:00:04. > :00:07.Barclays seems to have a finger in every one of those pies. Tonight,
:00:07. > :00:12.Panorama reveals how shareholders were misled about one of the
:00:12. > :00:16.biggest investments in the bank's history. Any discrepancy of that
:00:16. > :00:19.kind is serious because it raises questions in the minds of investors.
:00:19. > :00:24.Barclays told the world that a Middle Eastern Sheikh was investing
:00:24. > :00:27.more than �3 billion, but we discovered he never did. It's
:00:27. > :00:32.important because if you're not getting it right, you may be
:00:32. > :00:42.committing a crime. Tomorrow, the bank will announce
:00:42. > :00:57.
:00:57. > :01:04.how it intends to change. Tonight, Barclays, Britain's second biggest
:01:04. > :01:10.bank. 1,600 branches and 15 million customers. It's the sponsor of the
:01:10. > :01:13.Premier League and these, London's Boris bikes. Barclays isn't just
:01:13. > :01:20.the bank you know from the high street, that's all changed.
:01:20. > :01:27.Barclays is now a much bigger deal. It's grown from a national retail
:01:27. > :01:30.bank to an international financial powerhouse. Barclays has gone from
:01:30. > :01:34.being a high street bank with an investment bank attached to it, to
:01:34. > :01:38.effectively an investment bank with a high street bank attached to it.
:01:38. > :01:43.It was the high street operation, the money in millions of personal
:01:43. > :01:48.accounts, that helped the investment bank to grow. Having a
:01:48. > :01:53.retail bank attached to you is a great way to make an investment
:01:53. > :01:57.bank bigger and protect the investment bank from the risks that
:01:57. > :02:01.come with running an investment bank. The plan worked. The high
:02:01. > :02:06.street bank used by the likes of you and me is now the junior
:02:06. > :02:16.partner. The riskier investment bank made three times as much
:02:16. > :02:23.
:02:23. > :02:27.profit as its UK retail and But in recent years, the Barclays
:02:27. > :02:32.dream has gone sour. It was the first bank to admit cheating
:02:32. > :02:36.interest rates to boost profits. The so-called LIBOR scandal forced
:02:36. > :02:42.out Bob Diamond, the high-profile chief executive. Clearly, there
:02:42. > :02:45.were mistakes, clearly there was behaviour that was reprehensible.
:02:45. > :02:51.His replacement, Antony Jenkins, has not had a great couple of weeks.
:02:51. > :02:55.He is promising a fresh start at Barclays. I believe we have been
:02:55. > :02:58.too short-term focused, on occasions too aggressive and on
:02:58. > :03:02.occasions too self-serving. But two of his senior management team
:03:02. > :03:08.announced they were leaving. And after criticism of a potential
:03:08. > :03:10.million pound bonus, Mr Jenkins gave it up. Barclays have told us
:03:10. > :03:20.their commitment to change is genuine.
:03:20. > :03:21.
:03:21. > :03:25.And this corporate video shows senior ecs chewing the fat on
:03:25. > :03:30.Barclays new values. Can I justify to colleagues, friends, family,
:03:30. > :03:34.what have I done today? Am I improving their lives and can I be
:03:34. > :03:38.proud? It makes you feel good, as well. But there are much more
:03:38. > :03:43.serious threats on the horizon. Four investigations into how the
:03:43. > :03:52.investment bank did business. Five, if you include an internal Barclays
:03:52. > :03:56.review. So chase gone on inside Barclays?
:03:56. > :04:00.We have been through thousands of pages of documents and spoken to
:04:00. > :04:04.insiders to try and build a picture of the way the bank worked. It's a
:04:04. > :04:08.place where incredibly complex deals helped the Barclays bonuses
:04:08. > :04:13.keep coming. One man had more influence on the
:04:13. > :04:19.shape of Barclays today than any other - the former chief executive,
:04:19. > :04:27.Bob Diamond. He grew the investment bank into a
:04:27. > :04:31.money-making machine and then took over the whole Barclays operation.
:04:31. > :04:39.He was charismatic, charming, and influential.
