > 0:08:20Whilst I accept I was found guilty of a crime,
0:08:20 > 0:08:23I have to say that those words, I don't recognise those words
0:08:23 > 0:08:25as a fair description of who I am.
0:08:25 > 0:08:27I'm not a criminal mastermind fraudster.
0:08:27 > 0:08:28I'm not a criminal mastermind fraudster.
0:08:28 > 0:08:29I never was.
0:08:29 > 0:08:32In fact if you look at what was exposed during the trial,
0:08:32 > 0:08:35the knowledge of others, the missiles we used
0:08:35 > 0:08:37being known by others, these mechanisms became
0:08:37 > 0:08:40accepted practice.
0:08:40 > 0:08:43In reality is in extremely complex situations, where we were,
0:08:43 > 0:08:46where we had difficult choices to make as to how to protect
0:08:46 > 0:08:49the bank from the pressures we were facing, we made choices that
0:08:49 > 0:08:52in the end were viewed as criminal by the outside world,
0:08:52 > 0:08:55but within the bank, at the time, the activities
0:08:55 > 0:08:58we were undertaking were viewed in a way that made us feel
0:08:58 > 0:09:01that they were accepted practices.
0:09:01 > 0:09:04But what you are saying without being absolutely direct
0:09:04 > 0:09:07about it is that other people in the bank,
0:09:07 > 0:09:10indeed very senior people, knew and tolerated and accepted
0:09:10 > 0:09:13and perhaps even wanted you to do what you were doing,
0:09:13 > 0:09:16but there's been a thorough investigation and UBS are adamant
0:09:16 > 0:09:20that senior staff had no idea what you were up to.
0:09:20 > 0:09:23There was an investigation and the only person in the bank
0:09:23 > 0:09:27who faced criminal trial and conviction and imprisonment was you.
0:09:27 > 0:09:29The buck stops with you.
0:09:29 > 0:09:34Well, the buck stops with me because I took responsibility.
0:09:34 > 0:09:36However, these are not my words.
0:09:36 > 0:09:39In the words of the regulator, the Swiss regulator,
0:09:39 > 0:09:50the bank was responsible for creating the environment
0:09:50 > 0:09:52that encouraged the risk taking that we undertook.
0:09:52 > 0:09:54That my managers, for example, send e-mails...
0:09:54 > 0:09:57Are you saying that top people at the bank did know
0:09:57 > 0:09:58what was going on?
0:09:58 > 0:09:59Because they've categorically denied it.
0:09:59 > 0:10:03In the course of the investigation, it was shown that managers knew
0:10:03 > 0:10:06that we were trading out of our risk limits and using mechanisms
0:10:06 > 0:10:08to disguise the excess risk that we were taking.
0:10:08 > 0:10:09The fraud.
0:10:09 > 0:10:11That's the fraud.
0:10:11 > 0:10:13That's the fraud.
0:10:13 > 0:10:20Well, the problem the bank faced was that they wanted
0:10:20 > 0:10:22us to take more risk.
0:10:22 > 0:10:28But at the same time, culturally weren't ready to take that risk.
0:10:28 > 0:10:31The pressure, the responsibility to take that risk tends to...
0:10:31 > 0:10:33The pressure, the responsibility to take that risk tends to...
0:10:33 > 0:10:37Well, in our case it fell on us and it tends to fall on junior
0:10:37 > 0:10:39traders at the coalface.
0:10:39 > 0:10:40This is the reality.
0:10:40 > 0:10:41This is the reality.
0:10:41 > 0:10:43I'm no financial investigator but I do know what
0:10:43 > 0:10:44the courts decided.
0:10:44 > 0:10:46They decided you were guilty of fraud.
0:10:46 > 0:10:49Let's get human about this and personal, because God knows
0:10:49 > 0:10:50you've been through the ringer.
0:10:50 > 0:10:50I have.
