Live Chilcot Report Statement

:00:00. > :00:00.and it is now free of Ebola to talk I will look specifically into the

:00:00. > :00:00.issue of the bonus. I wasn't aware of that and I will get back to her

:00:00. > :00:23.about it. This is a difficult day for all the

:00:24. > :00:26.families who lost loved ones. Our thoughts today must be with them. In

:00:27. > :00:30.their grief and anger I hope they their grief and anger I hope they

:00:31. > :00:34.can draw some solace from the depths and rigour of this report and some

:00:35. > :00:40.comfort from knowing that we'll never forget the incredible service

:00:41. > :00:44.and sacrifice of their sons, daughters, husbands and wives will

:00:45. > :00:49.stop 179 British servicemen and women and 23 British civilians who

:00:50. > :00:52.did everything for our country. We must never forget the thousands more

:00:53. > :00:55.have suffered late changing injuries and we must pledge today to look

:00:56. > :01:01.after them for the rest of their lives. This report would have been

:01:02. > :01:06.produced sooner if it had begun when those on this side of the House and

:01:07. > :01:13.others first call for it back in 2006, but I'm sure the House will

:01:14. > :01:16.join me in thanking Sir John and his councillors including Martin Gilbert

:01:17. > :01:20.who sadly passed away during their work on the report. This has been a

:01:21. > :01:24.fully independent inquiry. Government ministers didn't see it

:01:25. > :01:26.until yesterday morning. The Cabinet secretary led a process that gave

:01:27. > :01:34.Sir John full access to Government papers, meaning an unprecedented

:01:35. > :01:39.public declassification of papers, Cabinet minutes, records of meetings

:01:40. > :01:46.and conversations picked Dell might between the UK Prime Minister and US

:01:47. > :01:54.President and letters. The inquiry also took evidence from more than

:01:55. > :01:58.150 witnesses and its report runs to 13 volumes, costing over ?10 million

:01:59. > :02:03.want the chance to study and debate want the chance to study and debate

:02:04. > :02:07.it in depth and I am making provision for next week. Then add a

:02:08. > :02:17.number of key questions that are rightly asked about Iraq -- there

:02:18. > :02:19.are. Was legal advice and considerations taken properly? Was

:02:20. > :02:22.the operation properly planned? Were the operation properly planned? Were

:02:23. > :02:27.we prepared for the aftermath of the initial conflict and did our forces

:02:28. > :02:31.have adequate funding and equipment? I will try and summarise the key

:02:32. > :02:34.findings on these questions before turning to the lessons I believe

:02:35. > :02:38.should be learned. A number of reasons were put forward for going

:02:39. > :02:43.to war in Iraq including the danger that Saddam Hussein posed to his

:02:44. > :02:48.people and the need to uphold United Nations resolutions. As everyone in

:02:49. > :02:54.the social remember, central to the Government's case, was the issue of

:02:55. > :02:57.weapons of mass destruction. Sir John finds there was a ingrained

:02:58. > :03:03.belief held in the UK and US Government that Saddam Hussein

:03:04. > :03:06.possessed chemical and biological capabilities and she wanted to

:03:07. > :03:10.develop them and was pursuing an active policy of deceit and

:03:11. > :03:13.concealment. They were good reasons for this belief. Saddam Hussein had

:03:14. > :03:20.built up chemical weapons in the past and had used them against

:03:21. > :03:27.Kurdish volumes and there really -- the Iranian military. The advice

:03:28. > :03:31.given to the Government by the intelligence and policy community

:03:32. > :03:36.was that Saddam Hussein seeks to develop these capabilities. As we

:03:37. > :03:41.now know, by 2003, this long-held belief or longer reflected the

:03:42. > :03:47.reality. Sir John says at no stage was the proposition that Iraq might

:03:48. > :03:51.no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes

:03:52. > :03:54.identified and examined by the joint intelligence committee or the policy

:03:55. > :03:58.community and as the report notes, the late Robin Cook had shown it was

:03:59. > :04:03.possible to come to a different conclusion from an examination of

:04:04. > :04:09.the same intelligence. In the wake of 911, Americans were concerned

:04:10. > :04:13.about the risk of weapons of mass destruction finding their way into

:04:14. > :04:17.the hands of terrorists. Sir John finds that well it was reasonable to

:04:18. > :04:23.be concerned about the fusion of planet Government proliferation and

:04:24. > :04:28.terrorism, there was no basis to suggest that Iraq itself represented

:04:29. > :04:31.such a threat. On the question of intelligence, Sir John finds no

:04:32. > :04:32.evidence that intelligence was improperly included or that number

:04:33. > :04:40.ten or probably influenced the text ten or probably influenced the text

:04:41. > :04:46.of the September 2002 dossier. But he finds that the material from the

:04:47. > :04:56.joint intelligence committee did not make clear enough the limit or

:04:57. > :05:01.intelligence did not make clear, it did not see that Saddam Hussein had

:05:02. > :05:03.continued to make biological or nuclear weapons and the joint

:05:04. > :05:06.intelligence committee, he says, intelligence committee, he says,

:05:07. > :05:11.should have made that clear to Mr Blair. He finds that public

:05:12. > :05:12.statements from the Government conveyed more certainty than the

:05:13. > :05:20.joint assessments. There was a lack joint assessments. There was a lack

:05:21. > :05:25.of clarity between what the committee assessed and what Tony

:05:26. > :05:29.Blair believed. In the 2002 dossier, he finds, I quote, a distinction

:05:30. > :05:35.between Mr Blair's belief and the actual judgments. Sir John does not

:05:36. > :05:39.question Mr Blair's belief nor his legitimate role in advocating

:05:40. > :05:43.to the question of legality, the to the question of legality, the

:05:44. > :05:45.inquiry has, and I quote, not expressed a view as to whether or

:05:46. > :05:50.not the UK's participation in the not the UK's participation in the

:05:51. > :05:56.war was legal. It does put the legal advice that the Attorney General

:05:57. > :06:01.gave the time, that there was a legal basis for action. Sir John is

:06:02. > :06:06.highly critical of the processes by which the legal advice was arrived

:06:07. > :06:09.and discussed and I quote, the circumstances in which it was

:06:10. > :06:19.ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for duty participation

:06:20. > :06:23.were far from satisfactory. He also finds that the diplomatic options

:06:24. > :06:27.had not at that stage been exhausted and that military action was

:06:28. > :06:31.therefore not a last resort. Sir John says that when the second

:06:32. > :06:34.resolution at the UN became unachievable, the UK should have

:06:35. > :06:35.done more to exhaust all diplomatic options including allowing

:06:36. > :06:43.inspectors longer to complete the inspectors longer to complete the

:06:44. > :06:46.job. Turning to the decision-making, the report documents the process

:06:47. > :06:49.followed. There was a Cabinet followed. There was a Cabinet

:06:50. > :06:52.discussion before the decision to go to war and a number of ministers

:06:53. > :06:56.including the foreign and defence secretaries were involved in the

:06:57. > :07:00.decision-making. The report makes specific citizens of the process of

:07:01. > :07:03.decision-making, in particular when akin to the options for military

:07:04. > :07:07.action, it was clear these were never discussed properly by a

:07:08. > :07:10.Cabinet committee or Cabinet. Arrangements were often informal and

:07:11. > :07:16.sporadic and frequently involve small groups of ministers and

:07:17. > :07:19.advisers, sometimes without formal record, and Sir John finds that a

:07:20. > :07:24.crucial points Tony Blair said personal notes and commitments to Mr

:07:25. > :07:27.Bush that had not been discussed with Cabinet colleagues. However,

:07:28. > :07:31.well Sir John makes many criticisms of process including the way

:07:32. > :07:34.information was handled and presented, at no stage did he

:07:35. > :07:38.explicitly say that there was a deliberate attempt to mislead

:07:39. > :07:43.people. Turning to operational planning, the initial invasion

:07:44. > :07:47.proceeded rapidly and we should be proud of what our armed forces

:07:48. > :07:50.managed to achieve quickly. This was despite the fact the military didn't

:07:51. > :07:54.have time to plan properly for an invasion from the south because they

:07:55. > :08:00.had been focused on the north until the late decision from the Turkish

:08:01. > :08:05.Government to refuse permission. There were also issues of equipment.

:08:06. > :08:07.But the bigger question was in the planning for what might happen after

:08:08. > :08:15.the initial operation and we mention this briefly. Sir John finds that

:08:16. > :08:23.when the invasion began, the UK Government was not any satisfactory

:08:24. > :08:31.position to find that satisfactory plans have been drawn up -- had

:08:32. > :08:38.been. He calls it a clear ministerial oversight of

:08:39. > :08:41.post-conflict strategy, effective collaboration between Government

:08:42. > :08:45.departments and fails to manage this adequately. Officials in the

:08:46. > :08:51.military remained to fixed on assumptions that the Americans had a

:08:52. > :08:56.plan, that the US would share it with the international community and

:08:57. > :09:02.that the UK role would be over three to four months after the conflict.

:09:03. > :09:07.Sir John says failure to prepare for the aftermath reduced the likelihood

:09:08. > :09:15.of achieving the UK's strategic objectives in Iraq and Sir John

:09:16. > :09:21.believes they did not require the benefit of hindsight. Turning to

:09:22. > :09:30.equipment and troops, Sir John is clear that objectives were not

:09:31. > :09:33.matched to resources. The failure to meet the needs of UK forces and

:09:34. > :09:40.provide powerful vehicles should not have been tolerated and he says the

:09:41. > :09:45.MOD was so slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq from

:09:46. > :09:48.exploding devices. The inquiry also identified a number of moments when

:09:49. > :09:51.it would have been possible to conduct a substantial reappraisal of

:09:52. > :09:56.our approach to the whole situation in Iraq and the level of resources

:09:57. > :09:59.required. Despite a series of warnings from commanders in the

:10:00. > :10:04.field, he finds that no such reappraisal took place. During the

:10:05. > :10:09.first four years, there was no clear statement of policy setting out the

:10:10. > :10:13.acceptable level of risk to UK forces and who was responsible for

:10:14. > :10:16.managing that risk. Sir John also finds that the Government, in

:10:17. > :10:22.particular the military, were too focused on withdrawing from Iraq and

:10:23. > :10:27.planning for an Afghanistan deployment in 2006 and that's true

:10:28. > :10:29.effort away. Each includes that although Tony Blair persuaded

:10:30. > :10:33.America and coming back to the United Nations in 2010, he was

:10:34. > :10:41.unsuccessful in changing decisions on other critical matters. That, and

:10:42. > :10:46.an absence of the Security Council in support of military action, at

:10:47. > :10:50.that point the duty was undermining the authority of the Security

:10:51. > :10:52.Council. While it is right for a UK Prime Minister to weigh up the

:10:53. > :10:55.damage to the special relationship that will be done by failing to

:10:56. > :11:01.support the US, Sir John says that it is questionable whether not

:11:02. > :11:11.participating Miller tally on this occasion would have broken the

:11:12. > :11:14.partnership -- militarily. He says that even with more resources, the

:11:15. > :11:18.circumstances are learning the invasion made it difficult to

:11:19. > :11:23.deliver substantial outcomes. Whether territorial integrity of

:11:24. > :11:27.Iraq remained, deep sectarian divisions opened and thousands of

:11:28. > :11:31.Iraqi civilians lost their lives. Well these divisions were not

:11:32. > :11:33.created by the International coalition, Sir John believes they

:11:34. > :11:42.were exacerbated, including through the extent are not addressed by

:11:43. > :11:46.re-conciliation. Sir John finds the policy of Her Majesty's Government

:11:47. > :11:54.got short of meeting its strategic objectives and helped create a space

:11:55. > :11:58.for Al-Qaeda. The decision to go to war came to decision in this House

:11:59. > :12:01.and those who voted for military action will have to take our fair

:12:02. > :12:04.share of responsibility. We cannot turn the clock back but we have to

:12:05. > :12:12.make sure lessons are learned and worked on. I'll cover the issues

:12:13. > :12:15.about machinery of Government, processes, culture and planning in a

:12:16. > :12:18.moment, but let me be the first to say that getting all of these things

:12:19. > :12:24.right doesn't guarantee the success of a military intervention. For

:12:25. > :12:31.example, on Libya, I believe it was right to intervene to stop: Gaddafi

:12:32. > :12:36.killing his people. We did have proper processes and comprehensive

:12:37. > :12:41.advice on key issues and we didn't put forces on the ground. We worked

:12:42. > :12:46.with a transitional Libyan Government but getting these things

:12:47. > :12:49.right doesn't meet the challenges of intermittent in -- intervention any

:12:50. > :12:53.less formidable and the changes are plain to see today. As Prime

:12:54. > :12:54.Minister for the last six years reading this report, I believe there

:12:55. > :12:59.are lessons we need to learn and are lessons we need to learn and

:13:00. > :13:02.keep on learning. First, taking the country to war should always be a

:13:03. > :13:07.last resort and should only be done if all credible alternatives have

:13:08. > :13:10.been exhausted. Second, the machinery of Government does matter.

:13:11. > :13:15.That is why on my first day in office, I established the National

:13:16. > :13:18.Security Council to ensure proper, coordinated decision-making across

:13:19. > :13:22.the whole of Government including those responsible for domestic

:13:23. > :13:26.security. This council is not just a meeting of ministers, it has the

:13:27. > :13:34.right breadth of expertise in the room with defence staff, the heads

:13:35. > :13:41.of military and other officials. I also pointed to the UK's first

:13:42. > :13:46.security adviser with a team in the office to make sure our national

:13:47. > :13:50.security apparatus is joined up. The machinery also taps the experience

:13:51. > :13:53.and knowledge of experts from outside Government. This helps us

:13:54. > :13:55.constantly challenge conventional wisdom within the system and avoid,

:13:56. > :14:02.hopefully, groupthink. It is inconceivable today that we

:14:03. > :14:08.could take a premeditated decision to commit, troops without a full

:14:09. > :14:13.discussion in the National Security Council on the basis of fill papers,

:14:14. > :14:17.legal advice are prepared and stress tested by all relevant departments

:14:18. > :14:21.with decisions formerly minuted. I would argue that the culture of

:14:22. > :14:25.established by Prime Minister is a stop -- matters, too. It is crucial

:14:26. > :14:30.that the Prime Minister establishes a climate in which it is safe for

:14:31. > :14:33.experts and officials to challenge policy and question the views on

:14:34. > :14:36.ministers and the Prime Minister without fear or favour. There is no

:14:37. > :14:42.question today that everyone sat around the NSC table is free to

:14:43. > :14:46.speak their mind. Fourth, if we are to take the difficult decisions to

:14:47. > :14:50.intervene in other countries, proper planning for what follows is a

:14:51. > :14:53.vital. We know that the task of rebuilding effective governance is

:14:54. > :14:57.enormous and that is why we created the conflict stability and

:14:58. > :15:01.stabilisation fund and beef up the cross government stabilisation unit

:15:02. > :15:04.so experts are able to deploy in post-conflict situations anywhere in

:15:05. > :15:08.the world at short notice. None of this would be possible without the

:15:09. > :15:16.historic decision we have taken to commit 0.7% of GD be on overseas

:15:17. > :15:18.aid. -- gross national income. That's not only assists with

:15:19. > :15:24.post-conflict planning but also in trying to prevent conflicts in the

:15:25. > :15:29.first place. This we must ensure our Armed Forces are always properly

:15:30. > :15:31.equipped. That is why we can be a regular strategic defence and

:15:32. > :15:35.Security review to insure the resources we have meet the ambitions

:15:36. > :15:40.of the National Security strategy. When meeting our mutual commitments

:15:41. > :15:45.dispensed 2% of our GDP on defence and planning to invest at least ?170

:15:46. > :15:49.billion on new military equipment over the next decade. We haven't

:15:50. > :15:52.trained the Armed Forces covered in law to ensure our Armed Forces and

