:00:04. > :00:08.For the north-east of Scotland and England be prepared for snow
:00:08. > :00:12.overnight overnight and tomorrow. Overnight, the worst of the snow in
:00:12. > :00:16.the hills of Scotland. Blowing around. By the end of the night
:00:16. > :00:20.getting down to a lower level. In the south a quieter story. The
:00:20. > :00:24.showers fading away. Mist and fog forming for England and Wales. A
:00:24. > :00:28.touch of frost possible almost anywhere in parts of the UK. In the
:00:28. > :00:33.morning, it is all about the snow in the east of Scotland. It is down
:00:33. > :00:37.at low levels. It is settles, the accumulations building up. Be
:00:37. > :00:42.prepared for tricky travelling conditions in the morning. Quieter
:00:42. > :00:47.over England and Wales in the morning. Cloud around but not much
:00:47. > :00:52.rain. Some rain towards Essex and Kent. Maybe a few light showers
:00:52. > :00:59.lingering on from the overnight period. Some brighter spells to be
:01:00. > :01:05.found. Mainly in the west, but here a chance of one or two showers.
:01:06. > :01:11.Maybe some snow up over the moors. Snow showers in Northern Ireland in
:01:11. > :01:18.some places. Through the day, the main focus is the north-east of the
:01:19. > :01:24.UK. The snow continuing to pile up. Then at sea level, about five to so
:01:24. > :01:27.centimetres, more in the hills and blowing around in places. In the
:01:27. > :01:35.south it is more straightforward. Sunny spells and heavy showers in
:01:35. > :01:39.the afternoon. A little bit of sunshine, reaching eight Celsius.
:01:39. > :01:45.By Wednesday, north of the line through Wales and the southern
:01:45. > :01:50.counties of England, that is where the colder air isened -- and the
:01:50. > :01:55.wintry showers. Thursday, a feed of cold air coming from the Continent.
:01:55. > :02:01.To the west, weather fronts bofrpling into that. Wind and rain
:02:01. > :02:06.piling into the cold air. Later on, uncertainty but the general theme
:02:06. > :02:10.is there. The rain is to turn to snow in the north of the UK. So,
:02:10. > :02:15.staying cold for the rest of the week. Bitter winds bringing snow
:02:15. > :02:25.with them. To keep up-to-date, do so online.
:02:25. > :02:25.
:02:25. > :03:59.Apology for the loss of subtitles for 93 seconds
:03:59. > :04:04.Good night. Ten years ago, the Iraq war began.
:04:04. > :04:08.We were told it was necessary to get rid of Saddam's weapons of mass
:04:08. > :04:16.destruction, WMD. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not
:04:16. > :04:22.shut down. It is up and running now. Tony Blair assured us the
:04:22. > :04:25.intelligence was beyond doubt. In fact, it was anything but. What
:04:25. > :04:29.appeared to be gold in terms of intelligence turned out to be
:04:30. > :04:36.fool's gold. He has existing and active military plans for the use
:04:36. > :04:45.of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45
:04:45. > :04:51.minutes. Did he say he'd seen the weapons? No. The Iraqi regime has
:04:51. > :04:56.tried to -- plotted to develop anthrax and nuclear weapons for
:04:56. > :05:00.over a decade. There was an atmosphere of "we've got to find
:05:00. > :05:05.something". Very bad intelligence got to the leadership quickly.
:05:05. > :05:11.Other intelligence just didn't make it. We can now show how much of the
:05:11. > :05:19.key intelligence was based on wishful thinking and lies. Why did
:05:19. > :05:24.he fabricate such a story? I think he wanted to find a new home.
:05:24. > :05:28.Fauplty -- faulty intelligence fabricated by spies like this man
:05:28. > :05:34.pressed the button for war. called me on a secure phone and
:05:34. > :05:39.said, he's fabricating. The Iraq war is based on lies. The source
:05:39. > :05:44.was an eyewitness. He actually was present during biological agent
:05:44. > :05:48.production runs. Were you present then? We have first-hand
:05:48. > :05:53.descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels. There were no
:05:53. > :05:59.mobile trucks? No. You were simply making it up? Yes. Tonight, we
:05:59. > :06:06.reveal how British and American intelligence got it so wrong. The
:06:06. > :06:16.fact is that we went to war in Iraq on a lie. That lie was your lie.
:06:16. > :06:29.
:06:30. > :06:35.The spies who fooled the world were telling Downing Street and the
:06:35. > :06:41.White House what they wanted to hear, that Saddam had WMD hidden
:06:41. > :06:45.away somewhere deep in the desert. But just six months before the
:06:45. > :06:53.invasion, there was one piece of intelligence that could have
:06:53. > :06:58.stopped the war. The story begins in Paris, the source was unique,
:06:58. > :07:03.the closest Western intelligence had ever got to Saddam, a minister
:07:03. > :07:07.in his cabinet. French intelligence held the key. The key was a trusted
:07:07. > :07:12.intermediary who had worked with the French before and who knew the
:07:12. > :07:19.minister well. The French decided to give the key to the head of the
:07:19. > :07:23.CIA station in Paris, Bill Murray. I was told that the source was
:07:23. > :07:26.considering leaving Saddam Hussein's regime and try to get out
:07:26. > :07:32.and that he had a great deal of intelligence that he might wish to
:07:32. > :07:37.share. How highly placed was the source? He was one of the chief
:07:37. > :07:44.members of Saddam Hussein's cabinet. So he looked like a person of real
:07:44. > :07:49.interest, somebody we should be talking to. French intelligence put
:07:49. > :07:56.Bill Murray in touch with the intermediary, an Arab journalist in
:07:56. > :08:00.Paris. What did the intermediary ask you for? $1 million up front.
:08:00. > :08:10.The sum demanded was huge, but so too was the potential value of the
:08:10. > :08:10.
