14/07/2016

:00:00. > :00:00.private members bills, they talk about the issues but they simply

:00:07. > :00:13.don't pursue them. Point of order, Paula Sheriff. As a matter of

:00:14. > :00:17.record, in recent weeks, there has been an escalation of misogynistic

:00:18. > :00:21.abuse and threats of violence disproportionally towards female MPs

:00:22. > :00:30.from all sides of this house. It is apparent that this abuse has become

:00:31. > :00:34.completely out of hand now with many members fearful. To the point where

:00:35. > :00:39.the number of members have discussed with me that they are worried about

:00:40. > :00:46.their own personal health as a result of this abuse. This comes

:00:47. > :00:50.just four weeks today that a dear colleague was murdered. This cannot

:00:51. > :00:54.be allowed to continue Mr Speaker. I wonder if you could advise this

:00:55. > :01:00.house what action the house can take to make it clear that this behaviour

:01:01. > :01:04.will not be tolerated from any party and all perpetrators will be

:01:05. > :01:11.punished appropriately. I thank her, to whose point of order I will

:01:12. > :01:15.respond in a moment in truncated terms. The leader of the house is

:01:16. > :01:21.signalling a desire to contribute and it is important we should hear

:01:22. > :01:25.from him. Can I say first of all, I absolutely agree with the honourable

:01:26. > :01:33.lady. Cannot I informed the house that there are measures to improve

:01:34. > :01:37.the security of members. There is a detailed project group looking at

:01:38. > :01:41.the lessons that can be learned after the tragic events of a few

:01:42. > :01:45.weeks ago and the commission will continue proposals for an

:01:46. > :01:51.improvement to the approach we take. I hope that included in that will be

:01:52. > :01:54.a great opportunity for individual members to raise concerns about

:01:55. > :01:58.their safety and have them acted upon. Please Mr Speaker, will

:01:59. > :02:03.everyone in the Housby reassured that you, myself, the chairman of

:02:04. > :02:07.ways and Means and the house officials are very mindful indeed

:02:08. > :02:12.for us to step up the security of members of Parliament and the

:02:13. > :02:21.service we provide to watch over their safety. I appreciate what he

:02:22. > :02:26.has said. Traditionally, we don't discuss security on the floor of the

:02:27. > :02:30.house for very good reasons. That said, the leader of the house has

:02:31. > :02:37.pointed out the extensive work that is taking place behind-the-scenes.

:02:38. > :02:44.What the right Honourable gentleman has said about cooperation between

:02:45. > :02:50.colleagues is of course pertinent and on the money. The leader of the

:02:51. > :02:54.house and I am the chairman of ways and Means are in regular discussions

:02:55. > :02:59.about these matters and indeed cooperated only a few days ago in

:03:00. > :03:06.putting together a letter to register our concerns and

:03:07. > :03:11.constructive proposals. That letter into another senior colleague. It is

:03:12. > :03:14.also true, that these matters will be broached in a meeting of the

:03:15. > :03:18.House of Commons commission on Monday. By definition, I cannot

:03:19. > :03:22.elaborate because the discussion is to be had but it is important that

:03:23. > :03:28.members should know that we are not in anyway a medically sealed from

:03:29. > :03:35.the rest of our colleagues. We share and take very seriously those

:03:36. > :03:43.concerns. Moreover, those of us who are quite fortunate in our living

:03:44. > :03:50.accommodation are very conscious of those who are not. To whom, we have

:03:51. > :03:55.a very particular sense of responsibility. So far as the

:03:56. > :04:00.honourable lady is concern today, I might make the point that if any

:04:01. > :04:06.individual member has particular and personal concerns, as of now, the

:04:07. > :04:14.best course of action is to approach the Parliamentary security director

:04:15. > :04:17.for his best advice. He is immensely experienced and better placed at a

:04:18. > :04:26.practical level to give guidance than any of us lay persons could be.

:04:27. > :04:30.I hope that is helpful but doubtless there will be further updates in due

:04:31. > :04:38.course. Point of order Mr Christian Matheson. I would like to save thank

:04:39. > :04:42.you and my right honourable friend for those contributions which are

:04:43. > :04:46.very reassuring. Could I seek your guidance about the rules of this

:04:47. > :04:51.place as they refer to the language we use in this house in referring to

:04:52. > :04:55.each other. We call each other honourable members and the

:04:56. > :05:00.underlying thought is we act honourably and honestly. But in

:05:01. > :05:04.business questions, it was raised that claims were being made during

:05:05. > :05:08.the referendum campaign which we now believe to be palpably untrue. If I

:05:09. > :05:11.was to accuse other honourable members to making those statements

:05:12. > :05:17.knowingly, you would instruct me to withdraw those comments if I

:05:18. > :05:23.referred to a specific member. Nevertheless, I do believe

:05:24. > :05:28.honourable members no claims women made and I would wish to call out

:05:29. > :05:34.those members. Is there a mechanism within the rules of the house

:05:35. > :05:41.whereby I can make suggestions without falling foul of the rules

:05:42. > :05:44.which we all hold very dear. Procedures with which some

:05:45. > :05:50.experienced movers of the house are well familiar, I think that for now,

:05:51. > :05:55.my best advice to the honourable gentleman is that he should go to

:05:56. > :06:00.the table office. The table office staff will be well able to acquaint

:06:01. > :06:08.him to that approach or mechanism which might enable him to pursue his

:06:09. > :06:12.objective. It would be a profitable visit for the honourable gentleman

:06:13. > :06:22.and it would consume, and he will know the whereabouts of the of this

:06:23. > :06:30.in question, very little energy. If there are no further points of

:06:31. > :06:40.order, we shall move on. The cloak will now read the orders of the day.

:06:41. > :06:45.Report of the Iraqi boy -- Iraqi enquiry. The question is have this

:06:46. > :06:51.has considered the report of the Iraqi enquiry. Before I call the

:06:52. > :06:58.first speaker from the backbenches, this is a continuation of the debate

:06:59. > :07:04.that began yesterday. I should say to the house that at this stage, I

:07:05. > :07:10.have not imposed a time limit on speeches, the house will be aware

:07:11. > :07:14.that there will have to be wind-up speeches from the opposition front

:07:15. > :07:21.bench and the government front bench tonight for which I have to allow.

:07:22. > :07:26.But beyond that, I will wait to see how things go. My best advice to

:07:27. > :07:32.colleagues is that if each feels able to contribute for ten minutes

:07:33. > :07:39.but not much more than that, it may not be necessary to have any formal

:07:40. > :07:44.limit. There is a burden upon the shoulders of distinguished

:07:45. > :07:50.colleagues as they commence their contributions. That burden I am sure

:07:51. > :07:57.will be keenly felt by the chair of the Defence Select Committee, the

:07:58. > :08:01.right honourable gentleman, remember for New Forest East, Doctor Julian

:08:02. > :08:06.Lewis. Thank you Mr Speaker. I shall endeavour to follow that instruction

:08:07. > :08:10.to be brief. There is very good reason to be brief at this stage of

:08:11. > :08:16.consideration of the Chilcott Report. That is that we have had

:08:17. > :08:24.very little time to consider a very large mass of detailed information.

:08:25. > :08:29.I generally find when trying to unravel what has happened

:08:30. > :08:34.historically that it is sensible to look back at some of the original

:08:35. > :08:38.sources. What I have done in the very short time available is to pick

:08:39. > :08:45.out a few original documents that have been included in the mass of

:08:46. > :08:50.published material. One of them is the joint intelligence committee

:08:51. > :09:00.assessment dated 29th January 2003 and entitled" Iraq, the emerging

:09:01. > :09:08.view from Baghdad." I just refer to two quotations from it. " The JI sea

:09:09. > :09:12.say in paragraph ten, "We are unlikely to receive any advanced

:09:13. > :09:16.warning of a pre-emptive attack on the Kurds. We judge that a

:09:17. > :09:25.pre-emptive limited artillery strike on Kuwait using CBW could be

:09:26. > :09:33.launched in as little as two hours." At another point in the report, a

:09:34. > :09:40.list of things which might be the results of an attack on Saddam

:09:41. > :09:45.Hussein is given. One of these possibilities is described in the

:09:46. > :09:50.following terms. " To inflict enough casualties on any coalition ground

:09:51. > :09:56.forces are perhaps in Kuwait, including through the use of CBW to

:09:57. > :10:03.halt a coalition attack and to swing public opinion in the West against

:10:04. > :10:15.hostilities. Moving forward to another note entitled "Saddam, the

:10:16. > :10:20.beginning of the end. " Following a discussion on the JI C on 19th March

:10:21. > :10:28.2003, we find the following quotation: "We judge Iraqi has a

:10:29. > :10:33.usable CBW capability, deliverable using artillery, missiles and

:10:34. > :10:42.possibly unmanned aerial vehicles. We judge Iraqi has esses up to 20

:10:43. > :10:48.missiles with a range of up to 650 kilometres and hundreds of shorter

:10:49. > :10:53.range missiles mostly with a range of 150 kilometres or less. These

:10:54. > :11:00.missiles may be able to deliver CBW although intelligence suggests

:11:01. > :11:07.Barack may lack warheads capable of effective dispersal of such agents."

:11:08. > :11:11.The reason I wrote those documents is that they were top secret

:11:12. > :11:16.documents that were never intended for publication until the archives

:11:17. > :11:23.eventually came to be released many years later. What that shows beyond

:11:24. > :11:29.any reasonable doubt is that the advice being received by the Labour

:11:30. > :11:36.government at that time was that Saddam Hussein did possess, in the

:11:37. > :11:39.assessment of our intelligence agencies, chemical and biological

:11:40. > :11:56.weapons. Ful As a result of the release of

:11:57. > :11:59.those documents, we know that the Labour Government of the day did not

:12:00. > :12:06.lie to Parliament over the question of its belief that chemical and

:12:07. > :12:10.biological weapons were kept. More contentious is the question of

:12:11. > :12:23.whether or not Tony Blair exaggerated. And there it is a

:12:24. > :12:27.matter of harder judgment I sometimes say to mayself - I wonder

:12:28. > :12:36.what the reaction of Parliament would have been, if we had come to

:12:37. > :12:42.myself and said - we really don't know for certain whether Saddam

:12:43. > :12:47.Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons. We know he has

:12:48. > :12:51.had them in the past, we know he has used them in the past, and because

:12:52. > :12:55.we can't be certain that he hasn't got them now, and because of the

:12:56. > :12:57.events that happened, only a matter of months earlier, which put

:12:58. > :13:00.Al-Qaeda and its suicide-brand of terrorism on the world stage, we

:13:01. > :13:04.cannot be sure that, for reasons of his own, he might not seek to supply

:13:05. > :13:12.such weapons to suicidal terrorist groups. We judge we can't take the

:13:13. > :13:18.chance. I will give way. I thank the honourable gentleman. I welcome the

:13:19. > :13:22.approach he is taking in going back to the resources. It is a us autoful

:13:23. > :13:25.one on this occasion, does not the information to which he refers,

:13:26. > :13:31.though, highlight just how dangerous it is to go to war on the basis of

:13:32. > :13:36.intelligence alone, which is essentially what marked the Iraq war

:13:37. > :13:40.out from every other and does he not agree with me, that in fact the be

:13:41. > :13:45.availability and assessment of intelligence by this House has got

:13:46. > :13:52.to be approved for the future or we could risk going there again? ! It

:13:53. > :13:58.is very tricky because, you see there are two types of scenario when

:13:59. > :14:01.you can go to war, and one type is quite straightforward - somebody

:14:02. > :14:09.attacks you, you get on with it, you are given no choi.s the other type

:14:10. > :14:13.is a situation like this, where you have -- reason to believe that

:14:14. > :14:21.horrible could happen and the question arises - should you

:14:22. > :14:27.intervene. I have to say I find one of the most problematic aspects of

:14:28. > :14:31.the Chilcot report, is where they say that military action was not a

:14:32. > :14:36.last resort and the peace process could have been given longer. The

:14:37. > :14:41.reality is, unless an attack is launched on you, you can always go

:14:42. > :14:45.on talking longer and longer and longer. I can't think of any point

:14:46. > :14:51.at which it would be possible to say - we have to launch an attack now

:14:52. > :14:57.because there is no prospect of continuing to try to find out,

:14:58. > :15:04.without taking military action. When the right honourable gentleman talks

:15:05. > :15:08.about this House then having to assess the intelligence, I'm not

:15:09. > :15:12.sure that that helps us too much, because we can never - I will in a

:15:13. > :15:18.moment - we can never be certain that what we are assessing is the

:15:19. > :15:22.whole picture because sometimes, as those of us who have served on

:15:23. > :15:28.bodies like the Intelligence and Security Committee will know,

:15:29. > :15:33.sometimes there are sources of intelligence that cannot be revealed

:15:34. > :15:39.and therefore, to present raw intelligence to the House, without

:15:40. > :15:45.being able to say but there is other intelligence we are not presenting

:15:46. > :15:51.to the House, leaves the House in an an op louse position. The right how

:15:52. > :15:54.long agree with me that the House voted in 2003 knotted just or mainly

:15:55. > :16:00.on the intelligence, if you look at the debate Mr Speaker, but on Saddam

:16:01. > :16:01.Hussein's repeated and unpress departmented non-compliance with

:16:02. > :16:06.mandatory United Nations' resolutions and on his record. Does

:16:07. > :16:09.he think from his reading of the report, that Saddam Hussein executed

:16:10. > :16:13.a massive bluff on the international community and his own people by

:16:14. > :16:17.pretending he still had the weapons, we know he had, or does he agree

:16:18. > :16:22.with the current Iraqi government that he sent them across the border

:16:23. > :16:25.to Syria? I agree with a great deal of what the honourable gentleman has

:16:26. > :16:31.just said, the right honourable gentleman has just said. The fact is

:16:32. > :16:37.that Saddam Hussein, although it is not a matter of primary concern to

:16:38. > :16:44.us now, was the author of his own misfortune. Saddam Hussein, we must

:16:45. > :16:51.remember, apart from just being a broughtal dictator, had invaded and

:16:52. > :16:56.occupied Kuwait in 1990. And Saddam Hussein chose to try to convince his

:16:57. > :17:01.own people that he had not given up these weapons when either he had

:17:02. > :17:07.given them up, or, as the right honourable gentleman says - and

:17:08. > :17:13.rumours persist to this day - he had spirited them away, possibly to

:17:14. > :17:24.Syria. However, although I see sort of a degree of agreement with me on

:17:25. > :17:32.the Labour benches on this issue, they may find it harder to September

:17:33. > :17:38.next point I wish to make. I have the greatest respect for my right

:17:39. > :17:45.honourable friend. Can I suggest on this issue, it was not just about

:17:46. > :17:50.intelligence sources from here, the United Nations inspectors at the

:17:51. > :17:53.time were pleading for more time because they couldn't find the WMD,

:17:54. > :17:55.possible which that premise we were going to war. We should have

:17:56. > :17:58.listened to them. The reason they don't find them all was ultimately

:17:59. > :18:02.because they didn't exist Yes, but the problem that they would always

:18:03. > :18:06.face and we would face was summed up by something that was said from the

:18:07. > :18:11.inquiry into the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. I was

:18:12. > :18:21.going to vote this at a later stage. I will do so now. I attended the

:18:22. > :18:26.Hutton inquiry on 21st August 2003. In the course course of giving

:18:27. > :18:31.evidence, a journalist made a statement about a conversation he

:18:32. > :18:36.had had on the telephone with Dr David Kelly in June 2003. Now, Dr

:18:37. > :18:41.Kelly was, of course, a weapons' expert and knew all about the

:18:42. > :18:48.difficulties of defecting weapons, stockpiles, if they were hidden. And

:18:49. > :18:54.in the course of that telephone conversation, Dr Kelly said it Mr

:18:55. > :18:58.Rufford the following. "It was very easy to hide weapons of mass

:18:59. > :19:06.destruction because you simply had to dig a hole in the desert, put

:19:07. > :19:13.them inside, cover them with tarpaulin, put them in sand and then

:19:14. > :19:17.they would be' almost impossible to discover'." The question we come

:19:18. > :19:22.back to once again is - if Tony Blair had come to this House and if

:19:23. > :19:29.he had more honestly highlighted the question marks against the

:19:30. > :19:35.reliability of the intelligence, would he be as ex-coraited today as

:19:36. > :19:45.he has been? And, in particular, just be counterfactual for a moment.

:19:46. > :19:51.Some stocks of anthrax had been discovered. Supposing there had been

:19:52. > :19:55.a secret cache, would we still be saying that is it was absolutely

:19:56. > :20:00.wrong for the people who took the decision in 2003, on the basis of

:20:01. > :20:04.what clearly was an honest belief that Saddam Hussein might have

:20:05. > :20:10.deadly stocks of anthrax, would it still be the case that we would now

:20:11. > :20:14.be saying they were wrong. So, in my opinion, and I have no hesitation in

:20:15. > :20:18.saying this, I believe that although the Government may have exaggerated

:20:19. > :20:24.and probably did exaggerate the strength of the evidence they had, I

:20:25. > :20:40.do believe that they genuinely believed and expected to find stocks

:20:41. > :20:44.of these weapons. I am I am I am taking interventions but am keen

:20:45. > :20:48.knotted to abuse the time limit. This is a focal point on the

:20:49. > :20:53.discussion. Would he not accept that there are some on these benches who

:20:54. > :20:57.think the whole issue - and this is justified in the Chilcot findings -

:20:58. > :21:06.that the whole issue of weapons of mass destruction, was an artificial

:21:07. > :21:12.causi, sms beli, in order to affect regime change. And if they were an

:21:13. > :21:16.issue, why wait 13 years, why not go in at the time of the first war? The

:21:17. > :21:19.answer to the second question is easy. And this is - what had

:21:20. > :21:23.happened in those 30 years was something that happened in September

:21:24. > :21:29.2001, namely, the appearance, on the international stage of a group that

:21:30. > :21:36.had been around for a long time, but had not succeeded in killing 3,000

:21:37. > :21:45.people in the heart of New York and Washington DC. And, therefore, and,

:21:46. > :21:49.therefore, the issue at question was now the traditional policy and we

:21:50. > :21:54.often hear this said, quite rightly said in the context of debates about

:21:55. > :22:02.international terrorism, that the technique of containment, which is

:22:03. > :22:07.usually the best technique to deal with rogue regimes with weapons

:22:08. > :22:15.stocks, stocks could not apply under circumstances when it was feared

:22:16. > :22:17.that rational deterrents would be ineffective in trying to prevent an

:22:18. > :22:23.international terrorist organisation, if, for any reason, it

:22:24. > :22:30.was supplied with a substance-like anthrax from using it, no matter how

:22:31. > :22:33.suicidely. Mr Speaker, I'm grateful to my right honourable friend for

:22:34. > :22:36.giving way. Giving the role he plays as Chairman of the Defence Select

:22:37. > :22:40.Committee, I wondered if he could qualify the statement he has just

:22:41. > :22:46.made, which did cause a reaction, I think in the House. He suggested

:22:47. > :22:51.that somehow the events of 9/11 then created a divan scenario in Iraq.

:22:52. > :22:55.Would he not agree with me that -- created a different scenario in

:22:56. > :23:08.Iraq. Would he agree with me in 2000 #3, Al-Qaeda was not present in Iraq

:23:09. > :23:12.and the relationship there cannot be made? That was not the point I was

:23:13. > :23:17.making. The point I was making was that the West was in a major

:23:18. > :23:21.stwand-off with -- stand-off with Saddam Hussein. And people use other

:23:22. > :23:27.groups and organisations for their own ends. And the danger was, and

:23:28. > :23:33.the Prime Minister said at the time - and this is what conadvised me to

:23:34. > :23:41.support him, at the time the danger was that for reasons of his own,

:23:42. > :23:47.Saddam Hussein might decide to make some of these weapons available to

:23:48. > :23:52.groups for - not because he was Allied to such groups, but because

:23:53. > :23:56.he and Al-Qaeda scared a common enemy in the West. But I want to

:23:57. > :24:00.move on. Some members will agree with what I have said, some won't.

:24:01. > :24:06.But let me continue and make the second branch of my remarks and then

:24:07. > :24:10.it will be for other members to put their own perspective on T I Hayesen

:24:11. > :24:14.to add, although my Chairmanship of the Defence Committee has been

:24:15. > :24:18.referred to a number of times, I am, of course, speaking entirely on my

:24:19. > :24:24.own behalf in making my remarks as someone who was here at the time and

:24:25. > :24:31.took part in the debate and indeed in the vote. So, when I look back at

:24:32. > :24:37.those circumstances, I say to myself that the reason I supported and

:24:38. > :24:42.spoke in favour of military action, the primary reason, was that I

:24:43. > :24:47.believed what I was told by the then Labour Government, about the

:24:48. > :24:50.possession, or the believed possession of anthrax and other

:24:51. > :25:00.weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. But here is where I

:25:01. > :25:06.have to make a major admission. At the back of may mind - and at the

:25:07. > :25:09.back, I believe of many other honourable members' minds was a

:25:10. > :25:16.second belief. It was the belief that if Saddam Hussein was removed,

:25:17. > :25:24.we might see the emergence of some form of democracy in Iraq. And in

:25:25. > :25:34.that belief, I was profoundly mistaken. And in looking at the

:25:35. > :25:43.scenario, as it developed, it is quite clear that what emerged was

:25:44. > :25:49.not any form of democracy, what reemerged was the mutual hatred

:25:50. > :25:53.between different branches of fundamentalist Islam that had led

:25:54. > :26:03.hem into bitter conflict for more than 1,000 years. And that was the

:26:04. > :26:09.lesson that I drew from the Iraq war and that was why subsequently, when

:26:10. > :26:17.it became clear that the same scenario was going to be played out

:26:18. > :26:24.in other theatres, for the same sort of reasons, particularly in relation

:26:25. > :26:32.to Syria, in August 2013, I was determined not to make the same

:26:33. > :26:37.mistake again. And I and 29 other honourable and Right Honourable

:26:38. > :26:42.members of the Conservative Party and nine members of the Liberal

:26:43. > :26:47.Democrat party, voted not to take the same sort of action against

:26:48. > :26:54.President Assad that we had taken against Saddam Hussein.

:26:55. > :27:02.Are a member hearing the same arguments in favour of removing

:27:03. > :27:06.President Assad that everyone now accept it had been inadequate for

:27:07. > :27:11.removing Saddam Hussein. I think honourable and right honourable

:27:12. > :27:19.members who feel so strongly that it was the wrong thing to do in 2003

:27:20. > :27:31.ought to check what the consequences were not doing, taking the same step

:27:32. > :27:37.in 2013. We have seen since 2013 huge blood-letting continuing in

:27:38. > :27:45.Syria but many of us still argue that if it is an alternative between

:27:46. > :27:54.an authoritarian dictatorship and eight total to civil conflict, where

:27:55. > :28:03.people are in gauge in it who believe that suicide terrorism is

:28:04. > :28:08.the answer to the world's problems and the fastest route to paradise.

:28:09. > :28:20.We can come to an appreciation that very often there are no simple or

:28:21. > :28:24.easy answers in these dilemmas. I am respectful, I believe I voted for

:28:25. > :28:31.him actually, is what he is saying, if he had voted, had his time again,

:28:32. > :28:38.he would have voted against it in 2003 and in favour of conflict in

:28:39. > :28:43.2010? What I am saying is I was absolutely right not to vote to

:28:44. > :28:51.remove resident Assad in 2013. And I was absolutely wrong to vote the way

:28:52. > :28:54.I did in 2003, but I did it because I believed what I was told about

:28:55. > :29:02.weapons of mass destruction. I also believed wrongly that there was a

:29:03. > :29:09.chance for Iraqi society to advance along more democratic lines. That

:29:10. > :29:13.was the terrible error I made. I will make a little more progress and

:29:14. > :29:21.then I will give way. That leads me to the second question. I have

:29:22. > :29:26.effectively, I hope, shown that when the Labour government of the day

:29:27. > :29:32.said to the House of Commons that it believed there were weapons of mass

:29:33. > :29:36.destruction, it was not lying. And that there was a reasonable case to

:29:37. > :29:46.be made on those grounds for taking the action that was taken. What the

:29:47. > :29:54.papers also show was that the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was not

:29:55. > :30:02.unaware of the possible consequences of removing Saddam Hussein. It in

:30:03. > :30:08.the results of the enquiry, Sir John Chilcot says the following? "We Do

:30:09. > :30:13.not agree that hindsight is required, the risks of internal

:30:14. > :30:18.strife in Iraqi, active Iranians pursuits of interest and Al-Qaeda

:30:19. > :30:27.activity in Barack were each explicitly identified before the

:30:28. > :30:32.invasion. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion

:30:33. > :30:35.were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraqi after

:30:36. > :30:42.Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. " There is a January

:30:43. > :30:47.2003 briefing note from Mr Blair to President Bush in which the then

:30:48. > :30:54.Prime Minister wrote "The biggest risk we face is into Nice I'm

:30:55. > :31:00.fighting between all the rival groups, tribes, etc in Iraq when the

:31:01. > :31:07.military strike destabilises the regime. They are perfectly capable

:31:08. > :31:13.on previous form of killing each other in large numbers." Let us

:31:14. > :31:20.remind ourselves Mr Speaker, that this vast total of deaths that have

:31:21. > :31:24.taken place in Iraqi are not people who have been killed by Westerners,

:31:25. > :31:30.they are Muslims who have been killed by other Muslims once the lid

:31:31. > :31:37.of authoritarian repression was removed. I am coming to an end, I

:31:38. > :31:44.promised I would give way. I am nervous to open up a new thread for

:31:45. > :31:49.him, but some of the deaths in Barack were our soldiers. Chilcot

:31:50. > :31:55.said there were some equipment to shortfalls when things began, two of

:31:56. > :32:00.my constituents died in Iraq, Sergeant Roberts -- Sergeant Robert

:32:01. > :32:04.died because of the wrong body armour, does my right honourable

:32:05. > :32:10.friend agree that we should never again send Armed Forces into combat

:32:11. > :32:16.without Rob Elliot gripping them for the task in hand? Never, ever again

:32:17. > :32:23.is a very strong statement. The truth of the matter is that it is

:32:24. > :32:33.seldom the case that when a conflict arises, especially a conflict which

:32:34. > :32:37.arises as a result of events unforeseen, that the Armed Forces

:32:38. > :32:43.are fully equipped in every respect. The history of our engagement in

:32:44. > :32:48.many conflicts is of a disastrous start, usually gradually rectified

:32:49. > :32:52.as events go on. What the report does bring out is that for far too

:32:53. > :33:00.long while the conflict was going on, equipment deficiencies were not

:33:01. > :33:05.identified and remedied. I think I will leave it at that at the moment.

