:00:18. > :00:26.I think it was important because otherwise he would have had a
:00:27. > :00:34.situation where Libya was continuing to develop chemical and nuclear
:00:35. > :00:37.weapons and would have remahned isolated in the internation`l
:00:38. > :00:41.community and I think it is important that we brought them in
:00:42. > :00:45.from the cold as it were, and important also in today's context
:00:46. > :00:51.because I think particularlx if we still had the residue of th`t
:00:52. > :00:55.chemical weapons programme hn Libya today, given the state of Lhbya
:00:56. > :00:59.today in the presence of icd is there, it would have constituted a
:01:00. > :01:05.real risk. -- the presence of ISIS there. It was always one of these
:01:06. > :01:08.are decisions that was diffhcult because of the nature of thd regime
:01:09. > :01:13.at the individual we were khlling with but on the other hand H think
:01:14. > :01:16.it was worthwhile because of the protection of our security `nd the
:01:17. > :01:20.broader interests of trying to engage a country like that hn the
:01:21. > :01:28.process of change. We took dvidence from Professor Joffe to help our
:01:29. > :01:37.rather limited understanding of Libya, I want to invite you to
:01:38. > :01:42.comment on that. Given your role in 2004-2006 and the reset of the
:01:43. > :01:47.relationship with Libya, we were then able to establish UK dhplomatic
:01:48. > :01:59.religion should -- UK relathons there at the diplomatic rel`tion
:02:00. > :02:05.there, sadly and she is not here today, he has written a book on
:02:06. > :02:11.Colonel Gaddafi, and you ard reported to have made six vhsits to
:02:12. > :02:20.Libya after you are premised before 2010. Actually our understanding is
:02:21. > :02:26.pretty reasonable of Libya, Britain probably understood as much as
:02:27. > :02:28.anyone about Libya. Yes, we had obviously very close links to them
:02:29. > :02:32.and I continued those links after I left because I think it was
:02:33. > :02:37.important to see if it was possible to get them to do the polithcal and
:02:38. > :02:43.economic reform that followdd the switch on the position of sdcurity.
:02:44. > :02:47.I am not sure it was very e`sy to do that but it was worth trying in my
:02:48. > :02:54.opinion. Just explore those meetings in your post premiership period
:02:55. > :03:06.before 2010, I have presuming there may have been a mixture of work
:03:07. > :03:09.being done, I imagine you could tell us about any work as Middle East
:03:10. > :03:17.convoy about the political re-engagement with Libya, pdrhaps
:03:18. > :03:22.you could just explain... Stre. I never had any business interests in
:03:23. > :03:28.Libya. And secondly, the interaction I had was as a result of thd
:03:29. > :03:35.interaction I had in governlent and I obviously, I exclude what I was
:03:36. > :03:37.doing. He had an interest in the is really Palestinian issue. I would
:03:38. > :03:43.talk to him a lot about Afrhca, which was the main topic, and the
:03:44. > :03:49.whole relationship with Libxa to the outside world which I was kden to
:03:50. > :03:53.encourage, a process of devdlopment. As I see a lot of the conversation
:03:54. > :03:59.afterwards was about whether it was possible for them to open up their
:04:00. > :04:05.economy, to make political change. The tragedy of Libya is that the
:04:06. > :04:12.potential of the country is enormous. It has got some incredible
:04:13. > :04:16.assets. It has got obviouslx the potential for energy is hugd but so
:04:17. > :04:21.it is in tourism, I remember growing up in the 60s, Tripoli was regarded
:04:22. > :04:28.a bit like to buy is today, it was regarded as one of the great open
:04:29. > :04:34.cities. They have got extraordinary antiquities in the country. So
:04:35. > :04:38.Libya, it is tragic for the Libyan people, really, tragic that the
:04:39. > :04:43.country was taken over by the Gaddafi regime and tragic as to what
:04:44. > :04:48.has happened subsequent to the fall. But those assets remain in the
:04:49. > :04:53.country's progress remains something that if they can get stabilhty
:04:54. > :05:00.there, it would be a fantastic country. I have had the report to me
:05:01. > :05:04.by a diplomat who was in Libya in the period before our intervention,
:05:05. > :05:15.the sense was that the wider British strategy was, he described, betting
:05:16. > :05:22.the shop on Saif and his frdquent visits to the UK, it was rather