:08:10. > :08:19.source. He was Iraq's Foreign Minister Naji Sabri.... To defend
:08:19. > :08:27.our lands, our people... I gave the intermediary up front a sum of
:08:27. > :08:33.money, I won't say exactly how much. Bill Murray gave the intermediary
:08:33. > :08:38.$200,000. In cash? In cash. To be used to pay his expenses, to show
:08:38. > :08:43.that we were serious and also to provide some personal items for the
:08:43. > :08:47.source. Due personally hand over -- did you personally Hanover the
:08:47. > :08:55.cash? Yes. In a suitcase, brown paper envelope? I don't remember,
:08:55. > :09:00.to tell you the truth, probably, probably a paper bag. We finally
:09:00. > :09:10.tracked down the intermediary in Paris. We understand he denies
:09:10. > :09:11.
:09:11. > :09:15.receiving any money. His name is Nabil Mo grabi. He wanted money for
:09:15. > :09:21.an interview. We said no. Bill Murray gave the intermediary
:09:21. > :09:25.questions for the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Top of the lift was WMD.
:09:25. > :09:29.-- list was WMD. The intermediary met the minister in New York six
:09:29. > :09:35.months before the invasion and only a week before the British
:09:35. > :09:39.Government published its dossier which made the case for war. Bill
:09:39. > :09:45.Murray received the answers to his questions and a secret sign was
:09:45. > :09:50.devised to show the source, Naji Sabri, was on board.
:09:50. > :09:55.intermediary had had a couple of suits tailor made for the source.
:09:55. > :09:57.One of which he wore when he gave a speech at the UN. That was part of
:09:57. > :10:03.the agreement to confirm the relationship between the
:10:03. > :10:09.intermediary and the source. when you saw the source, the Saddam
:10:09. > :10:14.cabinet minister wearing his new suit what did that tell you? It was
:10:14. > :10:17.my new seat. I here by declare before you... It told me that yes,
:10:17. > :10:21.they're telling me the truth, they really have had the meeting and you
:10:21. > :10:25.know, they've passed the materialsment The American
:10:25. > :10:30.officials have been fabricating... Murray couldn't meet the minister,
:10:30. > :10:34.so the intermediary briefed him on what Saddam really had. The CIA
:10:34. > :10:39.insists the intelligence showed Saddam had WMD programmes. Murray
:10:39. > :10:43.says his report was used selectively. He had some chemical
:10:43. > :10:48.weapons left over from the early 90s, so he had taken the stocks and
:10:48. > :10:52.given them to various tribes that were loyal to him. He had
:10:52. > :10:55.intentions to have weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological
:10:55. > :11:02.and nuclear, but the report was very clear about what he actually
:11:02. > :11:06.had at that point in time. He had virtually nothing. Were the British
:11:06. > :11:15.informed? All the intelligence we had was being passed to them. I
:11:15. > :11:20.have to assume that they knew about it. We asked Naji Sabri for an
:11:20. > :11:26.interview, but he declined. In a statement he said, "The entire
:11:26. > :11:33.story was totally fabricated." He confirmed he had met an Arab
:11:33. > :11:37.journalist in New York but disputes the account of the meeting. The
:11:37. > :11:41.Bush Administration simply dismissed this secret intelligence
:11:41. > :11:47.from Iraq's Foreign Minister on the grounds that "he would say this,
:11:47. > :11:57.wouldn't he"? They were not happy. I was told they were not happy.
:11:57. > :11:58.
:11:58. > :12:03.not? They just didn't believe it. I was told that the biological
:12:03. > :12:06.weapons information didn't square with the information from "our best
:12:06. > :12:13.source". It wasn't until later I heard about the history of
:12:13. > :12:18.Curveball. Curveball, the code name of
:12:18. > :12:23.American intelligence's best source. This shadowy figure was to
:12:23. > :12:30.transform the intelligence on WMD, an Iraqi refugee with first-hand
:12:30. > :12:36.evidence that Iraq was producing deadly biological weapons. The
:12:36. > :12:41.story he would spin began at the Zirndorf refugee camp outside
:12:41. > :12:46.Nuremberg, Germany. He arrived here at the end of December 1999
:12:46. > :12:54.desperately seek asylum as a refugee from Saddam's tiranical
:12:54. > :12:58.rule. We finally managed to track him down in a small German town.
:12:58. > :13:05.Hills real name was Rafed Al Janabi. In fear of his life, he disappeared
:13:05. > :13:09.from view, seeking anonymity and security. Intransigent my dream was
:13:09. > :13:19.not only my dream but the dream of many Iraqis to see Saddam Hussein
:13:19. > :13:20.
:13:20. > :13:23.out of power in Iraq. Janabi's details were placed on file at
:13:23. > :13:33.Zirndorf. As his background aroused particular interest he was
:13:33. > :13:36.
:13:36. > :13:39.interviewed by German intelligence. Intransigent the man told me --
:13:39. > :13:42.they've heard your statement. This is the first television interview
:13:42. > :13:50.that the head of German intelligence has ever given about
:13:50. > :13:56.Curveball. It was very difficult to get inside information at that time
:13:56. > :14:05.from Iraq. It was very important for us to have a human source who
:14:05. > :14:10.has been engaged in this programme and therefore, it was very valuable
:14:10. > :14:14.-- a very valuable source. They didn't know if this guy was a liar
:14:14. > :14:22.or telling the truth. If he's telling the truth then there was a
:14:22. > :14:26.serious problem. Years of UN inspections prove that Saddam had
:14:26. > :14:36.lied and concealed his lethal chemical and biological agents.
:14:36. > :14:38.
:14:38. > :14:44.They'd been manufactured in giant vats or fermenters like these. This
:14:44. > :14:52.agricultural seed factory is where Curveball said he worked.
:14:52. > :15:00.Translation: I worked at site for seven to eight months. This, at
:15:00. > :15:05.least, was true. Political asylum and money were on the horizon. He
:15:06. > :15:09.told his German interrogators with sketches that he'd been involved in
:15:09. > :15:14.developing mobile biological laboratories with fermenters
:15:14. > :15:19.mounted on trucks. TRANSLATION: They gave me an opportunity to say
:15:19. > :15:22.what I wanted. A lot of the information, which was given to
:15:22. > :15:32.German intelligence was extremely detailed and they verified this
:15:32. > :15:40.information. German intelligence gave the Americans over 100 top-
:15:40. > :15:45.secret reports on Curveball's case. The Americans wanted to meet
:15:45. > :15:52.Curveball face to face and make their own assessment of his
:15:52. > :15:56.credibility. But the Germans steadfastly refused. He told us, I
:15:56. > :16:01.don't want to see the Americans. If he is not willing, really, to meet
:16:01. > :16:05.the American side or others, then we have to respect that.
