:00:00. > :00:18.Welcome to HARDtalk, I am Stephen Sackur.
:00:19. > :00:21.This summer, Iraqis can perhaps see a glimmer of light amid the darkness
:00:22. > :00:25.that's enveloped their country for so long.
:00:26. > :00:28.The country's second city, Mosul, is no longer in the hands
:00:29. > :00:30.of jihadist fanatics, with the so-called Islamic State
:00:31. > :00:47.But will any semblance of stability and unity follow?
:00:48. > :00:52.My guest today is veteran Vice President Ayad Allawi.
:00:53. > :01:29.Let's begin with the fallout from Iraq's national army victory over
:01:30. > :01:32.so-called Islamic State in Mosul. Your Prime Minister, Mr Abadi,
:01:33. > :01:37.hailed it as a great victory for Iraq. There was a sense of
:01:38. > :01:44.triumphalism in his voice. Are you feeling triumphant today? Not
:01:45. > :01:49.really. Winning a battle or two was not like winning the war. We want to
:01:50. > :01:54.win the war against extremism and against terrorism. In Mosul of
:01:55. > :02:02.course this was a good in achievement but indeed we have not
:02:03. > :02:11.to Lucite of the people of most Oar and what he international community
:02:12. > :02:18.did -- Mosul. And I want them that this is not the end of the story. I
:02:19. > :02:27.want Abadi, I want the President, we need to win the war, and winning the
:02:28. > :02:31.war should be political. By abolishing extremism as a whole from
:02:32. > :02:35.society, and this can only be done by having a political process and by
:02:36. > :02:42.having a quality amongst the people of Iraq. So, so, just to stick with
:02:43. > :02:48.the military situation for a second, I one of the leaders for the Iraqi
:02:49. > :02:56.armed forces in Mosul the other day and he said they would retake Tal
:02:57. > :02:59.Afar, another town under IS control within days and the military ever
:03:00. > :03:05.since they can eradicate the caliphate on Iraqi soil but you seem
:03:06. > :03:11.to be saying it's not as simple as that. I don't think we are going to
:03:12. > :03:16.see the end of ISIS at all. It will be with us for a long time not only
:03:17. > :03:24.in Iraq but it will spread, it is spreading already. It has reached to
:03:25. > :03:29.Thailand and to the Philippines eastwards and definitely to Europe
:03:30. > :03:33.westwards. But in Iraq you are suggesting, what, they won't hold
:03:34. > :03:37.territory so much as conduct an underground insurgency? Holding
:03:38. > :03:46.territories is finished for them. But they will do insurgency, perform
:03:47. > :03:49.insurgencies and embark on insurgencies and resorting to the
:03:50. > :03:55.terrorist activities of explosions and killing associations. That is
:03:56. > :04:01.why we have to win the war rather than battles. One aspect of Iraq's
:04:02. > :04:09.approach to the Mosul conflict and the wider struggle against IS is the
:04:10. > :04:15.allegation among many quarters, not least from the Kurdish leader, that
:04:16. > :04:18.with the focus on the military struggle the Iraqi government has
:04:19. > :04:23.consistently failed to prepare for the post battle political and
:04:24. > :04:30.humanitarian settlement. Absolutely correct. Well, you're part of that
:04:31. > :04:35.government. I have said it. I was the first one to say this. Neither
:04:36. > :04:41.the humanitarian aspect was respected and treated well, nor the
:04:42. > :04:47.fact that looking beyond the military activities, looking into
:04:48. > :04:55.the political horizon of what should happen, this has not happened in two
:04:56. > :04:59.areas, and I told Abdai, by the way. Let's talk basic human rights. I am
:05:00. > :05:07.sure Mr vice president you have seen the shocking videos... Shocking. Of
:05:08. > :05:11.what appear to be Iraqi forces executing men, we don't know who
:05:12. > :05:16.they are, in Mosul after the end of the conflict. We've seen one graphic