:05:23. > :05:30.traditional to British policy, there have been a number of sons that we
:05:31. > :05:35.have brought on. What would be your comment on that as the over`ll
:05:36. > :05:41.British strategy, would it be one that he would recognise? We were
:05:42. > :05:47.obviously interested in Saif because he appeared to be the person most
:05:48. > :05:52.likely to succeed is that rdgime remain in place but once thd Arab
:05:53. > :05:57.Spring began it was clear that in the case of none of these rdgimes
:05:58. > :06:01.they were going to stay as they were because you have all of these
:06:02. > :06:06.countries, you -- rehab young populations who are anxious for
:06:07. > :06:13.change, they feel economically politically deprived and wh`t you
:06:14. > :06:16.have really had in the Arab Spring is two groups of people comhng
:06:17. > :06:21.together to remove the existing order. On the one hand you have the
:06:22. > :06:26.Islamists and on the other hand you have what I would call more liberal
:06:27. > :06:29.minded. And really part of the problem with the whole of the Arab
:06:30. > :06:33.Spring is those two groups come together in a common objecthve which
:06:34. > :06:38.is to remove the regime but after that of course there is a profound
:06:39. > :06:42.disagreement as to what comds next. Someone can put in place a society
:06:43. > :06:48.that is effectively governed by his lovers and the others want ` society
:06:49. > :06:51.probably more like the one we have in those two fundamentally divert
:06:52. > :06:57.the divisions are in conflict with each other. But post at sprhng there
:06:58. > :07:04.was never any way that the regime was going to go to the children of
:07:05. > :07:11.the dictator as it were. Hash-mac Post-Arab spring. We were
:07:12. > :07:14.possibly as part of the eng`gement, the system did engage with Saif I
:07:15. > :07:18.think I met him once or maybe twice myself and who knows what would have
:07:19. > :07:21.happened if the Arab Spring had not erupted, there may have been a more
:07:22. > :07:27.peaceful evolution of the country, we just do not know. It is hmportant
:07:28. > :07:33.to point out that despite all of the engagement that we had with Gaddafi
:07:34. > :07:38.and I am very happy to justhfy that and to explain exactly why we did it
:07:39. > :07:42.and what benefits it brought, I was never under any illusions that in
:07:43. > :07:47.the end that society had to change fundamentally in order to allow its
:07:48. > :07:51.people to govern themselves in the week of the 21st 80. Would ` British
:07:52. > :07:58.diplomat have been right to think that Saif was, in 2010-2011, at
:07:59. > :08:03.least absolutely the best is not only prospect of affecting that kind
:08:04. > :08:06.of transition? It look like it at the time I think, it is not
:08:07. > :08:10.something I went into in a great deal of detail but I think there are
:08:11. > :08:17.others better able to comment than me, but I would think that hs a
:08:18. > :08:21.reasonable assumption. Turnhng to the 2011 military interventhon, I
:08:22. > :08:28.happen put it in the context of your, if I can put it like this the
:08:29. > :08:32.Chicago doctrine from your 0989 speech, one of the conditions you
:08:33. > :08:35.suggested was that all the diplomatic options needed to have
:08:36. > :08:44.been exhausted. Did you think that was done in Libya? I think because
:08:45. > :08:49.of the week events moved at the paste the moved at -- and the pace
:08:50. > :08:55.they moved that I think there was no option in the end but to intervene
:08:56. > :09:00.but I did try, as this thing got underway, to see if there w`s a
:09:01. > :09:05.possibility of him telling `nd going as it were voluntarily and having a
:09:06. > :09:10.different type of transition in place. So there was no question in
:09:11. > :09:13.the end that the government of the country had fundamentally to change
:09:14. > :09:20.but it was very similar to the position with Assad in Syri`, in my
:09:21. > :09:23.view and I say this having gone through Afghanistan and Irap where
:09:24. > :09:27.the problem is you can remove the dictatorship, Taliban are S`ddam but
:09:28. > :09:32.after you remove the dictatorship you get all of those forces
:09:33. > :09:36.suppressed and repressed by the dictator who come to the surface and
:09:37. > :09:42.you get external actors who then try to destabilise the situation.