0:10:50 > 0:10:54What was it like in the summer of 2011 when you saw
0:10:54 > 0:10:56all of your trades suddenly going against the market,
0:10:56 > 0:11:00and you realised that not just that you were losing, you were used
0:11:00 > 0:11:03to that and you could deal with that, that happens in banks,
0:11:03 > 0:11:05but you were losing hundreds of millions.
0:11:05 > 0:11:08And then you were losing so much that was unimaginable.
0:11:08 > 0:11:11And then you were losing so much that it was unimaginable.
0:11:11 > 0:11:11$2 billion.
0:11:11 > 0:11:12What did that feel like?
0:11:12 > 0:11:13Well, I was...
0:11:13 > 0:11:17My pathway through the institution was as a problem solver.
0:11:17 > 0:11:22That's the same for a lot of traders around me,
0:11:22 > 0:11:25and you have to remember that it wasn't just me
0:11:25 > 0:11:26that was going through this process.
0:11:26 > 0:11:30There was a group of us going through this process and we
0:11:30 > 0:11:35were trying to find a solution.
0:11:35 > 0:11:37We were absolutely focused on protecting the bank's interest,
0:11:37 > 0:11:42so there was no time to stop and think, what does this feel like?
0:11:42 > 0:11:45What it feels like is we need to resolve the problem.
0:11:45 > 0:11:47There was a moment when the investigators came
0:11:47 > 0:11:50in and they took you away and they put new a room
0:11:50 > 0:11:53and they started quizzing you and interrogating you.
0:11:53 > 0:11:56First they said, don't worry, we'll let you out of here
0:11:56 > 0:11:58by midnight, I think, and the fact is they never did,
0:11:59 > 0:12:00because the police got involved.
0:12:00 > 0:12:02When you realised, without using a rude word,
0:12:02 > 0:12:05that something had hit the fan and there was no more
0:12:05 > 0:12:09talking your way out of this and would have to face the losses,
0:12:09 > 0:12:10how did you feel then?
0:12:10 > 0:12:13The same way I felt throughout my entire career.
0:12:13 > 0:12:14My responsibility is to this institution.
0:12:14 > 0:12:17It is to the people to my left and right.
0:12:17 > 0:12:19What can I do to protect them?
0:12:19 > 0:12:22And so I sent an e-mail taking responsibility on my shoulders.
0:12:22 > 0:12:25And the reason why I faced this journey that I faced
0:12:25 > 0:12:26is because I took responsibility.
0:12:26 > 0:12:29This is what people tend to forget, that ultimately I took
0:12:29 > 0:12:29responsibility myself.
0:12:29 > 0:12:33I sent an e-mail saying this has happened, and in that e-mail I tried
0:12:33 > 0:12:38to make sure that nobody else would try to face...
0:12:38 > 0:12:40You are making yourself sound like a victim.
0:12:40 > 0:12:43I'm not trying to make myself sound like a victim.
0:12:43 > 0:12:44The reality is that's what happened.
0:12:44 > 0:12:47I faced the charges I was asked to face.
0:12:47 > 0:12:50I chose to plead not guilty, not because necessarily I thought
0:12:50 > 0:12:53I wasn't guilty of causing the loss or being involved in the loss,
0:12:53 > 0:12:56but because I thought it was my responsibility to make
0:12:56 > 0:12:59sure the full story was told and that everybody could
0:12:59 > 0:13:01understand why it happened.
0:13:01 > 0:13:05Indeed the reason I am here in front of you right now is because I made
0:13:05 > 0:13:08a choice that has allowed this debate to continue to where we are.
0:13:08 > 0:13:11Had I not gone to trial, a lot of the information
0:13:11 > 0:13:15that was made clear during the trial would never have come out.
0:13:15 > 0:13:19But as I said, you are the only member of UBS staff who faced
0:13:19 > 0:13:21trialled and imprisonment as a result of that massive loss.
0:13:21 > 0:13:24trial and imprisonment as a result of that massive loss.
0:13:24 > 0:13:26Are you saying to me that's fundamentally wrong,
0:13:26 > 0:13:29that other people should have been in the dock on trial?
