:00:00. > :00:16.We're about to see what kind of impact President Donald Trump
:00:17. > :00:19.will have on the US and the world beyond.
:00:20. > :00:20.Today, my focus is the international arena.
:00:21. > :00:23.My guest has been close to the centre of US foreign
:00:24. > :00:29.Richard Haass was a senior adviser to both Bush presidents and has
:00:30. > :00:33.offered his insights to the President-elect, too.
:00:34. > :00:35.From big power diplomacy, with Russia and China, to global
:00:36. > :01:11.How different, how unpredictable is Trump going to be?
:01:12. > :01:15.Richard Haass in New York City, welcome to HARDtalk.
:01:16. > :01:19.You've just written a book with the cheery title
:01:20. > :01:25.In your opinion, does the election of Donald Trump
:01:26. > :01:35.to the presidency add to that sense of a world in disarray?
:01:36. > :01:38.It's more the world the 45th President of the United States
:01:39. > :01:43.It's the result, in part, of things the United States has done
:01:44. > :01:49.It's in part simply a result of the end of the Cold War,
:01:50. > :01:51.the loosening up our international relations, the rise of certain
:01:52. > :02:01.Where I think he may have added it slightly,
:02:02. > :02:04.Where I think he may have added to it slightly,
:02:05. > :02:07.and not just him but first in the American political campaign,
:02:08. > :02:13.candidates, including him, were saying things and endorsing
:02:14. > :02:15.positions which, shall we say, were untraditional.
:02:16. > :02:18.The fact that Senator Sanders, Secretary Clinton and Donald Trump,
:02:19. > :02:21.all three rejected the major pending trade agreement, the so-called
:02:22. > :02:25.that itself was a major departure from things.
:02:26. > :02:27.Obviously, during the transition, some of the things he's said
:02:28. > :02:34.But I would put the lion share of the explanation, if you will,
:02:35. > :02:36.for the disarray he'll inherit and this daunting inbox he's
:02:37. > :02:39.going to inherit more from things the United States and others have
:02:40. > :02:46.Right, so what you're laying out is a proposition
:02:47. > :02:49.is the preconditions are there for disarray
:02:50. > :02:52.and that a US president, whoever he or she may be incoming,
:02:53. > :02:55.can only do, and you just used your finger and thumb there,
:02:56. > :02:59.can only do a little bit to change that sense of disarray.
:03:00. > :03:02.So, to me, that is a recognition from you that actually
:03:03. > :03:04.the United States of America and its commander-in-chief have much
:03:05. > :03:14.less agency and leverage in the world than they used to have?
:03:15. > :03:20.Perhaps, but I wouldn't drive it too far.
:03:21. > :03:22.I think what we've learned is that when the United States stays
:03:23. > :03:26.aloof from the world, the world is not self organising.
:03:27. > :03:30.The centrifugal forces tend to get much stronger,
:03:31. > :03:32.and when the United States does engage in the world,
:03:33. > :03:36.we still have more capacity to act and to lead than anybody else.
:03:37. > :03:38.We can't control it, we can't determine it,
:03:39. > :03:40.but we can shape it more than any other single actor.
:03:41. > :03:44.Let's talk a little bit about Trump, because we're going to get the big
:03:45. > :03:46.picture, believe me, but it is important to tease
:03:47. > :03:48.out what we've learned from the weeks of transition that
:03:49. > :03:51.Donald Trump has a very particular style.
:03:52. > :03:53.You're a guy who's steeped in foreign policy-making,
:03:54. > :03:55.you're systems, a machines sort of guy.
:03:56. > :04:01.Donald Trump doesn't seem to operate inside the machine,
:04:02. > :04:07.he operates primarily through messages on Twitter.
:04:08. > :04:13.Do you worry about the style that's he's bringing to Washington?
:04:14. > :04:18.This wasn't exactly the style of diplomacy I studied
:04:19. > :04:20.when I was a student at Oxford 40 years ago.
:04:21. > :04:28.I worry that Twitter is all too easy a form of communication.
:04:29. > :04:33.You've got to think once or twice before you press send.
:04:34. > :04:36.I think the United States, as a country, has to think more
:04:37. > :04:39.than once or twice because so many others are counting on us
:04:40. > :04:41.and Twitter can be something that you, you're not doing it
:04:42. > :04:44.in a careful enough way, and if others are basing their
:04:45. > :04:46.security and their calculations on America, then we've
:04:47. > :04:52.got to be very careful with what messages we send.
