:00:00. > :00:07.This programme contains some strong language and scenes which some
:00:08. > :00:12.viewers may find upsetting from the start. This is the story of the
:00:13. > :00:16.secret British Army unit set up to deal with enemies of the state on
:00:17. > :00:24.the streets of the United Kingdom. So what was the mission as you
:00:25. > :00:28.understood it? To draw out the IRA and to minimise their activities.
:00:29. > :00:34.Minimise their activities. In what way? If they needed shooting, they
:00:35. > :00:38.would be shot. Now, after 40 years of silence, members of this
:00:39. > :00:44.undercover unit speaks candidly about what they did for Queen and
:00:45. > :00:54.Country. We were not there to act like an army unit. We were there to
:00:55. > :00:57.act like a terror group. This is a 9mm SMG Sterling, a little bit
:00:58. > :01:03.beyond the normal SMG because it is fitted with a silencer. We picked up
:01:04. > :01:09.shells which would went right down the street for another 20 yards, it
:01:10. > :01:14.is a Sterling automatic. We have investigated the unit and discovered
:01:15. > :01:21.evidence that this branch of the British state sometimes behaved like
:01:22. > :01:33.that IRA and shot unarmed civilians. He thought he was going to die. And
:01:34. > :01:39.I told him, no. Tonight, we tracked down one soldier accused of firing
:01:40. > :01:45.on innocent citizens. Hello. Mr Williams. John Ware is my name. 40
:01:46. > :01:51.years on, the victims and their relatives still want answers. Oh,
:01:52. > :02:01.yes, we want the truth. We don't want to stop, to get to the truth.
:02:02. > :02:05.People like us had to make decisions and a horrendous pressure. And make
:02:06. > :02:17.the right decision. That is why I am here today and they are not.
:02:18. > :02:24.In January 1972, British paratroopers shot 26 unarmed
:02:25. > :02:35.civilians during a protest in Londonderry. 14 people died in what
:02:36. > :02:38.became known as Bloody Sunday. What happened next is obscure. The army
:02:39. > :02:42.say their men were fired on... Getting to the truth took nearly 40
:02:43. > :02:48.years and an enquiry costing nearly ?200 million. Some of those soldiers
:02:49. > :02:55.are now being investigated for murder and attempted murder. What
:02:56. > :03:05.happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable.
:03:06. > :03:14.Today, case files of the conflict's 3260 dead are being reviewed as part
:03:15. > :03:19.of the peace process. Our investigation has discovered another
:03:20. > :03:24.group of soldiers who now stand accused of shooting unarmed
:03:25. > :03:29.civilians in 1972. These soldiers were undercover and what they did
:03:30. > :03:39.has been airbrushed from the official record. But some have now
:03:40. > :03:44.emerged from the shadows. I was told it was a plainclothes small unit
:03:45. > :03:49.operating mainly in Belfast and it was called the MRF. Which stands
:03:50. > :03:56.for? It stand for Military Reaction Force. Seven former members of the
:03:57. > :04:02.MRF have spoken to us about the unit did. Three agreed to go in front of
:04:03. > :04:06.the cameras on condition that we disguised their identities. I
:04:07. > :04:11.travelled from Liverpool and ended up in Belfast on a very dark
:04:12. > :04:17.Knight, waiting on the harbour there, waiting for them to pick me
:04:18. > :04:27.up, unarmed and eventually ended up in Holywood. The barracks? Palace
:04:28. > :04:32.barracks. Inside the barracks was a big iron compound and it looks like
:04:33. > :04:38.a builder's storage yard. Anyway, we pulled up at the main gate of the
:04:39. > :04:42.compound and the gates just opened. We couldn't take anything, was even
:04:43. > :04:49.photographs, no ID cards, no letters with addresses on, nothing. Anything
:04:50. > :04:54.tying us to the military was totally out. We never got a uniform, very
:04:55. > :04:59.few people knew what rank anybody was. I knew the boss was a captain.
:05:00. > :05:04.These are the only known photographs of the MRF compound tucked away
:05:05. > :05:05.inside a British Army base where ordinary soldiers were forbidden
:05:06. > :05:16.entry. This top-secret unit had around 40
:05:17. > :05:23.men, hand-picked from across the British Army. These were selected
:05:24. > :05:28.men who have had experience, who were well trained, knew their
:05:29. > :05:31.weapons, reliability and all the rest of the things which makes a
:05:32. > :05:39.good soldier and put into teams and sent across. We were told we
:05:40. > :05:47.officially don't exist on paper. The unit doesn't exist on paper. And if
:05:48. > :05:51.you are caught, you will be killed. And if you are caught and killed,
:05:52. > :05:54.the Government would probably put out a story that you were just a
:05:55. > :06:03.soldier in plainclothes that was caught by accident. The unit carried
:06:04. > :06:08.out round-the-clock patrols of West Belfast, heartland of the IRA
:06:09. > :06:14.unmarked cars. The cover didn't always work. When I had my first
:06:15. > :06:22.operation there were three of us in this really clapped-out Avenger. I
:06:23. > :06:27.was the back-seat driver. We saw a car that was on the wanted list and
:06:28. > :06:37.all of a sudden we turned around and then there were the power behinds.
:06:38. > :06:47.-- they were up our behinds. We were carrying the personal weapon, a
:06:48. > :06:52.Browning. 9mm. All of a sudden they opened up with ArmaLites. All of the
:06:53. > :06:56.excitement going to the interviews, all of a sudden I am now in the
:06:57. > :07:01.firing line, in the back-seat of this bloody car that was absolutely
:07:02. > :07:05.clapped-out, petrified. This is the end before I even start. The car was
:07:06. > :07:15.riddled with bullets and not one of us were hit.
:07:16. > :07:21.MRF soldiers say they sometimes acted as bait, goading the IRA to
:07:22. > :07:29.come out and fight. The soldiers wanted to take the war to the enemy.
:07:30. > :07:33.This is a 9mm SMG, a Sterling, but this is a little bit beyond the
:07:34. > :07:41.normal SMG because it is fitted with a silencer. Why the silencer? Well,
:07:42. > :07:46.it is quiet. We were on special operations, soap, you know, we had
:07:47. > :07:53.to be silent. To kill silently? Yes, as simple as that.