:16:05. > :16:09.Germans were telling us he doesn't like Americans. He doesn't speak
:16:09. > :16:14.English. He only speaks Arabic and German. He only wants to talk to
:16:14. > :16:17.Germans. But there was another reason. The Germans concerned that
:16:17. > :16:20.the Americans might overplay Curveball's intelligence. We were
:16:20. > :16:24.in a delicate situation. We don't know what the Americans will do
:16:24. > :16:32.with the information. We can't control that any longer, so the
:16:32. > :16:42.decision was quite clear - give them our level of information and,
:16:42. > :16:50.
:16:50. > :16:57.The story began to unravel when the Germans realised that Curveball had
:16:57. > :17:03.lied about parts of his story. Satellite imagery confirmed these
:17:03. > :17:08.doubts. Photographs contradicted the description of the site where
:17:08. > :17:12.Curveball had worked near Baghdad. He said large trucks with trailers
:17:12. > :17:16.had been driven in and out of the end warehouse but satellite images
:17:16. > :17:26.showed it would have been impossible for a truck to make that
:17:26. > :17:30.
:17:30. > :17:34.manoeuvre. What is more there was a six foot wall in the way.
:17:34. > :17:42.Curveball's duplicity was well known to his former boss and close
:17:42. > :17:50.friend. Each of thing to the other's wedding. We worked together
:17:50. > :18:00.for a long time. I knew this guy was a liar. A congenital liar.
:18:00. > :18:09.do you say that? He was always making up stories. He was a spy, a
:18:09. > :18:15.conman. A disaster worldwide and for Iraqis. After a year of
:18:15. > :18:21.interviews with Curveball, German intelligence decided to stop the
:18:21. > :18:24.regular meetings with him. At the beginning of two dozen of one he
:18:24. > :18:30.was out in the cold, flipping burgers at this fast food outlet
:18:30. > :18:38.near Nuremberg. But one seismic event was to change everything and
:18:38. > :18:42.place Curveball centre stage once again.
:18:42. > :18:47.9/11 gave President Bush the opportunity to achieve his long-
:18:47. > :18:54.term goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Erroneously associated him
:18:54. > :19:01.with Al-Qaeda. This is a regime that has something to hide from the
:19:01. > :19:07.civilised world. States like these and their terraced allies
:19:07. > :19:13.constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world.
:19:13. > :19:20.What Curveball was saying now seemed too good to dismiss. To the
:19:20. > :19:26.White House Curveball underpinned their case. But doubts were growing.
:19:26. > :19:32.In the spring of two dozen and to MI6 sent the CIA cable summing up
:19:32. > :19:37.its position on Curveball. Elements of his behaviour strike us as
:19:37. > :19:42.typical of individuals we normally assessed as fabricators.
:19:42. > :19:49.Nevertheless it was... Inclined to believe that a significant
:19:49. > :19:56.departure of his reporting is true. I believe there were doubts in MI6
:19:56. > :20:02.in this case. And there was a debate and they did not have any
:20:02. > :20:09.additional information. Curveball was saying I was first-hand witness
:20:09. > :20:15.to the production. I saw accidents were people died. I sort real road
:20:15. > :20:21.cars moving stuff. Some of it was quite detailed. That type of Mike
:20:21. > :20:27.Rolfe. He was telling us information that people wanted to
:20:27. > :20:32.hear. Despite all the reservations, both MI6 and the CIA decided to
:20:32. > :20:40.stick with Curveball. And they soon had what they thought was
:20:40. > :20:45.corroboration. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has
:20:45. > :20:51.mobile biological research laboratories.
:20:51. > :20:55.This was the second spy who fooled the world. An Iraqi defector from
:20:55. > :21:01.Saddam Hussein's intelligence services who made his way to Jordan.
:21:01. > :21:08.His name was major Mohammed Harith. He offered himself to an exile
:21:08. > :21:16.group known as the are rushing -- the Iraqi National Congress. He was
:21:16. > :21:26.an Iraqi defector in Jordan. He was quite desperate to get out of
:21:26. > :21:26.
:21:26. > :21:27.Jordan. Nabil Mussawi was filmed by American television talking to
:21:28. > :21:34.major Mohammed Harith. Major Mohammed Harith said it was his
:21:34. > :21:41.idea to develop mobile biological laboratories. He said he had
:21:41. > :21:46.brought tracks and he revealed how many. But the Americans had doubts
:21:46. > :21:56.because his story was so elaborate and unbelievable. He even claimed
:21:56. > :22:03.he had met Osama bin Laden. Major Mohammed Harith was given a
:22:03. > :22:13.lie-detector test. But perhaps surprisingly he passed. When he
:22:13. > :22:15.
:22:15. > :22:20.talked about the robot unit, I did believe it. Was his story true?
:22:20. > :22:26.it was fabricated. There was no proof. Why did he fabricate the
:22:26. > :22:34.story? I think he wanted to find a new home.
:22:34. > :22:38.In the end, neither the Pentagon nor the CIA was convinced. And in
:22:38. > :22:44.spring 2002 a berm notice was issued saying that Major Mohammed
:22:44. > :22:51.Harith was a fabricator. Americans realised that he was
:22:51. > :22:58.making it all up. Yet his intelligence was still quoted.
:22:58. > :23:07.with Curveball. Inexplicably as with Curveball, the intelligence
:23:07. > :23:12.would remain on file waiting to come back and fight.