0:13:29 > 0:13:31I'm saying that it really doesn't matter.
0:13:31 > 0:13:34What matters is we focus on the root cause of what happened
0:13:34 > 0:13:38What matters is we focus on the root cause of what happened
0:13:38 > 0:13:41and what lessons can be learnt from it for the benefit
0:13:41 > 0:13:42of others in the future.
0:13:42 > 0:13:45Well, that is important and I want to do that.
0:13:45 > 0:13:47I want to finish going through the Kweku Adoboli story
0:13:47 > 0:13:48if I may.
0:13:48 > 0:13:51You come from a well-to-do Ghanaian family who sent
0:13:51 > 0:13:53you to school at the age of 12.
0:13:53 > 0:13:55You have lived in Britain from the age of 12.
0:13:55 > 0:13:58You had gone through university, you studied hard.
0:13:58 > 0:14:00You had been a success in the bank.
0:14:00 > 0:14:02You had a pretty gilded career trajectory.
0:14:02 > 0:14:04You were doing fantastic.
0:14:04 > 0:14:07You ended up in a prison cell, sharing it with another bloke,
0:14:07 > 0:14:10with one toilet next to the bed, for almost four years.
0:14:10 > 0:14:13Some of it in Maidstone Prison, which I know was really,
0:14:13 > 0:14:14really tough.
0:14:14 > 0:14:15How did you cope?
0:14:15 > 0:14:18Well, I guess I coped in the way I always cope.
0:14:18 > 0:14:21I coped in the same way that has resulted in me getting
0:14:21 > 0:14:24to where I've got to in my life, by trying to contribute
0:14:24 > 0:14:26as much as I could.
0:14:26 > 0:14:29In prison I focused on helping the other offenders around me
0:14:29 > 0:14:31with prison process and protecting themselves from the difficulties
0:14:31 > 0:14:33and strictures of being in prison.
0:14:33 > 0:14:35But I also made sure that I was contributing
0:14:35 > 0:14:36to the entire system.
0:14:36 > 0:14:40So I was Prison Council Chairman in all the prisons I was in.
0:14:40 > 0:14:41Trying my best...
0:14:41 > 0:14:43Still trying to be the high achiever.
0:14:43 > 0:14:47Not trying to be a high achiever but trying to make sure
0:14:47 > 0:14:50that the environment I'm in, I'm doing my best to contribute
0:14:50 > 0:14:51as much as I can.
0:14:51 > 0:14:54Not for my benefit, but to make sure that the world I'm
0:14:54 > 0:14:59in functions properly.
0:15:16 > 0:15:18What did your family say to you?
0:15:18 > 0:15:22They've obviously been so proud of you and then there was that sense
0:15:22 > 0:15:23of humiliation, of disgrace.
0:15:23 > 0:15:26I'm not sure that humiliation and disgrace is the right
0:15:26 > 0:15:26word for it.
0:15:26 > 0:15:28Ultimately I've consistently taken my responsibility.
0:15:28 > 0:15:32I've done it in the way that I was taught to as a young person.
0:15:32 > 0:15:35The values of my family are when you're in trouble,
0:15:35 > 0:15:38if you can protect other people, you need to do so.
0:15:38 > 0:15:41Ultimately I'm a boy and I'm the oldest in my family,
0:15:41 > 0:15:43with three sisters, so you are consistently taught
0:15:43 > 0:15:45you need to protect the people around you.
0:15:45 > 0:15:48That's why I am where I am, because in the bank,
0:15:48 > 0:15:51as a trader, we tried to protect everyone around us.
0:15:51 > 0:15:51Our colleagues and our clients.
0:15:52 > 0:15:55The chief financial officer of UBS after all of this
0:15:55 > 0:15:57and after the investigation and the 2.3 billion was uncovered
0:15:57 > 0:16:00and everything else, he reckoned that your loss had been
0:16:00 > 0:16:03a major contributing factor in the loss of 500 jobs at UBS.
0:16:03 > 0:16:06Do you not have an enormous sense of guilt about that?
