13/07/2016

:00:26. > :00:32.Order. I will come to the honourable lady. How could I forget her? Her

:00:33. > :00:36.point of order will be heard, but I will deal with the presentation of

:00:37. > :00:46.the bill first. Presentation of Bill, Mr Craig McKinley. 1847

:00:47. > :00:54.Amendment Bill. Second readhng, what day? Friday 4th of November. Friday

:00:55. > :01:00.the 4th of November. Thank xou. The presentation of Bill, Mr Geremy

:01:01. > :01:08.Davis. UK environmental protection standards Bill. Second readhng, what

:01:09. > :01:14.day? Friday the 20th of October 2016. Friday the 28th of October.

:01:15. > :01:17.Thank you. Before we come to the ten minute rule motion, I will take the

:01:18. > :01:21.point of order from the honourable lady and any other points of order

:01:22. > :01:27.if there are such. Point of order, Diana Johnson. In light of the

:01:28. > :01:29.announcement that the Prime Minister made during Prime Minister's

:01:30. > :01:35.Questions time about the contaminated blood, financi`l

:01:36. > :01:38.support for people who recehved contaminated blood from the NHS in

:01:39. > :01:44.years gone by, I wondered whether it would be in order for you to seek a

:01:45. > :01:48.minister to come to the house to give further details. This hs an

:01:49. > :01:52.issue many members across all sides of the house have been concdrned

:01:53. > :01:57.about the many years, and whilst it is welcome that the Prime Mhnister

:01:58. > :02:01.has said that the government has reached a conclusion and will bring

:02:02. > :02:04.forward proposals they would wish to implement, I think it would be

:02:05. > :02:09.helpful for all members to have an opportunity to question a hdalth

:02:10. > :02:13.minister about the actual implications of what is announced

:02:14. > :02:18.today. I understand, Mr Spe`ker with respect, that the minister

:02:19. > :02:22.indicated in an e-mail to md this afternoon that she intends to put a

:02:23. > :02:25.written statement to the hotse tomorrow, but I would certahnly say,

:02:26. > :02:29.in light of the overwhelming interest on all sides of thd house,

:02:30. > :02:34.a minister appearing at the dispatch box would be much more helpful to

:02:35. > :02:38.members of Parliament. I th`nk the honourable lady for her point of

:02:39. > :02:41.order. This is an issue to which she has devoted close attention and

:02:42. > :02:47.which she has raised many thmes in the house, not least if memory

:02:48. > :02:52.serves me, on the 26th of M`rch 2015, to give but one example. I

:02:53. > :02:59.think it is only fair to sax to the honourable lady that tomorrow a day

:03:00. > :03:09.likely to be heavily subscrhbed being the second day of the two day

:03:10. > :03:15.debate on the report of the Iraqi enquiry. Whether they're for

:03:16. > :03:18.tomorrow is necessarily the best day for the purpose, I would like to

:03:19. > :03:22.suspend judgment on that matter but I'm happy to say to the honourable

:03:23. > :03:26.lady that from my vantage point knowing the extent and breadth of

:03:27. > :03:31.interest across the house in the issue, I think it would show a

:03:32. > :03:35.sensitivity to Parliamentarx feeling if there were an oral statelent

:03:36. > :03:38.rather than merely a written one. I hope that that is helpful and

:03:39. > :03:43.constitutes, in the mind of the honourable lady, an answer. If there

:03:44. > :03:50.are no further points of order, we come to the ten minute rule motion.

:03:51. > :03:54.Margaret Greenwood. Mr Speaker, I beg to move that leave be ghven to

:03:55. > :03:57.bring in the bill to re-est`blish the Secretary of State legal duties

:03:58. > :04:01.to the NHS in England and to make provision about the other dtties of

:04:02. > :04:03.the Secretary of State in that regard, to make provision about the

:04:04. > :04:08.administration of accountabhlity of the NHS in England, to repe`l

:04:09. > :04:14.section one of the Private Finance act 1997 and sections 38 and 13 on

:04:15. > :04:19.the immigration act 2014, and part nine of the health and soci`l care

:04:20. > :04:22.information act 2012 to makd provision about internation`l law in

:04:23. > :04:26.relation to the NHS and for connected purposes. It is a

:04:27. > :04:30.privilege to have the opportunity to present this builds House of Commons

:04:31. > :04:34.and I would like to pay tribute to the many patients, nurses, doctors,

:04:35. > :04:38.trade unions and campaigners across the country who have worked

:04:39. > :04:40.tirelessly to combat the privatisation of our Nation`l Health

:04:41. > :04:45.Service. I would also like to pay tribute to the work done by my right

:04:46. > :04:48.honourable friend, the membdr for the York Central, and that for

:04:49. > :04:52.Brighton Pavilion on this m`tter. The bill seeks to fully restore the

:04:53. > :04:56.NHS is at an accountable public service by reversing markethsation,

:04:57. > :05:05.abolishing the purpose of provider split and re-enacting of making

:05:06. > :05:14.them. We are seeing the privatisation of

:05:15. > :05:17.the NHS happen at pace. There are, I believe, three chord changes that

:05:18. > :05:22.the act brought in that are driving this privatisation -- core changes.

:05:23. > :05:25.Firstly the removal of the Secretary of State the health's legal duty to

:05:26. > :05:30.provide a comprehensive nathonal health service in England. The

:05:31. > :05:34.requirement to put NHS contracts out to the free market, putting the

:05:35. > :05:39.profit motive is at the heart of the service. And thirdly, allowhng NHS

:05:40. > :05:44.hospitals to make up to 49% of their money out of private patients. This

:05:45. > :05:49.bill makes the case for a planned, managed health service and

:05:50. > :05:53.reinstates the duty of the Secretary of State to provide a securd and

:05:54. > :05:57.comprehensive National Health Service which was lost under the

:05:58. > :06:01.2012 act. This is important, because on the current arrangements,

:06:02. > :06:06.clinical commissioning groups don't have do serve a geographic `rea nor

:06:07. > :06:10.are they required to attend to all conditions. In some areas there is

:06:11. > :06:14.already rationing of certain treatments, such as hip and knee

:06:15. > :06:17.replacements and cataract operations. Reinstating the duty of

:06:18. > :06:18.the Secretary of State for Health is vital to government account`bility

:06:19. > :06:30.needed if we are to The health and social care `ct

:06:31. > :06:34.allows the tendering of services into the private marketplacd,

:06:35. > :06:41.allowing companies to cherrx pick services. We have seen the dffect of

:06:42. > :06:44.NHS contracts going to priv`te companies, undermining the services

:06:45. > :06:48.and pay and conditions to staff and fragmenting the service. Thd sums of

:06:49. > :06:58.money involved are eye watering The government would have us believe 6%

:06:59. > :07:05.of contracts go to private firms, but a report says 38% go to private

:07:06. > :07:09.firms, securing 3.54 billion of the 9.2 six ?8 billion awarded. Does

:07:10. > :07:13.this matter? I would say absolutely without question. We know that

:07:14. > :07:19.contracting out is very extdnsive. In the USA, this cost accounts for

:07:20. > :07:25.around 30% of health care expenditure, at 25% in the nonmarket

:07:26. > :07:29.NHS pre-19 90. Any private company has a duty to generate profht and

:07:30. > :07:32.shareholders but the money we pay in our taxes should be spent on patient

:07:33. > :07:36.care and not going to the shareholders. We know that putting

:07:37. > :07:39.health care contracts out to competitive tender means money spent

:07:40. > :07:45.on marketing, lawyers, which could be spent on patients. We know that a

:07:46. > :07:48.proliferation of providers lean a proliferation of administrative

:07:49. > :07:53.costs and that it also opens up opportunities for fraud. Thd only

:07:54. > :07:57.way the private sector is rdducing cost is by cutting quality. This

:07:58. > :08:01.might happen to a number of means, cutting pay and terms and conditions

:08:02. > :08:05.of staff, or selling off of nationally owned assets. As a

:08:06. > :08:11.nation, I believe we hold otr doctors, nurses and other NHS staff

:08:12. > :08:14.in high esteem. It is important we protect pay and conditions. This

:08:15. > :08:20.bill requires national pay `nd conditions for relevant NHS staff

:08:21. > :08:24.under the NHS staff council agenda for change system. It includes

:08:25. > :08:27.provisions to aim to prevent the application of competition law and

:08:28. > :08:34.procurement rules to the NHS. It would abolish the monitor rdgulator

:08:35. > :08:42.that oversees the regulation of procurement costs, and it would

:08:43. > :08:45.repeal sections of the 2012 act relation to procurement, tariff

:08:46. > :08:49.prices and administration. H would like to consider the 49%. NHS

:08:50. > :08:54.hospitals are now allowed to make up the 49% of their money from private

:08:55. > :08:59.patients because of that 2002 act. How they make their 49% of loney is

:09:00. > :09:07.up to them. The startling f`ct is they can do it. They can choose to

:09:08. > :09:12.devote 49% of beds to private patients, 49% of theatre tile, 9%

:09:13. > :09:15.of consultant time, and absolutely nobody voted for that. It w`s in

:09:16. > :09:20.neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Democrat party's

:09:21. > :09:23.manifesto, and yet they went ahead and pass the legislation to make it

:09:24. > :09:27.happen. I believe this is nothing short of a national scandal. And I

:09:28. > :09:30.would ask honourable members to reflect on what it would me`n for

:09:31. > :09:34.their constituents if their hospital were to choose to do this. How soon

:09:35. > :09:40.with this happened? In some places it is happening already. Thd Royal

:09:41. > :09:44.Marsden Hospital now makes 26th cent of its money out of private

:09:45. > :09:49.patients, that is over a qu`rter. And so I turned to the financial

:09:50. > :09:53.crisis in the NHS, something we are aware of and it is particul`rly

:09:54. > :09:57.notable in our hospitals. Wd also know that the financial crisis is

:09:58. > :10:05.accelerating at a frightening pace. NHS trusts in England have recorded

:10:06. > :10:11.a deficit 2.45 billion for this is year, the biggest overspend in the

:10:12. > :10:16.history of the NHS, three thmes the overspend of the previous ydar, and

:10:17. > :10:20.20 times the size of the 2003-1 deficit. Three out of four of our

:10:21. > :10:24.hospitals are predicted to be in deficit this year and the fhnancial

:10:25. > :10:29.crisis is impacting deliverx of care. It is not a fickle to see how

:10:30. > :10:32.hospital managers may feel hn these circumstances that increasing the

:10:33. > :10:37.amount of private patients the NHS hospitals treat to generate income

:10:38. > :10:43.is one of the few options open to them. Then we can look at the

:10:44. > :10:48.arrival of sustainability transformation plans. England has

:10:49. > :10:58.been divided into 44 areas, each of which is to come up with a STP. The

:10:59. > :11:02.first priority of the STP is that CCGs and providers must stax within

:11:03. > :11:09.budget for the next four ye`rs. To be entitled to access to centrally

:11:10. > :11:14.controlled funding, so they will face cut choices, charging for

:11:15. > :11:19.services, rationing services, cutting services or selling assets.

:11:20. > :11:24.We can expect to see hospit`ls taking private patients to generate

:11:25. > :11:30.cash and putting NHS patients to the back of the queue. The government

:11:31. > :11:33.would argue that the hospit`ls will be able to reinvest the mondy from

:11:34. > :11:38.private patients but this does not stack up. If you cut resources from

:11:39. > :11:42.NHS patients then waiting thme will grow and we will see the qu`lity of

:11:43. > :11:49.the service declined. We will see a two tier health service, first rate

:11:50. > :11:53.for the people who have the money to pay, and second rate for people who

:11:54. > :11:57.are NHS. The concept of fred at the point of use NHS will be lost

:11:58. > :12:00.without a generation to grow within a generation and who will bd faced

:12:01. > :12:04.with having to pay for health insurance like they do in Alerica.

:12:05. > :12:08.These hospitals are ours, they have been paid for by our taxes `nd they

:12:09. > :12:17.are not the government's to give away. This bill addresses this and

:12:18. > :12:22.will remove the right to get NHS patients -- private patients to be

:12:23. > :12:25.49% of the hospital's patients. Why should we settle for an NHS which is

:12:26. > :12:30.free to all who are needed tnless they are elderly or have context

:12:31. > :12:34.needs? This bill provides us with an opportunity to provide a ch`nge to

:12:35. > :12:40.that, giving the Secretary of State a duty to integrate health `nd

:12:41. > :12:43.social care. This integration was a key aim of the Right Honour`ble

:12:44. > :12:47.member for Lee when he was secretary of state health in last Parliament

:12:48. > :12:51.and form part of the Labour Party manifesto. I think it would be

:12:52. > :12:55.welcomed by families of another country. The bill would provide for

:12:56. > :12:59.the transfer of financial obligations on the NHS PFI `grees to

:13:00. > :13:04.the Treasury would be obligdd to publish their obligations. Ht would

:13:05. > :13:12.improve public health and good, to some up, stop the privatisation of

:13:13. > :13:18.the images and refund make ht back to its primary principle. It is the

:13:19. > :13:22.public service ethos which has been a hallmark of the NHS. It is on life

:13:23. > :13:27.support at the moment and the public patient at NHS staff know it. This

:13:28. > :13:33.bill provides a viable alternative. The NHS 68 years old last wdek, we

:13:34. > :13:41.need to know it is there for all who need it in the next 60 years. The

:13:42. > :13:49.question is that the honour`ble member have leave to bring hn the

:13:50. > :13:57.bill. Mr Philip Davies. Thank you very much. I rise to oppose this

:13:58. > :14:00.bill. The whole bill, Mr Spdaker, is based on the fourth premise. The

:14:01. > :14:05.honourable lady said that the bill is necessary to stop the

:14:06. > :14:13.privatisation of the NHS. -, the whole bill is based on a forced --

:14:14. > :14:18.untrue premise. The privatisation of the NHS is not occurring so by her

:14:19. > :14:22.own words, this bill is not necessary. In fact, she may have

:14:23. > :14:26.gone a bit further, particularly with people on this side of the

:14:27. > :14:30.House, if she had actually... She was laying the blame of the

:14:31. > :14:37.so-called privatisation of the NHS on the House and social card act of

:14:38. > :14:41.2012. And thinks that repealing that act of 2012 would solve the problem

:14:42. > :14:47.of the colour as she describes it, the privatisation of the NHS. The

:14:48. > :14:50.honourable lady, who does not even seem to be able to be bothered to

:14:51. > :14:54.listen to the debate, even though it is her bill, the honourable lady

:14:55. > :14:57.might have actually acknowlddged that the so-called privatis`tion of

:14:58. > :15:05.the NHS was started long before the health and social care act of 2 12.

:15:06. > :15:09.In fact it gathered pace, it actually gathered pace, Mr Speaker,

:15:10. > :15:13.during the last Labour government. And if we look at the figurds for

:15:14. > :15:18.the expenditure on private providers, what we will acttally see

:15:19. > :15:22.is that from a near standing start under the Labour government, the

:15:23. > :15:27.amount of the total NHS resource expenditure which actually went to

:15:28. > :15:29.private providers group much more rapidly under the last Labotr

:15:30. > :15:35.government than it has under this government, the increase of NHS

:15:36. > :15:39.resources going to private providers actually slowed down under this

:15:40. > :15:45.government. The rate of increase is now much lower than it was. It was

:15:46. > :15:49.actually higher Labour government that introduced the private sector

:15:50. > :15:52.into the NHS. -- it was her Labour government and allowed priv`te

:15:53. > :15:57.sector providers to allow treatment on the NHS. That is something that I

:15:58. > :16:04.welcome, as it happens. I do not see that has a bad thing. I see that as

:16:05. > :16:07.a good thing. My constituents, who normally, with the NHS, if they need

:16:08. > :16:11.some hospital treatment, have to go either to Bradford Royal Infirmary

:16:12. > :16:15.which is not in my constitudncy it is in the constituency of the

:16:16. > :16:21.honourable member for Bradford West, they have to go to Airedale Hospital

:16:22. > :16:24.which is in another constittency. Under the current provisions whereby

:16:25. > :16:28.the NHS can actually allow private providers to supply these sdrvices,

:16:29. > :16:36.my constituents can now go to the my constituents can now go to

:16:37. > :16:39.Yorkshire clinic in my constituency. To have high-quality treatmdnt

:16:40. > :16:45.closer to their homes, and still free at the point of need. @s far as

:16:46. > :16:48.I am concerned, Mr Speaker, the essential founding principld of the

:16:49. > :16:52.NHS that must be preserved hs that treatment is free at the pohnt of

:16:53. > :16:57.need. That is really what m`tters to people. What people want whdn they

:16:58. > :17:01.need health care treatment hs they want free health care at thd point

:17:02. > :17:08.of need and high-quality he`lth care at a very convenient location for

:17:09. > :17:12.them, perhaps for their famhly members to visit. Whether that is

:17:13. > :17:15.carried out at an NHS hospital or private hospital in that sense is

:17:16. > :17:18.neither here nor there, as long as they are getting the treatmdnt free

:17:19. > :17:22.of charge at the point of nded. My constituents are greatly benefiting

:17:23. > :17:25.from this by being able to have their treatment at the Yorkshire

:17:26. > :17:32.clinic rather than having to go to one of the NHS hospitals outside of

:17:33. > :17:35.my constituency. The last L`bour government, Mr Speaker, werd

:17:36. > :17:38.actually far worse when it came to giving contracts out to the private

:17:39. > :17:42.sector, because those of us who were here at the time-honoured that they

:17:43. > :17:47.did not pay the same tariff... The honourable lady for Oldham keeps

:17:48. > :17:55.chatting away from the front bench, if she listens, she might ldarn

:17:56. > :17:58.something. She will do. And other memorable members may do as well.

:17:59. > :18:04.Many of us were not here at the time, but those of us who wdre here

:18:05. > :18:07.will recall... The honourable member to Shipley is exercising his

:18:08. > :18:11.democratic rights as a parliamentarian and the honourable

:18:12. > :18:17.gentleman must be heard. And preferably with courtesy, btt

:18:18. > :18:20.certainly without noise. Th`nk you, Mr Speaker, I appreciate th`t. The

:18:21. > :18:24.point I was making is that when the Labour Party used to give up contact

:18:25. > :18:28.the private sector, they actually paid the private providers `re

:18:29. > :18:35.higher tariffs are carrying out that work than they paid to NHS hospitals

:18:36. > :18:38.and NHS providers. Which, to my mind, was complete outrage. They are

:18:39. > :18:42.so against the private sector, why on earth are they paying thhs

:18:43. > :18:46.private providers are higher tariffs they were the NHS providers? It was

:18:47. > :18:50.this government that stopped that absolutely absurd practice `nd made

:18:51. > :18:54.sure that private providers were now only pays the same tariff as NHS

:18:55. > :18:58.providers. Perhaps the honotrable lady might have mentioned that in

:18:59. > :19:07.her remarks, but again, failed to do so. So the whole bill is based on a

:19:08. > :19:12.false permits. The last Labour government introduced tariffs, it

:19:13. > :19:19.paid private providers of c`rrying out the same work than NHS patients,

:19:20. > :19:26.-- Morford carrying out the same work. This government belt with

:19:27. > :19:29.those absurdities. The other thing I want to point out is the other part

:19:30. > :19:33.of this bill which the honotrable lady was pretty quiet on, which is

:19:34. > :19:38.about the section 38 of the immigration act, 2014, that she

:19:39. > :19:46.wishes to repeal. This actu`lly provides for nationals from outside

:19:47. > :19:50.of the EEA who cover more than six months, requiring them to p`y health

:19:51. > :19:54.are charge when they make their immigration application. Although

:19:55. > :19:57.there are no statistics on the revenue raised from the surcharge, a

:19:58. > :20:02.Parliamentary question last year showed that the government dstimated

:20:03. > :20:09.it would recover ?200 million per year from it from foreign n`tionals

:20:10. > :20:12.using the NHS. The honourable lady wishes to repeal the legisl`tion, in

:20:13. > :20:16.effect she wants foreign nationals to come into the UK and use the NHS

:20:17. > :20:23.free of charge. Their wonder she mentioned so little of it in her

:20:24. > :20:26.speech. -- no wonder. She speaks about the financial crisis being

:20:27. > :20:30.suffered by the NHS, and shd is now bringing forward a bill which will

:20:31. > :20:35.stop the NHS being able to recover some of this money that is spent on

:20:36. > :20:41.foreign nationals, treating them in the NHS. The whole bill, Mr Speaker,

:20:42. > :20:44.is a complete absurdity, and a complete nonsense. And if she was so

:20:45. > :20:48.proud of this particular provision in the Bill, why did she not

:20:49. > :20:53.munching it during her speech? Maybe she secretly is embarrassing about

:20:54. > :20:55.it as well, maybe she knows that her constituents would not parthcularly

:20:56. > :20:59.appreciate the fact that shd has tried to pass legislation in this

:21:00. > :21:05.house to give free treatment to foreign nationals actually costing

:21:06. > :21:08.the NHS, not saving the NHS money. I know that she is one of the last

:21:09. > :21:13.remaining supporters of the Leader of the Opposition. But even he might

:21:14. > :21:17.think that that is a rather strange thing for her to be doing to try and

:21:18. > :21:22.help the financial situation of the NHS.

:21:23. > :21:34.maybe, and I know this is the same bill brought forward by the Green MP

:21:35. > :21:39.for Brighton, but she maybe did not realise it brought forward that

:21:40. > :21:43.provision. It was either an admission on her part -- omhssion on

:21:44. > :21:49.her part or an absurdity th`t she wants to bring in legislation to

:21:50. > :21:53.take ?200 million away from the NHS. How that helps to save the NHS is

:21:54. > :21:58.the one she might be able to discuss. I can't see the logic in

:21:59. > :22:01.it. Mr Speaker, I don't intdnd to stop her having her moment hn the

:22:02. > :22:08.sun and bringing forward her bill, but I just wanted to point out that

:22:09. > :22:11.the whole bill is based on ` false premise. It was the last Labour

:22:12. > :22:15.government that introduced the private sector into the NHS, not

:22:16. > :22:20.this government, and no matter how many times she wants to repdat that

:22:21. > :22:23.particular myth it won't get off the ground, and her bill will actually

:22:24. > :22:27.cost the NHS more money, it won t save the NHS any money on and on

:22:28. > :22:31.that basis, when it does cole forward to the house I shall be

:22:32. > :22:36.here, Mr Speaker. The questhon is that the honourable member have

:22:37. > :22:43.leave to bring in the bill. As many of that opinion say our way. , on

:22:44. > :22:49.the contrary know. I think the ayes have it. Who will prepare and bring

:22:50. > :22:54.in the Bill? Caroline Lucas, Dawn Butler, Stella Creasy, petered out,

:22:55. > :22:56.Mike Kane, Liz McGuinness, Xasmin Qureshi, Stephen Twigg and John Pugh

:22:57. > :23:29.and myself. -- Peter Dow. The National Health Service bill.

:23:30. > :23:41.Second reading, what day? 4th of November 2016. 4th of November 016,

:23:42. > :23:45.thank you. Order. Motion nulber two, point of order, Mr Ian Austhn. In

:23:46. > :23:51.the debate on the 13th of Jtne I raise the issue of British taxpayer

:23:52. > :23:55.money being used to fund convicting -- convicted Palestinian terrorists.

:23:56. > :23:59.I've twice requested that the Minister of State publishes the

:24:00. > :24:02.memorandum of understanding between defeat and the Palestinian

:24:03. > :24:09.Authority. The Minister has written to me an extraordinary lettdr as

:24:10. > :24:12.saying that they are speaking to the PA to discuss the release of the

:24:13. > :24:15.document, and the Palestini`n authorities give him the right to

:24:16. > :24:18.veto a member of Parliament request for information. How are we supposed

:24:19. > :24:24.to hold the government to account when they refused to releasd crucial

:24:25. > :24:28.documentation unless they h`ve been given the permission of the

:24:29. > :24:32.Palestinian Authority? Well, it sounds a run business, I'm bound to

:24:33. > :24:38.say, but it's not a matter that the chair. -- a rum business. It is

:24:39. > :24:44.something that will have to be pursued with terrierlike tenacity.

:24:45. > :24:54.Knowing the honourable gentleman, as I have done for 30 years since a la

:24:55. > :24:58.robust skirmishes in the Unhversity of Essex student union, I c`n

:24:59. > :25:02.testify to his possession of that quality in a high degree. I

:25:03. > :25:10.therefore rather imagine th`t he will pursue the matter until he gets

:25:11. > :25:14.what he wants. If there are no further points of order, we come to

:25:15. > :25:19.motion number two on the Parliamentary standards authority.

:25:20. > :25:25.The question is on the order paper, as many as those in favour say our

:25:26. > :27:54.way. On the contrary, no. As many of the opinion say our way.

:27:55. > :27:58.On the contrary, no. Miss M`rgot James and Mr Guy Opperman. Tellers

:27:59. > :28:04.for the nose, Mr Steve McCabe and Kevin Brennan -- tell us for the

:28:05. > :37:52.noes. The ayes to the right, 312. The noes

:37:53. > :38:00.to the left, 45. Thank you. The ayes to the right,

:38:01. > :38:07.312, the noes to the left, 45, so the ayes have it, the ayes have it.

:38:08. > :38:13.Armlock. We now come to mothon number three on prevention `nd

:38:14. > :38:19.suppression of terrorism. To move the motion, I call the Minister of

:38:20. > :38:27.State for security, at the Home Office. Minister of State, John

:38:28. > :38:34.Hayes. I am extremely grateful, Mr Speaker. I beg to act that the

:38:35. > :38:40.terrorism act 2000, prescribed amendment number two, order 201 ,

:38:41. > :38:45.which was laid before the House on 11th July the July, be approved We

:38:46. > :38:48.can never entirely eliminatd the threat from terrorism but wd are

:38:49. > :38:51.determined to minimise the threat in the UK and abroad. Addition`lly we

:38:52. > :38:57.must continue to demonstratd our support for other lenders of the

:38:58. > :38:59.international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism where it

:39:00. > :39:30.occurs. we intend to add for proscrhbed

:39:31. > :39:35.groups to the act. These ard groups which are particularly relevant to

:39:36. > :39:42.south and south-east Asia, but significantly, also to the ongoing

:39:43. > :39:47.conflict in Syria. I will ghve way. I am sure that he will find the

:39:48. > :39:51.House in full at Green and with what he is proposing today. Can H ask him

:39:52. > :40:03.how many organisations are currently prescribed? I will be dealing with

:40:04. > :40:09.that lately in my remarks. He contributed last time I was at the

:40:10. > :40:14.dispatch box on the subject. I will be referring to some of the remarks

:40:15. > :40:19.he made on that occasion as well later in my remarks. These `re

:40:20. > :40:25.groups which are particularly relevant, I was saying, in

:40:26. > :40:32.south-east Asia and South Asia, but as I want to emphasise, thex are

:40:33. > :40:37.also significant to the conflict in Syria. The House will be aw`re that

:40:38. > :40:49.Syria is the number one destination of jihadist in the world, the recent

:40:50. > :40:58.attacks in battle -- -- Bangladesh indicate the threat in Asia.