:15:53. > :15:56.their families receive the treatment and respect they deserve. Sending

:15:57. > :16:00.our brave troops onto the battlefield without the right

:16:01. > :16:03.equipment was unacceptable and whatever else we learned from this

:16:04. > :16:07.conflict we must all pledge this will never happen again. There will

:16:08. > :16:09.be further lessons to learn from studying this report and the

:16:10. > :16:15.committee today that this is exactly what we will do. This report on my

:16:16. > :16:20.own experience, there are also some lessons here that I do not think we

:16:21. > :16:25.should draw. First it would be wrong to conclude that we should not stand

:16:26. > :16:28.with their American allies when our common security interests are

:16:29. > :16:32.threatened. We must never be afraid to speak frankly and honestly as

:16:33. > :16:34.best friends always should find where we commit our troops together

:16:35. > :16:38.there should be a structure through which our views can be properly

:16:39. > :16:42.conveyed as differences worked through. It remains the case that

:16:43. > :16:45.Britain and America share the same fundamental values and Britain has

:16:46. > :16:49.no greater friend or ally in the world than America and that our

:16:50. > :16:54.partnership remains as important for our security and prosperity as it

:16:55. > :16:57.has ever been. Second, it would be wrong to conclude that we cannot

:16:58. > :17:00.rely on the judgment of our brilliant and hard-working

:17:01. > :17:05.intelligence agencies. We know the debt we want them in helping to keep

:17:06. > :17:08.us safe everyday of the year since November 2014 they have enabled us

:17:09. > :17:12.to foil seven different planned terrorist attacks on the streets of

:17:13. > :17:17.the United Kingdom. What this report shows is that there needs to be a

:17:18. > :17:19.proper separation between the process of assessing intelligence

:17:20. > :17:25.and the policy-making that flows from it. As a result of the reform

:17:26. > :17:28.since the Butler report that is what they have in place. Third it would

:17:29. > :17:31.be completely wrong to conclude that our military are not capable of

:17:32. > :17:35.intervening successfully around the world. Many of the failures in this

:17:36. > :17:40.report were not directly about the conduct of Armed Forces in Iraq but

:17:41. > :17:43.rather the failures of planning before a shot was fired. There's no

:17:44. > :17:47.question that Britain's Armed Forces remain the envy of the world and the

:17:48. > :17:52.decisions we have taken to ensure the properly resourced will stay

:17:53. > :17:56.that way. Finally we should not conclude that intervention is always

:17:57. > :17:59.wrong. There are unquestionably times were it is right to intervene

:18:00. > :18:04.as this country did successfully in Sierra Leone and Kosovo. I'm sure

:18:05. > :18:07.that many in this house would agree that the urban times in the recent

:18:08. > :18:13.past and we should have intervened but didn't, like in failing to

:18:14. > :18:19.prevent the genocide in Rwanda and fragrance. Intervention is hard.

:18:20. > :18:22.Fighting is not always the most difficult part. Often the state

:18:23. > :18:26.building that follows is a much more complex challenge. Should not be so

:18:27. > :18:28.naive as to think that because we have the best prepared plans in the

:18:29. > :18:32.real world that things cannot go wrong. Equally because intervention

:18:33. > :18:37.is difficult to does not mean that there are not times when it is right

:18:38. > :18:39.and necessary. Britain has and will continue to learn the lessons of

:18:40. > :18:46.this report, but as without intervention against Daesh in Iraq

:18:47. > :18:49.and Syria, Britain must not and will not shrink from its role in the

:18:50. > :18:54.world stage or feel to protect its people and I commend this statement

:18:55. > :19:01.to the house. Thank you. Before addressing the

:19:02. > :19:05.issues raised in the Iraq enquiry report I would like to remember and

:19:06. > :19:09.or at the 179 British servicemen and women who were killed and the

:19:10. > :19:14.thousands maimed and injured during the Iraq war and their families. As

:19:15. > :19:19.well as the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died as a result of the

:19:20. > :19:24.invasion and occupation launched by the US and British governments 13

:19:25. > :19:28.years ago. Yesterday I had a private meeting with some of the families of

:19:29. > :19:31.the British dead, as I have continued to do over the past

:19:32. > :19:36.several years. It is always a humbling experience to witness the

:19:37. > :19:40.resolve and resilience of those families and the unwavering

:19:41. > :19:45.commitment to seek truth and justice, for those that are lost in

:19:46. > :19:50.Iraq. They have waited seven years for this report. It was right that

:19:51. > :19:55.the enquiry have evidence from such a wide range of people. And that the

:19:56. > :20:02.origins, conduct and aftermath of the war should have been examined in

:20:03. > :20:05.such detail. But the extraordinary length of time it has taken to see

:20:06. > :20:12.the light of day is frankly clearly a matter for regret. I should add

:20:13. > :20:17.that the scale of the report runs to 6275 pages, to which I was only

:20:18. > :20:21.given access at eight o'clock this morning. It means that today's

:20:22. > :20:28.response by all of us can only be a provisional one. The decision to

:20:29. > :20:32.invade and occupy Iraq in March 2003 was the most significant foreign

:20:33. > :20:38.policy decision taken by a British government in modern times. It's

:20:39. > :20:41.divided this house and said the government of the day against the

:20:42. > :20:47.majority of the British people. As well as against the weight of global

:20:48. > :20:51.opinion. The war was not in any way as Sir John Chilcott says, a last

:20:52. > :20:56.resort. Frankly it was an act of military aggression launched under

:20:57. > :21:01.friends -- false pretext as the enquiry accepts and has long been

:21:02. > :21:04.regarded as illegal by the overwhelming weight of international

:21:05. > :21:08.legal opinion. It led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people

:21:09. > :21:17.and the displacement of millions of refugees. It devastated Iraq's

:21:18. > :21:21.infrastructure and society. The occupation fostered a lethal

:21:22. > :21:26.sectarianism as the report indicates, that turned into a civil

:21:27. > :21:28.War. Instead of protecting security at home or abroad the war fuelled

:21:29. > :21:38.and spread terrorism across the region. From Sunday's suicide bomb

:21:39. > :21:42.in Baghdad which killed 250 people, the deadliest so far was carried out

:21:43. > :21:47.by a group whose origins lie in the aftermath of the invasion. By any

:21:48. > :21:51.measure, the invasion and occupation of Iraq has been for many a

:21:52. > :21:57.catastrophe. Mr Speaker, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 on

:21:58. > :22:00.the basis of what the Chilcot report called and I quote flight

:22:01. > :22:06.intelligence about the weapons of mass destruction has had a

:22:07. > :22:10.far-reaching impact on us all. It has led to a fundamental breakdown

:22:11. > :22:16.in trust in politics, and if our institutions of government. The

:22:17. > :22:20.tragedy is that while the governing class got it so horrifically wrong,

:22:21. > :22:29.many of our people actually got it right. Many on February 15 2003, won

:22:30. > :22:34.a half-million spanning the entire clinical spectrum and tens of

:22:35. > :22:38.millions of other people across the world marched against the impending

:22:39. > :22:43.war. The biggest ever demonstration in British history. It was not, Mr

:22:44. > :22:52.Speaker, that those of us who opposed the war, it wasn't that

:22:53. > :22:54.those of us who opposed the war underestimated the talented or the

:22:55. > :23:00.crimes of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Indeed, many of us

:23:01. > :23:06.campaigned against the Iraqi regime during its most bloody period. When

:23:07. > :23:09.the British government and the US administration were actually

:23:10. > :23:18.supporting that regime. As was confirmed by the 1986 Scott enquiry.

:23:19. > :23:22.But we could see the state is broken by sanctions and war pose no

:23:23. > :23:27.military threat and the WMD evidence was flimsy and convicted. Going to

:23:28. > :23:33.war without United Nations authorisation was profoundly

:23:34. > :23:36.dangerous. That foreign invasion and occupation would be resisted by

:23:37. > :23:42.force and it would set off a series of uncontrollable and destructive

:23:43. > :23:47.events. If only this house had been able to listen to the wisdom of many

:23:48. > :23:51.of our own people when it voted on the 18th of March against waiting

:23:52. > :23:56.for a UN authorisation for a second resolution, the course of events may

:23:57. > :23:58.have been different. All but 16 of the members of the official

:23:59. > :24:04.opposition at that time supported the war, while many in my party

:24:05. > :24:09.voted against it, as did others in other opposition parties. The

:24:10. > :24:13.members here today on all benches, including dozens of my Labour

:24:14. > :24:16.colleagues, who voted against the war, but none of us Mr Speaker

:24:17. > :24:27.should take any satisfaction from this report. Instead, all of us,...

:24:28. > :24:30.We can't have a running commentary on the statements made from the

:24:31. > :24:35.front bench. Members of this house only well enough to know that I will

:24:36. > :24:38.allow all opinions to be expressed and if that means the premise must

:24:39. > :24:42.be for quite a long time and he is accustomed to that. But the rate on

:24:43. > :24:48.a gentleman is entitled to be heard with courtesy. If people want to

:24:49. > :24:53.watch away, leave the chamber. It is boring and we don't need you. Thank

:24:54. > :24:57.you Mr Speaker. We have to be saddened that what has been revealed

:24:58. > :25:03.and we must now reflect on that. In addition to all of those British

:25:04. > :25:07.servicepeople and Iraqi civilians and combatants are still lives in

:25:08. > :25:10.the conflict there are many members who voted to stop the war but have

:25:11. > :25:15.not lived to see themselves vindicated by this report. First and

:25:16. > :25:20.foremost Mr Speaker it would do as well to remember Robin Cook, who

:25:21. > :25:24.stood over the 13 years ago and said in a few hundred words, in advance

:25:25. > :25:29.of the tragedy to come, what has been confirmed by this report in

:25:30. > :25:36.more than 2 million words. The Chilcot report has rightly dug deep

:25:37. > :25:37.into the litany of failures of planning for the occupation, the

:25:38. > :25:47.calamitous decision to stand down the Iraqi army and to dissolve the

:25:48. > :25:52.entire Iraqi state. But the reality is, it was the original decision to

:25:53. > :25:56.follow the US president into this war in the most volatile region in

:25:57. > :26:04.the world and impose a colonial style occupation that led to every

:26:05. > :26:09.other disaster. The government's September 2002 dossier with its

:26:10. > :26:13.claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that could be

:26:14. > :26:17.deployed in 45 minutes was only the most notorious of many deceptions.

:26:18. > :26:23.As Major General Michael Boddy told the enquiry and the court, we knew

:26:24. > :26:27.at the time that the purpose of the dossier was precisely to make the

:26:28. > :26:33.case for war rather than setting out the available intelligence. Military

:26:34. > :26:38.action in Iraq not only can the humanitarian crisis into a disaster,

:26:39. > :26:42.it also convulsed the entire region. Does that intervention in Libya in

:26:43. > :26:48.2011 as sadly left the country in the grip of warning militias and

:26:49. > :26:50.terror groups. The Iraq war actually increased the threat of terrorism

:26:51. > :26:56.around the country as Baroness Manningham bowler, former head of

:26:57. > :27:00.MI5 made clear to the enquiry. There are many lessons that needs to be

:27:01. > :27:06.drawn from the Iraq war. In the investigation carried out by Sir

:27:07. > :27:09.John Chilcott in his enquiry, for our government, country, this

:27:10. > :27:13.Parliament as well as my party and indeed every other party. They

:27:14. > :27:18.include the need for a more open and independent collision ship with the

:27:19. > :27:22.United States, and for a foreign policy based on upholding

:27:23. > :27:26.international law and the authority of the United Nations, which always

:27:27. > :27:32.seeks peaceful solutions to international disputes. We also need

:27:33. > :27:37.and the premises indicated this, much stronger oversight of security

:27:38. > :27:41.and intelligence services. Full restoration of proper Cabinet

:27:42. > :27:47.government and give Parliament the decisive say over any future

:27:48. > :27:51.decisions to go to war based on objective information and not just

:27:52. > :27:57.government discretion, but three war Powers act that I hope this

:27:58. > :28:01.Parliament will pass. And as in the wake of Iraq, our own and other

:28:02. > :28:03.Western governments increasingly resort to hybrid warfare based on

:28:04. > :28:09.the use of drones and special forces, our democracy, and our

:28:10. > :28:12.democracy is crucial and important, it must ensure that their use is

:28:13. > :28:17.subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny. There are no more

:28:18. > :28:21.important decisions a member of Parliament ever get asked to make

:28:22. > :28:28.the social waiting to peace and war. The very least, that track the very

:28:29. > :28:31.least that members of parliament in this country should be able to

:28:32. > :28:34.expect is rigorous and objective evidence on which to base their

:28:35. > :28:39.decisions. We now know that the house was misled on to the war as

:28:40. > :28:44.the house must now decide how it should deal with it 13 years later.

:28:45. > :28:47.Just as all those who take the decisions we are in the Chilcot

:28:48. > :28:51.report must face up to the consequences of their actions,

:28:52. > :28:54.whatever they may be. Later today, I will be meeting a group of families

:28:55. > :28:58.and military service men and women who lost loved ones. Iraq war

:28:59. > :28:59.veterans and Iraqi citizens who have lost family members as a result of

:29:00. > :29:11.the war. I will be discussing with them, our

:29:12. > :29:17.public and the Iraqi people, the decisions taken by our Government

:29:18. > :29:20.that led to war with terrible consequences. There are huge lessons

:29:21. > :29:24.for every single one of us here today. We make decisions that have

:29:25. > :29:29.consequences that don't just go on for the immediate years, they go on

:29:30. > :29:36.for decades and decades afterwards. We need to reflect very seriously

:29:37. > :29:39.for we take any decisions again to take military action without

:29:40. > :29:45.realising the consequences of those will live with all of us for many

:29:46. > :29:51.decades to come and have often palpable consequences. Let me

:29:52. > :29:55.briefly respond. I want to leave us much time for colleagues to make

:29:56. > :29:59.their points. I think the honourable gentleman is right to praise their

:30:00. > :30:05.families. I understand that a great over the time taken. The only point

:30:06. > :30:07.it would make is that when you have an independent report, you have to

:30:08. > :30:12.allow it to be independent and allow the chairman to make his or her own

:30:13. > :30:16.well it has been frustrating, I well it has been frustrating, I

:30:17. > :30:20.think frustration is better than intervention. In terms of the time

:30:21. > :30:24.he was given to read the port, I didn't want politicians including

:30:25. > :30:27.the former Prime Minister to be given more time than the families

:30:28. > :30:38.themselves and that's why they eat o'clock deadline was set. -- eight

:30:39. > :30:41.o'clock. He is right to say, on the deadline, that the intervention

:30:42. > :30:47.cheated space for Al-Qaeda. It is important to remember that violent

:30:48. > :30:55.Islamist extremism started long before the Iraq war and long before

:30:56. > :30:59.911 itself, which was several years before the Iraq invasion. It is

:31:00. > :31:04.important to remember that. In terms of the litany of failures, I have

:31:05. > :31:08.been able to be the executive summary and I'm sure colleagues

:31:09. > :31:14.will, he is right, there are number of failures, the way the Kurdish

:31:15. > :31:18.provisional authority works, the failure to plan for the aftermath

:31:19. > :31:24.and I think the powerful points made by Sir John Chilcot. I think many of

:31:25. > :31:29.the points you made we have already put in place, proper Cabinet

:31:30. > :31:34.discussions, national security discussions, parliamentary votes,

:31:35. > :31:38.intelligence agencies. I would urge him to come up with even more ways

:31:39. > :31:39.to oversee all intelligence agencies. I encourage colleagues

:31:40. > :31:44.from all around the House to look at from all around the House to look at

:31:45. > :31:49.the way the intelligence committee works and the other things we have

:31:50. > :31:51.done, not least in legislation going through both houses. We do need

