:00:00. > :00:22.In every aspect of our public and private life we have become
:00:23. > :00:26.dependent on the power of the Internet and computing. That makes
:00:27. > :00:36.us vulnerable to those who would do us harm. Look at the widespread
:00:37. > :00:42.ransomware WannaCry. It shut down public institutions around the
:00:43. > :00:49.world. My guess is Rob Wainwright head of Europol. Part of the
:00:50. > :01:14.cyber-criminals steps ahead of the cyber cops?
:01:15. > :01:23.Rob Wainwright, welcome to heart talk. For the last few days you have
:01:24. > :01:28.been somewhat preoccupied with WannaCry, this ransomware which has
:01:29. > :01:34.spread across the world. How seriously should we be taking it? It
:01:35. > :01:39.is one of 200 high profile investigations against cyber crime
:01:40. > :01:44.and including that there has been this trend of these growing threat
:01:45. > :01:49.from ransomware we have never seen anything on this scale spreading
:01:50. > :01:56.across 150 countries, over 200,000 victims. It is unique characteristic
:01:57. > :02:04.combining ransomware with a wormlike function. Another very stark warning
:02:05. > :02:10.to many years that is that we have to take cybersecurity seriously. We
:02:11. > :02:17.have been aware of it for 72 hours, your team have been working on it
:02:18. > :02:24.since then. Is it still spreading? We saw over the weekend, it was
:02:25. > :02:28.spreading quite quickly. As we started the working week, new
:02:29. > :02:34.infections in the hands of thousands in parts of Asia and Russia but not
:02:35. > :02:41.in Europe. What that shows is that those responsible for security in
:02:42. > :02:45.companies have heeded our warning and they patched their systems so
:02:46. > :02:51.when the working week begins again they will not all victim to it. It
:02:52. > :02:59.has been a good exercise in public-private partnership to get
:03:00. > :03:05.the message out. EC three, top quality computer experts on the
:03:06. > :03:10.case, where is it from? We do not know yet. A lot of the focus of the
:03:11. > :03:14.attention by national agencies across the world has been really
:03:15. > :03:20.about disaster recovery. We are starting to peace together some
:03:21. > :03:26.samples and we are hoping many authorities around the world now
:03:27. > :03:30.will look at what this looks like. I will talk to you a lot about
:03:31. > :03:36.co-ordination and intelligence sharing across Europe but how about
:03:37. > :03:42.globally? Oettl into America, China, the Russians? In the global
:03:43. > :03:49.co-ordination is absolutely needed. Our focus is on protecting the
:03:50. > :03:54.European space. To do that we have the huge trans- Atlantic engagement.
:03:55. > :04:01.The Americans, the FBI are with us on fighting cyber-terrorism... I
:04:02. > :04:06.wanted to ask you about the Russians because Russia is a cyber threat but
:04:07. > :04:11.on this occasion it is fair to say that it was not originated in
:04:12. > :04:16.Russia. Are you working closely with the Russians? We do not know where
:04:17. > :04:22.it originated and we are not working closely with China or rush at...
:04:23. > :04:30.Because you do not trust them? -- Russia. A relationship is different.