:04:39. > :04:43.He is, or was, extremely successful and aggressive and die mamic --
:04:43. > :04:47.dynamic investment banker. In the City he was admired for what he
:04:47. > :04:50.built. Whenever we questioned him as analysts he was never strong on
:04:50. > :04:54.the detail of the numbers but he had a clear plan and knew how he
:04:55. > :04:58.wanted to deliver that. I get newspaper the morning, I want
:04:58. > :05:03.a big breakfast, I want my girlfriend to say good morning, big
:05:03. > :05:09.boy... Barclays wanted to know know, as this advert shows from 2000, the
:05:09. > :05:13.bank was brash, proud, and up for the biggest deals. Big head... I
:05:13. > :05:21.get into my big car, she will give me a big wave, close the door of
:05:21. > :05:29.our big house... It was prepared to pay big rewards. Only one problem,
:05:29. > :05:34.my fee, I'd like it to be - what's the word?
:05:34. > :05:39.Bob Diamond instilled Wall Street values into Barclays. It was every
:05:39. > :05:45.man for himself. You imagine banks to be like that. The best banks are
:05:45. > :05:51.not like that. Those there in the early days as the investment bank
:05:51. > :05:56.grew, say it was all about doing bigger deals. You want to work at a
:05:56. > :06:03.profitable investment bank, if you don't there there be problems at
:06:03. > :06:09.bonus time. The bonus is King? Barclays, if you brought home the
:06:09. > :06:13.bacon, you could do speug - anything. How did they bring home
:06:13. > :06:16.the cash? Barclays shifted the focus from high street banking to
:06:16. > :06:22.trading on the international financial markets, some of which
:06:22. > :06:28.has been criticised as casino- banking. The power inside that bank
:06:28. > :06:32.passed away from the old-fashioned bankers to the casino operators
:06:32. > :06:36.like Bob and his gang. Genuinely, there were quite a few profits, but
:06:36. > :06:41.some of the profits of the superprofits were coming by taking
:06:41. > :06:45.an extreme risk. Barclays say many banks were involved in the
:06:45. > :06:49.aggressive pursuit of profit. They reject the term casino-banking
:06:49. > :06:54.and point out that the investment bank has raised around a trillion
:06:54. > :06:59.pounds for UK businesses. Sometimes the most amazing things can escape
:06:59. > :07:05.your attention... Barclays, as this slightly disturbing American
:07:05. > :07:12.recruitment video shows, went hunting for the best people. For
:07:12. > :07:16.Bob Diamond they didn't come cheap. He got out his cheque book and he
:07:17. > :07:21.pioneered the idea of guaranteed bonuses, so it didn't matter how
:07:21. > :07:24.badly you did, you'd just get your guaranteed bonus. And that became,
:07:24. > :07:28.you know, - some people said that was almost like a cancer that
:07:28. > :07:33.spread across the City. A company that is using their talents to
:07:33. > :07:36.become one of the fastest-growing investment banks... Investment
:07:36. > :07:39.banking is the same as the Premier League. The more you pay, the
:07:40. > :07:47.higher you finish up the League table in the Premier League, the
:07:47. > :07:52.same with investment banking. Of course, private companies can
:07:52. > :07:57.pay what they like. And other investment banks pay their staff
:07:57. > :08:02.well, too. But Barclays has been criticised for continuing to pay
:08:02. > :08:07.high bonuses even after the financial crisis in 2008. In 2011,
:08:07. > :08:13.Barclays paid nearly �2.6 billion in bonuses, but what about the
:08:13. > :08:18.people who actually own the bank - the shareholders? What does it feel
:08:18. > :08:22.like to be a shareholder of Barclays today? Pretty grim. Robert
:08:22. > :08:27.Muriel has been a shareholder for 30 years, but in recent years his
:08:27. > :08:33.dividend has been slashed. He has written to the bank over the years
:08:33. > :08:36.dozens of times. What did you tell the bank, what was your view?
:08:36. > :08:40.view was that these payments were excessive. I realise the people
:08:40. > :08:44.were making money for the bank at the time, but I couldn't see any
:08:44. > :08:48.need for any one individual to get that sort of reward.
:08:48. > :08:53.In fairness to Barclays, their record on dividend payments is
:08:53. > :08:57.better than some of their rivals. They say they are committed to
:08:57. > :09:00.rebalancing rewards between shareholders and staff. The
:09:00. > :09:04.overwhelming majority of shareholders support the pay
:09:04. > :09:13.structure, and those with shares in banks the Government did bail out
:09:13. > :09:17.still do not receive any dividends at all.
