0:00:02 > 0:00:06Alexander Blackman, better known as Marine A,
0:00:06 > 0:00:08has been serving a life sentence for the murder
0:00:08 > 0:00:12of a badly injured Taliban fighter in Afghanistan.
0:00:12 > 0:00:13Get him out!
0:00:13 > 0:00:17After a long appeal process, the judges now believe
0:00:17 > 0:00:20he was suffering from a form of combat stress at the time,
0:00:20 > 0:00:24and today have reduced his murder verdict to manslaughter.
0:00:30 > 0:00:34But now, as the former Royal Marine sergeant awaits resentencing,
0:00:34 > 0:00:38there are aspects of this story that remain untold and unexplained.
0:00:40 > 0:00:42I'm going to take you back to his battlefield...
0:00:47 > 0:00:50..and into the mind of the men who served with Blackman.
0:00:51 > 0:00:55It's the first time they've spoken publicly about the details
0:00:55 > 0:00:59of what happened on that fateful day in 2011.
0:01:01 > 0:01:03Everyone that was speaking on the radio was sending out
0:01:03 > 0:01:04a signal to Al.
0:01:04 > 0:01:08Everyone wanted that guy to be dead.
0:01:10 > 0:01:12It was a bloody tough tour.
0:01:12 > 0:01:13For every individual man
0:01:13 > 0:01:18there's a point at which he's had too much or seen too much
0:01:18 > 0:01:20or he's too tired or he's too stressed,
0:01:20 > 0:01:22and that's a fact for everybody.
0:01:25 > 0:01:26I'm asking you straight, now,
0:01:26 > 0:01:29would you think that what happened that day
0:01:29 > 0:01:32was the only time that happened in the Afghan war?
0:01:32 > 0:01:34No.
0:01:53 > 0:01:56Her Majesty's Royal Marines have a proud history
0:01:56 > 0:01:58that goes back over 350 years.
0:01:58 > 0:02:02The battle honours are wide and varied.
0:02:02 > 0:02:04They're the country's only dedicated commando force,
0:02:04 > 0:02:08and always at the sharp end of combat in all the major conflicts.
0:02:10 > 0:02:13So you can imagine the events of September 15th, 2011,
0:02:13 > 0:02:16had a huge impact on the Royal Marines -
0:02:16 > 0:02:18one of their own becoming the first British serviceman
0:02:18 > 0:02:21to be convicted of murder on the battlefield.
0:02:23 > 0:02:26But as of today, murder is now manslaughter
0:02:26 > 0:02:29on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
0:02:29 > 0:02:34Now, I've met Blackman several times and I've spoken to him in prison.
0:02:34 > 0:02:38At first it seemed he was caught red-handed because, unknown to him,
0:02:38 > 0:02:42the entire incident was filmed on another marine's helmet camera.
0:02:44 > 0:02:46GUNFIRE
0:02:53 > 0:02:55Now, for legal reasons, most of this footage
0:02:55 > 0:02:58you're not allowed to see, just hear.
0:02:58 > 0:03:01And I have to tell you, it's harrowing stuff.
0:03:01 > 0:03:03Marines dragging a bloodied,
0:03:03 > 0:03:05barely conscious enemy across a field,
0:03:05 > 0:03:08discussion about whether to treat him as the rules of war
0:03:08 > 0:03:10demanded that they should.
0:03:13 > 0:03:16Some chat there about whether he was actually dead or not.
0:03:16 > 0:03:18And at the time, at least two of the marines are brandishing
0:03:18 > 0:03:22their pistols quite threateningly around the prone enemy fighter.
0:03:22 > 0:03:25Then, quietly and deliberately,
0:03:25 > 0:03:27one marine, Alexander Blackman,
0:03:27 > 0:03:30steps forward and shoots the enemy in the chest at close range.
0:03:30 > 0:03:31GUNSHOT
0:03:33 > 0:03:36The insurgent contorts horribly and eventually dies.
0:03:50 > 0:03:53It seemed like an open-and-shut case,
0:03:53 > 0:03:55guilty as charged.
0:03:55 > 0:03:57But let's look beyond the pictures,
0:03:57 > 0:04:00of the hidden story no helmet camera could ever have seen.
0:04:02 > 0:04:07Rob Driscoll fought alongside Alexander Blackman in Afghanistan,
0:04:07 > 0:04:09on a tour of duty he will never forget.
0:04:11 > 0:04:12How has it been since Afghanistan?
0:04:12 > 0:04:15Pretty tough, I'll be honest.
0:04:15 > 0:04:16I've had my ups and downs.
0:04:17 > 0:04:20Afghan, I think it's ultimately contributed
0:04:20 > 0:04:22to the breakdown of my marriage.
0:04:22 > 0:04:25I think, physically,
0:04:25 > 0:04:28I suffered with anxiety and, you know,
0:04:28 > 0:04:31it's only within the last couple of years, really,
0:04:31 > 0:04:34that I've not suffered sleep-wise.
0:04:34 > 0:04:39So I think it had a huge, huge impact.
0:04:39 > 0:04:42In many ways, for Driscoll, it was a tour from hell.
0:04:42 > 0:04:45That is why he put into storage anything and everything
0:04:45 > 0:04:49that reminded him of that terrible time.
0:04:49 > 0:04:52But then he told me he had something he wanted to show me.
0:04:52 > 0:04:54He said he might still have the radio logs
0:04:54 > 0:04:56from the actual day of the killing.
0:04:58 > 0:04:59No, it's not in there, Chris,
0:04:59 > 0:05:03which means it's probably buried under there somewhere.
0:05:07 > 0:05:10Driscoll had not seen the logs for five years,
0:05:10 > 0:05:13and probably thought he'd never need to see them again -
0:05:13 > 0:05:16a handwritten record of radio messages,
0:05:16 > 0:05:18a sort of war diary,
0:05:18 > 0:05:20and a tangible link to the battlefield
0:05:20 > 0:05:24that might give us some clues to the lead-up to the day in question,
0:05:24 > 0:05:2715th September, 2011.
