0:00:02 > 0:00:04Now on BBC News it's time for HARDtalk.
0:00:07 > 0:00:08Welcome to HARDtalk.
0:00:09 > 0:00:10I'm Stephen Sackur.
0:00:10 > 0:00:12The military threats facing the Western world have
0:00:12 > 0:00:13changed dramatically.
0:00:13 > 0:00:18The West's military doctrine and capabilities
0:00:18 > 0:00:20have failed to keep up.
0:00:20 > 0:00:24That's the view of my guest today - not an outside observer,
0:00:24 > 0:00:26but, until last year, one of the most senior generals
0:00:26 > 0:00:28in the British Armed Forces.
0:00:28 > 0:00:31General Sir Richard Barrons led the UK's Joint Forces Command.
0:00:31 > 0:00:37He's fought in wars, from the Falklands to
0:00:37 > 0:00:42the Middle East and Afghanistan.
0:00:42 > 0:00:43-- the Balkans.
0:00:43 > 0:00:46How vulnerable is the West in the new balance of
0:00:46 > 0:00:49global military power?
0:00:53 > 0:00:54General Sir Richard Barrons, welcome to HARDtalk.
0:01:12 > 0:01:15Thank you very much.
0:01:15 > 0:01:20How comfortable are you in a civilian suit and out of uniform?
0:01:20 > 0:01:24Well, after nearly 40 years of service in the military,
0:01:24 > 0:01:26this is still in transition.
0:01:26 > 0:01:26In transition!
0:01:26 > 0:01:29Well, let's call upon your authority and experience, both
0:01:29 > 0:01:32with your new suit on, but with your uniform
0:01:32 > 0:01:35still in the cupboard.
0:01:35 > 0:01:38How, or what, would you define as the most pressing military threat
0:01:38 > 0:01:41facing the Western world today?
0:01:41 > 0:01:44I think it's a very complex answer to what, on the surface,
0:01:44 > 0:01:46is a simple question.
0:01:46 > 0:01:49But I think we have to recognise that we are at something
0:01:50 > 0:01:52of a strategic inflection point where the world we've known
0:01:52 > 0:01:57for the last 25 years is changing very rapidly,
0:01:57 > 0:02:02and not changing to the advantage of the West and Europe, in particular.
0:02:02 > 0:02:05So we have to acknowledge that are a new range of risks out there.
0:02:05 > 0:02:08And indeed the way conflict and confrontation is prosecuted,
0:02:08 > 0:02:11in terms of both method and thinking and ideas and capability,
0:02:11 > 0:02:12has changed.
0:02:12 > 0:02:15If you bundle all that together, we are looking at a mix
0:02:15 > 0:02:18of threats from Russia, as well as from terrorism.
0:02:18 > 0:02:22Am I to take it from what you've just said that you believe right
0:02:22 > 0:02:25now that the assumptions being made and the posture being adopted
0:02:25 > 0:02:29by the key Western military powers - and, let's face it, we're talking
0:02:29 > 0:02:32about the United States and the UK as well, maybe
0:02:32 > 0:02:34you could call in France - they've got it wrong?
0:02:34 > 0:02:39I think it's to be expected that many of the Western powers,
0:02:39 > 0:02:42particularly in Europe, are running on assumptions that
0:02:42 > 0:02:46reflect all our adult experiences from the end of the Cold War,
0:02:46 > 0:02:50where we didn't feel any existential risk to our homeland.
0:02:50 > 0:02:54We felt that the Western way was holding primacy in the world,
0:02:54 > 0:02:58and we had an initiative on how the world would actually turn out.
0:02:58 > 0:03:01And I think that is eroding very quickly.
0:03:01 > 0:03:03So, complacency is what you are suggesting?
0:03:03 > 0:03:05A combination of hubris, for sure, complacency.
0:03:05 > 0:03:07But also a preoccupation with our own internal business,
0:03:07 > 0:03:10such as Brexit or austerity, which has caused us not
0:03:10 > 0:03:11to look at these things.
0:03:11 > 0:03:16But even as you say this, I'm mindful of the fact that one
0:03:16 > 0:03:23of the key issues of our day - and we experience it sadly
0:03:23 > 0:03:27almost daily or weekly, with bombs going off in western
0:03:27 > 0:03:30cities, Istanbul or further afield - is this notion that there
0:03:30 > 0:03:34is a threat to the West's homelands, and that threat is from
0:03:34 > 0:03:40jihadist extremist terror.