:40:59. > :41:10.Prescribing these acts... The Home Secretary has the power to Gray an

:41:11. > :41:16.organisation which is -- thd Home Secretary has the power to lain

:41:17. > :41:19.macro and organisation. -- to proscribe an organisation. Ht could

:41:20. > :41:25.be useful to set out the factors which are considered when exercising

:41:26. > :41:29.discretion. These include the nature and scale of an organisation's

:41:30. > :41:42.activities and the need to support other members of the intern`tional

:41:43. > :41:46.community for terrorism. Proscription means the organisation

:41:47. > :41:59.is outlawed and therefore unable to operate in the organisation.

:42:00. > :42:05.Proscription can support other destructive activity includhng the

:42:06. > :42:09.use of immigration powers, prosecution for other offences and

:42:10. > :42:20.support strong messaging to deter fundraising and recruitment. Given

:42:21. > :42:24.its wide-ranging impact, thd St -- the Home Secretary only exercises

:42:25. > :42:30.this power after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on

:42:31. > :42:35.the organisation. And to th`t end, it is important to deal with the

:42:36. > :42:40.Right Honourable gentleman's question. 66 international `nd 4

:42:41. > :42:46.Northern Ireland related terrorist organisations are proscribed. The

:42:47. > :42:54.honourable gentleman when wd last debated these matters, which was

:42:55. > :43:00.actually about de-place-macro, not case macro, -- not

:43:01. > :43:07.he made a case these things should be reviewed. He was concerndd that

:43:08. > :43:13.case macro was indefinite. H ask those questions as well. It is there

:43:14. > :43:21.to say when I arrived at thd Home Office I asked these questions. The

:43:22. > :43:29.nomination can apply for thd proscription to be taken aw`y. The

:43:30. > :43:36.Home Secretary in those casds has to respond within 90 days and the

:43:37. > :43:43.organisation can then appeal to a senior commission, made up of senior

:43:44. > :43:46.figures, judicial figures, `nd I have become convinced that hs the

:43:47. > :43:51.right way to go about these things. As long as that appeal procdss,

:43:52. > :43:56.first to the Home Secretary and then beyond the Home Secretary, hs a

:43:57. > :44:02.robust one, I think the emphasis should be on those organisations to

:44:03. > :44:04.make the case. I thought it was right to take this opportunhty to

:44:05. > :44:12.deal with that as the honourable gentleman raised in a previous

:44:13. > :44:16.occasion. I am grateful for him to give way. The independent rdviewer

:44:17. > :44:21.David Anderson has suggested that there needs to be a time lilit. What

:44:22. > :44:26.is the government's responsd? Government on number of previous

:44:27. > :44:28.occasions, including before the minister took office, has s`id that

:44:29. > :44:35.the response would be coming shortly, which is now a couple of

:44:36. > :44:41.years since the Minister hurts to mention that. Do we have a view as

:44:42. > :44:46.to whether or not we access for the independent reviewer has sahd? I

:44:47. > :44:50.have made clear my own views on this, I do not have a right to say

:44:51. > :44:55.what the formal respond will speak. I hate his overtures on these

:44:56. > :44:59.matters may seriously -- I take his overtures on these matters very

:45:00. > :45:02.seriously and I will return to the Home Office with fresh alacrity to

:45:03. > :45:10.deal with how we will respond formally. I am clear, he having

:45:11. > :45:16.articulated these matters previously, is right to do so, as I

:45:17. > :45:19.said, I too felt it was importantly got this right and I asked the same

:45:20. > :45:23.kind of questions. I have bdcome convinced that the process `s it

:45:24. > :45:32.stands is the right one but it is right we formally respond and I will

:45:33. > :45:42.ensure we do so. As I said, the process proscription if there are,

:45:43. > :45:45.it involves looking at material across have meant, across government

:45:46. > :45:49.prescription review group stpports the Home Secretary in head

:45:50. > :45:55.decision-making process, thd decision is taking carefullx after

:45:56. > :45:59.considering all evidence. On that basis, although I cannot colment on

:46:00. > :46:07.specific intelligence, I can provide the summary of each group's activity

:46:08. > :46:10.in turn. The FirstGroup, Global Islamic Media Front, is Isl`mic

:46:11. > :46:13.extremist propaganda Associ`tion associated with Al-Qaeda and other

:46:14. > :46:22.extremist groups across the world. It's activities include publishing

:46:23. > :46:31.jihadi newscast and producing terra manuals. -- terror. It prodtces in a

:46:32. > :46:34.number of languages. We are aware of the rise of sectarian violence in

:46:35. > :46:43.badly -- and is tragic effects, and the group we are proposing to be

:46:44. > :46:50.proscribed, has claimed responsibly to a number of attacks on sdcular

:46:51. > :46:58.bloggers since 2013. They ptblished a info graphic containing n`mes and

:46:59. > :47:06.locations of 13 attacks the date of which were some grated with

:47:07. > :47:09.assassinations. The second group, Turkestan Islamic Party, it is an

:47:10. > :47:16.Islamic separatist organisation founded in 1989. It has clahmed is

:47:17. > :47:22.possibly tea for a number of attacks in China. This group has terrorist

:47:23. > :47:31.links to Al-Qaeda. In November 015, the Turkestan Islamic Party released

:47:32. > :47:34.a magazine detailing their jihad against the authorities, bo`sting of

:47:35. > :47:41.training camps controlled bx Pakistan Caliban, and more recently

:47:42. > :47:47.it has maintained a process in the Syrian war, and has claimed a number

:47:48. > :47:55.of attacks, suicide bombings, and so on. They have been banned bx the UN,

:47:56. > :48:02.sanctioned by the USA under the terrorist exclusion list. A further

:48:03. > :48:09.third group is the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah, the most -- de Mujahedeen

:48:10. > :48:22.Indonesia Timur, the most active group in the mountains. It hs led by

:48:23. > :48:26.Indonesia's mode most wanted terrorist, attacks the police and

:48:27. > :48:31.army, and they have been responsible for the deaths of a dozen police

:48:32. > :48:38.officers. The responsibilitx claimed for recent terrorist attacks has

:48:39. > :48:44.confirmed this group's determination not only to propagate but also to

:48:45. > :48:51.plan, execute terrorism. Thd last group is the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah,

:48:52. > :48:55.which was established in March 015, from the merger of several

:48:56. > :49:02.Indonesian extremist groups. The group has close ties to othdr

:49:03. > :49:09.terrorist groups including terrorism macro -- Daesh, they were

:49:10. > :49:17.responsible for the 2002 and 20 5 Bali attacks. Jamaah Anshortt Daulah

:49:18. > :49:22.are responsible for an attack in Jakarta in 2016 which was claimed by

:49:23. > :49:29.Daesh and resulted in the ddaths of seven people. Proscription latters

:49:30. > :49:34.because of the determination to encounter the malevolence I have

:49:35. > :49:39.described. Importing terra, we must as a people, -- in thwarting tarot,

:49:40. > :49:54.we must -- terror, we must... In these dangerous times, wd must

:49:55. > :50:04.and we'll do all we can to protect others from attack and I believe it

:50:05. > :50:12.is right that these four groups are proscribed in the way I set out I

:50:13. > :50:17.would customarily start a ddbate like this by saying something like,

:50:18. > :50:24.where is the Home Secretary? But I think even I would admit today that

:50:25. > :50:29.she has got better things to do I just want to take this opportunity,

:50:30. > :50:36.on behalf of these ventures, to pay tribute to her tenure, as a Home

:50:37. > :50:42.Secretary. I have certainly found that she has been prepared to

:50:43. > :50:47.listen, particularly in the case of Hillsborough, where her work was

:50:48. > :50:50.outstanding in respect of f`milies who had faced a terrible injustice

:50:51. > :50:56.for all of those years. I hope she will continue to listen as Prime

:50:57. > :50:57.Minister but I have every hope, Mr Speaker, that she will she will go

:50:58. > :51:09.on to make a good Prime Minhster. I'd also like to pay tributd to the

:51:10. > :51:14.Ministry of State, with thehr reshuffle fast impending, and he

:51:15. > :51:18.will be twitchy there, but his obvious talents will be I stspect

:51:19. > :51:24.rightly rewarded, the reshuffle The order before the house todax arises

:51:25. > :51:27.from the terrorism act 2000, legislation passed by the l`st

:51:28. > :51:32.Labour government, which was intended to provide a export

:51:33. > :51:39.framework to deal with the changing and emerging threat from new forms

:51:40. > :51:46.of terrorism. It is fair to say that we have seen unimaginable events in

:51:47. > :51:52.the 16 years since that leghslation was originally passed. Spechfically

:51:53. > :52:00.we've seen the rise of terrorism based on a distortion of Islam and

:52:01. > :52:06.its values. And it is important to describe it as such, rather than

:52:07. > :52:09.using the shorthand Islamic terrorism, because that, Mr Speaker

:52:10. > :52:15.is inaccurate and it makes life harder for those in the Muslim

:52:16. > :52:21.community who are facing a daily and monumental battle against this

:52:22. > :52:27.perversion of their faith. Let's be careful in our language. Let's help

:52:28. > :52:34.those who are battling radicalisation and not thosd who are

:52:35. > :52:41.fomenting it. If I may, I mhght at this point in my speech just direct

:52:42. > :52:49.some remarks at the BBC. I know that the BBC have taken to using the

:52:50. > :52:56.phrase so-called Islamic st`te. In my view, that is not helpful. The

:52:57. > :53:01.use of the word so-called does not undermine the following words,

:53:02. > :53:05.Islamic, or state. But thesd are the two words that the public hdre. It

:53:06. > :53:12.gives a status to the organhsation that they do not deserve and it also

:53:13. > :53:15.makes it sound as though thdy are unauthorised branch of Islal. I

:53:16. > :53:22.would urge the BBC director general to review this editorial decision

:53:23. > :53:29.and to move, as the governmdnt has done to the use of the titld Daesh.

:53:30. > :53:34.This is important, because `s I said at the beginning, we are facing a

:53:35. > :53:40.highly changing and challenging landscape when it comes to

:53:41. > :53:47.terrorism. Figures from the global peace index report 2016 show that

:53:48. > :53:55.deaths from terrorism incre`sed by 80% in the last year. Only 69

:53:56. > :54:04.countries in the entire world do not record a terrorist incident within

:54:05. > :54:11.their borders. And the intensity of terrorist activity is incre`sing. We

:54:12. > :54:18.have a situation now where there were reported 500 deaths in 11

:54:19. > :54:22.countries, doubling of the xear before, and we see incidents

:54:23. > :54:26.happening all the time. The killing of a police officer in France last

:54:27. > :54:35.month for which Daesh claimdd responsibility. 44 people khlled and

:54:36. > :54:43.290 people injured at Istanbul airport in June. Again, suspected

:54:44. > :54:54.that Daesh was responsible. These are big increases on a rising trend.

:54:55. > :54:57.2014 saw 34 -- 34,000 terrorist attacks across the world. This is

:54:58. > :55:04.the context in which we consider this order today. As this l`ndscape

:55:05. > :55:09.changes, the government is right to be vigilant and to aim to try and

:55:10. > :55:15.keep one step ahead. This brings me to the specific order beford us

:55:16. > :55:20.today, Mr Speaker. We are bding asked to give agreement to the

:55:21. > :55:24.government to prescribe for organisations linked to terrorism.

:55:25. > :55:33.Two of those organisations have links to Al-Qaeda and the other two

:55:34. > :55:44.organisations have links to Daesh. Mr Speaker, the focus is on the

:55:45. > :55:49.activities of Di Esch in Syria, but I believe it would be a mistake for

:55:50. > :55:55.this house to lose sight on what is happening in Asia, but Italx South

:55:56. > :56:01.East Asia as the minister Rhley said -- Daesh. It would furthermore be a

:56:02. > :56:07.mistake to focus on Daesh and lose focus on Al-Qaeda and its efforts to

:56:08. > :56:13.regroup. That is why the government is right to bring this order today.

:56:14. > :56:18.And it is right to disrupt the activities of these organis`tions

:56:19. > :56:24.before they establish a stronger foothold. It is clear from the

:56:25. > :56:28.evidence that the Home Office but before the house that there are

:56:29. > :56:32.grounds to prescribe these organisations, and we accept that

:56:33. > :56:40.evidence and will support the order this afternoon, but if I max, Mr

:56:41. > :56:45.Speaker, before I close makd one point I would ask the Minister and

:56:46. > :56:50.government to take into account and it goes back to when this

:56:51. > :56:53.legislation was first introduced and the first group of organisations

:56:54. > :57:01.that were proscribed under this act, that group included the

:57:02. > :57:09.international seek youth Federation. There were objections to th`t at the

:57:10. > :57:12.time. -- Sikh. What followed was a protracted argument that only

:57:13. > :57:19.recently ended in the courts and ended with the governments coming to

:57:20. > :57:24.lift the prescription. Learning from this experience, we know th`t if

:57:25. > :57:28.evidence does change over thme, and if there was grounds to prescribe

:57:29. > :57:34.that organisation back therd it had clearly gone some time ago, but the

:57:35. > :57:41.communities to whom these issues relate can find that those orders

:57:42. > :57:47.can stigmatise a section of the community. I certainly will give

:57:48. > :57:55.way. I think he is absolutely right, the fear of stigma is very luch in

:57:56. > :57:58.the minds of communities, an example being the LTTE which was prdscribed

:57:59. > :58:03.by the government, correctlx, which no longer exists, the leader having

:58:04. > :58:08.been killed. But there is still a stigma attached to members of the

:58:09. > :58:12.Tamil community and that is why it is so important to have a thme limit

:58:13. > :58:16.Eric can be reviewed rather than people having to go to court on

:58:17. > :58:20.every occasion. Of course wd support what the government is doing on this

:58:21. > :58:23.occasion and we always have done, but it's important we are able to

:58:24. > :58:30.review without the need to go to court. I would agree strongly, Mr

:58:31. > :58:38.Speaker, with the chair of the home affairs select committee. The

:58:39. > :58:40.experience of the Daesh comlunity in challenging the prescription of the

:58:41. > :58:47.International youth Federathon was pretty dispiriting in that they had

:58:48. > :58:55.to pursue a very lengthy legal process and they had to facd a very

:58:56. > :59:00.unresponsive Home Office. And there is a case that it might be good

:59:01. > :59:03.grounds to ascribe organisations and the one I mentioned he accepted

:59:04. > :59:07.there was a case in that instance, but the stigma does affect ` much

:59:08. > :59:10.wider community. And when the evidence changes, so should the

:59:11. > :59:17.government and they should `ct quickly to remove any such

:59:18. > :59:25.impression impression or perception, so I hope that they do listdn to

:59:26. > :59:29.what my right honourable frhend as to say they are right to, bdcause he

:59:30. > :59:33.is full of judgment and wisdom on these matters, and my only request

:59:34. > :59:38.is of the government that they instituted a regime of the kind that

:59:39. > :59:44.the right honourable gentlelan is suggesting, that there is a regular

:59:45. > :59:46.process of review and there is an up-to-date assessment of thd

:59:47. > :59:53.organisations that genuinelx pose a threat to the safety of our country.

:59:54. > :59:58.And finally that we make thd process of challenge easier than certainly

:59:59. > :00:04.it was found by members of the Sikh community. That is the only caveat I

:00:05. > :00:11.would place on our support for this order today. The government is right

:00:12. > :00:16.to bring it forward and terrorism is a threat to our country. It is right

:00:17. > :00:21.we take every possible action to root it out, as well as working with

:00:22. > :00:26.the communities who are strtggling to deal with it. It is therdfore

:00:27. > :00:35.right that this order comes before the house today and we will be

:00:36. > :00:40.giving it our full support. You will no doubt be pleased, as honourable

:00:41. > :00:43.members will be, I intensitx my comments as brief as possible with a

:00:44. > :00:53.view of freeing up as much time this afternoon to discuss the Ir`qi war

:00:54. > :00:56.enquiry. Although issues of national security are reserved, we whll

:00:57. > :00:59.continue to operate with thd UK Government closely and we rdcognise

:01:00. > :01:04.the security services and the police require adequate powers to fight

:01:05. > :01:07.terrorism. However, such powers should always be necessary,

:01:08. > :01:12.proportionate and in accord`nce with the rule of law and its agahnst the

:01:13. > :01:16.benchmark we assessed the four organisations to be added to the

:01:17. > :01:21.prescribe list. Firstly global Islamic media front, it is clear

:01:22. > :01:25.they propagate jihadist ideology. The East India needy and wotld you

:01:26. > :01:31.had in have a clear modus operandi to attack police and army and have

:01:32. > :01:33.made many killings. The Turkestan Islamic party has claimed

:01:34. > :01:40.responsibility for a number of atrocities in China and the G A D.

:01:41. > :01:46.Was responsible for the awftl mob attack we witnessed earlier this

:01:47. > :01:50.year in Jakarta. One other point, Mr Speaker, and I would like to add our

:01:51. > :01:53.calls from these benches to the member from Leeds, the requdst of

:01:54. > :01:58.the BBC to reconsider the l`nguage they use when dealing with terrorist

:01:59. > :02:03.organisations, particularly the kind of legitimacy it gives to using the

:02:04. > :02:08.phrase, which I consider appalling, so-called Islamic State. Thdy are

:02:09. > :02:12.not Islamic, Mr Speaker and the phrase should not be used any more

:02:13. > :02:16.and they should proceed to call is being championed on these bdnches

:02:17. > :02:24.that we should do as the government now does, the phrase Daesh. I would

:02:25. > :02:29.also like to add our own party's support what you are doing today. As

:02:30. > :02:38.we all know the focus is very much upon Syria and the prescription goes

:02:39. > :02:45.further, but the Minister h`s referred to the names and those of

:02:46. > :02:50.other prescribed organisations, and the Prime Minister in a statement to

:02:51. > :02:57.the house referred to the f`ct that there is a 20,000 rate of tdrrorist

:02:58. > :03:02.killed in battle and they h`ve lost 40% of territory. The questhon I

:03:03. > :03:05.would ask is this, as that has happened and as Daesh becomds more

:03:06. > :03:09.fragmented and singular and not the overall worry they might have been

:03:10. > :03:12.in the past, there will be lore prescribed organisations coling

:03:13. > :03:16.forward, small splinter grotps and organisations that spring up from

:03:17. > :03:25.across the whole of the Middle East. Is there a better way on prdscribing

:03:26. > :03:30.organisations when it comes to this house. I know there is a procedure

:03:31. > :03:33.to follow which you've clearly outline, but is there a better way

:03:34. > :03:41.of doing it, and that is thd first question. Secondly in the

:03:42. > :03:45.presentation to this, the legislation and change will apply to

:03:46. > :03:51.Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Minister referred to prescrhbed

:03:52. > :03:58.organisations in Northern Ireland and you mentioned -- mentioned, the

:03:59. > :04:02.threat level from Northern Hreland related terrorism has been ` severe

:04:03. > :04:07.levels since 2010, so can I asked the minister this will stop what is

:04:08. > :04:12.being done to bring down thd threat level and what impact is thd high

:04:13. > :04:16.threat level having on the terrorism act for Northern Ireland's `bility

:04:17. > :04:19.to prevent terrorism. Is it effective enough when it coles to

:04:20. > :04:23.those organisations that ard already prescribed in Northern Irel`nd for

:04:24. > :04:30.the high level that we have? Thirdly, as we all know terrorists

:04:31. > :04:35.across the world seemed to flock together when it comes to stpplying

:04:36. > :04:41.each other with weapons and ammunition is and bomb-making

:04:42. > :04:46.explosives. We have had grotps in Northern Ireland who are very much

:04:47. > :04:50.focused on that. Can we havd some indication, whether it is your remit

:04:51. > :04:56.or not, in relation to your response, but is there an activity

:04:57. > :05:00.seen from terrorist groups hn the far east, Middle East and South

:05:01. > :05:06.America with those at home hn Northern Ireland? Mr Speaker, thank

:05:07. > :05:11.you. I would like very briefly to ask in this debate why the

:05:12. > :05:19.government has still not banned and included in this order todax his

:05:20. > :05:27.books to rear. Following thd 7/ attacks, we think it should be

:05:28. > :05:33.banned, why has this not happened? In 2009 he attacked his predecessor

:05:34. > :05:38.in strong terms for not banning them and in 2010, the Conservative Party

:05:39. > :05:41.manifesto said a Conservative Party would ban any organisation that

:05:42. > :05:49.advocates hate or violent overthrow of our society. My point, and I m

:05:50. > :05:53.grateful for you on calling me, I would simply like to ask thd

:05:54. > :05:58.minister when he gets up to respond, why after all of these years, after

:05:59. > :06:01.six years in government, after all the work they have been abld to do

:06:02. > :06:04.on the issues, why have thex still not banned the group, as thdy

:06:05. > :06:15.promised on so many occasions? If the Minister of State wishes

:06:16. > :06:21.briefly to respond, he is at liberty to do so but he is under no

:06:22. > :06:26.obligation to do so. The Hotse will bear that with stoicism and

:06:27. > :06:37.fortitude and may even experience excitement in the way, we whll see.

:06:38. > :06:40.I hope my remarks will be phthy Mr Speaker, but it would be a

:06:41. > :06:43.discourtesy to those who contributed to the debate not to deal whth some

:06:44. > :06:48.of the important matters thdy have raised. Can I first of all deal with

:06:49. > :06:52.the Shadow Secretary of State, and thank him for his support for the

:06:53. > :06:58.work we are trained to do today Echo sentiments about the dxnamism

:06:59. > :07:02.and the intensity of terrorhsm, here is right about both. It is because

:07:03. > :07:09.of that we need to keep these matters under review. I thank him

:07:10. > :07:14.for the remarks about my talents, and I hope they have been hdard

:07:15. > :07:19.across the bench and further afield! He is right to draw attention to

:07:20. > :07:24.Asia and south-east Asia in particular. It is of course

:07:25. > :07:29.important that we focus on Syria, it is the main destination of the jihad

:07:30. > :07:34.-ists from across the world. But we should not underestimate thd

:07:35. > :07:39.worldwide spread of terrorism and we do not in the Home Office. H can

:07:40. > :07:42.assure him, we take Southeast Asia very seriously. Partly why we are

:07:43. > :07:52.dealing with these matters hn the way we are today. There was then a

:07:53. > :07:56.considerable number of commdnts from the chairman of the select committee

:07:57. > :08:05.and others about the process by which we have proscribed and not

:08:06. > :08:13.organisations. I am going to go further and say now that I `m not

:08:14. > :08:17.going to put into place a statutory period of review, contrary to the

:08:18. > :08:22.advice of David Anderson and the advocacy of the home affairs select

:08:23. > :08:25.committee chairman. I have listened carefully to what the shadow

:08:26. > :08:30.minister and others have sahd about the speed at which the currdnt

:08:31. > :08:34.system works. If we are not quite have review, and I think we should

:08:35. > :08:39.not, and that is my formal response, on behalf the government, I will put

:08:40. > :08:45.that into writing, then we do need to ensure that the process `s it

:08:46. > :08:51.stands is fit for purpose. That does mean ensuring that it is not

:08:52. > :08:56.burdensome, that it is not too lengthy, not insensitive in the way

:08:57. > :09:01.that was suggested it might have been in some cases, and to that end

:09:02. > :09:08.I will look again at making sure we put into place a process whhch is

:09:09. > :09:11.robust transparent but that is not endless. That is the point the

:09:12. > :09:16.honourable gentleman was making and that he indeed he was right, about

:09:17. > :09:22.the fact that stigma can have. I want to be sensitive to that. I

:09:23. > :09:26.think you can reasonably sax that he and the select committee ch`irmen

:09:27. > :09:30.and that commitment from me in the way that they shrug and thex have

:09:31. > :09:38.earned that commitment from me in the way they have put their case so

:09:39. > :09:42.reasonably. The honourable gentleman raised issues specific to Northern

:09:43. > :09:45.Ireland and more generally come he can be certain the government looks

:09:46. > :09:53.at these issues carefully and repeatedly. We consider proscription

:09:54. > :09:59.with absolute care but he is right as well that we need to look at the

:10:00. > :10:09.links between organisations, and I talked about a bit of that when I

:10:10. > :10:13.introduced the use, this order. I will follow up the question he

:10:14. > :10:16.raised about those links. Some of those matters I cannot speak about

:10:17. > :10:20.on the floor of the House bdcause they are highly sensitive and as he

:10:21. > :10:26.will appreciate, these intelligent issues cannot be aired. But I will

:10:27. > :10:30.follow that up because I thhnk it is an important point he makes. He will

:10:31. > :10:33.understand part of that rel`tes to something he has raised in this

:10:34. > :10:40.house before because he is ` diligent member of this house, and

:10:41. > :10:44.takes an interest in the subject. He has previously raised the role of

:10:45. > :10:52.social media and communicathon technology in making their links

:10:53. > :10:56.real. The government has taken this seriously but we are more than happy

:10:57. > :11:01.as I have before to correspond with him on those matters. The honourable

:11:02. > :11:12.gentleman who spoke last in the debate raised the particular matter

:11:13. > :11:18.of, Hezbollah, by pronunciation is not perfect but then I cannot be

:11:19. > :11:26.perfect in every way. It wotld not be appropriate for me to spdak more

:11:27. > :11:34.specifically about H U T as it is more commonly known, in this debate.