0:05:28 > 0:05:3110th September, we were involved in a firefight,
0:05:31 > 0:05:3511th of September, we were involved in a firefight.
0:05:35 > 0:05:37Two firefights on 11th September.
0:05:37 > 0:05:3912th of September, a firefight.
0:05:39 > 0:05:4314th of September, we were in a firefight, and this was...
0:05:43 > 0:05:44Grenades were thrown.
0:05:44 > 0:05:46And actually, just talking about this,
0:05:46 > 0:05:49I can feel, you know, my heart kind of, you know,
0:05:49 > 0:05:54getting a little bit more how it would have been on the day.
0:05:54 > 0:05:58You can just kind of get a feel for the intensity.
0:05:58 > 0:06:02In 2011, Sergeant Rob Driscoll was part of 42 Commando,
0:06:02 > 0:06:06a 650-strong unit of Royal Marines,
0:06:06 > 0:06:10deployed to one of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan.
0:06:10 > 0:06:12The year before in Helmand,
0:06:12 > 0:06:15a big military surge pushed through the district of Nad-e-Ali,
0:06:15 > 0:06:18forcing the insurgents from south to north.
0:06:20 > 0:06:22And so it was here, in Nad-e-Ali North,
0:06:22 > 0:06:24where the insurgency was concentrated
0:06:24 > 0:06:26and at its most threatening,
0:06:26 > 0:06:28that 42 Commando is deployed.
0:06:28 > 0:06:32650 men divided into four separate companies.
0:06:37 > 0:06:40It was near the beginning of their six-month tour
0:06:40 > 0:06:43that I myself embedded with 42 Commando as a film-maker.
0:06:45 > 0:06:49I'd worked many times in Afghanistan during the 13-year conflict,
0:06:49 > 0:06:51but now, I was about to find out
0:06:51 > 0:06:54that it had become a very different sort of war.
0:06:54 > 0:06:59The insurgents' choice of weapon had become the IED -
0:06:59 > 0:07:02improvised explosive devices hidden in the ground.
0:07:02 > 0:07:06Murderous, maiming and almost impossible to second-guess.
0:07:09 > 0:07:11On the night I arrived in Camp Bastion,
0:07:11 > 0:07:14the main British base, I was just in time to film
0:07:14 > 0:07:17some of 42 Commando embark on a very dangerous mission.
0:07:17 > 0:07:20Right, fellas, start getting in your order.
0:07:20 > 0:07:23These men were drawn from Juliet, or J Company.
0:07:23 > 0:07:26This was Alexander Blackman's company.
0:07:26 > 0:07:27On the flatbed.
0:07:27 > 0:07:30Now, he wasn't there that night, but he was staying back to help
0:07:30 > 0:07:33defend his checkpoint from enemy attack.
0:07:36 > 0:07:38But these men, Blackman's comrades,
0:07:38 > 0:07:40had been tasked to establish
0:07:40 > 0:07:44a new British outpost deep in enemy territory.
0:07:44 > 0:07:46I grabbed a last-minute interview
0:07:46 > 0:07:51with Major Steve McCulley, officer commanding the J Company.
0:07:51 > 0:07:52We'll take over the compound,
0:07:52 > 0:07:54establish a temporary checkpoint,
0:07:54 > 0:07:55and then from there,
0:07:55 > 0:07:57for a period of seven to ten days,
0:07:57 > 0:07:58we'll conduct fighting patrols
0:07:58 > 0:08:02and lure the insurgents into our location as best we can.
0:08:03 > 0:08:05How are you feeling yourself?
0:08:05 > 0:08:07Yeah, I mean, I'd be lying if I wasn't slightly apprehensive,
0:08:07 > 0:08:10because, you know, it's a very cheeky operation.
0:08:10 > 0:08:13We're there to disrupt the insurgents,
0:08:13 > 0:08:15and so it's a high level of risk.
0:08:15 > 0:08:18But, you know, that's the name of the game,
0:08:18 > 0:08:20that's what we're in business for.
0:08:20 > 0:08:25Within a week, two marines and an interpreter had been killed
0:08:25 > 0:08:29and several more marines had suffered life-changing injuries,
0:08:29 > 0:08:31including Steve McCulley himself.
0:08:32 > 0:08:34Basically tore my chest apart -
0:08:34 > 0:08:39ribs, lung, right lung, broken femur, patella, tibia.
0:08:39 > 0:08:41They cut me open, split my rib cage and they dug out
0:08:41 > 0:08:47as much shrapnel, body armour, clothing, mud, as they could.
0:08:47 > 0:08:50Stapled me together, put me in an induced coma on a ventilator
0:08:50 > 0:08:51and kind of thought,
0:08:51 > 0:08:54"Well, we'll get him back to the UK and let them decide the best way,
0:08:54 > 0:08:58"whether they take out the whole lung there and then or leave it."
0:08:58 > 0:09:00So, again, yeah...
0:09:03 > 0:09:06The emotional impact for Al Blackman, you know,
0:09:06 > 0:09:07it would have been horrific
0:09:07 > 0:09:09sitting back
0:09:09 > 0:09:11and getting that information fed,
0:09:11 > 0:09:13drip-fed down the radio,
0:09:13 > 0:09:15that people that you like,
0:09:15 > 0:09:17you've drunk with, you've socialised with,
0:09:17 > 0:09:19and, to an element,
0:09:19 > 0:09:21you probably love in a brotherly kind of way,
0:09:21 > 0:09:24have been torn to shreds, you know,
0:09:24 > 0:09:26less than 4km away from where you are.
0:09:26 > 0:09:28They would've heard the blasts.
0:09:28 > 0:09:31They know that those deaths would've been fairly horrific.
0:09:37 > 0:09:40When you start losing guys,
0:09:40 > 0:09:45whether they've been killed or injured, you know, it's...
0:09:47 > 0:09:51Cohesion can be built or lost around those types of situations.
0:09:51 > 0:09:53Thousands of people have been to Afghanistan,
0:09:53 > 0:09:56but there's just hundreds that have been involved
0:09:56 > 0:10:00in fierce combat, and those hundreds,
0:10:00 > 0:10:01it's the same guys over and over again.