:33:06. > :33:20.I just have two points on which to conclude. One is that I feel that we

:33:21. > :33:21.have now to accept that societies -- are not ready for Western-style

:33:22. > :33:30.democracy while politics remain linked with totalitarian religious

:33:31. > :33:33.supremacy is. I am not saying anything racialist in making these

:33:34. > :33:41.remarks because only a few hundred years ago, religious wars devastated

:33:42. > :33:48.Europe and here in England, heretics were treated just as barbarously as

:33:49. > :33:54.they are in the middle east today. But the reality is that the

:33:55. > :33:59.democratic model, if it is to work, usually has to evolve. If it doesn't

:34:00. > :34:08.evolve, a country has to be totally occupied for many years in order for

:34:09. > :34:13.it to be implanted and take root. Yesterday, the then Foreign

:34:14. > :34:18.Secretary said that he believed that some of these decisions that were

:34:19. > :34:28.mistaken at the time would be less likely to be taken in the future

:34:29. > :34:32.because of the creation and existence of the National Security

:34:33. > :34:38.Council. And that the national Security Council was a forum where

:34:39. > :34:45.these matters could be thrashed out more realistically. I am not sure

:34:46. > :34:53.that forum is white strong enough. I know that in bygone years, the heads

:34:54. > :35:01.of each of the three services had direct input to the policy debate. I

:35:02. > :35:07.know that the chiefs of staff committee was a body that had to be

:35:08. > :35:11.reckoned with, even by prime ministers as forceful as Winston

:35:12. > :35:15.Churchill. And I know the present arrangements we have in which the

:35:16. > :35:21.Chiefs of staff are supposed to funnel their views to the

:35:22. > :35:25.politicians, through the medium of just one person, the chief of the

:35:26. > :35:30.defence staff, is entirely inadequate. I am pleased that the

:35:31. > :35:39.Defence Secretary, my right honourable friend is continuing in

:35:40. > :35:42.his post and that he is here. I hope he his summing survey that I hope he

:35:43. > :35:48.will hear from the Defence Select Committee more about in the future.

:35:49. > :35:54.That is that there is too much of a disconnect between our top military

:35:55. > :35:59.advisers and the politicians. It is easier for a Prime Minister with a

:36:00. > :36:06.bee in his bonnet about overthrowing one regime or another to brush aside

:36:07. > :36:12.the words of one man, no matter how authoritative any Chief of defence

:36:13. > :36:17.staff may be, manages to brush aside the contribution of the heads of the

:36:18. > :36:22.Armed Forces as a whole. The Defence Select Committee suggested in one of

:36:23. > :36:27.its final reports under my predecessor as chairman, the

:36:28. > :36:32.honourable member for Penrith and the Borders, that the chief of staff

:36:33. > :36:38.committee needs to be constituted as the military subcommittee of the

:36:39. > :36:46.National Security Council. That recommendation was ignored but it is

:36:47. > :36:51.a recommendation I reiterate today. Because only when you have got

:36:52. > :36:57.people who are authoritative and expert and in a position to stand up

:36:58. > :37:02.to a Prime Minister on a mission, whether it is a mission to remove

:37:03. > :37:05.Saddam Hussein or a mission to remove Gadhafi while telling this

:37:06. > :37:13.house we were just going to do a no-fly zone to protect citizens. But

:37:14. > :37:18.it was very important that the strategic calculus should be

:37:19. > :37:24.properly presented to politicians so we don't get the situation ever

:37:25. > :37:29.again, as we are told happened in Libya where the chief of defence

:37:30. > :37:34.staff was told to do the fighting while the politicians did the

:37:35. > :37:45.planning. I am extremely grateful to the right honourable gentleman, Gray

:37:46. > :37:51.who interpreted my guidance loosely. He had to take lots of

:37:52. > :37:56.interventions, that is true, can I just ask, it is not the limit, I am

:37:57. > :38:01.leaving the house to regulate itself but members will want to take into

:38:02. > :38:05.account that people will want to intervene on them but we do want to

:38:06. > :38:10.hear from everybody, I say that with sincerity. The next contributor will

:38:11. > :38:22.be Ben Bradshaw, he now doesn't wish to contribute. I rather hope that Mr

:38:23. > :38:27.Pat McFadden does. I am happy to be a substitute for my honourable

:38:28. > :38:31.friend. The decision to go to war in Iraqi was in policy terms the most

:38:32. > :38:37.controversial decision of the Blair premiership and of that entire

:38:38. > :38:44.Labour period in government. 179 troops died, over 4000 American

:38:45. > :38:49.troops and many thousands of Iraqi civilians in the chaos and

:38:50. > :38:54.destruction afterwards. Sir John's enquiry was asked to look at how the

:38:55. > :38:58.decision was taken and what lessons can be learned. First there is the

:38:59. > :39:03.crucial question as to whether the war was based on a lie. On this the

:39:04. > :39:09.report concludes "There is no evidence that intelligence was

:39:10. > :39:13.improperly included in the dossier that was published or that number

:39:14. > :39:22.ten improperly influenced the text. " Prior to the publication of Sir

:39:23. > :39:27.John's report, there had been years of accusations about fabricating

:39:28. > :39:31.intelligence. In the wake of its publication, a different question

:39:32. > :39:35.has been raised, as to why the intelligence was not challenged? The

:39:36. > :39:41.Honourable member for new Forest is quoted from some of the report, I

:39:42. > :39:51.don't need to repeat his quotations but for a example, from 2002, the

:39:52. > :39:57.reports say that the intelligence was "Sporadic and patchy." They also

:39:58. > :40:05.say "It is clear Barack continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and

:40:06. > :40:09.deliver -- and their delivery means. They have a chemical weapons

:40:10. > :40:15.programme and they have chemical and biological weapons capability and

:40:16. > :40:21.Saddam is repaired to use them." These views turned out to be wrong

:40:22. > :40:26.but it was genuinely felt, reported to government time after time and

:40:27. > :40:28.shared by many intelligence services around the world, including

:40:29. > :40:35.countries that fiercely opposed the war. Sir John makes important

:40:36. > :40:40.recommendations about how intelligence is to be assessed and

:40:41. > :40:44.challenged in future. These are not the same as accusations of

:40:45. > :40:49.fabrication or lying or the use of intelligence deliberately to

:40:50. > :40:53.mislead. Moving on, Sir John concludes that the war was not a

:40:54. > :40:58.last resort. That the inspection process should have been given more

:40:59. > :41:01.time and the decision to use military action undermined the

:41:02. > :41:10.authority of the UN Security Council. This founding -- this

:41:11. > :41:12.finding these are huge constitutional question, in view of

:41:13. > :41:18.the fact that Saddam Hussein had been in breach of a series of UN

:41:19. > :41:23.Security Council resolutions over a period of 12 years and in view of

:41:24. > :41:24.the fact he had used chemical weapons in the past against his own

:41:25. > :41:36.people. One has to ask who was really

:41:37. > :41:40.undermining the UN in this situation, the country in breech or

:41:41. > :41:45.the countries trying to enforce the UN's will? And what does this

:41:46. > :41:48.finding in the report mean about this responsibility to protevenlingt

:41:49. > :41:50.an issue that was raised in the debate yesterday by my right

:41:51. > :41:54.honourable friend, the member for Leeds central S one of the lessons

:41:55. > :42:01.we are going to draw -- is one of the lessons, that we should never

:42:02. > :42:04.engage in military action, no matter how multiple the breaches of

:42:05. > :42:07.previous UN Security Council resolutions, unless there is full

:42:08. > :42:11.support from the UN Security Council itself? And if that is our

:42:12. > :42:17.conclusion, what does that mean for the authority of the UN? This is not

:42:18. > :42:20.the view that we took in Kosovo, where, although that action was

:42:21. > :42:26.opposed by some, it is generally felt to have had a positive

:42:27. > :42:32.outcomfort people there and prevented a disaster in the Balkans.

:42:33. > :42:39.Thirdly, let me turn to the issue of the aftermath and the chaos and

:42:40. > :42:45.destruction which ensued. Surely the question that this House has to ask

:42:46. > :42:52.is whether there is a weight of evidence to justify action or not.

:42:53. > :42:55.And to say that we should never go without express authority from the

:42:56. > :43:01.United Nations' Security Council is not the question, because that would

:43:02. > :43:04.be merely one section of evidence which the House should take into

:43:05. > :43:08.consideration. The example of Kosovo is a good one, there were other

:43:09. > :43:14.reasons for acting in the way we did there which I supported then and

:43:15. > :43:15.continue to support now. I appreciate the honourable

:43:16. > :43:20.gentleman's intervention, the point I'm raise something I think this

:43:21. > :43:23.finding about undermining the authority of the UN raises huge

:43:24. > :43:28.questions here and is one of the controversial findings in the

:43:29. > :43:32.report. Colin Powell famously remarked - you break it, you own it.

:43:33. > :43:36.And it is undoubtedly the responsibility of countries who

:43:37. > :43:41.remove a broughtal dictator, to put in place security measures

:43:42. > :43:44.afterwards. On this measure, Sir John's report is understandably

:43:45. > :43:48.critical of the UK and the United States. With intervention comes

:43:49. > :43:53.responsibility and security is a key part of that responsibility. But we

:43:54. > :43:58.should be clear about two other points. Firstly, that the killing of

:43:59. > :44:04.innocent civilians in Iraq was not being carried out by the UK or the

:44:05. > :44:10.US Armed Forces, but by terrorists and militias who blew up the United

:44:11. > :44:12.Nations' headquarters attack mosques and destroy already fragile

:44:13. > :44:18.infrastructure and bombed marketplaces. Secondly, sectarian

:44:19. > :44:24.violence and willing in Iraq, did not begin in 20003. Prior to 2003,

:44:25. > :44:32.it was carried out by the Saddam regime itself. The The use of

:44:33. > :44:36.chemical weapons against the Kurds in the North, the brutal supression

:44:37. > :44:43.of the Shia uprising after the first Gulf War in 1991. It was a rein of

:44:44. > :44:47.terror were mass graves are still being discovered decades on. I want

:44:48. > :44:50.it pay tribute to the courage and determination of my right honourable

:44:51. > :44:56.friend, the member for kol win valley, who was campaigning for the

:44:57. > :45:02.victims at Saddam's brutal regime long before the Iraq war in 20003.

:45:03. > :45:07.Fourthly, what is the lesson in terms of our own security? Now, I

:45:08. > :45:12.believe people supported the Iraq war for different reasons. I believe

:45:13. > :45:17.many people opposed it for different reasons, too and they should not all

:45:18. > :45:22.be put in the one bracket. Not everyone has drawn a direct line

:45:23. > :45:29.between this intervention and you will all the security problems we

:45:30. > :45:34.faced but some have. Now foreign interventions will anger jihadists.

:45:35. > :45:38.They may also be used as a recruiting sergeant for jihadists

:45:39. > :45:43.but it would be a fundamental mistake to believe that the mass

:45:44. > :45:49.murder of innocent people is only a response to what we do and if we

:45:50. > :45:53.start doing it, they would leave us alone. We should remember that

:45:54. > :46:06.Islamist terrorism existed long before the Iraq war. The U s. SS

:46:07. > :46:16.Cole was bombed and the US trade centre was bombed first in 2003 and

:46:17. > :46:25.then again and Bali in 2002, which saw the murder of many tourists. And

:46:26. > :46:30.in Paris last year, which took place in the country country which was

:46:31. > :46:38.most opposed to the Iraq war. I have said this before in the House, Mr

:46:39. > :46:43.speaker, understanding Islamist terrorism simply in what we do,

:46:44. > :46:48.infantilis it, confers responsibility on them for what we

:46:49. > :46:52.do and fails to stand up for the pluralism, diversity and religious

:46:53. > :46:57.freedom which we hold dear Whatever lesson we learn from past

:46:58. > :47:03.interventions, it should not be to franchise out our foreign policy

:47:04. > :47:08.decisions for the approval or veto of the terrorists who oppose our way

:47:09. > :47:16.of life. Now, finally, Mr Speaker, there is the lesson on

:47:17. > :47:20.interintervention itself. Sir John makes a number of interventions

:47:21. > :47:23.about how intelligence should be treated, mine steerial oversight,

:47:24. > :47:27.the challenge of arguments and so on. They look eminently sensible and

:47:28. > :47:33.I'm sure any future Government will take them on board. But the truth

:47:34. > :47:41.is, this is not just a matter of process. I'm grateful to my right

:47:42. > :47:48.honourable friend. He made a strong critique of one of Sir John's

:47:49. > :47:52.findings. One of the other findings, I find problematicical is the last

:47:53. > :47:56.resort suggestion which was also criticised by the Chairman of the

:47:57. > :48:01.Defence Select Committee. Does he agree with me that at that time, it

:48:02. > :48:05.was clear that time was running out, Saddam had been given 90 days when

:48:06. > :48:09.the resolution was specified, 30 days and to say that there was

:48:10. > :48:14.somehow other avenues that could be explored but not realistic at the

:48:15. > :48:22.time. I agree with my right honourable friend. I know at some

:48:23. > :48:26.point there is always the issue of deciding. Every debate about

:48:27. > :48:29.intervention since 2003 has taken place until the shadow of this

:48:30. > :48:33.decision. Iraq has already increased the threshold for military action

:48:34. > :48:37.and the Chilcot report will raise it further. But there is an inescapable

:48:38. > :48:41.question. Put bluntly -- you can have all the committees and

:48:42. > :48:46.processes that you want, but you still have to decide and your is he

:48:47. > :48:49.significance could go wrong and you cannot predict everything that will

:48:50. > :48:52.happen in the aftermath. A lot has been said about the size of the

:48:53. > :48:56.report, 2.5 million words, from here, it looks like, if you stack

:48:57. > :49:01.those volumes on top of one another, you would have a Bo two feet high of

:49:02. > :49:03.paper. The very sight of the report would be a warning to future Prime

:49:04. > :49:18.Ministers. Prime Minister and presidents since

:49:19. > :49:22.2003 have been cautious and this should make them cautious in the

:49:23. > :49:27.future but between what wrong after the invasion, now the timings of the

:49:28. > :49:32.report and add into the reduced size of our Armed Forces in reapers yoo,

:49:33. > :49:37.what if the conclusion was never to intervene again. What message would

:49:38. > :49:44.that send out to the oppressed of the world or to dictators or to

:49:45. > :49:50.terrorists groups? I was not an MP in 2003. And therefore never had to

:49:51. > :49:57.face the responsibility of the vote for the war in Iraq. The most

:49:58. > :50:02.significant vote on what happened on foreign policy, since I was elected,

:50:03. > :50:06.was over Syria in 2014. A vote heavily coloured by our experience

:50:07. > :50:12.in Iraq. I have a slightly different interpretation of that to the member

:50:13. > :50:21.for New Forest East. I voted against military action in 2013. Even after

:50:22. > :50:25.Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people, yet Syria,

:50:26. > :50:29.where we did not intervene, beyond limited air strikes we voted for

:50:30. > :50:33.last year, has been a humanitarian disaster, even worse than Iraq.

:50:34. > :50:37.Hundreds of thousands dead. Millions displaced. The greatest movement of

:50:38. > :50:46.refugees across Europe since the end of the Second World War. It isn't a

:50:47. > :50:51.vote it intervene which has troubled me most in my 11 years here, it is

:50:52. > :50:54.that vote not to intervee. As the international community, with the

:50:55. > :50:59.exception of Russia and where have the demonstrations been outside

:51:00. > :51:02.their embassies? Indeed, hear, hear. They decided it was all too

:51:03. > :51:06.difficult There is no Chilcot report into Syria. We can tell ourselves

:51:07. > :51:10.that because we didn't break it, we didn't buy it. But that makes

:51:11. > :51:21.absolutely no difference to the human cost. Exactly But let us

:51:22. > :51:25.learn, let us not sign a blank check for despots and terrorist groups

:51:26. > :51:30.around the world or delude ourselves that the security issues we face

:51:31. > :51:35.stem only from our decisions rather than the ideology that encourages

:51:36. > :51:39.the killing of innocent people in countries around the world. Yes,

:51:40. > :51:44.intervening has consequences. There are 2.5 million words detailing them

:51:45. > :51:51.before us. But, so does standing back. We have to decide the

:51:52. > :51:58.difference. Mr Speaker, thank you for calling

:51:59. > :52:03.me, I would suggest that Iraq 20003 ranks with Suez in a catalogue of

:52:04. > :52:08.British foreign policy disasters. It cost the lives of over 200 British

:52:09. > :52:16.nationals, many tens of thousands of lives of Iraqi nationals and

:52:17. > :52:20.citizens and set in train a terrible sequence of events, including a

:52:21. > :52:24.vicious civil war and fundmentally altering the balance of power within

:52:25. > :52:27.the region and 13 years later, Mr Speaker, I suggest we are still

:52:28. > :52:31.living with many of these consequences. Having resigned from

:52:32. > :52:35.the shadow frerge in 20003, to investigate against the war, I

:52:36. > :52:37.suppose it could be said it was a pivotal point in defining my

:52:38. > :52:42.political career, Mr Speaker, such as it has been. So it's been a

:52:43. > :52:48.little bit more than a passing interest to see the gross of the

:52:49. > :52:52.Chilcot report. -- see the progress. I defended the time he took and I

:52:53. > :52:59.would like to thank the opportunity of thanking Sir John and his team

:53:00. > :53:04.for the thoroughness of that report. As a former soldier, I would just

:53:05. > :53:07.like to start by making this point - and that is that whatever has been

:53:08. > :53:11.said previously, war should always be the measure of last resort when

:53:12. > :53:17.all other possibilities have been exhausted. And we should never lose

:53:18. > :53:25.sight of that simple fact. Of course there is such a thing as a just war

:53:26. > :53:28.but at the same time you owe it to your citizens, your Parliament and

:53:29. > :53:34.of about all the soldiers you are committing to battle that it has to

:53:35. > :53:38.be the measure of last resort. For me, the overwhelming conclusion from

:53:39. > :53:43.Sir John's report was actually that Iraq was not that last resort. Other

:53:44. > :53:47.possibilities had about not been exhausted. I think that was the most

:53:48. > :53:53.damming conclusion of the report itself. -- most damning. It made

:53:54. > :54:00.other points, the premise of war, we wept on to war on the premise of

:54:01. > :54:05.WMD, it was overtold and there was caveats attached to the intelligence

:54:06. > :54:09.and there was a lack of preparedness with regard to our Armed Forces and

:54:10. > :54:14.there was an absence of post-war planning. This litany of errors was

:54:15. > :54:17.compounded by an overestimation of our influence over the US. We could

:54:18. > :54:22.not at the time believe that it could be an in our interests not to

:54:23. > :54:26.be there, not to be on the frontline, when, when I think one of

:54:27. > :54:30.the proudest and best moments when it came to Prime Minister Wilson,

:54:31. > :54:35.was saying no to the Americans when it came to Veet nap t did not

:54:36. > :54:39.fracture the special relationship, in fact between 15 to 20 years, the

:54:40. > :54:44.special relationship, as it is so-called was on a very firm footing

:54:45. > :54:49.indeed. A litany of errors. I don't intend looking back on those, I do

:54:50. > :54:53.suggest that there are two key lessons from this episode that I

:54:54. > :54:56.think we would do well to reflect upon. The first is that Parliament

:54:57. > :55:03.should have done more to question the evidence that came before it.

:55:04. > :55:07.It's a failure, almost at every level. The legislative is not

:55:08. > :55:11.examining the evidence. It is not questioning the executive, at times

:55:12. > :55:16.like this, then when is it going to do so. There was a failure of those

:55:17. > :55:20.in the know. I would suggest at all level, and particularly the Cabinet

:55:21. > :55:23.at the time, to challenge what is being presented to the public. I

:55:24. > :55:27.think the one figure that stands proud with all of this, when it

:55:28. > :55:38.comes to the select group of people, within the Cabinet is Robin Cook who

:55:39. > :55:41.clearly, what he forecast on that eventful debate in 2003, everything

:55:42. > :55:46.he said has been proved right. I contributed to that debate as well

:55:47. > :55:53.but it was one of the best speeches I have heard for a very, very long

:55:54. > :55:56.time. But, we should - I will in a second - we should have questioned

:55:57. > :56:02.more. We should have examined the detail. I was told to stop asking

:56:03. > :56:07.awkward questions. We were asking so few awkward questions, as an

:56:08. > :56:10.Opposition, as an official Opposition, it was being suggested

:56:11. > :56:14.to me from the other side that we were trying to take, play political

:56:15. > :56:19.games with this issue, that they were hoping to perhaps, if it did

:56:20. > :56:22.blow up in the Government's face, then we, as an official Opposition

:56:23. > :56:29.could perhaps take advantage of that. That is how bad it got in that

:56:30. > :56:31.debate in 20003. We simply were not asking enough questions and we

:56:32. > :56:45.should have done so. I was here in 2003 and I went

:56:46. > :56:50.against the leader of my party and voted against action in the Iraqi

:56:51. > :56:55.war. It is being disingenuous to the house because it was one of the

:56:56. > :57:03.biggest rebellions there had been on the government side. And I remember

:57:04. > :57:06.that debate and how difficult it was to make that judgment. When you are

:57:07. > :57:13.being led by the leader of your party whose judgment you respect, it

:57:14. > :57:18.is a tough call to disagree and vote against an action of that kind. Can

:57:19. > :57:24.the Honourable gentleman accept as I do, that in a difference of opinion,

:57:25. > :57:28.I have not had any cause to change my mind over the decision I make but

:57:29. > :57:34.I believe those who made the decisions relieved they were doing

:57:35. > :57:38.the right thing. I believe we are saying different things. I am not

:57:39. > :57:43.saying there was intentional deceit. What I am saying is that this place,

:57:44. > :57:50.many of us did not question enough the evidence before us. The JI see

:57:51. > :57:55.report was full of caveats and holes but we relied on the Prime

:57:56. > :58:00.Minister's interpretation given in his foreword. I fully respect

:58:01. > :58:04.members views on that evening itself. If you cannot trust the

:58:05. > :58:08.Prime Minister standing at the dispatch box making the case for war

:58:09. > :58:13.and perhaps privy to intelligence that we haven't seen, then it is a

:58:14. > :58:18.sad turn of events. But I still come back to the fundamental point that

:58:19. > :58:23.we should have questioned more because there was a firm lack of

:58:24. > :58:28.evidence of WMD and that was the premise for war. We cannot forget

:58:29. > :58:32.that point. The reason the inspectors were pleading for more

:58:33. > :58:36.time is because they couldn't find WMD because they didn't exist. There

:58:37. > :58:41.is that component in this debate that the UN was asking us to give

:58:42. > :58:46.them more time. The problem was we were marching to a military

:58:47. > :58:51.timetable at that point. I am grateful to the Honourable gentleman

:58:52. > :58:56.to indulge me for a second, I was reduced to four minutes yesterday so

:58:57. > :59:00.I did not get the opportunity to page of you to my predecessor Robin

:59:01. > :59:07.Cook, who if not for his untimely death, I would not be in this place,

:59:08. > :59:12.he was my MP going up, we disagreed on many things but on Iraq we agreed

:59:13. > :59:19.and he is missed by many, and his family. I am conscious time is

:59:20. > :59:23.pressing on. I will try and wrap this up in a few minutes. That was

:59:24. > :59:28.the first lesson from my point of view that we would do well to

:59:29. > :59:34.reflect on. The second important lesson we should learn from Iraqi is

:59:35. > :59:42.that we need a proper functioning and funded well sited foreign policy

:59:43. > :59:46.apparatus. There is no doubt about it, Barack revealed clear

:59:47. > :59:49.deficiencies in that apparatus. Subsequent interventions would

:59:50. > :59:54.suggest that we still haven't put that right to a large part. In

:59:55. > :59:59.Helmand province, most of us supported the initial invasion in

:00:00. > :00:04.Afghanistan or the intervention to get rid of Al-Qaeda, we made a

:00:05. > :00:09.massive mistake in allowing that mission to morph into one of

:00:10. > :00:14.nation-building. That was a mission that was completely under resourced.

:00:15. > :00:18.In Libya, we did not understand events on the ground and that once

:00:19. > :00:23.you knocked the doors down, the easy part, you laid open all of the

:00:24. > :00:30.tribal rivalries. Again we had a lack of understanding of events on

:00:31. > :00:33.the ground. In Syria in 2013, there was a suggestion we would be arming

:00:34. > :00:40.the rebels, not realising that lurking in the shadows were the ISI

:00:41. > :00:44.tell situation and how that would play out. -- I

:00:45. > :00:54.a loss of expertise and foreign policy and it is a problem felt

:00:55. > :00:58.within the SCO. In this country we have a narrow pyramid when it comes

:00:59. > :01:01.to foreign policy making. In the States it is more open and diverse

:01:02. > :01:07.with lobbyists and political analysts. The experts can buy into

:01:08. > :01:13.the system and influence the system. In this country it is more narrowly

:01:14. > :01:19.defined. It is the reserve of the select few, which is why the SCO is

:01:20. > :01:26.part of that few, it must be firing on all cylinders. It has not been

:01:27. > :01:32.so. That is why we need proper funding of the SCO, we have had a

:01:33. > :01:35.continual erosion of the budget and hollowing out of expertise and

:01:36. > :01:41.staff. Traditional skills like languages and knowledge of events on

:01:42. > :01:45.the ground and peoples, places, have all been downgraded. As illustrated

:01:46. > :01:52.by the closure of the in-house language school and the gutting of

:01:53. > :01:57.the venerable library. How is it that we have got to the point that

:01:58. > :02:02.when Russia intervened in Ukraine, we did not how one Crimean expert

:02:03. > :02:08.within the FCO. How is it when the Arab uprising took place, we had so

:02:09. > :02:13.few Arabists that we were calling them out of retirement. And how we

:02:14. > :02:19.have a different budget, ten times that of the Foreign and Commonwealth

:02:20. > :02:24.Office. It does not serve us well. We need to increase the budget for

:02:25. > :02:29.long-term investment and make sure we are as well sited as we can be.