:07:54. > :07:58.The military action Force was operating in what in 1972 was one of
:07:59. > :08:10.the world's most dangerous places. In the space of 16 minutes there
:08:11. > :08:14.were 13 blasts and sent people screaming from one place of safety
:08:15. > :08:19.to another, none of them knowing where the next explosion might come
:08:20. > :08:27.from. That year there were over 10,000 shootings. Nearly 500 died,
:08:28. > :08:31.5000 injured. There was evil in the air just about everywhere. The
:08:32. > :08:36.shooting of soldiers and police was not an everyday occurrence but
:08:37. > :08:42.certainly a week occurrence. Looking back now it was chaotic and
:08:43. > :08:53.horrendous. The IRA planted nearly 1800 bombs. An average of five a
:08:54. > :08:58.day. Take away the religious aspect and some of these enemies were just
:08:59. > :09:02.people who had got hold of weapons and they wanted to shoot somebody.
:09:03. > :09:07.They were pure gangsters because somebody had given them a gun. A
:09:08. > :09:12.soldier was shot on open ground after an earlier attack on an army
:09:13. > :09:13.post nearby. Belfast was on the edge of anarchy. The politicians turned
:09:14. > :09:30.to the Army to restore order. To the MRF went the task of
:09:31. > :09:35.infiltrating IRA strongholds to see more while not being seen. British
:09:36. > :09:47.soldiers trying to pass themselves off as local. So you needed a
:09:48. > :09:51.variety of different guises. Yes. There was the trolley to pull, road
:09:52. > :09:56.sweeping. Belfast City Council dustbins. We would use those on
:09:57. > :10:01.covert operations. For what purpose? To stand around in the street. To
:10:02. > :10:11.pose as adjustment. Yes, you could observe a house or people. I spent
:10:12. > :10:17.quite a long as a meths drinker. Just lining -- lying in the gutters
:10:18. > :10:21.in the streets. You would have a machine gun in a bin. You wouldn't
:10:22. > :10:27.have rubbish in the bin. You would have the machine gun in the bin. I
:10:28. > :10:31.had spare magazines strapped to my leg and I carried a PPK on the back
:10:32. > :10:36.of my belt, a Browning under my left and my radio on my right hand side.
:10:37. > :10:45.We were quite armed. You never attracted any suspicion? No. It
:10:46. > :10:49.takes a lot of courage and it is a cold courage. It is not the courage
:10:50. > :10:56.of hot blood, which soldiers in a firefight in conventional terms will
:10:57. > :11:02.find the adrenaline rounds and gives them that extra. Jackson had served
:11:03. > :11:07.in Belfast as the young paratrooper and eventually became head of the
:11:08. > :11:11.British Army. He says he was barely aware of the MRF's activities, but
:11:12. > :11:20.he does admire the courage they would have needed. And you know if
:11:21. > :11:26.you are discovered a pretty gruesome fate may well await you. Torture
:11:27. > :11:30.followed by murder. However, surveillance was just one part of
:11:31. > :11:37.the MRF's mission, according to the soldiers we spoke to. We had two
:11:38. > :11:41.basic arms. One was a surveillance, information, intelligence gathering
:11:42. > :11:47.organisation and the other side was hard-hitting counterterrorist unit.
:11:48. > :11:54.Tell me about the hard-hitting side. The hard-hitting side, we went out
:11:55. > :12:01.and shot the terrorists. Like they'd uniformed comrades, MRF soldiers
:12:02. > :12:05.were given stop on sight mugshots of wanted IRA members. They say they
:12:06. > :12:10.would sometimes do more than just stop them. If you had a player who
:12:11. > :12:17.was well-known who carried out quite a lot of assassinations, then he had
:12:18. > :12:26.to be taken out. Taken out -- meaning? Taken out. Killed? Yes.
:12:27. > :12:31.These were people # These were players, known shooters. Shot on
:12:32. > :12:39.sight if you saw them? They were known in the organisation. We were
:12:40. > :12:44.hunting down hard-core baby killers. Terrorists. People that would kill
:12:45. > :12:48.you without even thinking about it. Yellow bobbing killers themselves,
:12:49. > :12:53.they had no mercy for anybody. They would kill each other for opening
:12:54. > :12:58.their mouth. With over 10,000 shootings in 1972 it is simply not
:12:59. > :13:03.possible to say how many the MRF were involved in.
:13:04. > :13:07.NEWS ARCHIVE: The killings have all the hallmarks
:13:08. > :13:11.of sectarian murders. The men were Catholics and had left the pub where
:13:12. > :13:15.one was a barman. MRF operational records have been destroyed and the
:13:16. > :13:21.soldiers we have interviewed have avoided incriminating themselves or
:13:22. > :13:28.their comrades. What is clear though is that in 1972 some plainclothes
:13:29. > :13:36.soldiers did think it acceptable to shoot unarmed people.
:13:37. > :13:43.In April that year, brothers John and Gerry Conway were on their way
:13:44. > :13:52.to a fruit stall they ran in Belfast city centre. As usual I was
:13:53. > :14:02.delivering the newspapers, which I did every day. The Conway Brothers,
:14:03. > :14:07.Gary and that, the fruit then, that is how I knew Jerry, the fruit man.
:14:08. > :14:10.He just waved over and the next thing these two cars appeared out of
:14:11. > :14:24.nowhere, just appeared. A car pulled up alongside. A man
:14:25. > :14:40.wound down the back window, like that. Run! He ran towards the Falls
:14:41. > :14:52.Road. He turned back towards Ballymurphy. The next thing, these
:14:53. > :14:57.people jumped out and shot him. Bullet lodged there in me. Gerry had
:14:58. > :15:05.been running down the Whiterock, and our car was there, so he had come
:15:06. > :15:09.over to the car and jumped on top of it squealing, please don't shoot me,
:15:10. > :15:16.I have a wife and four wee children. I think at that stage he didn't
:15:17. > :15:19.realise that he was shot, you know. It's the first time I'd seen blood
:15:20. > :15:29.so thick. I know you cut yourself, you get blood. But I'd never seen -
:15:30. > :15:34.I'm sorry... Who did you think had shot you? I didn't know who it was.