:31:52. > :31:55.leave our intelligence services with leave our intelligence services with

:31:56. > :31:59.a clear set of instructions and oversight arrangements, rather than

:32:00. > :32:03.change it every five minutes. War Powers act, I think that is

:32:04. > :32:06.something that will be discussed in the debate. It is something I have

:32:07. > :32:09.looked at carefully and I have come to the conclusion it is not the

:32:10. > :32:13.right thing to do was. I think we will get themselves into legal mess

:32:14. > :32:17.but I think house should debate it, as it will when it considers the

:32:18. > :32:20.report. On the issue of the United States, he calls for an opening

:32:21. > :32:25.partnership but I don't believe the United States is always right about

:32:26. > :32:27.everything, but I do believe our partnership with the United States

:32:28. > :32:32.is vital for our national security and I rather fear as opposed to the

:32:33. > :32:36.United States is always wrong. I don't think they're always right but

:32:37. > :32:39.I think the other best partner and we should work with them but I them

:32:40. > :32:44.and others to take the time to read the report, not in its entirety, I

:32:45. > :32:50.don't think anybody will have ten for 3.8 million words! But it's very

:32:51. > :32:54.carefully judged and thought through and it should be read in conjunction

:32:55. > :32:58.with the statement that Sir John has given today, which is an articulate

:32:59. > :33:05.distillation of what he says in his 200 page summary and I think that is

:33:06. > :33:08.what we should be guided by. We will all need time to study the many

:33:09. > :33:14.damning conclusions in this report about how this catastrophic decision

:33:15. > :33:17.was reached in 2003. The Prime Minister says we should read it with

:33:18. > :33:24.an eye to future lessons for the machinery of Government. There's my

:33:25. > :33:30.honourable friend agree that my only experience was a valuable

:33:31. > :33:34.innovation, that his successor should be recommended to look at

:33:35. > :33:40.whether or not we should not return to the pre-Tony Blair era of full

:33:41. > :33:47.collective Cabinet responsibility with proper time for meetings,

:33:48. > :33:50.proper information and studied conclusions and whether we should

:33:51. > :33:53.not also look at whether parliamentary accountability for

:33:54. > :34:03.these things should be reconsidered so that there are fool and properly

:34:04. > :34:07.informed debates here, held in good time, before the military are

:34:08. > :34:12.deployed and everything is set in hand and the position is

:34:13. > :34:23.irreversible? We need to go back to a much more collective and

:34:24. > :34:25.terms of Cabinet responsibility, terms of Cabinet responsibility,

:34:26. > :34:28.before decisions like this are made you have to have a Cabinet

:34:29. > :34:31.discussion but it would not try to substitute that for the work they

:34:32. > :34:39.NSC does now. Having the head of NSC does now. Having the head of

:34:40. > :34:43.MI5, MI6 and the head of the defence task sitting with you, they are able

:34:44. > :34:47.to speak up and tell you what they think. I think that debate is

:34:48. > :34:52.frankly more valuable than simply listening to other secretaries of

:34:53. > :34:56.state who are also there. I still think that is the best place to do

:34:57. > :35:00.that. In terms of parliamentary debates, we should have them, and it

:35:01. > :35:04.is good to have them in reasonable time. One of the issues with the

:35:05. > :35:08.Iraq debate was that it was so close to the point of decision that I

:35:09. > :35:12.think many colleagues felt that a vote in a different way was to let

:35:13. > :35:18.down our troops on the eve of a vitally important decision. Every

:35:19. > :35:27.Prime Minister for looking at a view Prime Minister for looking at a view

:35:28. > :35:34.of the millions of words of the report this morning. -- a few.

:35:35. > :35:40.Today, we remember the hundreds of people who died in Iraq, Iraqi

:35:41. > :35:49.civilians and witty service personnel -- British. Our hearts go

:35:50. > :35:55.out to them. The report we are considering now will be pored over

:35:56. > :35:59.in the weeks and months ahead and it should be the first step in learning

:36:00. > :36:10.lessons from the UK's most shameful foreign policy action in decades. On

:36:11. > :36:14.page 416, the Chilcott report confirms that on the 20th of July,

:36:15. > :36:24.2002, Tony Blair voted George Bush saying, and I quote, I will be with

:36:25. > :36:26.you, whatever. Frankly, it is remarkable, remarkable, that the

:36:27. > :36:27.Prime Minister didn't think that Prime Minister didn't think that

:36:28. > :36:31.that was even noteworthy to mention that was even noteworthy to mention

:36:32. > :36:38.in his statement to the House. My first question to the Prime Minister

:36:39. > :36:43.is why? Given much of the debate rests about the rationale of the

:36:44. > :36:48.Prime Minister at the time signing up to whatever course of action the

:36:49. > :36:57.native states was prepared to pursue. On intelligence, the report

:36:58. > :37:01.concludes in paragraph 807 that the assessed intelligence had not

:37:02. > :37:04.established beyond doubt either that Saddam Hussein had continued to

:37:05. > :37:10.produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop

:37:11. > :37:13.nuclear weapons continued. I completely understand, Mr Speaker,

:37:14. > :37:20.by the families of dead and injured UK service personnel and hundreds of

:37:21. > :37:26.thousands of Iraqis will feel that the were deceived about the reasons

:37:27. > :37:30.for going to war in Iraq. I can truly understand why they also feel

:37:31. > :37:36.let down when it came to the post-conflict situation and the

:37:37. > :37:41.Chilcot Report highlights in graphic detail the failure in planning for

:37:42. > :37:49.post-conflict Iraq. Add paragraph 630 of the executive summary, when

:37:50. > :37:53.Mr Blair set out the future for Iraq in the House of Commons in March

:37:54. > :37:58.2003, no assessment had been made of whether that vision was achievable,

:37:59. > :38:02.no agreement had been reached with the United States only workable

:38:03. > :38:04.post-conflict plan. Union authorisation had not yet been

:38:05. > :38:11.secured -- UN, and there had been a secured -- UN, and there had been a

:38:12. > :38:16.decision on the UN rule and post-conflict Iraq. In paragraph

:38:17. > :38:19.418, it says Tony Blair who recognise the significance of the

:38:20. > :38:24.post-conflict phase did not press President Bush or definite

:38:25. > :38:31.assurances about US plans. He did not consider a seek advice on

:38:32. > :38:35.whether a satisfactory plan called for a reassessment of the UK's

:38:36. > :38:40.engagement and did not make a plan for condition of UK participation in

:38:41. > :38:47.military action. In fact, the Chilcot Report concludes that, I

:38:48. > :38:56.quote, from paragraph 857, the UK did not achieve its objectives. The

:38:57. > :39:01.lack of planning has also been evident since, in allusion to

:39:02. > :39:08.Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and most recently, with absolutely no plan

:39:09. > :39:19.whatsoever in regards to Brexit. So when will UK Government of either

:39:20. > :39:28.Tory or Labour hue actually start learning from the past so we're not

:39:29. > :39:32.going to repeat mistakes? I hope those who were responsible and

:39:33. > :39:37.associated with taking the UK to war in Iraq, that has only cause

:39:38. > :39:41.hundreds of thousands of deaths, not just that, it has undermined

:39:42. > :39:44.people's face in Parliament on Government in the UK and left an

:39:45. > :39:50.indelible stain on Britain's standing in the world. I thank the

:39:51. > :39:54.honourable gentleman for his remarks. It is a sombre day and he

:39:55. > :39:57.is correct. He highlighted a number is correct. He highlighted a number

:39:58. > :40:03.of the very serious mistakes that were made, not least on planning for

:40:04. > :40:11.the aftermath. He asks a specific question about why I didn't mention

:40:12. > :40:16.the specific Tony Blair note. I was trying to be careful in my statement

:40:17. > :40:21.to accurately summarise what Sir John Chilcot has said and I did have

:40:22. > :40:28.a whole section in my statement saying about the President. I said

:40:29. > :40:30.Sir John says, a crucial point, Tony Blair made commitments to George

:40:31. > :40:36.Bush that had not been agreed with Cabinet colleagues and I think it is

:40:37. > :40:44.worth reading Sir John Chilcot's statement about that. On high gas

:40:45. > :40:55.6030, it is a powerful paragraph -- all in paragraph four --...

:40:56. > :41:05.I think it is one of the most powerful passages and I think he is

:41:06. > :41:09.right to draw attention to it. I don't accept that all the same

:41:10. > :41:15.failures and a padded in some way when it comes to planning in

:41:16. > :41:18.Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, there was a very clear connection between

:41:19. > :41:23.a Taliban regime that was playing host to Al-Qaeda and the goal of

:41:24. > :41:27.Government policy, which I supported at the time and put into place when

:41:28. > :41:34.I became Prime Minister, was to make sure that company can become a safe

:41:35. > :41:38.haven for Al-Qaeda -- could become. There was a huge amount of planning

:41:39. > :41:45.in the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan and we are still engaged

:41:46. > :41:50.in that. There is a plan, there is a UK run Officer training Cabinet to

:41:51. > :41:52.strengthen their army. You can have all the plans in the world that

:41:53. > :41:56.these are still extreme the difficult things to get right. If

:41:57. > :42:03.you somehow saying there is no point in ever taking part in intervention,

:42:04. > :42:09.that is a different position. You should be honest and say that. But I

:42:10. > :42:12.and Brexit, we have set out the and Brexit, we have set out the

:42:13. > :42:18.alternatives but it does not mean they are easy. The foreign affairs

:42:19. > :42:23.committee has stated its inquiry into the intervention in Libya in

:42:24. > :42:34.order to take into conclusion the Iraq inquiry. Given that the central

:42:35. > :42:36.not least stabilisation being not least stabilisation being

:42:37. > :42:43.described by my honourable friend at the time of fanciful rot, and to us

:42:44. > :42:48.in evidence as an unrealistic desktop exercise, would you

:42:49. > :42:54.reconsider his understandable decision not to give us information

:42:55. > :42:57.during the referendum campaign so that the reaching of the analysis of

:42:58. > :43:03.machinery of Government changes he outlined earlier to the honourable

:43:04. > :43:08.member can be properly assessed by the committee?

:43:09. > :43:15.I am very grateful for his remarks. I think the Foreign Secretary will

:43:16. > :43:17.be giving evidence. Obviously the Prime Minister is always asked to

:43:18. > :43:20.give evidence to every select committee of the house and I try to

:43:21. > :43:24.stick to answering questions here at the ways of committee and also the

:43:25. > :43:28.national Security committee, to bring together a number of different

:43:29. > :43:32.committees. I do not think it will be possible but I will consider

:43:33. > :43:34.every request. Can I first full heartedly endorsed the remarks the

:43:35. > :43:43.Prime Minister made about those who lost their lives? Could I also ask

:43:44. > :43:48.him, does he agree that each of us in Cabinet or in this house who are

:43:49. > :43:50.responsible, we should take responsibility for our own

:43:51. > :43:57.individual decisions, I'll be taken in good faith and basis of evidence

:43:58. > :44:04.before us? But equally does he agree that the amount of hatred and death

:44:05. > :44:06.in Al-Qaeda and Daesh should take responsibility for their actions and

:44:07. > :44:13.for the blood and horror that they inflict on others? The Honourable

:44:14. > :44:18.lady is right. I speak as someone who is a relatively new backbencher,

:44:19. > :44:21.sitting at the listing to the arguments coming to my own

:44:22. > :44:24.conclusions and I think anyone who voted for the conflict must take

:44:25. > :44:29.their share of responsible to. I don't choose to go back and say well

:44:30. > :44:33.if I knew now what I know then that I knew then what I knew now, I just

:44:34. > :44:36.think you make the decision, you decided at the time and you must

:44:37. > :44:38.live with the consequences in the year share of responsibility and

:44:39. > :44:42.that is the stand side take. She does make a very good point about

:44:43. > :44:48.the evil of these violent extremists, whether in Al-Qaeda or

:44:49. > :44:52.Daesh or elsewhere, this problem in our world existed before the Iraq

:44:53. > :44:57.war, it exists and is worse today. We are doing all sorts of things and

:44:58. > :45:00.all sorts of ways to try and combat it. While this debate about what

:45:01. > :45:04.happened in Iraq and the decisions we are taking is vital we must not

:45:05. > :45:12.let its sap our energy for dealing with this cancer in a world which is

:45:13. > :45:17.killing of their own country. The Prime Minister I think referred to

:45:18. > :45:20.the cause or the aim of this war as weapons of mass destruction but if I

:45:21. > :45:26.can rise attention again back to the document from Tony Blair to the

:45:27. > :45:33.American president, goes on later after it says I will be with you

:45:34. > :45:36.whatever, it goes on to say the reason for this is getting rid of

:45:37. > :45:44.Saddam Hussein is the right thing to do. Regime change. Not WMD. This

:45:45. > :45:47.factor in the fact that as Sir John Chilcott said, Blairs commitment

:45:48. > :45:51.needed very difficult for the UK to withdraw support from military

:45:52. > :45:56.action later on, this actually amounts to a deceit and the

:45:57. > :46:00.misleading of this House of Commons. It is not the only one, and Sir John

:46:01. > :46:03.has been very careful about avoiding accusing the previous Prime Minister

:46:04. > :46:08.of lying to the house but a lot of the evidence here suggest he did.

:46:09. > :46:14.What action can this house take in dealing with that? I think my right

:46:15. > :46:17.honourable friend makes an important point. I have had longer than anyone

:46:18. > :46:21.else to read this report but it is still trying to get to the bottom of

:46:22. > :46:25.this particular issue, I accept, is difficult. What Sir John Chilcott

:46:26. > :46:28.seems to be saying is that the British government had a policy of

:46:29. > :46:32.coercive diplomacy, wanting to use the pressure of the threat of

:46:33. > :46:36.military action in order to get Saddam Hussein to come principally

:46:37. > :46:40.disarm. Everyone is going to have to read the report and come to their

:46:41. > :46:45.own conclusions. From my reading of it, Sir John Chilcott is not

:46:46. > :46:49.accusing anyone of delivered it explicit deceit. But people must

:46:50. > :46:54.read the report and come to their own conclusions. Today we stand

:46:55. > :47:01.alongside the families of 179 service men and women and 24 British

:47:02. > :47:05.civilians who died in the Iraq war, we also stand beside those many more

:47:06. > :47:09.they continue to live with injuries inflicted while serving their

:47:10. > :47:15.country in Iraq. We are proud of them are the order them. Mr Speaker,

:47:16. > :47:18.the Chilcot report makes clear the absolute determination of the former

:47:19. > :47:23.Prime Minister Mr Tony Blair to pursue war in Iraq no matter the

:47:24. > :47:27.evidence. There is a stark contrast between that single-minded

:47:28. > :47:32.determination to go to war and the reckless and complete absence of any

:47:33. > :47:38.plan for what would come next. What came next is 179 British servicemen

:47:39. > :47:41.and women killed. What came next is 100,000 or more Iraqi civilians

:47:42. > :47:46.killed. And what came next was refuelling of what is now Isis

:47:47. > :47:50.Daesh, which threatens not only Iraq and the Middle East and indeed the

:47:51. > :47:55.safety of all others. The much missed Charles Kennedy said in this

:47:56. > :47:59.house in 2003 and the court, the big fear that many of us have is that

:48:00. > :48:03.this is simply going to breed further generations of suicide

:48:04. > :48:06.bombers. So will the Prime Minister now take the opportunity on the half

:48:07. > :48:09.of his party this house to acknowledge that Charles Kennedy was

:48:10. > :48:13.right all along in leading the opposition across this country

:48:14. > :48:17.against the counter-productive war, and should not those who accused

:48:18. > :48:22.Charles Kennedy of appeasement, some of whom are still on these benches

:48:23. > :48:26.today, apologised to him, to his family, to our service men and

:48:27. > :48:32.women, to our country and to the people of Iraq? My recollection of

:48:33. > :48:34.the debate was that there were honest disagreements between

:48:35. > :48:37.colleagues who were listening to the arguments in making their decisions.