:02:30. > :02:33.That is not the case at the moment. There is continual pressure on the

:02:34. > :02:38.FCO budget and we need to put that right. It is no surprise that

:02:39. > :02:43.Parliament has raised the bar when it comes to interventions. It

:02:44. > :02:47.expects to be consulted. That is one of the positive developments of the

:02:48. > :02:51.Iraqi intervention. If you believe there is a loss of expertise at the

:02:52. > :02:58.heart of your foreign policy apparatus and if there is a lack of

:02:59. > :03:03.trust, not just because of Barack but because of Helmand province,

:03:04. > :03:10.Libya, Syria, again, the bar needs to be raised. This is not a healthy

:03:11. > :03:13.position in the long term. In the increasingly challenging

:03:14. > :03:18.international environment, we need a knowledgeable executive to be firing

:03:19. > :03:23.on all cylinders. Well informed and resourced FCO has to be central to

:03:24. > :03:28.that, acting as a counterweight to number ten and it may help us avoid

:03:29. > :03:34.costly errors and conflicts going forward. There has to be within the

:03:35. > :03:40.system readiness to speak truth to power and I am not sure we are quite

:03:41. > :03:45.there yet. That is one of the key lessons with regard to Iraq. In

:03:46. > :03:50.conclusion Mr Speaker, we face enormous geopolitical challenges,

:03:51. > :03:56.both the UK and the West, going forward. The world population will

:03:57. > :04:02.rise to 9 billion by 2050, changing distribution in terms of Africa,

:04:03. > :04:07.urbanisation, the consequent strain on natural resources. 1 billion

:04:08. > :04:14.people lack access to sufficient water, by 2050, three quarters of

:04:15. > :04:20.the world could face water scarcity. There are environmental challenges

:04:21. > :04:22.caused by political and economic uncertainty. In the global

:04:23. > :04:28.information world, success will depend on not to prevail by force

:04:29. > :04:34.but who wins the story. One of the failures of Iraq is that it is

:04:35. > :04:39.symptomatic of a wider malaise. The deficiency in strategic analysis at

:04:40. > :04:45.the corner of our foreign policy apparatus. The greatest challenge

:04:46. > :04:50.for policymakers is to ensure that we embrace flexibility and foresight

:04:51. > :04:56.and perhaps diplomacy's greatest challenge must be to restore foreign

:04:57. > :05:01.policy and defence capabilities. Otherwise the country risks being

:05:02. > :05:05.left behind. This is happening at a time when international community is

:05:06. > :05:10.failing to produce coordinated responses to challenges facing

:05:11. > :05:14.mankind including poverty, organised crime, conflict, disease, hunger and

:05:15. > :05:20.inequality. In conclusion, I properly resourced and respected

:05:21. > :05:25.foreign policy apparatus, investment in soft power and old friendships

:05:26. > :05:30.and strong in defence because diplomacy and soft power cannot

:05:31. > :05:36.succeed by it self. We must have this proper funding in place for our

:05:37. > :05:41.FCO. If we are not well sited, the next intervention challenge, there

:05:42. > :05:46.will be more, it might not be as local in its ramifications as it has

:05:47. > :05:51.been in the past errors. We need to be better sited because the cost of

:05:52. > :05:56.getting it wrong might be so much greater next time. Jim Shannon. It

:05:57. > :06:01.is a pleasure to speak and to follow the members who have given a wealth

:06:02. > :06:11.and depth of information to this debate. My comments, the mistakes

:06:12. > :06:16.made and lessons learned, that is what I wish to refer to. British

:06:17. > :06:21.forces, 146,000 in the invasion phase but because of how things

:06:22. > :06:26.work, more than actually served, I would like to pay tribute to the 179

:06:27. > :06:34.brave and courageous servicemen and women who died during the campaign

:06:35. > :06:40.and commend those who served in this place and in the other place as

:06:41. > :06:45.well. The Chilcot Report has raised many issues. There is a lack of

:06:46. > :06:49.answers on such key issues as the cause of much of the public rage. It

:06:50. > :06:58.is now very clear that we followed the American lead without properly

:06:59. > :07:05.analysing intelligence. It was the public commitment from Tony Blair to

:07:06. > :07:08.the US president on support. We need to be more discerning about how we

:07:09. > :07:17.get material in regards intelligence. The plan for success

:07:18. > :07:24.was absent and in 2003, there was an expected success for which no one

:07:25. > :07:30.had planned. No one could see Saddam Hussein capitulating so early. So

:07:31. > :07:37.there were no successful programmes is sit such as oil aid. We did not

:07:38. > :07:45.have a vision of understanding what would happen if we were successful

:07:46. > :07:50.at time. It is felt strongly to this day, in the region and across the

:07:51. > :07:55.world. We did not understand the complex society of Barack. The

:07:56. > :07:59.cultural sensitivity and local division, the sectarianism and the

:08:00. > :08:04.politics that meant our presence was resented as time went on and things

:08:05. > :08:10.did not get better. There was the incident in Basra where war was

:08:11. > :08:14.pronounced. All of these were unforeseen. We cannot seem -- keep

:08:15. > :08:23.sending forces into places where they are not equipped Ford the

:08:24. > :08:26.surroundings and understanding. We need to fully prepare our Armed

:08:27. > :08:29.Forces and regain much of the damaged public trust. I was not a

:08:30. > :08:35.member at the time of the rock wall but I had constituents who were

:08:36. > :08:42.sending socks and boots and food and I have to say, on one occasion, body

:08:43. > :08:47.armour, there is something wrong when our people serve across the

:08:48. > :08:52.seas and we as families have to send them stuff that the army should send

:08:53. > :08:55.them. There needs to be a conversation. A lot of the things

:08:56. > :09:01.went wrong can be explained by the lack of resources. We have not got

:09:02. > :09:07.the capacity to fight on so many fronts any more. It is now clear

:09:08. > :09:13.that we greatly underestimated -- overestimated the capability of the

:09:14. > :09:21.enemy. That was another important point to learn and one that must be

:09:22. > :09:25.taken forward. I want to speak of the veterans in the family support

:09:26. > :09:30.package when soldiers were away. At that time, there were two soldiers

:09:31. > :09:36.left at headquarters to take care of family affairs, it became

:09:37. > :09:39.overpowering for them. I know that things have changed and I welcome

:09:40. > :09:47.those changes but we have to build on this and make sure these things

:09:48. > :09:54.are not forgotten. We need foresight and to continue learning. I want to

:09:55. > :10:00.quote an example of a gentleman who served in uniform. His story will be

:10:01. > :10:06.well-known to those who read the Sunday Times, Chris Braithwaite, 41,

:10:07. > :10:14.a former major in the Duke of Lancaster Regiment. His quote was

:10:15. > :10:19."In Basra, we were attacked daily for seven months. We believe the

:10:20. > :10:22.financial support that was provided by the Army in recognition of long

:10:23. > :10:30.service would reflect the family sacrifice until the rug was pulled

:10:31. > :10:33.from under us." "I have saved the Queen 's Diamond Jubilee Medal, I

:10:34. > :10:41.was given the news I was made risk -- made redundant, 87 days short of

:10:42. > :10:44.my 16 years service for that medal." These people fought for Queen and

:10:45. > :10:49.country, they did their bit and when they were needed, they had support

:10:50. > :10:54.back home but it fell short with a vengeance. We must take care of our

:10:55. > :10:59.veterans and make sure they get first-class services. Offer the best

:11:00. > :11:05.and get the best as well for those things are vitally important. I

:11:06. > :11:11.asked this question and I will ask again, are we going to have a

:11:12. > :11:19.statistic someday where more Iraqi -- Iraqi war veterans kill

:11:20. > :11:30.themselves than were killed in the conflict? There are statistical

:11:31. > :11:36.facts over Afghanistan, these are things we need to take recognition

:11:37. > :11:43.of and be aware of. If I can quickly referred to the reserves. We use the

:11:44. > :11:56.highest number of reservists on record and we have no method of

:11:57. > :12:00.tracking them to see if they have suffered after the conflict, and the

:12:01. > :12:10.number dropped from 45,000 to 30,000, there needs to be a rethink.

:12:11. > :12:16.It may well be that the Tony Blair was strong, is own self-importance

:12:17. > :12:19.having had successes in Kosovo and Sierra Leone and having brokered the

:12:20. > :12:25.Good Friday Agreement the genuinely thought he could do no long. This

:12:26. > :12:29.could be the will be with you whatever memo, it is increasingly

:12:30. > :12:33.clear, that our soldiers were being sent to war by Tony Blair no matter

:12:34. > :12:37.what. Tim Collins said that at the time they believe that there was it

:12:38. > :12:41.plan in place but we know now that this was not the case and we know

:12:42. > :12:46.that the lack of planning was disastrous for many. It is easy to

:12:47. > :12:50.point the finger at Tony Blair but there are others, Alistair Campbell,

:12:51. > :12:53.Jeff Kuhn and those in a circle of friends, decision-makers and there

:12:54. > :12:58.is something for them to think about. Mr Speaker, in the time that

:12:59. > :13:04.is available to me, right honourable and honourable members will be aware

:13:05. > :13:08.of that famous poem by Roger Kipling, from the poem Tommy. I will

:13:09. > :13:18.read the second burst your fifth one. The theme is applicable to

:13:19. > :13:24.today, "I went into a theatre as sober as could be, they sent him to

:13:25. > :13:32.the musicals but when it came to fighting they will show me in the

:13:33. > :13:40.stalls. It is Tommy this and Tommy that, the troop ships on the Tyne,

:13:41. > :13:55.it is special train for Atkins when the ships are on the Tyne. We talk

:13:56. > :13:59.of schools and fires for all. For it is Tommy this and Tommy that, and

:14:00. > :14:05.talk about the bridge, the saviour of his country when the guns begun

:14:06. > :14:11.to shoot. And it is anything you please but Tommy isn't a blooming

:14:12. > :14:15.fool. " I believe we need to do better by our veterans to make sure

:14:16. > :14:18.that those who have served this country well, should be looked

:14:19. > :14:27.after. I want to conclude with one comment. There was a vulnerable

:14:28. > :14:31.person scheme, set up after the war, when the current reflection in Iraq

:14:32. > :14:34.is important, it doesn't make an impact, the honourable member for

:14:35. > :14:40.Leeds Central referred to it. I want to refer to it again. There are

:14:41. > :14:46.Catholics, Protestants, and many others who continue to be targeted

:14:47. > :14:50.on the basis of their identity. Around 3.3 million have been

:14:51. > :14:54.displaced due to the instability of Iraq, many minority groups are on

:14:55. > :14:56.the verge of disappearance and during the UN Independent

:14:57. > :15:02.commission, it was determined that there should committed genocide

:15:03. > :15:10.against the UCD is, around 90% of them are Iraqi. The resettlement

:15:11. > :15:18.schemes are not national specific, they have only taken up to 315

:15:19. > :15:23.Iraqis, while some might fit the scheme, they're not eligible for

:15:24. > :15:28.asylum because they're not Syrian asylum seekers. I would call, for

:15:29. > :15:34.the modest increase in the resettlement scheme, for Iraqis who

:15:35. > :15:39.fit the criteria to qualify for asylum in the UK. A modest expansion

:15:40. > :15:43.is particularly pertinent, because the Iraqis have suffered as much as

:15:44. > :15:48.their Syrian counterparts at the hands of the Irish. The UK cannot

:15:49. > :15:54.absolve itself promises to Iraqis, making them illegible for

:15:55. > :15:59.resettlement. It is the least we can do. Mr Speaker, we have heard about

:16:00. > :16:05.mistakes, we can learn from those mistakes, we can move forward, we

:16:06. > :16:09.can make it a better place for our soldiers to serve. With the veteran

:16:10. > :16:12.support when they get home for our families as well. Let us learn from

:16:13. > :16:21.the report and move forward, learning from those mistakes. Thank

:16:22. > :16:26.you. Johnny Mercer. Thank you very much Mr Speaker, and for allowing me

:16:27. > :16:29.to rise. The Chilcot report allowed for sobering reading, many things

:16:30. > :16:32.had been said on the issue and I will not repeat them, the chief

:16:33. > :16:35.protagonists at the time have received in my view their

:16:36. > :16:39.criticisms. I have the fortunate position of having been in the Army

:16:40. > :16:44.at the time of the Iraq war and now a member of this place. I did not

:16:45. > :16:45.serve in combat in theatre, my theatre was another unpopular war in

:16:46. > :16:57.Afghanistan. The time of the Iraq the Army was a strange place to be.

:16:58. > :17:01.It is difficult to be positive about a million people marched against

:17:02. > :17:05.appointment just before you go. But it is a testament to the character

:17:06. > :17:09.and the professionalism of UK Armed Forces that the initial operation

:17:10. > :17:15.was a success despite cruel losses including from my enrichment on the

:17:16. > :17:19.23rd of March 2003 when Ian Seymour, and others from 29 commando were

:17:20. > :17:23.killed in southern Iraq by insurgents. But what happened

:17:24. > :17:28.following the initial operation, for the following seven years bad is

:17:29. > :17:32.indeed right up to date, has been a tragedy for Iraq. I visited the

:17:33. > :17:36.country last autumn and I met with the current president, it remains a

:17:37. > :17:40.place of extreme violence, heavy corruption and deep division. It was

:17:41. > :17:45.a challenge to return from a visit to Baghdad with much of a sense of

:17:46. > :17:48.optimism although recent changes in the Iraqi security forces and the

:17:49. > :17:52.international coalition's mammoth efforts in the fight against Daesh

:17:53. > :17:55.give real cause for hope and I want to pay tribute to all UK forces

:17:56. > :18:01.engaged in a fight to date as we speak in this house. But how did we

:18:02. > :18:05.really get here? I to the youngster and the public rage, the actions of

:18:06. > :18:07.some of those both at the top of government at the time and yes at

:18:08. > :18:13.the top of the military were negligent. I am concerned however

:18:14. > :18:17.that the public's fixation upon Tony Blair could make us miss some of the

:18:18. > :18:21.learning points, this is the whole point of this process that must be

:18:22. > :18:26.taken from the very conference of work. It was encouraging to hear the

:18:27. > :18:29.Prime Minister who left office yesterday say that it would be

:18:30. > :18:32.impossible for these events to happen again today because of the

:18:33. > :18:35.structures that he and his team have put in place and I commend him and

:18:36. > :18:45.the sexual state for defence for that. -- the Secretary of State for

:18:46. > :18:50.Defence. But there is a decency issue, the morality issue. It is a

:18:51. > :18:54.rarer and treasured commodity, in an organisation configured to but

:18:55. > :18:59.physical courage, the ability to stand up for your men in the face of

:19:00. > :19:03.a seemingly unstoppable sequence of events, to speak truth to power is

:19:04. > :19:07.an integral part of the duty of the nation. We drive it into the

:19:08. > :19:10.subordinate and we preach to anyone who will listen, so where was this

:19:11. > :19:15.courage in the build-up to this disastrous war? It is inconceivable

:19:16. > :19:17.to me to allow political administration in this country to

:19:18. > :19:21.have the preparations for war because it did not physically to be

:19:22. > :19:25.seen to be doing so. It is inconceivable to me to allow

:19:26. > :19:29.soldiers out patrol bases into contact with the enemy without body

:19:30. > :19:35.armour, not as a tactical decision, or a of enemy action, but simply

:19:36. > :19:39.because of bad planning. It is inconceivable to me to continually

:19:40. > :19:42.allow patrolling in snatch Land Rover is when they were known to

:19:43. > :19:46.provide no protection whatsoever to our men and women against a

:19:47. > :19:49.well-known and obvious IED threat. But yet these things happened and

:19:50. > :19:56.they directly cost UK military lives. And in this almost this rule

:19:57. > :19:59.fixation of hatred upon Tony Blair these lessons must not be missed

:20:00. > :20:03.less we do a further disservice to our men and women who serve. The

:20:04. > :20:09.Prime Minister does not make tactical decisions, she does not

:20:10. > :20:13.plan logistics, she is advised by those who do. I cannot as a very

:20:14. > :20:17.junior and insignificant commander in another unpopular war in

:20:18. > :20:20.Afghanistan would ever sanction an operation knowingly lacking in

:20:21. > :20:24.equipment required to protect my men from a threat that I clearly knew

:20:25. > :20:27.about because I wasn't prepared to say no. And I find it hard as do

:20:28. > :20:32.many of my cohort to understand why it was the case in this instance.

:20:33. > :20:36.And yet we did, we as a military betrayed the individuals who lost

:20:37. > :20:45.their lives in this conflict, as a direct result of equipment shortages

:20:46. > :20:48.and that is the point for me that really sticks in the group from all

:20:49. > :20:50.this. The political arguments, the strategic comings and goings will be

:20:51. > :20:53.debated at in-flight and so they must to ensure that we do not make

:20:54. > :20:56.the same stakes again. But the military and the tactical lessons

:20:57. > :21:00.must be learned also. What happened in Iraq had a profound effect on a

:21:01. > :21:03.whole generation of us junior commanders and military, who grew up

:21:04. > :21:07.in a deep sense of mistrust in our superiors as a result of the lack of

:21:08. > :21:11.actions or actions in the Iraq war. I know for many is formed us at a

:21:12. > :21:15.very formative stage in our careers. Finally in my contribution today, I

:21:16. > :21:20.want to speak strongly against this idea that the lives of British

:21:21. > :21:25.servicemen and women where somehow wasted in this war died for nothing.

:21:26. > :21:30.I'm afraid I simply cannot reconcile in my not insignificant personal

:21:31. > :21:33.experience of commanding men in combat that lives lost in the

:21:34. > :21:36.pursuit of protections of freedoms and privileges that we enjoyed in

:21:37. > :21:40.his country have been lost in vain. For the families, many of whom I

:21:41. > :21:44.know intimately, nothing common omission, no cause can be worth

:21:45. > :21:48.losing a loved one. But as a soldier I thought that I must represent the

:21:49. > :21:51.intimate conversations that we share, the deep motivations that we

:21:52. > :21:57.fell back on to get through yet another date in a sweat, he, blood

:21:58. > :22:00.and dust of these recent wars. For we soldiers are drawn from all

:22:01. > :22:04.backgrounds, race, original, colour and creed, we'll have different

:22:05. > :22:08.views, usually much more informed than anybody gives us credit for. No

:22:09. > :22:13.doubt crafted from each of R.N. Personal experience. But we wear one

:22:14. > :22:18.you reform, with one union Jack on our sleep, we sign up to the same

:22:19. > :22:21.core values to protect our nation, in the same traditions of the

:22:22. > :22:24.immense sacrifices of our forefathers who wore the same cap

:22:25. > :22:28.badges under the same flag. The truth is when a soldier leaves his

:22:29. > :22:31.patrol base in the morning comedies not thinking about how his

:22:32. > :22:34.particular contribution that they will help advance the cause of

:22:35. > :22:38.Iraq's future prosperity will gather some's place in the world. He's not

:22:39. > :22:41.thinking about whether we should have believed a dossier about the

:22:42. > :22:47.weapons of mass structure whether he will stumble upon a summer's house.

:22:48. > :22:52.He's thinking about calling his wife later comedies thinking of covering

:22:53. > :22:56.his arts and trying not to blink unless he misses something. He's

:22:57. > :23:00.making sure that he has got spare batteries, the is making sure he

:23:01. > :23:04.doesn't let his mates down. He is more focused on doing his section,

:23:05. > :23:07.his platoon and his battalion proud than whether or not he should be

:23:08. > :23:12.there in the first base. And in these endeavours he showing that

:23:13. > :23:15.courage, that fortitude and that resilience, that humanity that we

:23:16. > :23:21.all aspire to on the most revealing stage of all, welfare, where norms

:23:22. > :23:24.do not exist and brutality and brought human emotion is everywhere.

:23:25. > :23:28.We aspire to these things because they are good, because they are

:23:29. > :23:31.noble, because they are to be desired. These young men and women

:23:32. > :23:35.who made the sacrifices demonstrating these qualities, it

:23:36. > :23:40.makes those are those who witnessed it and lucky to return refuse to

:23:41. > :23:43.think it is futile. For they did make differences, they said, it's

:23:44. > :23:48.lives through their bravery, they shielded civilians from brutal

:23:49. > :23:51.enemy, with the intent showing the worst of the humanity. Improved

:23:52. > :23:56.amenities and made them safer and better. OK on a strategic level

:23:57. > :24:00.overall perhaps no, but it wasn't all a waste. So that courage, that

:24:01. > :24:04.resilience, that discipline, that commitment, that is why we must

:24:05. > :24:08.number from these conflicts to comic cannot and must never be forgotten,

:24:09. > :24:12.for that would be an even greater betrayal than the ones we see laid

:24:13. > :24:17.out in this report. They are not wasted lives, they were engaged in

:24:18. > :24:21.noble pursuits in the generational struggle of our lifetime, as in the

:24:22. > :24:24.First World War, the Second World War and conflicts since, these

:24:25. > :24:29.privileges that we enjoy. These freedoms that we exercise do not

:24:30. > :24:32.come cheap. So Mr Speaker in conclusion, let us learn these

:24:33. > :24:37.painful lessons, let us not fixate on Tony Blair, he is yesterday's

:24:38. > :24:41.man. Let us not commit to things that we cannot fulfil and pass the

:24:42. > :24:46.buck to the lower end of the command chain to simply work it out. Of

:24:47. > :24:50.course. I thank the honourable member for giving way and I thank

:24:51. > :24:53.him also for his very powerful speech. It is one of the things that

:24:54. > :24:57.has always worried me about the debate on the Iraq war has been the

:24:58. > :25:01.military as victims. As victims who were forced to go and fight when in

:25:02. > :25:05.fact they absolutely trained and wanted to do so. But what they

:25:06. > :25:10.didn't want was bad equipment. And what they don't want today, is bad

:25:11. > :25:14.equipment. And does it not behove this house and its members to be

:25:15. > :25:19.much more interested on a daily basis with what we are providing a

:25:20. > :25:24.service personnel with. Rather than just focusing on past decisions?

:25:25. > :25:28.Absolutely and I thank my honourable friend for her intervention, I think

:25:29. > :25:32.that we have, shortly long way in this process. -- an extraordinarily

:25:33. > :25:45.long way in this process. And absolutely right in that we do

:25:46. > :25:50.not want sympathy. We want more MP3 and understanding in what we do,

:25:51. > :25:55.there is sometimes too much sympathy. -- empathy. We do not

:25:56. > :26:02.expect to be ill-equipped to do so or be part of a mission which is

:26:03. > :26:07.badly planned and badly resourced. So let us never lose the courage to

:26:08. > :26:13.speak truth, no matter our rank or position in life. Let us remember it

:26:14. > :26:18.very humility and courage and sacrifice of our service men and

:26:19. > :26:21.women in Iraq and make sure we have learned the lessons that the

:26:22. > :26:27.hundreds of thousands who have lost lives on either side, civilian and

:26:28. > :26:35.military, the human race can only move forward and I sincerely hope we

:26:36. > :26:40.do. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to follow the honourable

:26:41. > :26:45.and gallant member, he makes such a powerful contribution. This whole

:26:46. > :26:52.House will congratulate him on that speech and remember that people went

:26:53. > :26:55.to that war on our behalf. Mr Speaker, it is a great pleasure to

:26:56. > :27:00.take part in this particular debate. I was one of the members of this

:27:01. > :27:07.House who was in the House when this House voted to go to war. For some

:27:08. > :27:12.of us, it offers closure now we have the Chilcot report. There is a real

:27:13. > :27:15.sense of vindication for people like me who resolutely oppose that

:27:16. > :27:25.conflict and opposed it all the way through. I remember that D, it was a

:27:26. > :27:32.horrible and ugly DE. It should be imprinted on the collective

:27:33. > :27:38.consciousness of this House. I refresh my memory about the

:27:39. > :27:41.atmosphere and culture, I know it sounds masochistic to look at

:27:42. > :27:47.YouTube recordings of Tony Blair making his speech but I felt it was

:27:48. > :27:53.important to get a sense of what that day was like. We had to listen

:27:54. > :27:58.to Tony Blair when he laid out back exaggerated and fabricated case. To

:27:59. > :28:03.listen again to those flights of fancy. We now know because of the

:28:04. > :28:08.Chilcot report that it was mainly nonsense and most of it was fiction.

:28:09. > :28:15.I was the chief whip of what was then a small group of MPs in 2003. I

:28:16. > :28:19.remember observing the government whips rounding up the recalcitrant

:28:20. > :28:25.and the doubters and those who were trying to make up their mind about

:28:26. > :28:30.this. Let us not forget, but Labour Government imposed a harsh three

:28:31. > :28:37.line whip on their members that day. Women and men dragooned into that

:28:38. > :28:43.lobbied to support that fabricated case and to giving support to their

:28:44. > :28:51.very flawed prime minister. The House passed that vote, 412 to 149.