:11:35. > :11:43.The government has signific`nt concerns about that organis`tion,

:11:44. > :11:47.connected to Hezbollah, he knows that has been done, we conthnue to

:11:48. > :11:53.monitor the activity closelx. Individual members are subjdct to

:11:54. > :11:56.general criminal law. And wd will certainly continue to ensurd that

:11:57. > :12:00.groups like it cannot operate without challenge in public places

:12:01. > :12:08.in this country, and organisations are made aware of groups, this group

:12:09. > :12:16.and groups like it. And the names at under which they organised. It is

:12:17. > :12:19.not proscribed at the moment in the UK but these matters are regularly

:12:20. > :12:27.scrutinised and considered by government and I think I had better

:12:28. > :12:31.leave it at that. With thosd comments, and double. I will give

:12:32. > :12:34.way. I am grateful to him for giving way. Before he doesn't sit down

:12:35. > :12:40.finally, I would be grateful if you would address the point that I

:12:41. > :12:47.raised and was echoed by thd SNP front bench, and that if thhs use by

:12:48. > :12:51.the BBC of this phrase so c`lled Islamic State. I have been hn

:12:52. > :12:57.mosques recently where I can say that it causes a great despondency

:12:58. > :13:03.amongst people there working to try and counter radicalisation. They say

:13:04. > :13:11.that the use of the word "So-called" does not undermined the word is it

:13:12. > :13:20.or state, and the BBC repeating this is only making their work work

:13:21. > :13:25.harder. Can he sent a clear message to the BBC today, they need to

:13:26. > :13:28.review this editorial decishon. Not for the first time, the honourable

:13:29. > :13:34.gentleman has done this health service by drawing our attention to

:13:35. > :13:38.exactly the -- this house a service by drawing our attention to this.

:13:39. > :13:43.The honourable gentleman is absolutely right that the mddia

:13:44. > :13:49.particularly the BBC, have ` salient response of the tea in this respect.

:13:50. > :13:53.They are of course say seven -- 's responsibility in this respdct. As a

:13:54. > :13:57.result, the impression created from the words they use can have a

:13:58. > :14:02.devastating effect. I entirdly agree with him and join with him `nd

:14:03. > :14:06.others who have made the case in this house today on behalf the

:14:07. > :14:10.government that we should indeed send a message to the BBC that

:14:11. > :14:17.calling organisations "So-c`lled" create the entirely the wrong

:14:18. > :14:25.impression. I hope that henceforth, they will drop that expresshon

:14:26. > :14:28.exactly as he has said. I al drawing my remarks to the exciting

:14:29. > :14:34.conclusion and I do not want to spoil that... Can he confirl he will

:14:35. > :14:37.write to the BBC to request this and we will not have a talking shop in

:14:38. > :14:42.the House today? That alone would not be good enough. I am gohng to

:14:43. > :14:47.speak to them, I am going to write to them, and it is recorded today in

:14:48. > :14:54.Hansard. The letter will le`ve my office this afternoon and I will

:14:55. > :15:02.speak to them by telephone today. I, I, I never, Mr Speaker, I ndver Mr

:15:03. > :15:11.Speaker, as you know, disappoint in this house, as you have oftdn said

:15:12. > :15:20.yourself. The exciting peroration which about to move to was this It

:15:21. > :15:25.has been said that the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is

:15:26. > :15:28.for the good men to do nothhng. The good men of this country and the

:15:29. > :15:33.good men and women, and I elphasise that particularly in the current

:15:34. > :15:37.climate, good men and good women... Laughter macro.

:15:38. > :15:51.I want him not only the Minhster of State's peroration, but also his

:15:52. > :15:58.application! When it comes to the matter of terrorism, this house will

:15:59. > :16:00.speak with a single voice, will exercise an iron will, and will

:16:01. > :16:08.certainly, rather than doing nothing, do everything we c`n to

:16:09. > :16:11.bring about its defeat. I al extremely grateful. I think the

:16:12. > :16:14.House will be, to the Right honourable gentleman, in light of

:16:15. > :16:22.the pressure on time, for hhm addressing us with the eloqtence of

:16:23. > :16:26.Demosthenes, and pettiness which is all his own. The question is on the

:16:27. > :16:28.order paper. As many as are of that opinion, say aye. On the contrary,

:16:29. > :16:41.no. We now come to the general debate on

:16:42. > :16:46.the report of the Iraq enquhry. To move the motion, I called the

:16:47. > :16:50.Secretary of State for forehgn income and affairs, secretary Philip

:16:51. > :16:54.Hammond. I welcome the opportunity to open this first day of ddbate on

:16:55. > :16:58.the report of the Iraq enquhry, although I suspect, Mr Speaker, in

:16:59. > :17:01.the circumstances, the world's eyes will not be focused on our

:17:02. > :17:06.proceedings with quite the laser-like intensity that mhght have

:17:07. > :17:11.been expected when the debate was originally announced. Let md start

:17:12. > :17:20.by paying tribute to the work of Sir John Chilcot and other membdrs of

:17:21. > :17:22.the enquiry committee including Sir John Gogarty sadly passed the wager

:17:23. > :17:27.on the writing of the report. For anyone who has read even part of

:17:28. > :17:30.this report, and I defy anyone to say they have read the entire thing,

:17:31. > :17:43.it will be clear that the committee has discharged herculean task with

:17:44. > :17:47.thoroughness, frankly, and with it degree which ensures there will be

:17:48. > :17:53.no ambiguity about the lessons that need to be learned. I want to signal

:17:54. > :17:56.my understanding that the publication of the Chilcot Report a

:17:57. > :18:00.week ago would have been a poignant and googled moment of the f`milies

:18:01. > :18:05.who lost loved ones -- diffhcult moment for the families who lost

:18:06. > :18:09.loved ones in Iraq. It is ilportant that even as we conduct this debate,

:18:10. > :18:13.they know that the House will never forget the sacrifice of the hundred

:18:14. > :18:17.and 79 British servicemen and women as well as the 23 British chvilians

:18:18. > :18:21.who lost their lives to ring the conflict and its aftermath. We will

:18:22. > :18:26.also never forget the service and sacrifice of the thousands lore who

:18:27. > :18:31.suffered life changing injuries and we reconfirm to those today our

:18:32. > :18:36.determination that they will get the care they need for the rest of their

:18:37. > :18:41.lives. I hope that the survhvors and relatives of the fallen alike will

:18:42. > :18:44.have taken comfort from the assiduous and detailed examhnation

:18:45. > :18:53.of the war to be found in this report. The sacrifice of our service

:18:54. > :18:58.people demands nothing less. That is bigger, more than 13 years since the

:18:59. > :19:02.invasion in Iraq began, ten years since the Conservative Partx and

:19:03. > :19:08.others first called for it `nd seven years since the them Prime Linister

:19:09. > :19:11.Gordon Brown finally can shoot it, the Iraq Inquiry report sets out to

:19:12. > :19:18.try and answer the crucial puestions that have dominated the deb`te about

:19:19. > :19:22.the war in Iraq and the events that preceded and followed it. Dhd the

:19:23. > :19:28.United Kingdom decided to go to war on a mistaken all. Miss? Were all

:19:29. > :19:38.the decisions leading up to the war properly taken? With the opdration

:19:39. > :19:43.to invade Iraq happily planned and executed? -- properly planndd and

:19:44. > :19:48.executed? Did the government of the day 40 and plan properly for the

:19:49. > :19:52.after match? And were our Armed Forces funded and provided with the

:19:53. > :19:55.proper protection and equiplent for their tasks? Budgeting fullx the

:19:56. > :19:59.content of this report will take weeks rather than days. Lass by

:20:00. > :20:21.Justin I will give when a second. The

:20:22. > :20:27.report sets out the conclushons it reached on some of the central

:20:28. > :20:30.issues that have proved so controversial including the handling

:20:31. > :20:35.leak on the use and present`tion of secret intelligence, and thdy

:20:36. > :20:42.identify many lessons that should be learned in the future. I am most

:20:43. > :20:46.grateful. Will he accept th`t a number of us are perplexed `t the

:20:47. > :20:51.speed at which this admittedly two-day debate is taking pl`ce? As

:20:52. > :20:57.he has said, there are 2.6 lillion words to be read, and for a really

:20:58. > :21:00.full understanding, it seems to me that today's debate is a little

:21:01. > :21:07.premature and might have bedn better had it been left to the auttmn.

:21:08. > :21:13.I suspect honourable members and right honourable members wotld have

:21:14. > :21:19.been dismayed if they hadn't had an opportunity to put on record their

:21:20. > :21:24.reactions to the Chilcot report albeit necessarily initial

:21:25. > :21:28.reactions, but we will no doubt here during the course of the debate

:21:29. > :21:33.whether the concerns he expresses are widely shared. The first words

:21:34. > :21:37.of the very first paragraph of the executive summary of the report

:21:38. > :21:42.spell out the enormity of the undertaking and the gravity which

:21:43. > :21:48.should have attended all aspects of its preparation and execution. I

:21:49. > :21:53.quote, in 2003 for the first time since the Second World War, the UK

:21:54. > :22:01.took part in an opposed inv`sion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign

:22:02. > :22:06.state, Iraq. A reading of Shr John's report however suggests floors,

:22:07. > :22:10.errors and omissions abounddd. If the House Alami, I will try to

:22:11. > :22:16.summarise the key findings he makes. On the question of why the TK went

:22:17. > :22:23.to war, the two issues central to the case that Tony Blair put forward

:22:24. > :22:32.were Saddam's failure to colply with the proposals put by the UN Security

:22:33. > :22:36.Council, and the threat to international peace and sectrity

:22:37. > :22:45.from the weapons of mass destruction that, he argued, were at Saddam s

:22:46. > :22:50.disposal. The report identifies and I quote, and ingrained belidf of the

:22:51. > :22:58.Government and the intelligdnce community that Saddam's reghme

:22:59. > :23:03.retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, and w`s

:23:04. > :23:07.pursuing an active and succdssful policy of deception and concealment.

:23:08. > :23:16.There were good reasons for this belief. Given the past actions of

:23:17. > :23:19.Saddam's regime. His past use of weapons against Kurdish cithzens and

:23:20. > :23:27.Israeli forces, his refusal to comply with weapons inspectors'

:23:28. > :23:32.demands and UN Security Council resolutions all pointed in that

:23:33. > :23:36.direction. As Sir John set out, Mr Blair was being advised by the

:23:37. > :23:40.chairman of the joint intelligence committee that Iraq possessdd

:23:41. > :23:46.chemical and biological weapons the means to deliver them and the

:23:47. > :23:51.capacity to produce them. However, as he also says, it is now clear

:23:52. > :23:56.that policy on Iraq was madd on the basis of flawed intelligencd and

:23:57. > :24:00.assessments. He finds that `t no stage was the proposition that Iraq

:24:01. > :24:10.might no longer have chemic`l biological weapons examined by

:24:11. > :24:15.either the joint intelligence committee or the wider intelligence

:24:16. > :24:20.community. In the case he sdt out to the House of Commons in 2003, Mr

:24:21. > :24:24.Blair also argued there was a link between international terrorism and

:24:25. > :24:29.weapons of mass destruction, and that, and I quote, the two together

:24:30. > :24:34.constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life. Sir John fhnds that

:24:35. > :24:39.while it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned `bout the

:24:40. > :24:44.fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no bashs in the

:24:45. > :24:51.JIC assessments to suggest Hraq itself represented such a threat. Mr

:24:52. > :24:55.Speaker, when it comes to the use and presentation of intelligence, in

:24:56. > :24:58.particular the Government's dossier on Iraq 's weapons of mass

:24:59. > :25:04.destruction, published on the day of the Commons debate on the 24th of

:25:05. > :25:09.September 2002, Sir John finds there is no evidence that the intdlligence

:25:10. > :25:13.was improperly included in the dossier or that Number Ten

:25:14. > :25:17.improperly influenced the tdxt. The JIC accepted ownership of the

:25:18. > :25:22.dossier and agreed its contdnt. However, he also finds that the

:25:23. > :25:27.judgment is presented in Mr Blair's statement to the House that day and

:25:28. > :25:33.in the dossier, and I quote, were presented with the certaintx that

:25:34. > :25:37.was not justified. The JIC he finds should have made clear to Mr Blair

:25:38. > :25:42.that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either

:25:43. > :25:46.that Iraq had continued to produce chemical or biological weapons or

:25:47. > :25:51.that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. On the qtestion

:25:52. > :25:56.of the legality of the war, the inquiry has not expressed a view on

:25:57. > :26:01.whether military action was legal. As Sir John says, that could only be

:26:02. > :26:09.resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised

:26:10. > :26:16.court. I give way. The Government is refusing to release confidential

:26:17. > :26:20.advice Whitehall officials gave to Mr Brown, this advice is wh`t made

:26:21. > :26:24.it impossible for Sir John Chilcot to rule on whether the war was

:26:25. > :26:29.illegal. The refusal flies hn the face of an informational trhbunal

:26:30. > :26:32.ruling which has ordered thd release of the materials and it means the

:26:33. > :26:37.public cannot see what options were considered when deciding on the

:26:38. > :26:43.nature and scope of the inqtiry Will the Government reconsider its

:26:44. > :26:47.refusal to release this information? The Government, in considerhng this

:26:48. > :26:51.report, will look at all thdse matters, but that is not thd reason

:26:52. > :26:58.that Sir John has primarily identified for his decision not to

:26:59. > :27:03.pass any view on whether military action was legal. He says that the

:27:04. > :27:08.inquiry is not constituted hn a way, nor does it have the necess`ry

:27:09. > :27:16.skills or qualifications to make that decision. However, he does .. I

:27:17. > :27:21.will give away one more timd. With respect, that is precisely ly

:27:22. > :27:26.question. The tribunal has ordered release of material showing why the

:27:27. > :27:31.remit of the inquiry was so refined. This is not a criticism of Chilcot,

:27:32. > :27:35.it is a criticism of the prdsent government for refusing to release

:27:36. > :27:39.information about why the scope of the inquiry was restricted not to

:27:40. > :27:44.look at the legality. That hs what the public want to know. Thd point

:27:45. > :27:48.I'm making is Sir John himsdlf identifies the lack of qualhfication

:27:49. > :27:54.of the members of the inquiry to reach that decision and says it

:27:55. > :27:56.could only be resolved by a properly constituted and internation`lly

:27:57. > :28:00.recognised court. The honourable lady will know that a huge number of

:28:01. > :28:06.documents have been declasshfied and made available in this procdss but

:28:07. > :28:12.clearly it is not possible to declassify every document. Sir John

:28:13. > :28:19.goes on to find that the thdn Attorney General advised on the 13th

:28:20. > :28:23.of March 2003 that there was on balance the secure legal basis for

:28:24. > :28:28.military action. The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided

:28:29. > :28:32.that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from

:28:33. > :28:37.satisfactory. Sir John however is clear that military action was not

:28:38. > :28:40.undertaken as a last resort, that there were further diplomathc steps

:28:41. > :28:44.that could have been taken to seek compliance by the Saddam regime and

:28:45. > :28:53.that by moving to a militarx solution when the UN SC would not

:28:54. > :28:55.sanction such a development, the UK, far from upholding it, was hn his

:28:56. > :29:05.words undermining the securhty council. The Foreign Secret`ry will

:29:06. > :29:09.have seen the words of Robin Butler, quote, the illegality of thd Iraq

:29:10. > :29:16.war was never a question Sir John Chilcot was asked to deal whth. So

:29:17. > :29:21.why won't the Government release the documents that would give the public

:29:22. > :29:24.and parliament an insight into why the Chilcot inquiry wasn't

:29:25. > :29:30.readmitted unqualified to ddal with the legality question? The point I

:29:31. > :29:35.have made already is that as far as I understand it, Sir John h`s not

:29:36. > :29:40.identified lack of remit as a reason he has given no opinion on the

:29:41. > :29:45.legality of the war. He has identified a lack of appropriate

:29:46. > :29:50.skill sets in the inquiry, `nd he suggested it should be a matter that

:29:51. > :29:57.is dealt with by a properly constituted and internation`lly

:29:58. > :30:01.recognised court. As I have said already, the Government, in looking

:30:02. > :30:05.at the report of the Iraq inquiry, and it will take some time to do

:30:06. > :30:08.that, will consider all these matters including questions the

:30:09. > :30:14.right honourable gentleman hs raising about whether any ftrther

:30:15. > :30:23.documents can appropriately be declassified and made avail`ble

:30:24. > :30:27.Obviously John Chilcot's report is masterful in its description of the

:30:28. > :30:33.formal records, the detail `nd lessons drawn, but as a polhtician,

:30:34. > :30:37.will the Foreign Secretary look at this in its political context. Does

:30:38. > :30:41.he agree with me the background was quite clearly that the Amerhcans and

:30:42. > :30:45.the Blair government wished to invade Iraq in order to change the

:30:46. > :30:52.regime and get rid of Saddal Hussein, but that would be hllegal

:30:53. > :30:57.regime change, so would he just have gone through this desperate desire

:30:58. > :31:01.to find evidence and persuade themselves that there were weapons

:31:02. > :31:05.of mass destruction, that hd wasn't cooperating with inspectors, that

:31:06. > :31:11.there's a risk of terrorism and on, was mainly no doubt subconsciously

:31:12. > :31:17.motivated by a desire to give the Attorney General some basis on which

:31:18. > :31:26.he could say it is legal. Mx reading of the inquiry report, Mr Speaker,

:31:27. > :31:33.is that it does indeed identify that regime change as an objective would

:31:34. > :31:42.be illegal in UK law, but I think the suggestion is that people who

:31:43. > :31:48.were involved in this process came to see regime change as a mdans to

:31:49. > :31:52.deliver the legitimate objective, which was compliance with the UN

:31:53. > :31:58.Security Council resolutions. I think a fair reading of the report

:31:59. > :32:04.suggests that that is the process of mine that is being spelt out by Sir

:32:05. > :32:10.John. I hope I may be able to assist the Foreign Secretary. The right

:32:11. > :32:16.honourable gentleman for Rushcliffe, and I understand his point `nd that

:32:17. > :32:20.it is a view he is held for a long time, but he didn't have thd

:32:21. > :32:24.advantage of being in the C`binet room when these discussions were

:32:25. > :32:29.taken place. Can I tell the Foreign Secretary that as we got closer to

:32:30. > :32:34.decision time, on repeated occasions the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair,

:32:35. > :32:38.stressed to the Cabinet that the resolution called for Saddal Hussein

:32:39. > :32:44.to comply with UN inspectors and if he did so, like, there would be no

:32:45. > :32:48.military action. And pointed out the downside of that was that this

:32:49. > :32:54.terrible man, who certainly did commit war crimes on a mass scale,

:32:55. > :32:59.would remain in power and that that was a downside we would havd to

:33:00. > :33:03.accept. I'm sure the House hs grateful for the honourable lady

:33:04. > :33:07.giving that insight from, as it were, the front line of where this

:33:08. > :33:10.debate started, but one thing that comes out clearly from a re`ding of

:33:11. > :33:14.the report is the misalignmdnt between the position of the UK

:33:15. > :33:19.Government and the US government, which clearly was pursuing regime

:33:20. > :33:25.change as an objective as it was legally entitled to do under its own

:33:26. > :33:31.regime. On the issue of operational planning, it is well recorddd the

:33:32. > :33:35.initial invasion and defeat of Iraqi forces proceeded rapidly. The UK's

:33:36. > :33:44.Armed Forces performed extrdmely well, a fact that we and thdy should

:33:45. > :33:53.be extremely proud, despite the Turkish government refusing access

:33:54. > :33:57.through their borders. Mr Speaker, the task that should have bden at

:33:58. > :34:02.least as big as preparing for the invasion was preparing for the

:34:03. > :34:07.aftermath. As Tony Blair sahd before the liaison committee in 2003, you

:34:08. > :34:10.do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change

:34:11. > :34:14.unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftdrmath of

:34:15. > :34:20.that regime change to make sure the country is stable and the pdople are

:34:21. > :34:23.properly looked after. However, Sir John has found out that when the

:34:24. > :34:28.invasion began, the UK Government was not in a position to conclude

:34:29. > :34:33.that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations m`de to

:34:34. > :34:37.meet now in post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq. Understanding

:34:38. > :34:41.what those challenges were, they need to restore broken

:34:42. > :34:48.infrastructure, administer dstate, provide security, including against

:34:49. > :34:52.the threats of violence, terrorism and Iranian influence, did not as

:34:53. > :34:56.the report clearly states rdquire the benefit of hindsight. Btt the

:34:57. > :35:00.Government assumed that the US will be responsible for preparing the

:35:01. > :35:04.post-conflict plan, that thd plan would be authorised by the TN

:35:05. > :35:08.Security Council and that the UN would play a major post-conflict

:35:09. > :35:13.role with the international community sharing the post-conflict

:35:14. > :35:18.burden. The report finds th`t the Government expected not to have to

:35:19. > :35:22.make a substantial commitment to post-conflict Administration, and it

:35:23. > :35:25.concludes that the failure to anticipate and plan for

:35:26. > :35:29.post-conflict challenges in the short to medium term increased the

:35:30. > :35:35.risk that the UK would be unable to respond to the unexpected in Iraq

:35:36. > :35:44.and in the longer term reduce the likelihood of achieving the UK's

:35:45. > :35:48.strategic objectives. Just to bring the Secretary of State back to the

:35:49. > :35:51.point of regime change, it hs important that what is said in

:35:52. > :35:57.private should also be refldcted in Parliament and vice versa. H would

:35:58. > :36:01.quote Tony Blair's point to Parliament in 2003, I have never put

:36:02. > :36:08.our justification for action as regime change, only to find that a

:36:09. > :36:13.week later on the 26th of M`rch that's why the immediate

:36:14. > :36:15.justification for action is ridding Iraq of Saddam and that is the real

:36:16. > :36:22.prize. Ministers, indeed all members,

:36:23. > :36:26.should be completely truthftl in their utterances to Parliamdnt at

:36:27. > :36:31.all time. The ministerial code makes that clear. Specifically on the

:36:32. > :36:35.reconstruction effort, Sir John finds the UK failed to plan or

:36:36. > :36:40.prepare for the major reconstruction programme required. And that lessons

:36:41. > :36:43.that had been learned through previous reviews of post-conflict

:36:44. > :36:51.reconstruction and stabilis`tion were not applied in Iraq. On the

:36:52. > :36:54.issue of debathification, Shr John finds early decisions on

:36:55. > :37:00.debathification and its implementation had a signifhcant and

:37:01. > :37:03.lasting negative impact offdr Iraq. Limited debathification to the top

:37:04. > :37:10.three-tiers rather than four of the party would have had the potential

:37:11. > :37:14.to be far less damaging to Hraq s post-invasion recovery and political

:37:15. > :37:19.stability. And the UK chose not to act on its well-founded misgivings

:37:20. > :37:25.about handing over implementation of debathification policy to the

:37:26. > :37:28.Governing Council. Turning to the equipping and resourcing of British

:37:29. > :37:33.troops, Sir John finds the Government failed to match resources

:37:34. > :37:38.to the objectives. He records that by undertaking concurrent operations

:37:39. > :37:42.in Iraq and Afghanistan, thd Government knowingly excited the

:37:43. > :37:46.defence planning assumptions. At least in part as a consequence, Sir

:37:47. > :37:54.John concludes, that the military role ended a long way from success.

:37:55. > :37:56.Furthermore, he finds delays in providing adequate medium-wdight

:37:57. > :38:01.protective patrol vehicles `nd failing to meet the needs for UK

:38:02. > :38:10.forces for helicopters should not have been tolerated. And MoD was

:38:11. > :38:18.slow in responding to the ddveloping threat of EID. Sir John finds the

:38:19. > :38:23.Iraq of 2009 did not meet the UK's objectives, it fell far short of

:38:24. > :38:28.strategic success. These findings relate to decisions taken at that

:38:29. > :38:32.time. And the eye rangements and processes in place at the thme. It

:38:33. > :38:36.is, therefore, for those who were ministers at the time to answer for

:38:37. > :38:41.their actions. This Governmdnt's role is not to seek to apportion

:38:42. > :38:48.blame or to revisit those actions. It is to ensure that the lessons

:38:49. > :38:52.identified by Chilcot are ldarnt and that they have either already led to

:38:53. > :38:58.changes or will lead to changes being implemented in the future The

:38:59. > :39:01.Government, including previous administrations, has not stood still

:39:02. > :39:06.while waiting for the findings we have before us today. There were a

:39:07. > :39:11.number of important reviews related to the invasion of Iraq before

:39:12. > :39:15.Chilcot. Including, Lord Butler s reviews on weapons of mass

:39:16. > :39:21.destruction. Lord Hutton's hnquiry surrounding the death of Dr David

:39:22. > :39:27.Kelly. The the intelligence security committee of both Houses. As a

:39:28. > :39:30.result of each, lessons havd been identified and changes impldmented.

:39:31. > :39:35.A good deal of the work has already been done. I hear what the Foreign

:39:36. > :39:41.Secretary says about processes. Would he just that the post,war

:39:42. > :39:46.conflict reconstruction in Libya would give us any confidencd that

:39:47. > :39:50.lessons have been learned from post-war reconstruction of Hraq Mr

:39:51. > :39:57.Speaker, the two things are completely different. In Ir`q, at

:39:58. > :40:01.the end of the war, Britain was a joint occupying power and shared

:40:02. > :40:08.joint responsibility for thd occupation commission. We wdre in

:40:09. > :40:11.control of the territory exor sighing all the functions and

:40:12. > :40:15.responsibilities of Governmdnt. As a result of the decisions takdn around

:40:16. > :40:20.Libya, British boots were ndver on the ground. We were never in control

:40:21. > :40:27.of that country in occupying power. We did not have it within otr

:40:28. > :40:32.capability to take the actions we did or should have done in Hraq Let

:40:33. > :40:36.me summarise the most important lessons Sir John in has drawn.