:09:17. > :09:24.This recent ad suggests Barclays has moved with the times. This is
:09:24. > :09:28.the shape of my banking. Bonuses at Barclays have reduced
:09:28. > :09:37.significantly since 2008. But bonuses have far outweighed what
:09:37. > :09:42.the bank has paid to its owners - the shareholders. I think that
:09:42. > :09:48.investment banking is - says it's for the shareholder, but actually
:09:48. > :09:52.is a machine for the enrichment of investment bankers. Karel Williams
:09:52. > :09:58.is an academic who we asked to study Barclays' accounts. He says
:09:59. > :10:04.the investment bank dominates the business. The firm has partly been
:10:04. > :10:08.captured by its investment banker workforce. The commitment of
:10:08. > :10:13.resources to Barclays investment bank is much more in the interest
:10:13. > :10:20.of the senior investment bankers than it is in the interests of the
:10:20. > :10:24.shareholders or the public. You can see why people might
:10:24. > :10:30.suggest that Barclays was being run for the benefit of its employees.
:10:30. > :10:36.Over the course of 2010 and 2011, Barclays paid its shareholders, the
:10:36. > :10:44.people who own the company, �1.4 billion. Over the same period,
:10:44. > :10:48.Barclays paid its staff �6 billion in bonuses. There's absolutely no
:10:48. > :10:53.doubt that they were at the expense of shareholders. Martin Taylor was
:10:53. > :10:56.chief executive of Barclays until 1998. At the time, he questioned
:10:56. > :11:02.Barclays' expansion of its investment bank. The value in the
:11:02. > :11:06.investment bank seemed to be going, even in the 1990s, to the people
:11:06. > :11:11.who worked in it. And the shareholders were underwriting the
:11:11. > :11:13.risk. That was what worried me. I don't think anybody in the
:11:13. > :11:17.investment banking industry deserves the amount of money
:11:17. > :11:22.they're being paid. I think the amount of money paid is utterly
:11:22. > :11:26.unjustified and has been for quite a long time.
:11:26. > :11:32.Barclays says it pays less than many investment banks and that
:11:32. > :11:36.dramatically cutting pay would cult in key staff leaving the business.
:11:36. > :11:40.What about Bob? What was he on? You might think a bank more than most
:11:40. > :11:44.employers would know how much they were handing over. So we asked
:11:44. > :11:50.Barclays to give us a figure for Bob Diamond's pay for the years he
:11:50. > :11:55.was a director. We asked lots of times. We asked for months. We got
:11:56. > :11:59.nowhere. Barclays told us that we were unable or unwilling to
:11:59. > :12:03.complete the simple task of compiling this information from the
:12:03. > :12:08.relevant public documents. They told us to look in 36 different
:12:08. > :12:14.places in the annual reports and said, the the answer is in there.
:12:14. > :12:19.We did look and so did our experts. It would take you hours and hours,
:12:19. > :12:23.if not weeks, to actually get to the bottom of this. You would need
:12:23. > :12:26.a team of people working on this for days. If you look you can see
:12:26. > :12:32.it's all over the place, you have to look there, and there. Four or
:12:32. > :12:37.five pages. Our best estimate is that in six years Bob Bob took home
:12:37. > :12:42.about �120 million in cash and shares. Barclays says a single
:12:42. > :12:52.figure for Bob's pay is a potentially very misleading and
:12:52. > :12:54.
:12:54. > :13:00.oversimplified approach. So where's the money coming from to
:13:00. > :13:02.fund the seven-figure bonuses? Panorama has gone inside a
:13:02. > :13:07.controversial department that flourished in Bob Diamond's
:13:07. > :13:14.investment bank. Barclays doesn't like talking about it, but it's
:13:14. > :13:18.called Structured Capital Markets or SCM. What it did was amazing, it
:13:18. > :13:25.only employed 100 people but managed to make around �1 billion
:13:25. > :13:28.in profit a year. Now 140,000 people work for Barclays. But this
:13:28. > :13:37.tiny team was generating a significant chunk of the bank's
:13:37. > :13:40.total profits. How on oert did -- earth did they do it? Structured
:13:40. > :13:50.capital markets, was that there when you were at the bank? Yes, it
:13:50. > :13:52.
:13:52. > :13:58.was. There was a business on a modest scale, very profitable.