:04:31. > :04:36.Interpol are helping to do that but it is true, this is the landscape we
:04:37. > :04:42.are working in. There is no single view on how to deal with cyber
:04:43. > :04:47.crime. Vladimir Putin has gone on the record saying he believes this
:04:48. > :04:51.is something that originated in the United States and pointed the finger
:04:52. > :04:59.at the US government. We know that Microsoft and we know that this
:05:00. > :05:08.ransomware attacks Microsoft windows. Microsoft says that as far
:05:09. > :05:11.as they are concerned, this ransomware was developed by the
:05:12. > :05:15.National Security Agency in the US and they were then hacked by the
:05:16. > :05:22.people who propagated this is ransomware. Can you confirm that is
:05:23. > :05:27.what happened? No, I have no Independent evidence of that. I have
:05:28. > :05:32.seen what Microsoft had said and what Vladimir Putin has said. We
:05:33. > :05:36.have no confirmation. It is a massive exploitation of the flaw
:05:37. > :05:40.within the Microsoft operating system by a criminal group stop who
:05:41. > :05:47.developed that flow? That is my question as well. You have just told
:05:48. > :05:53.me what close ties you have with US sister agencies say he would know if
:05:54. > :05:58.the NSA was indeed responsible for storing knowledge about the
:05:59. > :06:04.vulnerabilities in some Windows Microsoft operating systems. We are
:06:05. > :06:10.still working to get to the bottom of this. Cannot answer that question
:06:11. > :06:15.today. If I to say someone like that better know my facts were not a year
:06:16. > :06:23.telling me you cannot tell me all you generally do not know... We have
:06:24. > :06:27.had 4080 hours during which our focus has been stopping the
:06:28. > :06:34.spreading of this. The investigation is a high priority but it will take
:06:35. > :06:41.some time. A different point, the chief officer at Microsoft said
:06:42. > :06:44.State Security agencies spent a lot of time actually working out the
:06:45. > :06:49.vulnerabilities of all operating systems but they do not tell us what
:06:50. > :06:55.they discover and they do not tell us what knowledge say is boring
:06:56. > :07:00.about vulnerabilities in our systems and it is about time to come clean
:07:01. > :07:05.about these. Has he got a point? To be honest, and I am sorry to dodge
:07:06. > :07:09.the question, but you should be asking the security agencies. They
:07:10. > :07:19.have a job to protect our security. My job is to help police agencies
:07:20. > :07:26.about criminals. State sponsored actors can be criminals. There is a
:07:27. > :07:34.blurring of the lines, absolutely, but our primary focus of about those
:07:35. > :07:39.who are in it for commercial gain. Let's move on, if that is the limit
:07:40. > :07:42.you can tell me right now to your investigation into the ransomware we
:07:43. > :07:49.have seen spread around the world. Looking wider at cyber crime, there
:07:50. > :07:53.are people around the world who look at the scale of it at the moment and
:07:54. > :08:02.its origins and they point the finger at the Dikili at Russia. --
:08:03. > :08:08.particularly. At Europol be prepared to echo what has been set in the US,
:08:09. > :08:13.the National Father Security Centre in the UK, both saying Russia is
:08:14. > :08:21.responsible for a huge surge in cyber crime at liberty? We see
:08:22. > :08:24.criminals originating for several countries in the world but we do see
:08:25. > :08:31.a large proportion coming from Russian speaking places. Not just
:08:32. > :08:36.Russia. There are a number of regions of concern for art. The
:08:37. > :08:43.Russian speaking world is one of them. We are speaking where we can
:08:44. > :08:49.with police agencies around the world. You make a difference between
:08:50. > :08:55.state-sponsored cyber attacks and criminal cyber attacks but a
:08:56. > :09:00.comeback to this point you can often described state-sponsored activity
:09:01. > :09:05.is criminal. Case in point, the allegations of Limerick and may
:09:06. > :09:14.about Russians cyber meddling in their elections. -- the Americans
:09:15. > :09:19.made. The Germans are now saying they are braced for Russian activity
:09:20. > :09:26.in their election as well. Is this something that you are looking at?
:09:27. > :09:35.No, it is not. I made it clear I working against criminal actors. In
:09:36. > :09:38.this case it is state sponsored activity against the National
:09:39. > :09:43.security of those countries and be security agencies in those countries
:09:44. > :09:50.will lead those investigations. I am concerned about the million-dollar
:09:51. > :09:57.ransom crime. The multibillion-dollar hacking attempts
:09:58. > :10:03.on the global banking system is by sophisticated cyber crime groups
:10:04. > :10:13.developing banking Trojans and other aspects in which Internet technology
:10:14. > :10:18.has transformed the criminal world. Tell me whether you think important
:10:19. > :10:24.institutions, both private and public, whether they have made
:10:25. > :10:31.anything like the right sort of protective measures and actions to
:10:32. > :10:35.safeguard themselves from what you describe the surge of cyber
:10:36. > :10:40.criminality? For the banking that which has been in the firing line of
:10:41. > :10:44.most cyber attacks in recent years, they have learnt through painful
:10:45. > :10:49.lessons of that they should take this as a top level responsibility
:10:50. > :10:53.and they have committed to the right kind of investment and strategic
:10:54. > :10:57.framework and they are still in the firing line and still getting caught
:10:58. > :11:00.by their protection is much higher and that is why you saw on the
:11:01. > :11:06.weekend that very few banks in Europe were caught up cause their
:11:07. > :11:12.defences were quite high. In other sectors, public services, the health
:11:13. > :11:19.sector, there is a lesson. Many years still using Windows XP which
:11:20. > :11:23.is very old. We paid this picture of cyber-criminals being these
:11:24. > :11:27.futuristic geeks that can hit us anywhere and any time. They prey on
:11:28. > :11:32.the fact that we have vulnerabilities that we do not fix,
:11:33. > :11:39.that we make stupid mistakes, that we recycle old cyber tools and they
:11:40. > :11:47.catch us out. They are getting the ASICS right. How is your digital
:11:48. > :11:53.hygiene at Europol? I think it is a strong. You had to think about that
:11:54. > :12:05.and that is slightly alarming. You are an agency that is trying to
:12:06. > :12:11.achieve trust. I am wondering whether your hygiene in this field
:12:12. > :12:16.of data collection storage is as good as it could be. I think it is.