0:03:40 > 0:03:43Are you suggesting that is the wrong way of looking
0:03:43 > 0:03:44at the threat to our homeland?
0:03:44 > 0:03:46I'm suggesting it's only part of the problem.
0:03:46 > 0:03:49So, yes of course, there's an existential risk,
0:03:49 > 0:03:52a risk to our way of life from people like the so-called
0:03:52 > 0:03:54Islamic State, who will bring whatever weapons they may
0:03:54 > 0:03:56bring to bear.
0:03:56 > 0:03:59So we are used to the idea now of shootings, such
0:03:59 > 0:04:01as in the nightclub, and the use of explosions.
0:04:01 > 0:04:04Just recently in our own media, a recognition from the British
0:04:04 > 0:04:07government of the potential risk from weapons of mass destruction.
0:04:07 > 0:04:10But the fact is, in the modern age the risk to our homeland
0:04:10 > 0:04:14and our interests abroad are greater than that and they must include,
0:04:14 > 0:04:17clearly, cyber, but also the evolution of advanced precision
0:04:17 > 0:04:19ballistics missiles and a new generation of aircraft
0:04:19 > 0:04:20and cruise missiles.
0:04:20 > 0:04:21But whose missiles?
0:04:21 > 0:04:23Are you suggesting, because you're not actually using the word,
0:04:23 > 0:04:27but are you suggesting to me that Russia, which we know now has very
0:04:27 > 0:04:33sophisticated precision missiles, not least based in Kaliningrad,
0:04:33 > 0:04:36right on the border of Europe, within easy reach of Berlin.
0:04:36 > 0:04:38Are you suggesting that Russia should be regarded
0:04:38 > 0:04:45today as an active threat to European security?
0:04:45 > 0:04:49I think we need to look at the potential of Russian capability.
0:04:49 > 0:04:53So, I'm absolutely not suggesting we are at imminent risk of a major
0:04:53 > 0:04:54armed confrontation with Russia.
0:04:54 > 0:04:58And I think most Russian leaders would say that was fanciful talk
0:04:58 > 0:05:00anyway, and absolutely not in their interest.
0:05:00 > 0:05:03But if you look at the evolution of capability, then there are now
0:05:03 > 0:05:06things in the Russian military inventory that could cause great
0:05:06 > 0:05:09harm, not just to the UK, but to our European
0:05:09 > 0:05:12neighbours as well.
0:05:12 > 0:05:15As you say that, I think of Donald Trump.
0:05:15 > 0:05:18He is about to become president of the United States of America.
0:05:18 > 0:05:21In the recent days and weeks he's described how smart
0:05:21 > 0:05:23he thinks Vladimir Putin is.
0:05:23 > 0:05:27He's actually sided with Vladimir Putin in a very important
0:05:27 > 0:05:31argument about the allegation that Russia meddled in the American
0:05:31 > 0:05:39presidential election, using its cyber capabilities.
0:05:39 > 0:05:44Donald Trump has sided with a Russian leader against his
0:05:44 > 0:05:47own security establishment.
0:05:47 > 0:05:51And yet you're here sitting with me, telling me that Russia has
0:05:51 > 0:05:54to be regarded, in terms of its capability, as a threat
0:05:54 > 0:05:55to the West's interests.
0:05:55 > 0:05:56What's going on?
0:05:56 > 0:06:00Well, I think we have to allow Mr Trump some room to manoeuvre,
0:06:00 > 0:06:03since he's not yet the president, and one would expect to see a very
0:06:04 > 0:06:06strenuous conversation between Mr Trump and the formidable
0:06:06 > 0:06:08machine that resides in Washington that will give him
0:06:08 > 0:06:09intelligence and advice.
0:06:09 > 0:06:17He's just told us that he doesn't actually believe what he hears
0:06:18 > 0:06:19from his own intelligence agencies.
0:06:19 > 0:06:22That is, in a sense, the great import of this argument,
0:06:22 > 0:06:24over what the Russians did in US election.
0:06:24 > 0:06:27My first point is, let's allow that discussion to mature a little bit
0:06:27 > 0:06:29as Mr Trump takes office.
0:06:29 > 0:06:32But in terms of capability, I'm in absolutely no doubt
0:06:32 > 0:06:34that Russia, and others, have invested very thoughtfully
0:06:34 > 0:06:36over the last 15 years in evolving their military
0:06:36 > 0:06:40capability to do two important things.