0:10:01 > 0:10:03Not only have they done it day in, day out,
0:10:03 > 0:10:05they've done it on multiple tours.
0:10:05 > 0:10:06I don't care what anyone says,
0:10:06 > 0:10:09the more times you're subjected to those situations...
0:10:12 > 0:10:15..you have to get harder, but the harder it is to deal with.
0:10:18 > 0:10:22Just days after J Company had sustained such serious casualties,
0:10:22 > 0:10:25I flew in with the relieving company to the very outpost
0:10:25 > 0:10:29that Steve McCulley's men had established at such great cost.
0:10:29 > 0:10:32His men returned to their bases close by.
0:10:37 > 0:10:39But it was here,
0:10:39 > 0:10:42in what was described as the most dangerous square mile in the world,
0:10:42 > 0:10:44that I was to get a taste
0:10:44 > 0:10:48of what this unforgiving war was like for these marines.
0:10:48 > 0:10:51Patrols were sent out twice a day, without fail.
0:10:51 > 0:10:53IEDs were everywhere.
0:10:53 > 0:10:56So every footfall was a dice with death.
0:10:56 > 0:11:00That's why the marines call patrolling "Afghan roulette".
0:11:00 > 0:11:02And all this in 50 degrees of heat,
0:11:02 > 0:11:06even more in the corn fields where we often took cover.
0:11:06 > 0:11:08It's twice as hot as it is outside,
0:11:08 > 0:11:10the heat is enclosed in here.
0:11:10 > 0:11:12And it's absolutely...
0:11:13 > 0:11:15..unspeakably hot, sweltering.
0:11:15 > 0:11:17Markers here.
0:11:20 > 0:11:24The marines were there primarily to help secure local villages
0:11:24 > 0:11:26recently liberated from the Taliban.
0:11:26 > 0:11:30So whilst bomb disposal teams try to rid these villages of IEDs...
0:11:32 > 0:11:35..the enemy had to be kept at bay.
0:11:35 > 0:11:37And this was the job of the Royal Marines.
0:11:37 > 0:11:40They went out to draw enemy fire.
0:11:40 > 0:11:43They were the bait, if you like. The lure.
0:11:43 > 0:11:45The red rag to the Taliban bull.
0:11:47 > 0:11:48That's what it's all about.
0:11:48 > 0:11:51Engaging them on our terms when they think they're OK.
0:11:51 > 0:11:53The key thing is to try and kill them if you get the chance,
0:11:53 > 0:11:55that's the priority.
0:11:56 > 0:11:58And what did it feel like, then,
0:11:58 > 0:12:01to be...well, effectively, human bait?
0:12:01 > 0:12:04I think, initially, most of the marines were up for it
0:12:04 > 0:12:08because it meant that we were going to get involved in the action.
0:12:08 > 0:12:09We would start taking the fight to them
0:12:09 > 0:12:14and therefore winning the insurgent, kind of, campaign.
0:12:14 > 0:12:16I think we underestimated what kind of resistance
0:12:16 > 0:12:19we were going to get when we arrived.
0:12:19 > 0:12:21Towards the latter end of the tour,
0:12:21 > 0:12:24there was a definite swing in opinion.
0:12:24 > 0:12:25There was an air of despondency
0:12:25 > 0:12:29and perhaps feeling like we'd been left alone a little bit
0:12:29 > 0:12:32and we were just walking around.
0:12:32 > 0:12:33And the expression, "Figure 11 targets",
0:12:33 > 0:12:35"Walking figure 11 targets",
0:12:35 > 0:12:36is what everyone thought they were,
0:12:36 > 0:12:41which is a cardboard cut-out that we use on the ranges in the UK
0:12:41 > 0:12:44when we're practising our fire and manoeuvre.
0:12:44 > 0:12:47- And that's what you felt like? - That's what everyone felt like.
0:12:49 > 0:12:52The insurgency pretty much controlled the ground,
0:12:52 > 0:12:56and seeded it with IEDs continually.
0:12:56 > 0:13:00In a six-month period in Nad-e-Ali North,
0:13:00 > 0:13:02one IED was discovered
0:13:02 > 0:13:05or detonated every 16 hours.
0:13:05 > 0:13:07Casualty rates for 42 Commando mounted.
0:13:14 > 0:13:16Actions on contact IED.
0:13:16 > 0:13:19If you get an IED... self-treat yourself,
0:13:19 > 0:13:21if you've got any arms and legs left.
0:13:21 > 0:13:23OK, I'll call in the helo,
0:13:23 > 0:13:27it should be at Bastion within 21 minutes or whatever, OK?
0:13:29 > 0:13:30There's guys close.
0:13:30 > 0:13:33RADIO CHATTER
0:13:33 > 0:13:37An added pressure was the interception of Icom chatter,
0:13:37 > 0:13:40that's the insurgents' radio communications.
0:13:40 > 0:13:41Helpful for intelligence...
0:13:41 > 0:13:44They said, "Be ready for them. Don't let them go anywhere."
0:13:44 > 0:13:47..but it could also be very destabilising.
0:13:47 > 0:13:50Taliban said they've seen the patrol now.
0:13:50 > 0:13:52- They've seen the patrol?- Yeah.
0:13:52 > 0:13:53OK.
0:13:53 > 0:13:56The marines could hear the insurgents plotting their attacks,
0:13:56 > 0:14:00and it seemed they always had eyes on the British soldiers.
0:14:00 > 0:14:03We've had more Icom, and they're saying be careful, all right?
0:14:03 > 0:14:08XXX Anybody is PIDed, I want them taken out. Go.
0:14:08 > 0:14:11GUNFIRE
0:14:15 > 0:14:17Yeah, lads. Fucking good shooting.
0:14:17 > 0:14:20And yet all the time the marines were braced for enemy attack,
0:14:20 > 0:14:23they were having to try and win the battle for the hearts and minds
0:14:23 > 0:14:25of the local population.