:28:52. > :28:58.I was among the 149. It is the proudest fort of my 15 years in this

:28:59. > :29:03.House. It was a vote that characterised the last Labour

:29:04. > :29:08.government, just like the vote to leave Europe will characterise this

:29:09. > :29:17.Conservative Government. Both were done in a reckless gamble. There was

:29:18. > :29:21.no planning for what would happen when it comes to Brexit, there was

:29:22. > :29:27.no planning as we have learned from Chilcot about what they would do

:29:28. > :29:32.once they had advanced into Iraq. There are lots of parallels. It is

:29:33. > :29:37.curious that they seem big events that characterise particular

:29:38. > :29:40.governments and forever the last Labour government will be

:29:41. > :29:45.characterised by Iraq. More than that, it is all around one man and

:29:46. > :29:51.my apologies to the Member for Plymouth. It is Tony Blair. There is

:29:52. > :29:56.no escape from the personal association with the former Prime

:29:57. > :30:02.Minister and what transpired in Iraq. It will follow him to the

:30:03. > :30:06.grave. It will be on his headstone, such is his association with this

:30:07. > :30:10.conflict in Iraq. It would be as well being tattooed on his forehead.

:30:11. > :30:16.It is about this man and how he approached this war. When I look

:30:17. > :30:23.around, and I have listened carefully to many of the speeches

:30:24. > :30:29.from my colleagues, back on that day in 2003, I think we can grow them

:30:30. > :30:33.into three categories. I will explain what these categories are.

:30:34. > :30:40.First, my category, those who voted against the war, who did not except

:30:41. > :30:46.for a minute the case which was presented to us. We feel in a good

:30:47. > :30:50.place today. I look at some of my colleagues who were at the House

:30:51. > :30:58.that the. I want to pay tribute to the Liberal Party. They led that

:30:59. > :31:05.case against the war in 2003. And also to the Labour members. Take it

:31:06. > :31:13.easy, gentlemen. Labour members opposed it. It was as he said, the

:31:14. > :31:19.biggest rebellion we had during that period. They saw through it. They

:31:20. > :31:22.were prepared to reject the fabricated and nonsensical case the

:31:23. > :31:33.Prime Minister gave. They did the right thing. The second case... Yes,

:31:34. > :31:38.of course. Just briefly. It was historically the biggest government

:31:39. > :31:42.rebellion within the governing party in British political history. 122

:31:43. > :31:51.backbench colleagues in the Labour party voted on the motion that the

:31:52. > :31:55.case was not proven. Only 190 backbench colleagues voted with the

:31:56. > :32:00.government, under immense pressure as the honourable gentleman pointed

:32:01. > :32:05.out from the whips. He is correct. This is why it is important that I

:32:06. > :32:12.was setting the context of that day, it was horrible and ugly and

:32:13. > :32:17.dreadful. I want to come to the Conservatives because these are the

:32:18. > :32:21.second category. I have listened to several Conservative members, I

:32:22. > :32:26.cannot remember which one made the case earlier. There is a real sense

:32:27. > :32:32.among Conservative members that they were misled. They range in

:32:33. > :32:37.categories from angry and upset about the way they were misled and

:32:38. > :32:41.duped by the former Prime Minister to the former Prime Minister who

:32:42. > :32:48.resigned yesterday who was a bit more followers also about it. --

:32:49. > :32:53.philosophical about it. You have to go along with it because he was

:32:54. > :32:56.prime minister. But what the Conservative Party failed to do,

:32:57. > :33:03.this was the utter failure they had that day, they never held that

:33:04. > :33:07.Labour Government to account. They were not inquisitive. They did not

:33:08. > :33:12.look at the case presented to them and said, hold on a minute, this is

:33:13. > :33:18.a lot of nonsense. They should have known. The rest of the country knew

:33:19. > :33:24.this was wrong. 100,000 people marched in Glasgow. I was on the

:33:25. > :33:31.front of them. 1 million people in London marched against that war.

:33:32. > :33:35.There was an atmosphere in the nation, amongst the public who just

:33:36. > :33:40.knew profoundly that there was something wrong with this case. They

:33:41. > :33:46.just knew instinctively that what they were hearing night after night

:33:47. > :33:50.from Tony Blair and his cronies was an comfortable. There was something

:33:51. > :33:55.wrong. The Conservatives should have picked that up and had they done

:33:56. > :33:59.their job, we would not have been presented with this absolute utter

:34:00. > :34:05.failure and disaster. Thirdly, I won't come to the last category.

:34:06. > :34:12.Those of us to the who still seem to be almost making the case for war.

:34:13. > :34:17.As of this was somehow justified, that this was right. They point to

:34:18. > :34:22.things like the world is a better place without Saddam. Of course it

:34:23. > :34:31.is, but what price we have paid for the world. Half a million people

:34:32. > :34:34.dead. A region destabilised, a generation radicalise, foreign

:34:35. > :34:39.policy discredited like never before. It is unlikely we will ever

:34:40. > :34:44.restore that feeds in foreign policy ever again. This trust in politics.

:34:45. > :34:50.That was a key point where the public fell of trust with what we

:34:51. > :34:55.did in this House. Of course we welcome Saddam being removed, no one

:34:56. > :35:02.least of all the Iraqis who have to live with the consequences. Who

:35:03. > :35:10.would start to suggest that Iraq is a better place than it was in 2002.

:35:11. > :35:16.This decision about the public losing faith in this House, many of

:35:17. > :35:19.those accusations made against this government are not founded in the

:35:20. > :35:24.Chilcot report do not come to this conclusion about this House... Dirty

:35:25. > :35:28.not except that on that day it was very difficult for all others, even

:35:29. > :35:34.those who voted against it were not we had made the right decision. You

:35:35. > :35:38.cannot be so exact about your judgment call on that day. Surely he

:35:39. > :35:45.can except that those who voted in favour on that day thought they were

:35:46. > :35:53.doing the right thing? He is right. Let us have a look at this. He was

:35:54. > :35:56.in the House in 2003, and I correct? Yes. He would've been recalled to

:35:57. > :36:04.Parliament in September 2000 and two. When he was recalled like me,

:36:05. > :36:11.we would take out what has now become cold the dodgy dossier. Did

:36:12. > :36:14.he for a minute believe the fabricated nonsense that was that

:36:15. > :36:21.dossier? It was absolutely appalling for this case for war. Most of it

:36:22. > :36:29.came from the post doctoral thesis of a student. I have just finished

:36:30. > :36:33.reading a report from this student who has said his evidence and his

:36:34. > :36:38.work was doctored by this government. That was the case for

:36:39. > :36:43.war. That was the case that he and I have to make a judgment about. It

:36:44. > :36:49.was fabricated, a flight of fancy and that was what we were asked to

:36:50. > :36:57.go to war on, it was a disgrace, like a comedy sketch or a case to go

:36:58. > :37:04.to war. More sex dog than some teenage starlet embarking on their

:37:05. > :37:08.first video. -- sexed up. It was an appalling document. It should never

:37:09. > :37:13.have been taken for a minute, it was rubbish and nonsense. I listen to

:37:14. > :37:20.Tony Blair last week. I was appalled. I was appalled at his

:37:21. > :37:24.response to all of this. The lack of contrition. The half-hearted apology

:37:25. > :37:29.which would probably do nothing other than incense the victims. The

:37:30. > :37:37.flights of fancy still there. Almost an attempt to rewrite several

:37:38. > :37:42.sections of the Chilcot Report. His failure to acknowledge the enormity

:37:43. > :37:46.of what was unleashed. It is appalling what happened. Several

:37:47. > :37:53.things have to happen. My view is that we not at the end this process.

:37:54. > :37:59.I still think there is a journey to go in this particular story. This

:38:00. > :38:04.sorry saga. I do not think we're at the conclusion what happened in

:38:05. > :38:09.Iraq, mainly because of a couple of points that members have made. They

:38:10. > :38:13.were not able to judge about the legality of this conflict and we

:38:14. > :38:17.still have that extra mile to go just to get to say if this was an

:38:18. > :38:22.illegal war. Until we get back conclusion, there will still be big

:38:23. > :38:26.outstanding issues when it comes to this conflict and how it will be

:38:27. > :38:31.assessed. I think there is further journeys to go. Honourable members

:38:32. > :38:36.have waited Years and Years for the Chilcot report will have the sense

:38:37. > :38:44.this is another journey we have to take. What must happen -- those who

:38:45. > :38:49.are responsible for the biggest foreign policy disaster I have seen

:38:50. > :38:55.as, this is bigger than the Suez crisis. They must be held to account

:38:56. > :39:00.for the decisions they made and the things they did in the course of

:39:01. > :39:06.this conflict and how it was per suit. I support overwhelming the

:39:07. > :39:09.case that the chief architect, designer of the Iraq war, Mr Tony

:39:10. > :39:14.Blair should be brought in front of this House to face the charges that

:39:15. > :39:18.have been suggested. I really hope this House gets the opportunity to

:39:19. > :39:24.discuss this because the public expect us to do it. The public do

:39:25. > :39:28.not want after all this time to let this go. The only people who lost

:39:29. > :39:32.their jobs in the course of this conflict are two BBC journalist. Is

:39:33. > :39:37.that not an appalling way to leave things? I believe there is real

:39:38. > :39:44.public desire to move to the next stage now which is holding people to

:39:45. > :39:48.account so I hope we do that. Mr Speaker, I heated every single

:39:49. > :39:55.minute of the debate about the Iraq war and the build up to it and the

:39:56. > :40:00.post-conflict resolution. It was this House at its very worst. We

:40:01. > :40:05.must ever get the ever again. The one thing we can take from this is

:40:06. > :40:12.hopefully a case for lessons learned and we never do this again. Hold the

:40:13. > :40:19.people responsible to account and let us apologise for that conflict.

:40:20. > :40:23.Start to try to move on from all of this and let us know we will never

:40:24. > :40:31.do something like the Iraq war ever again in this Parliament. Doctor

:40:32. > :40:35.Philip Lee. Thank you Mr Speaker. Many important lessons will emerge

:40:36. > :40:39.over the coming months and years. Deep sympathy for the people of Iraq

:40:40. > :40:43.must persist and indeed to the families of the members of our

:40:44. > :40:50.outstanding Armed Forces who fell in the line of duty. I wish to focus on

:40:51. > :40:55.the Iraq inquiry's immediate lessons for the leadership of country. In

:40:56. > :41:04.which this House has such a vital role. Firstly, can I offer some

:41:05. > :41:08.historical perspective. It is worth noting some similarities between the

:41:09. > :41:14.times we're living in now and the last period in recent history which

:41:15. > :41:20.similarly defined by what I would define as a political sclerosis.

:41:21. > :41:26.Trigger first half of the 20th-century we witnessed the

:41:27. > :41:29.collapse of empires, Ottoman Empire, we saw a failure of an

:41:30. > :41:34.intergovernmental institution, the league of Nations. We enjoyed

:41:35. > :41:37.economic turbulence and oppression. Such dramatic chip physical change

:41:38. > :41:43.was fuelled by a remarkable technological change. With the mass

:41:44. > :41:48.transit of people. Advanced weapons of war, along with large armies

:41:49. > :41:55.which resulted in appalling human cost in two world wars. Today, we

:41:56. > :42:01.are experiencing similar geopolitical change. An expansionist

:42:02. > :42:06.China, a research and Russia. A socially unstable and perhaps more

:42:07. > :42:12.parochial United States of America, it is said people that we have mass

:42:13. > :42:19.transit. And globalisation which brings with it opportunities, and

:42:20. > :42:27.costs. Trojans have replaced tanks. And the potential for spaced based

:42:28. > :42:31.weaponry looms -- drones have replaced tanks. Within this context

:42:32. > :42:35.dramatic change, the new government must set its path, the crucial

:42:36. > :42:40.lesson from the Iraq Inquirer is that we had to be better prepared to

:42:41. > :42:46.provide great leadership, at historic tipping points. For our

:42:47. > :42:49.nation and for our world. It was not wrong to wish to depose Saddam

:42:50. > :42:54.Hussein but the way in which the US led coalition went about it has had

:42:55. > :42:59.effects that were predicted by many experts. Perfectly foreseeable and

:43:00. > :43:04.catastrophic for the Iraqi people but also for our own regional

:43:05. > :43:08.interests. R.N. Country's leadership at every level, from the Prime

:43:09. > :43:14.Minister down was far too weak to deliver the good outcome. I would

:43:15. > :43:20.note that we are again at a critical moment, this time in history of our

:43:21. > :43:24.own nation and continent, delivering a good and long-term outcome once

:43:25. > :43:30.again depends on this house supplying the best possible

:43:31. > :43:34.leadership now. The ties that have bound our nation, communities and

:43:35. > :43:38.people at home and abroad, are severely strained. Some are

:43:39. > :43:45.breaking. Our people mistrust those whom they have elected to represent

:43:46. > :43:49.their interests and lead our nation. As in 2003, decisions taken quickly

:43:50. > :43:53.today will have enormous ramifications over the coming

:43:54. > :43:57.decades. Like the proverbial flap of the butterfly wings in one part of

:43:58. > :44:02.the world, that creates a hurricane in another. It is that such critical

:44:03. > :44:08.moments that we require greater leadership. Leadership with the

:44:09. > :44:13.experience and perspective to see our nation 's role clearly.

:44:14. > :44:17.Leadership with the wisdom and understanding to realise what must

:44:18. > :44:21.be done, the vision to set clear direction, the tenacity to deliver a

:44:22. > :44:26.plan and the good sense to adapt when the context changes as it

:44:27. > :44:35.always does. We must not be sclerotic. Leadership and

:44:36. > :44:39.self-awareness to put the public interest at its heart. We needed a

:44:40. > :44:44.ship that will forge our future, not allow us to be carried off in the

:44:45. > :44:49.currents of history to an unknown hand unwonted destination. The Prime

:44:50. > :44:53.Minister, our new Prime Minister has taken an important step in setting

:44:54. > :45:00.out her vision for a country that works for everyone. And this and the

:45:01. > :45:04.previous government have made, welcome changes. Notably the

:45:05. > :45:06.National Security Council structures, enable more strategic

:45:07. > :45:15.decision-making in our national interests. Of course. I thank him

:45:16. > :45:20.for giving way: one of the lessons that I took from the Chilcot report

:45:21. > :45:23.was a habit that we have beaten out of those of us who have been to

:45:24. > :45:30.sound Hirst, which is not to start with your aim and retrofit

:45:31. > :45:33.justifications from that. At this time of change of national

:45:34. > :45:39.leadership, would he welcome any calls that might be made to the new

:45:40. > :45:43.Prime Minister to have a robust team of people to provide counter

:45:44. > :45:45.narratives that time key decision-making to really test

:45:46. > :45:48.hypotheses and to make sure that went difficult decisions have to be

:45:49. > :45:55.made the made in the best possible way. I thank my noble friend for his

:45:56. > :45:59.intervention, yes I think the absence of people speaking truth to

:46:00. > :46:03.power, in the room that matters, I think we have seen too much evidence

:46:04. > :46:08.of that over the last ten or 15 years. I am hopeful, that the

:46:09. > :46:12.elevation of our new Prime Minister will be ushering in the new period

:46:13. > :46:16.in which we do listen to experts and that we are prepared to listen to

:46:17. > :46:23.people who might have a different view and a different approach to the

:46:24. > :46:26.world in which we live. But the changes of the National Security

:46:27. > :46:29.Council are nowhere near enough to guarantee good leadership, this

:46:30. > :46:35.means that we are running an unacceptable level of risk for the

:46:36. > :46:39.security, our nation and our world. The referendum on UK membership of

:46:40. > :46:42.the European Union is the latest example, I'm no fan of our country's

:46:43. > :46:47.previous relationship with the European Union, it had to change.

:46:48. > :46:50.But to hold a referendum on membership, I fear was a strategic

:46:51. > :46:55.blunder which will add verse the impact our country and our world

:46:56. > :47:01.over the coming years and decades. We must avoid further such blunders

:47:02. > :47:05.in the future, because we face existential threats. These threats,

:47:06. > :47:15.across borders, they are by their very nature, transnational.

:47:16. > :47:19.International terrorism, radicalisation, a resurgent Russia

:47:20. > :47:24.and expansionist China, who are not respecting current borders. Cyber

:47:25. > :47:30.security, organised crime, pandemics, environmental

:47:31. > :47:37.degradation. All these are asked to work with other nations. We must now

:47:38. > :47:42.set out our geopolitical priorities. We must properly fund the objective

:47:43. > :47:46.to increase our influence around the world, we must revisit the

:47:47. > :47:51.government and how it works. Wisdom and experience must be at the heart

:47:52. > :47:55.of our decision-making. We must put people who know what they are doing

:47:56. > :48:01.in charge of delivering, and they must stay in jobs long enough to see

:48:02. > :48:05.them through. We must urgently overhaul how we identify and nurture

:48:06. > :48:09.future leaders, our people must once again be able to trust the aims,

:48:10. > :48:14.intentions and abilities of those who lead our country. We have two

:48:15. > :48:20.provide leaders worthy of that trust because it will be painstaking work

:48:21. > :48:26.turning back. This house must insist that we now go much further, and

:48:27. > :48:29.only then will members of this house in all conscience be able to

:48:30. > :48:35.reassure the people that we represent, that our nation will have

:48:36. > :48:42.the leadership that it needs when we need it.

:48:43. > :48:49.Thank you Mr Speaker, I have had very long involvement with Iraq, for

:48:50. > :48:53.the members not here, in the 80s and 90s and in the year 2000 aspect many

:48:54. > :49:00.times in this chamber, about the regime in Iraq. I chaired an

:49:01. > :49:05.organisation called the campaign against repression for democratic

:49:06. > :49:11.rights in Iraq, which had many members in this country. And

:49:12. > :49:14.overseas. We published several books, from academics, and people

:49:15. > :49:23.who lived in Iraq about the situation in the country. And I used

:49:24. > :49:29.to have somebody who is now the representative of Iraq, in South

:49:30. > :49:34.Korea, he would come here almost every other week with a list of

:49:35. > :49:40.people who had been executed at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad.

:49:41. > :49:46.Sometimes, they can solve their executions and their torture, were

:49:47. > :49:51.so dreadful that I would say to him, are you sure this is right? And he

:49:52. > :49:57.would come back, perhaps a week later and say, yes, it was right.

:49:58. > :50:06.And here is another long list. So we have no doubt what the situation was

:50:07. > :50:10.in Iraq. And it existed for a number of years the association and then I

:50:11. > :50:14.came back from the European Parliament in 1984 and I was asked

:50:15. > :50:23.to chair an organisation called indict. It was set up, with American

:50:24. > :50:27.backing and backing from the Kuwaitis. The Kuwaitis had a

:50:28. > :50:35.particular interest of course in finding the lost Kuwaitis who were

:50:36. > :50:40.captured during the invasion by Saddam Hussein, of Kuwait. And for

:50:41. > :50:46.many years, we tried to search for those missing people and to look

:50:47. > :50:52.maybe for their graves. So the Kuwaitis gave us backing, so did the

:50:53. > :50:54.Americans. We set up an organisation, with a team of

:50:55. > :51:02.researchers and the aim was to collect evidence against Iraqi war

:51:03. > :51:07.criminals. We had a list of 12 in particular, the most wanted, and we

:51:08. > :51:10.collected very detailed evidence about a great number of them.

:51:11. > :51:17.Because the idea was to bring them to court, by the mid-19 90s, a body

:51:18. > :51:24.of law existed that could bring human rights abusers to court.

:51:25. > :51:30.Development of international law was slow, even though the law existed,

:51:31. > :51:35.its application was dependent, on institutions, and governments that

:51:36. > :51:38.have their own political agendas. A new ruling of the International

:51:39. > :51:45.Court of Justice, blocked indictments for example of heads of

:51:46. > :51:52.state so whatever evidence we had against Saddam Hussein, we could not

:51:53. > :51:58.use it. In a court of law. And like the loss of which, who was brought

:51:59. > :52:05.before an international court. But that still left key members of the

:52:06. > :52:10.regime, open to indictments. We had a great deal of evidence for example

:52:11. > :52:15.against Tareq Aziz, who was then the Foreign Minister in Iraq. And then

:52:16. > :52:22.of course, Ali has an arm achieved, chemical Ali, we had plenty against

:52:23. > :52:29.him. I had meetings with the UN special rapporteur on torture, the

:52:30. > :52:35.then UN High Commissioner on human rights, Mary Robinson. And the

:52:36. > :52:40.Secretary General, Kofi Anand. I also addressed several international

:52:41. > :52:47.conferences, and tried to spell out what it was that we were doing. We

:52:48. > :52:49.had to have evidence that could stand up in court so we dismissed a

:52:50. > :52:58.loss of the evidence that we did not feel could stand

:52:59. > :53:04.up". We had, the advice of a top human rights barrister, a QC, and we

:53:05. > :53:07.worked hard interviewing over a period of five or six years

:53:08. > :53:12.thousands of people to collect testimonies. Once the evidence had

:53:13. > :53:21.been gathered and analysed by our legal team, my role along the other

:53:22. > :53:25.board members, was to persuade the lawmakers, in the relevant country,

:53:26. > :53:30.that there was enough evidence to indict the people concerned. We came

:53:31. > :53:38.very close to prosecution in Belgium for example. But at the last minute

:53:39. > :53:41.they change their laws. When I have finished my sentence. In the last

:53:42. > :53:48.minute they change the laws because someone had also tried to indict an

:53:49. > :53:54.Israeli leader Ariel Charente. Durable lady is making a speech

:53:55. > :54:03.where she persuades us that Saddam Hussein was a vile dictator. We all

:54:04. > :54:08.accept that. But, the argument was made on the basis of weapons of mass

:54:09. > :54:14.destruction, she will strongly in favour, when I come to that part of

:54:15. > :54:21.my speech durable gentleman will get his answer. We went to Switzerland,

:54:22. > :54:26.we went to Norway and we went to Belgium -- my speech, the honourable

:54:27. > :54:34.gentleman and will get his answer. Just like Britain, there were lots

:54:35. > :54:39.of warm words but no action. So we were trying very hard to avoid a

:54:40. > :54:47.war. We thought there was an alternative, and we tried to make

:54:48. > :54:51.the case, I made it in this chamber, and if the honourable gentleman was

:54:52. > :54:56.here, he would have heard it. But there were alternatives, but

:54:57. > :55:02.unfortunately all of the authorities prevaricated, and the issue dragged

:55:03. > :55:06.on. Without getting anywhere. Meanwhile our main funders, the

:55:07. > :55:10.Americans were having a change of heart. The Clinton administration

:55:11. > :55:15.had originally been enthusiastic, wanting us to campaign in the US as

:55:16. > :55:19.well as Europe. Suddenly they changed their minds, they had moved

:55:20. > :55:26.to a policy of containment. Not indictment. So our activities really

:55:27. > :55:30.no longer fitted in with their plans. But as the organisation was

:55:31. > :55:37.set up in this country, we continued, collecting the evidence.

:55:38. > :55:41.We turned our attention in particular to Tarik Aziz, because of

:55:42. > :55:47.his involvement in the taking of British hostages. I think people

:55:48. > :55:53.forget this, British hostages were taken in Kuwait, and

:55:54. > :56:02.we never had proper answers to the question why were they in two H, why

:56:03. > :56:06.the plane landed in Kuwait, and although Saddam Hussein had already

:56:07. > :56:13.invaded Kuwait, those people were obviously taken as human shields.

:56:14. > :56:20.Will I presented our evidence to the Attorney General. I had continual

:56:21. > :56:24.meetings with him to pressurise his teams because we felt they were not

:56:25. > :56:30.moving fast enough. They kicked their heels for a number of years

:56:31. > :56:34.and then our top barrister could not understand, given the evidence we

:56:35. > :56:40.had presented, they were still dragging their feet. We had as much

:56:41. > :56:47.evidence as we could possibly need, apart from getting a signed

:56:48. > :56:53.confession from Saddam Hussein, there was nothing further is legally

:56:54. > :56:57.we could possibly have done. I would occasionally spot Lord Williams in

:56:58. > :57:02.the corridors of Westminster and take off after him, chasing him down

:57:03. > :57:10.corridors. He would frequently jokey had to duck into the gents to avoid

:57:11. > :57:14.me. One day he said, I have good news regarding in sight. He was

:57:15. > :57:18.going to refer the case against Tarik Aziz to Scotland Yard. I said

:57:19. > :57:25.he was kicking it into the long grass but he denied that was the

:57:26. > :57:31.case. We visited the indict team which was made up mainly of Iraqis.

:57:32. > :57:36.We visited a chief superintendent in new Scotland Yard and talked about

:57:37. > :57:42.the evidence we had offered. We offered to help him and provide more

:57:43. > :57:49.evidence but we never got a single word back. It is understandable in

:57:50. > :57:56.some ways, it was not there are met, they had neither the resources nor

:57:57. > :58:02.expert sees nor the interest. -- expertise. We came in for somebody

:58:03. > :58:07.call from the tabloid press with cartoons of British bobbies

:58:08. > :58:14.apprehending Saddam Hussein. I think it was a very good opportunity

:58:15. > :58:18.missed. I make this point because there were alternatives and those

:58:19. > :58:22.alternatives for whatever reasons were not per suit in the way I would

:58:23. > :58:27.have wished and I am sure many others in this House would have

:58:28. > :58:33.wished as well. -- were not followed. I would like to be a

:58:34. > :58:38.tribute to my honourable friend from Northampton who was of great

:58:39. > :58:44.assistance at the time we were looking at many of these matters. He

:58:45. > :58:52.is a very wise counsellor and he assisted the Iraqis in many ways. I

:58:53. > :59:00.first became aware of human rights atrocities in Iraq before I was a

:59:01. > :59:06.politician in the 1970s. I met Iraqi students in Cardiff. I'm sure some

:59:07. > :59:09.of my Scottish friends will have met Iraqi students in Scotland. Some of

:59:10. > :59:15.whom had been imprisoned. There was one couple from Basra and one of

:59:16. > :59:19.them had been imprisoned and gone through a mock execution and the

:59:20. > :59:25.stories they told... He was a student activist. I came to learn of

:59:26. > :59:34.course that this was only the tip of the iceberg. In 1991, I was shadow

:59:35. > :59:40.set for International development. I stood up in Parliament and described

:59:41. > :59:43.what I had seen, myself on the mountains of Iraq and Iran when the

:59:44. > :59:50.Kurds fled from their helicopter gunships of Saddam. The scenes were

:59:51. > :59:58.appalling and typical of the attacks made by the Iraqi regime on Iraqis.