0:06:40 > 0:06:43One is, keep Nato out of their territory, their airspace,
0:06:43 > 0:06:45their waters and their land in the investment of things
0:06:45 > 0:06:46like advanced air defence.
0:06:46 > 0:06:50But also to invest in capabilities that in very sophisticated ways can
0:06:50 > 0:06:51bring harm in an opportunistic way.
0:06:51 > 0:06:54Not in a grand, strategic assault, but in an opportunistic way,
0:06:54 > 0:06:55to Berlin or London.
0:06:55 > 0:06:57And cyber is an important part of that.
0:06:58 > 0:06:59There's quite a rich conversation about cyber.
0:06:59 > 0:07:03But we also have to recognise that in the Russian inventory
0:07:03 > 0:07:05are capabilities that could deliver conventional - so not
0:07:05 > 0:07:07nuclear = conventional, precision effects in our homeland.
0:07:07 > 0:07:19And that's not a comfortable place that we would want to be.
0:07:19 > 0:07:23Until eight or so months ago, you were one of the top six generals
0:07:23 > 0:07:24in the UK Armed Forces.
0:07:25 > 0:07:27You actively were on duty as the Ukraine crisis
0:07:27 > 0:07:28unfolded, for example.
0:07:28 > 0:07:32What do you take from that, in terms of the way the West has
0:07:32 > 0:07:35responded and is still trying to respond by ramping up Nato
0:07:35 > 0:07:40capability and forces on the eastern flank directly facing Russia?
0:07:40 > 0:07:43Would you say that the West on your watch and after it has
0:07:43 > 0:07:51reacted with strength and credibility or not?
0:07:51 > 0:07:52Nothing like enough yet.
0:07:52 > 0:07:55I think it's a very, very difficult proposition for any government.
0:07:55 > 0:07:58Because in our adult experience we have not had a confrontation
0:07:58 > 0:07:59or conflict with Russia.
0:07:59 > 0:08:02And nobody wants to go back to the Cold War.
0:08:02 > 0:08:05And nobody is talking about, actually, a reset of the Cold War.
0:08:05 > 0:08:07The dynamics now are very different.
0:08:07 > 0:08:11I think the primacy of terrorism as a risk consumes an awful lot
0:08:11 > 0:08:12of government attention, resources and bandwidth,
0:08:12 > 0:08:14and we would all understand that.
0:08:14 > 0:08:17I think the effect of austerity since 2008 has made public
0:08:17 > 0:08:19spending decisions really, really difficult, and so there's
0:08:19 > 0:08:21no enthusiasm to think about unpalatable events that have
0:08:21 > 0:08:24not yet occurred that would cause perhaps difficult
0:08:24 > 0:08:38and different spending choices.
0:08:38 > 0:08:43I'm interested to know what you think is actually
0:08:43 > 0:08:44happening on the ground.
0:08:44 > 0:08:46Michael Fallon, the British Defence Minister, Secretary,
0:08:46 > 0:08:49said only a few weeks ago to a Parliamentary Committee,
0:08:49 > 0:08:52he said that he thought Britain and Nato would be ready to fight
0:08:52 > 0:08:55a war with Russia if necessary in two years' time.
0:08:55 > 0:08:58Is that good enough, and is it even true?
0:08:58 > 0:09:00I don't know, since I don't work in the Ministry
0:09:00 > 0:09:05of Defence any longer.
0:09:05 > 0:09:07You were there until eight months ago.
0:09:07 > 0:09:08Not much has changed, frankly.
0:09:08 > 0:09:12Well, there would have to have been a massive acceleration in planning,
0:09:12 > 0:09:14capability and in discussion with our Nato partners
0:09:14 > 0:09:16for a two-year horizon to be ready, deliverable.
0:09:16 > 0:09:24Always something can be done.
0:09:24 > 0:09:28But the fact is, we have to look at the state of Nato as an alliance
0:09:28 > 0:09:30which has gone through progressive demobilisation, for very
0:09:30 > 0:09:33good reasons during the aftermath of the Cold War.
0:09:33 > 0:09:36And it now sits with a lot of capability which is not
0:09:36 > 0:09:37held at high readiness.
0:09:37 > 0:09:41And in any case, quite a lot of Nato capability is not designed to deal
0:09:41 > 0:09:46with the sort of things that Russia is now able to present.