:12:17. > :12:21.I pause because I will be honest, there is no organisation that can
:12:22. > :12:27.get the threat down to zero because of the nature of the cyber-criminal
:12:28. > :12:30.activity depends on technological advances, a Kishore staff members
:12:31. > :12:39.are suitably aware of the threat and so on. For the moment we have no
:12:40. > :12:43.concerns. We take this practice readings from the UK and other
:12:44. > :12:51.governments. But I am not going to say we're absolutely safe. D using
:12:52. > :12:54.government cut corners because they cannot or will not afford the
:12:55. > :13:00.investment to upgrade their cyber defence. I do not think in the end
:13:01. > :13:06.it is about money but responsibility. It does not take a
:13:07. > :13:14.lot of money to take systems of XP. The patch older systems. It takes a
:13:15. > :13:18.recognition that this is a responsibility to put in place a
:13:19. > :13:24.security framework, to reach out to law enforcement and so on. There are
:13:25. > :13:29.institutions that give good advice. Follow that and that is 90%... Many
:13:30. > :13:36.public institutions in the UK have not in following that, why it do you
:13:37. > :13:40.think it is? It is frustrating, frankly, because in the health
:13:41. > :13:46.sector there have been multiple ransomware attack in the United
:13:47. > :13:50.States and Europe long before WannaCry came along. There are
:13:51. > :13:55.complexities to the IT systems in the health sector which I understand
:13:56. > :14:02.and are difficult to work around but in the end, this is really about
:14:03. > :14:06.taking responsibility and sorting this out in the way most global
:14:07. > :14:11.banks have been doing in many respects.
:14:12. > :14:19.To you think Europol is capable of keeping up with the abolition of
:14:20. > :14:23.more criminal activity on the Internet? If a challenge every day
:14:24. > :14:28.because we see the way in which the Internet helps to conceal the
:14:29. > :14:31.identity and communication of the offenders, particularly on the dark
:14:32. > :14:36.net. With see this wonderful technological advances coming out
:14:37. > :14:40.which is fabulous for society, we all know that. But of course, being
:14:41. > :14:45.exploited by ever more enterprising criminals and to a certain extent,
:14:46. > :14:53.terrorists. We are in this difficult challenge, I have to say. But that
:14:54. > :14:56.is why yielding... Is the gap between what you can do
:14:57. > :15:00.realistically to police the Internet and you just talked about the
:15:01. > :15:06.Duckworth and I would like to talk about that some more -- dark Web.