:59:59. > :00:03.Sometime later I met an Iraqi who made the point to me that Saddam had

:00:04. > :00:10.killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. He said to me that the

:00:11. > :00:14.biggest weapon of mass drop -- mass destruction was Saddam, why did it

:00:15. > :00:21.take so long for them to be removed? Many cars were killed during the

:00:22. > :00:28.genocide campaign, including as a result of the Bard issues of

:00:29. > :00:36.chemical weapons. -- barbarous use. I met some of the horribly injured

:00:37. > :00:45.victims. I took some of them to a London hospital. Many were killed

:00:46. > :00:49.brutally in cold blood in prisons and torture chambers all over the

:00:50. > :00:57.country. Repression, abuse and ethnic cleansing and extrajudicial

:00:58. > :01:04.killings continued right up to 2003. Saddam was without doubt a serious

:01:05. > :01:07.threat to domestic, regional and global stability. I had hoped the

:01:08. > :01:15.international community would neutralise them, but sanctions

:01:16. > :01:21.failed. International indictments never took place. UN Security

:01:22. > :01:32.Council resolutions were ignored time after time. All had been tried,

:01:33. > :01:36.all had failed. So from 1997 until 2003, I worked against Saddam and

:01:37. > :01:40.leading members of his regime to get them prosecuted under international

:01:41. > :01:47.law war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, on the basis

:01:48. > :01:53.of rock-solid witness testimony. The evidence was finally used in the

:01:54. > :01:57.trials of Saddam, Tariq Aziz and others when eventually be stood

:01:58. > :02:03.trial in Baghdad and I was very pleased to be there to witness some

:02:04. > :02:11.of those trials. I knew that our evidence was being used. I saw it in

:02:12. > :02:20.the rooms behind the chamber where they were being tried. In February

:02:21. > :02:24.2003, the cars were terrified. That chemical weapons were going to be

:02:25. > :02:34.used against them again. -- the Kurdish people. Since 2003, more

:02:35. > :02:44.secrets of this evil and despotic regime were revealed. I stood on a

:02:45. > :02:51.huge mound in the open ear several acres near Babylon. Where about

:02:52. > :03:01.10,000 bodies in a mass graves were being disinterred, mostly Shia

:03:02. > :03:07.Muslims. As more than 20 visits to Iraq as an envoy on human rights, I

:03:08. > :03:12.opened the first Kurdish genocide museum. It was snowing and people

:03:13. > :03:18.crowded into the museum. Their relatives had been tortured, many to

:03:19. > :03:25.death there. Former detainees had written messages on the cell walls.

:03:26. > :03:28.Sometimes the writing was on blood and sometimes there were just

:03:29. > :03:34.marched to cross off the days of the week. An old woman came up to me

:03:35. > :03:39.with a bit of plastic in her hands. I unwrapped it and saw three photos

:03:40. > :03:50.of her husband and two sons who had been killed in that place. Mr

:03:51. > :03:57.Speaker, over the last few days since the Chilcot report which I

:03:58. > :04:03.gave evidence to follow all afternoon, there have been very few

:04:04. > :04:08.voices of Iraqis heard. I have one from a doctor who is presently the

:04:09. > :04:17.senior adviser to the Iraqis president. He was appointed water

:04:18. > :04:24.Minister in 2003 in Baghdad. He was very successful, he managed to

:04:25. > :04:29.re-flight over a few years the marshes where the Marsh Arabs had

:04:30. > :04:35.been crudely displaced. This is what he said, it must be remembered that

:04:36. > :04:38.at the time, not only did Prime Minister Blair and President Bush

:04:39. > :04:43.wish to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq but so did most of the

:04:44. > :04:49.entire spectrum of the Iraqi opposition, including Kurds, Arabs,

:04:50. > :04:55.Shia and all minorities which make up Iraq. And most of the

:04:56. > :04:58.international community. The Dracula position lobbied governments

:04:59. > :05:03.throughout the world and wears representatives of the occupation

:05:04. > :05:07.believed that Prime Minister Blair and President Bush were acting in

:05:08. > :05:12.response to the Iraqi people and to protect them on the basis of

:05:13. > :05:19.evidence available at that time. -- the Iraqi opposition. There was,

:05:20. > :05:23.treat evidence that Saddam Hussein was complicit and instructed

:05:24. > :05:27.campaigns of genocide, torture, ethnic cleansing and use of chemical

:05:28. > :05:32.and biological weapons against the Iraqis population as well as

:05:33. > :05:36.neighbouring countries. We are still finding their mass graves of nearly

:05:37. > :05:48.1 million Iraqis murdered as a result of his actions. I believe...

:05:49. > :05:52.Iraqis themselves will always remember grateful for the support

:05:53. > :05:59.shown by Tony Blair and the British Government and British Parliament at

:06:00. > :06:03.that time. Mr Speaker, I thank the honourable lady for whom I have the

:06:04. > :06:09.utmost respect for all the work she has done over the years to try and

:06:10. > :06:15.get evidence against this regime, incredible work and I pay great

:06:16. > :06:18.tribute to her. One question that I have, I have never really understood

:06:19. > :06:29.where the chemical weapons went? Weirded big O? -- weirded the call?

:06:30. > :06:35.That is a very interesting question. I can only speculate. I ensure he

:06:36. > :06:41.has done so as well. I am sure some of them went to Syria. There is

:06:42. > :06:47.evidence that some of them went to Syria but there are still unanswered

:06:48. > :06:53.questions because the Kurds in particular truly believed that there

:06:54. > :06:56.were weapons of mass destruction. I myself never use that argument

:06:57. > :07:03.because I did not have all the answers but I did use their

:07:04. > :07:08.humanitarian argument for intervention because I thought it

:07:09. > :07:13.was important that the world should not turn its face away against the

:07:14. > :07:21.horrors that were going on in Iraq. Finally Mr Speaker, I just wanted to

:07:22. > :07:32.make a plea for continuing engagement with Iraq. The needs of

:07:33. > :07:39.the Iraqis are great. I personally have continued my association with

:07:40. > :07:47.Iraqis, with the Kurds and very well aware of their problems at this

:07:48. > :07:55.time, especially the threat of Isis and Daesh. It is not true to say

:07:56. > :08:01.that such people did not exist in Iraq before the war. They existed in

:08:02. > :08:08.Kurdistan for example under another name. It was in fact the Americans

:08:09. > :08:15.who managed to get them out at that time. We still need to protect the

:08:16. > :08:19.minorities of Iraq, there are so many of them. We have a

:08:20. > :08:26.responsibility to continue to assist that country in any way we can.

:08:27. > :08:30.Thank you. To try and accommodate all remaining colleagues, there will

:08:31. > :08:38.now be a ten minute limit on speeches with immediate effect. It

:08:39. > :08:42.is not a cause for the exhalation of a year, it is perfectly adequate. I

:08:43. > :08:47.know it is very important but I hope you can do it in ten minutes. David

:08:48. > :08:51.Davis. We now have the Chilcot Report, seven long years we have

:08:52. > :08:58.waited for the report. 2.6 million words. It has cost a huge amount of

:08:59. > :09:06.money and after seven years Sir John Chilcot comes up with the sentence,

:09:07. > :09:12.we have concluded that the United Kingdom chose to join the invasion

:09:13. > :09:17.of Iraq before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. It

:09:18. > :09:23.took seven years to come up with that conclusion. It took so long, Mr

:09:24. > :09:31.Speaker, that one of the five members of the inquiry actually died

:09:32. > :09:34.during the proceedings. I pay tribute to the speeches that were

:09:35. > :09:42.made yesterday by my right honourable friend, the Member for

:09:43. > :09:49.Houghton place. The right honourable member for Gordon. My honourable

:09:50. > :09:56.friend, the Member for Thanet and today's speech by the honourable

:09:57. > :10:00.member for Perth. I was absolutely sickened when I saw the interview of

:10:01. > :10:06.the former Labour Prime Minister on television. I thought if anyone

:10:07. > :10:12.deserved an Oscar, he should have been given it. After everything that

:10:13. > :10:19.we now know all has happened, instead of apologising like the

:10:20. > :10:24.noble Lord Prescott did, who has admitted he got it wrong. He was a

:10:25. > :10:31.deputy and made huge mistakes. He then told us he was presented with

:10:32. > :10:39.the same fact, what a joke, he would do the same again. -- if he was. I

:10:40. > :10:45.am delighted we are having a two deep report -- debate on this report

:10:46. > :10:49.but I do not think this is a great report. Both of the major parties

:10:50. > :10:53.are distracted. They are distracted about who is going to lead their

:10:54. > :10:58.party, at least the Conservatives have come to a conclusion about

:10:59. > :11:04.that. No doubt the Conservative benches are distracted about who is

:11:05. > :11:13.going to become a minister today. Not as! I feel the Chilcot Report

:11:14. > :11:18.deserves better scrutiny than the way it has been distracted over the

:11:19. > :11:22.last couple of days. This report has affected the world, not just the

:11:23. > :11:29.future of the Labour party or the future of the Conservative Party,

:11:30. > :11:33.but the whole of the world. So I am very disappointed that the two prime

:11:34. > :11:39.ministers could not have intervened and said to Sir John Chilcot, seven

:11:40. > :11:44.years? This is absolutely ridiculous. We should have had the

:11:45. > :11:50.report much more quickly than the seven years.

:11:51. > :11:59.Mr Speaker just very quickly wanted to draw on five elements of the

:12:00. > :12:01.report. The first one, misrepresentation of French

:12:02. > :12:09.declarations relating to their potential veto of any further United

:12:10. > :12:14.Nations resolutions. Sir Stephen Wall, the EU adviser to Mr Blair,

:12:15. > :12:20.told the Iraq Inquirer that following Jacques Chirac's statement

:12:21. > :12:25.he heard Mr Blair telling Alistair Gamble, the number ten direct

:12:26. > :12:33.rocking indications, to play the anti-French card with the Sun and

:12:34. > :12:36.others well that is nice, isn't it. Then statements related to suspected

:12:37. > :12:44.Iraqi stockpiles of chemical weapons. Mr Blair's speech gave the

:12:45. > :12:48.impression that the overwhelming evidence supported the view that

:12:49. > :12:54.Iraq had retained a significant stocks of chemical weapons in

:12:55. > :13:02.material breach of United Nations resolution 1441. In reality, the

:13:03. > :13:07.report did not claim that Iraq claimed banned weapons, merely that

:13:08. > :13:13.material was unaccounted for. The third element I wanted to draw on,

:13:14. > :13:19.statements related to suspected Iraqi stockpiles of biological

:13:20. > :13:26.weapons. Mr Blair confuse the distinction between biological

:13:27. > :13:31.weapons being unaccounted for and existing, and that the evidence did

:13:32. > :13:36.not support Mr Blair's representations to the house that

:13:37. > :13:44.Iraq had significant stockpiles of viable biological weapons. Fourthly,

:13:45. > :13:47.statements relating to Hussein Kamal's evidence regarding Iraq's

:13:48. > :13:53.chemical and by logic weapons programmes. By selectively quoting

:13:54. > :13:58.from General Kamal's evidence and by omitting his claims that Iraq's

:13:59. > :14:03.weapons of mass destruction programme had been closed in 1991,

:14:04. > :14:07.Mr Blair misled this House of Commons as to the extent of Iraq's

:14:08. > :14:14.chemical and biological weapons programme. And finally Mr Speaker,

:14:15. > :14:17.statements relating to the consequences of the Iraq war on the

:14:18. > :14:24.threat of terrorism to the United Kingdom. Baroness Manningham Buller,

:14:25. > :14:30.head no less of MI5 at the time of the Iraq war, gave evidence to the

:14:31. > :14:35.Iraq Inquiry regarding the assessment made by her department

:14:36. > :14:40.about the effect of joining the war on the risk of terrorism. Responding

:14:41. > :14:43.to the question of whether the United Kingdom participation in the

:14:44. > :14:51.Iraq war would increase the threat of terrorism in the UK by saying" I

:14:52. > :14:56.think you'll see from our report in early 2003, which is reflected in

:14:57. > :15:06.the G8 IC reporting, that the threat from Al-Qaeda would increase. " She

:15:07. > :15:11.went on to explain "I think it, the Iraq war, is highly significant and

:15:12. > :15:16.the Jake IC assessments that I have reminded myself of say that. Our

:15:17. > :15:22.involvement in Iraq radicalised for want of a better word, a whole

:15:23. > :15:28.generation of young people, some British scissors and is. Not a whole

:15:29. > :15:33.generation, a view among a generation who sought our

:15:34. > :15:39.involvement in Iraq on top of our involvement in Afghanistan as being

:15:40. > :15:46.an attack on Islam. And it is clear from the evidence provided to the

:15:47. > :15:50.Iraq Inquiry, that Mr Blair was made aware that the war would increase

:15:51. > :15:54.the risk of terrorist activity in United Kingdom and that he misled

:15:55. > :16:03.the house about how the conflict would impact on terrorist activity.

:16:04. > :16:08.So Mr Speaker, how many times have we heard today, there will be

:16:09. > :16:14.lessons to be learned from the Chilcot report. Since I have been in

:16:15. > :16:18.the house, I have seen at first hand, how most significant political

:16:19. > :16:25.careers end in tears. So I'm not sure how these lessons were actually

:16:26. > :16:28.be learned, and I say this to you Mr Speaker and I know my honourable

:16:29. > :16:34.friend from North Thanet said that he very much hoped that you would

:16:35. > :16:42.look favourably on a debate in terms of contempt of this house. I think

:16:43. > :16:47.that it would be an insult, to the families, who have lost loved ones

:16:48. > :16:51.in the conflict if we did nothing. Those families are going to take

:16:52. > :16:55.their own action, I understand that. But this will goodness sake is the

:16:56. > :17:00.mother of all parliaments and we can't just sweep it under the table

:17:01. > :17:03.as if nothing has happened. What is the point of being a member of

:17:04. > :17:07.Parliament and coming here and admitting that we got it wrong

:17:08. > :17:11.because we did get it wrong and I am one of the people who got it wrong.

:17:12. > :17:16.I voted the wrong way and I very much regret that, so I do hope Mr

:17:17. > :17:24.Speaker and I know not so many members were here in 2003, but we

:17:25. > :17:30.owe it to everyone, to make sure, that we put right the wrong, that we

:17:31. > :17:37.were responsible for in 2003. And that we hold the former Prime

:17:38. > :17:43.Minister, the then leader of the Labour Party, we should hold him to

:17:44. > :17:56.account for the way that he misled this Parliament. Mr Ian C Lucas.

:17:57. > :18:02.Stop Mac thank you Ray much can I was here in 2003 and I listen to his

:18:03. > :18:06.great interest. I'm one of the people who got it right. I listened

:18:07. > :18:09.to the evidence given to me at the time by the Prime Minister and I

:18:10. > :18:16.decide on the basis of what I heard and I sat on the back bench

:18:17. > :18:19.throughout the entire debate. And I was not called. During the debate

:18:20. > :18:25.but I did hear the debate and I made my decision on the evidence, and I

:18:26. > :18:28.believed then that I made the right decision and I believe today that I

:18:29. > :18:32.made the right decision. I think this to report is a very good report

:18:33. > :18:39.and I know it has taken a long time to arrive but I think it is very

:18:40. > :18:43.valuable. I would like to start if I may, talking about the context of

:18:44. > :18:48.where we were in 2003 because it is very important that we remember what

:18:49. > :18:53.happened in 2001 at 911 because much of what we discussed during the

:18:54. > :18:57.period leading up to war, was really seen from the prism of the attack on

:18:58. > :19:06.the World Trade Center. And I visited as a new MP, in 2001, New

:19:07. > :19:11.York and the United Nations. And, it was an extraordinary time, it was

:19:12. > :19:16.You could also feel the strength, You could also feel the strength,

:19:17. > :19:21.the entirely understandable strength of feeling within the United States

:19:22. > :19:24.about what had happened. And as a result of that we had the military

:19:25. > :19:28.intervention in Afghanistan which was very broadly supported not just

:19:29. > :19:36.in this house, but right across the world. One of the most extraordinary

:19:37. > :19:43.things that I saw in the UN in November 2001, was a committee which

:19:44. > :19:45.was chaired by the UK special representative Sir Jeremy

:19:46. > :19:51.Greenstock, taking evidence, and auditing terrorist activity in

:19:52. > :19:57.countries across the Middle East. There was a feeling and a sentiment,

:19:58. > :20:03.for a very short period before the Iraq war, that we could actually

:20:04. > :20:08.make some progress in dealing with international terrorism. But

:20:09. > :20:16.unfortunately very quickly, there was a development of a linkage

:20:17. > :20:21.between what happened in New York, in September 2001, and the issue of

:20:22. > :20:27.Iraq. And there were people who developed an agenda trying to draw

:20:28. > :20:35.together what happened at the World Trade Center, and the issue and the

:20:36. > :20:40.problem of Iraq. And this was in the area and it was referred to in the

:20:41. > :20:43.various discussions that we had, -- in the air. So although we had no

:20:44. > :20:51.direct evidence of links at all between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda,

:20:52. > :20:56.there was usage of a broad description of international

:20:57. > :21:03.terrorism. I will certainly give way. Does the honourable gentleman

:21:04. > :21:07.accept that it was a ruse of all linkage to try and associate the

:21:08. > :21:14.secular Saddam Hussein with fundamentalist Islamist who had a

:21:15. > :21:19.mutual loathing for one another? I think it is right, it is very clear,

:21:20. > :21:25.it would be very convenient for those people who were wanting to

:21:26. > :21:28.take their reaction in Iraq. If they could have made a linkage but

:21:29. > :21:32.clearly there was not and in all other discussions that they had in

:21:33. > :21:37.the lead up to the war there was no linkage established. But looking

:21:38. > :21:42.back from today, and also immediately after the votes in 2003,

:21:43. > :21:46.there was a terrible sense of inevitability about the military

:21:47. > :21:52.action in Iraq for me. I have always been reminded of the fact, the

:21:53. > :21:55.historian a GP Taylor talks about the importance of railway timetables

:21:56. > :22:01.at the beginning of the First World War. And when I was approaching the

:22:02. > :22:09.vote in March of 2003, I had that idea in my mind. And there seems to

:22:10. > :22:16.me that we were on a road that lead it to an inevitable conclusion. And

:22:17. > :22:22.it is a very interesting paragraph, in 830 of the report, it says "That

:22:23. > :22:26.a military timetable should not be allowed to dictate a diplomatic

:22:27. > :22:31.timetable. " I believe that the time of the vote this is exactly what

:22:32. > :22:36.happened. I recall very well what Hans Blix turned the UN weapons

:22:37. > :22:45.inspectors, I was watching Hans Blix to very closely, when I was deciding

:22:46. > :22:48.how to vote in the build-up of March 2000 and three. It seemed to me that

:22:49. > :22:52.he was doing his best to establish a position on weapons of mass to

:22:53. > :23:00.structure in and he was asking on March the 18th 2003, four more time.

:23:01. > :23:05.And on the basis of information, that I listen to in the debate, I

:23:06. > :23:11.thought it was right, to give more time. That is why, I voted in the

:23:12. > :23:16.way that I did and why I supported the amendment. Vary interestingly, I

:23:17. > :23:26.attended a meeting a couple of years after the vote, in which has Blix

:23:27. > :23:29.spoke. And I recall that he said, in March of 2003, that he believed that

:23:30. > :23:37.Sadam had weapons of mass to structure in. I had not known that

:23:38. > :23:42.-- weapons of mass destruction. On the day that the vote was cast I did

:23:43. > :23:46.not know that. But I think it is extraordinary, that he did say that.

:23:47. > :23:54.And that he genuinely believed himself the position. It seems to me

:23:55. > :23:59.that he had a similar view to the then Prime Minister Tony Blair at

:24:00. > :24:02.that time. He had a genuine honest belief, the difference was that he

:24:03. > :24:14.wanted more time to investigate it further. And the Prime Minister did

:24:15. > :24:19.not allow us more time so to do. So the drumbeat in March of 2003 was

:24:20. > :24:25.quickening, that is why military action happened. That is not a good

:24:26. > :24:30.reason for military action. The then US government was acting in the long

:24:31. > :24:35.shadow at 911, it had people there who had an agenda to intervene in

:24:36. > :24:42.the Middle East. They used that context to justify this

:24:43. > :24:49.intervention. The immediate post-911 period, they made some really bad

:24:50. > :24:55.judgments. In Iran there had been Mordred forces who were holding sway

:24:56. > :24:59.before 2003, -- moderate. George Bush then made a dreadful axis of

:25:00. > :25:05.evil speech which was part of the process that shattered any chance of

:25:06. > :25:09.a unified response to 911. The alienation of Iran at that time also

:25:10. > :25:15.had a massive negative impact on the post-war period in Iraq after 2003

:25:16. > :25:20.and undermined progress towards reconstruction. I think it was a

:25:21. > :25:29.massive and state for the UK Government and Tony Blair to support

:25:30. > :25:36.that Bush and US agenda at the time. I am quite certain, that Tony Blair

:25:37. > :25:41.acted in good faith. In March 2003, I think he believed just like Hans

:25:42. > :25:46.Blix to, that Sadam possessed weapons of mass destruction. I

:25:47. > :25:55.believe, it was through the UK insistence that the US was involved

:25:56. > :25:59.in the UN. But when the weapons inspectors asked for more time in

:26:00. > :26:08.2003, the ally should have given it to them. -- the Allies.

:26:09. > :26:16.As Sir John Chilcot concludes, diplomatic options had not been

:26:17. > :26:21.exhausted. The point had not been reached where military action was a

:26:22. > :26:27.last resort. On the information available to me at the time, a

:26:28. > :26:33.backbencher, I voted against the Leibowitz for the first time, along

:26:34. > :26:40.with many many Labour colleagues. -- the Labour whip. The nationalist

:26:41. > :26:45.parties and some conservatives did the same. The official Conservative

:26:46. > :26:55.opposition however supported military action in a largely

:26:56. > :26:59.unquestioningly. I will give way. Prior to the debate and the

:27:00. > :27:04.statement by the Prime Minister in that debate which was criticised by

:27:05. > :27:08.the honourable member who spoke previously, my recollection of that

:27:09. > :27:14.time was the Conservatives were cut -- were calling for action earlier,

:27:15. > :27:18.before that evidence was presented so to turn up now and say it was

:27:19. > :27:23.because of Tony Blair, is a little bit disingenuous. I would not go

:27:24. > :27:33.quite that far because I am more kindly. My recollection is that we

:27:34. > :27:39.had a Leader of the Opposition who got this completely and utterly

:27:40. > :27:46.wrong. The official opposition failed in its constitutional duty to

:27:47. > :27:51.ask difficult, hard questions and to hold the government to account. It

:27:52. > :27:57.was left to other parties in the House and the Labour backbenchers to

:27:58. > :28:01.hold the government to account. The failure of the official opposition

:28:02. > :28:09.to charge the Prime Minister and the government effectively... Wrong

:28:10. > :28:14.decision easier. This is a big lesson for the official opposition

:28:15. > :28:20.today. There were a number of things the government did write on the Iraq

:28:21. > :28:26.issue. Firstly it did hold a vote and it should be remembered, this

:28:27. > :28:32.was the first time... I will handover. I think he's being

:28:33. > :28:40.slightly disingenuous because there were only 165 Conservative members

:28:41. > :28:45.of Parliament, we were not a huge opposition so he is slightly

:28:46. > :28:50.misrepresenting things. Why are you using the word disingenuous?

:28:51. > :28:54.Anyway... There is a misrepresentation which you think is

:28:55. > :29:02.inadvertent. We will leave it there. Ian Lucas. I have no offence, I

:29:03. > :29:07.understand his point. It is difficult to be a small opposition,

:29:08. > :29:11.but it is important nonetheless to our survey questions. The Leader of

:29:12. > :29:21.the Opposition got this completely wrong. -- to ask the right

:29:22. > :29:25.questions. I think it changed the relationship between government and

:29:26. > :29:29.Parliament on questions of military action. We have seen the

:29:30. > :29:38.consequences of those in the more recent decisions on Libya and Syria.

:29:39. > :29:44.Sorry there is a conversation down near but on the main issue of taking

:29:45. > :29:48.military action in Iraq in much of 2003, Tony Blair and the Labour

:29:49. > :29:57.Government made a huge, honest error. I think this is supported by

:29:58. > :30:06.the Chilcot Report in front of us. It is a conclusion with which I

:30:07. > :30:13.agree. Mr Graham Allen. Mr Speaker, the decision to commit to the US

:30:14. > :30:17.neo-con agenda for the invasion of Iraq was and remains the biggest

:30:18. > :30:26.political misjudgement in foreign policy in my political lifetime.

:30:27. > :30:31.Chilcot, and I gave evidence to Chilcot, was an opportunity which

:30:32. > :30:36.could have been seized by the then former Prime Minister Tony Blair to

:30:37. > :30:40.actually said, I need a serious misjudgement, I was wrong but at the

:30:41. > :30:48.time I thought I was doing the right thing. Instead we had a very

:30:49. > :30:53.equivocal set of apologies which, considering the circumstances, some

:30:54. > :30:57.people got injured and died, was not enough. Had he taken that

:30:58. > :31:05.opportunity, he would have healed not only himself, but he would have

:31:06. > :31:12.healed a fault line in his party and the heart suffered to some extent by

:31:13. > :31:17.the nation and people across the globe but he missed that

:31:18. > :31:23.opportunity. I am sorry he did that because it will remain with us for

:31:24. > :31:28.as long as he feels to do that. They were two biggest rebellions in

:31:29. > :31:34.British political history within a governing party in February and

:31:35. > :31:39.March 2000 three. I want to talk about the Parliamentary side.

:31:40. > :31:44.Because Parliament could have done better, even in those circumstances.