0:09:46 > 0:09:49You are using very diplomatic language, but I know,
0:09:49 > 0:09:52and of course you know, that your real views came out last
0:09:52 > 0:09:57September in a memo that ended up in the newspapers when you talked
0:09:57 > 0:09:59about the deliberate withering of Britain's defence capabilities.
0:09:59 > 0:10:05You listed in terms of naval power, air power, manpower on the ground,
0:10:05 > 0:10:08all of the different ways in which, in your view, the British military
0:10:08 > 0:10:09was being hollowed out.
0:10:09 > 0:10:12And Britain, of course, being - outside America -
0:10:12 > 0:10:16perhaps the most important member of Nato.
0:10:16 > 0:10:23And I think that is absolutely So.
0:10:23 > 0:10:26I also think it's entirely understandable in the sense that
0:10:26 > 0:10:29if you look at the passage of our history since the end
0:10:29 > 0:10:33of the Cold War, in the absence of that sense of a threat
0:10:33 > 0:10:36from Russia, and with many other compelling things to spend
0:10:36 > 0:10:38the public purse on, why wouldn't you take some risk
0:10:38 > 0:10:39with your defence capability?
0:10:39 > 0:10:43And my point is, first of all, let's be honest with ourselves
0:10:43 > 0:10:44about the state of Western defence.
0:10:44 > 0:10:46This is much more than the UK.
0:10:46 > 0:10:49But, secondly, let's look at the world as it's really turning
0:10:49 > 0:10:53out, and ask ourselves the question, OK, so if we are in the place
0:10:53 > 0:10:55we are now for good and understandable reasons,
0:10:55 > 0:10:57is it the right answer for the future?
0:10:57 > 0:11:01Can you guarantee that the future going forward will be as reasonably
0:11:01 > 0:11:02benign as the recent past?
0:11:02 > 0:11:06And if you can't, then you may have to do some different things and make
0:11:06 > 0:11:07some different choices.
0:11:07 > 0:11:10Well, I come back to the central fact that the Western
0:11:10 > 0:11:13world faces right now, which is that in a few days' time
0:11:13 > 0:11:16Donald Trump will be the de facto leader of the Western world,
0:11:16 > 0:11:18the most important man in Nato.
0:11:18 > 0:11:21Not only has he talked about the smartness of Vladimir Putin,
0:11:21 > 0:11:24he has said he will consider whether the United States
0:11:24 > 0:11:26under his watch should recognise Russian sovereignty over the Crimea,
0:11:26 > 0:11:29ie, recognise the annexation of what was Ukrainian territory.
0:11:29 > 0:11:32He has suggested that Nato members who don't meet the spending
0:11:32 > 0:11:35commitments of at least 2% of GDP on military expenditure will have
0:11:35 > 0:11:37to go their own way.
0:11:37 > 0:11:39And that Nato, in effect, would be over, finished.
0:11:39 > 0:11:43This is the man that you are now saying has to take responsibility
0:11:43 > 0:11:46for leading the West in a much more proactive building up
0:11:46 > 0:11:51of military resources.
0:11:51 > 0:11:53Well, I currently want to stick with the hope,
0:11:53 > 0:11:56as Mr Trump takes office, a richer discussion with his
0:11:56 > 0:12:00new team, with the organs of state in Washington and with his allies,
0:12:00 > 0:12:03will make it clearer to Mr Trump that we have all bought
0:12:03 > 0:12:04into collective security.
0:12:04 > 0:12:08Certainly since the end of the Second World War.
0:12:08 > 0:12:11That it's not in the US's interests to break with Nato,
0:12:11 > 0:12:16or to cause Article 5 to be...
0:12:16 > 0:12:19When you look at his tweets, when you look at his mindset,
0:12:19 > 0:12:21how worried are you?
0:12:21 > 0:12:24I'm worried, but I would want now to be in the position
0:12:24 > 0:12:28where I would like to give him the time to have that discussion
0:12:28 > 0:12:29with his own people.
0:12:29 > 0:12:32Fascinating, you keep talking about, "I hope he will talk
0:12:32 > 0:12:33to his own people."
0:12:33 > 0:12:36You know some of his key appointees very, very well.
0:12:36 > 0:12:38Thinking about General Mattis, who is now going to be
0:12:38 > 0:12:41Defence Secretary.
0:12:41 > 0:12:44We're talking about the other generals, one of whom is now his
0:12:44 > 0:12:47National Security Adviser, a very controversial figure indeed.