0:14:30 > 0:14:33But also the marines had to work closely
0:14:33 > 0:14:35with the Afghan security forces,
0:14:35 > 0:14:37and that brought its own big problems.
0:14:38 > 0:14:43The main mission was to integrate and hand over
0:14:43 > 0:14:46and let the Afghans lead the patrols.
0:14:46 > 0:14:49But the way they did their business was very...
0:14:49 > 0:14:50Not British.
0:14:50 > 0:14:56The leverage that the Afghan applied onto the residents
0:14:56 > 0:15:01was to place a 9mm pistol in a child's mouth.
0:15:01 > 0:15:03They would beat people, threaten to kill people,
0:15:03 > 0:15:05cock their weapons at people,
0:15:05 > 0:15:07they would fire into the floor next to people.
0:15:07 > 0:15:12I can remember one of my patrol gave a little girl a biscuit,
0:15:12 > 0:15:14you know, walk up behind the little girl
0:15:14 > 0:15:16and hit her on the back of the head with a rifle
0:15:16 > 0:15:19so hard that she fell, rolled into the canal.
0:15:19 > 0:15:20What do you do with that, you know?
0:15:20 > 0:15:24You can't challenge the behaviour, it's too complicated to address.
0:15:24 > 0:15:26All I then have to do is restrain my soldiers
0:15:26 > 0:15:31from attacking the people that we're partnering with.
0:15:31 > 0:15:33It's...it's...
0:15:33 > 0:15:35You know, I've got bigger issues to deal with.
0:15:35 > 0:15:38It sounds horrific, but I've got bigger issues to deal with.
0:15:40 > 0:15:42Some of the marines think
0:15:42 > 0:15:45that seeing such relentlessly brutal behaviour
0:15:45 > 0:15:50might have skewed their own sense of right and wrong.
0:15:50 > 0:15:53The days didn't finish with pistols being put in mouths,
0:15:53 > 0:15:56the days finished when we got back to the camp.
0:15:56 > 0:16:00And in-between that, I would see my friends blown to smithereens,
0:16:00 > 0:16:04I would see other friends with horrific, life-changing injuries,
0:16:04 > 0:16:08I would see young children come out to take photos of helicopters
0:16:08 > 0:16:09and get shot,
0:16:09 > 0:16:12I would see limbs hung in a tree,
0:16:12 > 0:16:14I would be ambushed,
0:16:14 > 0:16:16I would see farmers killed,
0:16:16 > 0:16:19I would see A&A beat a young man to death,
0:16:19 > 0:16:24I would then fire and manoeuvre, under fire, 200 metres
0:16:24 > 0:16:25and then get back to the CP.
0:16:25 > 0:16:30You know, the days were horrific.
0:16:30 > 0:16:33And there's a lifetime full of events
0:16:33 > 0:16:37in one day to kind of rationalise,
0:16:37 > 0:16:40analyse, self-criticise,
0:16:40 > 0:16:43but I haven't got time for that, because the next day I'm going out
0:16:43 > 0:16:47and repeating that exercise with the same kind of risks.
0:16:50 > 0:16:52Colonel Oliver Lee was commanding officer
0:16:52 > 0:16:56of another Royal Marine unit in Nad-e-Ali South,
0:16:56 > 0:16:59adjacent to 42 Commando in the north.
0:16:59 > 0:17:01His was a relatively benign area,
0:17:01 > 0:17:03and although he never met Blackman
0:17:03 > 0:17:05or personally visited his checkpoint,
0:17:05 > 0:17:09he had become increasingly worried about the stresses on the men
0:17:09 > 0:17:12in that pressure-cooker environment to his north.
0:17:13 > 0:17:16I was. I was worried indeed at a number of points.
0:17:16 > 0:17:20There are a series of factors that are common to something
0:17:20 > 0:17:23very serious going wrong on the battlefield.
0:17:23 > 0:17:29It's a range of factors relating to adequacy or not of training,
0:17:29 > 0:17:32of oversight, of leadership,
0:17:32 > 0:17:35of cultural awareness,
0:17:35 > 0:17:38to a sense in individuals or groups of individuals
0:17:38 > 0:17:42of isolation or abandonment,
0:17:42 > 0:17:46the loss of much-loved and talismanic colleagues,
0:17:46 > 0:17:50a sense, as a result of that, of dehumanising the enemy.
0:17:50 > 0:17:53Those are the sort of factors that sit at the heart
0:17:53 > 0:17:57of these kind of disasters on the battlefield.
0:17:58 > 0:18:00Some have reported on this,
0:18:00 > 0:18:03suggesting that soldiers had gone rogue or feral.
0:18:03 > 0:18:08They are not words that I personally would choose,
0:18:08 > 0:18:12but my observation that the manner in which operations
0:18:12 > 0:18:14were being conducted there
0:18:14 > 0:18:18was very far indeed from how I would have chosen it to be,
0:18:18 > 0:18:23and, in my view, increased rather than decreased the likelihood
0:18:23 > 0:18:26of a Sergeant Blackman-type event taking place.
0:18:26 > 0:18:29And I felt that those factors were, largely speaking,
0:18:29 > 0:18:33factors that lay outside Sergeant Blackman's control.
0:18:37 > 0:18:39Were we feral?
0:18:39 > 0:18:42You could...
0:18:42 > 0:18:45I don't really know what we were at the end.
0:18:46 > 0:18:50I think we were just shell-shocked, if anything.
0:18:52 > 0:18:53I don't think feral is the right word,
0:18:53 > 0:18:57it almost kind of implies some disregard for authority
0:18:57 > 0:18:58and there was no disregard for authority.
0:18:58 > 0:19:01We respected our HQ, to a degree,
0:19:01 > 0:19:04as much as any other soldier would on a front line.
0:19:04 > 0:19:10After that repetitive kind of exposure to violence
0:19:10 > 0:19:14and different cultures, I'd changed.
0:19:14 > 0:19:16And it's taken a long time,
0:19:16 > 0:19:21and I still think it's perhaps a process that's ongoing,
0:19:21 > 0:19:23to get back to who I was before.