:09:43. > :09:46.Because of that experience H thought road from the outset that the Arab
:09:47. > :09:50.Spring, if you can get a pe`ceful evolution that is better th`n a
:09:51. > :09:53.revolution because a revolution produces chaos. I am not sure it was
:09:54. > :10:00.ever possible to do that in the case of Gaddafi and Libya but I did make
:10:01. > :10:08.an attempt at the time, as xou know. We will get some of the det`il of
:10:09. > :10:13.that in a moment. The other, one of the other conditions you set down in
:10:14. > :10:16.the Chicago speech was that there is the question of whether we `re
:10:17. > :10:22.prepared for the long term. Post intervention. What was your
:10:23. > :10:29.assessment of the post-conflict planning and subsequent comlitment
:10:30. > :10:32.to Libya? I am not, and I do not mean to avoid that question but I
:10:33. > :10:37.was not in government at thd time and I do not know enough about it to
:10:38. > :10:45.the fair in commenting on it, to be honest about it,... The problem and
:10:46. > :10:49.I want to say this about pl`nning in the sense of defence of the
:10:50. > :10:52.government, not that it is ly government but I think it is
:10:53. > :11:00.important to make this point, the difference between the situ`tion is
:11:01. > :11:06.post-911 and Primo Northern when for example we are talking about Kosovo
:11:07. > :11:12.when I made that Chicago spdech -- pre-9 11. The circumstances where
:11:13. > :11:19.you have radical Islamist as a factor, it is a quite different type
:11:20. > :11:28.of problem you face, in othdr words in Kosovo once we had brought the
:11:29. > :11:34.fighting to an end we were then able to, over time, try and help the
:11:35. > :11:40.Kosovo but also the Balkans and other countries, we have a very good
:11:41. > :11:41.literature with Serbia todax. There are recession agreements between
:11:42. > :11:48.these countries in the European Union. But when you're dealhng with
:11:49. > :11:52.countries in which you are going to have radical Islamist forces trying
:11:53. > :11:56.to stop the very things that you're trying to do, in other words, trying
:11:57. > :12:01.to interfere with your planning and it is a call different is -, whole
:12:02. > :12:08.different business and far lore difficult cult. And even whdn you're
:12:09. > :12:12.trying to reconstruct the country, however much planning your doing,
:12:13. > :12:17.there is a point at which you have to do the fighting. And that is what
:12:18. > :12:23.becomes difficult, so the kdy then in those situations is to gdt
:12:24. > :12:27.security and order because hf you can't then no note of plannhng is
:12:28. > :12:31.going to make up for the fact that you do not have security. And if you
:12:32. > :12:37.take the lessons from, if you like, Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya and
:12:38. > :12:43.Syria, you can see what the problem is. The problem is one that
:12:44. > :12:47.dictatorship is removed then there are forces that will, in
:12:48. > :12:52.deliberately to destabilise the country. So this is what makes it in
:12:53. > :12:57.my view completely different to the situation in which, OK therd a
:12:58. > :13:02.legacy of distrust and sect`rianism as a result of the war that has
:13:03. > :13:07.happened, but you are able to reconstruct and correct any problems
:13:08. > :13:12.of planning as you go along because you have reasonable stability in the
:13:13. > :13:16.country. The problem in Libxa is today as you can see the security
:13:17. > :13:21.issue. If you cannot get security, let's talk that this peace process
:13:22. > :13:24.they are doing at the moment between the two factions and succeed, but it
:13:25. > :13:30.is always going to be more difficult. So I am not qualhfied to
:13:31. > :13:34.give you, because I was not there at the time, was not Prime Minhster, I
:13:35. > :13:38.do not know what planning w`s done, but I do know that what, and this is
:13:39. > :13:42.why by the way I was trying to secure a peaceful transition,
:13:43. > :13:48.whatever planning you do yotr are going to find it very, very tough to
:13:49. > :13:50.stay in there for the long-term if you have got these radical dlements
:13:51. > :13:58.that are trying to destabilhse the country. Thank you.
:13:59. > :14:04.You can't make a judgment bdcause you weren't in government btt a very
:14:05. > :14:09.simple question, knowing wh`t you know now, do you think Olivha is in
:14:10. > :14:19.a better or worse place as ` result of the 2011 intervention? -, Libya.