0:12:47 > 0:12:49Other generals who have been appointed to Homeland Security.
0:12:49 > 0:12:52Talk about another one being Director of Intelligence.
0:12:52 > 0:12:57These were guys who worked with in the field, general to general.
0:12:57 > 0:12:58Yes, I count them as friends.
0:12:58 > 0:13:01I admire them.
0:13:01 > 0:13:05They are uniquely experienced in the business of confrontation
0:13:05 > 0:13:07and conflict, and they know their business.
0:13:07 > 0:13:10And they have learnt their business through hard yards, principally
0:13:10 > 0:13:14in Iraq and Afghanistan.
0:13:14 > 0:13:16They are military men with no experience of statecraft
0:13:16 > 0:13:18or diplomacy whatsoever.
0:13:18 > 0:13:22Yeah, so if you ask them for a cool, clear, genuinely strategic
0:13:22 > 0:13:27experienced military view, then there are almost nobody better
0:13:28 > 0:13:31in the world to give that advice.
0:13:31 > 0:13:33But these are guys who know how to fight wars.
0:13:34 > 0:13:36Now we're talking about political roles, being the head
0:13:36 > 0:13:38of the Defence Department, the boss in the Pentagon.
0:13:38 > 0:13:41That's not a job for a bloke in uniform.
0:13:41 > 0:13:44That's a job for a bloke like you now, with a suit on.
0:13:44 > 0:13:47They are now faced with a very difficult transition.
0:13:47 > 0:13:50I have such confidence in their character and their abilities
0:13:50 > 0:13:53and experience that I think they will be able to seize this
0:13:53 > 0:13:56transition into what is clearly a political and policy role,
0:13:56 > 0:14:00but it's going to be difficult.
0:14:00 > 0:14:02Why do you have such confidence?
0:14:02 > 0:14:07In the United Kingdom there is no way that generals fresh out
0:14:07 > 0:14:12of uniform, men such as yourself, could be hoisted into political jobs
0:14:12 > 0:14:13like being Defence Secretary.
0:14:13 > 0:14:16Why do you think it's appropriate that it happens
0:14:16 > 0:14:17in the United States?
0:14:17 > 0:14:20I think in the United States there is a cultural difference.
0:14:20 > 0:14:23So the role of senior retired military in commercial and political
0:14:23 > 0:14:26and public life in the US is cast in a different way
0:14:26 > 0:14:29than it is in the United Kingdom, where people are genuinely
0:14:29 > 0:14:31uncomfortable with it in the United Kingdom.
0:14:31 > 0:14:34I also think that these folk are used to operating
0:14:34 > 0:14:35at the genuinely strategic level.
0:14:35 > 0:14:36They are soldier-statesmen.
0:14:36 > 0:14:39They will find it relatively easy to make the transition
0:14:39 > 0:14:41into the political space because as senior commanders
0:14:41 > 0:14:46they so often operated in support of that.
0:14:46 > 0:14:49There's a phrase that Gordon Adams, a very respected professor
0:14:49 > 0:14:51at the American University School of International Services coined.
0:14:51 > 0:14:55He says there's no risk of a military coup in the United States
0:14:55 > 0:14:58under Donald Trump, but given the nature of his appointments,
0:14:58 > 0:15:02there is what I call, he says, a "Velvet militarisation of American
0:15:02 > 0:15:03foreign and national security policy."
0:15:03 > 0:15:05Do you see what he's driving at?
0:15:05 > 0:15:06Absolutely I do.
0:15:06 > 0:15:09I don't think it's proven, but I think if you fill your
0:15:09 > 0:15:12administration with a lot of senior military leaders then people
0:15:12 > 0:15:14are going to make that accusation of them.
0:15:14 > 0:15:18But if you ask Jim Mattis and John Kelly for their view of how
0:15:18 > 0:15:21the world turns, then I think you would get a much
0:15:21 > 0:15:22more sophisticated answer.
0:15:22 > 0:15:24You know them very well.
0:15:24 > 0:15:27You just told me you regard them as friends.
0:15:27 > 0:15:30It's quite obvious that actually the British government doesn't have
0:15:30 > 0:15:32that many strong contacts with the people at the heart
0:15:32 > 0:15:34of the Trump team.
0:15:34 > 0:15:37At least one Conservative MP has suggested that people
0:15:37 > 0:15:41like you should be deployed to reach out to these new top figures
0:15:41 > 0:15:43in the Trump administration, in a sense, general to general.