:04:53. > :04:55.And it's not just about Twitter in itself, it's also about the degree
:04:56. > :04:57.to which the United States' incoming president actually listens
:04:58. > :05:07.There have been a few symbolic moments, if you like.
:05:08. > :05:09.One was when asked on Fox News whether he was reading
:05:10. > :05:12.the presidential daily brief, the intelligence brief, he said,
:05:13. > :05:14."Yeah, but only sort of reading it once a week,
:05:15. > :05:24."I don't have to be told because, you know, I'm like a smart person.
:05:25. > :05:29.I don't have to be told the same thing in words every single day".
:05:30. > :05:31.Again, speaking as a guy who's been inside the system,
:05:32. > :05:33.that isn't really the way things have worked.
:05:34. > :05:36.Do you think it's the way things should work, that a guy
:05:37. > :05:46.There's that old expression, I think it was the former
:05:47. > :05:49.governor of New York, that you campaign in poetry,
:05:50. > :05:55.My own experience, from having worked with four presidents,
:05:56. > :05:58.is when you govern, you're dealing at a level of detail that outsiders
:05:59. > :06:03.I myself found the daily intelligence briefings quite
:06:04. > :06:07.They actually do change quite a bit from day-to-day,
:06:08. > :06:10.particularly when they give you the broader brush,
:06:11. > :06:14.sets of analyses, as the CIA and others do.
:06:15. > :06:17.So, to be perfectly honest, I hope that Mr Trump establishes
:06:18. > :06:18.a better working relationship with the intelligence community,
:06:19. > :06:22.and if he does, I think he'll actually find it to be a valuable
:06:23. > :06:25.We've already seen one important episode.
:06:26. > :06:28.When it came to the allegations which have emerged, which have been
:06:29. > :06:31.verified as far as the US intelligence community is concerned,
:06:32. > :06:35.from CIA, FBI, Director of National Intelligence,
:06:36. > :06:41.all of them adamant that there is compelling proof
:06:42. > :06:45.that the Kremlin authorised a hack of the Democratic National
:06:46. > :06:48.Committee, because they wanted to influence the US presidential
:06:49. > :06:55.Donald Trump chose to side with Putin's message,
:06:56. > :06:58.rather than the message coming out of his own intelligence chiefs.
:06:59. > :07:00.Now, that's something that happened, it's not something we have
:07:01. > :07:10.It is, I think its raised questions about his relationship
:07:11. > :07:16.Again, I'm hopeful, I'm not predicting,
:07:17. > :07:24.I think it raises questions also about US policy towards Russia.
:07:25. > :07:26.I would simply say that this hacking was not an exception,
:07:27. > :07:30.We've seen Russia do what it did to Ukraine and Crimea
:07:31. > :07:35.We saw Russian intervention in Syria, which was a war crime,
:07:36. > :07:37.I would argue, by any measure and standard.
:07:38. > :07:40.There's all sorts of evidence that the sort of political
:07:41. > :07:42.machinations they did in the United States
:07:43. > :07:50.I expect we're going to see an awful lot of that in places like Germany,
:07:51. > :07:54.What we need is a comprehensive policy towards Russia that,
:07:55. > :07:56.among other things, would say, you'll only get sanctions relief
:07:57. > :07:58.if we see measurable changes and improvements in your behaviour.
:07:59. > :08:01.I would also argue that we need to look very hard at
:08:02. > :08:07.After the end of the Cold War, the United States and European
:08:08. > :08:09.allies essentially stripped Nato of a lot of its military
:08:10. > :08:12.and its land components, and I would think they need to be
:08:13. > :08:17.reintroduced in places like the Baltic states.
:08:18. > :08:19.Not so long ago you were in Trump Tower talking about,
:08:20. > :08:22.I wasn't there and privy to it, but I imagine Russia came up.
:08:23. > :08:24.What you've just said runs diametrically in opposition,
:08:25. > :08:34.again referring to Twitter, to the opinions of Donald J Trump.
:08:35. > :08:39.Quote, "I always knew he was very smart", talking of Vladimir Putin.
:08:40. > :08:42."Having a good relationship with Russia is a good
:08:43. > :08:46.only stupid people or fools would think it is bad".