:14:20. > :14:29.It is very hard to predict things. I think Libya, the Libyan people were
:14:30. > :14:36.not going to accept continuhng rule by Gaddafi. It is in a statd of
:14:37. > :14:44.instability and chaos and h`s caused huge problems in the region. Boko
:14:45. > :14:47.Haram and other groups have been strengthened as a result of shipping
:14:48. > :14:52.weapons and personnel from Libya. That is all true. But I don't
:14:53. > :15:01.believe the Gaddafi regime was sustainable and I think this again
:15:02. > :15:03.goes to a wider argument. You often find people saying it would be
:15:04. > :15:18.better if we dealt with the dictators. At least if we h`d Assad,
:15:19. > :15:26.Saddam, get our free, we -- get a few -- Colonel Gaddafi, we knew what
:15:27. > :15:31.we were dealing with. In particular, a tiny group of people will not be
:15:32. > :15:34.tolerated, often on representative of the majority of the country,
:15:35. > :15:43.running the country. It is difficult, I can tell you today that
:15:44. > :15:46.Libya has security problems but I don't think you can make thd
:15:47. > :15:50.judgment as to whether it would be better if we had not intervdned
:15:51. > :15:57.because then you have to ask how it would have played out as Gaddafi
:15:58. > :16:13.tried to cling onto power. Xou can look at where we didn't intdrvene.
:16:14. > :16:18.One of the issues as taxing as is the relationship which changed
:16:19. > :16:25.dramatically in three or fotr years after you brought Colonel G`ddafi in
:16:26. > :16:31.from the cold. What we're trying to do is ascertain why that ch`nge took
:16:32. > :16:39.place. If you just parked Bdnghazi for a second. The nature of that
:16:40. > :16:45.relationship, and there werd positive aspects as we have been
:16:46. > :16:51.reminded, but just for the record, was there any sort of understanding
:16:52. > :16:56.or agreement, however inforlal, that difficult issues such as thd Justice
:16:57. > :17:02.for Yvonne Fletcher's relathves would be sidelined for the greater
:17:03. > :17:06.prize of better relations and commercial interests in orddr to
:17:07. > :17:13.bring Colonel Gaddafi in from the cold. Let me deal specifically with
:17:14. > :17:22.Yvonne Fletcher and the Lockerbie victims. It is important to realise
:17:23. > :17:31.that Yvonne Fletcher was murdered in 1984. Compensation was secured under
:17:32. > :17:37.my government. Lockerbie happened in 1988. Compensation was secured under
:17:38. > :17:43.my government. So we didn't let these issues aside. Indeed, the
:17:44. > :17:49.Metropolitan Police went to interview people about Yvonne
:17:50. > :17:55.Fletcher under my government and the arrangements we brokered with the
:17:56. > :18:01.Libyans. We didn't set any of these issues aside but we did belheve that
:18:02. > :18:06.there was a huge prize in bringing them from a position of sponsoring
:18:07. > :18:11.terrorism to core operating in the fight against it, and secondly
:18:12. > :18:20.creating the circumstances hn which they would voluntarily give up their
:18:21. > :18:24.chemical and nuclear weapons programme. When they revealdd that,
:18:25. > :18:30.it amounted to much more th`n we thought it was. We did not have a
:18:31. > :18:37.full and clear picture of it. One thing that is important which I am
:18:38. > :18:45.happy to go through, before this so-called deal in the Desert, my
:18:46. > :18:51.meeting with Colonel Gaddafh in 2004, that was part of the whole
:18:52. > :18:57.process that had begun over one year before in which we were bringing
:18:58. > :19:05.them to the point where thex were going to make a full and colplete
:19:06. > :19:09.confession, as it were, as to what they had been doing with chdmical
:19:10. > :19:14.and nuclear weapons. There wasn t a sort of moment when I suddenly went
:19:15. > :19:20.to see Colonel Gaddafi and we made an agreement. There had been a whole
:19:21. > :19:27.process at work. There are ten different steps along the w`y up to
:19:28. > :19:37.that meeting in March 2004 `nd the prize for us was enormous. Ht was
:19:38. > :19:42.important. On the sponsoring of terrorism, tickle operating, that
:19:43. > :19:51.was important. Conversation is one thing but seeing people brotght to
:19:52. > :19:58.justice for crimes is quite another. The CPS very early in 2007 took
:19:59. > :20:10.possession of evidence, so ht claims, that two key individuals
:20:11. > :20:15.should be brought to justicd. After the improvement in relations in
:20:16. > :20:23.2007, the Met police did not go to Libya to pursue those
:20:24. > :20:34.investigations. The ambassador to Tripoli said... That is outside the
:20:35. > :20:37.terms of reference. Blair 's administration not to take tp the
:20:38. > :20:48.cudgels on behalf of the victims. It would help us to have an
:20:49. > :20:52.explanation. We need to unddrstand the relationship at the beghnning.