:05:17. > :05:22.video of an individual being thrown off a cliff and shot. How can the
:05:23. > :05:29.Iraqi government allow this to happen, given the history of Iraq
:05:30. > :05:33.over the last 15 years? Because this plays into more extremism. Because
:05:34. > :05:37.this has gone out of the hands of the government. This has gone into
:05:38. > :05:46.the militia ares and to the lawless people, and indeed to a government
:05:47. > :05:49.that is unable to control the situation in Mosul. This is one I
:05:50. > :05:57.refer to the collateral damage that has been happening. Let alone what I
:05:58. > :06:01.have witnessed and seen myself, people living, displaced people,
:06:02. > :06:08.living really beneath what animals live in Iraq. The UN has said the
:06:09. > :06:15.humanitarian crisis in and around Loza today is so pressing... It is a
:06:16. > :06:20.ticking bomb, it will explode in our face in future, I assure you. --
:06:21. > :06:25.Mosul. There are thousands without parents, without families coming out
:06:26. > :06:29.of tunnels and rooms in Mosul and no one it seems in your government has
:06:30. > :06:33.a clue what to do with them. There is bitterness now amongst the
:06:34. > :06:37.people. The people are quite bitter, especially the people who are living
:06:38. > :06:41.in tents, who are refusing to go back to Mosul, people who have had
:06:42. > :06:48.their parents to streak in the conflict, and people who are left in
:06:49. > :06:53.the shelters. There is bitterness there and it will only increase with
:06:54. > :06:59.time, and it will be an exploding bomb. This is what nobody looked at.
:07:00. > :07:02.The humanitarian side. I keep reminding myself you are the vice
:07:03. > :07:05.president of the country. You may tell me that is meaningless, that
:07:06. > :07:09.you are a figurehead. Or alternatively what on earth are you
:07:10. > :07:14.doing about it? Because your government needs to be held to
:07:15. > :07:18.account. Of course, I agree. And I have raised this issue in the
:07:19. > :07:22.meetings with the Prime Minister and with the President, of course. And I
:07:23. > :07:29.have been raising this issue in the media, and in the meetings, but
:07:30. > :07:36.nothing is happening. They say the military conflict should take
:07:37. > :07:41.precedence in the conflict. But the humanitarian issue is really very
:07:42. > :07:44.bad. And, indeed, the political horizon of what may happen in future
:07:45. > :07:48.is very bad. We have been talking for a few minutes and on every
:07:49. > :07:53.aspect of what we discuss in Mosul and the security situation around
:07:54. > :07:57.Mosul, you seem to be saying that the government you represent as vice
:07:58. > :08:01.president is incapable of imposing its will and its authority. And is
:08:02. > :08:06.actually stoking the flames of the conflict which, although we have
:08:07. > :08:12.just seen Mosul "Liberated" in your view it is actually going to get
:08:13. > :08:17.worse. Well, they don't want to see the reality, the government, they
:08:18. > :08:21.don't want to see the humanitarian side, although they speak about it.
:08:22. > :08:25.And they don't want to see the political side. But I am getting a
:08:26. > :08:28.feeling that you are pretty powerless in this situation. On the
:08:29. > :08:32.bigger picture, that of the militias and indeed the popular mobilisation
:08:33. > :08:39.forces as well, we know that five of the largest of the popular
:08:40. > :08:43.mobilisation forces, including the Badder brigade for example, they
:08:44. > :08:51.have support, money and direct assistance from Tehran. Now, what
:08:52. > :08:56.should be done about that? -- Badr. Well, that has always been a problem
:08:57. > :08:59.for Iraq. And I want since a long time ago that Iran is moving
:09:00. > :09:05.gradually, systematically to controlling the situation in Iraq.