0:19:24 > 0:19:26Louis Nethercott, a young machine gunner
0:19:26 > 0:19:29who worked closely with Alexander Blackman,
0:19:29 > 0:19:31does not accept that their standards dropped,
0:19:31 > 0:19:33despite the pressures.
0:19:33 > 0:19:37The routine and the soldiering and the standards were maintained
0:19:37 > 0:19:40to the high level that they always are,
0:19:40 > 0:19:45but personal feelings, I was just tired.
0:19:45 > 0:19:47And I know the lads were as well.
0:19:47 > 0:19:53And, you know, we didn't have the numbers that we did initially,
0:19:53 > 0:19:57so it's just, you know, it was just tough at that point, I think.
0:19:59 > 0:20:03So were these the same pressures felt by Alexander Blackman
0:20:03 > 0:20:06that, after six months in Nad-e-Ali North,
0:20:06 > 0:20:08culminated in the day that was to become
0:20:08 > 0:20:11the most infamous in the Afghan campaign?
0:20:12 > 0:20:17On 15th September, we pushed out patrols early in the morning.
0:20:17 > 0:20:2011 Lima is now going out, so this was my call sign.
0:20:20 > 0:20:24Literally, as soon as we walk out the door here at 7:05,
0:20:24 > 0:20:27we've got five fighting-age males north of my location.
0:20:27 > 0:20:30It wasn't just our call sign that was involved,
0:20:30 > 0:20:32there was lots of other patrols on the ground.
0:20:32 > 0:20:34Here, we can actually see some names -
0:20:34 > 0:20:37Janati and Khales.
0:20:37 > 0:20:42I mean, this could well be the name of the guy that was killed.
0:20:44 > 0:20:46"We've had some alcohol."
0:20:46 > 0:20:49It was quite common that we'd pick up communications,
0:20:49 > 0:20:51and a couple of times, when we arrested people,
0:20:51 > 0:20:53they were under the influence of alcohol,
0:20:53 > 0:20:57a lot of the time under opiates and what have you.
0:20:57 > 0:21:01But there was some other crazy drugs that they must have been taking.
0:21:01 > 0:21:03"We have shot the camp.
0:21:03 > 0:21:06"We have met the friends who gave us the little things."
0:21:06 > 0:21:10The Taliban, they'd always have little code words.
0:21:10 > 0:21:13And over time, we knew that "little things" were the grenades.
0:21:13 > 0:21:16This is all trigger communications for us on the ground.
0:21:16 > 0:21:18So we would have been quite ramped up
0:21:18 > 0:21:19and quite worried about this.
0:21:19 > 0:21:22When they start talking about more manpower
0:21:22 > 0:21:24and using mobiles to communicate,
0:21:24 > 0:21:26you can pretty much guarantee
0:21:26 > 0:21:30that something bad is going to happen to someone.
0:21:30 > 0:21:34At 0700 on 15th September, 2011,
0:21:34 > 0:21:38Rob Driscoll set out with his multiple of about 15 men on patrol.
0:21:38 > 0:21:41He moved from his base at Checkpoint Daqhiqh
0:21:41 > 0:21:45to check for IEDs that might have been seeded overnight
0:21:45 > 0:21:48but then, from these compounds here, came under fire.
0:21:48 > 0:21:51Now, after a brief firefight,
0:21:51 > 0:21:53he made a tactical withdrawal back to his checkpoint.
0:21:53 > 0:21:57But not long after that, a second patrol was attacked.
0:21:57 > 0:21:59And that was when Sergeant Blackman and his men,
0:21:59 > 0:22:03based down here at Checkpoint Omar, were ordered to investigate.
0:22:04 > 0:22:07About 1,000 metres to the north, they got to the compounds,
0:22:07 > 0:22:10and there, they stormed them, but found nothing,
0:22:10 > 0:22:11the enemy had fled.
0:22:11 > 0:22:15He then started to return back to his checkpoint.
0:22:15 > 0:22:17That was when he received intelligence
0:22:17 > 0:22:20that the enemy was flanking him - in other words,
0:22:20 > 0:22:22coming in from the other side, ready to attack.
0:22:22 > 0:22:26That was when an Apache attack helicopter was called.
0:22:26 > 0:22:29GUNFIRE
0:22:29 > 0:22:33Louis Nethercott was on Blackman's patrol.
0:22:33 > 0:22:36Two insurgents were positively identified,
0:22:36 > 0:22:37had weapons systems on them
0:22:37 > 0:22:41and then I remember the Apache engaging the guys.
0:22:41 > 0:22:43I remember the sound of the rounds.
0:22:43 > 0:22:46GUNFIRE
0:22:46 > 0:22:48MAN CHEERS
0:22:48 > 0:22:51From the evidence of the helmet camera footage,
0:22:51 > 0:22:54one enemy fighter was seen to fall.
0:22:54 > 0:22:58Though, to everyone's consternation, another man was seen to escape.
0:23:11 > 0:23:16And then we were tasked to go over to one of the males who had been
0:23:16 > 0:23:23hit by the helicopter and, I guess, see what state he was in,
0:23:23 > 0:23:26get the weapons systems, any intelligence, you know,
0:23:26 > 0:23:27do the normal protocol.
0:23:29 > 0:23:31I don't think he's dead.
0:23:31 > 0:23:35Blackman's patrol had been tasked to carry out a BDA,
0:23:35 > 0:23:37or a battle damage assessment.
0:23:37 > 0:23:40In other words, check to see if this insurgent had been killed,
0:23:40 > 0:23:43and then to take photographs and various measurements
0:23:43 > 0:23:44for identification purposes.
0:23:44 > 0:23:46Al, let's push up there.
0:23:47 > 0:23:49I walked past this guy,
0:23:49 > 0:23:52he was in the middle of a cornfield, a very exposed area.
0:23:52 > 0:23:57All I was concerned about at that point was doing my personal job,
0:23:57 > 0:24:02which was to watch the western flank.
0:24:02 > 0:24:03So as I pushed west,
0:24:03 > 0:24:07I walked past this guy that had been hit by the Apache.