:08:47. > :08:48.So tell me a little bit about this private conversation
:08:49. > :08:54.Did you try to put him right, as far as you're concerned, on Russia?
:08:55. > :08:59.In our conversations Russia actually didn't figure all that prominently,
:09:00. > :09:04.it was more about developments in the Middle East,
:09:05. > :09:08.It was about trade, it was about immigration.
:09:09. > :09:10.We haven't spoken in the context of the hacking report
:09:11. > :09:17.What I've been saying publicly on that does disagree somewhat.
:09:18. > :09:23.Our goal should not be a better relationship with Russia, per se.
:09:24. > :09:25.What our policy should be is we want a better relationship,
:09:26. > :09:28.but only on a basis of Russian behaviour that takes
:09:29. > :09:30.into account our interests and what we think are the norms
:09:31. > :09:37.So we don't want to have, if you will, a cosmetically
:09:38. > :09:42.improved relationship, we want to have a substantially
:09:43. > :09:45.improved relationship, and that's really up to Mr Putin.
:09:46. > :09:49.Yeah, well, it's sort of up to Mr Putin, but it's also up
:09:50. > :09:55.For example, the degree to which in response
:09:56. > :09:59.to the intelligence community's conclusions about hacking,
:10:00. > :10:03.whether there's mileage in more sanctions.
:10:04. > :10:06.For example, Senator John McCain and a bunch of other
:10:07. > :10:09.Republican Congress people have said that they now want to seek extra
:10:10. > :10:15.Sanctions are one of the possible responses.
:10:16. > :10:17.I might be more interested in certain types of cyber
:10:18. > :10:22.As I just mentioned, I'd be interested in strengthening
:10:23. > :10:25.our military capability, both outside Ukraine
:10:26. > :10:31.I'd also be more interested in providing certain types
:10:32. > :10:33.of defensive military help to Ukraine.
:10:34. > :10:35.There's already a lot of sanctions on Russia.
:10:36. > :10:37.I'd have to be persuaded that additional sanctions would make
:10:38. > :10:42.I'm not interested in symbols, I'm interested in substance
:10:43. > :10:46.of things that will send a message to Mr Putin that he will receive.
:10:47. > :10:57.The evidence, at least on the surface, would suggest not.
:10:58. > :11:00.But again, we'll have to wait and see what he actually
:11:01. > :11:04.At the moment you are an independent observer, a commentator
:11:05. > :11:09.Politico, for example, which gets some stories
:11:10. > :11:11.right and some wrong, said in mid-December you were one
:11:12. > :11:14.of the top tips for the number two job at the State Department,
:11:15. > :11:16.and that Trump was actively considering you.
:11:17. > :11:20.Given everything we've discussed so far, could you conceivably work
:11:21. > :11:29.Well, I think the answer is, when asked if I could work for any
:11:30. > :11:32.president, and I've worked for four, you can only do it if,
:11:33. > :11:34.one, you have a similar conception of the job,
:11:35. > :11:35.what it actually would entail, and more important,
:11:36. > :11:38.that your in sufficient alignment on the major policies.
:11:39. > :11:40.You don't have to agree on everything, Stephen,
:11:41. > :11:42.but you've got to agree on enough of the big things that
:11:43. > :11:44.you can faithfully and effectively represent them.
:11:45. > :11:47.I think in my case we would need to talk about it, because there's
:11:48. > :11:51.Look, I've just come out with a new book,
:11:52. > :11:54.I've written a dozen books before, so my views are not
:11:55. > :12:05.It wouldn't make sense for me to be there, unless I thought
:12:06. > :12:08.I could have a real chance to affect policy, to influence it
:12:09. > :12:11.and that we were sufficiently in sync, so I could be an effective
:12:12. > :12:13.representative of this president and this administration,
:12:14. > :12:15.and those would be issues that we would have to resolve
:12:16. > :12:17.to their satisfaction and to my satisfaction.
:12:18. > :12:20.Let me just say, I don't know if I'm seriously
:12:21. > :12:24.I don't know if I'll be asked to do anything.
:12:25. > :12:27.Obviously we'd have you back if you do know that.
:12:28. > :12:31.As you say, your analysis of a world in disarray seems to me to have
:12:32. > :12:33.I'm going to be very shorthand about them,
:12:34. > :12:36.but you say that the United States needs to be realistic
:12:37. > :12:39.in its ambition, it needs to match its vision of ends
:12:40. > :12:41.with means, rather than having very ambitious ends but not
:12:42. > :12:48.the will and the means to enforce them.