0:16:06 > 0:16:10I think it's incredibly sad, and I'm very sorry that those job
0:16:10 > 0:16:13losses are attributed to our loss, but the reality is the reason
0:16:13 > 0:16:15we were working so hard, 20-hour days, travelling around
0:16:15 > 0:16:19the world at the drop of a hat to go to see our clients,
0:16:19 > 0:16:21taking losses from our traders and other salespeople
0:16:21 > 0:16:31to try to reduce the impact on them.
0:16:31 > 0:16:34All of those choices were being made in order to further
0:16:34 > 0:16:35the institution's goals.
0:16:35 > 0:16:37That's the tragedy of this thing.
0:16:37 > 0:16:40It happened because we were trying too hard to achieve the bank's
0:16:40 > 0:16:42goals, not to further our own goals.
0:16:42 > 0:16:43I think this is what...
0:16:43 > 0:16:47Let me just stop you there, because you have said that so many
0:16:47 > 0:17:01times in this interview.
0:17:01 > 0:17:05I'm sure you are well aware of the history of "rogue traders".
0:17:05 > 0:17:08Perhaps the most famous of them all, Nick Leeson bust Barings Bank,
0:17:08 > 0:17:10I think $1.3 billion losses he ran up.
0:17:10 > 0:17:13He became very frank afterwards and he said anybody who tells
0:17:13 > 0:17:17you that greed isn't a huge issue in these sorts of cases is simply
0:17:17 > 0:17:18not telling the truth.
0:17:18 > 0:17:20Greed is a word you have consistently avoided
0:17:20 > 0:17:21in this interview.
0:17:21 > 0:17:24Because I'm not a greedy person and I never have been.
0:17:24 > 0:17:27I think it's one of the caricatures that is made of bankers.
0:17:27 > 0:17:29People forget that bankers are human beings.
0:17:29 > 0:17:31They are your brothers and sisters.
0:17:31 > 0:17:32They're your children.
0:17:32 > 0:17:34They are no different to anyone else.
0:17:34 > 0:17:37They are part of a system that treats them a certain way and asks
0:17:37 > 0:17:48them to achieve certain things.
0:17:48 > 0:17:51Now, that is not about them as individuals but them
0:17:51 > 0:17:52as a part of the system.
0:17:52 > 0:17:54That's really important to get right.
0:17:54 > 0:17:59If we are going to move the industry to where it needs to go to,
0:17:59 > 0:18:00we need to get that right.
0:18:00 > 0:18:03These loss events that happened, rogue trading events,
0:18:03 > 0:18:06whatever you want to call them, are driven by the same type
0:18:06 > 0:18:08of behaviour where large amounts of balance sheet assets
0:18:08 > 0:18:10are coagulated into one place.
0:18:10 > 0:18:13And then young people are asked to do their best to return
0:18:13 > 0:18:14yield on those assets.
0:18:14 > 0:18:18It's a very challenging thing to do, but the pressure is placed on them.
0:18:18 > 0:18:21But there is an enormous temptation for you to keep coming back
0:18:21 > 0:18:24But there is an enormous temptation for you to keep coming back
0:18:24 > 0:18:27to blaming the culture and the system and the institutional
0:18:27 > 0:18:28mechanisms, taking away accountability
0:18:28 > 0:18:29and responsibility from yourself.
0:18:29 > 0:18:30Absolutely not.
0:18:30 > 0:18:32The reality is I have taken responsibility,
0:18:32 > 0:18:34and I've been asked to pay a price.
0:18:34 > 0:18:36Three-and-a-half years in prison, half a decade of fighting
0:18:36 > 0:18:38against being deported from the United Kingdom.
0:18:38 > 0:18:41Which you may well be, because anybody who's been sentenced
0:18:41 > 0:18:44to a prison sentence of more than four years who does not
0:18:44 > 0:18:47have a British passport is usually sent back to their home country.
0:18:47 > 0:18:49That's going to happen to you.
0:18:49 > 0:18:51Well, I hope it doesn't.