:48:38. > :48:42.I don't think anyone should be accused of appeasement for voting

:48:43. > :48:46.against this war, should people who voted in favour of it in good faith

:48:47. > :48:51.on the evidence they were being given be subject to answer criticism

:48:52. > :48:54.either. People who voted for the world like we had to take their

:48:55. > :48:57.share of responsibility. That is important. But it is not right to

:48:58. > :49:04.accuse people who voted against the appeasement. I was shadow

:49:05. > :49:07.international developer secretary at the time and asked 91 written

:49:08. > :49:10.questions of the government, accommodating in an opposition Day

:49:11. > :49:16.debate on the 30th of January 2003 because they had not received

:49:17. > :49:20.answers or any satisfactory answers. With the Prime Minister for the sake

:49:21. > :49:26.of the many many victims please assure the house that we have truly

:49:27. > :49:31.learn a lesson of failure to plan for contingency? I remember very

:49:32. > :49:36.well how effective my honourable friend was in holding those debates.

:49:37. > :49:41.People say we did not debate post-war reconstruction in Iraq, we

:49:42. > :49:45.did, endlessly, in this house. A lot of debate had. It is quite clear

:49:46. > :49:48.from this report that there was a total planning failure. An

:49:49. > :49:50.assumption that the Americans had a plan when they didn't, an assumption

:49:51. > :49:55.that the UN would moving copperhead is ugly when he didn't, an

:49:56. > :50:01.assumption that British troops would be adding three to four months. I

:50:02. > :50:04.think it is one of the greatest areas of criticism, it is the any of

:50:05. > :50:07.failure that I think should be accepted most clearly and it is the

:50:08. > :50:15.one for any future conflict we plan for most carefully. I thank the

:50:16. > :50:20.Prime Minister for summing up the main findings of the Chilcot report,

:50:21. > :50:28.although unlike him I have not had the opportunities to even read the

:50:29. > :50:32.summary. Would he agree that in 2003, when I voted for the war, when

:50:33. > :50:35.he voted for the one and many other colleagues voted for the war, we did

:50:36. > :50:49.it on the basis of the knowledge that we had. Iraq was in breach of

:50:50. > :50:53.17 UN resolutions in 2003. Saddam Hussein had already killed half a

:50:54. > :51:04.million of his own people. He went on to kill more and more. The Shia

:51:05. > :51:11.in the south, the Kurds in the north, and if you stood by the mass

:51:12. > :51:16.graves where 10,000 Iraqi bodies lie, still many of them

:51:17. > :51:22.undiscovered, those of us who had campaigned for human rights over

:51:23. > :51:26.many years in Iraq and I over 30 years, were very well aware of the

:51:27. > :51:31.torture and the horrors that were happening in that country. And I

:51:32. > :51:36.wish people would ask Iraqis what they think of the invasion. Because

:51:37. > :51:42.many Iraqis are grateful, Mr Speaker, that we took the action

:51:43. > :51:46.that we did at that time. I hope we are greater opportunity to discuss

:51:47. > :51:49.these matters because there was some planning, not enough, I agree, but

:51:50. > :51:55.there was some planning, part of which I was involved with. But the

:51:56. > :52:02.horrors of Saddam Hussein, what he did to his own people, were clearly

:52:03. > :52:08.documented. And I think we were right to take part in that invasion.

:52:09. > :52:13.I will remember the speeches of the right Honourable Lady when I was

:52:14. > :52:15.sitting there are, she made very powerful speeches about the

:52:16. > :52:21.appalling thing Saddam Hussein did to his own people and the practices

:52:22. > :52:24.in that country. That is a fair point. I also think that when the

:52:25. > :52:27.case was made, people were acting on the knowledge of fraud of the money

:52:28. > :52:31.was not just weapons of mass destruction, it was the sense that

:52:32. > :52:34.we were trying to uphold the position of the United Nations and

:52:35. > :52:41.the massive danger he posed to the region and his own people. We must

:52:42. > :52:46.be frank. The consequences of what followed have been truly very poor.

:52:47. > :52:48.That is what Sir John Fiennes. I think that section of his report

:52:49. > :52:54.when he talks about the objectives of the government not being met and

:52:55. > :52:57.that far from dealing with the problem with potentially resumes

:52:58. > :53:02.linking up with terrorists, which Tony Blair talked about in his

:53:03. > :53:04.dispatch box, this did end up with creating a space for Al-Qaeda so we

:53:05. > :53:10.must learn all the lessons, including the ones we are paying

:53:11. > :53:13.for. With my right honourable friend agree with me that there are lessons

:53:14. > :53:18.for having them of this house and every member of the media as to how

:53:19. > :53:24.we assess evidence? We can no longer take refuge in the peat heads that

:53:25. > :53:28.we did not know the evidence about the non-existence of weapons of mass

:53:29. > :53:33.destruction. The report says the assessed intelligence had not

:53:34. > :53:36.established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce

:53:37. > :53:39.chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear

:53:40. > :53:44.weapons continued. That evidence was set out in the dossier, and as I

:53:45. > :53:50.showed in evidence to the Chilcot report, if you read the dossier,

:53:51. > :53:53.line by line, he could not fail to reach the same conclusion as Robin

:53:54. > :53:59.Cook that there were no weapons of mass destruction. The fact that we

:54:00. > :54:02.didn't, or very largely be did not reach that conclusion, is because we

:54:03. > :54:06.had ceased to look at evidence and we rely on briefings and spin

:54:07. > :54:11.doctors from our front benches. If this house is to get a grip of

:54:12. > :54:17.issues in the future, it must go back to looking at evidence itself

:54:18. > :54:21.is allowed journalists. What I would say to my right honourable friend is

:54:22. > :54:25.that a lot of things have changed since that evidence was produced in

:54:26. > :54:29.the way that it was, and one of the most important is the renewed

:54:30. > :54:34.independence and practices of the joint intelligence committee, so

:54:35. > :54:38.that ministers of course do still see individual pieces of

:54:39. > :54:43.intelligence, and of course one wants to have a regular update, but

:54:44. > :54:48.the process of producing JIC reports and JIC assessment is incredibly

:54:49. > :54:52.rigorous, so I do not think that what happened could happen again in

:54:53. > :54:55.the same way because the report she would get from the joint

:54:56. > :55:02.intelligence committee, I think, are now much cleaner about what they do

:55:03. > :55:06.now and what they think and what the conjecture rather than anything

:55:07. > :55:09.else. I think we can avoid that situation. That doesn't solve the

:55:10. > :55:12.problem in the House of Commons because it is impossible to assure

:55:13. > :55:17.all of that intelligence information with every member of Parliament. I

:55:18. > :55:20.join with others in paying tribute to the ex-service men and women who

:55:21. > :55:25.died in the conflict in Iraq and also the hundreds and thousands of

:55:26. > :55:28.civilians. One of the greatest scandals out of this whole episode

:55:29. > :55:34.is of course the lack of resources for our troops sent into battle

:55:35. > :55:38.without the equipment that they needed and this must never be

:55:39. > :55:41.allowed to happen again. And the Prime Minister set out for the house

:55:42. > :55:44.when he believes that the national security machinery that he has

:55:45. > :55:49.established would have forestalled the evident mistakes made in

:55:50. > :55:54.Whitehall in the run-up to the commitment in Iraq? I'm grateful to

:55:55. > :55:58.the right honourable gentleman. On the issue of equipment, of course

:55:59. > :56:03.money for our armed services is not infinite but I think what we have

:56:04. > :56:07.done is get rid of the black hole in the defence budget, so resources and

:56:08. > :56:11.commitment are more in balance, and by having a security and defence

:56:12. > :56:16.review every five years, we have had to since I have been Prime Minister,

:56:17. > :56:20.means that you imagine what you're spending to the things that your

:56:21. > :56:25.security forces require. That is a big improvement. It's depends on

:56:26. > :56:29.having the bee sources. I have tried to explain why the national Security

:56:30. > :56:31.Council architecture helps solve some of these problems but I'm not

:56:32. > :56:35.standing here saying you can completely reduce any risk of

:56:36. > :56:42.mistake or planning or of the rest of it because these things are by

:56:43. > :56:46.their nature very contributed. Human institutions are never going to be

:56:47. > :56:49.perfect, nor are they perfectible. But it must be said that the

:56:50. > :56:55.conclusions of the Chilcot enquiry as to the way in which legal advice

:56:56. > :56:59.was processed, intelligence was processed, and intelligence was used

:57:00. > :57:07.to inform policy, are pretty damning. Mr Speaker, my right

:57:08. > :57:10.honourable friend has rightly highlighted that much has changed

:57:11. > :57:15.since then. Certainly I can vouch for the fact that the processors,

:57:16. > :57:19.which I hope have been continued by legal advice is contained, a rather

:57:20. > :57:23.different from those that Sir John identifies. But when it comes to the

:57:24. > :57:29.collation of intelligence, which is an extremely difficult skill, is my

:57:30. > :57:36.right now friends satisfied that this is subject to enough scrutiny

:57:37. > :57:41.and review subsequent to ensure that lessons can be learned when mistakes

:57:42. > :57:47.in intelligence assessment are made? Because this does seem to me to be

:57:48. > :57:53.one of the key areas in which free a -- future decision-making is capable

:57:54. > :57:56.of continuing improvement. First of all I think my right honourable

:57:57. > :58:00.friend is right that the way legal advice is produced and considered is

:58:01. > :58:03.very different today to them because we have a National Security Council,

:58:04. > :58:08.we have the Attorney General sitting on it, and before decisions like

:58:09. > :58:11.these are made a well thought through piece of written legal

:58:12. > :58:15.advice is produced. The Attorney General is not suddenly called on to

:58:16. > :58:19.do this, the Attorney General is in the room white -- while these

:58:20. > :58:23.meetings are taking place, which he did believe they are the successors

:58:24. > :58:25.doing brilliantly. His point of the collation of intelligence and are we

:58:26. > :58:29.doing it right is more difficult to answer. There's no doubt that post

:58:30. > :58:33.but that the joint intelligence committee isn't helped -- incredibly

:58:34. > :58:37.rigorous about reaching judgments, testing them around the experts in

:58:38. > :58:41.Whitehall, confirming them with the Americans and others. And not

:58:42. > :58:46.pretending to know things that it doesn't know. How well we test that,

:58:47. > :58:50.I suppose there is a role for the ISC in that and thinking have we got

:58:51. > :58:55.these judgments right after they have been made, but that is

:58:56. > :59:00.something worth thinking can be done about. All of the intelligence

:59:01. > :59:03.briefing and information in the world, at the end you still must

:59:04. > :59:05.make a decision and you never have perfect information on which you

:59:06. > :59:09.make that decision. We up the balance of risks and that is often

:59:10. > :59:12.the case whether you're taking action against terrorists are trying

:59:13. > :59:18.to help secure the national interest. In the end you must decide

:59:19. > :59:26.and then defend the decision he made. The epitaph on Robin Cook's

:59:27. > :59:34.headstone in the great cemetery rue -- reads as follows: I may not have

:59:35. > :59:40.succeeded in stopping the war that I did secure the right of Parliament

:59:41. > :59:43.to decide. Parliament is right to say that in the circumstances that

:59:44. > :59:48.Parliament cannot be involved in the decision and then duck

:59:49. > :59:52.responsibility for the ramifications of that decision. Does the Prime

:59:53. > :59:59.Minister agree with me that the main element in that debate is the debate

:00:00. > :00:03.in which Parliament decided in 2003 was not the 45 minute claim that was

:00:04. > :00:09.not mentioned anywhere in those hours of debate, it was the fact

:00:10. > :00:16.that Saddam Hussein and his murderous sons had spent 13 years

:00:17. > :00:23.running rings around the United Nations, ignoring 17 UN resolutions,

:00:24. > :00:29.including resolutions calling for all necessary means to stop him.

:00:30. > :00:33.Wasn't that the main issue in that debate? And has the Prime Minister

:00:34. > :00:41.found any evidence whatsoever of any lies told to Parliament on that day?

:00:42. > :00:47.My memory of the debate is that it was about the balance of risks

:00:48. > :00:52.between action and inaction, and the case made by the then Prime Minister

:00:53. > :00:55.was that there was a real risk of inaction because you have someone

:00:56. > :00:59.who had been defying the UN, have done terrible things to his people,

:01:00. > :01:03.and centres neighbours, and the danger of that coming together with

:01:04. > :01:06.a potential programme of weapons of mass destruction and the other

:01:07. > :01:12.instabilities in the world post-911, you must remember it was post-911,

:01:13. > :01:16.that was what I think, I felt as a relatively young backbencher, I felt

:01:17. > :01:19.that is what we were voting on. Weapons of mass destruction was part

:01:20. > :01:24.of the picture, not the whole picture. His question about

:01:25. > :01:28.deliberate deceit, I think you must read the report carefully. I can see

:01:29. > :01:32.and hear an accusation of deliberate deceit, but there is certainly

:01:33. > :01:40.information that was not properly presented.

:01:41. > :01:53.-- I cannot say. -- I cannot see. I don't think the Prime Minister or

:01:54. > :01:59.the right honourable lady who voted for this war should feel ashamed or

:02:00. > :02:08.apologetic and as usual the Prime Minister has acted with honour and

:02:09. > :02:13.dignity. The fact is that we believe what we were told about weapons of

:02:14. > :02:18.mass destruction. Some of us walked into the no lobby but it was a

:02:19. > :02:20.narrow decision. I don't think there is any point in having

:02:21. > :02:27.recriminations because everybody in this House acted in good faith. For

:02:28. > :02:33.the future, surely we must distinguish between authoritarian

:02:34. > :02:43.regimes like Assad and Sadam who we must deter and oppose and

:02:44. > :02:50.totalitarian regimes like Isis who we must seek to destroy. We are not

:02:51. > :02:53.argument but on this I think he is argument but on this I think he is

:02:54. > :02:57.absolutely right. There is the difference between the Terence and

:02:58. > :03:05.containment and pre-emptive action when there is direct threat to the

:03:06. > :03:10.country. -- deterrence. I would also add there is a third, which is when

:03:11. > :03:13.you think you need to act in order to prevent a humanitarian

:03:14. > :03:18.catastrophe, which was the reason I stood at this dispatch box and said

:03:19. > :03:28.we would take action in respect to Libya. -- said we should. All of us

:03:29. > :03:33.who voted for the Iraq war must and will take our share of

:03:34. > :03:39.responsibility but there are many of us who do not regret the fact that

:03:40. > :03:42.Sadam Hussein is no longer in power for the reasons so powerfully set

:03:43. > :03:48.out a moment ago by my right honourable friend. Does the Prime

:03:49. > :03:52.Minister recognise that one of the wider lessons from Iraq is that we

:03:53. > :03:56.need a United Nations that is capable of giving effect to the

:03:57. > :04:03.responsibility to protect so that brutal dictators who murder and

:04:04. > :04:09.terrorise their own population can and will be held to account? As so

:04:10. > :04:14.often I think the right honourable gentleman speaks with clarity on

:04:15. > :04:17.these matters. Of course we need a United Nations who can do this and

:04:18. > :04:21.this is why sometimes we end up in the situation of being certain that

:04:22. > :04:26.it is right to take a particular action but because of a toe on the

:04:27. > :04:33.security council it somehow becomes legally wrong. There is a question

:04:34. > :04:37.about how something can be morally right but legally wrong. -- because

:04:38. > :04:41.of a veto on the security council. I think we need to continue reforming

:04:42. > :04:44.the United Nations. In the hope that we all accept that war should be the

:04:45. > :04:48.measure of last resort once all other options have been exhausted,

:04:49. > :04:52.given the publication of the Chilcott report, will the Prime

:04:53. > :04:58.Minister now do something that no government has done since 2003 and

:04:59. > :05:05.that is finally and unequivocally admit that this intervention was

:05:06. > :05:08.both wrong and a mistake? I think people should read the report and

:05:09. > :05:13.come to their own conclusions. Clearly the aftermath of this

:05:14. > :05:19.conflict was profoundly disastrous in so many ways and I don't move

:05:20. > :05:22.away from that at all. I take the view that if you voted in a

:05:23. > :05:25.particular way you can't turn the clock back, you have to take your

:05:26. > :05:35.responsibility but you learn the lessons of what went wrong. May I

:05:36. > :05:43.think the Prime Minister. The enquiry's view at point 20 is that

:05:44. > :05:48.in March 2003 that the options of diplomacy had not been exhausted so

:05:49. > :05:56.military action was not a last resort. Despite the lack of evidence

:05:57. > :06:02.of weapons of mass destruction, despite problems with the advice, in

:06:03. > :06:14..22 it says led by Tony Blair the UK Government supports military action.