:12:49. > :12:50.I'm just wondering, let's talk about some other key areas.
:12:51. > :12:53.For example, Nato, which of course I think 70% of the burden
:12:54. > :12:56.for spending in Nato comes from the United States.
:12:57. > :12:58.Does the United States, in your view, have an obligation
:12:59. > :13:02.to maintain that level of commitment to Nato?
:13:03. > :13:07.And what would happen if, according to Donald Trump
:13:08. > :13:09.and some of his advisers, if the United States got much
:13:10. > :13:13.tougher with allies and said if you don't front up more money,
:13:14. > :13:24.I think the Europeans need to do more, not so much spend more,
:13:25. > :13:27.though that would be welcome, they need to spend what they spend
:13:28. > :13:31.The problem with European defence spending is not so much the level,
:13:32. > :13:33.but that it's not co-ordinated, so you have tremendous areas
:13:34. > :13:35.of replication and you have large areas of shortfalls.
:13:36. > :13:38.But sure, I think the United States and Europe both have
:13:39. > :13:40.to spend more on defence, simply because the threat
:13:41. > :13:43.environment going forward is a lot more robust than we imagined it
:13:44. > :13:53.You began with a larger point, and I take it, which is any time
:13:54. > :13:56.in foreign policy you have a gap between your rhetoric
:13:57. > :13:57.and your actual capacity, you run into trouble.
:13:58. > :14:01.We've had that in the Middle East lots of times in recent years,
:14:02. > :14:04.where we said certain people must go and we didn't have policies to back
:14:05. > :14:06.it up, or when the Syrians used chemical weapons,
:14:07. > :14:11.So I think that ought to be a lesson.
:14:12. > :14:13.We've got to narrow the gap between American commitments
:14:14. > :14:18.and rhetoric, and American capabilities and actions.
:14:19. > :14:21.But the danger, and again I'm referring to stuff you've
:14:22. > :14:23.written in the book, the danger is that at times that
:14:24. > :14:25.looks like America abandons key values and principles.
:14:26. > :14:28.For example, just pluck a couple of the air,
:14:29. > :14:32.you're suggesting America needs to talk less loudly
:14:33. > :14:34.about human rights inside China or inside Russia.
:14:35. > :14:38.America needs to push less hard to expand the Nato
:14:39. > :14:43.family, to countries like Georgia and Ukraine.
:14:44. > :14:46.Now to some people around the world, you might call it realism,
:14:47. > :15:02.In the case of a country like China, look, the priority, what we need
:15:03. > :15:05.to focus on for the next couple of years is not trying
:15:06. > :15:07.to make China democratic, no matter how hard we press,
:15:08. > :15:13.What we can perhaps do is get China to work with us to deal
:15:14. > :15:19.with the pressing North Korean nuclear ballistic missile threat.
:15:20. > :15:21.In foreign policy, as in policy of any sort, you have
:15:22. > :15:23.to choose your priorities where your interests are greatest
:15:24. > :15:26.and your capacity to make a difference is greater.
:15:27. > :15:28.In the case of Ukraine and Georgia, bringing them into Nato,
:15:29. > :15:30.I would say they don't meet the qualifications.
:15:31. > :15:33.In the meantime, we've got our hands full meeting the commitments
:15:34. > :15:37.Going back to the guy who may or may not be your future
:15:38. > :15:44.boss, Donald Trump, and the issue of China...
:15:45. > :15:47.When he tweeted out that he saw no reason to be bound
:15:48. > :15:50.by the One China policy, and he was absolutely thrilled
:15:51. > :15:53.that the President of Taiwan had given him a phone call,
:15:54. > :15:56.in your view that was not representing America's national
:15:57. > :16:04.No, and I made it very clear in what I said and wrote
:16:05. > :16:08.in the aftermath of those comments of his, that I thought
:16:09. > :16:12.That we finessed this problem with China and Taiwan quite
:16:13. > :16:14.successfully for decades, and what that has allowed us
:16:15. > :16:17.to do, is to go ahead and forge a respectable
:16:18. > :16:23.And by the way, it's been good for Taiwan as well.