:13:58. > :14:02.was it for? It was for tax planning. Tax structuring. For international
:14:02. > :14:10.business, mostly. Is that tax avoidance? Um, it's tax avoidance,
:14:10. > :14:14.yes. Tax avoidance isn't illegal. And all banks work to lower taxes
:14:14. > :14:24.for their clients. But tax avoidance at Barclays was done on a
:14:24. > :14:32.
:14:32. > :14:35.It was a major profit sector fall of Barclays. It was like their
:14:35. > :14:41.office in Canary Wharf was an offshore island completely divorced
:14:41. > :14:44.from the rest of Britain. I had a good look at what SCM was doing in
:14:44. > :14:49.my day. The question was how aggressively it should be growing
:14:50. > :14:54.and in my view it was not growing aggressively. You could only grow
:14:54. > :14:58.it aggressively by pushing the envelope too far. Critics would say
:14:58. > :15:03.that Martin Taylor always opposed a major expansion of investment bank.
:15:03. > :15:13.It was the main reason that he left. After he went, the SCM department
:15:13. > :15:14.
:15:14. > :15:21.We have been given confidential documents that show the shape of
:15:21. > :15:26.one SCM tax avoidance scheme. sits there. That is the finance.
:15:26. > :15:28.Staff lent billions of pounds to a bank in Luxembourg with complex
:15:29. > :15:33.structures and a company in the Cayman Islands. At the bottom we
:15:33. > :15:39.have still got 2.5 billion. Barclays drew up the whole
:15:39. > :15:44.structure. It is like a nightmare Ikea map. All of this helped
:15:44. > :15:53.Barclays exploit the system and afford millions in tax. There is
:15:53. > :15:58.something else here, 120 million dividend. Barclays at the top.
:15:58. > :16:05.Barclays told us it does not offer, can don't or support unlawful tax
:16:05. > :16:13.evasion. Where any SCM transaction has UK tax implications, we make
:16:13. > :16:18.full and explicit disclosure to HMRC. Inside Barclays's investment
:16:18. > :16:23.bank, SCM was a closed world. We have tracked down an insider. As
:16:23. > :16:28.long as we protected his identity, he agreed to tell us about this
:16:28. > :16:32.little known tax avoidance department. It was isolated. The
:16:32. > :16:36.whole section had about 100 people including support staff so there
:16:36. > :16:41.were about 60 people on the front end. They made huge profits. But of
:16:41. > :16:45.their work was about finding new ways of avoiding tax. -- much of
:16:45. > :16:50.their work. Some smart people in the product development team would
:16:50. > :16:53.come up with a tax trick and the marketing team would cloak it in a
:16:53. > :16:57.rationale. There is nothing wrong with it, it is perfectly normal,
:16:57. > :17:03.but the issue is that they turned it into an industry within the bank.
:17:03. > :17:08.We set to ourselves at the time, how does a bank get away with this?
:17:08. > :17:12.SCM paid some of Barclays's biggest bonuses. The bonus pool was 10% of
:17:12. > :17:18.profits, we have been told, which would mean in its best year 100
:17:18. > :17:25.people shed �100 million. Barclays says that the figure is not
:17:25. > :17:32.accurate. At the weekend SCM closed and the bank is expected to say
:17:32. > :17:38.that they will no longer engaged in activities where the main objective
:17:38. > :17:46.is to avoid tax. That brings us to the biggest deal of all. In 2008,
:17:46. > :17:50.Barclays is in trouble. It looked like they have to ask for a
:17:51. > :17:55.Government bail out. In 2008, British banking was in crisis. But
:17:55. > :17:59.perfectly reasonably they were desperate to avoid a bail out.
:17:59. > :18:03.was Barclays keen to stay out of Government control when other banks
:18:03. > :18:07.were bailed out? Barclays has made much of the fact that it remained
:18:07. > :18:13.independent. But some say there is another reason, the same old reason,
:18:13. > :18:18.bonuses. They were prepared to do anything to avoid going to the
:18:18. > :18:24.taxpayer because that would have required limits on bonuses. It
:18:24. > :18:28.would have undermined the culture that Bob Diamond was known for.
:18:28. > :18:38.you think bonuses were a factor in this? I am sure it was. I don't
:18:38. > :18:40.
:18:40. > :18:45.believe it was the only reason but Barclays deny bonuses were a factor.