:06:15. > :06:19.-- in point 22. It was necessary to deferred to his close ally is on

:06:20. > :06:23.Iraq. Given the undermining of the UN and the horrible consequences is

:06:24. > :06:31.it not conceivable that Mr Blair should not be held to account for

:06:32. > :06:36.his actions? I think the honourable gentleman reads out some important

:06:37. > :06:41.parts of the report and I think it is significant that Sir John Chilcot

:06:42. > :06:46.finds that this undermines the United Nations because some of us

:06:47. > :06:50.fought at the time that the UN was being undermined by the actions of

:06:51. > :06:54.Saddam Hussein and the fact that he was not complying with so many

:06:55. > :06:59.resolutions. We need to study that and take that into account. As for

:07:00. > :07:04.how people should account for themselves, it is for them to read

:07:05. > :07:10.the report and think about why they did what they did. I want to setup

:07:11. > :07:14.the lessons I think we should learn, I am far more adjusted in the future

:07:15. > :07:20.and how we learn what is in here rather than rerun the Iraq debate.

:07:21. > :07:24.It may be unusual for anybody in this place to change the way they

:07:25. > :07:28.will vote following a speech made here and I can't prove that that is

:07:29. > :07:33.what I did but that is what I did the night of the debate because what

:07:34. > :07:37.was said about weapons of mass destruction. I now have to listen

:07:38. > :07:42.and wrestle with my own conscience, the then Prime Minister must wrestle

:07:43. > :07:48.with his. We'll my right honourable friend agree that the then Prime

:07:49. > :07:51.Minister must take full responsibility for encouraging this

:07:52. > :07:57.House to take the decision that it did, with disastrous consequences in

:07:58. > :08:03.the stabilising the world? -- will my. Of course it is right that the

:08:04. > :08:12.people who took the decisions have to take the responsibility. I voted

:08:13. > :08:17.for the action in 2003. It was a difficult decision but I don't

:08:18. > :08:23.apologise and I believe that we were right to remove the fascist regime

:08:24. > :08:29.of Saddam Hussein. The Prime Minister referred in his remarks to

:08:30. > :08:38.what has happened in Libya and in Syria. Can he speculate about what

:08:39. > :08:45.might have happened in Iraq if Saddam or Uday Hussein had been in

:08:46. > :08:50.power in 2011? Isn't it likely that the Baathist fascists in Iraq would

:08:51. > :08:57.have killed more than the number of Syrians killed and created nurdle

:08:58. > :09:04.than the number of refugees displaced from their homes. --

:09:05. > :09:08.created more than. It is impossible to answer that but just as there are

:09:09. > :09:12.consequences of intervention there are consequences of nonintervention,

:09:13. > :09:19.which is proved by Syria, where we have appalling numbers of deaths and

:09:20. > :09:27.displacement of people and a booming in the -- industry of terrorism. Can

:09:28. > :09:35.I thank my right honourable friend for pledging on behalf of this House

:09:36. > :09:41.that our soldiers who suffered life changing injuries in the Iraq war

:09:42. > :09:50.should be looked after for the rest of their lives? But may I also

:09:51. > :09:57.remind the House that we have an equal duty for our soldiers who

:09:58. > :10:04.suffered life changing injuries in previous conflicts, such as some of

:10:05. > :10:10.my 35 men so badly wounded on the 6th of December 1982 at Ballykelly

:10:11. > :10:16.as well as other regular army, Territorial Army, Ulster Defence

:10:17. > :10:22.Regiment and Royal Ulster Constabulary members who suffered so

:10:23. > :10:26.grievously in previous conflicts. My honourable friend with his previous

:10:27. > :10:31.military background is absolutely right to make this point. What I was

:10:32. > :10:36.trying to say was that Iraq and Afghanistan have been an enormous

:10:37. > :10:39.change in tempo for the British Army and you have seen not only the large

:10:40. > :10:47.number of people who lost their lives but also a very large number

:10:48. > :10:51.of life changing injuries, people who lost limbs who want to have full

:10:52. > :10:56.and active lives. The country came together to make sure that happens

:10:57. > :11:03.so it is important that the charities are still funded and that

:11:04. > :11:08.will help other people who suffered life changing injuries in other

:11:09. > :11:15.conflicts. Chilcot has concluded that this country went to war not as

:11:16. > :11:19.a last resort, that the authority of the UN was undermined, and the chaos

:11:20. > :11:24.and carnage which has Institute, partly explained by the complete

:11:25. > :11:28.lack of planning for the aftermath. I don't understand, given that we

:11:29. > :11:33.now know from Chilcot, the memo written by the then promised on the

:11:34. > :11:38.28th delight to George W Bush saying, I will be with you what

:11:39. > :11:43.ever, is in any way compatible to what was said to Parliament and

:11:44. > :11:48.people at the time. -- the 28th of July. Amid all this stuff about

:11:49. > :11:52.improving processes, which is fantastically important, is it not

:11:53. > :11:56.at the end of the day the people who made the decisions, and in our

:11:57. > :12:03.search for responsibility wouldn't have helped if individuals

:12:04. > :12:08.responsible were held responsible? My right honourable friend is right

:12:09. > :12:13.to highlight these aspects of the report, we were not at the last

:12:14. > :12:17.resort stage, the UN was undermined and there was this fundamental lack

:12:18. > :12:21.of planning that led to so many problems, and he is right that the

:12:22. > :12:25.people who took the decisions should be held accountable in this House,

:12:26. > :12:32.in the court of public opinion. They are also accountable in terms of

:12:33. > :12:36.people who might want to take action, as they have through the

:12:37. > :12:40.courts in respect of equipment failures and so on in Iraq and

:12:41. > :12:43.Afghanistan, but clearly the people of the day and the Prime Minister

:12:44. > :12:48.have to account for themselves, and I understand Mr Blair is doing that

:12:49. > :12:53.now. In regards to the structure of government, does he agree that

:12:54. > :12:57.perhaps the national security adviser, rather than being a civil

:12:58. > :13:01.servant, should be a Cabinet Minister, so it would bring all of

:13:02. > :13:09.the strands of government together, more accountability and transparency

:13:10. > :13:15.and perhaps more focus and decision-making and as we discuss

:13:16. > :13:20.and vote on militarily tree action, surely any Prime Minister needs to

:13:21. > :13:24.take ultimate authority because we don't know what the future holds and

:13:25. > :13:29.there might be circumstances where it isn't practical or we don't have

:13:30. > :13:32.the time? I think he is absolutely right on the second point, which is

:13:33. > :13:36.that prime ministers do need to be ready to deploy without

:13:37. > :13:41.parliamentary sanction if it is urgent and then to report to

:13:42. > :13:48.Parliament straight afterwards. It is when there was a premeditated

:13:49. > :13:50.decision to take action. I think in terms of the National Security

:13:51. > :13:55.advisor I think it is right that we have an expert who is not currently

:13:56. > :13:59.-- doesn't have to be a current civil service, and it is inexpert

:14:00. > :14:02.who is garnering together the military, civilian, intelligence,

:14:03. > :14:07.all of the different parts of Whitehall and it needs to be

:14:08. > :14:14.somebody full-time rather than running a department rather than

:14:15. > :14:17.being a politician. Would he put on record that he believes all of those

:14:18. > :14:25.who voted for the action against Saddam Hussein did so in good faith

:14:26. > :14:29.and on the very important lessons to be learned does he acknowledge that

:14:30. > :14:34.just as there are consequences, sometimes terrible, of military

:14:35. > :14:36.intervention, so there are consequences of nonintervention, as

:14:37. > :14:43.we are seeing at huge cost today in Syria? I am very happy to make both

:14:44. > :14:50.those points. I am sure that everybody who came here, like me,

:14:51. > :14:55.wrestled with the arguments and made the difficult decision and I am sure

:14:56. > :14:59.we can deal with this consequently. In terms of the consequences of

:15:00. > :15:03.nonintervention, it is absolutely the case, we can see that in Syria.

:15:04. > :15:14.The point I made to the Member for Telford South. -- Ilford. It is also

:15:15. > :15:19.worth mentioning humanitarian issues like Rwanda, as I did in my

:15:20. > :15:26.statement. Our troops shouldered the burden of Mr Blair's disastrous Iraq

:15:27. > :15:30.war and paid the price in blood. On a gentler note, and as an Iraq

:15:31. > :15:35.veteran, can I commend the Prime Minister for the work he has done

:15:36. > :15:40.for our troops, veterans and their families, in improving their lot,

:15:41. > :15:45.and can I ask whether he shares my hope and expectation that his

:15:46. > :15:49.successor will do the same? Can I thank my honourable friend for his

:15:50. > :15:52.kind remarks and also the good work he has done, not least in

:15:53. > :15:57.commemorating the battles of the First World War 100 years ago. I

:15:58. > :16:00.think we have now set up with the military covenant written into war

:16:01. > :16:06.and the covenant support group a mechanism in what also that every

:16:07. > :16:10.year we are trying to go further in supporting our Armed Forces, our

:16:11. > :16:16.veterans and forces, and there is a mechanism for ideas to come forward,

:16:17. > :16:20.whether helping with council tax or the pupil premium or free bus passes

:16:21. > :16:21.or help with medical expenses, there is a forum for those ideas that

:16:22. > :16:32.there wasn't in the past. We have heard a lot of justified

:16:33. > :16:36.criticism of Tony Blair but can I as the Prime Minister to think of his

:16:37. > :16:41.own role and of the others who voted for this? They heard Robin Cook's

:16:42. > :16:45.powerful speech criticising the Government's case. They argued that

:16:46. > :16:49.the invasion would be a catastrophe. The evidence was there if people

:16:50. > :16:53.chose to look for it. Would it not be a step towards restoring public

:16:54. > :16:57.trust in this House to offer some form of apology for the decision to

:16:58. > :17:02.support the war? The Honourable lady wants to replace all the arguments

:17:03. > :17:07.of the day. I don't really see a lot of point in that. Members of

:17:08. > :17:10.parliament came to this House, made decisions, made them in good faith,

:17:11. > :17:16.they can now reflect on whether those decisions were right or wrong.

:17:17. > :17:21.I think what we should do instead is tried, as Sir John Chilcot does,

:17:22. > :17:29.learn the lessons of what happens, and make sure mistakes cannot be

:17:30. > :17:32.made in the future. The decision not to give Hans Blix more time to

:17:33. > :17:37.conclude his UN weapon inspections is surely one of the principal midst

:17:38. > :17:41.judgment of the prewar period. Does my right honourable friend feel that

:17:42. > :17:45.in reference to the changes that have happened since then, the

:17:46. > :17:49.skipper of ignoring the UN in this way has been reduced? I think he is

:17:50. > :17:53.right that it is one of the most powerful points in the report that

:17:54. > :17:56.Blix should have been given more time and that was an argument made

:17:57. > :18:01.at the time that has even more force with the way it is written by Sir

:18:02. > :18:04.John. I don't think I can stand here and honestly say that all the

:18:05. > :18:10.changes we have put in place make mistakes like that impossible to

:18:11. > :18:12.prevent because at the end of the day, governments and cabinets had to

:18:13. > :18:17.make judgments on the basis of evidence in front of them. It makes

:18:18. > :18:21.them more difficult because you are going to have, with the National

:18:22. > :18:24.Security Council and the way it is setup, a better forum for making

:18:25. > :18:30.decisions, listening to arguments and hearing expert advice and I that

:18:31. > :18:35.does make it more difficult to press our heads if you cannot take expert

:18:36. > :18:40.opinion with you although, of course, in the end Cabinet ministers

:18:41. > :18:44.can decide. However wrong it was to take military action on false

:18:45. > :18:48.intelligence, and I accept my responsibility in the way in which I

:18:49. > :18:54.voted for military action, was its not the case that many of us were

:18:55. > :18:58.influenced very much so buys Saddam Hussein's notorious record, the

:18:59. > :19:02.aggression against the Iranians date, a war that lasted eight years

:19:03. > :19:07.and took the lives of hundreds of thousands of young people on both

:19:08. > :19:10.sides and is not satisfied with that, two years later, the

:19:11. > :19:16.aggression against Kuwait which resulted in the first Gulf War?

:19:17. > :19:20.Would it not be totally wrong to come to the conclusion that had its

:19:21. > :19:24.not been for this invasion, which I say should not have taken place

:19:25. > :19:27.because it was based on false intelligence, everything would have

:19:28. > :19:32.been fine in the middle east and look at what is happening in stereo,

:19:33. > :19:37.where we did not intervene, I believe rightly so, and again, I was

:19:38. > :19:45.influenced by what happens over what we are disgusting now. -- stereo. He

:19:46. > :19:48.put it very well. Each year is a situation where there was this

:19:49. > :19:52.appalling record. Saddam Hussein had gassed the Kurds and murdered his

:19:53. > :19:56.own people, invaded his neighbour, used weapons of mass action in the

:19:57. > :20:00.past and we were told he was developing them again in the future

:20:01. > :20:03.and on the basis of that, we were told we could not risk leaving him

:20:04. > :20:07.in place and leaving those programmes in place. Even the

:20:08. > :20:10.heightened risk post and 911. Those were very strong arguments and I

:20:11. > :20:14.think it is worth recording that. It is worth taking into account the

:20:15. > :20:19.point but who knows what would have happened if Saddam had still been in

:20:20. > :20:22.place at the time of the Arab Spring, but it is possible to

:20:23. > :20:26.believe that his reactions to his own people would be rather like the

:20:27. > :20:32.reactions of President Assad to his own people which I would argue has

:20:33. > :20:38.done more to ferment terrorism and cause extremism perhaps anything

:20:39. > :20:43.else in the last decade. Today is a dark day for the UK Government. It

:20:44. > :20:47.is a tragic day for Iraq and it is a desperately for the families of our

:20:48. > :20:52.service men and women who I know are watching today. War is not a sport

:20:53. > :20:57.and now should be a time of deep inflection and humility across

:20:58. > :20:59.Government and across the operations of the military who advise the

:21:00. > :21:04.Government. I want to pay tribute to those who fought and their families.

:21:05. > :21:06.They are the best of us, the true patriots and they pay is the

:21:07. > :21:12.greatest sacrifice for the liberties that we enjoy in this House. With me

:21:13. > :21:16.that we need to make sure that how we look after these people, how we

:21:17. > :21:21.say we want to do it and how we actually do it are the same thing?