:09:06. > :09:12.You know, let me exclaimed one thing which is very important. The vice
:09:13. > :09:15.president, the President, the president do not have any executive
:09:16. > :09:23.powers. I am getting that feeling during this interview... It is more
:09:24. > :09:27.or less protocol. Yes. And I joined them because of the reconciliation
:09:28. > :09:39.process, which was undermined. To be blunt about it, you are there as a
:09:40. > :09:47.figleaf. Yes, yes, yes. And they useful figleaf. As long as you sit
:09:48. > :09:51.as vice president you are giving some sort of credibility to a
:09:52. > :09:58.government which you appear to be saying, is in essence right now
:09:59. > :10:02.being run by the Iranians. Not run completely by the Iranians but Iran
:10:03. > :10:08.is making the macro and micro decisions. The macro decisions
:10:09. > :10:12.started in 2010 when we won the elections and the United States
:10:13. > :10:17.sided with the Iranians then. What colour you think the US and Iran
:10:18. > :10:21.ensured that you, even though your coalition actually won the most
:10:22. > :10:26.seats, you didn't take power, and you're saying it was the combination
:10:27. > :10:32.of the United States and Iran... ? Air I made it clear that it would
:10:33. > :10:37.run against Allawi, and the Americans were with this and this
:10:38. > :10:41.was conveyed to us of course by Biden, the vice president of the
:10:42. > :10:46.United States, that we are not ready to accept that, that Iran will
:10:47. > :10:51.intervene in Iraq and we are going to pull out from Iraq, so we will
:10:52. > :10:58.have to toe the rope with Iran. I mean, Prime Minister al Maliki
:10:59. > :11:07.seemed close with Tehran. It always seemed Prime Minister al Abadi was
:11:08. > :11:15.somewhat less beholden to Iran. He is, yes, but he is overpowered. By?
:11:16. > :11:20.Iranian forces. Sylla money, who is sometimes seen on Iraqi territory,
:11:21. > :11:28.he spends a great deal of time surgery Dick Lee planning Iran's
:11:29. > :11:34.role. Tactically. We are talking about the command of the
:11:35. > :11:38.revolutionary forces. He spends more time in Iraq and in Iran. The more
:11:39. > :11:44.you tell me about what is happening in your country today as you see it,
:11:45. > :11:48.the more I am thinking that any talk of Mosul's liberation being a
:11:49. > :11:53.watershed moment, something Iraqis can hold onto as a sign that things
:11:54. > :11:59.are going to and get better, it is wrong. I don't see this happening
:12:00. > :12:04.personally. I called for political resolutions. That will lead to
:12:05. > :12:13.equality in Iraq. I call that they should stop by -- bifercation, which
:12:14. > :12:17.is happening these days. They should really take care of the displaced.
:12:18. > :12:25.They should stop the... I spoke to the leaders of the liberation, by
:12:26. > :12:29.the way, and I told them that the only person eligible is those who
:12:30. > :12:35.joined the army and the police. Iraq should not have two parallel armies,
:12:36. > :12:40.both for the mobilisation and in the ordinary army and police. And I told
:12:41. > :12:45.this to Abadi and I said this to the media. But we don't have executive
:12:46. > :12:49.powers. Even the president doesn't have executive powers. This is
:12:50. > :12:55.contrary to the Constitution, by the way. The Constitution says that the
:12:56. > :13:00.President, the presidency, should oversee the implementation of the
:13:01. > :13:06.Constitution. If you are so concerned about these threats to
:13:07. > :13:11.unity in Iraq, and the preponderance of militias and mobilisation units
:13:12. > :13:17.in the end represent sectarian forces inside your country, why oh
:13:18. > :13:31.why have you in recent weeks decided to throw in your lot politically
:13:32. > :13:38.with Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the firebrand members of the political
:13:39. > :13:43.situation? No, no, I never signed any political deal. But we are
:13:44. > :13:48.trying to explore who is closest to us in terms of the basic issues in
:13:49. > :13:56.Iraq. And so far he is the closest as far as the quality, as far as
:13:57. > :14:01.anti- sectarian, as far as attacking Iran. But forgive me, Muqtada
:14:02. > :14:06.al-Sadr is trusted by no one in the Sunni community and now you appear
:14:07. > :14:10.with your party and your coalition intent on using him to try to win
:14:11. > :14:17.power in the next Iraqi election. It is opportunism... No, no, no. I
:14:18. > :14:21.haven't signed any agreement with him, believe me. I am saying is on
:14:22. > :14:32.TV, open TV. I haven't signed any agreement. We are talking to all
:14:33. > :14:36.parties in Iraq, Sunni, Shia, Baathist, believe me, we want to
:14:37. > :14:41.forge any kind of coalition ultimately. We don't feel now is the
:14:42. > :14:47.time for coalitions and definitely I don't feel that I am ready to force
:14:48. > :14:51.agreements and coalition with any sectarian force at all. I am
:14:52. > :14:58.secular. I am against sectarianism. I am against this and I am not going
:14:59. > :15:04.to move away from this position at all.