:16:24. > :16:27.It's flourished economically, it represents a democratic model
:16:28. > :16:30.that's something of an alternative, to say the least, to
:16:31. > :16:34.So my sense of "if it ain't broke, don't fix it", so I disagree
:16:35. > :16:37.with the idea of questioning the One China policy.
:16:38. > :16:40.The more we talk and the more we run round some of the key issues
:16:41. > :16:42.facing the globe today, the more I'm thinking,
:16:43. > :16:44.despite your caution about declaring Trump a major addition
:16:45. > :16:47.to the uncertainty and disarray in the world, that's precisely what,
:16:48. > :16:50.in substance, you do seem to be saying, on a whole raft of issues.
:16:51. > :16:52.Well again, I never assume there is a correlation
:16:53. > :16:54.between what was said during a campaign,
:16:55. > :17:07.The purpose of campaigning, shockingly enough,
:17:08. > :17:10.The purpose of governing is something very different.
:17:11. > :17:14.But assuming I continue to be on the outside of things,
:17:15. > :17:17.and I think that's a pretty good assumption, where I see areas
:17:18. > :17:20.of policy I agree with, I will stand up and say fantastic,
:17:21. > :17:23.and where I see policies I disagree with, I will criticise them.
:17:24. > :17:25.That's been my stance during the last eight years
:17:26. > :17:27.of Mr Obama, and that will be my position going forward,
:17:28. > :17:30.again assuming I continue to be here at the Council on Foreign
:17:31. > :17:36.I'm interested in this concept you developed,
:17:37. > :17:38.correct me if I'm paraphrasing it wrongly, but this idea
:17:39. > :17:43.That is the idea that nation states these days do have obligations that
:17:44. > :17:46.run far beyond their own borders, in terms of collective action on key
:17:47. > :17:51.issues facing the world community, whether it be trade issues,
:17:52. > :17:55.global trade issues or the huge challenge of climate policy.
:17:56. > :18:09.I want to know if you believe the United States, looking forward,
:18:10. > :18:12.is going to be meeting its sovereign obligations?
:18:13. > :18:19.This is what I think is smart and necessary.
:18:20. > :18:23.Nothing stays local for long any more.
:18:24. > :18:26.What goes on inside countries is no longer simply their business alone,
:18:27. > :18:28.whether it's a coal burning electricity plant, whether it's
:18:29. > :18:31.a virus that comes out like Zika or Ebola that can affect everybody,
:18:32. > :18:33.whether it's terrorists or hackers, what we've learned
:18:34. > :18:36.is nothing as local, everything's potentially global.
:18:37. > :18:38.I believe this ought to become the intellectual compass,
:18:39. > :18:45.so to speak, of American foreign policy and that we ought to be
:18:46. > :18:49.consulting and talking with other countries,
:18:50. > :18:52.and also companies and NGOs and others about how we deal
:18:53. > :18:57.with this global world, in which all these challenges
:18:58. > :19:00.you mention are far ahead of their responses.
:19:01. > :19:03.Will the Trump administration do this?
:19:04. > :19:09.The clue is in the mantra "Put America First".
:19:10. > :19:12.That doesn't seem to be recognising collective obligations in the sense
:19:13. > :19:17.Obviously not, but again that was a campaign slogan.
:19:18. > :19:22.Whether that's a governing slogan we will have to see,
:19:23. > :19:26.and even if it remains a slogan, what will it actually mean
:19:27. > :19:32.For example, does the United States change the basis of its regulatory
:19:33. > :19:34.framework when it comes to where we are on climate
:19:35. > :19:39.Does the United States actually pull out of Paris?
:19:40. > :19:42.I hope we don't pull out of Paris, indeed the Paris agreement
:19:43. > :19:45.is a model of an international agreement, where countries retain
:19:46. > :19:48.the ability to decide for themselves what it is they want to do or don't
:19:49. > :19:52.want to do when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions,
:19:53. > :19:54.and they simply pledge to do their best, but they set
:19:55. > :20:01.So it is fully consistent with American sovereignty.
:20:02. > :20:02.I'm hoping that the Trump administration comes
:20:03. > :20:10.It's the argument I've made to people around
:20:11. > :20:12.Mr Trump privately already, that people should think twice
:20:13. > :20:14.before they see the Paris agreement as a problem.