:21:22. > :21:24.As ever, he speaks with great clarity on these things. He is right

:21:25. > :21:29.that it is a moment for deep reflection. He is also right that as

:21:30. > :21:33.we think of our arms forces serving out, we should proud of what they

:21:34. > :21:39.did. We should be proud of the bravery and courage. They were all

:21:40. > :21:43.being the command of this House -- all being the command of this House

:21:44. > :21:46.and performing in the way you would expect. He is right think of it like

:21:47. > :21:50.that. He is also right to say that the promises of the armed services

:21:51. > :21:56.cover and are kept in reality as well as on paper. Can I say that we

:21:57. > :22:00.should remember that the real responsibility for the murder and

:22:01. > :22:06.killing of so many Iraqi civilians lies with Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda,

:22:07. > :22:09.and of course Isis as well. Can I say this, the three main complaints

:22:10. > :22:14.made about Tony Blair and the Government's position at the time,

:22:15. > :22:16.one that he misled Parliament or a lighter parliaments, the Prime

:22:17. > :22:20.Minister has said that has not been found in the Chilcot report. The

:22:21. > :22:26.other that intelligence was doctored. As I understand it from my

:22:27. > :22:29.quick reading, that has not been found either. The other that it was

:22:30. > :22:35.not in a regal warts but we know that Chilcot makes it very clear

:22:36. > :22:41.that it relied on intelligence that it was illegal to go to war at that

:22:42. > :22:47.point. I'm afraid he will have to read the report and to those

:22:48. > :22:52.questions but first of all, on the dossier that was produced, the

:22:53. > :22:56.report is clear that number ten and the Prime Minister did not wrongly

:22:57. > :23:00.alter that. There are some comments in there about how the report did

:23:01. > :23:04.not necessarily report all of the things that were in other papers

:23:05. > :23:10.which is a different point. On the issue of whether the war was Iraq or

:23:11. > :23:15.illegal, Chilcot does not take a stand and perhaps I've already out

:23:16. > :23:19.exactly what he says. He says that there was legal advice and that

:23:20. > :23:23.advice had a legal case for war and that is how the Government preceded

:23:24. > :23:27.by Chilcot is not saying he is seeking a position. On the issue of

:23:28. > :23:31.misleading Parliament is, there is nothing in the report that I can see

:23:32. > :23:38.pointing to deliberate deceit but clearly there are occasions when

:23:39. > :23:42.more information or better information could have been put

:23:43. > :23:46.forward so I think one has to be careful in reading the report, but

:23:47. > :23:50.also be my shorthand answers to his questions. Can I ask my friends for

:23:51. > :23:55.his statement today. I understand from listening to the debate so far

:23:56. > :23:58.that there will be noble tickle recriminations for reasons I

:23:59. > :24:01.understand. Can I seek his assurance that as there will be no

:24:02. > :24:05.recriminations against those who sent our Armed Forces to war, there

:24:06. > :24:09.will be no recrimination against our Armed Forces being chased by

:24:10. > :24:15.ruthless for doing our bidding and looking after our nation? I very

:24:16. > :24:22.much agree with the statement he put forward. We are doing everything we

:24:23. > :24:29.can to get through and knock down these holy and justified enquiries

:24:30. > :24:40.that have been put in place because -- wholly unjustified. On this day

:24:41. > :24:43.when we rightly reflects on our own intervention and our own

:24:44. > :24:51.responsibilities, it is important to remember that violence did not begin

:24:52. > :24:56.in Iraq in 2003. Against the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the

:24:57. > :25:04.south, the regime of Saddam Hussein killed hundreds of thousands of

:25:05. > :25:08.people. An adverse lessons learned from the intervention, which I fully

:25:09. > :25:10.set out in the report and the lessons and the Leicester should be

:25:11. > :25:17.learned. It has also been rightly commented that we should learn the

:25:18. > :25:22.lessons from not intervening in Syria weather has been a

:25:23. > :25:27.humanitarian catastrophe. Can I asked the Prime Minister, of all the

:25:28. > :25:33.lessons learned, does he agree that the gay inclusion should not be

:25:34. > :25:37.never to intervene because if that was the conclusion, the result would

:25:38. > :25:42.be to a band and oppressed people around the world and to give a blank

:25:43. > :25:48.cheque to dictators and terrorist groups. -- the key inclusion. What I

:25:49. > :25:50.said in my statement was that I thought there were lessons to learn

:25:51. > :25:54.but also lessons not alone and the lesson not to learn is that

:25:55. > :25:59.intervention is always wrong. Sometimes it is and our interest of

:26:00. > :26:04.national security or to prevent humanitarian catastrophes were it is

:26:05. > :26:08.right to intervene and we should be very clear what that there are cases

:26:09. > :26:14.where we have not intervened and has been almost the same amount of chaos

:26:15. > :26:18.and of the bodies. I welcome my right honourable friend's statement

:26:19. > :26:22.today. Would he join me in expressing some slight concern not

:26:23. > :26:26.only at the shape of the centre of Government that was around at the

:26:27. > :26:29.time of the Blair Government but also the departments that supported

:26:30. > :26:34.its because of course, the top of the pyramids can only work if the

:26:35. > :26:36.supporting pillars are in place and I have only read the executive

:26:37. > :26:40.summary so I cannot comment in detail but it seems to me quite

:26:41. > :26:46.clear that part of the military of defence, including chiefs of staff,

:26:47. > :26:48.were not delivering the advice of the Government is needed and

:26:49. > :26:51.elements of the Foreign Office had succumbed to read form of groupthink

:26:52. > :26:57.that leaves me deeply concerned as to the structure and advice

:26:58. > :27:02.governance can get. I'm going to have it date before answering. There

:27:03. > :27:06.is not a huge amount of that in the executive summary of the Iraq

:27:07. > :27:11.inquiry. I think we will have to dive into the volumes to see exactly

:27:12. > :27:14.what Sir John has to say about advice from the MOD, from the

:27:15. > :27:18.Foreign Office, how much groupthink they're genuinely was and all the

:27:19. > :27:21.rest of it. I would hesitate with that. I think we will have to study

:27:22. > :27:29.the report and discuss this next week. Those of us who come to the

:27:30. > :27:33.report scandalised anew by the duplicity of pleasant Asian and the

:27:34. > :27:37.property of preparation on such grave matters nevertheless have to

:27:38. > :27:42.remember that those who are acutely burden today by the cruel sense of

:27:43. > :27:46.futility of sacrifice in terms of lives lost, lives devastated and

:27:47. > :27:49.lives changed. The Prime Minister rightly emphasises lessens the need

:27:50. > :27:53.to be learnt but we must take care not to turn this report into a grey

:27:54. > :27:57.wash by converting it into a syllabus about foresight in

:27:58. > :28:01.Government and oversight in Parliament. This is not a day for

:28:02. > :28:04.sound bites, but does the Prime Minister not agree that the hand of

:28:05. > :28:09.history should be feeling somebody's collar?

:28:10. > :28:16.I don't they did is a grey wash or a whitewash or on anything else wash.

:28:17. > :28:20.From what I've seen so far, this is a thorough effort at trying to

:28:21. > :28:22.understand the narrative of the offence the decisions that were

:28:23. > :28:28.taken and the mistakes that were made I think there's a huge amount

:28:29. > :28:36.to learn and I think everyone who has played a part in it has to take

:28:37. > :28:39.their responsibility for it. It's been so bring this afternoon to

:28:40. > :28:45.hear the reflections of those who took the decision here in 2003. I

:28:46. > :28:49.went to Iraq in 2007 to deliver on that decision. It was a difficult

:28:50. > :28:52.and dangerous time. During that summer, many of my friends and

:28:53. > :28:57.colleagues were sent home dead and injured. The Prime Minister have

:28:58. > :29:03.spoken about the processes which addressed the Armed Forces's

:29:04. > :29:06.equipment. Can the Prime Minister reassure the House at the urgent

:29:07. > :29:10.operating requirement process is not quick enough so that we will never

:29:11. > :29:15.again when troops into battle in vehicles not fit for purpose?

:29:16. > :29:19.First, can I thank my honourable friend for his service and thank all

:29:20. > :29:23.of those who serve in operation after 2003 all the way through to

:29:24. > :29:27.when we withdrew. I'll never forget going to Iraq myself and meeting

:29:28. > :29:32.some of the soldiers, some of whom who were there on the second or

:29:33. > :29:36.third tour. And their sense that the situation was extremely difficult.

:29:37. > :29:39.One of the positive things that has come out of this and Afghanistan is

:29:40. > :29:44.the urgent operational requirements system which means we have

:29:45. > :29:47.commissioned some fantastic equipment more quickly, and

:29:48. > :29:51.responded to their needs. By the time our troops were coming out of

:29:52. > :29:55.Afghanistan I'd been there 13 times over a period of six or seven years.

:29:56. > :29:59.By the end, they were saving the equipment was better than the

:30:00. > :30:02.Americans and they have things more quickly. New bits of kit could be

:30:03. > :30:09.produced. There are positive lessons to be learned from all of this, as

:30:10. > :30:17.well as all the negative ones. Could I ask the House to pause for a

:30:18. > :30:21.minute to remember Robin Cook, who had the courage to speak up against

:30:22. > :30:26.the orthodoxy of the day and the courage to eat out as a voice for 30

:30:27. > :30:31.in 2003. Note the sequence of events which led to the UK's participation

:30:32. > :30:35.in the invasion of Iraq show that where the unshakeable in the of a

:30:36. > :30:40.political leader's self belief traps him or her in its own logic that

:30:41. > :30:46.they cannot see beyond it, the consequences can be catastrophic. As

:30:47. > :30:49.the man who voted against the war in 2003, I know that the Iraq war did

:30:50. > :30:54.not create from scratch the multiple problems that we see today in the

:30:55. > :30:57.Middle East. But it does make them so much more intractable. We'll be

:30:58. > :31:01.PM agree with me that at root, the peoples of the Middle East, what

:31:02. > :31:05.they want is not so different from what people over here want? They

:31:06. > :31:09.want security, they want respect, and they want to know that they're

:31:10. > :31:15.not treated with double standards by the international community.

:31:16. > :31:18.I very much agree that we should recognise what people in the middle

:31:19. > :31:24.east want is what we want in terms of respect, the right to a decent

:31:25. > :31:27.government, the rule of law and decent standards. It is worth

:31:28. > :31:32.reading parts of the report about weapons of mass destruction. It says

:31:33. > :31:40.in paragraph 496 the ingrained belief that Adam Hussein's retained

:31:41. > :31:42.warfare capabilities was determined to do enhances capabilities

:31:43. > :31:49.including at some point in the future nucleic and was underpinning

:31:50. > :31:54.responsibility since the Gulf conflict ended. It was wrong but he

:31:55. > :31:58.had weapons of mass destruction, we now live he didn't. But it is worth

:31:59. > :32:02.recalling the sense that everyone in this house have that it was very

:32:03. > :32:06.deeply ingrained in policy makers and policy thinkers that he did.

:32:07. > :32:10.It's right that Chilcott comes to the agreement that Robin Cook was

:32:11. > :32:14.right to say that you could look at the evidence and come to a different

:32:15. > :32:18.conclusion. But it is quite important to remember just how many

:32:19. > :32:24.people and how many organisations were convinced that this was the

:32:25. > :32:30.basis of politics. My right honourable friend attends

:32:31. > :32:35.the Nato Warsaw summit this weekend. He will be acutely aware of the

:32:36. > :32:40.pressure that Nato feels right now. And Nato member states, from Russia.

:32:41. > :32:45.Is it not the case but President Putin will be examined very closely

:32:46. > :32:49.the action at this Parliament takes moving forward. As Parliament knows,

:32:50. > :32:54.Nato can only act when the Security Council of it meets to act. Chapter

:32:55. > :32:58.five says an invasion on one country is an invasion on all. Can I ask

:32:59. > :33:02.that this house does not move to the position where it has to prove that

:33:03. > :33:06.before we take that action, because otherwise we could find that the

:33:07. > :33:10.Iraq lessons and Iraq as a whole is just used as a mother shield to

:33:11. > :33:15.never take any military action. -- as another shield.

:33:16. > :33:18.We should not use this sobering moment of reflection where we look

:33:19. > :33:22.at the mistakes made and lessons to be learned. We should not use this

:33:23. > :33:26.moment to think that somehow it's right for Britain to shrink away

:33:27. > :33:32.from international responsibility and engagement. That would be the

:33:33. > :33:36.wrong lesson to learn from this. Like the Prime Minister, I remember

:33:37. > :33:40.the debates of February and March 2000 and three. We were both elected

:33:41. > :33:43.for the first time in 2001. What I remember is many of the members Ben

:33:44. > :33:52.who ask questions and demanded evidence were heckled and shouted

:33:53. > :33:56.down. One have debated on this report, it is white but as well as

:33:57. > :34:00.scrutinising the conduct others should have some of scrutiny on

:34:01. > :34:05.themselves. We now know that of what was reported to be evidence in 2003

:34:06. > :34:08.was obtained by people who had been tortured having been illegally

:34:09. > :34:13.rendered. Will the Prime Minister give me an assurance that this

:34:14. > :34:18.country will never again basic foreign policy judgments on evidence

:34:19. > :34:21.or information obtained in that way? I can certainly give him that

:34:22. > :34:26.assurance. That is something physically addressed during the

:34:27. > :34:30.Kurdish government -- Coalition Government that we should not use in

:34:31. > :34:36.any way evidence delivered by means of torture.

:34:37. > :34:39.Can I thank my right honourable friend for giving such an excellent

:34:40. > :34:43.statement on this war. As my right honourable friend knows, my

:34:44. > :34:48.constituency includes three command Brigade whose wives and families

:34:49. > :34:54.will have played a significant part in this whole conflict. You sure

:34:55. > :34:57.that MPs from similar garrison cities are also given names and

:34:58. > :35:03.details of those families so that we can communicate with them in order

:35:04. > :35:07.to make sure that we can talk to them about the impact this conflict

:35:08. > :35:12.will have had upon their lives? I'm happy to give that assurance, I

:35:13. > :35:19.think that work is in hand. Can I make comments about the loss

:35:20. > :35:23.of life in Iraq, specifically to take this opportunity to commemorate

:35:24. > :35:26.the service and sacrifice of our Armed Forces. They served in good

:35:27. > :35:32.faith and we should be proud of them today, as we are everyday. It's

:35:33. > :35:36.critical that the public can have trust in the decisions we take in

:35:37. > :35:40.this place. And at no time is that truer than on a vote to take our

:35:41. > :35:44.country to war. Whatever we think about the judgment that was made, we

:35:45. > :35:48.should acknowledge that the bond of trust between the Government, this

:35:49. > :35:52.house and the public has been damaged by the decision that was

:35:53. > :35:58.taken in 2003. We in this place today now have an absolute need to

:35:59. > :36:02.put that right for the future. Can I ask the Prime Minister if he will

:36:03. > :36:07.consider reviewing how intelligence is shared with members of this house

:36:08. > :36:11.before voting on military action? In addition to considering what steps

:36:12. > :36:15.could be taken to improve MPs, Armed Forces and our intelligence that

:36:16. > :36:20.this is the ability to work together to take these difficult decisions?

:36:21. > :36:23.First, let me join the honourable gentleman who served himself in our

:36:24. > :36:27.Armed Forces in paying tribute to what our Armed Forces did in Iraq.