:31:45. > :31:50.It was used and abused by thicket of power in the most blatant way. I

:31:51. > :31:58.will mention some examples later. I will be pleased to give way. I

:31:59. > :32:03.recall the role he in formulating the cross-party amendment which was

:32:04. > :32:06.put to the House. I expect I will agree with most of what he was

:32:07. > :32:12.saying about Parliament, before he does so will you reflect on the fact

:32:13. > :32:19.that Parliament did one thing perfectly which was to the credit of

:32:20. > :32:21.Michael Martin, the Speaker, in that he selected the honourable

:32:22. > :32:28.gentleman's amendment over the official opposition one? I have some

:32:29. > :32:34.things to say about the Speaker and I will get onto those fairly

:32:35. > :32:40.quickly. To set a context, I think there was an growing unease,

:32:41. > :32:45.certainly around the time of the Crawford talks between Prime

:32:46. > :32:50.Minister Blair and the US President George W Bush that we were being set

:32:51. > :32:54.on an inevitable path. This was not something anybody was going to

:32:55. > :33:01.change but something which had been agreed and was going to happen,

:33:02. > :33:03.whatever. That was the thing that I think frustrated and annoyed

:33:04. > :33:08.parliamentarians throughout the House at that point. It was a

:33:09. > :33:15.decision which was preordained and was going to happen. So that is why

:33:16. > :33:21.I and many many others felt, as Chilcot said, this was not

:33:22. > :33:27.hindsight, this was foresight. You could say it. If you read the

:33:28. > :33:32.history books about the composition of Iraq, religious and tribal, you

:33:33. > :33:38.would realise this would set off an incendiary device in the Middle East

:33:39. > :33:43.which was even then in difficulty. So many of us felt that rather than

:33:44. > :33:47.Parliament being ignored, people talk about the debates, what a

:33:48. > :33:52.wonderful thing that was for Parliament! We had to drag

:33:53. > :33:56.Parliament kicking and screaming to a debate. I wrote to the Speaker and

:33:57. > :33:59.suggested the recall of the House. He said of course you can put that

:34:00. > :34:05.suggestion to the House when it returns. So we had to wait until the

:34:06. > :34:10.House returns in order to get the House are called. I felt that was

:34:11. > :34:18.probably not the finest moments from the cheer but what we actually did

:34:19. > :34:22.was to create, because there were such clarity among many parties in

:34:23. > :34:32.the House, that the House had a role hear. We actually petitions --

:34:33. > :34:38.petitions and did letters and did everything possible and because all

:34:39. > :34:43.that failed, we decided collectively to set up our own alternative

:34:44. > :34:49.Parliament. I hired a Church House in order that members of Parliament,

:34:50. > :34:57.members of Parliament could speak on this issue. I met the former speaker

:34:58. > :35:00.who very kindly agreed to put his reputation on the line to be the

:35:01. > :35:05.Speaker of that Parliament. One of the things we agreed was that people

:35:06. > :35:12.would not be left out, as my honourable friend and I wear when

:35:13. > :35:16.trying to speak in the debate. Jack Weatherall said he would take every

:35:17. > :35:25.single person who wanted to speak for ten minutes at least, even it

:35:26. > :35:32.that back if it meant that we would go on until three o'clock in the

:35:33. > :35:36.morning. Having then got that critical mass of backbenchers

:35:37. > :35:45.willing to do that, I asked the BBC if they would cover it. Then they

:35:46. > :35:48.finally said they would cover the alternative Parliament since the

:35:49. > :35:52.actual Parliament was not allowed to meet. They would cover it from the

:35:53. > :35:59.opening until the end of the proceedings. Amazingly, within a

:36:00. > :36:07.day, I then received a phone call from Robin Cook saying that you lot

:36:08. > :36:14.had won, we are going to recall the proper Parliament. As he recalls in

:36:15. > :36:19.his memoir is, my reply was, my God that leaves me with 1000 volt longs

:36:20. > :36:25.and 200 bottles of wine on my slate which I ordered to refresh their

:36:26. > :36:29.members in the alternative Parliament. I am still working my

:36:30. > :36:37.way through those from my deepfreeze. This was the House at

:36:38. > :36:44.its best in the sense that backbenchers came together. Some are

:36:45. > :36:52.hear today, some are not, Charles Kennedy, Charles Smith, Tony Lloyd,

:36:53. > :37:02.Gordon, Orkney, Shetland, Tayside North and Angus. Many of those

:37:03. > :37:08.colleagues, some are still hear today, the collectively decided on

:37:09. > :37:13.how do the resolutions and the amendments be framed. That was

:37:14. > :37:19.members of parliament working together in a next fluent way. 24

:37:20. > :37:26.September, Parliamentary called and the debate was held. Not many people

:37:27. > :37:29.voted at that point. As we went through, there were a series of

:37:30. > :37:34.issues which we all raised again collectively about how the House

:37:35. > :37:39.works. Legal advice to members of Parliament. We were in a position

:37:40. > :37:42.where some of us could have been arranged to the International Court

:37:43. > :37:50.of Justice. We needed to know what the truth was, the then Clerk of the

:37:51. > :37:55.House said he would get as legal advice and sent me off to the lawyer

:37:56. > :37:59.that the House employees for health and safety matters who assumed I had

:38:00. > :38:06.some sort of accident in the offices. It was not of great help

:38:07. > :38:09.which was not his fault. The House and members should have legal

:38:10. > :38:19.advice, just as the government has legal advice which is also

:38:20. > :38:25.controversial. Powers we should divide in this House, how are we

:38:26. > :38:29.involved? A sensible set of words and we worked hard in the reform

:38:30. > :38:32.committee to come up with those words so be could respond in the

:38:33. > :38:39.event of the immediate threat of attack where appropriate. In a

:38:40. > :38:44.proper democracy where the executive and the legislator work together.

:38:45. > :38:47.Recalling the House, instead of being farcical, allowed the Speaker

:38:48. > :38:52.to say, on the balance of why have heard from people, there is a very

:38:53. > :38:58.strong feeling that the House should be recalled on whatever issue rather

:38:59. > :39:03.than one dozen people doing it or 550 not being allowed to. Give the

:39:04. > :39:10.Speaker that power rather than the government have that power to ask

:39:11. > :39:15.the Speaker to do that. Of course, not standing orders, but a free vote

:39:16. > :39:24.on war because if you look at the first result on the vault on

:39:25. > :39:29.Wednesday the 26th of February, 122 Labour backbenchers voted against

:39:30. > :39:34.the proposal. 190 and Labour backbenchers voted with the

:39:35. > :39:39.government. I am absolutely confident, if those backbenchers had

:39:40. > :39:45.been allowed to make their own decision, not being pressured by

:39:46. > :39:50.whips and being asked as he the Prime Minister and even his wife on

:39:51. > :39:55.occasion and being got at at a relentless basis, the majority would

:39:56. > :40:02.have been much more than 122 Labour members. I would guess there would

:40:03. > :40:09.be around of about 20 or 30 who would've voted with the government

:40:10. > :40:13.in that case. I would also suggest that some of the Conservative

:40:14. > :40:20.members that stood with us on that day deserve a mention at this point,

:40:21. > :40:24.after Chilcot. I have not spoken on this matter at any length at all

:40:25. > :40:29.since we went to war because I thought afterwards my job was to

:40:30. > :40:36.support the young men and women of my constituency who went to war. I

:40:37. > :40:43.will mention a member of politically -- member of the leaky, the Member

:40:44. > :40:48.for Isle of Wight, they are all still with us, good colleagues like

:40:49. > :40:56.Peter Ainsworth and other who are no longer with us and to put their

:40:57. > :41:01.necks out on the conservative side. Finally we came to the vote on March

:41:02. > :41:08.the 18th. The case for war was not established and 139 Labour

:41:09. > :41:14.colleagues rebelled, they supported that resolution and 217 in favour.

:41:15. > :41:20.Despite the immense pressure put on people. Mr Speaker, we went to war,

:41:21. > :41:25.we won the war but lost the peace. We are now reaping the whirlwind.

:41:26. > :41:35.Let Parliament to be strong what ever. John Nicholson.

:41:36. > :41:41.Two weeks ago many of us in this houseboat in another debate on the

:41:42. > :41:47.centenary of the Battle of the Somme. The events of hundred years

:41:48. > :41:50.ago were commemorated and one of the recurring themes here and elsewhere

:41:51. > :41:55.was the importance of treasuring the Young lives of our soldiers. When we

:41:56. > :41:59.read about the senseless slaughter on the Somme, we like to think of

:42:00. > :42:03.ourselves as more sophisticated than previous generations and less

:42:04. > :42:07.gullible. We like to think that we are more concerned with the lives of

:42:08. > :42:11.others, be it our own soldiers or civilians abroad. And yet in this

:42:12. > :42:21.house in very recent history we voted for a war which was an total

:42:22. > :42:28.folly. In March 18, 2000 three, 411 MPs followed Tony Blair into the yes

:42:29. > :42:34.lobby unleashing the forces of Heck in Iraq. 139 of those MPs are still

:42:35. > :42:39.serving in Parliament today. That must be difficult to live with that

:42:40. > :42:42.vote, but rather than accept personal responsibility, too many

:42:43. > :42:46.say that if I had known then what I know now, I would never have voted

:42:47. > :42:52.for the war. I would like to focus on that because I don't buy it and I

:42:53. > :42:57.think it is too easy a copout. Tony Blair has become such a discredited

:42:58. > :43:02.figure that he is a convenient depository for shared guilt, it was

:43:03. > :43:06.his golden oratory that bamboozled me, say some MPs. The seductive

:43:07. > :43:12.mendacity. Who could have questioned our security services in all their

:43:13. > :43:16.wisdom either? We believe: Powell to with his illustrated talk at the

:43:17. > :43:21.United Nations, with its cartoon mock-up of mobile laboratories and

:43:22. > :43:25.trucks. And we fell for his dire warnings that the secular Saddam

:43:26. > :43:32.Hussein was in cahoots with the fundamentalist Osama bin live in,

:43:33. > :43:36.however culturally illiterate the claim was. It was all so convincing,

:43:37. > :43:41.if only we had known then what we know now. But it is all nonsense Mr

:43:42. > :43:46.Speaker, we did know then much of what we know now. And if we did not

:43:47. > :43:53.it is because we chose not to absorb the expert opinion available at the

:43:54. > :43:57.time. We knew that Saddam Hussein had once possessed chemical weapons,

:43:58. > :44:02.used them in the 1980s, we all used that, against the Kurds, the

:44:03. > :44:07.Iranians and the Shia. We also knew that the implementation of two

:44:08. > :44:11.no-fly zones from 1991 until the war in 2003, one in the north of Iraq

:44:12. > :44:15.and one in the south prevented any further chemical attacks as the

:44:16. > :44:21.chemical weapons could no longer be dropped. Even at the height of his

:44:22. > :44:27.powers, there were limits to those powers. In 1991, 39 SCUD missiles

:44:28. > :44:32.were fired at Israel, I was there at the time as a journalist. He crudely

:44:33. > :44:39.targeted Tel Aviv, and killed no one. But even if he couldn't fire

:44:40. > :44:44.his chemical weapons, might they somehow have become a threat in the

:44:45. > :44:49.battlefield? In the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in the Gulf War

:44:50. > :44:52.in 1990, the United Nations special commission, was set up to inspect

:44:53. > :44:59.Iraqi weapons facilities and maintained a presence in the country

:45:00. > :45:03.until several years later. And there was broad agreement among experts

:45:04. > :45:07.that Iraq was not an imminent threat. Those that had been used

:45:08. > :45:13.against Iranians and Kurdish opponents had been destroyed or were

:45:14. > :45:19.degraded beyond use. Let us remind ourselves what the experts said at

:45:20. > :45:27.the time. Scott Ritter, a UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998

:45:28. > :45:33.stated in 2002 the following "Since 1998, Iraq had been a fundamentally

:45:34. > :45:39.disarmed country, 90 to 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction

:45:40. > :45:43.capacity been verifiably eliminated. If Iraq was producing chemical

:45:44. > :45:50.weapons we would have had proof, and simple. " Chemical weapons the

:45:51. > :45:56.experts told us, repeatedly, don't have a long shelf life. He stated

:45:57. > :46:01.that Iraqi sarin and the other one had a shelf life of approximately

:46:02. > :46:06.five years, but the toxin and anthrax last about three years. So

:46:07. > :46:12.as members debated the war in this house, they knew that at the height

:46:13. > :46:17.of his powers, Saddam had never had the capacity to fight chemical

:46:18. > :46:21.weapons long range. But with years of no-fly zone restrictions and the

:46:22. > :46:25.passage of time, he's weapons even had he had the power to fire them

:46:26. > :46:33.which we knew he did not, were degraded and beyond use. I seem to

:46:34. > :46:37.recall Mr Speaker that the honourable gentleman and myself were

:46:38. > :46:43.both in television studios at the time and I also seem to recall us

:46:44. > :46:51.laughing at those mock-ups of those vehicles, and together, we agreed

:46:52. > :46:54.that if those vehicles existed you could easily photograph them from

:46:55. > :46:58.the sky so we thought they can't exist. Why do you need to make

:46:59. > :47:02.drawings of them when you can get photographs of the actual vehicles.

:47:03. > :47:08.The honourable and gallant member remembers very well, we did indeed

:47:09. > :47:12.sit in television studios because we called in experts to ask experts for

:47:13. > :47:16.their evidence. And so it was relatively easy even as a

:47:17. > :47:22.journalist, to pick apart many of the absurd claims. But of course

:47:23. > :47:29.some journalists were screaming for war. The sun around the absurd

:47:30. > :47:36.headline" Brits 45 minutes from doom." About how supposed threats to

:47:37. > :47:41.the troops in Cyprus. The Star wrote "Mad Sadam ready to attack". And

:47:42. > :47:46.quite 45 minutes from a chemical war". It was all nonsense, the

:47:47. > :47:51.journalists knew it was nonsense but it was terrifying for some members

:47:52. > :47:55.of the house. In January 2003, the UN weapons inspectors had reported

:47:56. > :47:59.that they had found no indication whatsoever that Iraq possessed

:48:00. > :48:04.nuclear weapons or an active programme of chemical weapons. These

:48:05. > :48:08.national atomic energy agency at the time found no evidence, or plausible

:48:09. > :48:15.indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.

:48:16. > :48:20.And the UN monitoring verification Inspectorate said at the time that

:48:21. > :48:23.they did not find evidence of the continuation or resumption of

:48:24. > :48:30.programmes of weapons of mass destruction. However, Vice President

:48:31. > :48:33.Dick Cheney retorted "We believe that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein has

:48:34. > :48:41.in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr L Baradari,

:48:42. > :48:46.director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

:48:47. > :48:51.frankly is wrong. " So who are Parliament Terence to believe, the

:48:52. > :48:56.chemical weapons experts, the missiles expert, the atomic energy

:48:57. > :49:02.agency, or Dick Cheney, George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and the neocons? The

:49:03. > :49:06.house had to make up its mind. In the run-up to the Iraqi war, I was

:49:07. > :49:11.working as a journalist, has the honourable gentleman has pointed

:49:12. > :49:15.out, presenting among other things a three hour daily radio news

:49:16. > :49:20.programme. We had access to expert has any news journalist do. We

:49:21. > :49:25.called them in and asked them to outline their evidence. Now I'm not

:49:26. > :49:28.a pacifist, I supported Nato action in Bosnia and Kosovo due to the

:49:29. > :49:34.imminent threat of life and the need to say civilians. In fact, I was on

:49:35. > :49:39.the hostage flight back from Iraq which an honourable member mentioned

:49:40. > :49:43.earlier on. I was with the hostages, as they returned having fled from

:49:44. > :49:47.Saddam Hussein. However, during interviews with experts and

:49:48. > :49:51.academics in the run-up to the house 's vote, I saw clearly, that's the

:49:52. > :49:58.case for war was built on exaggeration deceit. It was

:49:59. > :50:01.blindingly obvious. Tony Blair frequently told this house and the

:50:02. > :50:05.British people that he was working towards disarming Iraq and its

:50:06. > :50:09.weapons of mass structure and comedy repeatedly told this house that his

:50:10. > :50:12.aim is not regime change. So the house could have been under no

:50:13. > :50:24.illusion what it was being asked to vote for. Mr Blair said "JIC is a

:50:25. > :50:29.very brutal and repressive leader, however disarmament of the weapons

:50:30. > :50:34.of mass destruction is our aim, it is not regime change -- Saddam is a

:50:35. > :50:38.very brutal and repressive leader. " So the challenge to the house, Mr

:50:39. > :50:43.Blair was asking members to vote on one basis and one basis alone. The

:50:44. > :50:49.Yemen is danger posed by Saddam's weaponry. -- the imminent danger.

:50:50. > :50:56.Soap were all the experts wrong, were there any elevated groups of

:50:57. > :51:00.experts, a court with extraordinary knowledge, unavailable to the

:51:01. > :51:03.ordinary expert. Tony Blair often said, that if only you could see

:51:04. > :51:07.what crosses my desk you would never doubted the danger that we are in

:51:08. > :51:15.and the pressing case for immediate action. Yes. The I thank the

:51:16. > :51:22.honourable member for giving way, does he share my concerns about

:51:23. > :51:27.recent mission creep, drone strikes, after the event and what that means

:51:28. > :51:30.full transparency. I am and I'm not at all convinced that we have

:51:31. > :51:35.learned the lessons, many members say that we have learned the lessons

:51:36. > :51:40.of war. I am not convinced, I was not convinced when we had the debate

:51:41. > :51:42.on Syria. Tony Blair made a direct appeal saying that he was seeing

:51:43. > :51:49.privileged information that no one else was seeing. He asked the house

:51:50. > :51:54.to trust him. And many members have said that appeal for trust was what

:51:55. > :52:02.swayed them. It was a direct appeal to members to ignore the available

:52:03. > :52:06.scientific evidence, but there was one embarrassing hurdle in the way.

:52:07. > :52:09.That was Robin Cook, I had an extensive interview with Robin Cook

:52:10. > :52:14.after his resignation from the Labour front bench on the 17th of

:52:15. > :52:18.March 2000 three. I asked him if he saw the same briefings as the Prime

:52:19. > :52:23.Minister on Iraq? He says, yes I do. I said what was it I asked him which

:52:24. > :52:27.had crossed Mr Blair 's desk which he couldn't tell us about, but which

:52:28. > :52:34.contradicted all the expert evidence. Robin Cook told me there

:52:35. > :52:38.was nothing. Nothing crossed the Prime Minister 's desk that hadn't

:52:39. > :52:41.crossed his as Foreign Secretary and nothing had crossed his or the Prime

:52:42. > :52:47.Minister 's desk that suggested an imminent threat from chemical

:52:48. > :52:53.weapons. He told me that on that basis the war could therefore not be

:52:54. > :52:57.justified. Now every MP listening to that interview meeting with Robin

:52:58. > :53:02.Cook Kirin house, or taking on board the opinion of experts, at the time,

:53:03. > :53:09.would have known that the case presented to this house was flimsy

:53:10. > :53:13.to the point of absurdity. I am of course aware of the pressure that

:53:14. > :53:18.MPs were under, setting aside their promotion prospects in government,

:53:19. > :53:23.tabloid newspapers had launched a vicious campaign against opponents

:53:24. > :53:27.of the war. The sun published a traitor 's dart board, something

:53:28. > :53:32.that I noted has since deleted from the website in the aftermath of the

:53:33. > :53:36.Chilcot report. It ran a front-page picture, showing a picture of a

:53:37. > :53:39.snake and Charles Kennedy with a headline, spot the difference, one

:53:40. > :53:45.is a spineless reptile that spits venom and the other a poisonous

:53:46. > :53:50.snake. MPs were frightened that they would be targeted as cowards and

:53:51. > :53:55.peaceniks. But as we survey the carnage of Iraq, the countless

:53:56. > :53:58.civilian lives lost, soldiers lives lost, and family lives destroyed, it

:53:59. > :54:05.is easy to look for a single stakeholder and while I share the

:54:06. > :54:11.thing about Tony Blair, there is something gutless about attributing

:54:12. > :54:14.all of the MPs votes to him and him alone. The truth is that expert

:54:15. > :54:22.information was freely available to any member who chose to take it. Can

:54:23. > :54:26.I start by saying that I welcome the fact that the government have

:54:27. > :54:32.allocated stays for this debate. And I would also welcome the fact that

:54:33. > :54:37.this is an opportunity to remind the house that some members from all

:54:38. > :54:41.parties here, considered the same evidence as other members, and

:54:42. > :54:45.evidence presented to the house by Mr Blair, and came to a different

:54:46. > :54:51.conclusion about whether military action was timely or illegal. I

:54:52. > :54:58.would also like to say that he's no longer in his place, but the member

:54:59. > :55:01.for Plymouth, I wanted to thank him for the service he has given to the

:55:02. > :55:06.country as have other members who are here today. But also to reassure

:55:07. > :55:11.him that whilst I along with many other members here today marched

:55:12. > :55:16.against the Iraq war, I have always been fully supportive of our troops

:55:17. > :55:20.who were dispatched by our government to fight that war, or

:55:21. > :55:24.indeed any other. I have no criticism of them. I might have some

:55:25. > :55:32.criticism of their senior officers but that is a different matter. What

:55:33. > :55:38.do we know about all since the publication of the Chilcot report?

:55:39. > :55:41.My friend, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, provided a helpful

:55:42. > :55:47.summary in his speech earlier this week, in the Lords, so we know that

:55:48. > :55:52.the Cabinet was not provided with a full detailed opinion of the

:55:53. > :55:56.Attorney General. And Sir John Chilcot falsely finds that is not

:55:57. > :55:59.proper and should not happen again. He found that military action was

:56:00. > :56:03.not the last resort, diplomatic options were still available, that

:56:04. > :56:08.there was no imminent threat, that Doctor Hans Blix and about I was

:56:09. > :56:10.still able to carry out their responsibilities and there were

:56:11. > :56:14.conflicting views about resolution 1441.

:56:15. > :56:28.And about article two of the night Nations charter about regime change

:56:29. > :56:34.that this was not a legal water. We also heard from my friend Lord Tyler

:56:35. > :56:39.that Chilcot was quite explicit on the fact that going to war without

:56:40. > :56:44.as majority on the United Nations Security Council undermined the

:56:45. > :56:52.authorities of the native Nations. We have put great stead in ensuring

:56:53. > :57:01.we support the United Nations. -- the United Nations. My friend Lord

:57:02. > :57:08.be pointed out in his contribution the inadequacies in the preparation

:57:09. > :57:15.from a military perspective from the MoD, inadequate preparation for the

:57:16. > :57:20.known danger of IED is and the failure to provide adequate armoured

:57:21. > :57:26.vehicles. I want to dwell on that for a few more minutes. The focus on

:57:27. > :57:33.post-conflict reconstruction, and area which has not had much of an

:57:34. > :57:38.outing today. It is possible that better planning and preparation for

:57:39. > :57:42.a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq might not necessarily have prevented the

:57:43. > :57:49.events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and now but I think the major

:57:50. > :57:52.issue that Chilcot has identified was that there was no planning to

:57:53. > :58:05.speak of at all for the post-conflict stage. Before I was

:58:06. > :58:12.elected, I used to work in project management. It has been interesting

:58:13. > :58:21.looking at the section, section 530 onwards in the executive summary, a

:58:22. > :58:26.cursory examination of that section highlights that if we consider the

:58:27. > :58:32.work done in Iraq as a project, it failed the most basic test in

:58:33. > :58:38.initiation and execution of the smallest project. Is it clear who

:58:39. > :58:45.was responsible for which tasks? Paragraph 593 says this is not the

:58:46. > :58:51.case. The UK thought the United States would be responsible for

:58:52. > :58:57.preparing a post-conflict plan. Will there are any contingency plans? The

:58:58. > :59:01.answer is there were not. None were made for the case of the UK being

:59:02. > :59:08.drawn in for a huge commitment of resources. Is the clarity be about

:59:09. > :59:14.who had the power to take decisions? Paragraph 603 says not. No one has

:59:15. > :59:21.sufficient authority to establish unified planning across the MOD and

:59:22. > :59:26.the Treasury and tested. Was it clear who was in overall control?

:59:27. > :59:34.The answer Es no, no single person was in control of overseeing all

:59:35. > :59:38.aspects of preparation. -- the answer was no. Where there are

:59:39. > :59:43.sufficient trains people available? The answers there were not. The MoD

:59:44. > :59:49.were not prepared for nation building on this scale. Where

:59:50. > :59:55.assumptions challenged? They were not, they were seldom challenged.

:59:56. > :00:01.Any project manager in IT, construction or any other field, who

:00:02. > :00:10.had designed a project as purely planned, resourced and executed as

:00:11. > :00:15.this one would have been sacked. Yet in 2003, our government was planning

:00:16. > :00:19.to invade and country, support regime change and introduce

:00:20. > :00:24.democracy, rebuild their lackey infrastructure without so much as a

:00:25. > :00:30.plan literally written on the back of a cigarette packet. This is one

:00:31. > :00:38.of them was shocking aspects of the Iraq war. To conclude, the Iraq war

:00:39. > :00:45.and its legacy of internecine religious war, the 180 UK troops who

:00:46. > :00:50.were killed and the many casualties, the car bombs, suicide bombers,

:00:51. > :00:53.hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqis civilians, the instability which

:00:54. > :00:59.reverberates around the region to this day. We can argue whether this

:01:00. > :01:03.was linked to our intervention in 2003 but no one can argue that our

:01:04. > :01:11.intervention actually helped stabilise Iraq. On the contrary.

:01:12. > :01:15.What we need today from the Minister is some reassurances that the UK

:01:16. > :01:19.government will never ever again launch into such a reckless

:01:20. > :01:25.adventure on such a flimsy premise with so little preparation. I wonder

:01:26. > :01:33.if the Minister will be able to give us that guarantee? Paul Williams. Mr

:01:34. > :01:37.Speaker, I was a member of this House when the decision to invade

:01:38. > :01:42.Iraq was taken. Plaid Cymru was against the war from the start,

:01:43. > :01:49.along with colleagues from other parties and direct knowledge their

:01:50. > :01:54.part in this. Myself and colleagues were unanimous in our opposition to

:01:55. > :02:00.the war and we were subject to vilification way beyond what is

:02:01. > :02:06.respect -- expected in the usual argy-bargy between politicians of

:02:07. > :02:12.exposing -- of opposing views or from the press. I made no complaint

:02:13. > :02:16.then and I make no complaint now. We did not really pay the price. The

:02:17. > :02:20.price was paid by those who lost their lives, those injured

:02:21. > :02:24.physically and psychologically, the women and children who were killed.