:15:35. > :15:39.Plain-clothes soldiers had shot a couple of unarmed men mistaking them
:15:40. > :15:44.for two of the IRA's most deadly snipers. Witnesses heard the
:15:45. > :15:52.soldiers say they'd got Tommy "Toddler" Tolan and Jim Bryson. I
:15:53. > :16:00.says, "That's not Bryson, that's not Bryson. That's Gerry, he's a frui -
:16:01. > :16:05.that's wee Gerry the fruit man." By the time uniformed soldiers arrived,
:16:06. > :16:13.John Conway had vanished. His brother Gerry was badly wounded and
:16:14. > :16:21.taken to hospital by the Army where they still insisted he was IRA man
:16:22. > :16:26.Jim Bryson. I got on to the corridor I could hear my brother shouting.
:16:27. > :16:40.And this soldier kept insisting and said to my brother, "Tell me you're
:16:41. > :16:44.locking Bryson." This soldier would keep repeating he was Bryson. And I
:16:45. > :16:48.think if my brother said he was Bryson, they would have locking shot
:16:49. > :16:51.him, and that's my point of view. Even today, the Ministry of Defence
:16:52. > :16:57.refuse to say whether soldiers in this shooting were members of the
:16:58. > :16:59.MRF. And the MRF soldiers we've interviewed wouldn't comment on
:17:00. > :17:03.specific operations either. We were there in a position to go after the
:17:04. > :17:13.IRA and kill them when we found them. Whether they were armed or
:17:14. > :17:17.not? Occasionally, yes. It was shootings like that of the two
:17:18. > :17:22.unarmed Conway brothers that sparked rumours of an undercover Army unit
:17:23. > :17:26.engaged in assassinations. The Government gave this denial to
:17:27. > :17:31.Parliament. In no circumstances are soldiers employed to assassinate
:17:32. > :17:35.people or in any way which would involve deliberately going outside
:17:36. > :17:38.the law. Patrols work under normal military discipline and in
:17:39. > :17:46.accordance with the Yellow Card. The Yellow Card set out the rules under
:17:47. > :17:50.which soldiers were allowed to open fire. Troops were ordered not to
:17:51. > :17:55.shoot unless their lives, or the lives of others, were in immediate
:17:56. > :18:00.danger. The orders are if you can see a gunman, a man with a weapon,
:18:01. > :18:08.then you may shoot him. A man with a weapon. The use of force must be
:18:09. > :18:11.reasonable in the circumstances, what the Yellow Card set out to do
:18:12. > :18:18.was to give some codification to that word "reasonable". It was a
:18:19. > :18:25.guide for soldiers to say if you want to stay within the law, follow
:18:26. > :18:35.this? Precisely. You knew the rules of the Yellow Card? Yes, inside out.
:18:36. > :18:39.They didn't apply to the MRF? No. I just want to be clear about where
:18:40. > :18:44.the red line was as it were? I think it's a fuzzy red line. It would
:18:45. > :18:47.depend on the situation, how it developed. Whereas the uniform
:18:48. > :18:52.people they would be rigidly bound by it even down to the fact they had
:18:53. > :18:56.to carry the card or face court martial or at least get charged.
:18:57. > :19:01.There was some discretion allowed in your case? In the MRF's case? There
:19:02. > :19:05.would be, yes. If I've got a weapon, but I wasn't aiming the weapon at
:19:06. > :19:10.you, I was a legitimate target? If you had a weapon? But I wasn't
:19:11. > :19:14.aiming at you? No, you are supposed to be arrested. I know, but you
:19:15. > :19:27.didn't. No. You would do what? Shoot you. At the time, the Army's leading
:19:28. > :19:32.expert on counter-terrorism was this man, Brigadier Frank Kitson. A
:19:33. > :19:37.textbook he wrote became the Army's manual on counter-insurgency. In
:19:38. > :19:41.order to put an insurgency campaign down one must use a mix of measures,
:19:42. > :19:46.not just military measures. And it is sometimes necessary to do
:19:47. > :19:50.unpleasant things, which lose certain amount of allegiance for a
:19:51. > :19:57.moment in order to produce your overall result. Kitson was also
:19:58. > :20:01.commander in Belfast when the MRF was established. He had done much of
:20:02. > :20:08.his soldiering in the dying days of empire - fighting in the British
:20:09. > :20:14.colonies of Kenya and Malaya. Kitson departed Northern Ireland in April
:20:15. > :20:18.1972. Some of those he left behind had been schooled in the aggressive
:20:19. > :20:27.tactics of small colonial wars - some of which were illegal under
:20:28. > :20:38.British law. We'd seen Malaya, the fighting in Malaya, Cyprus, and
:20:39. > :20:42.things didn't always go by the book. In 1972, Tony Le Tissier was a Major
:20:43. > :20:45.in the Royal Military Police. He had been posted to Belfast to deal with
:20:46. > :20:51.a backlog of legal complaints against the Army. For the
:20:52. > :20:54.professional soldier, no, it was difficult to accept that this was
:20:55. > :20:57.the United Kingdom. It was a fighting situation for which you had
:20:58. > :21:00.been trained sort of thing and you were going to use the same methods
:21:01. > :21:04.here. There were elements in the Army that had imported a colonial
:21:05. > :21:09.approach to Northern Ireland? Virtually, the whole lot had
:21:10. > :21:12.imported this, it wasn't just elements. It was a strong theme
:21:13. > :21:15.within the, the armed forces, that was the experience that they were
:21:16. > :21:23.bringing to Northern Ireland, where it was not applicable. Well, I mean,
:21:24. > :21:35.you could just about do anything you wanted. Northern Ireland was firmly
:21:36. > :21:40.split along sectarian lines. Both Republican and Loyalist gunmen would
:21:41. > :21:45.drive into each other's areas and fire at unsuspecting civilians -
:21:46. > :21:56.these became known as drive-by shootings. Work began this morning
:21:57. > :22:01.on putting up permanent barricades to block side streets in part of
:22:02. > :22:04.Ballymacarret, the strongly Protestant district alongside the
:22:05. > :22:08.shipyard. Both Protestants and Catholics set up barricades to
:22:09. > :22:16.protect their communities. Both had lost faith in the British state's
:22:17. > :22:20.ability to protect them. Youths and men, masked and uniformed, armed
:22:21. > :22:25.with modern weapons patrol openly. They control completely entry and
:22:26. > :22:29.departure. The IRA would sometimes stage events like this for the
:22:30. > :22:34.cameras. In fact, barricades were often amateurish, with unarmed
:22:35. > :22:38.locals just "doing their bit" to protect their communities. But
:22:39. > :22:48.that's not how some MRF soldiers saw barricades. Barricades were illegal.