:36:28. > :36:31.They should be proud of the work they did. They were acting on behalf

:36:32. > :36:35.of this House of Commons and the gunmen to took that decision. They

:36:36. > :36:38.behaved bravely and courageously and we should remember that and those

:36:39. > :36:42.who gave their lives and what we did. On his question about how we

:36:43. > :36:47.share intelligence information with this house, two reflections. One is

:36:48. > :36:55.that we have tried. We did in the case of Libya and Syria to try and

:36:56. > :36:59.publish assessments cleared for the House of Commons and cleared, I

:37:00. > :37:03.might add, by officials rather than by ministers. That is the first

:37:04. > :37:10.point. The second point is getting the chairman to read the statement

:37:11. > :37:15.or speech made by the Prime Minister to make sure it accurately reflects

:37:16. > :37:20.the intelligent information. I think those are two things we should try

:37:21. > :37:23.to do. Sometimes time is short, the picture is changing, the

:37:24. > :37:26.intelligence is changing. Those are good things to try and do, but I

:37:27. > :37:31.would say there is no perfection in all of this. In the end, you can

:37:32. > :37:34.receive and share as much intelligence as you like, but you

:37:35. > :37:39.must make a decision, make an argument and then defend it whether

:37:40. > :37:44.it is right or wrong. Given that the Chilcot Report found

:37:45. > :37:47.that the UK Government undermined Security Council authority and the

:37:48. > :37:51.result of the EU referendum, what plans do the Government had to

:37:52. > :37:53.reinforce the Foreign Office and restore our international

:37:54. > :37:59.arbitration? I think the Foreign Office has been

:38:00. > :38:01.restored in many ways. -- international reputation. William

:38:02. > :38:05.Hague restore the language school and opened a number of embassies

:38:06. > :38:10.around the world. I think the Foreign Office has seen once again

:38:11. > :38:17.is a great place to go and is and work. -- to go and work. We have to

:38:18. > :38:22.go on recognising that the combination of our 2% spending on

:38:23. > :38:26.the militarily, I 0.7% spending on aid and our proper funding at the

:38:27. > :38:33.Foreign Office, those three things going together do enhance our soft

:38:34. > :38:38.and hard power in the world. I'm always proud when we hear that

:38:39. > :38:42.we're not shrinking from our place on the board's stage. But the brunt

:38:43. > :38:46.of that always falls on the servicemen and we have had many

:38:47. > :38:49.peoples you today on how we should be looking after our servicemen,

:38:50. > :38:55.giving them the right kit and the right mental health. We must also

:38:56. > :38:59.look after their families. When we review every five years what we're

:39:00. > :39:07.doing, can we guarantee we've got enough resources?

:39:08. > :39:11.I agree, I did mention service families because I think it is

:39:12. > :39:15.important that we look after them and the covenant is partly about

:39:16. > :39:19.them. We heard the talk today about what a

:39:20. > :39:27.dreadful dictator Saddam was and how he's been ignoring UN rules. The

:39:28. > :39:32.question in 2003 was "Why now?". That is why the intelligence around

:39:33. > :39:35.weapons of mass destruction was so crucial. Would-be Prime Minister

:39:36. > :39:38.agree with me that the key parts of the special relationship is that it

:39:39. > :39:42.should be like any other relationship. The reason we are so

:39:43. > :39:46.close to some people is that they will tell us what we need to hear,

:39:47. > :39:54.not what want to hear. There is a very good section of the

:39:55. > :39:56.report entitled Why Now. It is important to read the part of the

:39:57. > :40:03.report about what would have happened if Britain had not have

:40:04. > :40:06.stood alongside the United States. In the review, that would not have

:40:07. > :40:09.terminally damaged the special relationship and I think that is the

:40:10. > :40:18.correct. As my right honourable friend said

:40:19. > :40:20.earlier, today, Sir John Chilcot has confirmed the existence of a dirty

:40:21. > :40:31.deal between Tony Blair and President Bush. Given that, will be

:40:32. > :40:36.Prime Minister join me in demanding that Tony Blair apologises

:40:37. > :40:41.unreservedly to the families of the 179 UK service personnel killed, and

:40:42. > :40:45.to be hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who also died. When he or

:40:46. > :40:51.so join me in asking Mr Blair to apologised for the British public,

:40:52. > :40:53.whose faith in me democratic process has been faithfully undermined by

:40:54. > :40:58.this whole sorry affair? We should wait to see what Mr

:40:59. > :41:06.Blatter... He's eating probably while we are here. -- Mr Blair. --

:41:07. > :41:11.he's. -- he's speaking. The barbarity of

:41:12. > :41:15.Saddam Hussein is beyond doubt and my thoughts are with the thousands

:41:16. > :41:22.of Kurds murdered by Mikel weapons in 1988. Despite that, -- by

:41:23. > :41:27.chemical weapons. Despite that, I did not support the 2003 war and

:41:28. > :41:31.Cammy clarify that military action was being taken against Saddam

:41:32. > :41:34.Hussein before then because Will the Prime Minister at knowledge that

:41:35. > :41:41.operation Warden and operation provide comfort, the no-fly zones in

:41:42. > :41:46.Iraq, meant that Saddam Hussein was a caged animal?

:41:47. > :41:49.I think my honourable friend who served in at least one of those

:41:50. > :41:54.missions have made this point before. It's set out here as well.

:41:55. > :41:58.Which is that there was a policy of deterrence and containment. I think

:41:59. > :42:02.Sir John Chilcot argues quite persuasively that that's situation

:42:03. > :42:07.should have continued for longer with more UN action before the last

:42:08. > :42:13.resort of military action. He makes that point very clearly.

:42:14. > :42:17.There are some practical constitutional lessons to be learnt

:42:18. > :42:23.here, specifically for Parliament, given Parliament's role. For

:42:24. > :42:25.example, wouldn't it be better if we had specific opportunity to

:42:26. > :42:29.scrutinise the Attorney General before decisions are made? Shouldn't

:42:30. > :42:33.we have better parliamentary scrutiny of the security services?

:42:34. > :42:38.On those occasions where we do have to come to a decision about military

:42:39. > :42:42.integration, because sometimes that is necessary, shouldn't there be a

:42:43. > :42:46.better equipped to national security council which has that thread of

:42:47. > :42:50.accountability, somehow, back to Parliament?

:42:51. > :42:53.These are all interesting ideas and I'm prepared to consider them. The

:42:54. > :42:58.Attorney General does answer questions in Parliament and is

:42:59. > :43:00.accountable to Parliament. The National Security Council members

:43:01. > :43:06.are accountable to Parliament and there is this committee, both Lords

:43:07. > :43:10.and Commons, which scrutinises the National Security strategy which I

:43:11. > :43:14.have appeared in front of. Our intelligence services are far more

:43:15. > :43:16.accountable than they've ever been, including giving speeches openly

:43:17. > :43:22.about what they're doing and answering questions at meetings in

:43:23. > :43:25.considerable detail. I'm always happy to consider other things, but

:43:26. > :43:31.I think in terms of accountability we have a huge way.

:43:32. > :43:38.I would also paid tribute to troops and also to ask that those who have

:43:39. > :43:42.ended up with broken lives because of it shouldn't just be looked after

:43:43. > :43:48.through the covenant while serving but long-term. We know of cases of

:43:49. > :43:52.troops and their families who are continuing to suffer. Two things

:43:53. > :43:56.coming out of this are that in essence what was being carried out

:43:57. > :44:02.was regime change, which would not normally be considered a legal basis

:44:03. > :44:07.for war, and that there was inadequate planning for the peace

:44:08. > :44:11.afterwards. Does this not apply to Libya? In that predominantly what we

:44:12. > :44:16.got caught into their was getting rid of Colonel Gaddafi and we have

:44:17. > :44:20.invested a fraction in the nation-building in Libya than we did

:44:21. > :44:24.in the border. The other thing mentioned was that Saddam Hussein

:44:25. > :44:29.was known to have attacked his own people, yet we still sold him

:44:30. > :44:33.weapons after that, still sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, we are

:44:34. > :44:38.getting involved in Yemen and no decision!

:44:39. > :44:43.I think she is right to say that the bit of the report dealing with the

:44:44. > :44:49.issue about whether the government was involved in quirks of diplomacy

:44:50. > :44:54.to try and make Iraq go down a different path, or whether this was

:44:55. > :44:59.regime change, makes interesting reading. I would disagree about

:45:00. > :45:05.Libya, it was a humanitarian intervention to stop slaughter of

:45:06. > :45:10.innocent people. We then assisted as forces in Libya strove to get rid of

:45:11. > :45:17.a brutal dictator, who had delivered Semtex the IRA. That is Robert Lee

:45:18. > :45:20.still available to some people in Northern Ireland today. -- that is

:45:21. > :45:26.probably still available. You can have procedures in place and money

:45:27. > :45:31.put into Libya and can still be glib -- still be difficult to get a

:45:32. > :45:38.different outcome. Many of us who voted against the war, particularly

:45:39. > :45:41.on the government side, remember it vividly, the arm-twisting, letters

:45:42. > :45:48.coming in being called to see the Prime Minister for foreign sale --

:45:49. > :45:52.Foreign Secretary, and one lesson for this parliament for members from

:45:53. > :45:59.all sides is that sometimes your country becomes before your party.

:46:00. > :46:04.I think your country should always come before your party. I am not a

:46:05. > :46:08.huge believer in arm-twisting, but sometimes there are times when you

:46:09. > :46:12.believe a course of action to be profoundly right and want to

:46:13. > :46:16.persuade your colleagues. I persist in the view that it would have been

:46:17. > :46:21.better with the United States to take action against Assad after his

:46:22. > :46:25.use of chemical weapons and I tried to persuade colleagues. I don't

:46:26. > :46:30.think I physically twisted anyone's home. I was not successful but it

:46:31. > :46:38.does not mean it was not worth trying. Hundreds of thousands of

:46:39. > :46:42.dead, a region destabilised, generation radicalised, Heist

:46:43. > :46:48.received with a fabricated case for war, all of this is indelibly linked

:46:49. > :46:51.with one man, who should have Iraq tattooed on his forehead. Surely it

:46:52. > :46:56.is not conceivable that someone must be held to account for what has

:46:57. > :47:02.happened over the course of these past years? Everyone has to account

:47:03. > :47:07.for their actions, people voting for this, people who proposed it,

:47:08. > :47:10.failures to planned. Our whole set of arguments in this document to

:47:11. > :47:17.consider and to see how best to hold people to account. It is clear from

:47:18. > :47:21.these exchanges that the report will not settle questions about whether

:47:22. > :47:26.the war was right or wrong. But shouldn't it once and for all lead

:47:27. > :47:33.to arrest allegations of bad faith, lights or deceit? The report finds

:47:34. > :47:37.clearly that there was no falsification or improper use of

:47:38. > :47:43.intelligence, no deception of the Cabinet, no secret commitment to

:47:44. > :47:47.war. I think everyone will have to study the report carefully. Earlier,

:47:48. > :47:54.I tried to give shorthand answers to the question of deceit and legality.

:47:55. > :47:57.But I feel the honourable gentleman that many of these argument should

:47:58. > :48:06.go on. Somebody has complained about not getting calls. I try to call

:48:07. > :48:10.everybody. Although what everyone has to see is enormously important

:48:11. > :48:16.to them, it is not necessarily more important than what anyone else has

:48:17. > :48:20.to say. I don't need any help with my duties, I will call colleagues,

:48:21. > :48:25.but colleagues need to be patient, and I am sure they will not for one

:48:26. > :48:29.moment any of them be self-important. That is not

:48:30. > :48:37.imaginable! LAUGHTER Thank you, Mr Speaker. From my early

:48:38. > :48:41.and hurried reading of the report I can see no evidence anyone acted in

:48:42. > :48:46.bad faith in relation to what was said in the report. But I am aware

:48:47. > :48:51.from reading at the report refers to a war that was 13 years ago. There

:48:52. > :48:57.have been conflicts since, in Libya, with the force but not ground

:48:58. > :49:01.troops. In Syria, where we did not act for several years. Is there

:49:02. > :49:05.anything in subsequent conflicts we are the Prime Minister disagrees

:49:06. > :49:09.with some of the conclusions from this report, to have an updated

:49:10. > :49:16.view, not just basing actions going forward on a report from a war 13

:49:17. > :49:20.years ago? I need to wait for the debate, because they need longer

:49:21. > :49:26.answers. The point I would make is that in the case of Libya obviously

:49:27. > :49:32.we took the decision not to put in ground troops, which had advantages

:49:33. > :49:35.in making sure there were not UK military casualties. But of course

:49:36. > :49:39.it has the disadvantage that you are not more able to directly put in

:49:40. > :49:44.place they plan on the ground. My point I am trying to me, maybe not

:49:45. > :49:49.as clearly as I shoot, is these things are difficult by their very

:49:50. > :49:53.nature. You can have the best military and post conflict plan, and

:49:54. > :49:58.even though you definitely need to half, there is no certainty you will

:49:59. > :50:01.be successful. We should not pretend there are some perfection. We can do

:50:02. > :50:08.better than the past but we will never be perfect. I commend Charles

:50:09. > :50:14.Kennedy for his leadership provided to me and others on this issue. For

:50:15. > :50:18.members today who perhaps were not there in 2003 they may not be aware

:50:19. > :50:21.quite how difficult this decision was, and how much criticism Charles

:50:22. > :50:26.and my colleagues received at the time. Does the Prime Minister

:50:27. > :50:33.believe that there are any pointers in the Chilcot Report, or anything

:50:34. > :50:35.from personal experience, that could perhaps help opposition parties if

:50:36. > :50:40.they are faced with a similar decision in the future and be better

:50:41. > :50:47.placed to scrutinise decisions the government might be about to take?

:50:48. > :50:50.Very good question. The advances that have been made in terms of

:50:51. > :50:55.Select Committee access to government papers, critters -- the

:50:56. > :51:00.scrutiny of intelligence and security services, the process of

:51:01. > :51:04.producing written summaries of legal advice, all these things help, but

:51:05. > :51:15.in the end, you can't substitute judgment as well. In March 2003,

:51:16. > :51:21.Hans Blix believed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. But

:51:22. > :51:27.he wanted more time. I've voted on that day to give him that no time.

:51:28. > :51:31.But the official opposition didn't. And in my view failed in its duty to

:51:32. > :51:37.scrutinise properly. Doesn't the primers to agree that a lesson for

:51:38. > :51:42.today is for a government to work effectively it has to have a

:51:43. > :51:48.competent and effective opposition? -- doesn't the primers that agree?

:51:49. > :51:56.The job of an opposition, I take both bits of it seriously, loyal

:51:57. > :52:00.opposition, and if you think the government is making an interest in

:52:01. > :52:04.-- is making a decision in the interest of the country, you should

:52:05. > :52:12.support it. It is not to oppose it come what may. Thank you for your

:52:13. > :52:20.statement, in particular lessons learned from the Chilcot Report. You

:52:21. > :52:24.referred to systems for veterans. 179 personnel gave their lives

:52:25. > :52:27.bravely. But only two welfare officers were left in headquarters.