:23:12. > :23:15.Now there was to be a third attempt to fool the world. Based on the
:23:15. > :23:20.nightmare scenario that Saddam Hussein could be developing a
:23:20. > :23:26.nuclear weapon. Saddam Hussein is determined to get
:23:26. > :23:33.his hands on a nuclear bomb. Once again the story starts with
:23:33. > :23:37.the tantalising kernel of truth. This time in Rome. In 1999 a
:23:37. > :23:43.genuine secret letter came to light indicating that an Iraqi ambassador
:23:43. > :23:50.was planning to visit Niger, a country rich in uranium. But soon
:23:51. > :23:55.the fact turned to fantasy. Fantasy would also around this man,
:23:55. > :24:00.Rocco Martino, flew over the years have had dealings with the Italian
:24:00. > :24:08.and other intelligence agencies. In this so Ben's picture he's meeting
:24:08. > :24:18.an intelligence officer. He liked to be a charming man. He was very
:24:18. > :24:23.mysterious. And there was something shadowy around him.
:24:23. > :24:29.Rocco Martino gave Elisabetta Burba a a set of documents which she
:24:29. > :24:34.later gave to the American embassy. Potentially they were at the
:24:34. > :24:40.smoking gun that everybody at the time was looking for.
:24:40. > :24:45.It is a murky story. What is clear is that Rocco Martino got the
:24:45. > :24:54.documents from the Embassy of Niger in Rome and an Italian intelligence
:24:54. > :25:01.officer was involved as some stage. The sensational documents detailed
:25:01. > :25:06.how Iraq was planning to buy 8500 tons of pure uranium from Niger and
:25:07. > :25:11.was signed and sealed by the President of Niger.
:25:11. > :25:16.The documents looked authentic and they even included the original
:25:16. > :25:21.genuine laughter. But on closer examination they soon turned out to
:25:21. > :25:29.be a crude forgery. There were filled with all kinds of
:25:29. > :25:39.mistakes. They newest the name of the previous minister of foreign
:25:39. > :25:41.
:25:41. > :25:45.affairs. -- they used. It was a pretty bad forgery for stock de -.
:25:45. > :25:51.Earlier on Rocco Martino had tried to sell the documents to French
:25:51. > :25:59.intelligence but they refuse to take the bait. We were highly
:25:59. > :26:05.sceptical. We did not even mention them to any friendly services. And
:26:05. > :26:12.we did not trace any acquisition of uranium by Iraq during that whole
:26:12. > :26:16.period. French intelligence officers were
:26:16. > :26:24.twice dispatched to the uranium mines in Niger and to check it out.
:26:24. > :26:30.There reported there was nothing to it. Pierre Brochand talks about the
:26:30. > :26:36.spread of the documents. It was disseminated to some intelligence
:26:36. > :26:46.services including France, Germany, the UK. Then across the Atlantic
:26:46. > :26:47.
:26:47. > :26:53.and in the end only the US and the UK may that public. Because
:26:53. > :26:58.probably their immune system was weak.
:26:58. > :27:05.The White House eagerly seized on the intelligence. Once again it was
:27:05. > :27:11.exactly what they wanted to here. The CIA had his reservations but
:27:11. > :27:18.the larger story just kept on turning up.
:27:18. > :27:28.My agency tried repeatedly to bang down that whole issue over and over
:27:28. > :27:32.
:27:32. > :27:36.again. One of my colleagues referred to it as whack a mole.
:27:36. > :27:46.contacted Rocco Martino through this family but they said he was
:27:46. > :27:52.
:27:52. > :27:57.too ill to look - judged to do interview. The exact role of
:27:57. > :28:04.intelligent services is unclear. The journalist who fuelled the
:28:04. > :28:11.story feels guilty. Personally I feel very bad because I have been
:28:11. > :28:18.used. To justify a war or which ended up with hundreds of thousands
:28:18. > :28:22.of deaths. MI6 stood by in the merger story.
:28:22. > :28:29.Not based on the forged documents but on British intelligence
:28:29. > :28:33.including eavesdropping from here at GCHQ.
:28:33. > :28:40.The current British inquiry into the Intelligence failings chaired
:28:41. > :28:46.by Sir John Chilcott is now into its 4th year. Behind its closed
:28:46. > :28:52.doors one senior MI6 officer was distinctly underwhelmed by the
:28:52. > :29:02.intelligence on the Niger. That uranium story was pretty
:29:02. > :29:04.
:29:04. > :29:10.unfortunate. It should never have seen the light of day.
:29:10. > :29:16.The late Brian Jones who was head of the WMD section at Defence
:29:16. > :29:19.Intelligence was equally dismissive. There was no suggestion in
:29:19. > :29:24.intelligence that Saddam Hussein was close to having a nuclear
:29:24. > :29:30.weapon. We knew that he had sought nuclear weapons but there was never
:29:30. > :29:35.any suggestion that he had acquired them or indeed was close to
:29:35. > :29:39.acquiring them. Saddam Hussein's alleged attempt to
:29:39. > :29:49.buy uranium from Elijah remained on intelligence files in Washington
:29:49. > :29:50.
:29:50. > :29:54.and London just like Curveball's and Major Mohammed Harith's. They
:29:54. > :30:00.had sowed the seeds for the biggest intelligence fender in living
:30:00. > :30:06.memory. Politically events were now moving
:30:06. > :30:12.fast. 11 months before the war, Tony Blair met President Bush at
:30:12. > :30:16.his ranch in Texas. Tony Blair agreed to support race seemed
:30:16. > :30:23.changed but only if the United Nations wrote had been exhausted. -
:30:23. > :30:28.- regime change. Sir Richard Dearlove, the hemp - does the head
:30:28. > :30:33.of MI6, but the Prime Minister on his visit to Washington in July. He
:30:33. > :30:42.is reported as saying, military action was now seen as inevitable.
:30:42. > :30:47.The intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.
:30:47. > :30:53.In our view we felt that intelligence was used to justify a
:30:53. > :31:00.war which was a walk of choice, of pure choice. But the intelligence
:31:00. > :31:04.was used to disguise that as a war of necessity.