:40:37. > :40:42.First, taking military action should always be a last resort. Only after

:40:43. > :40:46.exhausting all credible resources should we consider taking the

:40:47. > :40:50.country to war. This is my personal belief, the political price that has

:40:51. > :40:54.been paid for apparently neglecting this important principal will ensure

:40:55. > :41:01.future administrations are tnlikely to overlook it. Secondly, how

:41:02. > :41:05.Government is conducted matters The failures of process, of challenge

:41:06. > :41:10.and even of proper record-kdeping identified by Sir John was serious

:41:11. > :41:17.and widespread. In part, to prevent such failures in the future, the

:41:18. > :41:23.Conservative-led Coalition Government established the council

:41:24. > :41:24.in may 2010 to ensure proper coordinated strategic decishon

:41:25. > :41:32.making across the whole of Government. The NSC includes the

:41:33. > :41:39.chief of defence star. Jaunt Intelligence Committee as wdll as

:41:40. > :41:42.relevant officials. It is properly supported by a dedicated

:41:43. > :41:46.secretariate led by the nathonal security adviser ensuring all parts

:41:47. > :41:51.of the national security apparatus are properly joined up across

:41:52. > :41:56.Whitehall and beyond. We now have a system that ensures gheeingses on

:41:57. > :42:00.serious security issues are taken on the basis of full papers, proper

:42:01. > :42:04.challenge and discussion with legal advice fully explained and

:42:05. > :42:09.considered and proposals stress-tested by departments with

:42:10. > :42:13.decisions formally recorded. Having sat on the National Securitx Council

:42:14. > :42:17.for six years, firstly as an occasional member, as Transport

:42:18. > :42:22.Secretariy, then purple nindtyly as Defence Secretary and now as Foreign

:42:23. > :42:27.Secretary, it seems to me hhghly improbable that the process of

:42:28. > :42:32.conduct of business in relation to that matter in 2002 and 2003 as set

:42:33. > :42:39.out by Chilcot could be repdated now. I'm grateful. I think that last

:42:40. > :42:44.comment was particularly colplacent. If you look at the example of

:42:45. > :42:50.Attorney General, why is th`t not an independent appointment? Whx do we

:42:51. > :42:54.still allow the Attorney General to be aan appointment of the Prime

:42:55. > :42:58.Minister, it should be someone independently legally qualified in

:42:59. > :43:02.that area. That wasn't the case during the Iraq war. The Attorney

:43:03. > :43:08.General's Office is filled with expert lawyers. The Attornex General

:43:09. > :43:15.produces his advice on the basis of the advice provided to him by his

:43:16. > :43:18.expert lawyers. I have no doubt from my extensive experience of @ttorney

:43:19. > :43:24.General advice as defence and Foreign Secretary that it is

:43:25. > :43:28.impatient, it is fearless and quite often, it gives us advice that we

:43:29. > :43:36.perhaps don't like and we h`ve to change course accordingly. That is

:43:37. > :43:41.appropriate. No, the honour`ble lady's conspiracy theory gods too

:43:42. > :43:44.far. If we get advice from the Attorney General which steers us

:43:45. > :43:51.away from a course of action we change the course of action. I can

:43:52. > :43:56.tell us from my direct experience off advice from the Attornex General

:43:57. > :44:04.causing us to think again and go in a different direction. The third

:44:05. > :44:10.lesson to draw... I thank mx honourable friend for giving way. On

:44:11. > :44:15.that point, it is important to note, isn't it, that when sofa Government

:44:16. > :44:18.takes place, officials from the Government legal service and

:44:19. > :44:21.Attorney General's Office are not present to hear Thor conversations

:44:22. > :44:30.and to give advice where th`t's necessary. That's right. Th`t's one

:44:31. > :44:34.of the purposes of a more formal process of decision making. I can

:44:35. > :44:37.say from personal experiencd Attorney General advice is often

:44:38. > :44:42.complex. It is necessary to have it in advance of the meeting in which

:44:43. > :44:47.decisions will be discussed and taken so one can absorb it `nd

:44:48. > :44:52.consult one's own deParliamdntmental lawyers to explain it, or challenge

:44:53. > :44:57.it or review it further. Mr Speaker, the third lesson to draw from the

:44:58. > :45:02.inquiry is that a culture at the heart of Government that we cans

:45:03. > :45:05.challenge to the convention`l - welcomes challenge or the strongly

:45:06. > :45:11.held conviction of ministers is essential to avoid the group think

:45:12. > :45:18.that led to what Chilcot describes as the ingrained belief Saddam

:45:19. > :45:22.Hussein's regime had chemic`l and biological warfare abilities. It is

:45:23. > :45:26.a product primarily of the climate established by the Prime Minister of

:45:27. > :45:32.the day. Ensuring people around the NSC table feel free to speak their

:45:33. > :45:36.minds without jeopardising their careers is the greatest contribution

:45:37. > :45:39.a Prime Minister can make. H pay tribute to my right honourRhght

:45:40. > :45:44.Honourable Friend, the membdr who are Whitney, in the way he has done

:45:45. > :45:48.that over the last six years. Fourth, proper planning for the

:45:49. > :45:51.aftermath of any intervention in another country is vital to

:45:52. > :45:57.successfully delivering the overall objective. The failure in London

:45:58. > :46:02.properly to plan for the conflict's aftermath fatally combined with the

:46:03. > :46:06.flawed assumption the Americans must have a plan when they didn't led to

:46:07. > :46:12.the chaos we saw on the grotnd in Iraq. As we know will be thd case in

:46:13. > :46:17.Syria, Libya, Yemen and agahn, today, Iraq, when the current

:46:18. > :46:20.conflicts in each end, the challenge of rebuilding effective Govdrnments

:46:21. > :46:24.in conflict-torn countries hs enormous. Under this Governlent

:46:25. > :46:29.we've created the conflict stability and stab I will Australiaathon fund

:46:30. > :46:34.with a billion pounds a year in it now rising to ?1.3 billion by the

:46:35. > :46:37.end of the Spending Review period. Building on the success of the

:46:38. > :46:41.cross-Government establish H will Iation unit to ensure proper

:46:42. > :46:46.planning for post-conflict situations and a capacity for rapid

:46:47. > :46:52.deployment of expert staff `nywhere in the world. The fifth lesson we

:46:53. > :46:56.draw, one that I feel particularly keenly as a former Defence

:46:57. > :47:01.Secretary, is that our Armed Forces must always be properly equhpped for

:47:02. > :47:07.the tasks we ask them to do. That is why we have instituted strategic

:47:08. > :47:10.defence and security reviews to ensure we commit the level of

:47:11. > :47:16.resources necessary to meet the ambition set out in the nathonal

:47:17. > :47:19.security strategy. Since 2000, we've eliminated the ?38 billion black

:47:20. > :47:24.hole we inherited in the defence pro cruorment budget. We've continued to

:47:25. > :47:29.meet the Nato commitment to spend at least 2% of our GDP on defence.

:47:30. > :47:33.We've set out a ten-year forward defence programme planning to invest

:47:34. > :47:38.at least ?178 billion on new military equipment over the next

:47:39. > :47:42.decade. I'm proud of these decisions. But we should be clear

:47:43. > :47:46.today that the decision to send our troops into a pre-planned in

:47:47. > :47:52.gaugementp without the right equipment in both Iraq and later in

:47:53. > :47:57.Afghanistan was unacceptabld and something that no Government should

:47:58. > :48:02.ever allow to happen again. There are, of course, many more ldssons to

:48:03. > :48:06.be drawn from the report of the Iraq inquiry. Too many to fit into a

:48:07. > :48:09.single speech. Some, I'm sure, will be drawn out during the course of

:48:10. > :48:14.the debate today and tomorrow. But, as the Prime Minister said hn his

:48:15. > :48:20.statement last week, there `re also some lessons and conclusions that we

:48:21. > :48:25.could but should avoid drawhng. We should not dismiss the importance of

:48:26. > :48:29.solidarity with our close friends and allies, the United Statds, when

:48:30. > :48:35.our common security interests are threatened. As both President Obama

:48:36. > :48:39.and Secretary of State Kerrx have reaffirmed in their respecthve

:48:40. > :48:42.recent visits to London, thd relationship between the Unhted

:48:43. > :48:47.States and the UK is special. We share not only culture and history

:48:48. > :48:51.but fundamental values. America is our principal ally and partner

:48:52. > :48:55.around the world. And our partnership remains vitally

:48:56. > :49:00.important for our continued security and prosperity. Now, of course, that

:49:01. > :49:05.does not mean we should blindly or slavishly follow US foreign policy

:49:06. > :49:09.or fail to speak frankly and honestly as close friends should.

:49:10. > :49:15.But we must be clear about the value of the relationship between our two

:49:16. > :49:19.countries and that that valte is a legitimate factor to be takdn into

:49:20. > :49:24.account in British foreign policy decisions. Protecting and enhancing

:49:25. > :49:31.the special relationship in itself makes Britain safer. Secondly, it

:49:32. > :49:34.would be wrong to conclude we cannot trust the analysis and judglents of

:49:35. > :49:39.the UK intelligence community. As Foreign Secretary, I know as well as

:49:40. > :49:41.anyone the vital contribution our intelligence agencies make to

:49:42. > :49:44.keeping Britain and the British people safe. I know the risks they

:49:45. > :49:52.sometimes have to take in order to do so. But intelligence is rarely

:49:53. > :49:55.black and white. And it alw`ys comes with a calibrated health warning as

:49:56. > :50:03.to the confidence level the user should attach to it. That places a

:50:04. > :50:06.burden of responsibility on the user when decisions or indeed strategic

:50:07. > :50:12.communications are based on intelligence. The reforms ptt in

:50:13. > :50:19.place following the Butler Report have separated the process of

:50:20. > :50:24.assessing intelligence from the policies making from it. We are in

:50:25. > :50:34.much better shape than in 2003 as a result of this and other reforms.

:50:35. > :50:37.Thirdly, we should not conclude our military lax capability to hntervene

:50:38. > :50:42.successfully around the world. The military invasion of Iraq, despite

:50:43. > :50:45.the problems of planning, w`s successfully and swiftly colpleted.

:50:46. > :50:52.Rather, it was the failure of policy makers to plan for the aftermath

:50:53. > :50:59.which led to the subsequent deterioration

:51:00. > :51:07.We must not conclude military intervention in another country is

:51:08. > :51:14.always wrong. In Kosovo in 0999 Sierra Leone in 2000, and the French

:51:15. > :51:17.led intervention in Mali in 201 have shown there are circumstances

:51:18. > :51:23.in which it is right and appropriate to intervene. Having commemorated

:51:24. > :51:34.just two days ago the 21st anniversary of the strip

:51:35. > :51:48.-- Srebrenica massacre, this is a prominent example. Britain lust not

:51:49. > :51:56.and will not shrink from military intervention as a last resort when

:51:57. > :52:02.our security is threatened, nor will it resile from its proper role on

:52:03. > :52:08.the world stage. Our commitlent to the campaign against Daesh hn Iraq

:52:09. > :52:11.and Syria is testament to that resolve, and today the Unitdd

:52:12. > :52:16.Kingdom stands united with Hraq in the face of continued terrorism And

:52:17. > :52:21.we will continue to help thd Iraqi people as they defeat Daesh,

:52:22. > :52:28.reassert the territorial integrity of their country, and seek to build

:52:29. > :52:32.a better future for their children. There is no greater decision that a

:52:33. > :52:37.Prime Minister and cabinet can take them to commit this country to war,

:52:38. > :52:41.to ask our troops to put thdmselves in harms way on our behalf, and the

:52:42. > :52:47.decision to invade Iraq and topple its government in 2003 was `mong the

:52:48. > :52:52.most controversial in our n`tion's recent history. It is right there

:52:53. > :52:56.for that we should seek to learn the lessons from the mistakes that were

:52:57. > :53:00.made to make sure they are not repeated in the future. The report

:53:01. > :53:07.of the Iraq inquiry has been a long time coming, but I think most agree

:53:08. > :53:17.that it is a thorough, independent tanks at -- independent and

:53:18. > :53:21.exhaustive piece of work. As I set out earlier, I am confident that

:53:22. > :53:26.many of the most important lessons identified in the report have

:53:27. > :53:30.already been learned and thd necessary responses already

:53:31. > :53:33.implemented, but in the weeks and months ahead, as we examine the

:53:34. > :53:36.report in greater detail, the Government will look further at

:53:37. > :53:45.whether any additional steps are required. Mr Speaker, the ddcision

:53:46. > :53:49.to wage war is not easily rdversible so it must be carefully and

:53:50. > :53:54.diligently made with proper regard to June process and legal

:53:55. > :54:00.obligations. War itself is of course intrinsically dangerous so ht must

:54:01. > :54:04.be properly prepared for and the people fighting it must be properly

:54:05. > :54:08.equipped and protected, and the aftermath of war is unpredictable

:54:09. > :54:14.but usually ugly so it must be meticulously planned for and

:54:15. > :54:18.systematically executed. But subject to these conditions, we shotld be

:54:19. > :54:24.clear as a nation that we whll not resile from the use of military

:54:25. > :54:29.force to protect our security where all other options have faildd. Sir

:54:30. > :54:34.John has done the nation a great service in pointing the way to

:54:35. > :54:43.ensure the proper, safe and legal use of military force. The rest is

:54:44. > :54:49.up to us. The question is that this House is considered the report of

:54:50. > :54:53.the Iraq inquiry. I call thd Shadow Secretary of State, Emily

:54:54. > :54:57.Thornberry. If this is the Foreign Secretary's last appearance at the

:54:58. > :55:05.dispatch box in his current role, he has made a typically serious and

:55:06. > :55:08.thoughtful speech for his f`rewell. We must reflect seriously and

:55:09. > :55:12.thoughtfully on the Chilcot report, and for the Labour Party a duty to

:55:13. > :55:17.apologise for the mistakes lade to all of the families of the British

:55:18. > :55:21.servicemen and women and civilian personnel who lost their lives, to

:55:22. > :55:24.all of those who suffered lhfe changing injuries, and some hundreds

:55:25. > :55:29.of thousands of Iraqi civilhans who have died and are still dying today.

:55:30. > :55:34.The Leader of the Opposition has rightly done that. But if there is

:55:35. > :55:38.one grave danger we face, it is to assume the lessons of Chilcot have

:55:39. > :55:41.been learned and I listened carefully to what the Secretary of

:55:42. > :55:47.State said about this, and H am concerned at some of the st`tements

:55:48. > :55:51.he has made. Because it concerns me that what one has to draw from that

:55:52. > :55:57.is that he's assuming the mhstakes made in Iraq couldn't be made again,

:55:58. > :56:02.indeed listening to the Prile Minister's statement last wdek, he

:56:03. > :56:06.seemed to pick out the same five lessons as examples today bx the

:56:07. > :56:11.Secretary of State. And agahn said that he felt the lessons have been

:56:12. > :56:16.learned. He seemed to be saxing the actions that have already bden taken

:56:17. > :56:19.such as setting up the national Security Council or creating the

:56:20. > :56:23.conflict and stability fund had effectively fixed the kind of

:56:24. > :56:28.problems that arose as a result of the Iraq war. Perhaps you would

:56:29. > :56:32.allow me to read out what I said, I'm confident that many of the most

:56:33. > :56:36.important lessons identified in the report have already been le`rned and

:56:37. > :56:40.the necessary responses alrdady implemented, but in the weeks and

:56:41. > :56:45.months ahead, the Government will look further at whether any

:56:46. > :56:49.additional steps are requirdd. I'm grateful to the honourable gentleman

:56:50. > :56:52.because I think the emphasis is important that I do believe there

:56:53. > :57:00.are further lessons that nedd to be learned. I will not be spending any

:57:01. > :57:05.particular time repeating f`ctual findings Chilcot made because I

:57:06. > :57:11.think we need to be looking at the lessons and making sure that we do

:57:12. > :57:14.not make any of those mistakes again. The Secretary of State for

:57:15. > :57:18.Defence will speak later about operational lessons that thd

:57:19. > :57:21.military must learn, but it seems to me that there are more than the five

:57:22. > :57:27.lessons that ministers have been outlining so far. So in the time

:57:28. > :57:34.available to me, I would like to outline some of the things H believe

:57:35. > :57:37.jump out of the report. It seems to me that we have been continting to

:57:38. > :57:44.make mistakes and we have bden making those mistakes during the

:57:45. > :57:48.current Prime Minister's tile in office. Turning to flawed

:57:49. > :57:52.intelligence, while Chilcot finds there was no deliberate attdmpt made

:57:53. > :57:56.to mislead people, the intelligence on which the war was based was

:57:57. > :58:01.clearly flawed and did not justify the certainty which was att`ched to

:58:02. > :58:06.it by the Government, so has that lesson been learned? Last ydar the

:58:07. > :58:10.Government asked this House to authorise military action in Syria,

:58:11. > :58:18.in contrast to Iraq in 2003 the military action was not to hnclude

:58:19. > :58:25.the deployment of ground troops Can I ask my right honourable friend

:58:26. > :58:30.whether she is aware of an `ttempt to call a contempt motion for the

:58:31. > :58:35.House to consider against Tony Blair, and does she agree whth me

:58:36. > :58:42.that whatever else is in thd Chilcot report, it does not give grounds for

:58:43. > :58:49.such a motion? I think this is a serious point and one that H hope

:58:50. > :58:54.members will consider. In mx view, the question is whether or not the

:58:55. > :58:58.House was deliberately misldd and Chilcot has said that althotgh the

:58:59. > :59:03.intelligence may have been flawed and therefore the House was misled,

:59:04. > :59:08.he didn't conclude the Housd had been deliberately misled. In my

:59:09. > :59:13.opinion therefore, if this House was to try to make any findings as to

:59:14. > :59:18.facts, and therefore to act on findings as to fact, they would be

:59:19. > :59:23.moving away from previous thmes when this instrument has been usdd,

:59:24. > :59:26.because in previous times when it has been used there has been a

:59:27. > :59:32.finding of facts upon which the House has been able to act. Either

:59:33. > :59:36.someone has been found guilty or admitted offences. There has been no

:59:37. > :59:41.admission of deliberately mhsleading this House, therefore if thhs House

:59:42. > :59:46.was to attempt to make a factual finding, in my view it would be a

:59:47. > :59:52.kangaroo court. In my view ht would not be allowing the person `ccused

:59:53. > :59:56.to be able to represent thelselves and it would fly in the facd of the

:59:57. > :00:02.established principles of jtstice that we have in this countrx and for

:00:03. > :00:06.those on this site particul`rly interested in the Human Rights Act,

:00:07. > :00:13.particularly clause six, thd right to a fair trial. I'm grateftl to the

:00:14. > :00:18.right honourable lady. It dhd seem to me to be somewhat strangd that

:00:19. > :00:22.members of this House, some members who have proclaimed quite rhghtly

:00:23. > :00:25.the importance of the Europdan Convention on human rights `nd I

:00:26. > :00:35.need to adhere to do should suggest a process which cannot meet article

:00:36. > :00:39.six requirements. I always get very worried when I agree so thoroughly

:00:40. > :00:48.with the right honourable gdntleman but I do find myself agreeing with

:00:49. > :00:52.him on many occasions. I he`r people saying you lawyers are all the same,

:00:53. > :00:57.but when it comes to certain principles we do agree and they cut

:00:58. > :01:01.through. Our concern is to dnsure our colleagues who are not lawyers

:01:02. > :01:08.understand these basic principles as well. Shouldn't she be worrhed about

:01:09. > :01:14.disagreeing with her own le`der and his comments on these matters just

:01:15. > :01:18.at the weekend? My question to the honourable lady, has she actually

:01:19. > :01:22.read the Private notes that the former Prime Minister sent the

:01:23. > :01:29.president of the USA and colpared them with his public parlialentary

:01:30. > :01:37.reports, and does she find these things consistent? The notes and the

:01:38. > :01:44.statements were considered by Chilcot over a long period of time,

:01:45. > :01:49.I feel the report and the pdrson writing it was a man of gre`t

:01:50. > :01:53.standing and the report verx fair one and I'm not going to sax any

:01:54. > :02:00.more than that. My view is there are plenty of lessons to learned from

:02:01. > :02:03.this report, and in my view the lessons go much further than simply

:02:04. > :02:10.focusing on one individual `nd what may have happened many years ago.

:02:11. > :02:14.What is important in my view is what is happening now, and to make sure

:02:15. > :02:17.the Government makes correct decisions before intervening in

:02:18. > :02:24.other people's countries and losing of others. Is it the right

:02:25. > :02:29.honourable lady's position that someone can only be found in

:02:30. > :02:37.contempt of this House if they admit that contempt? No, what I'm saying

:02:38. > :02:43.to this House is that there should be standards that we have always

:02:44. > :02:48.upheld. For example, Warren Hastings may have been tried by this House

:02:49. > :02:51.200 years ago but he was trhed by judges, represented, given `n

:02:52. > :02:57.opportunity to come along and say what he said, and I don't think that

:02:58. > :03:02.for us to draw conclusions hn a way that Chilcot was not able to without

:03:03. > :03:07.the person involved, having an opportunity to speak or be

:03:08. > :03:16.represented... I'm sorry, all right one more. In that case, can she say

:03:17. > :03:24.which court called the Primd Minister be tried on? Their

:03:25. > :03:29.respective nation, I apprechate about what may or may not h`ppen to

:03:30. > :03:33.the former Prime Minister. This is not within my brief today speaking

:03:34. > :03:38.as the Shadow Foreign Secretary and attempting to draw the lessons from

:03:39. > :03:41.Chilcot. My own view is that it is important I address that thhs

:03:42. > :03:46.afternoon in the time avail`ble to me and leave it to others to take

:03:47. > :03:51.such legal action as they think is appropriate, and it will be for them

:03:52. > :03:55.to take it to the proper cotrts But I don't think we can constitute

:03:56. > :04:02.ourselves as a proper court within the great traditions of our country.

:04:03. > :04:06.I can't remember where I was. The last year, the Government asked this

:04:07. > :04:11.House to authorise military action in Syria, and in contrast to Iraq

:04:12. > :04:16.the deployment of ground troops was ruled out, and that meant a reliance

:04:17. > :04:21.on local forces instead. I was talking about flawed intellhgence,

:04:22. > :04:25.because we were told at that stage there were 70,000 moderate rebels in

:04:26. > :04:31.Syria, ripples that would hdlp defeat Daesh which in turn would

:04:32. > :04:38.force Assad to step down. M`ny were sceptical about that 70,000 figure,

:04:39. > :04:41.but the 70,000 figure was produced by the joint intelligence committee

:04:42. > :04:47.and the Government declined to say which groups were included hn that

:04:48. > :04:50.figure, where they were, wh`t the definition of moderate was, or how

:04:51. > :04:55.we could be sure these rebels were signed up to the coalition's

:04:56. > :05:00.military strategy or how thdy would get to the battlefield. All of those

:05:01. > :05:05.questions mattered and as the Government itself acknowledged, no

:05:06. > :05:10.military strategy could succeed without forces on the ground. Time

:05:11. > :05:14.will tell whether those 70,000 moderate Sunni rebels existdd and

:05:15. > :05:18.whether they are in a posithon to be able to fight the battles which it

:05:19. > :05:23.was claimed they were going to be able to do, but I have to s`y that

:05:24. > :05:27.it seems to me that there is a parallel to be drawn between the

:05:28. > :05:32.intelligence relied on in rdlation to the 70,000 figure and fl`wed

:05:33. > :05:36.intelligence that has been relied on in the past. It is important to

:05:37. > :05:40.learn a lesson from Iraq 12 years earlier. Serious questions have been

:05:41. > :05:46.raised about intelligence which underpins decisions we make to take

:05:47. > :05:50.military action, and in my view once again Parliament has simply been

:05:51. > :05:55.asked to take on trust what the Government says about intelligence.

:05:56. > :06:01.There are further issues - the lack of ability to challenge intdrnally.

:06:02. > :06:06.Chilcot made clear that civhl servants and Cabinet members lacked

:06:07. > :06:10.the opportunity and information or encouragement to challenge the case

:06:11. > :06:14.being made to them. The Prile Minister says his national Security

:06:15. > :06:19.Council has fixed that. If that is right, why is it that the joint

:06:20. > :06:24.committee on National Securhty strategy says that the NSC has so

:06:25. > :06:29.far proved itself to be, and I quote, a reactive body rathdr than a

:06:30. > :06:34.strategic one which seems to have lost an opportunity.

:06:35. > :06:42.The NSC certainly did not challenge the short-sighted and highlx damage

:06:43. > :06:48.it caused to our Armed Forcds in the last Parliament despite the huge

:06:49. > :06:52.unjust I'vifiable misgivings of senior military figures abott their

:06:53. > :06:59.impact on our defence capabhlities. Nor is there evidence of thd NSC to

:07:00. > :07:04.challenge the inadequate pl`nning in the aftermath of Libya. Ulthmately,

:07:05. > :07:07.while making progress in sm`ll ways, the NSC failed to address the

:07:08. > :07:15.fundamental problem which is this. There is a culture in Whitehall I

:07:16. > :07:17.still believe, of Averill optimistic group think which exposure to

:07:18. > :07:24.independent views could help to us challenge. It is not good enough to

:07:25. > :07:30.say it has been fixed. It h`s not. If the NSC... The honourabld

:07:31. > :07:36.gentleman Sis how do I know? I'm giving the honourable gentldman how

:07:37. > :07:41.I know theres. Because of the result of decisions, I have more I will go

:07:42. > :07:50.into during this speech. Thd honourable lady is completely wrong

:07:51. > :07:55.in her analysis of how the NSC approach the the review in 2010 I

:07:56. > :08:00.was one of the members of the National Security Council. We spent

:08:01. > :08:05.weeks reading the advice. In the light of situation the country found

:08:06. > :08:08.itself in and a ?38 billion black hole in the defence budget we made

:08:09. > :08:13.our decisions. The idea somd expertise was lacking beford the

:08:14. > :08:20.National Security Council is the that time is completely wrong It is

:08:21. > :08:24.certainly my view, I only spent six months doing defence, though I spent

:08:25. > :08:32.a great deal immersing myself on it I don't just rely on my own views as

:08:33. > :08:35.to what a disaster the first strategic defence roof coalhtion

:08:36. > :08:39.spray deuce. There were senhor military figures in this cotntry and

:08:40. > :08:45.amongst our allies who were very concerned about what the cuts to the

:08:46. > :08:51.military budget was doing to our capability. The second Strategic

:08:52. > :08:57.Defence Review spent a great deal of time patching up the holes from the

:08:58. > :09:02.first review. Once again, she is wrong. At the table for the first

:09:03. > :09:05.security and defence review were the most senior military offici`ls and

:09:06. > :09:11.soldier in the country. Thex were part of the discussion. Thex were

:09:12. > :09:14.not locked out. The honourable gentleman has had his opportunity to

:09:15. > :09:19.put his views on the record. I'm sure he will speak later. It is my

:09:20. > :09:24.view that if it has been fixed in the way in which the right

:09:25. > :09:26.honourable gentleman, the Sdcretary of State for foreign affairs has

:09:27. > :09:32.stated, we would not be getting ourselves into a position where we

:09:33. > :09:40.swing backwards and forwards in our military budget. We spend the next

:09:41. > :09:45.time trying to patch it up. As one of the defence ministers at the

:09:46. > :09:48.time, may I say it was the lost unpleasant experience as a

:09:49. > :09:54.Conservative having to make cuts in our Armed Forces. But the truth was

:09:55. > :09:57.that the budget deficit of ?156 billion which we inherited was

:09:58. > :10:01.itself a threat to our national security and we had to take action.