:02:25. > :02:31.Paid by those who are still fighting and by those who are still having

:02:32. > :02:34.lives blighted for ever. It is all right to say this now when

:02:35. > :02:40.opposition to the war is the accepted view, it was not the case

:02:41. > :02:44.then. Plaid Cymru is a party for peace. We are not a pacifist party

:02:45. > :02:50.and we are prepared to support military action as a last resort in

:02:51. > :02:53.extreme circumstances and with international agreement. That is why

:02:54. > :03:01.we supported emergency military action in Libya with the required

:03:02. > :03:06.support of the United Nations. I certainly regret that we did not

:03:07. > :03:14.then press the case harder for reconstruction. We have seen the

:03:15. > :03:20.effect of intervention in Libya as we have seen in Iraq. Immediately

:03:21. > :03:28.hear we have two of the reasons why we oppose the invasion of Iraq. The

:03:29. > :03:36.required UN resolution had not been passed. As Chilcot says clearly, in

:03:37. > :03:40.the executive summary, as said, the diplomatic options had not been

:03:41. > :03:47.exhausted at that stage. Military action was therefore not a last

:03:48. > :03:53.resort. Mr Blair presents Iraq is a real and present danger with

:03:54. > :03:58.certainty which was not justified. Yesterday the honourable member for

:03:59. > :04:05.North Thanet made a telling point, his colleague persuaded him the

:04:06. > :04:14.night before to vote for the war. He in turn had been misled by Mr Blair.

:04:15. > :04:20.Later we content that Mr Blair misled this House and for that he

:04:21. > :04:26.must be held to account. It is clear from Chilcot, not least from Mr

:04:27. > :04:30.Blair supporting Mr Bush, that he had already agreed to go to war

:04:31. > :04:37.whilst reporting to this House that it had a part in the matter. That is

:04:38. > :04:42.the only reasonable interpretation of the infamous statements recorded

:04:43. > :04:53.in Chilcot volume two. That was Mr Blair's choice as point 364 states,

:04:54. > :04:57.the UK felt it was right and necessary to defer to its close ally

:04:58. > :05:04.and senior partner, the United States. It was clear that President

:05:05. > :05:12.Bush had long before decided to go to war. My personal experience

:05:13. > :05:20.confirms this. I was with Adam tries, the MP for Caernarfon East in

:05:21. > :05:32.mid-September to in Washington. -- Adam Price. On a visit with new MPs,

:05:33. > :05:38.are very instructive visit. But it was the first anniversary of 9/11

:05:39. > :05:42.and feelings were running high. There were official ceremonies to

:05:43. > :05:52.commemorate the event and to support the forces of justice and an implied

:05:53. > :05:57.impression to make someone pay. One felt it was not just someone but

:05:58. > :06:03.anyone should pay. That was the atmosphere then and it is important

:06:04. > :06:08.to remember that. In Washington we discussed Iraq with the State

:06:09. > :06:13.Department officials. This official was not a high official but had been

:06:14. > :06:19.tasked with briefing MPs from across the pond. It was Adam tries to put

:06:20. > :06:25.the blunt question, do you intend to invade Iraq in September 2002? And

:06:26. > :06:34.the answer was equally forthright. Yes, he said. With our friends if he

:06:35. > :06:41.can, without them if we must. As it seems was a commonplace view amongst

:06:42. > :06:46.officials at that time. One that they shared with insignificant

:06:47. > :06:55.visitors such as ourselves. It is very insignificant is that is the

:06:56. > :06:58.significant point ear. If we knew what they intended then so did Mr

:06:59. > :07:08.Blair and his associates. I will give way. Can I complements him for

:07:09. > :07:14.his support in the Iraq rebellions and also commend the MP for

:07:15. > :07:19.Carshalton. What he's saying about America going ahead regardless of

:07:20. > :07:26.the UK is absolutely right and a of one week before the final vote that

:07:27. > :07:29.this House took to go to Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld said in a press

:07:30. > :07:35.conference that it was not necessary for the UK to join America and there

:07:36. > :07:42.would be work friends if that is -- if the UK decided not. He makes a

:07:43. > :07:48.telling point, it was a conscious decision therefore to join our

:07:49. > :07:54.senior ally and deferred to their view of the world. That is

:07:55. > :07:58.significant matter. It was a choice taken by Mr Blair and his associates

:07:59. > :08:03.because he did know what America intended. We know about the meetings

:08:04. > :08:08.with Crawford. I do not need to go over that. Of course he knew and the

:08:09. > :08:16.response was, we will be there with you whatever. American preparedness

:08:17. > :08:19.was also confirmed quite casually in the conversation I referred to a

:08:20. > :08:26.moment ago when I asked about the war aims. I had a particular

:08:27. > :08:33.interest, I have an interest in the situation of the Kurdish people for

:08:34. > :08:38.a long time. The northern cards, as aware rather than the southern cards

:08:39. > :08:43.with whom the other honourable member has been involved for several

:08:44. > :08:51.years. -- southern Kurdish people. The answer was, he said, we are

:08:52. > :08:58.looking for a democratic Iraq within its current borders. I remember the

:08:59. > :09:06.words clearly because the cards in the North were thinking of having a

:09:07. > :09:12.semi-independent state, if not being the southern part of a greater

:09:13. > :09:19.Kurdistan. That was the war name and we know the subsequent outcome only

:09:20. > :09:24.too well. The northern Iraqis, this southern cards have a degree of

:09:25. > :09:30.self-government but as to a democratic Iraq, that is an even

:09:31. > :09:39.which has not been achieved. -- this southern cards. My point is there

:09:40. > :09:44.was no secrecy about this. There was no deficiency of vision or idealism

:09:45. > :09:51.either, just an enormous deficiency of realism and good sense. I want to

:09:52. > :09:59.finish on one point as time is short. I want to ask the Minister

:10:00. > :10:05.for some action. Yesterday the Member for be concealed expressed

:10:06. > :10:10.his concern about a process of sanction which could be employed by

:10:11. > :10:20.this House in respect of Mr Blair. -- be concealed. I do not know if

:10:21. > :10:26.this was entirely persuasive but he made his argument very well indeed.

:10:27. > :10:33.-- Beaconsfield. We have consistently called for those

:10:34. > :10:40.responsible for taking the UK to war against Iraq to appear before the

:10:41. > :10:45.International Criminal Court. It is not currently prosecutable by that

:10:46. > :10:50.court. Some 30 countries have agreed to rectify this following a

:10:51. > :10:55.convention in 2010. The UK has also said informally that it would

:10:56. > :11:03.support such change but has not yet formally ratified that position.

:11:04. > :11:08.Under ICC rules, signatories have to agree which means all countries have

:11:09. > :11:12.to sign up so I am asking the Minister and calling on the UK

:11:13. > :11:17.government to formally agreed to the necessary change to pave the way by

:11:18. > :11:21.those responsible for taking the UK into the illegal war in Iraq to face

:11:22. > :11:30.this quartz and I hope that assurance today. Mr Speaker, let me

:11:31. > :11:35.begin by making a declaration of interest, my brother served on the

:11:36. > :11:40.front line in the Iraq war and the decision taken in this House had a

:11:41. > :11:45.direct impact on my family and his wife and two children. I do get

:11:46. > :11:52.concerned when we debate issues in this House and we discuss Islam,

:11:53. > :11:56.critically we equate it fundamentally with fanaticism and

:11:57. > :12:06.fundamentalism. Many belief systems are prone to fanaticism.

:12:07. > :12:17.In 1995, a Christian fanatic to 168 people, injuring nearly 1000 in a 16

:12:18. > :12:20.block radius in Oklahoma. And if members wish to debate fanaticism, I

:12:21. > :12:26.do wish they would bring it to the floor of the house itself and

:12:27. > :12:29.debated in detail. It was just under three months ago that I myself with

:12:30. > :12:34.many other colleagues participated in a debate and I was grateful to be

:12:35. > :12:37.able to sum up on behalf of my party, one calling for the

:12:38. > :12:43.publication of the report, I'm glad that I got to the point, I am

:12:44. > :12:46.grateful as for many others to Sir John and those others participating

:12:47. > :12:49.in its construction for their diligence, work and the man on which

:12:50. > :12:54.they have carried out their examinations. I believe that the

:12:55. > :12:57.report will go down as one of the most important documents to be

:12:58. > :13:00.created on the floor of this house and will have far-reaching

:13:01. > :13:07.consequences. Although I do agree with the right Honourable member

:13:08. > :13:10.that their radars come a point in his couple of weeks of politics in

:13:11. > :13:16.which it will be overshadowed and that is quite sad. The publication

:13:17. > :13:21.and conclusion of this report will come as some comfort to families

:13:22. > :13:24.with Army personnel such as my own. Those also with casualties and those

:13:25. > :13:29.who have been waiting for answers for far too long and why we were

:13:30. > :13:33.taken to war. I would like to take a moment to praise those families who

:13:34. > :13:36.have liked their loved ones fought the good fight and have never

:13:37. > :13:40.allowed this issue to be forgotten with their quest for justice and

:13:41. > :13:47.truth. This house must note their courage in seeking answers regarding

:13:48. > :13:51.the conflict. The report should and must send reverberations through the

:13:52. > :13:55.whole British establishment, which undermined by the decision to go to

:13:56. > :13:59.war, the report must if anything enhance the debate about the nature

:14:00. > :14:06.of our constitutional democracy and the duties of the government and its

:14:07. > :14:10.attitude to war and peace. The words "I will be with you whatever" will

:14:11. > :14:15.be forever associated with a former member for Sedgefield. It will be

:14:16. > :14:20.their political epitaph. And yet that phrase is much more than that,

:14:21. > :14:22.it will forever live and scar the hearts of those families whose

:14:23. > :14:29.relations were casualties of that war. May they be in the armed

:14:30. > :14:33.services or the civilians of Iraq. That is the true legacy of "I will

:14:34. > :14:42.be with you whatever" and one that must never allow the allowed to be

:14:43. > :14:45.forgotten. We must remind our representatives that the actions

:14:46. > :14:53.will have wide ranging consequences beyond this place. Thank you Mr

:14:54. > :15:00.Speaker, I thank durable gentleman for allowing me to intervene on him.

:15:01. > :15:07.For me, that phrase really blows apart my absolute belief that our

:15:08. > :15:13.Prime Minister would always act in the best interests of our country,

:15:14. > :15:18.regardless of political persuasion. It has been deeply upsetting for me

:15:19. > :15:24.to hear that phrase used on a memo to the United States president. I'm

:15:25. > :15:28.grateful for the intervention, from the gallant Honourable member whose

:15:29. > :15:32.opinion I take on board on many occasions. I will go on to that

:15:33. > :15:37.further in my speech. The actions in the lead up to the invasion had a

:15:38. > :15:44.detrimental and fundamental impact in the confidence in our mocha Seat

:15:45. > :15:47.Parliamentary system. We must use that report to rebuild the

:15:48. > :15:52.confidence as we risk so much if we don't. Parliamentary democracy is

:15:53. > :15:56.being attacked across the world as we speak. The report brings forward

:15:57. > :16:00.damming and fundamental issues with regard to the role of government in

:16:01. > :16:05.the invasion. The duty of the government is to carry out its

:16:06. > :16:08.responsibilities, in a responsible and transparent manner in terms of

:16:09. > :16:13.war and peace. This is vitally important and is now clear that in

:16:14. > :16:18.2003, those actions of the then member for Sedgefield flew in the

:16:19. > :16:22.face of this. We are told that collective responsibility has

:16:23. > :16:27.underpinned our democracy for centuries. As outlined in this

:16:28. > :16:32.report, this system was abused and ignored by the former member for

:16:33. > :16:36.Sedgefield. Their actions, are a warning to the current government

:16:37. > :16:41.and to future governments, that the mechanism of government itself must

:16:42. > :16:46.not be twisted and subverted by an individual to meet their own as I

:16:47. > :16:49.would think delusional self appointed Godlike views, and that

:16:50. > :16:56.the full transparency and accountability must at all times be

:16:57. > :17:00.addressed. To ensure accountability and transparency and for justice to

:17:01. > :17:04.be carried out, those who made the decision to go to war must be

:17:05. > :17:09.brought to order. That is why like many other members in this house, I

:17:10. > :17:14.will be fully supporting the contempt motion against the former

:17:15. > :17:18.member for Sedgefield and that the general public expects this house

:17:19. > :17:23.needs to demand it, and the international community, has two C

:17:24. > :17:28.justice be done. And with that, I wish to say Mr Speaker, there will

:17:29. > :17:32.be those who questioned this motion given the former premier's public

:17:33. > :17:40.apology. Yet I would draw this conclusion on that apology. An act

:17:41. > :17:47.of contrition requires a heartfelt and sincere and full intention not

:17:48. > :17:51.to recommit that sin. The apology given by the former member of

:17:52. > :17:57.Sedgefield, I would advise them this, is to seek a longer console

:17:58. > :18:02.with their confessor to understand the full concept of an act of

:18:03. > :18:08.contrition. I wish not to take much more time, but I wish to consider

:18:09. > :18:12.the words of the former presiding officer, of the Scottish parliament.

:18:13. > :18:18.George Reid. When a motion was placed before that place to debate

:18:19. > :18:21.this very matter. And they stated "Above the doors of the Red Cross in

:18:22. > :18:26.the knee jerk, there is a phrase from Dostoevsky that we should

:18:27. > :18:33.remember in a time of war. It states that in war everyone is responsible

:18:34. > :18:42.to everyone for everything. " And it reminds me Mr Speaker, of the

:18:43. > :18:47.journalist, Michael Wayne, and their account of their time reporting the

:18:48. > :18:56.conflict itself. While we may wish to seek peace, and an end to war.

:18:57. > :19:03.Only the dead CD end of war. -- CD end. Thank you Mr Speaker, a number

:19:04. > :19:10.of people have said today that the 2003 decision casts a long shadow.

:19:11. > :19:15.And indeed it does Mr Speaker. And there has been lots of talk about

:19:16. > :19:25.lessons learnt. And lessons needing to be learnt. But I fear that really

:19:26. > :19:32.what this is, is largely about "I was right". And others were wrong,

:19:33. > :19:40.and there is a slightly self-righteousness about where you

:19:41. > :19:46.stood. On the vote in 2003. That I feel is not going to help us

:19:47. > :19:56.actually make the decisions that we are facing. Which are, as Sirius and

:19:57. > :20:03.as dangerous and as consequential. I wasn't in the house in 2003, I

:20:04. > :20:07.didn't come in until 2005. And at the time, I was outside, I was one

:20:08. > :20:15.of the people marching up and down and saying no to war. And when I

:20:16. > :20:21.came in, I never in my wildest dreams thought I would spend most of

:20:22. > :20:27.my time on defence matters. But I came into this chamber one day, and

:20:28. > :20:31.I noticed, that there was a group of middle-aged men talking to a group

:20:32. > :20:35.of middle-aged men. Across the chamber, on perhaps one of the most

:20:36. > :20:44.important subject that the subject had to face. I thought I am not

:20:45. > :20:48.having this. And I went out of my way, to teach myself to fence. --

:20:49. > :21:03.myself defence. I had to say you have to do

:21:04. > :21:07.that unless you have been in the Armed Forces, to find out how

:21:08. > :21:12.decisions are made, what kind of equipment is used. How on earth a

:21:13. > :21:18.decision to go to war is implemented, and how it is carried

:21:19. > :21:24.through. It is not enough, to be a member of this Parliament and think

:21:25. > :21:28.that defence is something that you can dip into. And sadly, too many

:21:29. > :21:35.honourable and right Honourable members think it is. You have no

:21:36. > :21:44.right I don't feel to criticise unless you actually have looked and

:21:45. > :21:51.questioned. What equipment are rather people going to war with? --

:21:52. > :21:56.our war. How many of them are there. What is going to happen when we have

:21:57. > :22:01.two meet the numbers of personal that we want to send, against a

:22:02. > :22:07.number of personnel they are going to be meeting. A disastrous decision

:22:08. > :22:13.that we made when we sent our people to hell mad, nobody questioned it,

:22:14. > :22:17.we're not having a big two-day debate. About that disaster. And how

:22:18. > :22:23.many honourable members bothered to read the defence committee report on

:22:24. > :22:29.anything. And quite honestly I wonder how many honourable members

:22:30. > :22:32.have read the STS are. How many members have been worried and

:22:33. > :22:41.concerned about the paring back over and over and over again of our Armed

:22:42. > :22:44.Forces -- have read the SDSR. Hanley people have been worried about the

:22:45. > :22:49.cuts to the platforms they are going to be able to utilise. It is all

:22:50. > :22:52.very well to go back to 2003 and beat our breasts, to spend seven

:22:53. > :22:59.years, but I have been in this house and I had taken three decisions.

:23:00. > :23:15.About going to war. And I spent a lot of time on all three decisions.

:23:16. > :23:22.Libya. As great a disaster as Iraq. I spent a lot of time asking is this

:23:23. > :23:29.resume change? And I was told no this is not regime change. I don't

:23:30. > :23:33.believe actually that is true, I think it was always going to be

:23:34. > :23:37.regime change. I asked about what we were going to do about post-conflict

:23:38. > :23:42.reconstruction because it was the big lesson, I was told that we

:23:43. > :23:49.weren't putting boots on the ground and therefore it wasn't an issue for

:23:50. > :23:55.us. I most certainly will. The honourable member knows that I have

:23:56. > :24:00.deep respect for her and that will continue, but I seem to recall that

:24:01. > :24:08.we had little choice but to intervene in Libya and I personally

:24:09. > :24:17.voted for it because I was terrified that people would be killed. Thank

:24:18. > :24:21.you for that intervention, that is most helpful. Because it takes you

:24:22. > :24:28.back to the exact same issue. That people were facing in relation to

:24:29. > :24:34.Saddam Hussein. Because Saddam Hussein led people down a track

:24:35. > :24:46.where really, intervention was almost inevitable. He ignored all of

:24:47. > :24:55.the UN missions, he was obstructive many times. To the people who went

:24:56. > :24:58.in, looking for weapons. I actually asked Iraqis and I'm not sure of the

:24:59. > :25:04.honourable gentleman was with us on the visit to Iraq, when we met a

:25:05. > :25:10.group of tribal elders, we met in a room, where they told us that the

:25:11. > :25:14.last time they had been in it, they had been called there by Saddam

:25:15. > :25:18.Hussein to hear a report about the changes that he was introducing to

:25:19. > :25:24.the health service in Iraq. Someone had stood up and said, not that he

:25:25. > :25:30.disagreed with it, not that he thought that Saddam Hussein was

:25:31. > :25:34.wrong, but that perhaps a small change would make it slightly

:25:35. > :25:44.better. The man was marched out of the room and shot at the front door

:25:45. > :25:51.of the building. That is the world that we were trying to understand. I

:25:52. > :25:57.asked on that occasion, why on earth did Saddam Hussein not just say I

:25:58. > :26:03.have given up the weapons of mass destruction, I don't have any. I got

:26:04. > :26:06.rid of the chemical weapons. I dead have any. Why didn't he step

:26:07. > :26:17.forward? I was told because he was more

:26:18. > :26:23.afraid of his own people than you. He had to convince his own people

:26:24. > :26:28.that he had those weapons so that is why he kept that myth going, not

:26:29. > :26:35.fries, not because he was afraid of our invasion but because he was

:26:36. > :26:42.afraid of his own people if they thought he showed any weakness. --

:26:43. > :26:46.not for us. That was exactly the same situation in Libya. Gaddafi

:26:47. > :26:51.made it impossible for the people in this House is not to feel that we

:26:52. > :26:56.could not sit back and let him say, I am going to slaughter those people

:26:57. > :27:02.in Benghazi which is what he said he was going to do and we acted. But

:27:03. > :27:07.look at the consequences. In seven years' time, I people going to

:27:08. > :27:15.criticise others for that vote and stand there self righteously seeing

:27:16. > :27:19.how you had no reconstruction plan. We did not and it is a mess and

:27:20. > :27:26.there are so many lessons to learn. I have been to Iraq and Afghanistan.

:27:27. > :27:32.I believe as a member of the defence committee, if we send our personnel

:27:33. > :27:38.there, we have a responsibility to go ourselves and C and talk with

:27:39. > :27:43.people on the front line and ask them, have you got the right kit and

:27:44. > :27:48.equipment? Are you being looked after correctly? What do we need to

:27:49. > :27:55.change in Parliament, tell us and we will be your voice? That is the

:27:56. > :28:03.lessons we have to learn. We have to be more robust in our understanding

:28:04. > :28:07.of defence. We have to be more responsible in understanding the

:28:08. > :28:12.tasks and responsibilities we place in front of our Armed Forces. We

:28:13. > :28:19.don't want to be pontificating about whether Tony Blair was a liar and

:28:20. > :28:24.weather when he says, I will be with you whatever, there is a jolly big

:28:25. > :28:30.but underneath that sentence. I want us to be looking much more at what

:28:31. > :28:37.we have learnt and what we're going to do about the future because, I

:28:38. > :28:43.doubt if any of you have read it but the defence Select Committee put out

:28:44. > :28:46.a report recently about Russia. Be afraid, be very afraid because that

:28:47. > :28:53.is coming down the track. I will give way. I do not disagree with her

:28:54. > :28:59.speech but does she not agree with me that part of the problem during

:29:00. > :29:03.that period was that the United Nations, all the major partners did

:29:04. > :29:08.not want to play a part? That includes the Russian Federation who

:29:09. > :29:15.did not want to play its part. I look at the Russians in Syria, I

:29:16. > :29:22.look at what the Russians did in Afghanistan. Do I want to stand

:29:23. > :29:30.alongside them? You know, I have my standards. But I am not for the

:29:31. > :29:36.Barrow bombing of civilians. The Russians take it as perfectly

:29:37. > :29:44.acceptable. I am not someone who is going to be happy coming to this

:29:45. > :29:55.House and seeing, we made mistakes in Iraq, yes. We made mistakes in

:29:56. > :29:59.Libya. We made mistakes, quite honestly, in every war this country

:30:00. > :30:06.has been involved in. Every time. What I would like to know, and I am

:30:07. > :30:13.glad the Secretary of State is with us, is when are the historic

:30:14. > :30:17.analysis team that used to be in the Ministry of defence and actually

:30:18. > :30:25.looked historically and analysed and taught the lessons learnt. Two

:30:26. > :30:32.military personnel. Whether that is going to be reinstated? Because that

:30:33. > :30:38.will have more impact than anything else that we discussed in the year

:30:39. > :30:42.because that is what we need. We need our personnel to know the

:30:43. > :30:53.lessons which are learnt. The South China Sea. We have 19 ships, 19

:30:54. > :31:01.ships. Are you worried about Iraq? Worry about the South China Sea. We

:31:02. > :31:08.have 19 ships. Please let us be realistic because the world is

:31:09. > :31:14.looking and laughing. Laughing at us tearing ourselves apart. I want a

:31:15. > :31:18.confident Britain, a secure Britain, a country which is not afraid of

:31:19. > :31:23.making difficult decisions. I Britain which is not afraid of

:31:24. > :31:29.sticking its neck into wasps nest, well equipped and well trained. But

:31:30. > :31:36.we will take on our responsibilities in the world. We will look at our

:31:37. > :31:43.mistakes and we will learn, but we will not waste our time just casting

:31:44. > :31:51.rude and offensive remarks at people who lead us. Thank you very much. It

:31:52. > :31:56.is a pleasure to follow the honourable lady and I commend her

:31:57. > :32:00.for a thoughtful and well thought contribution to the debate. I

:32:01. > :32:05.disagree with every point she had. You would not expect that but I did

:32:06. > :32:10.agree with the tone in which we should approach this debate today. I

:32:11. > :32:16.think we should approach it with a degree of humility. We should be

:32:17. > :32:20.careful not to reinvent history. I was here into thousand three. I

:32:21. > :32:27.remember these debates. I was listening to my other colleagues, I

:32:28. > :32:33.kept looking over their because that is where I remember her sitting as

:32:34. > :32:39.she made the speeches during the debates in 2003 and they were very

:32:40. > :32:43.powerful speeches. I remember well the atmosphere which was described

:32:44. > :32:48.by the honourable member for Perth in the way in which these thoughts

:32:49. > :32:50.were whipped and the way the government steam-rollered every

:32:51. > :32:57.effort into getting these motions through the House. The honourable

:32:58. > :33:05.member for Perth said he felt vindicated. I know what he meant by

:33:06. > :33:12.that, I confess I do not feel anything quite as possible --

:33:13. > :33:17.positive as vindication. If anything I feel slightly depressed because I

:33:18. > :33:21.think there was an inevitability which wasn't addressed by this House

:33:22. > :33:26.at the time. It is depressing because I view we still would not

:33:27. > :33:33.address that if we were placed in the same situation today. I will

:33:34. > :33:37.turn later to talk more about that and how the House should deal with

:33:38. > :33:42.this in the future but I think first of all we should place on record our

:33:43. > :33:47.regards to Sir John Chilcot and his team who have done a thorough piece

:33:48. > :33:50.of work. I have been critical about the length of time it has taken, but

:33:51. > :33:56.there is no denying the thoroughness of the work which has been done. I

:33:57. > :34:02.think we should be grateful to them. Given what we seen out in the table

:34:03. > :34:08.in front of us, it certainly clarifies one thing in my mind, that

:34:09. > :34:12.we were absolutely right to set the inquiry up as an independent inquiry

:34:13. > :34:17.because we have been chivvying that man and his team for years now and

:34:18. > :34:24.now we C White it has taken as long as a House. The report fills in a

:34:25. > :34:37.lot of the background detail. -- now we C Y. He does place on the page a