0:24:09 > 0:24:12Wasn't really interested in looking at him,
0:24:12 > 0:24:13saw his dishdasha.
0:24:13 > 0:24:16I believe he was wearing a sort of white dishdasha.
0:24:16 > 0:24:20And this guy had been hit by an Apache, so, you know,
0:24:20 > 0:24:23it's going to do some serious damage.
0:24:23 > 0:24:27I thought the chances are this bloke is probably dead.
0:24:27 > 0:24:31That's some guy in a bloody body on a floor.
0:24:31 > 0:24:33I didn't know the guy.
0:24:33 > 0:24:36I've no emotional attachment to him.
0:24:36 > 0:24:39On that tour, I'd seen good mates of mine
0:24:39 > 0:24:41in far worse states than that.
0:24:41 > 0:24:46So, you know, why should it make me feel any way?
0:24:46 > 0:24:47So I walked past this guy,
0:24:47 > 0:24:50and then the guys did their jobs behind me.
0:24:52 > 0:24:54Here's a simple map of the scene.
0:24:54 > 0:24:58The insurgent who'd been hit lay in a cornfield, here.
0:24:59 > 0:25:01To the east was a supply route
0:25:01 > 0:25:05that Rob Driscoll had been trying to clear of IEDs,
0:25:05 > 0:25:07and to the west were the compounds
0:25:07 > 0:25:10that, earlier, Blackman and his patrol had stormed.
0:25:10 > 0:25:13To the south, a tree line and an irrigation ditch.
0:25:13 > 0:25:16And this is where Blackman's patrol concealed themselves,
0:25:16 > 0:25:19helped by the fact there was a three- or four-metre stretch
0:25:19 > 0:25:20of much more mature corn
0:25:20 > 0:25:23which was that much higher and provided good cover.
0:25:25 > 0:25:28Now, Blackman would have been totally within his rights
0:25:28 > 0:25:30to shoot the insurgent from a distance
0:25:30 > 0:25:32because he could have been ready to detonate a grenade
0:25:32 > 0:25:34as soon as anyone got close to him.
0:25:34 > 0:25:36When I went to see Blackman in prison,
0:25:36 > 0:25:37he told me that that the insurgent
0:25:37 > 0:25:40might have been a source of information,
0:25:40 > 0:25:42and the marines were eager at that time to establish
0:25:42 > 0:25:45the location of a bomb-making factory in the vicinity.
0:25:45 > 0:25:47So Sergeant Blackman and one other marine
0:25:47 > 0:25:50moved forward to investigate the prone body.
0:25:52 > 0:25:54One of three other marines
0:25:54 > 0:25:57who was standing back in the long corn to provide cover
0:25:57 > 0:25:59was Sam Deen.
0:25:59 > 0:26:03He has since left the marines and returned to civilian life.
0:26:03 > 0:26:07I tracked him down and he agreed to talk to me.
0:26:07 > 0:26:11His memories of that day in Afghanistan were undimmed.
0:26:13 > 0:26:18Basically, we went over and Al and one of the other guys,
0:26:18 > 0:26:21they did their assessment on him.
0:26:21 > 0:26:24They found a grenade, an AK,
0:26:24 > 0:26:25quite a lot of rounds.
0:26:25 > 0:26:28- So they moved forward first, you stood back?- Yeah.
0:26:28 > 0:26:32Then as they did the assessment, they rolled him over,
0:26:32 > 0:26:35took the grenade off him and disarmed him.
0:26:40 > 0:26:44They then called over for another guy and I went over.
0:26:44 > 0:26:48Because we were in the middle of a field, quite vulnerable,
0:26:48 > 0:26:50we took him back to the side-line,
0:26:50 > 0:26:53basically, on the edge of an irrigation ditch.
0:26:57 > 0:27:01Sam Deen and two others were called forward.
0:27:01 > 0:27:03So now five marines dragged the injured man
0:27:03 > 0:27:06back here to the long corn.
0:27:06 > 0:27:09But was this just about seeking cover from the enemy
0:27:09 > 0:27:13or was it to conceal what they were doing or might do?
0:27:16 > 0:27:19Were they concerned about the circling Apache helicopter
0:27:19 > 0:27:22with its powerful surveillance camera?
0:27:22 > 0:27:24It was now that Blackman,
0:27:24 > 0:27:27as part of his BDA, battle damage assessment,
0:27:27 > 0:27:31got on the radio to tell all the other call signs what was going on.
0:27:41 > 0:27:44Rob Driscoll, at his checkpoint about 500 metres away,
0:27:44 > 0:27:46was listening in on the radio
0:27:46 > 0:27:49as Blackman proceeded with his battle damage assessment.
0:27:50 > 0:27:53Well, I'd hoped it went like every other BDA,
0:27:53 > 0:27:56where we go out and everyone's dead,
0:27:56 > 0:27:59and it's a case of swabbing their skulls or whatever is left of them.
0:27:59 > 0:28:03So we were very hopeful that's what was going to happen.
0:28:03 > 0:28:04And it wasn't to be,
0:28:04 > 0:28:08cos as the communications unfolded, you know,
0:28:08 > 0:28:12it obviously indicated that this guy perhaps wasn't dead.
0:28:12 > 0:28:15And that there was a strong chance that,
0:28:15 > 0:28:19against all rationality and tactical sense,
0:28:19 > 0:28:20we were going to try and...
0:28:22 > 0:28:26..you know, get him out and get him to hospital and fix him up.
0:28:28 > 0:28:30That wouldn't have been a popular move?
0:28:30 > 0:28:31It wouldn't have been a popular move at all.
0:28:31 > 0:28:33I mean, the guy has just been shooting at us.
0:28:33 > 0:28:37He could have been the guy that shot at us an hour earlier.
0:28:37 > 0:28:40Blackman was in a difficult situation,
0:28:40 > 0:28:42militarily and morally.
0:28:42 > 0:28:45According to the rules of war, an injured, captured enemy
0:28:45 > 0:28:49is referred to as hors de combat, meaning outside the fight,
0:28:49 > 0:28:52and so should be accorded the same treatment and respect
0:28:52 > 0:28:54due to one of your own.