:22:49. > :22:53.And generally, a barricade in really bad area, there was almost someone
:22:54. > :22:56.always armed on that barricade. You may not see the weapon, but it's
:22:57. > :23:07.almost certain that somebody's going to be armed. We used to just plod
:23:08. > :23:12.along, do a quick assess of the situation, and then move in and take
:23:13. > :23:17.a few targets out and move along and let the uniform sort the rest out.
:23:18. > :23:21.When you say "take a few targets out", you mean individuals on the
:23:22. > :23:28.barricades? Yeah, and they were fully armed, displaying weapons.
:23:29. > :23:32.Another MRF soldier told us whether or not they could see weapons on a
:23:33. > :23:40.barricade, they'd sometimes, as he put it, give them a blast! We've
:23:41. > :23:49.investigated two incidents where witnesses say this happened with
:23:50. > :23:55.devastating consequences. The first was just before midnight. Aiden
:23:56. > :24:01.McAloon and Eugene Devlin were in a taxi taking them home from a disco.
:24:02. > :24:05.I remember saying at the time, "There's a car behind us" and
:24:06. > :24:13.somebody said, "Oh it wasn't much heed paid." We didn't pay much
:24:14. > :24:16.attention to it. We were tired and on our way home. This is the first
:24:17. > :24:27.time these men have told their story. Taxi turned around, dropped
:24:28. > :24:32.us off, we walked up Slievegallion Drive, there was a barricade further
:24:33. > :24:38.on up. Which was sparsely manned, five or six people, maybe. At that
:24:39. > :24:50.moment, an MRF patrol car came cruising by. GUNFIRE I thought it
:24:51. > :24:57.was all over. I thought it was the end. They were meaning to kill or
:24:58. > :25:01.maim someone that night and they were trying their damnedest to do
:25:02. > :25:04.that. Within hours of the shooting, the soldiers had made routine
:25:05. > :25:08.witness statements to the Royal Military Police - and we've
:25:09. > :25:13.unearthed those statements. They don't match what thele civilians
:25:14. > :25:17.have told us. As we approached the junction a car began to reverse on
:25:18. > :25:20.to the Andersontown Road. In the headlights of the reversing car, I
:25:21. > :25:27.saw a man at the junction. He was armed with a firearm which was aimed
:25:28. > :25:31.towards us. Did you see a rifle at all? No rifle. Did you have a rifle?
:25:32. > :25:37.No. Do you remember seeing a man with a rifle? Definitely not. Did
:25:38. > :25:41.you have a rifle? No. I heard a shot fired which could have been aimed at
:25:42. > :25:49.us or the reversing car. I then aimed at the man with the rifle and
:25:50. > :25:55.fired eight rounds from my SMG. Later that night, both victims say
:25:56. > :25:59.they were forensically tested by the police to see if they had handled
:26:00. > :26:02.firearms. The results were negative. They were out to do something that
:26:03. > :26:11.night. There was no-one had weapons at that barricade. After opening
:26:12. > :26:16.fire, the MRF car returned to the base. However, it was part of a
:26:17. > :26:20.two-car patrol, and the second one continued to circulate. Within
:26:21. > :26:36.minutes, five more men had been shot. GUNFIRE A man came to my door
:26:37. > :26:43.and told me that a man had been shot. I recognised him as Pat
:26:44. > :26:48.McVeigh, one of the parishionerers from my district. I knelt down
:26:49. > :26:54.beside him and gave him the last rites. Was he conscious? No, he was
:26:55. > :26:58.dead. Patrick McVeigh's family say he had been on his way home from the
:26:59. > :27:03.pub and had stopped to chat to some friends dismantling a makeshift
:27:04. > :27:06.barricade. I arrived home late and there was people standing in the
:27:07. > :27:10.hall, and I couldn't understand what was happening and the door opened
:27:11. > :27:17.and there was a neighbour, and when I walked in she just pulled me and
:27:18. > :27:23.said, "Your daddy's dead, he was shot" and obviously you're in
:27:24. > :27:28.denial, shaking your head, "No, no." At that stage, my mummy had been
:27:29. > :27:41.sedated by the doctor and, ah, that's how I found out. What was
:27:42. > :27:48.your dad like? Um, a good person, um, very loyal, hard-working, good
:27:49. > :27:57.to his children, um, just a nice person. I was horrified when I heard
:27:58. > :28:05.the man had been killed and I couldn't believe it. I just thinking
:28:06. > :28:12.to myself how lucky I had been to be alive. Patrick McVeigh and several
:28:13. > :28:18.other people were at this corner of Riverdale Park, a Ford Cortina swept
:28:19. > :28:22.up and a machine-gunner inside sprayed the group with at least 20
:28:23. > :28:26.bullets. The IRA propaganda machine was quick to exploit the shooting.
:28:27. > :28:31.Gerry O'Hare was then the IRA's Belfast spokesman. Were any of the
:28:32. > :28:35.men that you saw known to you to be involved in the IRA? No, absolutely
:28:36. > :28:39.not. There were people who, at night-time, would have come out and
:28:40. > :28:42.manned the barricades in their own areas and they had to be local
:28:43. > :28:45.people because they would have known who was coming in and coming out.