:10:02. > :10:06.Sadly, defence had had to t`ke some of those cuts. Where would the right

:10:07. > :10:10.honourable lady have made the cuts if not in defence? I think we are

:10:11. > :10:14.moving a long way to the lessons that need to be drawn from Chilcot.

:10:15. > :10:17.If I may, I will return to ly speech. The honourable gentleman and

:10:18. > :10:21.I have discussed defence on many occasions. I always enjoy the

:10:22. > :10:28.discussions I have with him. I'll be quite happy to take this at another

:10:29. > :10:36.time. I don't want to spend the entire afternoon discussing defence,

:10:37. > :10:40.much Asim tempted to. If thd NSC had brought in outside perspectdrs from

:10:41. > :10:43.time to time it clearly hasn't done so enough to deal with the

:10:44. > :10:47.underlying problem. There w`s another issue which I think comes

:10:48. > :10:54.out in Chilcot. I don't think it has been fixed. The lack of challenge in

:10:55. > :10:58.Parliament. The other potential source, challenge to the Government

:10:59. > :11:03.was our Parliament. Whilst there were vigorous debates in thhs House,

:11:04. > :11:08.those debates and the 217 MPs who voted that the case had not been

:11:09. > :11:12.made were ultimately not enough to stop the march to war. I was not in

:11:13. > :11:16.the House myself. I was on the demonstrations. Although thdre were

:11:17. > :11:20.more Labour MPs who voted against the war than MPs from any other

:11:21. > :11:23.political party there were not sufficient numbers in order to be

:11:24. > :11:29.able to stop it. Have we moved on since then? If we look at 2013 vote

:11:30. > :11:34.against taking military acthon in Syria, many people have said that

:11:35. > :11:39.was a watershed moment. It cemented convention whatever the views of the

:11:40. > :11:43.executive, it is this House that has the final say and asked to `pprove a

:11:44. > :11:47.broad mandate for the use of military force where there hs no

:11:48. > :11:51.coherent strategy, no clear objectives and long-term pl`n. It

:11:52. > :11:58.was all too reminiscent to the approach to Iraq in my view. Members

:11:59. > :12:04.of all sides of the House hdld a healthy degree of scepticisl. At the

:12:05. > :12:08.same time, the House exercised a healthy degree of scepticisl. They

:12:09. > :12:11.were right to do so. However, at the same time, the Government's

:12:12. > :12:15.increasingly taken advantagd of loopholes in the existing convention

:12:16. > :12:19.to intervene in more conflicts with less oversight. It has developed a

:12:20. > :12:24.military capability in cyberspace which they refuse to say in what

:12:25. > :12:28.circumstances it might be used or when Parliament might be informed.

:12:29. > :12:31.Increased investment no drones and special forces at a time whdn there

:12:32. > :12:36.has been so much cuts to other parts of the Armed Forces. It has shown a

:12:37. > :12:43.willingness to use both as `ence moo of intervening in conflicts. The UK

:12:44. > :12:48.is not a party in quasi-conventional roles. In doing so, the Govdrnment

:12:49. > :12:50.seeks to bypass not just parliamentary support of thdse

:12:51. > :12:54.interventions but any form of parliamentary oversight as well The

:12:55. > :13:01.development of... If I may finish this point... The development of

:13:02. > :13:05.hybrid warfare, in my view, demands new mechanisms to ensure th`t the

:13:06. > :13:09.executive is held to account. All parties on both sides of thd House

:13:10. > :13:12.should be working on how we develop these new mechanisms in orddr to

:13:13. > :13:19.ensure the executive is held to account. Hybrid warfare, we all

:13:20. > :13:23.know, ask likely to be the future. Would she not acknowledge there is

:13:24. > :13:27.at least an argument using the Sis tomb it secure a parliament`ry

:13:28. > :13:32.majority for a pre-determindd war, rather than empowering the House of

:13:33. > :13:35.Commons it emass could you lates it. It prevents backbenchers from

:13:36. > :13:39.holding the Government to account. Would she not be in favour of

:13:40. > :13:43.bringing forward a UK war powers act to get round that difficultx? There

:13:44. > :13:50.has been a continuing debatd about this. I think there is, so long as

:13:51. > :13:56.we can be confident that a decision made in this House will not then

:13:57. > :14:01.need to be taken off to the courts and the judges eventually m`ke a

:14:02. > :14:06.decision about whether we wd go to war or not, which I would s`y is

:14:07. > :14:11.entirely inappropriate. We can ensure we keep control of

:14:12. > :14:18.legislation and it ensures Parliament, when it is posshble

:14:19. > :14:22.will come to in order for us to express our view. That's right. I

:14:23. > :14:28.understand it is the system we have at the moment. What I am concerned

:14:29. > :14:32.about is that in a way, although the convention continues to devdlop and

:14:33. > :14:36.strengthens as time goes on, it is still in the gift of the exdcutive

:14:37. > :14:40.to decide whether or not we bring this matter to Parliament. H know

:14:41. > :14:45.that, as times goes on, it strengthens but there is an argument

:14:46. > :14:51.to put it on to a more form`l basis. There is the danger about court

:14:52. > :15:00.intervention. I think it's ` mute point and one we need to continue to

:15:01. > :15:06.rook at. I'm very grateful for the honourable lady's strategic lesson

:15:07. > :15:12.in modern combat capabilitids in Armed Forces and her description in

:15:13. > :15:17.the use of special forces in almost combat capabilities having served in

:15:18. > :15:24.various of Her Majesty's forces in the past. It is a very novel

:15:25. > :15:29.interpretation that hybrid warfare is somehow something that m`y not

:15:30. > :15:35.continue to exist. We are gdtting into a rather bizarre discussion, if

:15:36. > :15:40.you'll forgive me, on the strategy and use of Armed Forces when,

:15:41. > :15:43.surely, the focus should be on the legality and appropriateness of

:15:44. > :15:47.deployment. One does sort of feel it might be best to stick to the area

:15:48. > :15:50.this House is qualified to talk about rather than dress up `s

:15:51. > :15:55.armchair generals and pretend we know what's going on in different

:15:56. > :16:00.areas? I think it is very ilportant that we look to tomorrow's problems.

:16:01. > :16:07.I think it is likely the spdcial forces will be used increashngly. I

:16:08. > :16:14.think the idea that we will be sending, for example, speci`l forces

:16:15. > :16:20.into Libya in a training capacity, I agree exactly how that might end up

:16:21. > :16:23.being a quasi--combat role, presumably if these training forces

:16:24. > :16:28.are in Libya, they will be hn a camp, a part of Libya that hs

:16:29. > :16:33.allegedly supposed to be safe. They will need to be guarded. Who will be

:16:34. > :16:38.guarding them? We can see a slippery slope. Therefore, it seems to me, at

:16:39. > :16:45.the moment, though inappropriate for a decision to send special forces or

:16:46. > :16:56.trainers into a particular `rea if we can have parliamentary scrutiny

:16:57. > :17:00.of our secret service and there is a way in which there is, that the

:17:01. > :17:04.behaviour of MI5 and MI6 is answerable to a committee of the

:17:05. > :17:08.House, it is not beyond our wit to allow there to be a similar form of

:17:09. > :17:12.cat ability when it comes to special forces. I have written about this

:17:13. > :17:18.issue. On a very important point here, the oversight that thd ISC and

:17:19. > :17:25.their prominent members of the ISC present, the oversight that the ISC

:17:26. > :17:32.ex-or sizes over the intellhgence community is always post thd fact.

:17:33. > :17:35.The only oversight over special force deployment would have to be

:17:36. > :17:39.before the fact. That would be a very, very different proposhtion.

:17:40. > :17:45.I'm grateful for the honour`ble gentleman for his question. I'm not

:17:46. > :17:48.expecting that before speci`l forces are used they have to go before a

:17:49. > :17:56.committee of Parliament and get permission. But I do think that

:17:57. > :18:04.there should be some form of cat ability and explanation. I felt that

:18:05. > :18:09.it was embarrassing and showed the Democratic Deficit that we have in

:18:10. > :18:14.relation to hybrid warfare when one read in the papers that the king of

:18:15. > :18:18.Jordan was gossiping with congressmen in America about our

:18:19. > :18:21.special forces in a way that we haven't even been told about and

:18:22. > :18:26.no-one in this housest Housd had been told about. That seems to me to

:18:27. > :18:30.highlight the deficit we have in this country. We should learn

:18:31. > :18:33.lessons from Chilcot, about accountability, about not shmply

:18:34. > :18:37.trusting the executive to gdt a decision right and we should make

:18:38. > :18:42.sure there is more accountability and we are on our toes and `re

:18:43. > :18:46.prepared to modernise our structures as necessary in order to reflect the

:18:47. > :18:51.changing nature of warfare going into the 21st Century. If I can go

:18:52. > :18:54.back to the speech. I was t`lking about the development of hybrid

:18:55. > :18:57.warfare and new mechanisms `nd different ways in the which the

:18:58. > :19:01.executive should be held to account. I believe all parties should be

:19:02. > :19:08.working together on that. Another point raised was about

:19:09. > :19:12.American/British relations. Chilcot made is clear American/Brithsh

:19:13. > :19:17.relations would not have bedn harmed had the UK not joined the US-led

:19:18. > :19:22.coalition. Chilcot argues that was not a basis to join the inv`sion.

:19:23. > :19:28.Indeed, in my view, that is another lesson we've not learned. In 20 3,

:19:29. > :19:35.there was pressure from the United States playing a major role in the

:19:36. > :19:41.Government's rush to intervdne in Syria. It became obvious th`t the US

:19:42. > :19:44.administration's own efforts to persuade Congress to back

:19:45. > :19:47.intervention hinged on the success of the Prime Minister in persuading

:19:48. > :19:52.Parliament. Speaking after our House declined to support the acthon in

:19:53. > :19:57.Syria, the then Defence Secretary now the Foreign Secretary s`id that

:19:58. > :20:01.the vote would "certainly doomage the Anglo-American relationship . It

:20:02. > :20:07.did. In my view, the relationship endured. We've got over it without

:20:08. > :20:12.any adverse consequences. It serves as a reminder that our alli`nce with

:20:13. > :20:16.the United States rests on stronger foundations than an expectation of

:20:17. > :20:24.unquestioning British complhance with American wishes. The hop rebel

:20:25. > :20:28.lady speaks of the special relationship and clearly thd

:20:29. > :20:36.relationship with the United States is deeper than one incidencd or one

:20:37. > :20:42.vote. But is it not also valid to listen to various American generals

:20:43. > :20:47.who after the vote pointed to the damaging reimpact that vote would

:20:48. > :20:51.have on the enduring commitlent and understanding between the US and the

:20:52. > :20:58.British militaries? Would she not also recognise that just as there

:20:59. > :21:01.are many threads that build up that special relationship undermhning

:21:02. > :21:10.that thread by thread also weakens it.

:21:11. > :21:16.Our relationship is strong dnough to endure differences of opinion, and

:21:17. > :21:20.if we are to be good friends, good friends trust each other and trust

:21:21. > :21:27.each other to be able to disagree at times, and I think it's important we

:21:28. > :21:31.do that. 2013 Syria vote made clear parliament understood this `nd also

:21:32. > :21:36.suggested the Government did not. This is one of the reasons ht is

:21:37. > :21:39.such a tragedy in my view that cuts to the Foreign Office budget has

:21:40. > :21:42.weakened Whitehall 's institutional knowledge of the world becatse in my

:21:43. > :21:47.view it is important for our leadership role in the world for us

:21:48. > :21:52.to have a proper understandhng of the world, and we have had for

:21:53. > :21:56.hundreds of years, have had an insight into the world the other

:21:57. > :21:59.countries have not, and we have a leadership role and we can have a

:22:00. > :22:05.different voice than the Amdricans because we will have a diffdrent

:22:06. > :22:09.understanding. So for us to have 16% cuts in the Foreign Office xear on

:22:10. > :22:18.year, and to be hollowing ott the institutional knowledge has been a

:22:19. > :22:23.tragedy in my view. And sorry, the honourable gentleman has intervened

:22:24. > :22:28.twice. Fifth, Chilcot says Tony Blair ignored warnings about the

:22:29. > :22:32.sectarian violence that would sweep Iraq after Saddam fell with an

:22:33. > :22:36.appalling loss of life that has followed in Iraq and surrounding

:22:37. > :22:40.countries. We are still livhng with that mistake but has the lessons

:22:41. > :22:45.being learned? Looking at intervention in Libya, it is clear

:22:46. > :22:49.it has not. Armed militias `cross the country focused their attention

:22:50. > :22:52.on toppling the regime, the British Government later seemed surprised

:22:53. > :22:58.that once the goal had been achieved they turned their fire on e`ch

:22:59. > :23:02.other. While divisions in Lhbya were always more tribal than sectarian

:23:03. > :23:06.divisions in Iraq, the result has been the same, and to believe

:23:07. > :23:16.democratic elections would fill the power vacuum proved to be

:23:17. > :23:20.overoptimistic. Had those whth knowledge of the country te`m

:23:21. > :23:23.directly consulted at the thme, they would have warned the Government

:23:24. > :23:30.this would happen. Such warnings were readily available and hn the

:23:31. > :23:36.public domain and had inforled advice been supplied it would be

:23:37. > :23:40.made clear there would be a huge risk of knock-on instabilitx as well

:23:41. > :23:45.armed highly trained mercen`ries returned to their native cotntries

:23:46. > :23:50.such as Mali, Nigeria and Chad. The warnings were there but such advice

:23:51. > :23:55.was not heard or not listendd to one that was too late. Again thdre is a

:23:56. > :23:59.parallel to be drawn between our intervention in Libya and otr

:24:00. > :24:17.understanding of what would happen next and are listening to experts

:24:18. > :24:20.and what happened. I wanted to say two things, firstly the intdrvention

:24:21. > :24:25.in Libya was at the request of the Arab League who I suggest would have

:24:26. > :24:30.an insight into the region, would count as people who knew wh`t was

:24:31. > :24:32.going on. Secondly while I understand the analysis

:24:33. > :24:41.cheesemaking, doesn't it le`d her to the conclusion that toppling any

:24:42. > :24:46.despot creates the risk of chaos and confusion. We are five years down

:24:47. > :24:51.the line from ending a 40 ydar ruling of a brutal dictatorship in

:24:52. > :24:55.Libya and this game isn't over yet but I predict Libya will end up a

:24:56. > :24:59.better place than it was under Gaddafi. It is interesting to hear

:25:00. > :25:04.what the honourable gentlem`n says but I think it is an issue of

:25:05. > :25:09.speculation. It is my view that it is not legal to intervene in a

:25:10. > :25:14.country to topple the regimd, and that we should not in any event

:25:15. > :25:19.morally be intervening in a country unless we can have some forl of

:25:20. > :25:25.strategy that will ensure that the country we leave is in a better

:25:26. > :25:32.state than when we first arrived. I'm grateful to the honourable lady.

:25:33. > :25:36.Firstly I have to say to her that I don't think there was a blinding of

:25:37. > :25:40.oneself to the potential problems that might come from that

:25:41. > :25:45.intervention. I really don't think that at all from my memory. The

:25:46. > :25:48.second thing is that the trhgger for the intervention was the fact

:25:49. > :25:53.Colonel Gaddafi was about to kill tens of thousands of his own

:25:54. > :25:59.citizens, and it is that whhch prompted the UN resolution which

:26:00. > :26:05.provided the legal basis for the intervention. If I may say to her, I

:26:06. > :26:10.think this highlights some of the really difficult decisions that we

:26:11. > :26:14.have in these areas, even qtestions of legality don't come into it. But

:26:15. > :26:18.I certainly wouldn't be willing to characterise that interventhon as

:26:19. > :26:22.having been wrong in the circumstances that prevailed at the

:26:23. > :26:29.time. I think the point I'm trying to make is that it was again about

:26:30. > :26:33.information that was available that could have informed the way in which

:26:34. > :26:41.the intervention was made, `nd then once the intervention was m`de, what

:26:42. > :26:45.happened thereafter, and how the dangers that were obvious wdre

:26:46. > :26:49.protected against. I don't think that happened, and it is a lesson

:26:50. > :26:54.that we can get from Chilcot and Iraq that is so much more ilportant

:26:55. > :27:00.than any form of soap opera in relation to Tony Blair. If H may

:27:01. > :27:04.move on, the other issue I think is important is about post-war

:27:05. > :27:10.planning, and there has been some that has been touched on as well,

:27:11. > :27:14.and this is my final point. Finally and perhaps most devastatingly,

:27:15. > :27:18.Chilcot highlight the total absence of adequate planning for wh`t would

:27:19. > :27:24.happen after the war, and what the long-term strategy was for Hraq If

:27:25. > :27:27.ever there was a mistake, it should never be repeated, it is thd idea we

:27:28. > :27:33.go into another military intervention with no idea of its

:27:34. > :27:39.consequences, no plan for the aftermath, no long-term str`tegy,

:27:40. > :27:45.and yet it is the exact hallmark of all the outgoing Prime Minister s

:27:46. > :27:50.interventions. And again, wd can see the evidence in Libya. The Prime

:27:51. > :27:54.Minister, in the words of President Obama, became distracted. Once the

:27:55. > :27:58.Gaddafi regime had been overthrown and the lengthy task of post-war

:27:59. > :28:04.reconstruction was supposed to be started, it was all but ignored and

:28:05. > :28:08.in the years since Libya has been riven with factionalism and

:28:09. > :28:12.violence. Its experiment with democracy was brief, with power in

:28:13. > :28:20.the hands of rival militias and the ungoverned space that this created

:28:21. > :28:24.was an invitation to Daesh to establish a strategic foothold. It

:28:25. > :28:30.is a stain on this Government that only begun to pay any attention to

:28:31. > :28:36.the mess it made in Libya once the terrorist threat from Daesh became

:28:37. > :28:40.too urgent to ignore. I'm not sure the honourable lady has said

:28:41. > :28:45.anything about Chilcot's finding about the circumstances in which it

:28:46. > :28:49.was ultimately decided therd was a legal basis for UK particip`tion. He

:28:50. > :28:54.says they were far from satisfactory. I'm sure he whll agree

:28:55. > :28:57.with me the Attorney General should give independent and imparthal

:28:58. > :29:04.advice. Chilcot details how according to the then Attorney

:29:05. > :29:11.General's evidence, he inithally resisted the legality and eventually

:29:12. > :29:17.acquiesced that the view of military force could be legally justhfied. As

:29:18. > :29:24.she got a view on what changed his mind? Tempting though it is to

:29:25. > :29:30.debate this aspect with the honourable lady, it is important

:29:31. > :29:35.that anyone taking the role of Attorney General knows that they are

:29:36. > :29:42.the only person in the Cabinet who can say to the Prime Ministdr no.

:29:43. > :29:47.You cannot do that, it is not legal, you are not allowed to, no. The

:29:48. > :29:55.burden of that is heavy and is one that needs to be exercised by people

:29:56. > :29:59.of great courage and substance. And it is about the rule of law, and

:30:00. > :30:09.it's about the fact that no one is above the law. I think therd is a

:30:10. > :30:13.lesson that all AGs need to learn, and they need to be confident of

:30:14. > :30:18.being able to stand up to their leader because that is an ilportant

:30:19. > :30:23.point. One of the things I would say in relation to international law is

:30:24. > :30:28.that Britain has always been a leading light in the development of

:30:29. > :30:33.international law. It is much of international law has been ` result

:30:34. > :30:36.of documents we have drafted and our adherence to international law has

:30:37. > :30:41.been an important part of the development of it. One thing that

:30:42. > :30:47.has been clouded as a result of intervention in Iraq, and indeed

:30:48. > :30:53.intervention since, has been the law that we do need to have, and we do

:30:54. > :30:57.need to have a clear law in relation to in what circumstances yot can

:30:58. > :31:03.intervene and what circumst`nces you can't, has not developed as well as

:31:04. > :31:11.it might have. If there had not been a temptation to press the f`cts into

:31:12. > :31:15.what was understood of the law. My honourable friend who is sitting

:31:16. > :31:25.behind me, the right honour`ble lady for Leith Central is a big fan of

:31:26. > :31:36.RTP, and it is very sad the effect the Iraq war had on the devdlopment

:31:37. > :31:42.of that, which is something Cook was attempting to develop at thd time of

:31:43. > :31:53.the Iraq war and was held up. If I may go back, whether lessons on

:31:54. > :31:58.long-term planning in Iraq learned? In conclusion, we cannot turn the

:31:59. > :32:02.clock back, we cannot correct the mistakes that were made, we cannot

:32:03. > :32:07.bring back the lives of those who were lost, we cannot undo the chaos

:32:08. > :32:12.we have created but we can `nd must stop the mistakes being repdated.

:32:13. > :32:16.Unfortunately, as I pointed out today, whatever his rhetoric and

:32:17. > :32:22.well-meaning intentions, too often the outgoing Prime Minister has

:32:23. > :32:27.repeated exactly those same mistakes in his own military interventions

:32:28. > :32:32.relying on speculative intelligence, and failing to plan for whatever

:32:33. > :32:36.happens afterwards. It is hoped the new Prime Minister will study the

:32:37. > :32:40.Chilcot report, not as a colmentary on decisions made in the past but as

:32:41. > :32:48.a guide to future decisions she will have to make. Let's hope shd does

:32:49. > :32:57.so, and that as she takes on her new and owner its responsibilithes, we

:32:58. > :33:00.wish her well. Mr Speaker, the decision to invade Iraq was in my

:33:01. > :33:06.opinion the most disastrous foreign policy decision taken by thhs

:33:07. > :33:10.country in my lifetime. And it didn't cause but greatly contributed

:33:11. > :33:14.to the extraordinary problels that have persisted in the Middld East

:33:15. > :33:19.and the wider world ever since, and it will continue to have tr`gic

:33:20. > :33:24.consequences I fear for somd years to come, so I think firstly we all

:33:25. > :33:29.owe a debt to Sir John Chilcot for producing what will undoubtddly be

:33:30. > :33:38.the most authoritative analxsis of how on earth such and appalling

:33:39. > :33:42.blunder was taken. I haven't had chance to get much beyond the

:33:43. > :33:46.executive summary, and I thhnk it will take a long time beford anyone

:33:47. > :33:50.in this House gets through the millions of words we have h`d

:33:51. > :33:58.produced. But I think the ldssons from this inquiry based on the Iraq

:33:59. > :34:04.war will in fact be of benefit to specialists in particular, those in

:34:05. > :34:08.the military, in the intellhgence services, and diplomatic corps and

:34:09. > :34:15.politicians. Those who have held the Government to account. It is too

:34:16. > :34:18.soon to follow up on his extremely formidable findings which I'm sure

:34:19. > :34:24.are correct but there is a role for this House to consider, as we are,

:34:25. > :34:29.the political aspect of this. Sir John Chilcot has examined the formal

:34:30. > :34:32.records, the meetings, the processes, and obviously he has

:34:33. > :34:36.analysed those in terms of looking at what happened and why it's

:34:37. > :34:42.arrived at, but he's not a politician and I think the House of

:34:43. > :34:56.Commons and ministers involved can look at this with a slightlx

:34:57. > :35:01.different eye as to why people reach decisions, and what went wrong,

:35:02. > :35:04.particularly as far as the Cabinet is concerned, and accountabhlity

:35:05. > :35:11.through Parliament to the whder public is concerned. I'm not sure

:35:12. > :35:15.Sir John Chilcot, who is not a politician, can on his own `nswer

:35:16. > :35:22.that wider perspective for the future. May I begin by agreding

:35:23. > :35:26.briefly with one point the honourable lady made from the front

:35:27. > :35:30.bench opposite, in saying how irrelevant I think it has bden to

:35:31. > :35:35.try to turn all this into a witchhunt against celebrity

:35:36. > :35:40.individuals who were involvdd at the time. It is one of the great

:35:41. > :35:45.failures of political debatd of our day has so far as the wider media

:35:46. > :35:52.and world were concerned, the recent referendum debate was largely the

:35:53. > :35:58.David and Boris show, and I think it's quite pointless to say, let's

:35:59. > :36:05.persecute Tony Blair. He was in charge, are we going to prosecute

:36:06. > :36:09.him as a war criminal and the rest of it.

:36:10. > :36:15.Nobody's committed any crimd. As one who was present at the time, I have

:36:16. > :36:20.absolutely no doubt that nobody acted at the time on any other basis

:36:21. > :36:24.than they believed passionately they were acting in the public interest.

:36:25. > :36:29.One of the great things abott Tony Blair was he did believe,

:36:30. > :36:33.passionately, what he was doing at the time. It was very evident on the

:36:34. > :36:36.floor of the House. He never had a doubt about what he was doing. I'm

:36:37. > :36:43.not surprised he continues to protest as strongly as he does. He

:36:44. > :36:49.hasn't changed his mind. He did believe he was acting in thd

:36:50. > :36:52.national interest in cementhng our alliance with the Americans. He

:36:53. > :36:56.thought it was absolutely kdy to our security. He actually thought a

:36:57. > :37:04.British contribution would help the Americans with the planning and the

:37:05. > :37:08.add sow Cassie and so on. Hd firmly believed just removing Sadd`m

:37:09. > :37:13.Hussein was a virtuous act which would make the world a bettdr place.

:37:14. > :37:18.He still does. Then, as now, that's the bit where he gets most

:37:19. > :37:22.passionate, the regime change. He really thinks, probably right, I

:37:23. > :37:29.agree with him actually, he got rid of an evil regime. I agree with

:37:30. > :37:33.those who say that wasn't in itself totally adequate achievement. He

:37:34. > :37:39.certainly believed they'd wdapons of mass destruction. I faced hhm in the

:37:40. > :37:45.House. I remember one day thinking this is the last man still living

:37:46. > :37:52.who still believes they're going to find weapons of mass destruction in

:37:53. > :37:57.Iraq. Everybody else, it became increasingly obvious no such

:37:58. > :38:02.material was going to be fotnd. Anyway, pursuing Tony Blair is a

:38:03. > :38:08.complete irrelevance to what the House should be doing. I'll give

:38:09. > :38:15.way. I am not in the front bench, I can't keep giving way. I'm grateful

:38:16. > :38:18.to him for giving way. I agree about the dangers of focusing on one

:38:19. > :38:22.person. I worry about the w`y in which he appears to be letthng off

:38:23. > :38:28.that one person from any re`l responsibility for misleading the

:38:29. > :38:32.House. You only have to read Chilcot how Blairs led the House about the

:38:33. > :38:36.position of the French. In that motion to the House he said it has

:38:37. > :38:40.not proved possible to secure a second resolution because one

:38:41. > :38:44.permanent member of the Sectrity Council may play its intensd to use

:38:45. > :38:49.the veto whatever the circulstances. A few minutes, even before PMQs the

:38:50. > :38:54.French were on the phone to Tony Blair saying he was misreprdsenting

:38:55. > :39:01.their position. We should not only focus on one man but let's not let

:39:02. > :39:05.him off the hook completely. I certainly didn't rise to defend Tony

:39:06. > :39:11.Blair. He's not the first politician to make a mistake and won't be the

:39:12. > :39:17.last. If she believes the French, she believes the French. Thd French

:39:18. > :39:20.were not able to exercise a veto in the Security Council. It was a

:39:21. > :39:24.mistake at the time to try to blame the French entirely. They wdre never

:39:25. > :39:31.going to get a majority in the Security Council. The French were...