:31:04. > :31:09.Tony Blair's chief-of-staff, Jonathan Powell, have warned the
:31:09. > :31:17.public opinion was fragile and the government now needed a Rolls-Royce
:31:17. > :31:20.information campaign. The last call went out for any
:31:20. > :31:26.further intelligence that could be presented in a dossier designed to
:31:26. > :31:32.be made public. With the publication deadline approaching,
:31:32. > :31:36.three pieces of crucial new intelligence game into MI6.
:31:36. > :31:42.Uncertainty became certainty. Saddam Hussein was now judged to
:31:42. > :31:47.have active chemical and biological weapons.
:31:47. > :31:54.The most dramatic new intelligence was the warning that the WMD could
:31:54. > :31:57.be launched within 45 minutes. has existing and active military
:31:58. > :32:03.plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be
:32:03. > :32:13.activated within 45 minutes. So where did this intelligence come
:32:13. > :32:18.
:32:18. > :32:27.The founder headed a military committee with secret cells of
:32:27. > :32:34.dissident army officers inside Iraq. This was all based on very tight-
:32:34. > :32:40.knit connections through relatives to avoid the security of Saddam. We
:32:40. > :32:45.had cells and various units. Information was to be passed to us.
:32:45. > :32:49.Dr Allawi's group was first told about the 45-minute warning when it
:32:49. > :32:57.was planning a coup in the mid90s and feared Saddam would use WMD
:32:57. > :33:02.against defecting soldiers. The warning came from an Iraqi kernel
:33:02. > :33:08.called Al-Dabbagh, an artillery commander in Iraq's western desert.
:33:08. > :33:16.What was the intelligence? That they are ready to, within 45
:33:16. > :33:21.minutes to hit any unit that will defect. With what? With chemical
:33:21. > :33:25.weapons. Did Colonel Al-Dabbagh say he had seen the weapons? No.
:33:25. > :33:30.fact Colonel Al-Dabbagh simply assumed the sealed boxes delivered
:33:30. > :33:36.to his unit contained chemical or biological agents and they'd just
:33:36. > :33:41.be short range weapons for use on the battlefield. Was it clear from
:33:41. > :33:47.the intelligence from Colonel Al- Dabbagh that the 45 minutes was
:33:47. > :33:52.refer to battlefield weapons? it was clear, yes. The intelligence
:33:52. > :33:56.was then passed from Colonel Al- Dabbagh to his relative Brigadier
:33:56. > :34:02.General Muhie, a senior officer in Saddam's military. We contacted him
:34:02. > :34:07.but he didn't want to talk. Brigadier General Muhie pass today
:34:07. > :34:13.to the INA. When you got the information about the 45 minutes,
:34:13. > :34:21.did you pass that information on to MI6? I think it was passed by one
:34:21. > :34:29.of our officers. To MI6? Yes. the time it got to London, the
:34:29. > :34:33.intelligence was third-hand. Unusually, MI6 did not say the 45-
:34:33. > :34:38.minute warning came from on opposition group, albeit a trusted
:34:38. > :34:42.one, but simply said it came from a reliable source. CIA director
:34:42. > :34:49.George Tenet was less than flattering about Britain's 45-
:34:49. > :34:54.minute claim. Reportedly he referred to it as "that 45 minute
:34:54. > :35:00.shit". The 45 minute intelligence prompted serious concern at the
:35:00. > :35:04.MoD's defence intelligence staff. Their experts thought it vague and
:35:04. > :35:09.ambiing Russ -- ambiguous. referred generally to chemical and
:35:09. > :35:16.biological weapons, which immediately suggested that whoever
:35:16. > :35:20.was providing the material didn't have a detailed understanding.
:35:20. > :35:26.first Government inquiry into the use of intelligence was chaired by
:35:26. > :35:30.Lord Butler. He singled out the 45- minute warning as being one of the
:35:30. > :35:35.most misleading intelligence failings, since it implied Iraq was
:35:35. > :35:40.a serious and current threat to the UK. It was interpreted as referring
:35:40. > :35:46.to missiles that you could fire at Cyprus and that did make it
:35:46. > :35:50.sensational. That misunderstanding was due to a bit of sloppy
:35:50. > :35:59.intelligence, unusual because for the most part the intelligence was
:35:59. > :36:06.handled professionally, but in this case, it was left vague. What's
:36:06. > :36:11.more, although MI6 knew that the 45-minute claim referred to short-
:36:11. > :36:16.range battlefield weapons and not long-range missiles, this critical
:36:16. > :36:22.distinction was never mentioned in their intelligence report or in the
:36:22. > :36:26.Government's dossier. Indeed, the MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove
:36:26. > :36:30.admits he knew it only referred to battlefield weapons. But MI6 never
:36:30. > :36:34.told the Prime Minister or ever mentioned it in the dossier.
:36:34. > :36:44.think it was a serious owe mission because it misled a lot of people.
:36:44. > :36:45.
:36:45. > :36:50.So I think one can say that it was a serious error in the dossier.
:36:50. > :36:53.there were still more errors to come. Just 12 days before the
:36:53. > :36:57.dossier was published, Sir Richard Dearlove took personal charge of
:36:57. > :37:04.the other two pieces of new intelligence and drove to Downing
:37:04. > :37:09.Street to brief the Prime Minister. For the first time, MI6 had a spy
:37:09. > :37:17.who claimed to have direct access to the production of chemical and
:37:17. > :37:21.biological agents. He became known as the new source on trial. Sir
:37:21. > :37:27.Richard called it a significant breakthrough. Although the source
:37:27. > :37:35.was not quoted in the dossier, the intelligence was seized upon as
:37:35. > :37:42.confirmation that Saddam had active WMD. It was an exciting event, last
:37:42. > :37:48.minute, rather like stop press news in a newspaper. So people did act.
:37:48. > :37:52.I think with undue haste. Giving evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry
:37:53. > :37:58.some MI6 officers were highly sceptical of the new source on
:37:58. > :38:03.trial. It was... Being torn Ovcharov the teleprinter and rushed
:38:03. > :38:06.to Number Ten with a little more haste than was probably appropriate.