:28:46. > :28:55.You couldn't put people who didn't live in the area on there. We've
:28:56. > :28:59.learned the identity of the commander of the MRF car who opened
:29:00. > :29:04.fire with his machine-gun on Patrick McVeigh. Sergeant Clive Williams of
:29:05. > :29:08.the Royal Military Police - known as Taff. This is a rare picture of Taff
:29:09. > :29:14.Williams. Taken when he was in the MRF it's a grainy official
:29:15. > :29:19.photograph which shows him dressed in civvies. I would say he was
:29:20. > :29:28.fearless. Was he a compassionate man? With us, yes. Not with the
:29:29. > :29:32.enemy. He had a good feeling for it, did Taff Williams. Four hours after
:29:33. > :29:36.the shooting, Sergeant Williams gave his version of events in a statement
:29:37. > :29:41.to a fellow Sergeant in the Royal Military Police. One of the men in
:29:42. > :29:47.the group of four raised his weapon and fired three rounds at the
:29:48. > :29:50.vehicle. The wounded men and their clothes were swabbed to see if there
:29:51. > :30:02.was any evidence they had fired weapons. The forensic lab could find
:30:03. > :30:06.none. Tests in 1972 were not as reliable as they are today. However,
:30:07. > :30:11.police at the time was satisfied that none of the men had been armed.
:30:12. > :30:13.The army tried to cover up their involvement in this shooting. They
:30:14. > :30:21.called it a crime which was motiveless. Implying it was
:30:22. > :30:25.sectarian. The assumption was it was a group of loyalists that had done
:30:26. > :30:27.the shooting and that was a dangerous assumption because that
:30:28. > :30:33.increased the tension between the two communities. It was six weeks
:30:34. > :30:39.before Mike Patricia McVeigh learned her father had been killed by
:30:40. > :30:44.undercover soldiers and then only by chance, from a detective. Added
:30:45. > :30:51.route reacts? Astonished, astounded, angry. -- how did we react? The
:30:52. > :30:59.forces who were supposed to be protecting us had actually killed my
:31:00. > :31:06.father and injured four the men -- four other men. It didn't seem
:31:07. > :31:12.right. When I went home that night to go to bed and I took off my
:31:13. > :31:20.trousers, my knees were covered in his blood. I felt it dreadful,
:31:21. > :31:27.washing the blood of that man from my knees.
:31:28. > :31:34.One of the MRF soldiers we have spoken to were involved that night
:31:35. > :31:37.-- norm of the soldiers. But one did explain why those on a barricade
:31:38. > :31:43.should not have been given the benefit of the doubt.
:31:44. > :31:52.We were finding our targets and we were shooting at them. We shot, we
:31:53. > :31:58.found our targets and we eliminated them or neutralising them. We didn't
:31:59. > :32:02.go around town, blasting, shooting all over the place like you see on
:32:03. > :32:06.the TV. We were looking for our targets, finding them and taking
:32:07. > :32:10.them down. We may not have seen a weapon but more than likely there
:32:11. > :32:13.would have been weapons there is a vigilante patrol. It is possible
:32:14. > :32:18.they could have been shot at even if the weather hadn't -- the weapon
:32:19. > :32:21.hadn't been seen. On occasions the MRF would make an assumption that
:32:22. > :32:29.someone had a weapon even if you couldn't see one? Occasionally. And
:32:30. > :32:36.they would get shot? Occasionally. Some people would say that was
:32:37. > :32:41.murder. In fact, I think most people would say it was murder. It is
:32:42. > :32:45.possible. I wouldn't say that. But if you haven't seen a weapon and you
:32:46. > :32:50.haven't evidence there is a weapon there is an assumption you can't
:32:51. > :32:56.keep -- kill people on that basis, can you? You are not supposed to but
:32:57. > :33:02.we were in a terrorist conflict and people in that area, it all depends
:33:03. > :33:06.on where they are and what they are doing at the time and as far as we
:33:07. > :33:11.were concerned, as far as I was concerned and a few other people in
:33:12. > :33:15.the unit were concerned, people caught in a specific situation, a
:33:16. > :33:25.specific area, were part and parcel of the terrorist organisation.
:33:26. > :33:31.Six weeks later Sergeant Taff Williams once once again on patrol,
:33:32. > :33:37.one that would eventually land him in court. This is what local
:33:38. > :33:38.witnesses say happened. That once again innocent and unarmed civilians
:33:39. > :34:00.were shot. A lovely sunny day, around about
:34:01. > :34:07.lunchtime. I was just sitting, the door open. This Cortina drew up. A
:34:08. > :34:15.guy sitting in the back putter submachine gun out of the window. He
:34:16. > :34:21.opened fire. The bullet came through the door and hit in the chest, that
:34:22. > :34:31.is what happened on a sunny afternoon. I didn't really hear any
:34:32. > :34:38.shooting. I sort of smelt it. Then I got this lightness, I thought I was
:34:39. > :34:47.shot in the head, then I just collapsed, that was me.
:34:48. > :34:54.Eileen Shaw saw the whole incident from her kitchen window. The card
:34:55. > :34:58.game down on the wrong side of the road. The back man produced a gun of
:34:59. > :35:04.some sort, fired indiscriminately at these men. Sergeant Williams had
:35:05. > :35:11.fired several bursts from a machine gun, hitting four men. You got a
:35:12. > :35:16.bullet in the chest, just one question not Just one, it is enough.
:35:17. > :35:29.Has it caused you much difficulty since? Yes. Pain. I have to go to
:35:30. > :35:40.hospital to get pain injections. Painkillers. Everyday? Every day.