0:15:43 > 0:15:45Are you prepared to do that?
0:15:45 > 0:15:48Does the government want you to do that, more importantly?
0:15:48 > 0:15:51Of course I'm prepared to do it, because I know these people well.
0:15:51 > 0:15:54But I don't think it's ever been done successfully.
0:15:54 > 0:15:57First of all, Jim Mattis would have to want it and find it useful.
0:15:57 > 0:16:01And even if they did, we invest a lot in currently serving
0:16:01 > 0:16:04officers and senior officials and politicians
0:16:04 > 0:16:05who own that relationship.
0:16:05 > 0:16:09And they would have to do think it's helpful for somebody like me to come
0:16:09 > 0:16:11and have a supporting role and actually,
0:16:11 > 0:16:16that's pretty unlikely.
0:16:16 > 0:16:19Yeah, the truth is that also there are things being said by,
0:16:19 > 0:16:22for example, Michael Flynn, the general who is now going to be
0:16:22 > 0:16:25the National Security Adviser to the president inside
0:16:25 > 0:16:27the White House, his suggestion that there is something
0:16:27 > 0:16:29fundamentally dangerous about Islam.
0:16:29 > 0:16:35But if you were to talk to him you would have to say,
0:16:35 > 0:16:36"Would you not?"
0:16:36 > 0:16:38This kind of language is completely inflammatory,
0:16:38 > 0:16:39unacceptable and unhelpful.
0:16:39 > 0:16:43Yes.
0:16:43 > 0:16:47Well, we would have to be able to have that sort of conversation,
0:16:47 > 0:16:50but the advantage of deploying friends and colleagues is that
0:16:50 > 0:16:52you can have that sort of conversation.
0:16:52 > 0:16:54But actually, so can our ambassador in Washington.
0:16:54 > 0:16:55So can the defence attachment...
0:16:55 > 0:16:58Oh, come on, do you seriously think the Trump administration
0:16:58 > 0:16:59is going to...?
0:16:59 > 0:17:02Well, we know he's not going to listen to the UK ambassador
0:17:02 > 0:17:05in Washington, because he thinks Nigel Farage should be UK
0:17:05 > 0:17:05ambassador in Washington.
0:17:05 > 0:17:08I'm not making a flippant point, I'm making a serious point.
0:17:08 > 0:17:11The British government, with its own view of what is in
0:17:11 > 0:17:15the West's security interests, is going to have very little to no
0:17:15 > 0:17:16leverage with Donald Trump.
0:17:16 > 0:17:19I think it's going to have to assume very little leverage to start with,
0:17:20 > 0:17:22and then it's going to have to build it.
0:17:22 > 0:17:26But I come back to the point that it is in the United States'
0:17:26 > 0:17:28interests to continue to invest in the collective security
0:17:28 > 0:17:29arrangements represented by Nato.
0:17:29 > 0:17:32And a discussion with senior partners in Nato must be
0:17:32 > 0:17:33a good thing.
0:17:33 > 0:17:36And perhaps we still allow time for that to happen.
0:17:36 > 0:17:39We've talked a lot about Nato, and, of course, underlying our
0:17:39 > 0:17:41conversation has been the notion that there is a Russian
0:17:41 > 0:17:44assertiveness stroke aggressiveness at play right now that changes a lot
0:17:44 > 0:17:46of the dynamic within Nato.
0:17:46 > 0:17:47Yeah. We haven't talked about China.
0:17:47 > 0:17:50But many people, not least Barack Obama with his so-called
0:17:50 > 0:17:53pivot to Asia, believes that actually the key national security
0:17:53 > 0:17:55interest for America going forward lay in the Pacific
0:17:55 > 0:18:02and in relation to China.
0:18:02 > 0:18:05Donald Trump says he doesn't even feel bound by the traditional
0:18:05 > 0:18:07recognition of the One China Policy.
0:18:07 > 0:18:10So, put your mind towards broader horizons of Asia, the Pacific,
0:18:10 > 0:18:11and the US and the East.
0:18:11 > 0:18:13Do you see problems there, too?
0:18:13 > 0:18:17I do, because I think we recognise we live in the Asian century.
0:18:17 > 0:18:20The power and wealth and the power of decision is shifting east
0:18:20 > 0:18:22over this century.