:39:32. > :39:36.No, I'm not going to... THE SPEAKER: Order, order, the right

:39:37. > :39:42.honourable gentleman has made it plain he's not giving way. The House

:39:43. > :39:49.must listen to the developmdnt of the gentleman's argument. Mdmbers

:39:50. > :39:52.who wish to argue about the French veto in 2003 can argue betwden

:39:53. > :39:56.themselves. The point I'm going to make is that the political

:39:57. > :40:01.background to this, what was actually being decided, what the

:40:02. > :40:05.politicians wanted to do was key. I was, of course, a backbench MP

:40:06. > :40:10.opposite. I followed these dvents with some care. I had one advantage,

:40:11. > :40:14.not the access to what was going on inside the Government, but H did

:40:15. > :40:19.know a lot of Americans as well as British politicians. At varhous

:40:20. > :40:27.political gathering, I knew quite a lot of the key American Neo cons. On

:40:28. > :40:30.friendly terms. I was arguing the merits of the invasion of Iraq some

:40:31. > :40:36.time before the debate ever started here. That's quite an important

:40:37. > :40:44.background to this question. In the Bush administration, the kex policy

:40:45. > :40:51.makers wanted to envied Irap immediately after 9/11. By 2001

:40:52. > :40:57.they were going to invade Iraq. There wasn't the slightest doubt

:40:58. > :41:00.about it. They had a rather naive, idealistic approach which f`intly

:41:01. > :41:06.shocked me. They thought thd previous administration had not used

:41:07. > :41:09.American military power for all the benefits it could produce in the

:41:10. > :41:15.world. They were going to use military power for good. Thdy

:41:16. > :41:23.thought they would be greetdd as liberating here rows when they

:41:24. > :41:29.arrived in Baghdad and be able to improve a better regime. Thdy

:41:30. > :41:33.actually thought a man would win the election that would be held there

:41:34. > :41:38.after. I met that man once or two. He once go about 2% in an Iraqi

:41:39. > :41:46.election. He was going to bd in charge. But he need supervision

:41:47. > :41:51.There would be a US general. Constant comparisons made whth

:41:52. > :41:57.General McArthur turning imperial Japan into a democracy after the

:41:58. > :42:03.war. The importance of deNaziification that followdd the

:42:04. > :42:08.fall of Hitler. Hence you h`ve to go in for debathification when you went

:42:09. > :42:13.to Iraq. Get rid of people hn the army security service and so on I

:42:14. > :42:18.won't go on. I fiercely dis`greed with this. I liked these people But

:42:19. > :42:23.my thought all the time was, one of us isn't on the same planet when I

:42:24. > :42:27.got into some of these disctssions. But I formed a fairly hoes style

:42:28. > :42:33.view to this a long time before it arrived here. The point is, moving

:42:34. > :42:40.on, if I knew enough in 2000 to know that the Bush administration was

:42:41. > :42:46.going to invade Iraq, I am puite certain Tony Blair knew, I'l quite

:42:47. > :42:52.sure the British military knew and they had a long time to work out how

:42:53. > :42:58.they were going to join in. And that is the explanation of a lot of these

:42:59. > :43:02.things. Why did the Americans want the British to join in? Thex didn't

:43:03. > :43:07.need us for military purposds. They could defeat the Iraqis without our

:43:08. > :43:13.military assistance. They dhdn't rate our military that highly though

:43:14. > :43:16.our special forces and our intelligence they thought wdre very

:43:17. > :43:22.good. We were a very valuable political ally. The present`tion of

:43:23. > :43:25.what they were doing, would, they thought, be greatly improved if the

:43:26. > :43:30.British could be at the heart of the alliance. As I've already s`id, Tony

:43:31. > :43:40.Blair was very enthusiastic`lly keen to join them. I doubt whethdr he

:43:41. > :43:46.bought all the neo-con theories U but clearly he thought getthng rid

:43:47. > :43:50.of Saddam Hussein's regime could be one of the best contributions to

:43:51. > :43:57.make to the Iraqi people. Hd dough sided to join in. You reed these

:43:58. > :44:02.mysteries you ask what was the snag for Tony Blair and the Government? I

:44:03. > :44:07.feel confident I knew enough about what was actually going on tat,

:44:08. > :44:13.through my various contacts to feel pretty confident about this, the

:44:14. > :44:20.snag for Tony Blair who wanted to take part, who, it seems, h`d

:44:21. > :44:26.already told George Bush th`t, George W Bush, that he wantdd to

:44:27. > :44:31.take part was that it wasn't legal for the United Kingdom to t`ke part

:44:32. > :44:37.in a war being launched for the purpose of changing the reghme in

:44:38. > :44:41.another country. When he received that advice, I think every lawyer in

:44:42. > :44:47.the place is agreed that was undoubtedly right. And, as somebody

:44:48. > :44:53.has said, that wasn't the vhew the Americans took. American neo-cons

:44:54. > :44:57.are not so impressed with international law. Their

:44:58. > :45:02.constitution doesn't constr`in them. I once had a quay Americanoficial

:45:03. > :45:08.tell me, we have all the legal authority we have to invade. We have

:45:09. > :45:14.a large majority in both Hotses of Congress. That was it. But, of

:45:15. > :45:20.course, they were so keen to have the British, they were prep`red to

:45:21. > :45:27.give some time to Tony Blair to tackle this problem of whether it

:45:28. > :45:33.was lawful for him to take part and to work out some basis upon which

:45:34. > :45:37.the British could join. Now, so far, I think the motives of all these

:45:38. > :45:45.people were virtuous. They believed all this. They were making the world

:45:46. > :45:50.a better place by removing ` tyrant and installing a western,

:45:51. > :45:54.pro-American, pro-Western, pro-Israeli democratic Government in

:45:55. > :45:57.a liberal society. And they were, therefore, going to change the

:45:58. > :46:03.regime. We were going to do it lawfully and we had to turn to this

:46:04. > :46:06.whole question of the dreadful weapons which Saddam Hussein

:46:07. > :46:13.undoubtedly had used against his own people years before. Whether they

:46:14. > :46:16.had all been disposed off and whether you could actually

:46:17. > :46:21.demonstrate he was a continting threat. Because, if you could

:46:22. > :46:27.demonstrate he had weapons of mass destruction, that they were a threat

:46:28. > :46:33.to British and his neighbours and that he was not cooperating with

:46:34. > :46:42.weapons inspections and so on, and if you got an UN Resolution, then

:46:43. > :46:49.you had a legal base for invading. I think once one realises that was the

:46:50. > :46:55.perfectly worthy, well-intentioned mind-set of most of the British

:46:56. > :47:02.people taking part in this process to intervene, I think then one can

:47:03. > :47:11.understand why some of thesd extraordinary processes took part. I

:47:12. > :47:20.personally believe that the American administration actually del`yed the

:47:21. > :47:26.invasion for a month or few... Two months... Two months, to give the

:47:27. > :47:32.British more time to get through this convoluted legal stuff, I use

:47:33. > :47:36.sarcastic words which probably the occasion impatient American used a

:47:37. > :47:42.version of at the time, to get through before they could join in.

:47:43. > :47:46.Then the problem occurred for the Americans. They went to the UN. Got

:47:47. > :47:50.Resolution 1441 and you will the rest of it. They began to lose

:47:51. > :47:56.patience. They began to see this could go on forever. They bdcame,

:47:57. > :48:08.they reached a stage where they were going to invade in March 2003. They

:48:09. > :48:12.couldn't wait any longer. So, the Blair Government, those that knew

:48:13. > :48:17.what was going on, had to speed the thing up a bit. Because thex

:48:18. > :48:27.realised if they were not c`reful, they were going to fail to get there

:48:28. > :48:37.in time. One thing that surprises me is the advice from the JIC which

:48:38. > :48:41.really surprises me. They dhd eventually produce enough

:48:42. > :48:44.intelligence which was plausible and believed in by those putting it in

:48:45. > :48:49.the reports for the Attornex General, I think it is obvious,

:48:50. > :48:54.quite reluctantly to be persuaded there probably was a basis on this

:48:55. > :49:00.for going ahead. Then the urgent debates to take place in thhs House

:49:01. > :49:04.would last about two days bdfore everyone knew the troops who were

:49:05. > :49:10.already in battle positions in the middle east were about to go ahead

:49:11. > :49:18.with the whole operation. I do think it's from that that we should learn

:49:19. > :49:24.the political lessons. One of the first lessons was that, I think an

:49:25. > :49:30.ever-increasing rush to acttally get into the position where you could

:49:31. > :49:35.lawfully invade left everyone to engage in wanting to be persuaded

:49:36. > :49:43.that various things were correct, various steps had been taken which,

:49:44. > :49:47.if they'd submitted themselves to slower, more challenged and

:49:48. > :49:53.considered consideration, would have led to a different conclusion. So,

:49:54. > :50:00.what in my opinion is the ottline at least to the political lessons from

:50:01. > :50:06.this. The first is the Amerhcan alliance should not be entered into

:50:07. > :50:10.blindly. I would only briefly say, I think I'm a passionate belidver that

:50:11. > :50:14.our alliance with the United States is crucial to this country's future

:50:15. > :50:23.security and our role in thd world as Tony Blair is. So, I'm not - not

:50:24. > :50:29.a trace of anti-Americanism. It is one of our most valuable fe`tures of

:50:30. > :50:33.foreign policy. But that dodsn't mean blindly, always right or wrong,

:50:34. > :50:38.you can let yourself go along with what the American president of the

:50:39. > :50:44.day wishes to do. I take th`t no further. We might have a prdsident

:50:45. > :50:49.Trump. So it's a question worth bearing in mind. I actually do agree

:50:50. > :50:54.with the right honourable l`dy, you don't destroy the American `lliance.

:50:55. > :50:59.You may damage it for a month or two if you don't go along absolttely

:51:00. > :51:06.with what the President wants you to do. The other thing that's clear in

:51:07. > :51:13.Chilcot, it was plain from the way the ministry behaved at the time,

:51:14. > :51:18.the advice of our defence chiefs is hugely important. I share the pride

:51:19. > :51:24.in them that keeps being expressed in these debates. They alwaxs want

:51:25. > :51:30.to take part in any militarx activity in which the Americans want

:51:31. > :51:34.them to join. It may be verx considered advice but it always

:51:35. > :51:40.comes down to, we must ask the Americans to let us make a big

:51:41. > :51:44.contribution. If you're a trained military man, you have trained for

:51:45. > :51:47.the purpose of using your mhlitary force in the national doctors,

:51:48. > :51:51.further worthwhile objectivds, you can't help but think this is our

:51:52. > :51:59.moment, this is the great action I've got to take part in.

:52:00. > :52:04.Similarly with the intelligdnce services, they prise their

:52:05. > :52:09.relationship with the Americans above all relationships thex have

:52:10. > :52:16.with the outside world, and so they are dependent on cooperation. They

:52:17. > :52:22.do depend on us in some ways, but they are anxious to please `nd

:52:23. > :52:26.anxious to do what they think their and American colleagues wish to do.

:52:27. > :52:31.When you have a Prime Minister and government that wants to enter the

:52:32. > :52:36.war, then everybody is extrdmely anxious to find the facts, to be

:52:37. > :52:41.convinced of the situation, to enable the Prime Minister to do what

:52:42. > :52:46.he wants and to go ahead. I think that's actually quite an essential

:52:47. > :52:52.point because it requires a simple politician like me to make ht, it

:52:53. > :52:56.doesn't appear in the pages of the report. That when you raise your

:52:57. > :53:01.eyebrows going through what happened, I think that answdrs a

:53:02. > :53:06.lot. I do think the time we were talking about, there weren't enough

:53:07. > :53:11.diplomats involved, there w`sn't enough looking at the expertise of

:53:12. > :53:17.the Foreign Office. The Americans got rid of most of theirs and got

:53:18. > :53:23.people who had been involved in the Nicaraguan episode because they were

:53:24. > :53:26.ideological more sound. Americans did not like the therapists we got

:53:27. > :53:33.in the Foreign Office because they kept complicating things by talking

:53:34. > :53:38.about tribes and different sorts of Muslim which they thought w`s not

:53:39. > :53:43.relevant in the new era of western democracy, in which they were going

:53:44. > :53:52.to take the country. I haven't got time, I apologise to my honourable

:53:53. > :53:58.friend. The Attorney General was obviously giving the right `dvice. I

:53:59. > :54:07.am sitting alongside a very tough Attorney General who would not give

:54:08. > :54:11.the advice that the Prime Mhnister wanted, and I agree with wh`t the

:54:12. > :54:18.honourable lady said, that hs what the Attorney General 's fourth. I

:54:19. > :54:22.know Lord Goldsmith, he's all right, but he must have felt so exposed

:54:23. > :54:30.that in the end he gave in to the temptation to say, well just about,

:54:31. > :54:35.I suppose that what you say is satisfactorily proved, you lust do

:54:36. > :54:39.so. I have taken longer than I intended, but the big thing that

:54:40. > :54:46.matters, it matters very much as we are having a change of government

:54:47. > :54:51.today, is how does the Cabinet come into this? What about accountability

:54:52. > :54:55.to Parliament? I must say it was obvious at the time, it was obvious

:54:56. > :54:59.if you listened to the Forehgn Secretary publicly, it was obvious

:55:00. > :55:02.to what half the Labour Party said, obvious that if you listened to

:55:03. > :55:07.officials that Cabinet government was not working properly in the

:55:08. > :55:19.Government of Tony Blair. Hd went in for sofa government, and Margaret

:55:20. > :55:29.Thatcher got keener on sofa government towards the end of her

:55:30. > :55:33.time. Parliament, the same thing. There was reluctance to comd to

:55:34. > :55:45.Parliament. Both were essentially seen as hurdles.

:55:46. > :55:53.How are you going to get it passed Parliament? I would suggest for the

:55:54. > :55:58.future that is not the mindset that people should be in, they should be

:55:59. > :56:02.setting the proposition, advocating it to covenants, and with proper

:56:03. > :56:07.information listen to it behng debated and examined by people who

:56:08. > :56:14.have got time to do so. Simhlarly parliaments should be consulted when

:56:15. > :56:19.it can be, given proper information, and you shouldn't rely on the of the

:56:20. > :56:25.debate and the work of the whips to yourself through to say aftdrwards

:56:26. > :56:33.that you have the democratic endorsement, and I haven't got time

:56:34. > :56:38.to apply my strong stricturds. If you read it with my arguments in

:56:39. > :56:45.mind, the chubby report I think defeat the impression I had as

:56:46. > :56:49.someone who participated in debate. Military action is difficult.

:56:50. > :56:56.There's no point politicians being light-heartedly irresponsible. There

:56:57. > :56:59.will be occasions you cannot do it, there will be occasions somdone has

:57:00. > :57:04.attacked the British interest and you have got to fight back. You can

:57:05. > :57:07.tell Cabinet, you can tell Parliament afterwards and any

:57:08. > :57:22.sensible Parliament will endorse it. This wasn't an emergency. For two

:57:23. > :57:26.years we were told there wotld be an invasion of Iraq. It had bedn

:57:27. > :57:29.planned and discussed. The reason there was in full Cabinet

:57:30. > :57:32.discussion, and the reason there wasn't time the Parliamentary

:57:33. > :57:42.debate, was because you might not get it past them. We didn't start

:57:43. > :57:48.debating in Parliament till February 2003, and the actual final key vote

:57:49. > :57:51.as I say is when the troops were in the field, which put a lot of

:57:52. > :57:56.Conservatives off voting ag`inst it who might otherwise have voted

:57:57. > :58:01.against it, our boys were about to go into action the next day which is

:58:02. > :58:05.what occurred. Some off that has been addressed. The National

:58:06. > :58:14.Security Council is a hugelx beneficial innovation of my right

:58:15. > :58:19.honourable friend's, the outgoing Prime Minister, who brought it in. I

:58:20. > :58:24.would only say it is not tile to debated now. It still needs to be

:58:25. > :58:31.improved. It has not covered everything, it is a lot better than

:58:32. > :58:34.it was. Cabinet government, I think my right honourable friend should

:58:35. > :58:37.ask themselves if they are still in office under the next Prime

:58:38. > :58:40.Minister, can they ensure adequate time is given to discuss thhngs

:58:41. > :58:49.that adequate information is given in advance, that Cabinet government

:58:50. > :58:54.isn't moving quickly from fhghting to item, that you have had papers

:58:55. > :59:01.beforehand to allow you to consider it, and the National Security

:59:02. > :59:06.Council certainly. I genuindly congratulate the Prime Minister

:59:07. > :59:10.Some of the best discussions I took part in whether in the National

:59:11. > :59:16.Security Council, with my total approval. I personally may be too

:59:17. > :59:20.sensitive, I think it could be improved sometimes because there are

:59:21. > :59:36.occasions when a freight Colpany has been brought there and expl`ined to

:59:37. > :59:40.you. -- a fait accompli. Thd whole history of the Middle East `nd North

:59:41. > :59:46.Africa is we have removed f`scist dictatorships of the most poisonous

:59:47. > :59:50.kind from country after country and then been surprised that thdy had

:59:51. > :59:56.been replaced by a situation which is sometimes even worse than the one

:59:57. > :00:04.we have removed. A continuing answer to that problem needs to be sought,

:00:05. > :00:08.although at the moment we h`ve reached a stage that there `re now

:00:09. > :00:12.perhaps bigger problem is that we have to confront. I began bx saying

:00:13. > :00:19.this is the biggest foreign policy disaster of my time. We all have to

:00:20. > :00:27.ask, why did the institutions of the United Kingdom failed to evdn

:00:28. > :00:32.develop a hint of that? It wasn t particularly courageous for the

:00:33. > :00:37.House to vote in favour. 70$ of the British public supported thd

:00:38. > :00:41.invasion. For the first week or two it was extremely popular. H`d we

:00:42. > :00:46.held a referendum, which is now the fashionable way of governing the

:00:47. > :00:49.country, compared with this old-fashioned Parliamentary

:00:50. > :00:53.democracy, it would have sahled through with animal must majority.

:00:54. > :00:57.The danger of following opinion polls is that I've found a xear

:00:58. > :01:01.later you couldn't find a mdmber of the public who had never met anybody

:01:02. > :01:07.who agreed with the invasion of Iraq. In the light of better

:01:08. > :01:22.information, people suddenlx realised it had been a terrhble are.

:01:23. > :01:26.-- terrible error. We voted against it, we spoke against it, neddless to

:01:27. > :01:30.say I have looked at my spedch and I'm very sad to say I predicted

:01:31. > :01:36.quite a lot of the consequences of what was going to go ahead. We all

:01:37. > :01:43.agree never again we can avoid it, but there's a big, big subjdct and

:01:44. > :01:46.it's no good saying we should look at the intelligence arrangelents, we

:01:47. > :01:50.should have a look at the arrangements for the way our

:01:51. > :01:54.government is run, the way this Parliament organises itself, and how

:01:55. > :01:58.we get sensible accountabilhty to the House of Commons the next time

:01:59. > :02:09.the Government has to engagd in such difficult decisions. Mr Alex

:02:10. > :02:14.Salmond. The Parliamentary wounds on the Iraq war are still perthnent

:02:15. > :02:20.today, but we should remembdr they are as nothing compared to the

:02:21. > :02:25.wounds of the 179 families who lost servicepeople, and the 23 British

:02:26. > :02:28.civilian staff who were killed, the 200,000 Iraqis, the thousands of

:02:29. > :02:33.American soldiers, the carn`ge in the Middle East which is with us

:02:34. > :02:43.today, these wounds are still raw and open and continuing. I looked

:02:44. > :02:48.back at the debate on the 18th of March 2003, and I was struck by a

:02:49. > :02:53.number of things we don't always remember. We remember Robin Cook's

:02:54. > :02:59.brilliant resignation speech the day before. We don't necessarilx

:03:00. > :03:06.remember John Denham's disthnguished and measured contribution on the day

:03:07. > :03:12.of the debate. He reminded ts that public opinion at that stagd was in

:03:13. > :03:17.favour of war and those who spoke against it weren't given a

:03:18. > :03:19.particularly easy time. I looked at the contribution from Charlds

:03:20. > :03:26.Kennedy in that day, who was barracked throughout his spdech

:03:27. > :03:30.against war. Suggestions of Chamberlain Charlie was one of the

:03:31. > :03:42.more printable epithets, or the toast of Baghdad, which was flung at

:03:43. > :03:47.some of us who opposed the war. Members who argued against ht have

:03:48. > :03:52.been vindicated, but also to remind people of the nature and context of

:03:53. > :03:59.the debate we were in. Therd were only 179 members in this Parliament

:04:00. > :04:05.who were members of that parliament in 2003, little over a quarter of

:04:06. > :04:09.members in this Parliament were present and voting in that

:04:10. > :04:13.particular debate so it is `s well that people remember and understand

:04:14. > :04:18.the context if we are to understand the feelings of Parliamentary

:04:19. > :04:24.democracy. Not referendum btt Parliamentary democracy that votes

:04:25. > :04:28.on that illustrated about Iraq. And I have also been checking the

:04:29. > :04:32.record, and I think I can honestly say I don't think I've ever quoted

:04:33. > :04:37.in The Times newspaper ever in 0 years in this place off and on, but

:04:38. > :04:42.I'm going to quote it today because I thought their headline and their

:04:43. > :04:47.first paragraph in the report last Thursday hit the mark absolttely.

:04:48. > :04:53.Under the headline, Blair's private war, they wrote, Britain fotght a

:04:54. > :04:59.potentially illegal war in Hraq because of Tony Blair's misguided

:05:00. > :05:05.and personal commitment to George Bush, the Chilcot report concluded

:05:06. > :05:08.yesterday. It would be impossible in reading the Chilcot report not to

:05:09. > :05:14.look at that personal level of accountability as well as the wider

:05:15. > :05:16.context of the legality. Thd right honourable member for Rushcliffe

:05:17. > :05:21.started his speech by saying this is not all about Tony Blair, and the

:05:22. > :05:26.rest of his speech illustrated why it is very largely about Tony Blair.

:05:27. > :05:32.The Chilcot report, more importantly, let me quote from the

:05:33. > :05:38.executive summary, but belidve me it is backed enormously in the full

:05:39. > :05:45.report on page 58 and 59, goes through the sequence of

:05:46. > :05:50.decision-making until the ilmediate onset of war. If it was sof`

:05:51. > :05:55.government, it was a very slall sofa indeed because the crucial decisions

:05:56. > :06:02.about the strategy and of this country were made with the Prime

:06:03. > :06:07.Minister and very few of his advisers. Chilcot finds not even a

:06:08. > :06:12.Cabinet committee, according to Chilcot, discussed these crtcial

:06:13. > :06:17.decisions, which are listed on page 58 and 59. For example the first of

:06:18. > :06:21.which, the decision at the beginning of September 2001 to offer to work

:06:22. > :06:26.with President Bush and a strategy to deal with Iraq as part of phase

:06:27. > :06:31.two on the war on terror, ddspite the fact there was no evidence of

:06:32. > :06:37.Iraqi involvement in the attacks on the United States. Right through to

:06:38. > :06:41.our view of UK policy at thd end of February 2003, where the inspectors

:06:42. > :06:44.have found no evidence of wdapons of mass destruction and only lhmited

:06:45. > :06:49.support for the second resolution in the Security Council.

:06:50. > :06:56.All of these decisions made without consultation with a range of

:06:57. > :06:59.colleagues in the cabinet. When the Deputy Prime Minister concltded this

:07:00. > :07:04.weekend in a way that Chilcot wasn't allowed to do either becausd of his

:07:05. > :07:11.remit or lack of specialisms on the inquiry that the war was illegal and

:07:12. > :07:14.apologised for it, what he `ctually should have been apologising for as

:07:15. > :07:18.Deputy Prime Minister was that this was allowed to happen over `

:07:19. > :07:22.sequence of 15 months where one individual, the Prime Minister, with

:07:23. > :07:27.his advisers was able to take these decisions without any account of any

:07:28. > :07:35.sort or kind of collective responsibility. Doesn't Chilcot also

:07:36. > :07:41.say, though, that the form of Government should be described as a

:07:42. > :07:46.profession Al Faw um? That ht shouldn't be regarded as just

:07:47. > :07:52.advisers and cronies. Isn't that the specific point of evidence that Lord

:07:53. > :07:57.Turnbull gave to Chilcot? I'm dealing with the findings of

:07:58. > :08:02.Chilcot. The inquiry considdrs that there should have been a collective

:08:03. > :08:08.discussion by a Cabinet comlittee or small group of ministers on the

:08:09. > :08:13.basis of advice agreed at a senior level of officials. That is page 58,

:08:14. > :08:18.if it helps the honourable gentleman. Paragraph 409. I've

:08:19. > :08:27.answered the honourable gentleman. Let me continue. Perhaps I'll give

:08:28. > :08:34.way later. THE SPEAKER:. We cannot conduct a

:08:35. > :08:38.debate with people yelling from a sedentary position. If the right

:08:39. > :08:41.honourable gentleman wants to give way later he will. If he dodsn't, he

:08:42. > :08:48.heent'. No doubt the Chilcot report would

:08:49. > :08:53.have concluded otherwise but we have the report as it's concluded not not

:08:54. > :08:59.just on individual pieces of evidence but the conclusion of the

:09:00. > :09:02.Chilcot Inquiry itself. That's why the Times were undoubtedly right to

:09:03. > :09:08.describe this in the way thdy did as Blair's private war. In terls of

:09:09. > :09:12.what this place and this pl`ce's collective responsibility. Where I

:09:13. > :09:16.fundamentally disagree with the Right Honourable Member for

:09:17. > :09:22.Rushcliffe, if a Parliament is to hold future executives to account,

:09:23. > :09:27.it's not just a question of changing the process of decision makhng. I

:09:28. > :09:32.accept some changes have bedn made. I don't accept the confidence of the

:09:33. > :09:37.Foreign Secretary that mist`kes could never be repeated agahn. I

:09:38. > :09:43.don't believe his disstings between a land campaign in Iraq and an

:09:44. > :09:47.aerial bombardment in Libya fully explains, for example, why this

:09:48. > :09:52.country, never mind its allhes, spent 13 times as much bombhng Libya

:09:53. > :09:56.as we did in any budget for reconstruction. That might be a

:09:57. > :10:00.lesson which hasn't been carried forward. But the changes th`t must

:10:01. > :10:04.be made are not just in terls of Government processes. They're

:10:05. > :10:10.changes in terms of parliamdntary accountability. The most fundamental

:10:11. > :10:13.point of parliamentary accountability is the Parli`ment

:10:14. > :10:18.decided whether it has been misled or not. My contention is... I give

:10:19. > :10:26.Waugh to the member. On this question of Libya. The fact is Libya

:10:27. > :10:28.was already in a brutal civhl war before western airforces prdvented

:10:29. > :10:33.Gaddafi slaughtering innocent people. That's what was happening.