:35:41. > :35:44.Even today, 40 years on? Even today, 40 years. Taff Williams says he only
:35:45. > :35:48.fired on the man because they had opened up on him. He said a bullet
:35:49. > :35:54.had smashed his rear windscreen. We got to the hospital, we were swamped
:35:55. > :36:01.by the police for forensics. There was no traces of nothing. None of
:36:02. > :36:06.you were involved? Not one. At first the army once again covered up their
:36:07. > :36:11.involvement. Later that day they said plainclothes soldiers had been
:36:12. > :36:17.shot at and returned fire. Detectives from the Royal Ulster
:36:18. > :36:22.Constabulary were suspicious. I do remember the shooting on the Glen
:36:23. > :36:28.Road. I do remember rumours going around that it was some funny army
:36:29. > :36:35.unit roaming about West Belfast and other parts doing strange
:36:36. > :36:41.shootings. We didn't find out they were called the MRF. When detectives
:36:42. > :36:45.inspected Sergeant Williams' car, they suspected he'd smashed the rear
:36:46. > :36:51.window to make it look as if he had come under fire. Williams was
:36:52. > :36:54.eventually sent for trial at this now derelict Belfast courthouse,
:36:55. > :37:02.charged on three counts of attempted murder. However, we can reveal that
:37:03. > :37:11.the jury got only a partial picture. I was given the job of covering the
:37:12. > :37:15.Williams trial. Is not in here? As reporters, we had never seen any
:37:16. > :37:24.undercover people being hauled into court and charged and prosecuted. It
:37:25. > :37:27.didn't happen. Within the Ministry of Defence, alarm bells rang at the
:37:28. > :37:34.prospect of this secret unit being unmasked. Declassified files show
:37:35. > :37:40.just how determined MoD were to protect the MRF. There can be no
:37:41. > :37:44.useful purpose in admitting the admittance -- existence of any such
:37:45. > :37:46.organisation. There seems to be considerable advantage in
:37:47. > :37:55.maintaining as much confusion as possible. Sergeant Williams' victims
:37:56. > :38:01.sat in the public gallery to see and hear his testimony. He was the
:38:02. > :38:09.double of Omar Sharif. Being so swarthy. Williams was put-in my
:38:10. > :38:14.charge to take to court. I had to hand him over to the police there at
:38:15. > :38:18.the actual trial its self. Williams' evidence was that he was
:38:19. > :38:22.responding to fire that had hit is moving vehicle. He was asked how he
:38:23. > :38:26.could possibly have returned fire at the men who were now behind his car
:38:27. > :38:36.and receding rapidly into the distance. So he used the end of the
:38:37. > :38:40.pew to demonstrate this. He sat there the gun on the floor in front
:38:41. > :38:45.of him and picked it up and whipped it around like this in the firing
:38:46. > :38:50.position. It was done in a matter of a split second, you know. That
:38:51. > :38:56.wasn't the only bit of courtroom drama that -- there had also been an
:38:57. > :39:01.extraordinary revelation. Williams had opened fire not with a standard
:39:02. > :39:07.Army issue weapon but with a gun commonly used by the IRA, Thompson
:39:08. > :39:13.submachine gun. We didn't know until then that this organisation was
:39:14. > :39:18.using an -- that this organisation was using IRA weapons. If you are
:39:19. > :39:22.using a Thompson submachine gun, the forensics come along later, taking
:39:23. > :39:28.bullet holes out of the car, a wall or body, they will say that man shot
:39:29. > :39:32.with that machine gun had been an IRA killing. When challenged over
:39:33. > :39:36.the Tommy gun, Williams gave an explanation for why he had had the
:39:37. > :39:42.weapon which he had never mentioned in his police interviews. He told
:39:43. > :39:47.the jury he had been on a firing range that morning, demonstrating
:39:48. > :39:54.the characteristics of the IRA's favourite weapon. Williams he
:39:55. > :39:58.claimed he happened to have a Thompson submachine gun in the
:39:59. > :40:03.back-seat, which is comical, ludicrous. You just don't happen to
:40:04. > :40:06.have a Thompson under the back-seat of the car unless you are going to
:40:07. > :40:13.use it for some purpose and not very nice purpose. One piece of evidence
:40:14. > :40:19.the jury never heard was that the police suspected cover-up over the
:40:20. > :40:24.Thompson. Because Williams had lied to them. At first he told detectives
:40:25. > :40:29.he had fired a standard Army issue gun. When confronted with evidence
:40:30. > :40:35.of Thompson bullet casings, he changed his story. Williams also
:40:36. > :40:42.told the police this was the first and only time he had used the gun,
:40:43. > :40:49.but was that true? We found an officer from another regiment who
:40:50. > :40:53.told the military police in 1972 that he knew Williams sometimes went
:40:54. > :40:59.on patrol with the Thompson. Other former MRF soldiers independently
:41:00. > :41:06.told us the same story. Is it fair to say that it was Williams' weapon
:41:07. > :41:12.of choice? Yes. Because? Because he liked it. Because? It was powerful.
:41:13. > :41:17.It had knock-down power. It was a weapon that was associated to the
:41:18. > :41:23.terror groups. It was part of the disguise, which was perfect. If I
:41:24. > :41:27.had had access and permission, I would probably have used it as well.
:41:28. > :41:33.They were playing at being bandits, weren't they? They were meant to be
:41:34. > :41:38.IRA outlaws, that is what they were pretending to be, I presume. That is
:41:39. > :41:45.why they were in plainclothes and operating in plain vehicles and they
:41:46. > :41:53.had Thompson submachine guns. To what end? What was the military
:41:54. > :41:57.objective? No idea, no idea. After a brief trial where several key
:41:58. > :42:01.witnesses were not called to give evidence in person, the jury had to
:42:02. > :42:08.decide if they believe Williams in the face of witnesses whose accounts
:42:09. > :42:14.contradicted his. The evidence produced proof there were no guns,
:42:15. > :42:19.no bullet cases, that the windscreen was knocked out from the inside,
:42:20. > :42:25.there was a Thompson submachine gun and the evidence against him, he got
:42:26. > :42:29.cleared. How did you feel about that? Sickened. Williams was
:42:30. > :42:34.acquitted of attempted murder by a majority verdict. He was
:42:35. > :42:41.subsequently promoted, leaving the Army with the rank of captain and
:42:42. > :42:46.the military medal for bravery. Today, Williams lives on the other
:42:47. > :42:50.side of the world, so we went to find him to see if 40 years on he
:42:51. > :42:56.was prepared to answer questions about the people he had shot with
:42:57. > :43:01.the Thompson submachine gun. This is where we think Clive Williams
:43:02. > :43:08.lives. It has been quite difficult him down, but we called the house we
:43:09. > :43:12.are about to visit. His wife answered and said there was no such
:43:13. > :43:15.person living there, but we think he does live there. Anyway, we will
:43:16. > :43:31.soon find out. Hi, Mr Williams? Yes. Sorry to
:43:32. > :43:37.bother you, John Ware is my name. I am making a programme for the BBC.