:34:38. > :34:45.lot of the dots and it is now for Parliament to join them up to

:34:46. > :34:48.produce a discernible picture. In particular he says clearly and

:34:49. > :34:54.fairly he will not express a view on the locality of the war. But he does

:34:55. > :35:00.offer as evidence from which we can draw our own conclusions. In

:35:01. > :35:04.particular we now have the already infamous memo from Tony Blair to

:35:05. > :35:10.George Bush saying I will be with you whatever. I think it is

:35:11. > :35:15.important that the House puts that into the context of the time because

:35:16. > :35:20.as others have said, Tony Blair was always meticulous in this House in

:35:21. > :35:25.making a case which was based on weapons of mass destruction. That

:35:26. > :35:30.was not true of George Bush. George Bush never pretended this was

:35:31. > :35:33.anything other than an exercise in regime change so when Tony Blair was

:35:34. > :35:38.saying to George Bush, I will be with you whatever, then he was

:35:39. > :35:43.saying I will support you even though I know what you're doing is

:35:44. > :35:47.something which is done on a quite different bases than that for which

:35:48. > :35:54.am seeking authority from the House of Commons. That is significant

:35:55. > :35:58.because of course, a war which was entered into for the purpose of

:35:59. > :36:06.regime change would be an illegal war. One for which the purpose was

:36:07. > :36:10.the removal of weapons of mass destruction was one for which there

:36:11. > :36:16.could have been a legal basis. The right honourable member, the

:36:17. > :36:23.chairman of the defence Select Committee, post what I think was a

:36:24. > :36:31.pertinent question. He said, how would the House have reacted if Tony

:36:32. > :36:36.Blair had been more balanced and evenhanded in the presentation of

:36:37. > :36:40.the evidence? That is where the detail of what Chilcot tells us is

:36:41. > :36:47.important because we C from that memo why Tony Blair was not more

:36:48. > :36:53.evenhanded and balanced in the presentation of the evidence because

:36:54. > :36:59.he was working to an objective. He was supporting a commitment that he

:37:00. > :37:08.had already made. The right honourable member also referred to

:37:09. > :37:13.the vote from 2013 on Syria. I would suggest to him that he goes back and

:37:14. > :37:18.refreshes his many on the terms of the motion against which he and

:37:19. > :37:22.others voted, quite legitimately. I do not challenge his reasons for

:37:23. > :37:29.doing so but it was not a vote to remove Assad, it was a motion which

:37:30. > :37:36.instructed the government to obtain authority from the United Nations

:37:37. > :37:40.and then to come back to this House for any further military action to

:37:41. > :37:46.be sanctioned. That is why I was prepared to support it. I say he

:37:47. > :37:49.wants to intervene. Yes, I had planned to intervene to haven't

:37:50. > :37:54.spoken earlier on but this is one of the knock-on effects of we are

:37:55. > :38:00.discussing today. By the time we got to that vote, we knew perfectly well

:38:01. > :38:05.that if we had passed that resolution, the bombing would have

:38:06. > :38:10.started that weekend. All the planes were ready to go and I am surprised

:38:11. > :38:17.that the right honourable gentleman is naive enough to believe anything

:38:18. > :38:21.else, if I can say so gently. I do not want to be taken down a side

:38:22. > :38:26.alley into the question of Syria, compelling as that is. The bombing

:38:27. > :38:30.could not have started without the authorisation of this House on the

:38:31. > :38:36.basis of the motion which was put to the south against which he voted. It

:38:37. > :38:40.is interesting to speculate although not germane to this debate what

:38:41. > :38:47.would have happened if the House had gone down the road which was marched

:38:48. > :38:51.on it in 2013. What might then have been the action of President Obama,

:38:52. > :38:54.how things might have moved on, whether we would have been put in

:38:55. > :39:02.the position we were in relation to the vote are two clashed year on

:39:03. > :39:07.Syria. What I think is undeniable, of all these decisions, Libya is a

:39:08. > :39:11.good example, they were taken under a cloud which still hangs over

:39:12. > :39:20.foreign policy and our role in the world as a result of the experience

:39:21. > :39:27.of the debate in Iraq. It is also I think as my right honourable friend

:39:28. > :39:31.for Carshalton pointed out, quite remarkable if regime change was the

:39:32. > :39:39.agenda that sat behind the American intervention in Iraq, then needed so

:39:40. > :39:45.little to prepare for the aftermath. -- they did. The removal of the Bath

:39:46. > :39:49.party from government stands out as one of the biggest strategic errors

:39:50. > :39:55.we have ever been party to. It completely failed to understand that

:39:56. > :39:59.for many ordinary Iraqis who were engaged in Iraqi government and

:40:00. > :40:05.civic society, they did so as part of this party because it was the

:40:06. > :40:10.only party in town. Two renews the intercept -- the infrastructure in

:40:11. > :40:13.government in the week was done in 2003, has left a void in the

:40:14. > :40:22.infrastructure of government which remains a problem for Iraq to this

:40:23. > :40:29.day. -- to remove. It also provided fertile ground for extremism to

:40:30. > :40:33.flourish. That was all staff which was predicted by many of us who

:40:34. > :40:40.questioned the decision to go to war in 2003. The House today, I have to

:40:41. > :40:47.say, is a very different one from the House that to that decision in

:40:48. > :40:56.2003. 659 members at the time of that only 172 remain members of the

:40:57. > :41:02.House today. I calculate that that 172 there are 141 who voted in

:41:03. > :41:08.favour of action and now only 21 voted against.

:41:09. > :41:19.I rewrote the debates before I came here. I was reminded and I agree

:41:20. > :41:26.with the honourable member, that it was not a happy atmosphere. It was

:41:27. > :41:30.tench, brutal and it was deliberately so because it was that

:41:31. > :41:35.atmosphere that forced many to vote for an enterprise against their

:41:36. > :41:40.better judgment. This is why it is important that we approach this with

:41:41. > :41:47.some humility. The amendment that the honourable member garnered

:41:48. > :41:52.support said that the case for war had not been proven and that was

:41:53. > :41:55.certainly the view that I took. I was not going to vote for a motion

:41:56. > :42:04.that said we would never go to war because like other members, I knew

:42:05. > :42:09.that Saddam was a British dictator. We knew he had weapons of mass

:42:10. > :42:15.destruction in the past, we had been quite happy to turn a blind eye to

:42:16. > :42:21.it in the past because he had been using it against Iran, a regime we

:42:22. > :42:26.will also happy to see removed. It was that sort of double standard in

:42:27. > :42:33.our foreign policy that I hope we can see an end of. Sadly, it does

:42:34. > :42:41.not seem to have been the case. I go back to the speech I said in 2003

:42:42. > :42:44.calling for the implementation of UN security council resolution 242.

:42:45. > :42:50.Sadly we are no further forward ahead on that issue today than we

:42:51. > :42:54.were in 2003, arguably if anything we are further behind. That is why

:42:55. > :42:59.should we ever find ourselves in this position again, the House has

:43:00. > :43:06.got to take is due to youth more seriously. We have got to ask the

:43:07. > :43:16.questions we cannot accept assertions when we should be given

:43:17. > :43:24.evidence. The honourable member is exactly right. The issue of where

:43:25. > :43:27.the House allowed itself to assertions of evidence touches on

:43:28. > :43:32.the point I think I would agree with that the honourable member was

:43:33. > :43:36.making that members of this House have to take seriously their

:43:37. > :43:39.responsibilities when it comes to vote on matters like this, because

:43:40. > :43:45.it is matter that will not just affect the life and lives of others

:43:46. > :43:53.in other countries, but affects the life of servicemen and women that

:43:54. > :43:57.will be deployed. There is a huge lesson and I hear it from people who

:43:58. > :44:06.were in the debates on all sides at that time. People now regret that

:44:07. > :44:12.they allowed, they downloaded from the dispatch box their sense, their

:44:13. > :44:17.judgment because they believed that a Prime Minister would not tell us

:44:18. > :44:19.things in these terms unless it was absolutely firm and true and

:44:20. > :44:24.therefore it must be right, and those who demurred from that you

:44:25. > :44:30.were being demonised both inside and outside this House because that was

:44:31. > :44:36.the assumption. If there is any lesson from all of this, it has to

:44:37. > :44:40.be that never again should anybody mistake dispatch box certitude for

:44:41. > :44:47.certainty on key and grave matters. We are told by some people that this

:44:48. > :44:55.report shows that there is no smoking gun against the former Prime

:44:56. > :44:57.Minister and people say what are the exaggerated versions against Tony

:44:58. > :45:05.Blair that he lied or misled Parliament, and they said none of

:45:06. > :45:11.that is in this report. I would just say a number of things. Firstly, I

:45:12. > :45:18.did in the past make the point that I had experienced working with John

:45:19. > :45:23.Chilcot in various capacities and I did say that while he had many

:45:24. > :45:30.attributes, I was not sure he would be independent or challenging. I

:45:31. > :45:35.accept this is a very compelling report and it might be written with

:45:36. > :45:40.typical British understatement, but we should not neglect just the key

:45:41. > :45:46.truths that are in here and the lessons that do need to be learned.

:45:47. > :45:53.While some will say, there is not the smoking gun that there was, that

:45:54. > :45:57.the dossier was dodgy, let's just as an example of that understatement,

:45:58. > :46:05.the way in which John Chilcot reports. He says, the enquiry shares

:46:06. > :46:11.the conclusion is that it was a mistake not to see the risk of

:46:12. > :46:15.combining in the September dossier the assessment of intelligence and

:46:16. > :46:18.other evidence with the interpretation and presentation of

:46:19. > :46:23.the evidence in order to make the case for policy action. That I think

:46:24. > :46:31.is a very telling criticism about what exactly was the photo with the

:46:32. > :46:36.September dossier. The Prime Minister when he reported to us on

:46:37. > :46:43.the report last week, he highlighted that Sir John had identified that

:46:44. > :46:47.there was an ingrained belief genuinely held by people in both the

:46:48. > :46:55.US and UK governments about Saddam and the weapons that were held. I

:46:56. > :47:02.think that is actually true and possible. I know that I myself in

:47:03. > :47:10.November of 2002 hurt Tony Blair address myself and other socialist

:47:11. > :47:14.leaders in Downing Street when he told us not just about what he

:47:15. > :47:20.believed was the case with Sadam and what he thought would be found, but

:47:21. > :47:26.also shared the view that the US were going to go to war anyway and

:47:27. > :47:29.that it was important that he maintained a restraining influence

:47:30. > :47:33.and he described himself as someone in the role of a bridge, trying to

:47:34. > :47:40.make sure that America would not go too far in relation to Iraq, trying

:47:41. > :47:45.to hold America back and I said I did not buy the image he was selling

:47:46. > :47:50.of him as a mooring rope trying to hold America closer to where Europe

:47:51. > :47:55.was, but I thought America saw him as a tow rope he would pull Europe

:47:56. > :48:01.and watching Europe in the course of this. I don't doubt that he

:48:02. > :48:05.sincerely believed that he somehow was in a position of restraining and

:48:06. > :48:15.influencing America by adopting because he was preparing to adopt.

:48:16. > :48:21.However... A very different approach was taken at the time by Canada. The

:48:22. > :48:27.then Prime Minister said Canada would not stand with the United

:48:28. > :48:30.States. Now, 13 years down the line, does he think that the relationship

:48:31. > :48:37.between Canada and the US is any the worse for the decision they took?

:48:38. > :48:43.No, I don't and to say that I might accept the point that this was an

:48:44. > :48:47.ingrained belief genuinely held is not to anyway endorse that belief or

:48:48. > :48:52.to say it was actually a wife's belief. It was a very foolish and

:48:53. > :48:58.rash belief and I think in some ways was deluded. The fact is alongside

:48:59. > :49:07.the ingrained belief that was genuinely held, the Chilcot report

:49:08. > :49:11.also brings out that there was an ingrained intent on the part of the

:49:12. > :49:15.UK Government particularly Tony Blair that was not genuinely

:49:16. > :49:20.expressed either to this House or in public, because the ingrained intent

:49:21. > :49:26.was that they were going to war anyway because he thought that was

:49:27. > :49:29.where America was going. We see in the report examples of where

:49:30. > :49:34.evidence was being bent and melted and confected to justify that the

:49:35. > :49:40.preparation for any intervention was going to be on the basis of weapons

:49:41. > :49:45.of mass destruction, where as it was clear the Prime Minister knew the

:49:46. > :49:49.intervention was really on the agenda of regime changed and people

:49:50. > :49:56.on this House move this was illegal and so that was withheld. Nobody can

:49:57. > :50:04.say in saying, Chilcot has not said Tony Blair led to macrolide or

:50:05. > :50:09.misled this House. Nobody can say that it is not the case that there

:50:10. > :50:15.was a Jupiter city in presentation in this throughout. The other big

:50:16. > :50:19.indictment from this report is the paucity of preparation. The fact

:50:20. > :50:23.that there was a commitment to go to war without the proper equipment

:50:24. > :50:29.that would protect and safeguard people who were being put in harms

:50:30. > :50:33.way and allowed them to give care to people they would be meeting in

:50:34. > :50:41.distress as well. The paucity of preparation in terms of the

:50:42. > :50:46.aftermath in terms of any kind of reconstruction, the assumption that

:50:47. > :50:50.the Americans would sort that out. That is something that is serious

:50:51. > :50:55.and has to bear on all of our minds and that is why when it came to

:50:56. > :51:01.things like the vote on Syria and the vote on Libya, I and other

:51:02. > :51:05.members obviously had to look to what is it that we're being told,

:51:06. > :51:08.what are the assurances and assumptions on which the

:51:09. > :51:18.Government's position is resting and that is why I was not convinced on

:51:19. > :51:24.any of those. Say that because I hoped I was going to be proved wrong

:51:25. > :51:27.and when it looked as though the early intervention in Libya had

:51:28. > :51:35.achieved what people had wanted it to achieve, I was more than happy in

:51:36. > :51:41.that instance to have been proved wrong. Similarly in relation to

:51:42. > :51:46.Syria, there was a time, there were points in the debates were some of

:51:47. > :51:50.us who were asking questions about the Government's proposals were

:51:51. > :51:55.being advised that we should listen to what the Prime Minister was

:51:56. > :51:58.saying, so there were people here still who had not let the lessons

:51:59. > :52:04.from the Iraq war because if our Prime Minister is telling us this,

:52:05. > :52:08.then we should do it and proceed. It is clear that in this House we do

:52:09. > :52:15.need to do much more to learn the lessons of all of this. The motion

:52:16. > :52:19.before us says that the House has considered the Chilcot report. I do

:52:20. > :52:25.not do your font that motion but we should not pretend that this debate

:52:26. > :52:29.is anything like adequate consideration of this report. I

:52:30. > :52:38.cannot pretend to have read all 2.6 million words of it. And of course

:52:39. > :52:43.it has taken place in the context of a swirl of other events as well

:52:44. > :52:48.which is somewhat distracting. It is also the case that a strong

:52:49. > :52:53.undertone has been in this debate about the question of the former

:52:54. > :52:58.Prime Minister and the member for Plymouth was very right in pleading

:52:59. > :53:02.that we don't just personalise it around him and I thought also the

:53:03. > :53:07.very significant point is that he made on behalf of people who serve

:53:08. > :53:13.in these sorts of military ventures was hugely important as well. But I

:53:14. > :53:18.would ask those members who tried to say that this somehow exonerate Tony

:53:19. > :53:24.Blair, to stop making the mistake of polishing non-findings and trying to

:53:25. > :53:29.rubbish some of the findings that are in this report because some of

:53:30. > :53:34.the people who are highlighting the non-findings of questioning some of

:53:35. > :53:38.the findings in relation to what the future requirements should be in

:53:39. > :53:44.terms of upholding UN positions and proper Parliamentary oversight,

:53:45. > :53:48.proper Parliamentary information and awareness. The final point I would

:53:49. > :53:53.make in agreeing with the honourable member in which he said people don't

:53:54. > :53:56.have the right to criticise unless they have the right equipment.

:53:57. > :54:01.People don't have the right to justify the Iraq war and pretend the

:54:02. > :54:05.report is not an indictment of that decision and how it was taken. If

:54:06. > :54:11.they did not ask those questions at the time, questions that should have

:54:12. > :54:18.been screening out at us, any reading of the intelligence at the

:54:19. > :54:22.time would have told them. It is a privilege to take part in this

:54:23. > :54:25.debate on the Chilcot report and to listen to some colleagues who have

:54:26. > :54:28.much greater knowledge and more direct experience of the issues and

:54:29. > :54:33.events concerned than I have and I don't intend to repeat many of the

:54:34. > :54:37.points that have been made. I was not an MP at the time so my

:54:38. > :54:42.opposition was from my limited knowledge from outside this House

:54:43. > :54:47.and I made my view is now very vigorously to my then MP. In this

:54:48. > :54:54.report, Chilcot has been prepared to be critical of processes and

:54:55. > :54:57.decisions and that opportunity to be critical is vital to our democracy.

:54:58. > :55:01.What is important is we learn the lessons from the report. It was the

:55:02. > :55:10.Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown who set up the Chilcot enquiry in

:55:11. > :55:14.June 2009. That it would cover the period 2001-2009, including the way

:55:15. > :55:20.decisions were made and identified the lessons that can be learned.

:55:21. > :55:23.There had been calls for an enquiry before and our response was that we

:55:24. > :55:31.should wait until troops had withdrawn. For us now, we need to

:55:32. > :55:35.learn the lessons and as parliamentarians, we need to focus

:55:36. > :55:41.on the decision-making process. The basis for the advice on the legality

:55:42. > :55:44.of the war was that the Attorney General understands that it is

:55:45. > :55:49.unequivocally the Prime Minister's view that Iraq has committed further

:55:50. > :55:53.material breaches as specified in paragraph four. But this is a

:55:54. > :56:02.judgment for the PM. It's quite clearly on the Prime

:56:03. > :56:07.Minister and the lesson that we need to learn is whether the level of

:56:08. > :56:11.Defence Secretary wider cabinet or Defence Secretary wider cabinet or

:56:12. > :56:12.abuse we should scrutinise most Catholic any such advice before we

:56:13. > :56:21.commit to war. Clearly, when MPs in commit to war. Clearly, when MPs in

:56:22. > :56:23.2013 when cancer meeting the integration and Syria, events in

:56:24. > :56:28.Iraq were very much on their minds. The dilemma is when you see the

:56:29. > :56:33.terribles suffering in Syria, how do you deal with it? With our

:56:34. > :56:40.intervention cause more suffering and make matters worse? What do you

:56:41. > :56:47.do with people like that? As mentioned by the member, we need to

:56:48. > :56:48.fund the FCO properly and to ensure that we have a very detailed and

:56:49. > :56:51.up-to-date understanding of the up-to-date understanding of the

:56:52. > :56:57.complexities of what is happening in many foreign countries where there

:56:58. > :57:01.could be potential conflict or we could potentially be involved. It's

:57:02. > :57:05.an easy option to cut as it is out of sight of public outcry but better

:57:06. > :57:08.understanding and diplomatic efforts can avoid the devastation and

:57:09. > :57:15.cost of war, it is money well spent. cost of war, it is money well spent.

:57:16. > :57:22.Likewise with the commitment to 0.1 -- 0.7% of GDP development. Work

:57:23. > :57:25.like this helps make the world a safer place and reduces the new form

:57:26. > :57:31.initially intervention. During the last Parliament, it was worrying to

:57:32. > :57:35.note that Sir John Stanley joined committed on Arms export control

:57:36. > :57:40.reported that since 2010, there had been a relaxation and astringency on

:57:41. > :57:44.the bridge aims that we were spotting too. It is vital that we

:57:45. > :57:47.should be wary of what we sell to who. That committee needs to

:57:48. > :57:52.continue to be belligerent and the Government to be responsive to its

:57:53. > :57:58.concerns. We need to pull support and strength the work of the UN. The

:57:59. > :58:02.Security Council on the protection Security Council on the protection

:58:03. > :58:13.of civilians and armed conflict. Therefore, as chair of the

:58:14. > :58:17.protection of civilians. Order. Quite a lot of conversations going

:58:18. > :58:24.on in the chamber. I think you're going to reply to the debate and it

:58:25. > :58:28.would be a courtesy if members would listen, there is a minister

:58:29. > :58:33.wittering away from essentially position which is not a great sign

:58:34. > :58:36.of intelligent and which is discourteous. It is very obvious.

:58:37. > :58:44.The honourable lady will be heard. With courtesy. Thank you very much.

:58:45. > :58:49.I am particularly concerned that the UK is not supportive of the UN

:58:50. > :58:52.Secretary General's initiative to development at political declaration

:58:53. > :58:57.to stop the gaze of explosive weapons with wild area effects in

:58:58. > :59:00.populated areas and I do believe, Mr Speaker, we need to take it very

:59:01. > :59:03.within the secretive Council of the within the secretive Council of the

:59:04. > :59:06.UN and make sure we do everything we possibly can to avoid the walk

:59:07. > :59:15.through working with international organisations like the UN. Thank

:59:16. > :59:18.you. I have sat through all of the debate, yesterday and today, and I

:59:19. > :59:23.must say it has been a fascinating education. I have really appreciated

:59:24. > :59:29.listening to many of the members who were here 13 years ago. I have been

:59:30. > :59:35.disappointed by the lack of numbers on the benches here. I am new to

:59:36. > :59:41.of this issue over the years and of this issue over the years and

:59:42. > :59:43.given the long wait that we have had for the Chilcott report, I am

:59:44. > :59:47.here. I will put that down to the here. I will put that down to the

:59:48. > :59:57.fact that so much more is going on in the political firmament and there

:59:58. > :00:01.is so much to read. I would place on the Government benches to think

:00:02. > :00:06.about that and to realise that this is not the end of the Chilcott

:00:07. > :00:09.procedure and the Chilcott investigation, a lot more discussion

:00:10. > :00:12.and thought has to go into that report and I would appeal to the

:00:13. > :00:18.Government to think about that, take that away and think how we could

:00:19. > :00:23.come back and look into all the ramifications that the report has

:00:24. > :00:27.brought this chamber. Can I also say that I think no one has quite given

:00:28. > :00:31.due recognition to the fact that it was the previous Labour Government

:00:32. > :00:34.under Gordon Brown by commission this report and I think that should

:00:35. > :00:46.be recondite because that was a brief thing to do. -- brave thing to

:00:47. > :00:52.do. The Suez intervention which is the other post-war diplomatic

:00:53. > :00:55.disaster on the verbal scale, that Britain blundered into. There were

:00:56. > :00:58.repeated attempts over the eight years remaining of the Conservative

:00:59. > :01:04.Government after 1956 to get a public inquiry after the Suez and

:01:05. > :01:10.that was rejected. Now we got the that was rejected. Now we got the

:01:11. > :01:14.Chilcott report we have learned that when we make the six we have to own

:01:15. > :01:27.up to them and examine the details. I particularly enjoyed listening to,

:01:28. > :01:31.enjoy is perhaps the wrong word,. I have been surprised by the response

:01:32. > :01:36.of some members, particularly on the Labour says, and trying to justify

:01:37. > :01:43.what it was quite clearly the biggest diplomatic blunder of the

:01:44. > :01:53.last 30 years. And particularly I was surprised by the honourable

:01:54. > :01:57.member for Leeds Central and for the member for Wolverhampton South East.

:01:58. > :02:04.Both of whom tried to draw some comfort in the fact that the

:02:05. > :02:08.Chilcott report has not found the former prime Minster Tony Blair

:02:09. > :02:09.guilty of misleading the House. I don't know if that's what Chilcott

:02:10. > :02:15.set out to do but certainly it comes set out to do but certainly it comes

:02:16. > :02:19.by mislead. Because there is by mislead. Because there is

:02:20. > :02:23.abundant evidence, even in the cursory read of the report, even if

:02:24. > :02:31.you have only read the summary report, there is abundant evidence

:02:32. > :02:35.in the Chilcott findings that the fax were pummelled, twisted, jumped

:02:36. > :02:40.on, stretched to the point where no one knew what was going on. And that

:02:41. > :02:47.was a deliberate move of the executive to try and impose its view

:02:48. > :02:53.of the world on this chamber. Is abundant, Mr Speaker, but I think we

:02:54. > :02:56.have to grasp as well as the politics and the dependency and the

:02:57. > :03:02.military issues that Chilcott deals with, there is essential

:03:03. > :03:05.constitutional issue at the heart of that report that this chamber and

:03:06. > :03:13.yourself, so, has to take into account. The executive in the shape

:03:14. > :03:17.of Tony Blair and his immediate allies, the executive got out of

:03:18. > :03:25.hand. This chamber and the Cabinet lost control of the executive in the

:03:26. > :03:30.run-up to the intervention in Iraq. That is the fundamental findings of

:03:31. > :03:34.the Chilcott report. Yes, the actual nature of the intubation, all that

:03:35. > :03:38.extract from that, the executive was extract from that, the executive was

:03:39. > :03:43.not under control. That can never happen again. It has been bred in

:03:44. > :03:51.the history, in the whole history, it has been breath the such an event

:03:52. > :03:56.to take place. The executive to completely get out of control. It

:03:57. > :04:03.cannot happen again. And so if we're going to have a debate later on

:04:04. > :04:06.about bringing some of the individuals, the former Prime

:04:07. > :04:13.Minister Tony Blair to this House, to answer for their actions, the

:04:14. > :04:18.issue is not retribution. The issue is not they were wrong in Iraq and

:04:19. > :04:21.got us into a terrible disaster and we should hold them to account, that

:04:22. > :04:25.is an issue but the fundamental issue in this House in deciding

:04:26. > :04:29.whether or not the former Prime Minister is still to be held account

:04:30. > :04:34.in this chamber is the executive got out of control, we have to have

:04:35. > :04:45.Beirne learn the lessons of that and we cannot let that happen again. If

:04:46. > :04:49.that is what happened, we cannot let those who flouted this House, who

:04:50. > :04:56.flouted Cabinet Government get away with it. Because if we do that, then

:04:57. > :05:04.it could happen again. I also was rather surprised by the verb both of