0:18:51 > 0:18:53I've lived here since I was a child.
0:18:53 > 0:18:55Ultimately I'm a product of the British education system.
0:18:55 > 0:18:58I am a product of the British financial system.
0:18:58 > 0:19:00What happened has got nothing to do with my nationality.
0:19:00 > 0:19:04I cannot stress enough how British culturally I feel and how much it
0:19:04 > 0:19:06would be crushing to be deported from my home.
0:19:06 > 0:19:07Separated from my friends.
0:19:07 > 0:19:11But can you see how Britain might not want you any more,
0:19:11 > 0:19:13as a convicted fraudster who cost his bank $2 billion.
0:19:13 > 0:19:17I can see why that might be a temptation if you don't
0:19:17 > 0:19:19understand the root cause of what happened, which is why
0:19:19 > 0:19:25I first take responsibility.
0:19:25 > 0:19:28At the end of my trial the judge said, you never
0:19:28 > 0:19:30denied what you've done, which is absolutely right,
0:19:30 > 0:19:31and I still don't.
0:19:31 > 0:19:35No, but you discuss at great length whether one should really call it
0:19:35 > 0:19:38a crime, and you discuss at great length whether in fact
0:19:38 > 0:19:41you were simply following out the logic of the instructions you
0:19:41 > 0:19:42were given by your senior managers.
0:19:42 > 0:19:45If we do end this interview by talking about learning lessons
0:19:45 > 0:19:48and thinking about the culture of banking which allowed your
0:19:48 > 0:19:50situation to develop, are you telling me that consistently
0:19:50 > 0:19:53traders, people like you, were and are given far too much
0:19:53 > 0:19:56leeway and leniency by those compliance people in the banks
0:19:56 > 0:19:59who are supposed to ensure that you follow the rules?
0:19:59 > 0:20:05Not just compliance people.
0:20:05 > 0:20:06Not just compliance people.
0:20:06 > 0:20:08It's not just management, it's the entire system.
0:20:08 > 0:20:17There's so much complexity involved and there's so much pressure
0:20:17 > 0:20:19to generate returns, especially in a system where fields
0:20:19 > 0:20:23in have been crushed to the point where the only way to generate
0:20:23 > 0:20:26profit is to go up the risk curve, OK?
0:20:26 > 0:20:34And the reality is that that pressure comes to tell.
0:20:34 > 0:20:37If you look backwards over time, these things keep happening,
0:20:37 > 0:20:40and they keep happening because of the culture in the industry
0:20:40 > 0:20:42and because of the purpose of the industry.
0:20:42 > 0:20:45Not because necessarily the people within it are bad,
0:20:45 > 0:20:48but because of what they are being asked to try and achieve.
0:20:48 > 0:20:50Let's talk about risk, because it's inherent
0:20:50 > 0:20:52in the business that you were in.
0:20:52 > 0:20:55Of course, you are banned now from going back into finance,
0:20:55 > 0:20:57but risk is at the core of it.
0:20:57 > 0:21:00Are you saying that institutionally the banks, to this very day,
0:21:00 > 0:21:01embrace too much risk?
0:21:01 > 0:21:04They're kind of forced to embrace too much risk,
0:21:04 > 0:21:07because, like I say, central banking policies crunch
0:21:07 > 0:21:10the yields that banks can earn on the assets that they deploy.
0:21:10 > 0:21:26That forces the banks to go up the risk curve.
0:21:26 > 0:21:28In order to maintain the same level of profitability,
0:21:28 > 0:21:31it's the only way to do it, you have to take more risk,
0:21:31 > 0:21:34if you're going to generate the same amount of profit
0:21:34 > 0:21:35when the yields are crushed.
0:21:35 > 0:21:38And ultimately there's a cultural imperative to try and generate
0:21:38 > 0:21:41the same level of profits as before, or more.
0:21:41 > 0:21:43What they in compliance and regulation and oversight,
0:21:43 > 0:21:46what they should really ensure they do is employ people on the risk
0:21:46 > 0:21:48side of the business, on the trading desks,
0:21:48 > 0:21:52who do not have a predilection to embrace too much risk.