:15:07. > :15:11.The gap between what you can do and what the bad guys can do, is it
:15:12. > :15:14.getting wider? The river gap because we are working within legal
:15:15. > :15:22.constraints, of course we are, and they not. -- there is gap. We have
:15:23. > :15:26.the combined resources of some of the best investigators around the
:15:27. > :15:30.world and not to mention some of the wonderful partnerships we have with
:15:31. > :15:33.the private sector. If we can get that right and exercise that kind of
:15:34. > :15:36.interconnection between these different communities, we have a lot
:15:37. > :15:41.of power and we are beginning to show that. A lot of power but
:15:42. > :15:46.whatever kind of talks you have got, there are places that you can't
:15:47. > :15:51.shine its -- porch. The dark Web, it has become a huge underground
:15:52. > :15:56.criminal environment. You talk about the ways in which people, terrorists
:15:57. > :16:01.or straightforward committals can buy a British passport via the dark
:16:02. > :16:08.Web, untraceable, for 750 British pounds, about 850 US dollars. You
:16:09. > :16:12.can't keep up, that's the problem. Well, we find a particular it
:16:13. > :16:17.difficult to do that, I will be honest with you, particularly on the
:16:18. > :16:23.dark Web. It is transforming the nature of how criminal markets
:16:24. > :16:27.function. It has changed the way in which drugs are bought and sold
:16:28. > :16:33.because it protects the identity of the buyer and seller. We found one
:16:34. > :16:37.major crypto market on the dark Web back in 2015. Today it is 20.
:16:38. > :16:41.Selling hundreds of listings of drugs and other commodity. It is
:16:42. > :16:45.growing and it is very difficult for us to track it. We have had a number
:16:46. > :16:50.of successes, most recently regarding a major sexual
:16:51. > :16:55.exploitation network that was operating on the dark web. We are
:16:56. > :16:59.updating our side that we are in a race with those guys. Is anything
:17:00. > :17:05.you can see collectively to close down this criminalised dark net or
:17:06. > :17:11.dark Web? It's difficult to legislate against the dark net. Not
:17:12. > :17:15.to mention, there is a good part of it that is used for good purposes
:17:16. > :17:22.are round the world. Those people living in some countries that try to
:17:23. > :17:26.exercise freedom of speech for example. It will be difficult to ban
:17:27. > :17:30.the dark Web. What we need to make sure is that the police services and
:17:31. > :17:35.public security have better capability to investigate this. This
:17:36. > :17:39.means, I think, especially, having better partnerships with the tech
:17:40. > :17:42.sector. Are you a fan of governments, and am thinking at
:17:43. > :17:47.about the British government in the wake of the recent terrible
:17:48. > :17:51.Westminster attack, you a fan of governments that say, "As a result
:17:52. > :18:02.of what we learn of the way terrorists operate, using, as they
:18:03. > :18:06.do, encrypted communications", the politicians' response is that we
:18:07. > :18:12.need to make sure the people behind those services give us a state
:18:13. > :18:18.backed door into their system so that when required we can to survey
:18:19. > :18:22.all people, even on these supposedly encrypted systems. You a fan of
:18:23. > :18:30.that? I'm not sure the British government asked for a backdoor but
:18:31. > :18:36.they express some frustration at apps like that do not offer the
:18:37. > :18:42.ability to monitor the communications of potential
:18:43. > :18:46.terrorists. We have a means of communication, we can intercept a
:18:47. > :18:58.telephone call between two people but we cannot interrupted their
:18:59. > :19:04.WhatsApp messages. So you want total surveillance? No, not absolutely. --
:19:05. > :19:07.absolutely not. I want to give police investigators around the
:19:08. > :19:10.world at the right kind of proportionate control and
:19:11. > :19:15.supervision, the right means by which to protect our public from
:19:16. > :19:18.terrorism. That isn't the problem the public don't trust a
:19:19. > :19:25.state-sponsored organisations, people, frankly, such as yourself,
:19:26. > :19:29.to find the right balance. It is too easy for state actors such as
:19:30. > :19:33.yourself to use it what you might portray as a 1-off right to turn it
:19:34. > :19:40.into something which it looks as very much like 20 four sevenths
:19:41. > :19:44.surveillance, electronically, of everybody, all the time. Rola Winnie
:19:45. > :19:50.to avoid that. It is clearly not a proportionate way to manage the
:19:51. > :19:57.balance between privacy and security in a technocratic societies. -- we
:19:58. > :20:01.need to avoid that. There is something needs to be drawn within
:20:02. > :20:05.some parts of society and not in others. It is proportionate which is
:20:06. > :20:08.difficult to do in the Internet because of the technological design.