:18:45. > :18:49.They had been told, like all banks, to increase the amount of their
:18:49. > :18:53.reserves. By October, 2008, they found themselves with just a couple
:18:54. > :19:03.of weeks to find the cash. We have been told they went to some
:19:03. > :19:08.surprising places to try and get it. Like Libya. This was when Colonel
:19:08. > :19:12.Gaddafi was still in charge. We have been told that Barclays asked
:19:12. > :19:22.the Libyan investment authority if it wanted to buy a slice of the
:19:22. > :19:22.
:19:22. > :19:25.bank. One of the men who ran the Libyan fund told Panorama that they
:19:25. > :19:29.turned Barclays down because the deal was too rushed and risky.
:19:29. > :19:38.Barclays so that is not accurate and they had no need for funding
:19:38. > :19:42.from Libya. -- Barclays said. In the end it did not matter. Two of
:19:42. > :19:47.the groups in the Middle East were happy to provide the cash. �7
:19:47. > :19:54.billion, mainly from the Gulf states of Qatar and Abu Dhabi. It
:19:54. > :19:58.came at almost credit card rates of up to 14%. The Qatar deal is under
:19:58. > :20:03.investigation by the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Services
:20:03. > :20:08.Authority. But we think the Abu Dhabi side of the deal raises
:20:08. > :20:18.questions, too, about Barclays's relationship with a Middle Eastern
:20:18. > :20:20.
:20:20. > :20:24.You might not have heard of the man named as the main Abu Dhabi
:20:25. > :20:32.investor. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan. But you will have heard
:20:32. > :20:35.of his other big British Investment, Manchester City. Sheikh Mansour
:20:35. > :20:40.fronted the take-over of Manchester City a few months before he turned
:20:40. > :20:45.his attention to Barclays. Here he is, meeting the players. He has
:20:45. > :20:52.kept a low profile in the UK. I want you to tell me what you know
:20:52. > :20:57.about Sheikh Mansour. He owns City. He is a good supporter of City.
:20:57. > :21:00.That is all we know, really. He is a very wealthy person and he is
:21:00. > :21:05.doing a fabulous job here. I don't know much about his investment in
:21:05. > :21:09.this country, other than the stuff we did with Barclays bank, was it?
:21:09. > :21:14.He bailed them out rather than have them going to the Government. I
:21:14. > :21:19.know he made more cash from that. Sheikh Mansour is a member of the
:21:19. > :21:24.ruling family in Abu Dhabi. Back in 2008, Barclays told the world that
:21:24. > :21:28.the Sheikh was giving it more than �3 billion. Shareholders were told
:21:28. > :21:33.the same thing and voted to accept the deal. Panorama has noticed
:21:33. > :21:39.something odd. It was buried deep in paperwork that was issued the
:21:39. > :21:43.day after the shareholders gave their approval. On page 44 of this
:21:43. > :21:49.prospectus, it says that Sheikh Mansour has arranged for his
:21:49. > :21:54.investment to be funded by an Abu Dhabi Government investment vehicle.
:21:54. > :21:58.That seems like the Abu Dhabi Government was providing the cash,
:21:58. > :22:02.and not Sheikh Mansour. And that is important because although Sheikh
:22:02. > :22:06.Mansour is a member of the ruling family, there is a difference
:22:06. > :22:11.between his money and the Government's. Are they the same?
:22:11. > :22:18.They are not. It is sloppy thinking, this. There is a big difference
:22:18. > :22:25.between a member of ruling family in the Emirates, who has his own
:22:25. > :22:28.personal life, wealth and activities. When we started delving
:22:28. > :22:35.deeper, we found more contradictions in the Barclays
:22:36. > :22:39.paperwork. Barclays's filings to the US Government suggest that the
:22:39. > :22:43.Abu Dhabi Government is the investor, not Sheikh Mansour. But
:22:43. > :22:47.the Barclays annual report, that is sent to shareholders, talks about
:22:47. > :22:56.Sheikh Mansour in two separate years, and the problem for Barclays
:22:56. > :22:59.is that they cannot both be right. Two reports referring to the same
:22:59. > :23:04.date, you would expect them to be entirely consistent. If they are
:23:04. > :23:08.not, that means something is wrong. Something is not accurate. Every
:23:08. > :23:12.bank is aware that the annual report is a critical document and a
:23:12. > :23:18.huge amount of time and attention is put into getting the details
:23:18. > :23:22.correct. Barclays has now told us the investor was actually the Abu
:23:22. > :23:26.Dhabi Government. They have admitted that they knew the
:23:26. > :23:33.investor might change, even as shareholders voted for Sheikh
:23:33. > :23:40.Mansour. The banks say that when the change was confirmed, it
:23:40. > :23:43.provided the appropriate disclosure. Barclays admits it was wrong to
:23:43. > :23:52.identify Sheikh Mansour in the annual report but they say this was
:23:52. > :23:55.simply a drafting error. So Barclays misled the public and its
:23:55. > :24:02.shareholders over one of the biggest investments in its history.