0:18:22 > 0:18:25You can see the beginnings of a clash between a resurgent
0:18:25 > 0:18:27Chinese exceptionalism and an American exceptionalism that
0:18:27 > 0:18:28we've all grown up with.
0:18:28 > 0:18:32And probably the focus for that is the South China Sea
0:18:32 > 0:18:35where China has made it clear, I think since 1948, that it regards
0:18:35 > 0:18:37the South China Sea as sovereign waters.
0:18:37 > 0:18:40And the United States and many other nations in the region and elsewhere
0:18:40 > 0:18:44subscribe to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea and say,
0:18:44 > 0:18:46no, these are part of the global commons.
0:18:46 > 0:18:48And those are two fundamentally irreconcilable positions.
0:18:48 > 0:18:52So if China's ambition is to keep the US out of the South China Sea,
0:18:52 > 0:18:55or at least the US military out of the South China Sea,
0:18:55 > 0:18:59and the US under Mr Trump take the view that this is part
0:18:59 > 0:19:02of the global commons - one third of the world trade flows
0:19:02 > 0:19:05through those waters - then there's going to be,
0:19:05 > 0:19:10at the very least, a difficult discussion coming.
0:19:10 > 0:19:13So, you've painted a picture of a world over the next few years
0:19:13 > 0:19:15that has to acknowledge the power and assertiveness,
0:19:15 > 0:19:20not just of Russia, but of China as well.
0:19:21 > 0:19:21Yes.
0:19:21 > 0:19:24And you've nodded to it, but I now want your explicit view
0:19:24 > 0:19:27on the rise of new forms of unconventional warfare,
0:19:27 > 0:19:29and in particular cyber warfare, as it's loosely termed.
0:19:29 > 0:19:32Let's leave aside whatever the Russians did or didn't do
0:19:32 > 0:19:35during the US presidential campaign, but it seems to me that there
0:19:35 > 0:19:38is an issue today about whether the West, which is of course
0:19:38 > 0:19:41the richest bloc, and arguably the technologically most advanced
0:19:41 > 0:19:44bloc, actually has a military edge when it comes to the use,
0:19:44 > 0:19:50the employment, of these cyber tactics.
0:19:50 > 0:19:51What do you think?
0:19:51 > 0:19:53This is a work in progress.
0:19:53 > 0:19:56In terms of intellectual ability, then the bright minds that sit
0:19:56 > 0:19:59in Silicon Valley, in Washington, in Cheltenham at GCHQ,
0:19:59 > 0:20:01they are as good as anybody in the world.
0:20:01 > 0:20:06But the fact is, Russia has, according to some research,
0:20:06 > 0:20:08perhaps a million programmers perhaps connected to 40
0:20:08 > 0:20:09organised cybercrime rings.
0:20:09 > 0:20:16So in terms of capacity, Russia has a much more developed
0:20:16 > 0:20:25approach to cyber relationships.
0:20:26 > 0:20:29I think it comes back to this point that in the West,
0:20:29 > 0:20:32for so long, we haven't really felt a risk to our homeland,
0:20:32 > 0:20:35and yet we are open societies and building ever more connected
0:20:35 > 0:20:37societies, so we have created vulnerabilities.
0:20:37 > 0:20:40I think what we need to do now is recognise those vulnerabilities
0:20:40 > 0:20:43and harden our act up and organise better to deal with the risks.
0:20:43 > 0:20:45So are we doing it?
0:20:45 > 0:20:48That critique I cited earlier of you saying that in Britain
0:20:48 > 0:20:56we are allowing our defence capabilities to wither on the vine,
0:20:57 > 0:21:00I think you did make one specific point about a failure to really
0:21:00 > 0:21:03conceive of just how important this new cyber warfare capacity is.
0:21:03 > 0:21:05How vulnerable are we in Britain?
0:21:05 > 0:21:08I think in its simplest terms, we have to recognise that war
0:21:08 > 0:21:10between advanced states or even fairly advanced states,
0:21:10 > 0:21:13won't necessarily be focused on the destruction of Armed Forces
0:21:13 > 0:21:15or the carpet bombing of citizens, as we have seen
0:21:15 > 0:21:17so tragically in Aleppo.
0:21:17 > 0:21:20It might well be fought simply by dismantling daily life
0:21:20 > 0:21:22through the assault on critical national infrastructure.
0:21:22 > 0:21:30And cyber is the obvious way of doing that.
0:21:30 > 0:21:32There are obviously other more kinetic means available.