:10:34. > :10:37.The question he has to answdr is what would he have done to help

:10:38. > :10:44.those women and children in Benghazi? What would he havd done to

:10:45. > :10:48.help them? Probably, as my honourable friend said, probably not

:10:49. > :10:53.supplying arms to people like that over a period of time. Not doing oil

:10:54. > :10:58.deals in the sun in a tent with Colonel Gaddafi might be a second.

:10:59. > :11:03.That wasn't the point. Let le make my speech. That wasn't the point I

:11:04. > :11:07.was making. It was about thd lesson of reconstruction. Not about the

:11:08. > :11:13.argument of the conflict. Btt the lesson of reconstruction. It is a

:11:14. > :11:19.very fair point to make to point out of fact this country spent 03 times

:11:20. > :11:23.as much bombing Libya as we did in aiding a budget for recon strukts of

:11:24. > :11:28.Libya. That -- reconstruction of Libya. That may be a lesson given

:11:29. > :11:30.priority to the aftermath of conflict which I'm not cert`in the

:11:31. > :11:35.Foreign Secretary fully took on board. The point I was going to

:11:36. > :11:39.make, this is not just about the process of Government but about

:11:40. > :11:44.parliamentary accountabilitx. The most fundamental point of all. In

:11:45. > :11:49.the past, we've held people accountable in the relatively recent

:11:50. > :11:54.past, pro fume owe and a sex scandal. Stephen Byers accused of

:11:55. > :11:57.misleading Parliament because he was nationalising a railway company if

:11:58. > :12:02.I remember correct. And these are things which, no doubt, are very

:12:03. > :12:06.important and that line of accountability is crucial. How much

:12:07. > :12:09.more important is a line of accountability on peace or war where

:12:10. > :12:14.thousands or hundreds of thousands of people lose their lives `s a

:12:15. > :12:22.result of decisions that ard made by the executive? My contention would

:12:23. > :12:28.be that Chilcot gives huge `rray of evidence of a lack of parli`mentary

:12:29. > :12:31.truthfulness. One thing was being said to the president of thd United

:12:32. > :12:37.States and quite a different thing was being said to Parliament and to

:12:38. > :12:41.people. That doesn't take place over a single speech or a single

:12:42. > :12:46.parliamentary statement, though the immediate run up to the war gives

:12:47. > :12:54.ample and detailed examples. For example, as my honourable friend for

:12:55. > :12:59.the Green Party indicated, the total misrepresentation to the UN. Chilcot

:13:00. > :13:02.published what was being sahd within Government and we can compare that

:13:03. > :13:07.directly to what was being offered to this Parliament as an

:13:08. > :13:13.explanation. But the process of Parliament being told one thing

:13:14. > :13:17.while George W Bush was being assured another didn't take place

:13:18. > :13:23.over a fee weeks or single debate or statement, it took place ovdr 1

:13:24. > :13:29.months. It's amply demonstr`ted in the evidence presented to Chilcot.

:13:30. > :13:33.We know now why Chilcot fought so strongly to have these priv`te memos

:13:34. > :13:40.to be part of the overall rdview of the report. The Right Honourable

:13:41. > :13:45.Member for Rushcliffe pointdd to the motivations of regime changd and the

:13:46. > :13:50.difficulty that regime change could not make the war legal in gdnerally

:13:51. > :13:55.understood international terms. That's demonstrated in the private

:13:56. > :14:03.memos from Tony Blair to George W Bush. In December 2001. Any link to

:14:04. > :14:07.11th accept and Al-Qaeda is at best very tenuous. At present

:14:08. > :14:13.international opinion would be reluctant outside the United States

:14:14. > :14:18.or the UK to sup pour immedhate military action. For sure, people

:14:19. > :14:25.want to be rid of Saddam. Wd need a strategy for regime change that

:14:26. > :14:31.builds over time. That was Des 001. However, at the same time, December.

:14:32. > :14:39.Charles Kennedy in pursuing the Prime Minister at Question Time was

:14:40. > :14:42.told the two faces of war included Afghanistan and the pursuit of

:14:43. > :14:47.international terrorism in `ll of its different forms. That is a

:14:48. > :14:51.matter for investigating thd finances, how terrorists move across

:14:52. > :14:58.frontiers. The House was behng told stage two of the war on terror was

:14:59. > :15:03.not an assault on Iraq, far less a regime change in Iraq but a pursuit

:15:04. > :15:10.of infer national terrorism. The two things are totally incompathble One

:15:11. > :15:15.thing to George Bush in private -- private, another to this Parliament

:15:16. > :15:20.and the people of the country. Then there's the issue moving into 2 02

:15:21. > :15:24.which was amply picked up bx the press after the Chilcot

:15:25. > :15:33.REPORTER:Ed. I will be with you whatever. That was in the mdmo of

:15:34. > :15:38.20th July 20002 to George Btsh. I heard the former Prime Minister

:15:39. > :15:44.explain this to John Humphrdys as the idea of "What." Meant somehow

:15:45. > :15:47.whatever and didn't give an unconditional commitment to stand

:15:48. > :15:53.with the United States in a war I'm not sure I fully understood that

:15:54. > :15:58.explanation. But crucially, neither did John Chilcot. And neithdr did

:15:59. > :16:07.Jack Straw, a crucial member of the administration. Jack Straw's memos

:16:08. > :16:15.to Tony Blair were also published. And the -- on 11th March 2003 in the

:16:16. > :16:18.report Straw wrote to Blair, when British graishly accepted your offer

:16:19. > :16:26.to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive not dead. Referring

:16:27. > :16:29.to not the mortal danger to troops or civilians from a war but

:16:30. > :16:34.politically whether the Prile Minister would be alive or dead

:16:35. > :16:37.Jack Straw was under no illtsions whatsoever about the commitlent that

:16:38. > :16:43.had been given to George Bush and neither were Tony Blair's own

:16:44. > :16:47.advisers who advised him to take it out of the memo and neither,

:16:48. > :16:54.certainly, it was George Bush or his advisers or Secretary of St`te Colin

:16:55. > :16:58.Powell. Sir John Chilcot concludes that the meaning of this, Mr Blair's

:16:59. > :17:02.note, which had not been discussed or agreed with colleagues sdt the UK

:17:03. > :17:09.on a path leading to diplom`tic activity in the UN. The possibility

:17:10. > :17:13.of participation in militarx action in a way to make it very difficult

:17:14. > :17:17.for the UK to withdraw support from the United States. But that was not

:17:18. > :17:23.what was being told to Parlhament at the same time. Parliament w`s not

:17:24. > :17:27.told of assurances to Georgd W Bush on military action. Parliamdnt was

:17:28. > :17:33.told the Prime Minister was striving for peace. He was trying to find

:17:34. > :17:40.anyway way to avoid a conflhct. That it was all up to Saddam whether he

:17:41. > :17:42.those peace or conflict. And that deliberate misrepresentation of what

:17:43. > :17:48.was being said to the Americans and what was being said to Parlhament,

:17:49. > :17:58.continued, of course, into the very onset of war itself. And whdn the

:17:59. > :18:04.memo quoted by my honourabld friend earlier on in this debate, when

:18:05. > :18:09.Blair was telling Parliament even in the speech, in the war or pdace

:18:10. > :18:14.debate, I have never put out justification for action as regime

:18:15. > :18:18.change. He was telling George Bush only a few days later, that's why

:18:19. > :18:22.Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is the immediate justificathon for

:18:23. > :18:30.action, ridding Iraq of Saddam is the real prize. Now, we heard

:18:31. > :18:36.earlier that this was not a matter of one man. But that one man was the

:18:37. > :18:40.Prime Minister. We were told earlier it was really about processds of

:18:41. > :18:44.Government. But it was the Prime Minister who dictated the process of

:18:45. > :18:47.Government and prevented processes of Government in terms of checks and

:18:48. > :18:53.balances not working. And, `bove all, it was the Prime Minister who

:18:54. > :19:00.prevented this House having the information it required to take a

:19:01. > :19:06.reasonable judgment. I heard last week that one of the defencds of

:19:07. > :19:11.intervention in Iraq was a counter-factual argument. What if

:19:12. > :19:20.Saddam Hussein had stayed in power? What would he have done? Dalage in

:19:21. > :19:25.the Arab string, for exampld? There's another counter-factual

:19:26. > :19:33.argument I have in mind. Wh`t if the massive international coalition that

:19:34. > :19:36.was built to deal with Al-Q`eda in Afghanistan had been held together,

:19:37. > :19:42.what if the hundreds of billions of dollars which were then to be

:19:43. > :19:46.waisted in the Iraqi desert, what if they had been applied to making a

:19:47. > :19:52.real success of the rebuildhng of Afghanistan? What if the

:19:53. > :19:56.justification for a totally legal international intervention which

:19:57. > :20:00.this country took part in h`d resulted in a genuine benefht and

:20:01. > :20:06.that massive coalition which extended, incidentally, even to

:20:07. > :20:09.approval from the Palestini`n liberation organisation, th`t

:20:10. > :20:14.massive Corration could havd demonstrated a legal war, correctly

:20:15. > :20:17.applied, could result in thd reconstruction and in allowhng a

:20:18. > :20:22.country the investment requhred to be a shining light of a gentine

:20:23. > :20:29.international intervention? And the United States of America, in a way,

:20:30. > :20:33.never stronger than it was hn the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was

:20:34. > :20:39.never more respected becausd it had suffered under the terrorist

:20:40. > :20:46.atrocity. If a broader coalhtion had brought that to fruition instead of

:20:47. > :20:55.this meandering into Iraq on a private vendetta from the President

:20:56. > :21:00.of the United States with its closet advisor of neo-Conservative and

:21:01. > :21:02.prevented this Parliament from having the information it rdquired

:21:03. > :21:14.to hold him to account? I once told the former Primd

:21:15. > :21:18.Minister that he would answdr to a higher law than this Parlialent and

:21:19. > :21:22.I believe that to be absolutely true. But in the meantime, this

:21:23. > :21:29.Parliament, add this stage, should hold him accountable. Not bdcause it

:21:30. > :21:33.is a matter of pursuing the former Prime Minister but because ht will

:21:34. > :21:36.demonstrate and illustrate that even retrospectively, if thd

:21:37. > :21:43.parliament is systematicallx misled, they will say, up with it they shall

:21:44. > :21:48.not put. It is part of the change we are going to make, not just in the

:21:49. > :21:55.processes of government, to pause collective responsibility, not just

:21:56. > :21:58.in hope but the essential changes of parliamentary accountabilitx. We

:21:59. > :22:05.will be able to say legitim`tely that this could never happen again.

:22:06. > :22:10.Mr Dominic Grieve. Thank yot, Mr Speaker. It is a pleasure to follow

:22:11. > :22:15.the honourable member and indeed my right honourable friend in this

:22:16. > :22:19.debate. There is no doubt, Lr Speaker, they have to clear

:22:20. > :22:25.advantages over me in this debate in that both of them of course opposed

:22:26. > :22:31.the notion in the House in 2003 which initiated our militarx action

:22:32. > :22:36.in Iraq. Whereas I supported it Something which, I have to say, I

:22:37. > :22:39.have come to very much regrdt. I supported it at the time because I

:22:40. > :22:45.was indeed persuaded by the arguments put forward by thd Prime

:22:46. > :22:50.Minister, at the time, Mr Blair with great eloquence, to thhs House,

:22:51. > :22:57.about the fact that in his tse and a real and present danger, but in the

:22:58. > :23:01.immediate context is justifhed taking military action against him,

:23:02. > :23:08.even without going back for a further resolution of the United

:23:09. > :23:12.Nations Security Council, rdlying on the previous resolutions whhch, I

:23:13. > :23:17.have to say, there was conshderable evidence that Saddam Hussein had

:23:18. > :23:23.Celia Lee breached. Certainly in terms of his non-co-operation. So on

:23:24. > :23:30.that basis I voted for the lotion as did many other honourable mdmbers

:23:31. > :23:40.still present in this House today. Sir John Chilcot's report hhghlights

:23:41. > :23:44.how the decision-making processes of governments can become distorted

:23:45. > :23:48.under pressure of events. Indeed, I would like to think, I am always a

:23:49. > :23:56.little wary of this, that the distortions are so consider`ble in

:23:57. > :23:58.relation to the report that he highlights a dysfunctionality within

:23:59. > :24:04.the heart of Mr Blair's govdrnment but I hope may have been exceptional

:24:05. > :24:08.to him. But for all that I think there are plenty of caution`ry tales

:24:09. > :24:13.for us in this House today which we can look at in current contdxt as

:24:14. > :24:17.much as they would have been looked at, at the time. But the pohnt seems

:24:18. > :24:21.to me to have been rather wdll made and I will not repeat it. That

:24:22. > :24:28.because Mr Blair had formed in his view very strong resolution that we

:24:29. > :24:34.should support the United States including removing Saddam Htssein

:24:35. > :24:39.and effecting regime change that the entirety of the processes of

:24:40. > :24:43.government and Whitehall was skewed in order to achieve that ail and

:24:44. > :24:46.have the mischief of disreg`rding all the evidence that might be

:24:47. > :24:53.available to contradict whether this was in fact the right coursd of

:24:54. > :24:58.action to take. Whether it was intelligence information or for that

:24:59. > :25:01.matter whether it was the thorny problem of legality, both of which I

:25:02. > :25:09.want to touch on briefly thhs afternoon. So far as the qudstion of

:25:10. > :25:13.the intelligence is concerndd, those of us who have been in government

:25:14. > :25:18.and served on the National Security Council, as I have or indeed in my

:25:19. > :25:21.current role as chairman of the intelligence and Security committee,

:25:22. > :25:26.know perfectly well that intelligence often obtained at great

:25:27. > :25:33.risk and with difficulty can only be what it is, which is a tool to

:25:34. > :25:39.decision-making. It may be listaken. You cannot prevent that in human

:25:40. > :25:42.society and you cannot guar`ntee its interpretation will be corrdct. I

:25:43. > :25:50.have to say that my impresshon during my time in government was

:25:51. > :25:55.that the intelligence committees go to considerable lengths to point out

:25:56. > :25:59.the limits to which intelligence can properly be put. A lesson I suspect

:26:00. > :26:05.that they derived from this experience. The simple fact is that

:26:06. > :26:09.one can only read the Chilcot Report to conclude the way in which the

:26:10. > :26:15.intelligence was handled stdering the run-up to the war was in some

:26:16. > :26:21.cases truly breathtaking. And it makes troublesome reading. @nd I

:26:22. > :26:26.hope very much, I will say nothing more about this, those withhn the

:26:27. > :26:36.agencies who are known do the work will read and reread this rdport in

:26:37. > :26:42.order to remind ourselves of how reasonable intelligence was misused

:26:43. > :26:53.for the purpose of justifying theory. As proved by Mr Blahr when

:26:54. > :26:56.he came to address the Housd before the war was sanctioned by this

:26:57. > :27:06.Parliament. It is the certahnties engendered by this, and my right

:27:07. > :27:09.honourable friend made a good intervention last week when he said

:27:10. > :27:13.that if we had actually takdn the time and trouble to read sole of the

:27:14. > :27:15.background information available we might have doubted some of the

:27:16. > :27:20.certainties that were being expressed. I think it was absolutely

:27:21. > :27:24.right about that, and think it is another burden which members of this

:27:25. > :27:30.House or participated in thhs debate will have to bear. So much then for

:27:31. > :27:34.the intelligence. What about the process of legal advice. Mr Speaker,

:27:35. > :27:38.I have been apart of trying to provide legal advice to govdrnment

:27:39. > :27:42.when I was a law officer. Mx right honourable friend the Solichtor

:27:43. > :27:49.General was on the front bench and he too has also been involvdd in

:27:50. > :27:56.these processes. Legal advice is often, and law officers know this,

:27:57. > :28:02.advice which cannot in any way be certain. Legal advice is ex`ctly

:28:03. > :28:05.what it says it is. In some cases, particularly when one is de`ling

:28:06. > :28:10.with international law, the question as to whether or not you ard on the

:28:11. > :28:15.right side or the wrong sidd of international law is an intdnsely

:28:16. > :28:21.grey area precisely because there is no ultimate tribunal to detdrmine

:28:22. > :28:26.those issues. And yet apart of the British government's doctrine and

:28:27. > :28:30.ethics is that we must act lawfully at all times. And it is for the law

:28:31. > :28:35.officers to try and steer that course. What of course shinds

:28:36. > :28:41.through to me, reading the Chilcot Inquiry report, is not, as some

:28:42. > :28:50.critics have said, and I will come back to this in a moment, that Lord

:28:51. > :28:54.Goldsmith as an Attorney General abandoned legal objectivity, because

:28:55. > :28:57.I have to say now that I have read the Chilcot Inquiry and looked at

:28:58. > :29:03.these passages carefully, it seems to me that you fulfilled those

:29:04. > :29:08.criteria as best he possiblx could. But he was drawn into this process

:29:09. > :29:14.which in itself was utterly flawed because he cherry picked whhchever

:29:15. > :29:19.bit of advice he wanted to present and then sold it in that wax both to

:29:20. > :29:23.the Cabinet would never properly scrutinised it at all and ultimately

:29:24. > :29:27.to the public. I give way to my right honourable friend. I thank my

:29:28. > :29:32.right honourable friend forgiving way. Does he really think the

:29:33. > :29:38.Attorney General met all his duties? Report refers to the final puestion,

:29:39. > :29:42.to Tony Blair, which it says was answered the phone and orally about

:29:43. > :29:46.the weather conditions had been met. Surely he should have been lore

:29:47. > :29:51.pressing than just accepting a Coventry report before changing his

:29:52. > :29:57.view? Is simply quote from paragraph eight, ten, from this summary, I'm

:29:58. > :30:02.sorry I don't have the entire sorry. This was written by an official in

:30:03. > :30:05.the attorney's department. @bout a further resolution of the sdcurity

:30:06. > :30:11.council that that is strong evidence that Iraq has failed to comply with

:30:12. > :30:15.and corporate body within the remit resolution 1441. It has failed to

:30:16. > :30:19.take the final opportunity offered by the Security Council in that

:30:20. > :30:21.resolution. The Attorney General understands and is unequivocally the

:30:22. > :30:27.view of the Prime Minister that Iraq has committed further materhal

:30:28. > :30:31.breach is, as specified in resolution 1441. But as this is a

:30:32. > :30:36.judgment for the Prime Minister the attorney would be grateful for

:30:37. > :30:41.confirmation that this is the case. Now, Mr Speaker, it is important to

:30:42. > :30:46.understand, I think, one of the big changes that has taken placd between

:30:47. > :30:50.2003 and today, in a way in which a law officer's advice would be

:30:51. > :30:57.secured. My impression, I hope of got it right, reading Chilcot, in

:30:58. > :31:02.practice, the Attorney General was only provided with sketched

:31:03. > :31:09.backgrounds of the factual `nalysis on which his legal opinion was being

:31:10. > :31:14.sought. The big difference, which I can tell the House without giving

:31:15. > :31:19.away state secrets, is, if law officers are now being asked to

:31:20. > :31:22.advise on a factual basis which involves serious or context problem

:31:23. > :31:27.of international law, they will receive briefing as good as,

:31:28. > :31:32.potentially better, if they demand it, of that which would be provided

:31:33. > :31:37.to the Prime Minister himself, as to the intelligence and factual base

:31:38. > :31:42.that justifies it. So they have to make an independent assessmdnt of

:31:43. > :31:47.that. But I have to say it hs quite clear that in 2003, and I think

:31:48. > :31:52.before them, it's not peculhar to 2003, this is not the practhce that

:31:53. > :31:57.was being adopted. It was not how government works. So in practice the

:31:58. > :32:01.law officer, Lord Goldsmith, was being placed in a position where he

:32:02. > :32:05.had reasonably to take on trust the factual assessment is laid by others

:32:06. > :32:12.and particularly the Prime Linister, I want to make clear, I cannot make

:32:13. > :32:17.a judgment on whether Lord Goldsmith's advice of March seven

:32:18. > :32:22.was right or not but he set out correctly in my view, the

:32:23. > :32:25.alternative interpretations available for resolution 1441, and I

:32:26. > :32:32.simply make the point, as I made earlier in my intervention, that

:32:33. > :32:37.there are areas of internathonal law which raise massive difficulties of

:32:38. > :32:45.interpretation. If for example and I give it as an example to thd House,

:32:46. > :32:51.if we stuck, as some jurists would argue, to the principle that no

:32:52. > :32:53.military intervention Kante place without the United Nations Security

:32:54. > :32:59.Council authorisation, then the United Kingdom doctrine, -- can take

:33:00. > :33:03.place, a well established one of intervening on the basis of the

:33:04. > :33:08.monetary and is a city which is what led us to be able to take action in

:33:09. > :33:13.Kosovo, would never have happened -- one intervening on the basis of

:33:14. > :33:18.human necessity. S check this into the debate the House has had to try

:33:19. > :33:22.to understand the complexithes - is simply check this in. Of cotrse none

:33:23. > :33:28.of this gets away from the fact that the debate would likely havd been

:33:29. > :33:32.very different within Cabindt if Lord Goldsmith's advice in hts

:33:33. > :33:40.original form had been propdrly presented, circulated, and

:33:41. > :33:43.discussed, because if any of us know who have been in government, the

:33:44. > :33:47.process by which you moderate each others' opinions is challenging

:33:48. > :33:51.them. And if you don't have a process of challenge we shotldn t be

:33:52. > :33:54.surprised that at the end of the day people end up rubber stamping

:33:55. > :33:58.decisions because it seems convenient to do so. One of the

:33:59. > :34:01.interesting features of being in publishing was that I quickly came

:34:02. > :34:06.to realise that, because thdre were some members, of whether it was the

:34:07. > :34:09.national Security Council or Cabinet will not be held on to the Prime

:34:10. > :34:14.Minister, it raised the levdl of challenge in a manner that one might

:34:15. > :34:19.not necessarily have found when in fact it is single party govdrnment.

:34:20. > :34:22.An interesting reflection on some of the problems that flow from it. And

:34:23. > :34:31.when you have a Prime Minister who is an utterly dominant figure after

:34:32. > :34:35.four or five years in government and a triumphant second mandate it gets

:34:36. > :34:40.even harder. So Mr Speaker those are my thoughts on looking on these two

:34:41. > :34:44.principal issues. There are lots of other issues in this report but

:34:45. > :34:48.think it is one of the most compelling read but I've had. I m

:34:49. > :34:53.not sure I'll be able to get through the lot but I will certainlx try to

:34:54. > :34:59.read much more of it. But I just make two final points? -- could

:35:00. > :35:06.adjust? Firstly to the honotrable member for Gordon and his ddsire

:35:07. > :35:09.that accountability should lead to at least someone being held in

:35:10. > :35:16.contempt of this House Mr Blair has acted improperly. As to say to him

:35:17. > :35:22.that just as some people talked about impeachment, stews in 180 ,

:35:23. > :35:30.contempt proceedings in Parliament, unless based on findings made in an

:35:31. > :35:39.external tribunal which meets Article six's compliance, is going

:35:40. > :35:41.to be, in practice, difficult. And I would strongly recommend th`t,

:35:42. > :35:46.tempting as such a route might suggest itself to be, the practical

:35:47. > :35:53.difficulties are likely to lake it impossible to follow and I say that

:35:54. > :35:59.in all since 30. I give way... - I give way in all sincerity.

:36:00. > :36:05.Am not quite clear in what way the honourable and learned gentleman

:36:06. > :36:10.considers that the former Prime Minister's civil rights and

:36:11. > :36:15.obligations would be determhned at that contempt motion, as I

:36:16. > :36:20.understand it as a novice and Parliamentary procedure. It is a

:36:21. > :36:24.breach of privilege, it is not a criminal charge, it is not `

:36:25. > :36:30.contempt of court. I wonder if he could elucidate on which basis he

:36:31. > :36:34.thinks article six would be engaged. It depends, I suppose, if I may say

:36:35. > :36:38.to the honourable lady, what sanction this house wishes to

:36:39. > :36:43.follow. In addition to that, I think there is a second issue. Yot may

:36:44. > :36:52.have examples where somebodx says one thing to this house and in front

:36:53. > :36:57.of a tribunal or court of rdcord on evidence, on oath, says somdthing

:36:58. > :37:01.different. And the house can look at those two things juxtapose them to

:37:02. > :37:06.conclude, for example, that the house was misled in evidencd that it

:37:07. > :37:11.was being given. That, if I may say so, might well found a findhng of

:37:12. > :37:16.breach of privilege for contempt, although that still leaves the

:37:17. > :37:24.question unanswered as to s`nctions, but I understand her point. In this

:37:25. > :37:27.case, if I may say, I am not giving some definitive statements, I am

:37:28. > :37:32.simply saying what, to my mhnd, appears to be the difficulthes

:37:33. > :37:35.likely to come from pursuing this particular course of action. As on

:37:36. > :37:40.the whole, I would like the reputation of this house to stand an

:37:41. > :37:45.enhanced by the way we report the Chilcot Inquiry report and hts

:37:46. > :37:47.aftermath, I am always wary of suggesting, counselling or

:37:48. > :37:50.recommending a course of action which might lead to the verx

:37:51. > :37:56.opposite of what is intended. I give way. He is very generous He

:37:57. > :38:04.knows that an old legal expdrtise in the highest regard. -- he knows that

:38:05. > :38:07.I hold his legal expertise. He says it is important that the reputation

:38:08. > :38:11.of the house is enhanced in the outcome of dealing with this report.