:24:02. > :24:06.But that is not the only reason why our discovery might be important.
:24:06. > :24:10.Although Sheikh Mansour's money did not save Barclays, it did play a
:24:10. > :24:14.crucial role in the deal. He was chairman of the Abu Dhabi
:24:14. > :24:18.investment vehicle that provided the funding, a Government official.
:24:18. > :24:25.If it turned out that Sheikh Mansour profited personally from
:24:25. > :24:29.the deal, it might look like a bribe. You have to worry not
:24:29. > :24:34.because Sheikh Mansour may or may not be doing something wrong. You
:24:34. > :24:39.have to worry because you may be doing something wrong as a bank.
:24:39. > :24:46.How big an issue is it to get that right? It is important because if
:24:46. > :24:51.you are not getting it right, you may be committing a crime.
:24:51. > :24:57.Barclays deal offered a lucrative incentive, the chance to buy 758
:24:57. > :25:01.million shares at a fixed price. We don't know who benefited from these
:25:02. > :25:08.share options, technically called warrants, because Barclays issued
:25:08. > :25:13.them to an offshore company. We do know a few facts. That offshore
:25:13. > :25:17.company was controlled by Sheikh Mansour. It then transferred to the
:25:17. > :25:22.Abu Dhabi Government, then an Abu Dhabi official, before eventually
:25:22. > :25:27.ending up back with Sheikh Mansour. Because it is all offshore it is
:25:27. > :25:30.impossible to prove whether the Sheikh benefited personally. Our
:25:30. > :25:35.evidence suggests that there are serious grounds to investigate
:25:35. > :25:43.whether he did. I think that red flags have popped up all over the
:25:43. > :25:47.place. Every Fred fly past to be dealt with. -- every red flag has
:25:47. > :25:52.to be dealt with. Whose responsibility is it to get to the
:25:52. > :25:55.bottom of those issues? It is Barclays's. We asked Sheikh Mansour
:25:55. > :25:59.and the Abu Dhabi investment vehicle about the deal but neither
:25:59. > :26:04.of them would speak to us. Barclays told us the allegations were not
:26:04. > :26:09.justified and that the change in ownership had no bearing on the
:26:09. > :26:13.transaction or required approvals. What we know for certain is that
:26:13. > :26:17.the Sheikh ended up as one of Barclays's biggest shareholders.
:26:17. > :26:21.The bank told us the deal was the correct decision for Barclays, its
:26:21. > :26:25.shareholders, its customers and its clients, as well as for the UK.
:26:25. > :26:30.They never turned to the British taxpayer. Senior executives did
:26:30. > :26:40.waive their bonuses the following year because of the deal, but the
:26:40. > :26:41.
:26:41. > :26:45.bonus culture inside the bank Barclays says it is not fair to put
:26:45. > :26:51.this programme out the night before the new chief executive outlines
:26:51. > :26:55.his vision for the future. In a statement, Mr Jenkins told us:
:26:55. > :27:00.Unfortunately I cannot change the past. No one should underestimate
:27:00. > :27:07.our total resolve to make Barclays a better bank. One of his
:27:07. > :27:12.predecessors says things have to change. I think that trying to put
:27:12. > :27:20.the business on a more solid for towing so that it does not make
:27:20. > :27:26.these mis-steps in the future is very important. -- solid footing.
:27:26. > :27:31.But some critics think it is too little too late. Barclays went from
:27:31. > :27:34.being the most reputable bank long ago. You lose a reputation that
:27:34. > :27:42.takes hundreds of years to build in a few years and it will take them a
:27:42. > :27:45.long time to rebuild it. After so many years of relying on its
:27:45. > :27:55.troublesome investment bank, can Barclays finally end its addiction
:27:55. > :27:59.