0:21:52 > 0:21:55You, for example, correct me if I'm wrong, got into spread
0:21:55 > 0:21:57betting as a side issue, a personal thing, and you lost
0:21:57 > 0:21:59hundreds of thousands of pounds personally
0:21:59 > 0:22:00because of spread betting.
0:22:00 > 0:22:03You clearly were a guy who should not have been handling hundreds
0:22:03 > 0:22:05of millions of dollars.
0:22:05 > 0:22:06Of the bank's money.
0:22:06 > 0:22:09The reality, again, and it is very difficult to see into this
0:22:09 > 0:22:12in the length of time that we have in this show,
0:22:12 > 0:22:16but the reality is you have to teach people to embrace risk taking.
0:22:16 > 0:22:19A lot of us, myself especially, are actually quite risk averse.
0:22:19 > 0:22:22I found myself in a situation, having gone into the institution
0:22:22 > 0:22:25as an operations analyst, being asked to become a risk-taker.
0:22:25 > 0:22:28I was very risk averse.
0:22:28 > 0:22:31In order to encourage me to learn how to trade risk I was encouraged
0:22:31 > 0:22:34to embrace spread trading.
0:22:34 > 0:22:36Ah, so again it comes back to blaming the system.
0:22:36 > 0:22:37It's not about blame.
0:22:37 > 0:22:39It's about explaining how these things occur.
0:22:39 > 0:22:41We are almost out of time.
0:22:41 > 0:22:44Everything you have have said to me in this interview suggests to me
0:22:44 > 0:22:48that you believe that this sort of disaster could happen again.
0:22:48 > 0:22:52Is that what you believe?
0:22:52 > 0:22:55That right now in the international banking system, the way risk
0:22:55 > 0:22:58is handled and trading is done, it could all happen again,
0:22:58 > 0:22:59this kind of massive mega loss?
0:22:59 > 0:23:03Yes, I do.
0:23:03 > 0:23:06Whilst I think that there is cause for hope, because the debate
0:23:06 > 0:23:09is happening, there is the reality that it could absolutely happen
0:23:09 > 0:23:16again, because culture hasn't moved enough.
0:23:16 > 0:23:19We've begun the debate, so there is cause for hope.
0:23:19 > 0:23:22I've met some people and I'm being asked to contribute to that
0:23:22 > 0:23:33change, which I hope I will be able to do.
0:23:33 > 0:23:37It is one of the reasons why I'm asking not to be deported
0:23:37 > 0:23:39as a compelling reason, because there is value.
0:23:39 > 0:23:41It is not just my idea.
0:23:41 > 0:23:43It's universities and institutions and the finance industry.
0:23:43 > 0:23:44But is it cultural?
0:23:44 > 0:23:47Is it you going in and talking to traders about what they need
0:23:47 > 0:23:50to understand about risk, or is it regulatory?
0:23:50 > 0:23:52Do there need to be much tougher regulations?
0:23:52 > 0:23:53There are multiple pillars.
0:23:53 > 0:23:55It is not necessarily about tougher regulation,
0:23:55 > 0:23:56it's about smarter regulation.
0:23:56 > 0:23:58It's about understanding that the people at the coalface
0:23:58 > 0:24:01are human beings that are incredibly fallible, especially under
0:24:01 > 0:24:02the pressure of consistent pressure-filled risk-taking,
0:24:02 > 0:24:05and that risk-taking affects your ability to make
0:24:05 > 0:24:09conscious and clear decisions.
0:24:09 > 0:24:12And that later, after the mistakes are made, it's easy to label certain
0:24:12 > 0:24:13activities as criminal.
0:24:13 > 0:24:16But when they are profitable they are accepted practice.
0:24:16 > 0:24:19Kweku Adoboli, we have to end there, but I thank you very much
0:24:19 > 0:24:20for being on HARDtalk.
0:24:20 > 0:24:22Thank you for your time.