:43:38. > :43:41.Not interested, go away. We have some questions to put you. We have
:43:42. > :43:45.some questions to put to you. And they are serious allegations about
:43:46. > :43:51.the number of people that you are alleged to have shot. A lot of
:43:52. > :43:58.people will say that your silence speaks for itself.
:43:59. > :44:02.One of the questions Williams would not discuss was how he came to have
:44:03. > :44:08.a Thompson submachine gun in the first place. Something else the jury
:44:09. > :44:11.wasn't told was that the Tommy gun used by Williams wasn't even owned
:44:12. > :44:17.by the army. In fact it belonged to this man. Hamish McGregor,
:44:18. > :44:23.29-year-old captain serving in Northern Ireland to Parra. He had
:44:24. > :44:28.previously seen active service in Aden, and winning the military Cross
:44:29. > :44:34.for gallantry. We had many casualties coming in and the
:44:35. > :44:38.soldiers behaved magnificently. In May 1972, McGregor joins the MRF and
:44:39. > :44:42.with him came his privately owned Thompson, which was kept in the MRF
:44:43. > :44:46.armoury. He officially became the unit's Commander 12 hours after
:44:47. > :44:54.Williams used the weapon to shoot four people. We wrote to McGregor,
:44:55. > :44:58.who retired as a Brigadier, to ask had he authorised Williams to take
:44:59. > :45:06.his Thompson on patrol? After a month, we heard nothing, so we paid
:45:07. > :45:10.him a visit. Mr Ware, I was going to the Post Office to post you a
:45:11. > :45:15.letter. I see. So I don't want to be interviewed. Thank you. McGregor's
:45:16. > :45:19.letter insisted that the only reason that the MRF had a Thompson was for
:45:20. > :45:24.training. However, our evidence seems compelling, that at least one
:45:25. > :45:36.of his men used it for more sinister purposes. By July 1972, the pressure
:45:37. > :45:40.was on for the MRF to get results. In Belfast this afternoon, as the
:45:41. > :45:46.streets were thronged with weekend shoppers, bombs exploded one another
:45:47. > :45:49.the other... The IRA had spectacularly breached the security
:45:50. > :45:55.cordon around Belfast city centre. In just 65 minutes, 19 bombs were
:45:56. > :46:04.exploded, killing nine and horribly maiming many others. Bloody Friday,
:46:05. > :46:11.is one of the worst days I can ever remember. It was a war zone. Report
:46:12. > :46:16.on this the heaviest days bombing since the Troubles began in Ulster.
:46:17. > :46:20.That has never gone from the back of my head. From that then, we were
:46:21. > :46:24.under a hell of a lot of pressure. We had to get results because people
:46:25. > :46:28.from above were screaming murder, to prevent all this happening. Results
:46:29. > :46:42.meaning what? Well, you know, to curb the IRA presence coming into
:46:43. > :46:47.Belfast. Officially, the MRF didn't exist. However, by autumn 1972,
:46:48. > :46:53.rumours about a trigger-happy undercover Army unit were rife. That
:46:54. > :46:56.September, another section of the MRF was involved in an incident
:46:57. > :47:05.which would make the unit a liability. It involved two young
:47:06. > :47:09.Catholic friends - Daniel Rooney and Brendan Brennan. The thing I
:47:10. > :47:18.remember is leaving the girlfriend's house, as I was turning into me own
:47:19. > :47:22.street I seen Daniel and met up and we started to talk about different
:47:23. > :47:27.things. We were just standing at the corner, and we were just standing
:47:28. > :47:32.having a conversation, the three of us. As we were standing talking, we
:47:33. > :47:37.noticed the cars coming down St James' Road with the, the lights
:47:38. > :47:42.full blast. They more or less glanced at us, and we looked at them
:47:43. > :47:52.and... Just suspicion. -- suspicious. Deirdre and I come down
:47:53. > :47:57.St James' Road, we were on the Falls Road and we were just chatting. And
:47:58. > :48:01.there only seemed to be a matter of minutes when a fella came out of one
:48:02. > :48:05.of the houses across the street and shouted to us, "Get off the corner
:48:06. > :48:09.because there's strange cars in the district." It was something about
:48:10. > :48:15.the car and the way it was driving and we just both of us then, just
:48:16. > :48:18.turned and ran. The car went by and we were talking about it. And
:48:19. > :48:36.that's, that's when the shooting started. GUNFIRE It just turned and
:48:37. > :48:38.came towards us and shot. I can remember thinking, "I'm gonna be
:48:39. > :48:54.killed here." He told me that he was shot and he
:48:55. > :49:06.thought he was going to die. And I told him no, he'd be alright. A
:49:07. > :49:13.bullet had torn through an artery. Daniel Rooney was just 18. I was
:49:14. > :49:24.actually in me own house when I was told that he was dead. And do you
:49:25. > :49:35.remember how you reacted? Yeah, I cried me eyes out. What was he like?