:38:06. > :38:12.Another said it was... Wishful thinking, which promised the crock
:38:12. > :38:16.of gold at the end of the rainbow. Why wasn't it shown to the defence
:38:16. > :38:23.intelligence staff who could have made a proper assessment of it?
:38:23. > :38:30.Because it was thought dangerous that here was a new source on trial
:38:30. > :38:36.and if it was compromised in any way, the source might be lost.
:38:36. > :38:40.found it quite difficult to believe that there could zist a single
:38:40. > :38:43.piece of intelligence -- could exist a single piece of
:38:43. > :38:48.intelligence in which there could be such great confidence. This made
:38:48. > :38:53.me suspicious about it and about what was going on. I think it was a
:38:53. > :38:58.serious mistake that it wasn't shown to the analysts, it always
:38:58. > :39:02.should be shown to the people who can analyse its validity.
:39:02. > :39:06.Richard Dearlove also told Tony Blair of more dramatic new
:39:06. > :39:12.intelligence. It seemed to corroborate Curveball's claims of
:39:12. > :39:17.mobile biological labs. I was told and specifically briefed about
:39:17. > :39:24.these mobile production facilities for biological weapons. So this was
:39:24. > :39:30.an additional and new factor. MI6 chief said one of their trusted
:39:30. > :39:36.spies code named red river had heard that Iraq had developed
:39:36. > :39:42.biological fermenter to be carried on lorries or railway trucks. The
:39:42. > :39:46.problem was it was here say. Red River was basing this on what he
:39:46. > :39:49.was told by someone else, whom MI6 had never met. What's more that
:39:49. > :39:55.someone else had never claimed that the fermenters had any connection
:39:55. > :39:59.with biological weapons. This really didn't substantiate
:39:59. > :40:04.Curveball's information but it was complementary to it. What this
:40:04. > :40:08.illustrates is that you must always subject those reports to the
:40:08. > :40:14.technical experts. We asked Sir Richard Dearlove to comment, but he
:40:14. > :40:18.said he could not ahead of the forth coming Chilcot report.
:40:18. > :40:23.General Sir Mike Jackson was Britain's senior soldier when
:40:23. > :40:26.troops were sent to fight a war, allegedly justified by this
:40:26. > :40:29.intelligence. What I do know is intelligence sources do not always
:40:30. > :40:35.tell the truth. What appeared to be gold in terms of intelligence
:40:35. > :40:45.turned out to be fool's gold, because it looked like gold but it
:40:45. > :40:49.wasn't. When the eagerly awaited dossier was finally published, the
:40:50. > :40:54.Prime Minister lost no time in telling Parliament that the
:40:54. > :40:57.intelligence case had been established beyond doubt.
:40:57. > :41:04.weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and
:41:04. > :41:10.growing. The trouble was the intelligence was never that certain,
:41:10. > :41:15.as defence analysts felt at the time. We had not seen evidence that
:41:15. > :41:21.established that beyond doubt. That concerned us. The weapons of mass
:41:21. > :41:31.destruction programme is not shut down. It is up and running now.
:41:31. > :41:31.
:41:31. > :41:35.was just guessing that there could be reSidual stocks and reassumption
:41:35. > :41:41.of activities. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological
:41:41. > :41:45.weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them. There was a
:41:46. > :41:49.contistent effort to find insell jepbs that supported pre-conceived
:41:49. > :41:53.positions and desires. He has existing and active military plans
:41:53. > :41:59.for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be
:41:59. > :42:05.activated within 45 minutes. that was a surprising statement to
:42:06. > :42:10.us in the military. What was your reaction? Extremely surprised.
:42:10. > :42:14.were quite dismissive of that intelligence and thought it was
:42:15. > :42:22.transparently weak. What was your reaction to the 45-minute claim?
:42:22. > :42:26.haven't had such kind of information. The intelligence
:42:26. > :42:33.picture they paint is one accumulated over the last four
:42:33. > :42:37.years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritytive. In fact, the
:42:38. > :42:44.original intelligence that was given to the Prime Minister was
:42:44. > :42:49.clearly qualified. It said: "Intelligence remains limited, is
:42:49. > :42:52.sporadic and patchy." The crucial qualifications to the
:42:52. > :42:57.intelligence were totally absent from the Government's dossier in
:42:57. > :43:04.order to make a convincing case to the public and to Parliament. It
:43:04. > :43:07.seems the Government wanted to leave little room for doubt.
:43:07. > :43:12.qualifications should have been there, because I think that in a
:43:12. > :43:20.sense, this was the mistake, the dossier led people to believe that
:43:20. > :43:25.because it was intelligence, it was uniquely worthy of belief. There
:43:25. > :43:27.was other intelligence from human and technical sources,
:43:27. > :43:32.eavesdropping and intercepts, but they painted a less alarming
:43:32. > :43:36.picture. Blair's critics have accused him of deliberately sexing
:43:36. > :43:42.up the dossier by owe mitting these qualifications and including flakey
:43:42. > :43:49.intelligence. Was Tony Blair a liar? No, I don't believe he was a
:43:49. > :43:56.liar. I believe that when he said what he believed about Saddam
:43:56. > :44:02.Hussein, he was speaking the truth, but I think, because the
:44:02. > :44:06.qualifications on the evidence weren't made clear, I think he
:44:06. > :44:11.oversold the case. But that's the reason why there are so many people
:44:11. > :44:14.today who feel outraged still today that they were misled by the Prime
:44:14. > :44:21.Minister. Yes, but I think one could say in the Prime Minister's
:44:21. > :44:29.defence that he misled himself. He, and indeed the intelligence
:44:29. > :44:35.community, had misled themselves. When the dossier was published, the
:44:35. > :44:42.invasion was just six months away. America's war machine was waiting
:44:42. > :44:47.for the signal to go. Now the Bush Administration was determined to
:44:47. > :44:56.use Curveball to clinch the case for war. The CIA was more anxious
:44:56. > :44:59.than ever to meet him face to face. At a Washington restaurant Tyler
:44:59. > :45:06.Drumheller pressed his contact in German intelligence for access to
:45:06. > :45:11.Curveball. He and I were good friends. We had a lot to talk about.