:20:09. > :20:13.What are your relationships like with the bosses of successful into
:20:14. > :20:19.-- Infotech companies? I'm asking because the head of Twitter said
:20:20. > :20:22.this recently, "Yeah, of course security services in each to keep
:20:23. > :20:28.people say -- safe but these disproportional surveillance they
:20:29. > :20:34.are seeking have no place in a democratic society." He will take
:20:35. > :20:38.that view, I respect that. What I will say is that Twitter is one of
:20:39. > :20:44.those companies we have an excellent partnership with in terms of
:20:45. > :20:51.removing terrorist content online. This is a voluntary code of conduct
:20:52. > :20:55.between us, Twitter, Facebook and many of the other partners, 50 of
:20:56. > :20:59.them in fact, who have helped us more aggressively take away this
:21:00. > :21:03.terrorist content in the online space. I applaud Twitter for doing
:21:04. > :21:08.that. Not every social media company is doing that but most of them are.
:21:09. > :21:12.It is an example of where sometimes, I think, public and private sector
:21:13. > :21:15.partners, even in this space, can come together and find their
:21:16. > :21:22.interests meeting in a way that supports the general public 's'
:21:23. > :21:26.good. I must ask you, something that has happened since we last spoke to
:21:27. > :21:31.each other, and that is Brexit. He used it as the director of Europol,
:21:32. > :21:35.as a Brit. You will be the last British director of Europol, that's
:21:36. > :21:39.quite obvious. You said to me when we spoke more than a year ago,
:21:40. > :21:43.fighting crime and terrorism in the UK will be more costly and much less
:21:44. > :21:58.affective if the country leaves the EU. Are you feeling that today
:21:59. > :22:01.still? I still feel the uncertainty about what will happen, Stephen.
:22:02. > :22:04.What I certainly see in the ransomware events of the last few
:22:05. > :22:08.days, terrorist incidents we have seen, make the point even strongly
:22:09. > :22:10.than what I was making a year ago. Writing crime and terrorism has
:22:11. > :22:13.become an international game. We need the closest possible
:22:14. > :22:16.collaboration in Europe. The extent to which Britain will continue to
:22:17. > :22:19.have access to it is rather dependent upon and depends upon the
:22:20. > :22:23.outcome of the negotiations. That sounds somewhat like to read the May
:22:24. > :22:27.when she presented that Article 50 letter to her colleagues in Europe
:22:28. > :22:31.saying this, "In security terms, a failure to reach an agreement will
:22:32. > :22:36.mean our ability to fight against crime and terror will be weakened."
:22:37. > :22:41.-- Theresa May. Many in Europe thought that was a form of blackmail
:22:42. > :22:44.and you seem to be playing the same game. You're didn't read the letter
:22:45. > :22:50.that way and I'm not sure most of those in Britain and read it that
:22:51. > :22:56.way --. She was steeply stating the reality that co-operation in Europe
:22:57. > :23:03.is growing because of cross-border threats -- she was simply stating.
:23:04. > :23:07.Even if you couldn't get a trade agreement or anything else, why are
:23:08. > :23:11.you conflating and putting the two together? I'm not here to be the
:23:12. > :23:14.Prime Minister's spokesman that the way I read her letter, she was
:23:15. > :23:18.simply setting out her strategic objectives under the Article 50
:23:19. > :23:23.process and she is quite right as putting security is one of those top
:23:24. > :23:27.line objectives as well as trade. Simply stating the fact that this is
:23:28. > :23:31.in the common interest of the UK and the rest of the EU to get the right
:23:32. > :23:35.kind of security deal because of the way in which what it takes these
:23:36. > :23:40.days to fight terrorism. Let me put it bluntly. Who loses out more if
:23:41. > :23:45.Britain cannot do a full-fledged security agreement with the 27
:23:46. > :23:51.remaining members of the EU in the future? Who loses out more, Britain
:23:52. > :23:54.or the EU member states? This is about the collective security
:23:55. > :23:58.interests of Europe and I think both sides understand that and we're go
:23:59. > :24:02.into negotiations with that in mind. We have two went there. Rob
:24:03. > :24:30.Wainwright, thank you for being on HARDtalk. -- we have to end there.
:24:31. > :24:34.Here in the UK, winter and spring have been drier than normal.
:24:35. > :24:38.But could May be the month that bucks the dry trend?