:49:36. > :49:44.Cheeky chap by, you know, girls all loved him and very pleasant coming
:49:45. > :49:47.going. -- cheeky chappie. Very happy-go-lucky, just out to have a
:49:48. > :49:52.good time and a good laugh. He would have been a kidder, you know, he
:49:53. > :49:56.would have had a joke with you and that, you know. The next day, the
:49:57. > :50:00.Army admitted plaipb clothed soldiers had been -- plain-clothed
:50:01. > :50:08.soldiers had been involved. 100 local women came out in protest. I
:50:09. > :50:13.run down and lifted one of them young lads, oh God, blood was just
:50:14. > :50:16.oozing out of them. One was shot in the back, right there in the whole
:50:17. > :50:21.back, the other one was shot right in the stomach. The Army's version
:50:22. > :50:25.of what happened is that a patrol of two cars with soldiers in civilian
:50:26. > :50:29.uniforms was coming up street when five shots were fired at them. The
:50:30. > :50:33.Army claimed that Daniel Rooney was a known IRA gunman. There is no
:50:34. > :50:37.credible evidence for this. The IRA have never claimed him as a member,
:50:38. > :50:40.and on this Republican memorial a few hundred yards from where he
:50:41. > :50:48.died, Daniel Rooney is commemorated as a civilian. There's a pattern
:50:49. > :50:53.here. This is the third shooting in a matter of months where MRF have
:50:54. > :50:57.been involved, they say they've seen gunmen and weapons, the wounded and
:50:58. > :51:02.the dead are tested, swabbed, on each and every occasion there is no
:51:03. > :51:08.positive test of being near the weapons. How do you explain that? I
:51:09. > :51:11.don't. What do you think the explanation, what do you think the
:51:12. > :51:16.explanation might be? Is it possible that the police that tested them
:51:17. > :51:19.didn't really test them? A lot of strange things happened in Ireland
:51:20. > :51:26.at that time. The Army didn't trust the police. The police didn't trust
:51:27. > :51:32.the Army. We didn't trust anybody. Nor in 1972 was there much trust in
:51:33. > :51:37.the ability of the Army to investigate itself. Fatal Army
:51:38. > :51:42.shootings were usually left to the Royal Military Police to
:51:43. > :51:47.investigate. The enquiries sometimes amounted to little more than a cosy
:51:48. > :51:53.chat. We would have a cup of coffee, we would discuss what happened and
:51:54. > :51:56.then we would hand our reports over. Did the Royal Military Police
:51:57. > :52:02.basically used to rewrite your reports? Erm, I think so. It is
:52:03. > :52:08.possible. They made some adjustments. I would imagine it was
:52:09. > :52:11.possible for people to oncoct stories under those circumstances. A
:52:12. > :52:14.section that had been involved in an action, or half a section had been
:52:15. > :52:19.involved in an action, sort of, you know, let's get this story together,
:52:20. > :52:29.boys. That would be possible. I'm not saying it happened. It would be
:52:30. > :52:33.possible. 3,260 people died in the 30-year conflict. Today, former
:52:34. > :52:38.detectives are reviewing all those deaths. They belong to the
:52:39. > :52:43.Historical Enquiries Team set up to assist the peace process. For many
:52:44. > :52:51.families, the HET is their last chance to find out who killed their
:52:52. > :52:56.relatives and why. You are still asking questions 40 years on? Oh
:52:57. > :53:06.yes, we want the truth. We don't want to stop. Some people would say
:53:07. > :53:08.you can't turn the clock back, you have to get on with your life? We
:53:09. > :53:28.have. But it's still there. By late 1972, the Army top brass
:53:29. > :53:32.were winding up the MRF. It appears that the Prime Minister, Edward
:53:33. > :53:36.Heath, had been informed why. At Heath's request, a top secret note
:53:37. > :53:40.reminded the military that whatever undercover unit replaced the MRF...
:53:41. > :53:50.Special care should be taken to operate within the law. There have
:53:51. > :53:55.been several occasions where you have acknowledged what the police
:53:56. > :54:00.would describe as "criminal behaviour". You would accept that?
:54:01. > :54:03.They would probably describe it as criminal behaviour, yeah. How would
:54:04. > :54:11.you describe it? Fighting terrorists. In an unconventional way
:54:12. > :54:17.and saving innocent people's lives, which we did. We asked the MRF's
:54:18. > :54:22.officer commanding about the claims made by his men. Hamish McGregor
:54:23. > :54:27.insisted to us that he ran a pretty tight ship and that the MRF was
:54:28. > :54:33.never tasked to hunt down IRA leaders and shoot them. That would
:54:34. > :54:38.have been against the law, he said, his unit had always abided by the
:54:39. > :54:45.Yellow Card rules. I am extremely disappointed that a very few have
:54:46. > :54:50.sensationalised a routine job and invented stish fictitious incidents
:54:51. > :54:54.to give the impression that the MRT was anything other than a
:54:55. > :54:58.properly-controlled and accountable unit. Whatever orders Captain
:54:59. > :55:04.McGregor gave, it seems they weren't enough to stop some of his soldiers
:55:05. > :55:11.opening fire on unarmed men. I'm not saying that anybody stood up and
:55:12. > :55:14.said you have to do this, it was a prototype counter-terrorist unit and
:55:15. > :55:18.we had to make up the procedures as we went along - and we did. Was it
:55:19. > :55:24.an understanding that you should open fire? On these top players,
:55:25. > :55:28.whether they were armed or unarmed? Or was it a specific order? We had
:55:29. > :55:33.to use our own initiative. That is why I was selected for this
:55:34. > :55:38.operation, to use my own initiative. The MRT was answerable to 39 Brigade
:55:39. > :55:45.under the command of Brigadier Alexander Boswell. The MRF was wound
:55:46. > :55:54.down after an MoD review concluded there was no provision for detailed
:55:55. > :56:00.command and control. So we asked Brigadier Alexander Boswell if that
:56:01. > :56:06.meant lethal MRF operations were not properly supervised. He declined to
:56:07. > :56:11.comment. Asked about the allegations that MRF soldiers shot unarmed men,
:56:12. > :56:16.the Ministry of Defence say they have referred this to the police to
:56:17. > :56:21.investigate. Your job was to hunt down the enemy? And to kill them,
:56:22. > :56:25.yes. That's what was done. Were they specifically sent out to... If you
:56:26. > :56:31.are talking about assassination squads, certainly not. We were there
:56:32. > :56:36.to do a job. To eliminate an enemy that was ruthless, dedicated to
:56:37. > :56:43.their cause. I totally reject the death squad. But, you know, put
:56:44. > :56:48.yourself in my situation. Yeah, we are on our homeland, we have a dirty
:56:49. > :56:55.war, a war that was out of control. We knew who the operators were. We
:56:56. > :56:59.knew who the shooters were. So what are you going to do about it, John?
:57:00. > :57:03.I'm asking you the question now. What are you going to do about it?
:57:04. > :57:08.Are you going to allow these people to carry on, killing innocent
:57:09. > :57:13.people? Planting bombs? Killing ordinary civilians? People in this
:57:14. > :57:23.country were killed. So how would you define it? I think you have
:57:24. > :57:28.answered the question. OK. The IRA surrendered its weapons largely
:57:29. > :57:35.because undercover soldiers and policemen crippled its ability to
:57:36. > 0:50:41fight. The MRF was the prototype of this undercover war and the soldiers
0:50:42 > 0:50:43who have appeared on camera have done