:45:11. > :45:15.At the end, I said, "By the way, they asked me to ask you about the
:45:15. > :45:18.Curveball case. Is there any way they can get access to him. It's
:45:18. > :45:22.really important." He said don't ask, they're not going to give you
:45:22. > :45:26.access. He said look, this is a source we don't have any
:45:26. > :45:29.corroboration for. I'll tell you off the record, he said, that I
:45:30. > :45:36.think personally, he said I dealt with this case, I believe
:45:36. > :45:43.personally that he may be a fabricator. The CIA stkrector says
:45:43. > :45:48.Drumheller failed to pass this and other warnings on. Just before
:45:48. > :45:53.Christmas 2002, the head of German intelligence August Hanning sent a
:45:53. > :45:57.personal cabelling to CIA director George Tenet warning about the
:45:57. > :46:02.intelligence from Curveball. It is not confirmed, please be cautious
:46:02. > :46:06.to use this kind of not confirmed information. Of course he was a
:46:06. > :46:12.single source. He was a single source. We told them. Did you do
:46:12. > :46:21.enough to warn the Americans, to warn the CIA about Curveball?
:46:21. > :46:25.But they were not in a state or in a mind set to be warned. The CIA
:46:25. > :46:31.says Hanning's cable never left Drumheller's office. George Tenet
:46:31. > :46:35.says he never got that cable from the head... But he did. But he says
:46:35. > :46:41.he did. I tell you he did. You have to put my word against George
:46:42. > :46:46.Tenet's. I won't say he lied, but I just say I know. How do you know he
:46:46. > :46:50.got it? Because we sent it to him. Apparently there are other senior
:46:50. > :46:53.officers who don't have any specific recollection of these 11th
:46:53. > :46:56.hour warnings that came from Tyler Drumheller. I have complete faith
:46:56. > :47:05.in the integrity both of George Tenet and of John McLaughlin his
:47:05. > :47:09.George Tenet says he never got your cable. It was addressed to him
:47:09. > :47:19.personally himself to him, I have no explanation for it. Do you
:47:19. > :47:28.
:47:28. > :47:32.believe George Tenet? I always By the return of the year no one in
:47:32. > :47:39.the White House or donning Street down to that war was imminent.
:47:39. > :47:44.Debtor at Downing Street. I do not believe the issue of W o d e was
:47:44. > :47:53.the sole reason to go to war. It was that strategic dimension. And
:47:53. > :48:01.without doubt the ideological mood in Washington was that way. Would
:48:01. > :48:07.the war have happened anyway? believe that the United States were
:48:07. > :48:11.determined to deal with the Saddam Hussein regime.
:48:11. > :48:20.Finally there was to be one last piece of intelligence that could
:48:20. > :48:26.have stopped the war. Incredibly the source was the Iraqi head of
:48:26. > :48:31.intelligence, Habbush Al-Tikitri, the Jack of Diamonds on America's
:48:31. > :48:39.notorious deck of cards. Three months before the war and LA6
:48:39. > :48:44.officer met him in Jordan. We understand that Habbush Al-Tikitri
:48:44. > :48:50.told MI6 that Saddam Hussein had no active weapons of mass destruction.
:48:50. > :48:54.The same message as that conveyed by the Iraqi Foreign Minister just
:48:54. > :48:59.days before the British dossier it was published. But it was not what
:48:59. > :49:06.London or Washington wanted to hear. Apparently they dismissed it out of
:49:06. > :49:13.hand because they thought it was propaganda. It did the fit exactly
:49:13. > :49:19.into the story. Did you get information about the
:49:19. > :49:24.meeting between MI6 Secret Intelligence Service and Habbush in
:49:25. > :49:31.Jordan? Was that part of the paperwork you had from SIS? Were
:49:31. > :49:37.discovered it was part of the paperwork we got. We discover that
:49:37. > :49:43.after the event. Why was it not discovered before? And cannot
:49:43. > :49:48.explain that. This was something which I think our review did miss.
:49:48. > :49:56.But when we asked about it we were told it was not a very significant
:49:56. > :50:00.factor. Because SIS discounted it. It was something they said was
:50:01. > :50:06.designed by Saddam Hussein to mislead. Claud Butler's inquiry did
:50:06. > :50:14.not even know about the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the man in the
:50:14. > :50:19.new suit. Were you aware that that Serie A had retreated to the Iraqi
:50:19. > :50:24.Foreign Minister as a source? not. One would have thought he
:50:24. > :50:29.would have been informed of that. If SIS was aware of it then we
:50:29. > :50:34.should have been informed. It is possible that if MI6 and the Serie
:50:34. > :50:37.A had been able to convince Tony Blair and President Bush of the
:50:37. > :50:41.validity of the intelligence there were getting from their two most
:50:41. > :50:44.highly placed sources, the Iraqi Foreign Minister and head of
:50:44. > :50:52.intelligence, then Britain and America it might not have gone to
:50:52. > :50:56.war. But by this time the die had probably been cast.
:50:56. > :51:02.The month before the invasion, despite the growing doubts,
:51:02. > :51:06.Curveball was about to be revealed to the world. The US secretary of
:51:06. > :51:13.state Colin Powell prepared to make a landmark speech to the United
:51:13. > :51:19.Nations. Tyler Drumheller says he was sent the draft for vetting.
:51:19. > :51:26.There was a whole bunch of stuff on Curveball. I called my new boss and
:51:26. > :51:33.he said you had better check this with John McLaughlan. I said
:51:33. > :51:37.there's a problem with this, we should not use it. They are
:51:37. > :51:42.paragraphs from crows for all through the speech. John McLaughlin
:51:42. > :51:47.said he has no recollection of you telling him this. Someone is not
:51:47. > :51:51.telling the truth. I am telling the truth. The night before the speech
:51:51. > :51:59.Colin Powell and George Tenet were closeted in a hotel room in New
:51:59. > :52:03.York with their top aides. I sat with George Tenet until around 2
:52:03. > :52:09.o'clock or later. The atmosphere was serious. We knew this was
:52:09. > :52:13.profound and we knew we had to get it perfect. Did Colin Powell
:52:13. > :52:18.question the intelligence he was being given on weapons of mass
:52:18. > :52:25.destruction? The secretary of state not only Quested it but quench
:52:25. > :52:32.under intensely. To judge questioned it intensely.