:15:05. > :15:15.Let's's talk about the Kurds. The Kurdish regional area. In just a
:15:16. > :15:20.month or so, September 25, we are going to see a referendum organised
:15:21. > :15:28.by the ruler of the Kurdish region. Yes or no to Kurdish independence.
:15:29. > :15:34.It is predicted that the Kurdish people are going to vote yes. What
:15:35. > :15:43.impact will that have on Iraq's chances of staying as a unitary
:15:44. > :15:50.state? It would be dismantled completely. That is why I spoke to
:15:51. > :15:59.some of those in Kurdistan who I am going to see once I get back to
:16:00. > :16:07.Iraq. I think the referendum is pretty much sure. The dismemberment
:16:08. > :16:12.of Iraq would makes the Kurds the losers in this case. Do you believe
:16:13. > :16:17.that this referendum could hasten a future conflict between the Baghdad
:16:18. > :16:26.government... Yes, it will, I am sure. Even the regional governments
:16:27. > :16:35.and the Kurds. You mean war? Well, conflict... Taking it step-by-step.
:16:36. > :16:46.There will be complex. I don't think any of the regions will acknowledge
:16:47. > :16:53.this. Neither Iran or Turkey... It has been conveyed to me that Iran is
:16:54. > :16:56.putting pressure, this was discussed last week, Iran is putting a lot of
:16:57. > :17:01.pressure on the Kurds, because they don't accept what is happening. The
:17:02. > :17:09.Iranian is, let alone the Kurds... Your message to the Kurds is, be
:17:10. > :17:16.careful what you wish for? Yes, and rationalise even the question. This
:17:17. > :17:22.is very important. One factor in all of these publications...
:17:23. > :17:27.Self-determination is something in the nature of Iraq. Independence
:17:28. > :17:33.from Iraq is something else. Really, the wording of the questions should
:17:34. > :17:37.be very clear. One factor we have... This is what the Iraqi government
:17:38. > :17:44.should focus on when they talk to Mosul. The referendum has to take
:17:45. > :17:49.place. They cannot run away from this. But there is another way of
:17:50. > :17:57.rationalising the issue of the referendum in the questioning. The
:17:58. > :18:03.statement that should come out on this issue of the referendum, if
:18:04. > :18:08.they continue this is to separate Iraq and Kurdistan, this is going to
:18:09. > :18:15.be very bad for everybody in the region, not only Iraq. This is the
:18:16. > :18:23.promises that have been laid down, I am not blaming anybody but powers
:18:24. > :18:29.including the United States have a hand in this, when they occupied
:18:30. > :18:33.Iraq... They dismantled the whole country. I was going to ask you
:18:34. > :18:38.about the United States. One factor we have not discussed is the role of
:18:39. > :18:45.the United States. President Trump, for the last six months in power in
:18:46. > :18:50.Washington... Do you believe the Americans are actually understanding
:18:51. > :18:54.just how dangerous the situation in Iraq is? I don't think they are
:18:55. > :19:00.understanding, I don't think they want to understand. I think even be
:19:01. > :19:04.a conflict on Isis, they were only thinking on the functionality side
:19:05. > :19:14.of things. They wouldn't even look at how to prepare for post- Isis,
:19:15. > :19:18.what to do in Mosul and elsewhere. America have a very distinct
:19:19. > :19:25.imagination for the greater Middle East area. Donald Trump has made it
:19:26. > :19:27.plain that as far as he is concerned, his primary focus and
:19:28. > :19:33.responsibility is to destroy so-called Islamic State and protect
:19:34. > :19:39.America from terrorism in Iraq, in Syria, and that is, beyond all else,
:19:40. > :19:45.his objective. Fine, we don't dispute this. On the other hand, he
:19:46. > :19:55.should take into account care of what is legal and political, as well
:19:56. > :19:59.as... Taking care of Iraq and the future of Iraq, because after all,
:20:00. > :20:07.they hold legal responsibility when they dismantle the country. Iraq
:20:08. > :20:12.wanted US forces out, Obama withdrew all forces in 2011. Do you think
:20:13. > :20:20.American forces me to come back? No, no, I am not suggesting this. I am
:20:21. > :20:24.suggesting that the United States should have clear policies and they
:20:25. > :20:30.need to advise the Iraqi government because they have a moral obligation
:20:31. > :20:36.to do so -- need. They have a legal obligation to do so. They are
:20:37. > :20:39.defending the United States in the world from Islamic State, but Iraq
:20:40. > :20:44.is the theatre for this conflict. They need to be more careful and
:20:45. > :20:50.work more clearly with the moral as well as the other obligations.