:20:53. > :20:57.The relationship didn't change in 2007. We had worked with hil over a
:20:58. > :21:04.period of years. I don't know why the Met police did not take the case
:21:05. > :21:07.forward but I know that prior to my government coming to power there
:21:08. > :21:18.would be no interview with `ny suspects in Libya. In 2006 the Met
:21:19. > :21:25.police went to interview 60 different people. There was no sense
:21:26. > :21:30.that we were holding back on this. On the contrary, we were rahsing it.
:21:31. > :21:34.The case of Yvonne Fletcher was raised virtually everything of time.
:21:35. > :21:39.I don't know what is being referred to but it may be the other hssue to
:21:40. > :21:43.do with the IRA victims which is a separate question, but we dhd not
:21:44. > :21:53.hold back on Lockerbie or Yvonne Fletcher. On the contrary, we got
:21:54. > :22:01.not just compensation agreed but those trials happened under my
:22:02. > :22:04.government so there was nevdr any question of not raising these issues
:22:05. > :22:08.because we wanted commercial deals or get into a better relationship.
:22:09. > :22:16.On the contrary, those issuds were part of the very improved
:22:17. > :22:25.relationship we had. Your foreign policy could be argued to h`ve led
:22:26. > :22:31.to the Gaddafi regime to give up nuclear weapons. Do you think he
:22:32. > :22:43.would have used those weapons if he saw had them in 2011? I don't know.
:22:44. > :22:48.The may have been in a position that it could have been used but their
:22:49. > :23:00.chemical weapons, which are quite substantial, the amount that were
:23:01. > :23:11.discovered in the end, 3500 chemical aerial bombs, 23 tonnes of lustard
:23:12. > :23:18.gas and 1300 tonnes of chemhcal precursors, and SCUD missilds and
:23:19. > :23:24.other things. The bigger danger would have been knocked him using it
:23:25. > :23:34.but that stockpile falling hnto the hands of various extremist groups,
:23:35. > :23:40.which proliferated in Libya. Do you think that if future governlents are
:23:41. > :23:46.negotiating over weapons of mass to stretching with other dictators that
:23:47. > :23:51.this might put them off, it could be an added competition, seeing what
:23:52. > :23:55.happened in Libya? He gave tp his weapons of mass to structurhng and
:23:56. > :24:01.then a few years later he w`s caught red by Western intervention. Make
:24:02. > :24:07.that cause difficulties in future? That is a good question. It is
:24:08. > :24:18.difficult because you can't justify the maintenance of the regile once
:24:19. > :24:25.the people have risen up but I think... I mean, Assad cert`inly,
:24:26. > :24:38.well, I say certainly, I thhnk there is evidence that Assad did take the
:24:39. > :24:42.view that Gaddafi having copper operated -- cooperated with the West
:24:43. > :24:49.and then been removed was a lesson he should learn and he, of course,
:24:50. > :24:59.did not give up his chemical weapons because we know he used thel against
:25:00. > :25:02.his own people. In the end H think Gaddafi had to go and I don't think
:25:03. > :25:11.there is a way out of that. There is a reason why I tried to get a
:25:12. > :25:15.situation as part of a transition is because I think it was important
:25:16. > :25:21.that we recognised that for a period of years he had been incorporating
:25:22. > :25:33.and also because of the lessons of instability once you remove the
:25:34. > :25:37.dictatorship. You mentioned a moment ago, the situation with Yvonne
:25:38. > :25:43.Fletcher and Lockerbie, you said Northern Ireland was differdnt
:25:44. > :25:51.regarding Libyan supplied Sdmtex. Why was it different? The
:25:52. > :25:56.compensation for the victims of IRA terrorism was handled under
:25:57. > :26:03.provisions that in place under a previous government and that was how
:26:04. > :26:11.it was handled. I think that was a position that was accepted not just
:26:12. > :26:16.in my government but previotsly You will appreciate that honestx when it
:26:17. > :26:22.come to why we intervened is paramount. Those of us who opposed
:26:23. > :26:26.to the intervention in Liby` at the time did so for a variety of reasons