:52:32. > :52:38.daughter answered the phone and it was George calling from the United
:52:38. > :52:47.Nations. He wanted to get a telephone number for somebody in
:52:47. > :52:55.SIS. I said that German report, make sure they do not use that.
:52:55. > :53:01.There is a lot of problems with that. He said, it is under control.
:53:01. > :53:06.George Tenet says he has no word -- no recollection of that. One of us
:53:06. > :53:11.is not telling the whole truth. I am quite comfortable with what I
:53:11. > :53:19.had to say. Every statement I made to date is backed up by a solid
:53:19. > :53:24.sources. These are not anything but solid intelligence. A monetary the
:53:24. > :53:28.person presiding over the United Nations session was the German
:53:28. > :53:35.foreign minister. He knew there was a big question hanging over
:53:35. > :53:41.Curveball. Colin Powell said these are facts. We knew that the veil
:53:41. > :53:48.fact is that neither Colin Howell nor a week could prove that these
:53:48. > :53:51.are facts. It might be true, it might not. The source was an eye
:53:52. > :53:56.witness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these
:53:56. > :54:06.facilities. He was actually present during biological agent production
:54:06. > :54:16.runs. Colin Powell said that the source was president -- was present
:54:16. > :54:16.
:54:16. > :54:22.during the biological runs. We are present? Know. Way you present on
:54:22. > :54:27.site when the accident occurred? was not. We have first-hand
:54:27. > :54:34.descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails.
:54:34. > :54:42.You say you provided diagrams of the mobile biological tracks. You
:54:42. > :54:52.were making that up? And also, you made a model, you constructed a
:54:52. > :54:57.model of these trucks. Again, you made that up? I turned on the
:54:57. > :55:07.television in my office and it is the Curveball stuff he's going
:55:07. > :55:10.
:55:10. > :55:14.through. Not only that he has got graphics of mobile trailers. Which
:55:14. > :55:22.gave me the impression that this was drawn from things that could
:55:22. > :55:28.fall said. All of it was Maurice? Yes. This has been corroborated by
:55:28. > :55:32.other sources. An Iraqi Major had affected confirmed that Iraq has
:55:32. > :55:39.mobile biological research laboratories. That was the second
:55:39. > :55:44.spy who fooled the world. Major Mohammed Harith. But inexplicably,
:55:44. > :55:52.no one had told Colin Howell that he had been formally dismissed as a
:55:52. > :56:00.fabricator nine months before. is Curveball, that is it. It was
:56:00. > :56:06.based on lies. Gradually the lines were revealed.
:56:06. > :56:11.Three days after Colin Powell's presentation, United Nations
:56:11. > :56:18.inspectors now back in Iraq visited the site worker Paul said he had
:56:18. > :56:27.seen them off while biological laboratories. What did you find?
:56:27. > :56:35.lot of corn, a lot of seed. A lot of nothing. We have first-hand
:56:35. > :56:41.descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels. The building
:56:41. > :56:45.was dusty, extremely dusty. There were some old equipment. I did not
:56:45. > :56:50.recognise it. I don't think any have been used for biological
:56:50. > :56:55.production. And the 6 ft wall for a block the entrance to the warehouse
:56:55. > :57:01.was still there. I do not know the last time the human was in that
:57:01. > :57:05.building but it was a long time. This was clearly not in use for a
:57:05. > :57:11.long time and clearly not a biological production facility. At
:57:11. > :57:15.that stage I was very disappointed. As doubts were growing about the
:57:15. > :57:20.strength of the intelligence case, 1 million demonstrators marched
:57:20. > :57:27.through London to express their opposition to the imminent invasion.
:57:27. > :57:30.Tony Blair remained adamant. This is not the time to falter. This is
:57:30. > :57:34.the time for this house not just this government or this Prime
:57:35. > :57:39.Minister, but for this House to give the lead. To show we will
:57:39. > :57:45.stand up for what we know to be right.
:57:45. > :57:54.The following night, of the war began. In a matter of weeks Saddam
:57:54. > :57:59.Hussein's regime was toppled. After the war was over and the fall of
:57:59. > :58:03.Saddam Hussein, MI6 and the CSA traverse the Middle East hoping to
:58:03. > :58:08.track down their precious agents. They helped to confirm that they
:58:08. > :58:14.were reliable sources and find out where the elusive weapons of mass
:58:14. > :58:18.destruction were hidden. There were no weapons of mass
:58:18. > :58:23.destruction and no substance to the corroborating sources on which MI6
:58:23. > :58:27.had relied. The two key pieces of the last minute intelligence that
:58:27. > :58:33.the MI6 chief have personally conveyed to Tony Blair were
:58:33. > :58:40.withdrawn. The new source on trial was deemed to be unreliable. Red
:58:40. > :58:46.River was given a lie-detector test and failed. And what is more, the
:58:46. > :58:51.controversial 45 minute claim was withdrawn.
:58:51. > :58:57.There was even if one report that MI6 trace the source back to a
:58:57. > :59:01.small Jordanian town. He was a taxi driver who said he had overheard
:59:01. > :59:06.Iraqi generals talking about weapons of mass destruction in the
:59:06. > :59:13.back of his cab. It seemed to epitomise how flaky some of the
:59:13. > :59:18.intelligence was. It was a year after the invasion
:59:18. > :59:23.before this series finally got to meet Curveball. An MI6 officer was
:59:23. > :59:29.also present. Curveball was shown a satellite photograph of the site
:59:29. > :59:38.where he had worked. It bore no relation to how he had described it.
:59:38. > :59:46.Curveball said that has been doctored. But it had not. He just
:59:46. > :59:52.stopped talking. Then he said I told you this was a mistake. What