0:28:54 > 0:28:57But there were other considerations and pressures
0:28:57 > 0:28:58piling in on Blackman -
0:28:58 > 0:29:01in fact, piling in on everyone.
0:29:04 > 0:29:06Obviously, emotions are running high.
0:29:07 > 0:29:11It's quite difficult to stop being
0:29:11 > 0:29:13on the verge of being very aggressive,
0:29:13 > 0:29:16to then treating a wounded male
0:29:16 > 0:29:18who's been trying to kill you and your oppos.
0:29:18 > 0:29:21So that's quite difficult to distinguish the two.
0:29:21 > 0:29:26There was a clear reluctance to apply first aid to the insurgent...
0:29:31 > 0:29:34..although battle dressings were eventually applied.
0:29:40 > 0:29:43And there was some discussion amongst the patrol
0:29:43 > 0:29:47and exchanges over the radio with HQ about activating a MERT,
0:29:47 > 0:29:49that is, a "medical emergency reaction team",
0:29:49 > 0:29:53to take the insurgent for medical treatment to Camp Bastion.
0:29:57 > 0:29:59It's just not feasible, you know -
0:29:59 > 0:30:02that would have meant a Mastiff group,
0:30:02 > 0:30:08which is four or five vehicles crewed with five guys
0:30:08 > 0:30:11coming up a route we know is IEDed
0:30:11 > 0:30:13that we can't get out to clear,
0:30:13 > 0:30:15cos every time we do, we get shot at.
0:30:15 > 0:30:18The thought of them bringing in a million-pound aircraft
0:30:18 > 0:30:20with a highly trained British crew
0:30:20 > 0:30:23who have mums, dads, brothers and sisters,
0:30:23 > 0:30:25that's what the enemy wanted us to do.
0:30:25 > 0:30:28They wanted us to land our aircraft
0:30:28 > 0:30:31so they could try and shoot them or...
0:30:31 > 0:30:37They wanted us to drive up the road so they could blow us up.
0:30:37 > 0:30:41That's what they wanted. It's not like this guy was innocent at all.
0:30:41 > 0:30:43He was proven guilty and, actually,
0:30:43 > 0:30:45a decision had been made at some level to kill him.
0:30:45 > 0:30:49So what you're saying is, as best as you can recollect,
0:30:49 > 0:30:52is that what Blackman did is what everybody wanted him to do?
0:30:52 > 0:30:54Yeah, on my recollection,
0:30:54 > 0:30:58which I played back many, many times and tried to analyse,
0:30:58 > 0:31:03was that there was certainly implied taskings on the radio.
0:31:04 > 0:31:06It's...
0:31:06 > 0:31:08When you say "implied taskings", what do you mean by that?
0:31:08 > 0:31:11I mean that I think everyone that was speaking on that radio,
0:31:11 > 0:31:16everyone...was sending out a signal to Al -
0:31:16 > 0:31:19we don't need this to happen, you know?
0:31:19 > 0:31:21Make it so that it doesn't happen.
0:31:21 > 0:31:24- You mean in terms of evacuating the insurgent?- Yes.
0:31:24 > 0:31:27He could have done several different things.
0:31:27 > 0:31:29You know, and what he did...
0:31:31 > 0:31:35The endgame is what I think everyone wanted.
0:31:35 > 0:31:40You know, that guy needed to pass away somehow.
0:31:40 > 0:31:44I think how he did it perhaps was...
0:31:44 > 0:31:46Well, in the eyes of the law,
0:31:46 > 0:31:48it is the wrong thing to do, isn't it?
0:31:48 > 0:31:52But everyone that day who was privy to the information,
0:31:52 > 0:31:55who was stood by the gate ready to go,
0:31:55 > 0:31:57they didn't want to go out and rescue some bloke
0:31:57 > 0:32:00that's been shooting at them for the last four months.
0:32:00 > 0:32:03Everybody wanted that guy to be dead.
0:32:05 > 0:32:07Implied tasking, in military terms,
0:32:07 > 0:32:10is really saying something without spelling it out.
0:32:10 > 0:32:14So was Blackman responding consciously or subconsciously
0:32:14 > 0:32:18to the power of the collective mind?
0:32:18 > 0:32:22And there could have been another pressure on Blackman closer to home.
0:32:25 > 0:32:27It's clear from the helmet camera footage
0:32:27 > 0:32:30that some of the younger marines were getting agitated.
0:32:36 > 0:32:40We were all pretty angry, and at the time when it happened,
0:32:40 > 0:32:41it was just...
0:32:41 > 0:32:45We just wanted to just get the assessment done and just leave,
0:32:45 > 0:32:47we didn't really want to hang around.
0:32:47 > 0:32:50At least two of the marines I can see from the video
0:32:50 > 0:32:51had unsheathed their own pistols
0:32:51 > 0:32:54and were threatening to shoot the insurgent themselves.
0:33:03 > 0:33:05One of the voices belongs to Jack Hammond,
0:33:05 > 0:33:08referred to in the trial as Marine C.
0:33:08 > 0:33:11And extracts from his diary from the day were read out in court.
0:33:11 > 0:33:13This is one of them.
0:33:13 > 0:33:15"So there I was, pistol drawn,
0:33:15 > 0:33:19"waiting for the Sergeant and to get off the net" - that means radio -
0:33:19 > 0:33:22"so I could pop this little wanker and be done with it."
0:33:24 > 0:33:27Now, Hammond claimed that this was all just bravado,
0:33:27 > 0:33:30but it may have impacted on Blackman all the same,
0:33:30 > 0:33:33because Sam Deen also admits to mouthing off
0:33:33 > 0:33:35about shooting the insurgent,
0:33:35 > 0:33:37"just to be one of the lads," he says.
0:33:37 > 0:33:39Would you say you feel responsible now?
0:33:39 > 0:33:41You feel some guilt yourself?
0:33:41 > 0:33:43Yeah, a little bit, yeah.