:38:12. > :38:16.Surely the reputation will not be enhanced if there is not anx attempt

:38:17. > :38:24.to hold the former Prime Minister to account?

:38:25. > :38:27.I listen to what the honour`ble and learning lady says, and this is a

:38:28. > :38:32.matter that can perhaps be debated or discussed at greater length. But

:38:33. > :38:36.I simply counsel caution. The truth is that the Prime Minister has been

:38:37. > :38:39.examined, or the then Prime Minister, Mr Blair, has been

:38:40. > :38:46.examined at the Court of public opinion and the judgment of history,

:38:47. > :38:51.and I think that it is likely that that judgment will be prettx unkind

:38:52. > :38:57.to the way in which this was carried out. Whether this house feels that

:38:58. > :39:02.it wants to do more immediately is a matter that we can debate at another

:39:03. > :39:07.time. Can I then turned fin`lly the point has been made that thd outcome

:39:08. > :39:12.of this process in the Middle East has been, on the evidence,

:39:13. > :39:17.lamentable. Of course, the Liddle East is a place of massive

:39:18. > :39:22.dysfunctionality, maybe even if we had not intervened in 2003 we would

:39:23. > :39:30.find ourselves with another pattern that would have occurred of war and

:39:31. > :39:33.bloody conflict based on a whole series of disintegration is of the

:39:34. > :39:37.social fabric of that area which has been going on for some time, and we

:39:38. > :39:41.can see manifested in the ctrrent conflict in Iraq and Syria which, I

:39:42. > :39:47.have to say, I don't think hs necessarily entirely due to our

:39:48. > :39:52.intervention in 2003, it has element inherent inside those societies

:39:53. > :39:56.themselves. But I worry, and very much, and I think it has coloured my

:39:57. > :40:00.view as a politician ever shnce that it has also had a terrhble

:40:01. > :40:05.effect on public trust in us and our institutions in this countrx,

:40:06. > :40:08.sometimes which, I rather agreed, for once, with the new statdsman

:40:09. > :40:15.article, it carries itself `ll the way into the Brexit referendum and

:40:16. > :40:20.its aftermath. -- the New Statesman article. I think we have lots to

:40:21. > :40:27.learn from this sorry episode. The nuggets that I derive from ht is

:40:28. > :40:30.that we have to have open ddbate, and we must avoid simply trdating

:40:31. > :40:38.politics as presentational gimmick is. -- gimmicks. Because if we keep

:40:39. > :40:43.doing it, and it has become a habit in modern Western society bdcause of

:40:44. > :40:47.the development of social mddia the press and the way in which we

:40:48. > :40:54.communicate ideas, if we continue doing it we will ruthlessly

:40:55. > :40:58.undermine sensible decision,making and the ability to come to the right

:40:59. > :41:03.conclusions by debate, which is absolutely the heart of what this

:41:04. > :41:09.house should be about. Mrs Margaret Beckett. Thank you Mr

:41:10. > :41:13.Speaker. I want to begin whdther right honourable gentleman who has

:41:14. > :41:18.just spoken very eloquently ended by saying that I entirely agred that

:41:19. > :41:23.there is much to learn from the Chilcot Report. One of the things

:41:24. > :41:28.that concerns me much is th`t honour and it is very early to say so, I

:41:29. > :41:31.know, but it is far from cldar to me that we will actually learn the

:41:32. > :41:39.things we should. In the morning of the Chilcot Inquiry publication I

:41:40. > :41:45.listened to the radio and hdard a number of commentators and, indeed,

:41:46. > :41:49.members of this house, I thhnk that right honourable member was one

:41:50. > :41:55.saying one after another well, of course, we all know what happens.

:41:56. > :41:59.And it was a simple script, Familia. Tony Blair knew there were no

:42:00. > :42:05.weapons of mass destruction, a deliberately lied to the Hotse of

:42:06. > :42:08.Commons about the intelligence. . Whether there was intelligence to

:42:09. > :42:14.suggest there were such weapons He had a secret pact made with George

:42:15. > :42:18.Bush won before -- long before to commit us to war in all

:42:19. > :42:21.circumstances, and so all that went in between was irrelevant and almost

:42:22. > :42:26.did not happen, that the war itself was illegal because there w`s not a

:42:27. > :42:30.second United Nations resolttion. And it seems to me that this is the

:42:31. > :42:35.right moment to point out that, I think, this is the fifth inpuiry

:42:36. > :42:42.into what happened in 2003 `nd before and after the invasion, and

:42:43. > :42:45.as far as I recall, none of them has actually verified that incrddibly

:42:46. > :42:53.simple script, nor does it seem to me that the Chilcot Inquiry either

:42:54. > :42:56.simply confirms it. The inqtiry team accept, as the right honour`ble

:42:57. > :43:00.member for Rush Chris Hazzard the former Attorney General, th`t when

:43:01. > :43:05.the Prime Minister told this house that he believed that Saddal Hussein

:43:06. > :43:10.had weapons of mass destruction he believed it in place of the TB true.

:43:11. > :43:12.He was not making up the intelligence, he was not telling

:43:13. > :43:19.this house anything other than what he believed to be true, let alone

:43:20. > :43:25.inventing a light, which sedms to be implied, and, indeed, the rdport

:43:26. > :43:29.points out that the basic c`se that Saddam Hussain had both ret`ined

:43:30. > :43:35.weapons of mass destruction and that he had the intent to develop more,

:43:36. > :43:41.given the opportunity, was what the joint intelligence committed itself

:43:42. > :43:44.believed. The former Attorndy General touched on this and it seems

:43:45. > :43:49.to be one of the most important things coming out of Chilcot, the

:43:50. > :43:54.degree to which whole swathds of people whose professional jtdgment

:43:55. > :44:01.was involved were, indeed, listaken. That continue to be the casd right

:44:02. > :44:06.up to and, indeed, beyond the invasion. What Chilcot makes clear

:44:07. > :44:09.is that that was what the joint intelligence committee had

:44:10. > :44:15.continually reported, both to the then Prime Minister and to the

:44:16. > :44:19.Cabinet. I noticed that there was no evidence, they say, that

:44:20. > :44:27.intelligence was improperly included in the dossier, or that Number Ten

:44:28. > :44:31.improperly influenced the tdxt. They said that this inquiry is not

:44:32. > :44:38.questioning Mr Blair's belidfs, or his legitimate role in advocating

:44:39. > :44:43.Government policy. That, I think, is really important to bear in mind,

:44:44. > :44:46.especially as one listens to some of the detailed and very deterlined

:44:47. > :44:52.attempts to create a differdnt impression. Sir John Chilcot also

:44:53. > :44:56.pointed out that, along with the dangers that the intelligence

:44:57. > :45:00.community believed Saddam Htssein presented, they believed, and again,

:45:01. > :45:05.I am quoting from what Sir John Chilcot said, that Saddam Htssain

:45:06. > :45:16.could not be removed without an invasion. And they also thotght that

:45:17. > :45:19.to be relevant. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the

:45:20. > :45:24.intelligence community and the then Prime Minister were wrong, but we

:45:25. > :45:30.did not know it then. And, what s more, it is what our intellhgence

:45:31. > :45:34.services believed, it was bdlieved by almost every other intelligence

:45:35. > :45:42.service in the world, including the French and the Russians, whhch is,

:45:43. > :45:44.no doubt, why security council resolution 1441 was actuallx carried

:45:45. > :45:50.unanimously. I give way. I thank the right

:45:51. > :45:57.honourable lady for giving way. The JAC, on the 15th of March 2002, said

:45:58. > :46:01.the intelligence on Iraq Ha`s weapons of mass destruction and

:46:02. > :46:09.ballistic missile production is sporadic and patchy -- JIC said

:46:10. > :46:15.Tony Blair said, two weeks later, we know these weapons constitute a

:46:16. > :46:19.threat. How is that consistdnt? I am familiar with this exchange and this

:46:20. > :46:24.insistence that in some way this is hugely important. This is not the

:46:25. > :46:29.impression that the public `re being given and, if I may say so, that he

:46:30. > :46:32.amongst others is striving to give them. They are being given the

:46:33. > :46:37.impression that the intelligence services, not that they said it was

:46:38. > :46:40.sporadic and patchy but that they knew there were no weapons of mass

:46:41. > :46:44.destruction and the then Prhme Minister knew there were no weapons

:46:45. > :46:50.of mass destruction and delhberately this led the house. That is not

:46:51. > :46:57.true, it was never true, and no attempt to read that into the

:46:58. > :47:02.record, it seems to me, can possibly be justified. We did not know it

:47:03. > :47:06.then, no one knew it then, lost people very firmly believed in

:47:07. > :47:11.Saddam Hussein's intentions. The third allegation is the one about

:47:12. > :47:16.the secret commitment, I was not the slightest bit surprised to hear the

:47:17. > :47:22.honourable member quoting the single sentence quoted in the background

:47:23. > :47:28.notification, I agree with him entirely of his assertion that it

:47:29. > :47:33.was a profound mistake for the former Prime Minister to usd that

:47:34. > :47:40.phraseology. However, I don't read into it the sinister feeling that he

:47:41. > :47:44.reads in it nor, indeed, it seems to me, and the Chilcot Inquiry. To my

:47:45. > :47:47.mind, if this had been a conversation rather than a written

:47:48. > :47:54.memorandum, it was something along the lines of, look, I am on your

:47:55. > :47:57.side, but... But, if we are to take action, all these things have to be

:47:58. > :48:02.addressed, we had to go to the United Nations, and so on.

:48:03. > :48:08.Certainly, Chilcot... In a loment. Certainly Chilcot acknowledges that

:48:09. > :48:12.it was Mr Blair's intent to get the president to go through the United

:48:13. > :48:17.Nations route, that he pursted that with determination and, indded, he

:48:18. > :48:22.was doing so against the advice of President Bush's own allies.

:48:23. > :48:25.I think as she pursues the report she will find that Chilcot find that

:48:26. > :48:33.much more significant, that is why it said it would make it difficult

:48:34. > :48:36.for the UK, and the US. How does she explained Jack Straw's memo to Tony

:48:37. > :48:42.Blair, when President Bush graciously accepted your offer to be

:48:43. > :48:47.with him all the way. Can she explain? It would be better to as my

:48:48. > :48:52.former colleague. Having bedn the recipient of his notes, I would

:48:53. > :48:56.suggest that what he was dohng was ironically quoting back to the Prime

:48:57. > :49:00.Minister words he didn't thhnk the Prime Minister should have tsed and

:49:01. > :49:04.he was right about that, as, no doubt, the honourable gentldman will

:49:05. > :49:08.agree. And then there is thd question of the legality. It has

:49:09. > :49:13.been said here before, and no doubt will be again, but Chilcot does not

:49:14. > :49:18.pronounce on the legality of the proceeding. He criticises the

:49:19. > :49:22.processes, he does not say that a second resolution was needed,

:49:23. > :49:26.although I accept that he does not go into that territory. There is an

:49:27. > :49:30.enormous amount of dispute `bout this matter, and the former Attorney

:49:31. > :49:34.General touched on it a momdnt ago. It has led to the query which he

:49:35. > :49:38.raised why there were so few questions from the Cabinet to the

:49:39. > :49:44.Attorney General when he gave us his advice. One of the things that I am

:49:45. > :49:48.pretty sure I have said before but I don't suppose anybody has p`id

:49:49. > :49:52.attention and they probably will not now, it is quite simply the case

:49:53. > :49:55.that the issue of whether or not we needed a second resolution had been

:49:56. > :50:02.gone over, if you like, at nausea. It had been discussed at length The

:50:03. > :50:06.Cabinet had had extensive vdrbal reports from the then Foreign

:50:07. > :50:10.Secretary and Prime Minister about the progress of discussions in the

:50:11. > :50:13.security council, about the desire for a second resolution, about how

:50:14. > :50:18.things were going, who was objecting. Very much in det`iled

:50:19. > :50:25.terms about how that process of negotiation was taking placd. The

:50:26. > :50:29.views, of course, of the thdn Foreign Office legal adviser in

:50:30. > :50:33.London have been very much puoted, and evidence was given to the

:50:34. > :50:37.Chilcot Inquiry about that. That is absolutely right and wholly

:50:38. > :50:40.understandable that all the focus has been on that advice, thd advice

:50:41. > :50:46.of the Foreign Office legal people in London. I was interested in the

:50:47. > :50:50.remarks of the former Attorney General about how unclear

:50:51. > :50:53.international law is, and how it is not always easy to interpret, it is

:50:54. > :50:58.certainly not the impression that the public has been given. What I

:50:59. > :51:02.have rarely seen quoted at `ll or referenced in any way is th`t

:51:03. > :51:09.someone else gave evidence to the inquiry about the legality of

:51:10. > :51:12.resolution 1441 and whether a second resolution was required. Th`t was

:51:13. > :51:20.the head of the Foreign Offhce legal team at the United Nations. The team

:51:21. > :51:23.whose day to day dealings whth the security council, the team who

:51:24. > :51:27.advised the then Government and presumably, equivalent to pdople in

:51:28. > :51:31.the Government today on the handling of negotiations and to give them

:51:32. > :51:38.legal advice about the detahl of what resolutions mean, the hmporter

:51:39. > :51:42.that they will have and so on. He confirmed what, indeed, consistently

:51:43. > :51:47.the former Foreign Secretarx told the cabinet, day after day, that the

:51:48. > :51:51.Russians and the French in particular had tried to get an

:51:52. > :51:54.explicit reference into resolution 1441 to the need for a second

:51:55. > :52:01.resolution before any milit`ry action could be undertaken, even

:52:02. > :52:06.though 1441 as drafted use the words this is a final opportunity to

:52:07. > :52:07.comply with UN resolutions, and talked about serious conseqtences if

:52:08. > :52:18.Saddam did not comply. Those discussions at the Security

:52:19. > :52:23.Council, we were told, this legal adviser told the Chilcot Inpuiry

:52:24. > :52:27.those discussions were exhatsted, it was a very strong attempt m`de to

:52:28. > :52:31.insist that a second resolution was carried yet in the end the Russians

:52:32. > :52:36.and the French accepted that a second resolution was not rdferred

:52:37. > :52:41.to and the resolution was c`rried unanimously, including, if H recall

:52:42. > :52:45.correctly, with the vote of the Syrian government, a remark`ble

:52:46. > :52:50.thought in today's circumst`nces. The accusation has also been made in

:52:51. > :52:54.all of these discussions th`t the attempts to get Saddam Hussdin to

:52:55. > :52:59.conform with United Nations resolutions was in some way false,

:53:00. > :53:03.but there was no intention, no wish for Saddam Hussein to conform, that

:53:04. > :53:11.the intention from the beginning was military action. As I said darlier,

:53:12. > :53:15.in an intervention, I think, from the Foreign Secretary, the then

:53:16. > :53:18.Prime Minister repeatedly w`rned the Cabinet that if Saddam Hussdin

:53:19. > :53:23.indeed chose to comply with United Nations resolutions, he staxs and

:53:24. > :53:28.reminded us that that in itself would be an outcome that many, not

:53:29. > :53:33.least the many in this Housd who campaigned on behalf of the Kurdish

:53:34. > :53:38.people, would deplore and rdgret. Yet it was repeatedly pointdd out to

:53:39. > :53:46.us that if Saddam complied, no military action, he would stay in

:53:47. > :53:50.power. Yes? Graciously giving way. I wanted to point out the fact that in

:53:51. > :53:56.the Chilcot Report he quotes Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 at

:53:57. > :53:59.the time, telling Tony Blair that the US were deliberately setting the

:54:00. > :54:06.bar, and I quote, so high that Saddam Hussein would not be able to

:54:07. > :54:09.comply. So when Tony Blair was standing in the House of Colmons on

:54:10. > :54:14.the day of the vote, this c`se that there was still time for Saddam to

:54:15. > :54:17.comply is something wrong. He had already been told by Siri Jtde

:54:18. > :54:22.Dearlove that the bar had bden set so high by the weapons inspdctors

:54:23. > :54:28.that Saddam could not possibly comply. -- Sir Richard Dearlove I

:54:29. > :54:33.know about the view that Sir Richard Dearlove expressed, he was not in

:54:34. > :54:41.place at the time that we speaking of. I accept that it was serious and

:54:42. > :54:46.difficult but if Saddam had shown any intention of complying `nd given

:54:47. > :54:51.any move to admit inspectors, when, for example, a series of tests were

:54:52. > :54:55.proposed that he could meet to show if he was complying, all th`t was

:54:56. > :55:05.rejected. By the French, by the way, and also by Saddam. So that is where

:55:06. > :55:11.we are, there was indeed a warning, that if Saddam complied milhtary

:55:12. > :55:18.action would not occur. The original four point zero is accusations

:55:19. > :55:26.placed. No three further accusations have been added. One from the

:55:27. > :55:32.Chilcot report itself, action taken when it was not a matter of the last

:55:33. > :55:35.resort, the second, that we could have held back longer and the whole

:55:36. > :55:39.matter could have been addrdssed by further inspections and the third,

:55:40. > :55:47.that the events in the Middle East since all as a result of thd Iraq

:55:48. > :55:53.invasion, that should also be on the consciences of all of us who voted

:55:54. > :55:58.for the invasion. On the qudstion of whether or not it was a last resort,

:55:59. > :56:04.it is appoint that was also made by my late right honourable frhend

:56:05. > :56:08.Robin Cook. -- appoint made by Robin Cook. And those who make thdir case

:56:09. > :56:13.rest their argument on the continual effectiveness of containment, backed

:56:14. > :56:18.by sanctions. But one of thd things that no one seems to mention any

:56:19. > :56:24.more is that, at this time, it was widely and seriously believdd that

:56:25. > :56:29.containment was weakening, but containment was seeking to be

:56:30. > :56:34.affected. And certainly anyone who was around and casts their linds

:56:35. > :56:37.back, will recall, there was an enormous, growing campaign `gainst

:56:38. > :56:44.the sanctions which were helping to keep in place the hope for

:56:45. > :56:48.containment. Many Right Honourable members here will recall th`t the

:56:49. > :56:52.process used to take place on a continual basis across the road in

:56:53. > :56:56.Parliament Square. I think lost everyone has forgotten, that was not

:56:57. > :57:01.in the beginning protest ag`inst the war, it was a protest against the

:57:02. > :57:06.maintenance of sanctions on Saddam Hussein. And to be fed to the people

:57:07. > :57:11.who undertook it, and the ldgitimate basis because Saddam was stdaling

:57:12. > :57:15.the money that was given to feed the Iraqi people and using it for his

:57:16. > :57:20.own purposes, so consequently there was growing poverty and hardship in

:57:21. > :57:24.Iraq. So it was understandable that people should be against thd

:57:25. > :57:33.sanctions on that basis accdnt they were in the campaign against

:57:34. > :57:36.sanctions was itself growing. Does the right honourable lady ftlly

:57:37. > :57:40.understand the significance of chapter 20 in the except sulmary

:57:41. > :57:45.which says quite clearly th`t this was not a last resort? The

:57:46. > :57:49.importance of this is that ht is absolutely fundamental to the

:57:50. > :57:55.definition of a just war. And if we accept that assertion by Chhlcot the

:57:56. > :58:00.corollary is that this was not a just war with all the consepuences

:58:01. > :58:04.that follow from that so all this volume is of stuff, that silple

:58:05. > :58:11.sentence in the executive stmmary that bangs the whole lot to rights.

:58:12. > :58:17.I did realise that was what it meant, although for the just war, I

:58:18. > :58:22.had the impression, unlike lany others I'm not a lawyer, although I

:58:23. > :58:29.thought that was a religious, rather than the military legal concept I

:58:30. > :58:34.do understand it in those tdrms Apart from the question of whether

:58:35. > :58:41.or not this was just becausd it was not a last resort, can I also say,

:58:42. > :58:45.on the matter of containment, that after that invasion, evidence was

:58:46. > :58:48.found that indeed Saddam had been in further breach of United Nations

:58:49. > :58:52.resolution even more than wd understood at the time of the

:58:53. > :58:55.invasion. Bridges that we wdre unaware of, for example Robhn Cook

:58:56. > :58:59.was not aware of them when he made his statement in the house. The

:59:00. > :59:12.impression was that containlent was working on a salad of element, which

:59:13. > :59:15.had been forbidden, -- on containment, they could, Ir`q was

:59:16. > :59:23.developing ballistic missilds with a longer range than permitted, and

:59:24. > :59:25.council resolutions, and he clearly intended to reconstitute long-range

:59:26. > :59:29.delivery systems and those systems were potentially for use with

:59:30. > :59:37.weapons of mass destruction. So it's not simple matter, if contahnment

:59:38. > :59:43.had been working, Saddam Hussain was not trying to take things forward in

:59:44. > :59:47.terms of weapons development, as we discovered once invasion had taken

:59:48. > :59:53.place. The second point on this is the argument that we could have held

:59:54. > :00:03.on. And there I must say, I have to accept the verdict of Chilcot. But

:00:04. > :00:07.it was not impossible but again the difficulty on which no one now

:00:08. > :00:12.touches was the circumstancds in which by then everyone found

:00:13. > :00:17.themselves. We had chips in theatre in very, very difficult incredibly

:00:18. > :00:24.difficult and dangerous circumstances. Troops who wdre

:00:25. > :00:28.indeed expecting, hourly, d`ily intentional attacks by biological or

:00:29. > :00:35.chemical weapons which everxone leaved Saddam possessed, and indeed

:00:36. > :00:39.which they hoped to resist. So it wasn't a simple matter of s`ying,

:00:40. > :00:45.there is no need. If you ard going to take action you have to start

:00:46. > :00:48.military reparations, and bx that point military preparations had

:00:49. > :00:52.advanced to such an extent that our troops were in theatre. And you

:00:53. > :00:56.could ultimately argue and no doubt some will, those troops could have

:00:57. > :01:01.been withdrawn. But what a signal would that have sent to Saddam or to

:01:02. > :01:05.the rest of the world? It sdems to me it would have given Sadd`m

:01:06. > :01:10.Hussein the signal that he was free to resume the kind of operations

:01:11. > :01:14.he'd done in the past, whether it be against the Kurds, or indeed as he

:01:15. > :01:18.had done against Iran? So these things are not as simple as it is

:01:19. > :01:23.sometimes seemed, although H completely accept the argumdnt made

:01:24. > :01:28.in Chilcot that one of the lessons we should learn is that we should be

:01:29. > :01:32.wary of letting military concerns drive political decisions. @nd that

:01:33. > :01:37.brings me back to my principal thesis, which is that there is much

:01:38. > :01:41.in Chilcot from which we cotld learn, but only if we do not divert

:01:42. > :01:49.ourselves onto things that Chilcot does not say.

:01:50. > :01:58.That brings me to the final issue, Mr Speaker, but I want to address.

:01:59. > :02:02.The final accusation, if yot like. The accusation that everythhng that

:02:03. > :02:06.has happened in Iraq, Syria, or across the Middle East sincd as all

:02:07. > :02:11.flowed from the invasion of Iraq, that it is all down to a drdadful

:02:12. > :02:15.miscalculation, the right honourable gentleman for Rushcliffe Cordoba and

:02:16. > :02:20.the worst foreign policy mistake. Let's say it was. I don't t`ke that

:02:21. > :02:24.view, but lead us take that premise. I don't think he argues, and I don't

:02:25. > :02:28.for one second I accept that everything terrible that has

:02:29. > :02:32.happened now in the Middle Dast is as a result of that invasion. And I

:02:33. > :02:38.think it is grossly irresponsible in order for people to satisfy the

:02:39. > :02:42.clear, very real anger and passion that people feel against thd then

:02:43. > :02:47.government, against the then Prime Minister, against the war in Iraq,

:02:48. > :02:56.it is grossly irresponsible to say to the evil men of Daesh, Isil, or

:02:57. > :03:00.Al-Qaeda that they are of the hook for any of the terrible things they

:03:01. > :03:04.do because it is all our fatlt. And it's no good people making noises

:03:05. > :03:08.off because we all know that that is just the kind of assertion that many

:03:09. > :03:13.people make. All this stuff is down to the mistakes of the West, all

:03:14. > :03:18.down to the evildoing of thd West, and everyone else is absolvdd. No

:03:19. > :03:23.one should be absolved from responsibility for the things that

:03:24. > :03:26.they themselves advocate or do. I do not seek to resile from the

:03:27. > :03:32.responsibility that I exerchsed when I voted in Cabinet and I voted in

:03:33. > :03:37.this House for the Iraq war. I regret bitterly the events that have

:03:38. > :03:42.occurred since, as any senshble person would. But I do not pretend

:03:43. > :03:46.that the decision I made was not my decision, that it was all somehow

:03:47. > :03:51.someone else's fault. Ray m`c order, I'm sorry to have to announce this

:03:52. > :03:54.to the House, on account of the number of would-be contributors

:03:55. > :03:58.there will be a ten minute limit on backbench speeches. That lilit may

:03:59. > :04:04.have to be reviewed although it is ten minutes for now. Mr Davhd Davis.

:04:05. > :04:08.Thank you, Mr Speaker, it is a privilege to follow the right

:04:09. > :04:13.honourable lady although I think she attributed to use that the body

:04:14. > :04:17.holds, that somehow Isil is off the hook because of the failures of the

:04:18. > :04:23.British government. Let's bd clear what those failures. 150,000 deaths

:04:24. > :04:29.by violence, a large majority of those innocent civilians. More than

:04:30. > :04:34.1 million deaths as a result of this war, medical estimates. A ddstroyed

:04:35. > :04:41.country. And at last dictatorship, but containment was broadly working.

:04:42. > :04:45.-- and a steep dictatorship. Sanctions, inspections were allowed,

:04:46. > :04:49.and no-fly zones. Damage to the stability of the Middle East. Of

:04:50. > :04:56.course it's not. Great but let's remember that Isis started hn

:04:57. > :05:01.prisoner of war camps so let's not forget that. And a signific`ntly

:05:02. > :05:05.increased terrorist threat worldwide, something known `nd

:05:06. > :05:11.warned of before we took thhs action. That is what we are talking