:20:15. > :20:17.Let me tap into your personal experience to something we touched
:20:18. > :20:20.on early on in the interview, but I would like to get a direct
:20:21. > :20:26.It's about the way in which people acquire policy-making powers
:20:27. > :20:29.in the national security and foreign policy arena.
:20:30. > :20:32.I mean, you worked at the coal face for 30 years, you served a number
:20:33. > :20:34.of different presidents, you worked as an official
:20:35. > :20:37.in the State Department and you took, in the end,
:20:38. > :20:39.some of the top jobs in national security and state,
:20:40. > :20:46.What we see in the Trump administration is a Secretary
:20:47. > :20:49.of State, Rex Tillerson, who has come straight from the CEO
:20:50. > :20:52.position in big business, as we know, with an oil company
:20:53. > :20:59.We see a Defence Secretary who has almost literally come
:21:00. > :21:02.straight out of uniform, who has not had any sort
:21:03. > :21:07.We see, for example, a son-in-law of the president,
:21:08. > :21:09.with absolutely no foreign policy making experience at all,
:21:10. > :21:12.who is now, it seems, in a post where he is expected
:21:13. > :21:25.I think in the case of the Secretary of State, nominee Rex Tillerson,
:21:26. > :21:28.this is someone with an awful lot of experience around the world.
:21:29. > :21:35.I'd say the same thing about General Mattis, who is going
:21:36. > :21:39.The real question is whether you can get a National Security Council
:21:40. > :21:42.There I think there's some grounds for concern,
:21:43. > :21:44.because you have so many people with positions of power
:21:45. > :21:51.You've got a president, a vice President, a chief of staff,
:21:52. > :21:53.a chief strategist, a national security adviser, now you've
:21:54. > :21:55.got a special adviser, so it's a lot of people.
:21:56. > :21:58.The question is - how are you going to orchestrate this?
:21:59. > :22:01.How are you going to make sure that the policy
:22:02. > :22:03.is made in the right way, and more importantly,
:22:04. > :22:05.implemented in a way that is consistent with the decisions?
:22:06. > :22:07.I think that's an enormous challenge for this administration,
:22:08. > :22:19.You rather diplomatically didn't address the one name I put to you,
:22:20. > :22:21.that some regard as most controversial of all.
:22:22. > :22:28.Mr Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
:22:29. > :22:30.You've been around the Middle East diplomacy and peacemaking effort,
:22:31. > :22:33.does it seem to you credible in any way that he should be given
:22:34. > :22:40.I'd say we'll see exactly what his role is and how it fits
:22:41. > :22:47.I don't know Mr Kushner, but I would simply say the idea
:22:48. > :22:49.of trying to re-establish a degree of strategic trust between
:22:50. > :22:52.the United States and Israel is essential and if he could help do
:22:53. > :22:58.Right now you can imagine scenarios the US and Israel could face over
:22:59. > :23:00.the next couple of years; the collapse of Jordan,
:23:01. > :23:02.some problems with Iran, another war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
:23:03. > :23:05.So anyone who could help bring these two governments together,
:23:06. > :23:12.In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process", quite honestly
:23:13. > :23:15.I don't think it much matters who works on it.
:23:16. > :23:16.I think the prospects for advancing that,
:23:17. > :23:27.The parties are so far apart and the essential prerequisites...
:23:28. > :23:29.I've been involved in Northern Ireland,
:23:30. > :23:31.I've been involved in Cyprus, I've been involved in Middle East
:23:32. > :23:34.peacemaking, and you've got to have protagonists that are both willing
:23:35. > :23:38.and able to make serious compromises.
:23:39. > :23:41.I simply don't see that between Israelis and Palestinians right now.
:23:42. > :23:45.So I wouldn't think this is an area that deserves an awful lot of focus.
:23:46. > :23:48.We're out of time, so it's a brief one.
:23:49. > :23:51.On the eve of the Trump Presidency, are you optimistic about the next
:23:52. > :23:56.four years of foreign policy-making, yes or no?
:23:57. > :23:59.In a word, I am worried, given what the inheritance is.
:24:00. > :24:01.I think anyone has got to be worried.
:24:02. > :24:03.Richard Haass, thank you very much indeed for joining me on HARDtalk.
:24:04. > :24:45.Good evening, fairly lively weather over the next few days. A week
:24:46. > :24:50.weather front crossing the UK overnight, not a great deal of rain.
:24:51. > :24:51.Pretty strong winds