:52:28. > :52:32.I've now that has been changed, steps taken to make sure veterans

:52:33. > :52:36.are not forgotten. The government sent brave people to war and should

:52:37. > :52:42.be willing to deliver for them. What will be done as a result of the

:52:43. > :52:47.Chilcot Inquiry to address family support criteria and high suicide

:52:48. > :52:52.rates that there are amongst veterans? You ask an important

:52:53. > :52:55.question. The report itself says huge improvements have been

:52:56. > :52:58.undertaken in terms of family support and liaison since then but

:52:59. > :53:03.there is more the need to do in the area of mental health and that is

:53:04. > :53:07.why we have given this area such a board. You're one of the most humane

:53:08. > :53:11.and rightly well liked members of this House, the honourable member

:53:12. > :53:16.for Strangford, almost laughed and part of the size. My long-term

:53:17. > :53:24.ambition is to persuade him not to use the word you. We will leave it

:53:25. > :53:29.there for today. Mr Alan Brown. In terms of lessons learnt, can act

:53:30. > :53:35.as the Prime Minister to reflect on Syria, and the original support for

:53:36. > :53:42.your strikes against a sad that became a vote for the sheiks against

:53:43. > :53:48.Daesh, -- for the error strikes against Daesh, and in terms of

:53:49. > :53:52.post-conflict planning, can we make the Prime Minister that there is a

:53:53. > :53:57.properly costed plan in place for course conflicts earlier that all

:53:58. > :54:05.foreign powers have signed up to and request the rate financial support

:54:06. > :54:08.for that plan? We have made commitments to support a plan

:54:09. > :54:13.post-reconstruction of Syria but I don't agree about the votes we had

:54:14. > :54:23.in the size, I wish we had won one of them, and wished we had taken

:54:24. > :54:27.action against Assad for his use of chemical weapons. That would have

:54:28. > :54:30.encouraged legitimate opposition and could have helped bring that

:54:31. > :54:36.conflict to rapid closure. The second vote, which we did win, that

:54:37. > :54:40.was right and we made progress in Syria, Britain playing a growing

:54:41. > :54:49.part of that, in making sure the people who directly threaten us in

:54:50. > :54:54.this country are properly combated. In March 2003, there were no moral

:54:55. > :55:00.certainty is available on that evening, and as one of the Labour

:55:01. > :55:04.MPs who voted against the war on that night, I can say I did then,

:55:05. > :55:09.and have always respected those who took a different decision based on

:55:10. > :55:13.what they had heard. But what does the Prime Minister think is the

:55:14. > :55:18.lesson from Chilcott about a relationship with the United Nations

:55:19. > :55:24.and the way we acted on that occasion in relation to the United

:55:25. > :55:28.Nations security council? He asks an interesting question, because before

:55:29. > :55:33.now, I always felt that one of the reasons for going to war was that we

:55:34. > :55:38.were trying to uphold the authority of the United Nations, given that

:55:39. > :55:42.Saddam Hussein was in breach of so many of its resolutions. But Sir

:55:43. > :55:47.John Chilcot says clearly that he thinks it undermined the United

:55:48. > :55:50.Nations and I want to read that bit of the report carefully. I should be

:55:51. > :55:55.clear and interest, my eldest brother served in both Iraq wars and

:55:56. > :56:00.still serves in our Armed Forces today. Above all else, we should

:56:01. > :56:04.take today to pay tribute to all those who serve under families,

:56:05. > :56:12.whether they came home or sadly did not. I wish to draw attention to

:56:13. > :56:18.pages 121-122, regarding the lead to military preparation, a politically

:56:19. > :56:22.expedient decision of the then Prime Minister, and earlier than

:56:23. > :56:26.anticipated deployment of forces and resulting lack of equipment. Does he

:56:27. > :56:30.agree those decisions are necessarily cost the lives of some

:56:31. > :56:34.of my brothers colleagues as there was insufficient time to overcome

:56:35. > :56:41.the shortfall in necessary equipment? First of all, can I thank

:56:42. > :56:44.through him his family for their service in the past and service

:56:45. > :56:54.currently? I can't give him I think an answer. I have read those pages

:56:55. > :57:00.one 121 and 122, but want to read carefully to see if it says that the

:57:01. > :57:07.delay had the effect that he says that it does, but perhaps I could

:57:08. > :57:11.write to him about that. I join all of those in this House paying

:57:12. > :57:17.tribute to Armed Forces, we owe them a huge debt of gratitude. But can I

:57:18. > :57:22.quote from the resignation speech of Robin Cook? He said, our interests

:57:23. > :57:27.are best protected not by unilateral action but by multilateral agreement

:57:28. > :57:32.and world order governed by rules. Does the Prime Minister agree that

:57:33. > :57:37.his statement then is as true today as it was at the time? And therefore

:57:38. > :57:42.one response to this report must be deep commitment to the United

:57:43. > :57:43.Nations, to Nato and somehow rebuild a relationship with European

:57:44. > :57:54.friends? We should all want to be committed

:57:55. > :57:59.to a wall of worlds and strong institutions, but there should be --

:58:00. > :58:05.a world of rules and strong institutions. Because a veto by one

:58:06. > :58:08.Security Council member, if you say we can then only act when the UN

:58:09. > :58:16.sanctions it you're stuck with rules that lead you to take a potentially

:58:17. > :58:21.immoral decision not to act to stop a humanitarian catastrophe or such.

:58:22. > :58:24.We have to be careful that yes, we want institutions or walls, that we

:58:25. > :58:28.have two reserve the ability to act where we think it is in either an

:58:29. > :58:35.national interest or a humanitarian interest to do so.

:58:36. > :58:39.I must first declare an interest in that my husband has served in our

:58:40. > :58:45.Armed Forces. It is crucial for Armed Forces families to have the

:58:46. > :58:47.utmost faith in governmental procedures and in Parliamentary

:58:48. > :58:51.scrutiny before they send their loved ones to war. Does the Prime

:58:52. > :58:56.Minister agree the decisions made in Iraq have undermined their faith?

:58:57. > :58:59.Will he apologised to them for the failings highlighted in the report

:59:00. > :59:04.in an effort to reach out and rebuild the trust?

:59:05. > :59:08.I think the best thing that we can do is to make sure that when

:59:09. > :59:14.mistakes are made, and when bad consequences follow as were the case

:59:15. > :59:18.with Iraq and the failure to plan, is that reports like this are

:59:19. > :59:20.commissioned and properly discussed and debated and lessons learned.

:59:21. > :59:25.This is the most important thing that we can do and that is something

:59:26. > :59:32.which this government and the previous one that commissioned the

:59:33. > :59:37.report are committed to doing. As a newly elected councillor, my

:59:38. > :59:42.very first motion before my counsel was to oppose this unjust war and I

:59:43. > :59:49.want to reaffirm that position strongly here today. A war that we

:59:50. > :59:52.found today to be based on a legality that was far from

:59:53. > :59:58.satisfactory and flawed intelligence. A war that resulted in

:59:59. > :00:03.the deaths of 179 British service personnel. A war that resulted in

:00:04. > :00:08.the deaths of over 100,000 innocent men and women and children. A war

:00:09. > :00:12.that resulted in the displacement of over 1 million people and a war that

:00:13. > :00:26.resulted in greater instability in that region. We cannot have a

:00:27. > :00:30.situation where we ever go into -- blindly go into war that results in

:00:31. > :00:34.the deaths of thousands of innocent men, women and children. I would

:00:35. > :00:38.like to ask the Prime Minister what measures he will be immediately

:00:39. > :00:42.putting into place, given the lessons that we have learnt from

:00:43. > :00:45.Chilcot. We will study the report very

:00:46. > :00:51.carefully to see what more lessons can be learned. Some of the early

:00:52. > :00:54.lessons are about processes, procedures, legal advice, National

:00:55. > :00:59.Security Council 's, use of intelligence information. There are

:01:00. > :01:05.still more things to be learnt and I commit to learning those lessons.

:01:06. > :01:09.At 24 years old I am the second gentlest member of this house. Many

:01:10. > :01:15.of the 179 service personnel who were killed in Iraq were under the

:01:16. > :01:20.age of 24, including 14 service men and women who were 19 and under. I

:01:21. > :01:23.commend their bravery and sacrifice. What specific assurances can the

:01:24. > :01:27.Prime Minister give to these families of the brave men and women

:01:28. > :01:31.that the disastrous decisions that led to their deaths will not be

:01:32. > :01:36.repeated, and those that led to this decision be held to account?

:01:37. > :01:42.First, I can say to those families thank you for the service and

:01:43. > :01:45.sacrifice of their children. We should genuinely praised the work

:01:46. > :01:52.that everyone in our Armed Forces did. We have two separate the

:01:53. > :01:55.decision-making and the lessons learned and the problems, separate

:01:56. > :02:01.fact from the military action. These people were serving their country.

:02:02. > :02:06.They were serving their country in a cause that had been sanctioned by

:02:07. > :02:09.the House of Commons. We should in any way denigrate their memory

:02:10. > :02:12.because they were doing what they believe in which was serving their

:02:13. > :02:16.country. The most important thing we can do for all the memories is to

:02:17. > :02:22.digest this report, learn the lessons and put in place better

:02:23. > :02:26.decision-making for the future. It has been 30 years since Robin

:02:27. > :02:31.Cook returned to the backbenches. The worst possible tribute that this

:02:32. > :02:34.house could pay to him or, more importantly, to the many service men

:02:35. > :02:40.and women and Iraqis killed and injured in this conflict would be to

:02:41. > :02:44.draw the wrong conclusions or, worse, to learn no lessons at

:02:45. > :02:48.school. As the Prime Minister prepares his own departure to the

:02:49. > :02:53.backbenches, can he tell us what advice he will give to his successor

:02:54. > :02:56.to ensure that we restore to Britain a foreign policy with an ethical

:02:57. > :03:00.dimension? I think our foreign policy should

:03:01. > :03:05.always have an ethical dimension and always have. The advice I give to my

:03:06. > :03:09.successor is to build on the processes and procedures that we've

:03:10. > :03:13.put in place so we better handle intelligence information and legal

:03:14. > :03:17.advice, we better discuss and debate the things in the National Security

:03:18. > :03:22.Council. We listen to expert opinion in the proper way. The worst lesson

:03:23. > :03:26.to learn would be that somehow, because the things difficult, but we

:03:27. > :03:32.should withdraw from the world, failed to intervene when it's in our

:03:33. > :03:36.interest do so. We should somehow retreat in the way that I've set up.

:03:37. > :03:39.That would be the wrong thing to do and I don't think that's what Robin

:03:40. > :03:45.Cook would want. My constituent Ben Shaw with a

:03:46. > :03:50.veteran from Iraq where he was blinded and will never be able to

:03:51. > :03:52.see his own family again. Then has been eagerly awaiting the

:03:53. > :03:58.publication of the Chilcot Report and has some real concerns that

:03:59. > :04:02.lessons may not be followed and it may be brushed under the carpet. Can

:04:03. > :04:08.I ask the premise to give some assurances to Ben as to what action

:04:09. > :04:12.will be taken to ensure the fullest possible access to veterans such as

:04:13. > :04:17.Bennett to get access to the full report whenever they can?

:04:18. > :04:20.Through the honourable gentleman, can I thank them for his service to

:04:21. > :04:26.our country and everything that he did. We must continue to help him

:04:27. > :04:29.throughout his life. The MOD ministers have offered meetings with

:04:30. > :04:33.veterans and their going ahead. The assurance I can give is that we

:04:34. > :04:36.already learnt a lot of important lessons. Whitehall is a very

:04:37. > :04:41.different place. The way decisions are taking is different, the use of

:04:42. > :04:46.legal advice is different. I don't underestimate the extent to which

:04:47. > :04:49.Whitehall has taken on board already so many lessons and change its

:04:50. > :04:53.practices and its culture. Clearly, they'll be more to do and that is

:04:54. > :05:01.why we should have this day debate. -- clearly there will be more to do.

:05:02. > :05:06.I pay tribute to the 179 brave servicemen and women who lost their

:05:07. > :05:12.life, including Corporal Matthew Cornish from Otley whose loss is

:05:13. > :05:17.still felt today. We've heard the Prime Minister make some powerful

:05:18. > :05:21.statements including about Hillsborough and bloody Sunday. But

:05:22. > :05:25.I have to say to him in his last major statement in the role that

:05:26. > :05:30.today we heard equivocation, and we have and have the acceptance that

:05:31. > :05:33.this country needs. There will be dismay at some of the contributions

:05:34. > :05:37.seeking, even now, to suggest that this was not a terrible mistake.

:05:38. > :05:41.Surely the first rule in politics is to accept when you done something

:05:42. > :05:46.wrong. The Prime Minister should be prepared to accept a mistake. A

:05:47. > :05:49.government should be prepared to accept a mistake. Parliament should

:05:50. > :05:54.be prepared to accept a mistake. If this house does not accept that Iraq

:05:55. > :05:57.was a disastrous mistake, then we have learnt nothing whatsoever from

:05:58. > :06:03.this. I've tried to be careful today to

:06:04. > :06:08.recognise that this was the act of a previous government. It was them,

:06:09. > :06:12.principally, to explain why they to be decisions that they did. And also

:06:13. > :06:17.I've tried to be careful today that this is not my report. This is Sir

:06:18. > :06:20.John Chilcot's report and the first thing we have to do is to read it

:06:21. > :06:26.carefully and take into account what it finds. I've tried very faithfully

:06:27. > :06:32.to reflect what he says and the way he says it with all the nuances that

:06:33. > :06:35.there, rather than simply to out some punchy bits that either down

:06:36. > :06:38.the Government or praise the Government that then was because I

:06:39. > :06:42.don't think that's my responsibility. My responsibility is

:06:43. > :06:46.to handle the publication of this, to draw out the lessons and to let

:06:47. > :06:51.others who were responsible at the time account for themselves.

:06:52. > :06:57.On a practical level, the report sets out but it's a difficult for

:06:58. > :07:00.intelligence to be assessed by members of Parliament. Currently,

:07:01. > :07:07.intelligence have only shared with the ISC after the event. It is an

:07:08. > :07:11.shed during current operations. Two years ago, the opposition put

:07:12. > :07:13.forward an amendment to allow in exceptional circumstances

:07:14. > :07:19.intelligence to be shared with the ISC for current engagements and

:07:20. > :07:23.situations. I wonder whether the Prime Minister, in light of the

:07:24. > :07:26.report today, thinks it would be worth revisiting that point and

:07:27. > :07:30.giving the eye these that opportunity in exceptional

:07:31. > :07:34.circumstances such as this country being on the brink of war to have

:07:35. > :07:41.access to intelligence? -- giving the ISC.

:07:42. > :07:47.What the lady is asking for is quite a difficult process. Ministers take

:07:48. > :07:50.action on the advice of officials and intelligence that of Catholic

:07:51. > :07:57.controlled by the joint intelligence committee. The me have two account

:07:58. > :08:02.-- that it carefully gathered by the joint intelligence committee. It is

:08:03. > :08:05.then to the Government or intelligence committee to put some

:08:06. > :08:09.of that intelligence in front of Parliament, as we did in the case of

:08:10. > :08:16.Libya and Syria. By its very nature, the idea of sharing intelligence on

:08:17. > :08:20.a much more wide basis I think is going to be very difficult and I

:08:21. > :08:25.don't want to do that. The ISC is there to scrutinise decisions that

:08:26. > :08:28.have been taken, rather than to pre-emptively review a decision that

:08:29. > :08:34.is about to be taken. We do need to get our ducks in a row. If we try to

:08:35. > :08:43.model but, I think we will get ourselves into a modem.

:08:44. > :08:49.My thoughts today -- into a muddle. My thoughts with a constituent son

:08:50. > :08:54.was killed in Iraq aged 18 years old and has waited a long time for the

:08:55. > :08:58.enquiry. The Prime Minister's statement on page 11 and the bottom

:08:59. > :09:02.says sending our brave troops onto the battlefield without the right

:09:03. > :09:11.equipment was unacceptable. Can I ask the Prime Minister to reflect,

:09:12. > :09:14.does the Prime Minister not appreciate that the state should

:09:15. > :09:18.apologise to the military families for their sons and daughters being

:09:19. > :09:21.sent into a war without the correct equipment? Will he take this

:09:22. > :09:30.opportunity to apologise to those families?

:09:31. > :09:32.First of all, he's absolutely right. Providing the correct military

:09:33. > :09:35.equipment is an obligation on government and I think huge steps

:09:36. > :09:41.forward have been taken in the last few years to make that happen. In

:09:42. > :09:47.terms of the responsibility for government apologies and the rest of

:09:48. > :09:52.it, the Government that took these decisions, the people responsible,

:09:53. > :09:56.are still alive and able to answer the criticisms in the report. I

:09:57. > :10:03.think this is slightly different to the situation over, for instance,

:10:04. > :10:08.Bloody Sunday or Hillsborough. This report is about a government

:10:09. > :10:13.decision and set of decisions that were taken. The people responsible

:10:14. > :10:18.are still around. It's easy for a Prime Minister to stand up and make

:10:19. > :10:21.an apology. I don't think this is appropriate for me today because I

:10:22. > :10:25.think the people who made these decisions are still around. That's

:10:26. > :10:31.what I chosen to speak in the way that I have.

:10:32. > :10:35.Thank you to the Prime Minister and to all colleagues to take part in

:10:36. > :10:38.these exchanges. Statement, the Secretary of State for Health.

:10:39. > :10:43.Secretary Jeremy Hunt.