0:33:43 > 0:33:48I feel like when we were there, I do remember saying,
0:33:48 > 0:33:49"Yeah, I'll put one in his head as well."
0:33:49 > 0:33:51And a few of the other lads said that.
0:33:51 > 0:33:53I do think he took the responsibility
0:33:53 > 0:33:56from the younger lads and the less senior blokes,
0:33:56 > 0:33:57and he took it on his shoulders,
0:33:57 > 0:34:00and I think he thought it was his responsibility to do it
0:34:00 > 0:34:03and then move on, because there was
0:34:03 > 0:34:05no point in calling in a MERT,
0:34:05 > 0:34:08so guys could get shot out of the sky.
0:34:09 > 0:34:12He did draw a line in the sand, and I don't think...
0:34:12 > 0:34:15He didn't kill him in cold blood,
0:34:15 > 0:34:19he just did it so we could just get on with it and move on.
0:34:19 > 0:34:21That's my personal opinion.
0:34:21 > 0:34:23Yet another consideration, then -
0:34:23 > 0:34:25did Blackman do what he did
0:34:25 > 0:34:29partly to protect his own young marines from themselves?
0:34:29 > 0:34:31I can't imagine what he was feeling.
0:34:31 > 0:34:35He's got young guys that, on camera, were going to shoot him anyway.
0:34:36 > 0:34:40So in a weird way, he kind of took one for the team.
0:34:42 > 0:34:44Whatever was going on in Blackman's mind,
0:34:44 > 0:34:47we do know as soon as the Apache helicopter,
0:34:47 > 0:34:49call sign Ugly, disappeared,
0:34:49 > 0:34:52he shot and killed the insurgent.
0:34:56 > 0:34:58GUNSHOT
0:35:13 > 0:35:18In a nutshell, in your view, Blackman did what he had to do?
0:35:18 > 0:35:22Yeah, and this is why this gives me sleepless nights,
0:35:22 > 0:35:25because I'm glad Al did what he did,
0:35:25 > 0:35:28because all my guys went home.
0:35:29 > 0:35:31And maybe, just maybe,
0:35:31 > 0:35:33if he hadn't done that, you know,
0:35:33 > 0:35:35I'd have been going to a few more funerals
0:35:35 > 0:35:39or laying some more flowers on people's graves
0:35:39 > 0:35:45for someone that I have absolutely zilch respect for.
0:35:46 > 0:35:49Because he was trying to kill my friends and me.
0:35:52 > 0:35:56Colonel Lee, there's a view that what goes on on the battlefield
0:35:56 > 0:35:59should stay on the battlefield?
0:35:59 > 0:36:02I don't have any sympathy with that at all,
0:36:02 > 0:36:04which is why I have never been
0:36:04 > 0:36:07a direct apologist for Sergeant Blackman,
0:36:07 > 0:36:10terribly sad though I find his circumstances.
0:36:10 > 0:36:13I think what goes on on the battlefield,
0:36:13 > 0:36:20quite rightly, particularly now in a 21st-century context,
0:36:20 > 0:36:23it merits immensely careful scrutiny.
0:36:23 > 0:36:26And that seems to me to be right and proper,
0:36:26 > 0:36:30and it also seems to me to be an absolutely key differentiator
0:36:30 > 0:36:35between us and those, very sadly, in recent times we have fought.
0:36:35 > 0:36:36Live, 30 mil only,
0:36:36 > 0:36:38on the north-south wood line.
0:36:38 > 0:36:39Engaging now.
0:36:39 > 0:36:44And my equally concerning or sad hunch
0:36:44 > 0:36:46is that the battlefields of the future
0:36:46 > 0:36:50will be still more opaque and still more challenging
0:36:50 > 0:36:53than those highly opaque and challenging ones of today.
0:36:53 > 0:36:58And so I think that the importance of learning these sort of lessons
0:36:58 > 0:37:00simply couldn't be any higher.
0:37:06 > 0:37:09Sergeant Alexander Blackman,
0:37:09 > 0:37:12as of today no longer a convicted murderer,
0:37:12 > 0:37:14will be resentenced for manslaughter
0:37:14 > 0:37:17on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
0:37:17 > 0:37:21But this long drawn-out case begs many questions,
0:37:21 > 0:37:22not least of which is,
0:37:22 > 0:37:25to what extent should the law allow for
0:37:25 > 0:37:30the incredibly demanding and unique circumstances of front-line combat?
0:37:31 > 0:37:33In modern warfare,
0:37:33 > 0:37:35especially counterinsurgency warfare,
0:37:35 > 0:37:39many talk about the need for courageous restraint,
0:37:39 > 0:37:43that is, having the courage to use the minimum lethal force.
0:37:44 > 0:37:48Our soldiers in Afghanistan had to combine ferocious intent
0:37:48 > 0:37:51with this idea of courageous restraint constantly -
0:37:51 > 0:37:54a difficult balance to achieve,
0:37:54 > 0:37:57as Sergeant Blackman found out, to his cost.
0:37:57 > 0:38:01The truth is, war and the actions of our soldiers have never been
0:38:01 > 0:38:05so closely watched, recorded and scrutinised.
0:38:05 > 0:38:08That means the reality for the modern soldier,
0:38:08 > 0:38:12perhaps as always, is that sometimes there can be a very thin line
0:38:12 > 0:38:16between a court-martial and a Military Cross.
0:38:19 > 0:38:21I'm asking you straight, now.
0:38:21 > 0:38:23Would you think that what happened that day
0:38:23 > 0:38:26was the only time that happened in the Afghan war?
0:38:26 > 0:38:28No.
0:38:31 > 0:38:32- Either before or after?- Yeah.
0:38:32 > 0:38:34That's the nature of the beast?
0:38:34 > 0:38:36Yeah. And the same in every other conflict
0:38:36 > 0:38:39where there was heavy kinetic activity.
0:38:40 > 0:38:45I think it was just another day in Afghanistan and...
0:38:46 > 0:38:49..that's the way it goes out there.
0:38:50 > 0:38:52None of us got hurt,
0:38:52 > 0:38:55so it was a successful day, as far as I'm concerned.