0:21:32 > 0:21:35So the challenge for the West, and this is much more than just
0:21:35 > 0:21:39the UK, is, we are probably used to dealing with a single event,
0:21:39 > 0:21:42such as the cyber assault on Sony, or the Ukrainian power grid.
0:21:42 > 0:21:46But in the future, if we are going to play our part in modern conflict,
0:21:46 > 0:21:49then we've got to deal with strategic cyber risk
0:21:49 > 0:21:50and protect our critical national infrastructure,
0:21:50 > 0:21:53protect our way of life.
0:21:53 > 0:21:55And that means a more thoughtful organisation.
0:21:55 > 0:21:58It probably means different laws, in fact, to share the responsibility.
0:21:58 > 0:22:00We are almost at an end.
0:22:00 > 0:22:03This phrase you just used, "If we are to play our part..."
0:22:03 > 0:22:07It seems to me the narrative you've given me suggests that for years,
0:22:07 > 0:22:09the West's publics haven't been fully engaged or even willing
0:22:09 > 0:22:12to play their part, because they haven't wanted to ramp
0:22:12 > 0:22:15up the expenditures in new areas of defence capacity in a way that
0:22:16 > 0:22:18would allow the West to keep an edge.
0:22:18 > 0:22:19Yes.
0:22:19 > 0:22:21So what's going to change the dynamic?
0:22:21 > 0:22:24Is it going to have to be the real threat of war...
0:22:24 > 0:22:26..That will, in a sense, wake the West up?
0:22:26 > 0:22:30I think there is enough evidence in a cool, hard look at the state
0:22:30 > 0:22:33of western defence, a cool, hard look at the way the world
0:22:33 > 0:22:36is changing, for governments to mount what governments should do,
0:22:36 > 0:22:38which is a properly rigorous investigation to come
0:22:38 > 0:22:39to some conclusions.
0:22:39 > 0:22:41And then make different choices about public expenditure,
0:22:41 > 0:22:42which can be done.
0:22:42 > 0:22:45That's really, really difficult, because public opinion will think
0:22:45 > 0:22:47it's slightly strange, or we are simply going to have
0:22:47 > 0:22:55to hope that bad things don't happen, and then when bad
0:22:55 > 0:22:56things do happen...
0:22:56 > 0:22:58It's not a great defence strategy, is it?
0:22:58 > 0:23:02I wonder whether you now would say, as a final thought, whether you now
0:23:02 > 0:23:04would say, mea culpa, I didn't shout loud enough
0:23:04 > 0:23:07about these issues when I was actually in place,
0:23:07 > 0:23:09one of the top six generals in the country,
0:23:09 > 0:23:10to make a difference.
0:23:10 > 0:23:14It's all right now that you've left to jump up and down and say we've
0:23:14 > 0:23:17got a real problem, but you didn't actually change very much
0:23:17 > 0:23:19when you were there with your uniform on.
0:23:19 > 0:23:20I accept that.
0:23:20 > 0:23:24What I don't accept is that I didn't say these things when I was surfing,
0:23:24 > 0:23:25because I did.
0:23:25 > 0:23:28And I said it over a number of years.
0:23:28 > 0:23:29So somebody wasn't listening.
0:23:29 > 0:23:29Well...
0:23:29 > 0:23:32The politicians weren't listening or you were just getting an easy
0:23:32 > 0:23:33out for yourself.
0:23:33 > 0:23:35Maybe I didn't explain it well enough, or I didn't
0:23:36 > 0:23:36win the argument...
0:23:36 > 0:23:42I certainly didn't win the argument.
0:23:43 > 0:23:46But actually I think as events unfold, the arguments I have been
0:23:46 > 0:23:48making for some time, are being reinforced by events,
0:23:48 > 0:23:50and so maybe these conversations have their time.
0:23:50 > 0:23:52And maybe that time is now.
0:23:52 > 0:23:55Do you really believe that? Well, I want to believe it.
0:23:55 > 0:23:57Because I think the longer we ignore these trends,
0:23:57 > 0:24:01the greater the risk is that we just present ourselves as strategic
0:24:01 > 0:24:02victims-in-waiting in a difficult world.
0:24:02 > 0:24:03We have to end there.
0:24:03 > 0:24:06General Sir Richard Barrons, thank you very much indeed
0:24:06 > 0:24:07for being on HARDtalk.
0:24:07 > 0:24:24Thank you so much.
0:24:24 > 0:24:26Hi there.