:20:51. > :20:56.Talking about the moral obligations, have you met Donald Trump? Not yet.
:20:57. > :20:59.You said not long ago, there is a vacuum in the overall leadership in
:21:00. > :21:04.the world. Really pointing a finger at the Americans. Gas. You said the
:21:05. > :21:12.Americans need to get back to their role as the international power.
:21:13. > :21:18.Yes. I agree with this statement -- Yes. Not using the military. But to
:21:19. > :21:24.exercise their political role as well as the military role. There is
:21:25. > :21:31.a vacuum in the leadership. In world leadership. There is nothing. In the
:21:32. > :21:38.end, you can't blame anybody else for the state of Iraq today. You and
:21:39. > :21:44.your generation... I just want to develop the sport. We have spoken
:21:45. > :21:52.several times and it seems your generation of Iraq, the post- Saddam
:21:53. > :21:58.generation of Iraqi leaders, have failed to deliver stability, in
:21:59. > :22:03.unity and the most basic security to the people of your country. I agree,
:22:04. > :22:07.and this is not because of the fault of politicians only. It is the
:22:08. > :22:11.dismantlement of the state, the institutions of the state of Iraq
:22:12. > :22:18.that had to do with occupation. We are paying the price now. Not only
:22:19. > :22:23.was Saddam overthrown, but the state of Iraq was overthrown. The army,
:22:24. > :22:33.the security, the intelligence. The judiciary. The process of
:22:34. > :22:40.political... Politicising the dismantling. There was a vacuum in
:22:41. > :22:45.Iraq. We first spoke many years ago, and I wonder if we speak again in
:22:46. > :22:49.ten years, you actually believe Iraq as we know it today will exist. We
:22:50. > :22:54.have talked about your belief that Islamic State is not eradicated and
:22:55. > :22:58.that the struggle will continue, and the Terror and the violence. We have
:22:59. > :23:01.talked about the Kurds and your belief that there could be a
:23:02. > :23:07.conflict looming with the Kurdish in the north of your country. Yes. Iraq
:23:08. > :23:12.doesn't seem to have a viable future? For now, there is that
:23:13. > :23:18.sense. But it is something that is changing in Iraq. The movement of
:23:19. > :23:27.the people, talking to the clerics of the Shia and Sunni, they are
:23:28. > :23:31.calling for a civic state, for dismantling sectarianism and moving
:23:32. > :23:36.towards an equal citizenship. That is talk, and the reality on the
:23:37. > :23:44.ground is that the sectarian militia, popular mobilisation
:23:45. > :23:48.forces, these sad... The clerics are aware, this was due to be
:23:49. > :23:56.mobilisation of people, millions went to the streets. -- these are.
:23:57. > :24:00.This is change. This is very clear change. The government are starting
:24:01. > :24:07.to impose these popular organisations. Other issues are not
:24:08. > :24:11.being taken into account. But the mood of the populace has changed in
:24:12. > :24:18.Iraq. This is what you should encourage. Ayad Allawi, we have to
:24:19. > :24:34.end there, but thank you very much. Thank you.