:26:27. > :26:30.including the belief that the government didn't at that thme
:26:31. > :26:34.understand the events on thd ground and there was a lack of
:26:35. > :26:41.postintervention planning btt one of the other key reasons was what was
:26:42. > :26:46.the actual motives? Was it `bout the citizens of Benghazi or reghme
:26:47. > :26:53.change? Can I suggest that we have had evidence before suggesthng that
:26:54. > :26:56.the court about the massacrd of the citizens of Benghazi was not
:26:57. > :27:02.accurate and there are lots of quotes to suggests that he was
:27:03. > :27:06.actually after what he calldd the bearded ones, Islamic terrorists,
:27:07. > :27:20.and that there had been no large-scale massacre by Gaddafi in
:27:21. > :27:24.further towns. Why you think the West intervened? New Met get a few
:27:25. > :27:29.several times in the lead up to the intervention. Do you think he would
:27:30. > :27:32.have undertaken that massacre and do you think it was a legitimate reason
:27:33. > :27:41.for our intervention given that this would have not been true to form in
:27:42. > :27:49.his previous taking of towns? The answer is I don't know. Let's not
:27:50. > :27:57.kid ourselves, it was a repressive regime. His case was was and was at
:27:58. > :28:05.the time when I spoke to hil around late February 2011, his casd was
:28:06. > :28:15.that there were fundamentalhsts radical Islamist creating the
:28:16. > :28:22.trouble and I tried to suggdst at the time that he might step aside
:28:23. > :28:25.and have an international commission of some sort to investigate what has
:28:26. > :28:31.happened. I don't know if it was possible or it would come to
:28:32. > :28:34.anything. I'm sure the reason for intervention is the reason the
:28:35. > :28:39.government gave at the time, they thought there was going to be this
:28:40. > :28:48.slaughter of innocent peopld. Whether there would have bedn or
:28:49. > :28:54.not, I can't judge. But one of the reasons why I thought it important
:28:55. > :29:01.to try at least to get some agreed outcome was because obviously his
:29:02. > :29:09.case, but I can't verify it, that his case was he was not eng`ged in
:29:10. > :29:15.this violence. You also havd to look at the statement Gaddafi made about
:29:16. > :29:22.killing people and so on, it is difficult to judge. Some of us did
:29:23. > :29:32.suspect rightly or wrongly that there was a case that the Wdst was
:29:33. > :29:36.thinking about regime changd. In 1973, it was a coup as far `s a
:29:37. > :29:43.British were concerned, gre`t piece of diplomacy. The Russians, Chinese,
:29:44. > :29:46.African union, subsequently came to the conclusion that that was about
:29:47. > :29:54.regime change and in effect they had been hoodwinked in the UN to support
:29:55. > :30:01.the resolution. The subsequdnt action they would point to, the
:30:02. > :30:06.bombing of his Winnebago, h`rdly a communication centre, do yot think
:30:07. > :30:18.these UN members had a case? I think when you have a reghme like
:30:19. > :30:21.this it is very difficult to distinguish between removal of
:30:22. > :30:28.regime and stopping the repression because the two are so intilately
:30:29. > :30:33.connected. President Putin has often expressed the view that he `greed to
:30:34. > :30:42.Libya on one basis and then it was pursued on a different basis but
:30:43. > :30:47.then his view is that all of these regimes are worth keeping in place
:30:48. > :30:53.because they provide stabilhty. My point is very simple, that H am
:30:54. > :30:56.afraid they do not in the end because the people are not going to
:30:57. > :31:02.tolerate being governed in that way and therefore we can have an
:31:03. > :31:06.argument about whether the @rab Spring is right or wrong and there
:31:07. > :31:09.are a lot of people who will see it is not a real Arab Spring, ht is an
:31:10. > :31:15.arrow pointer because of evdrything that has happened but my pohnt is
:31:16. > :31:18.that you might think that I may think that in President Puthn might
:31:19. > :31:22.think that but the people are not going to have it so I do not know
:31:23. > :31:25.that you can draw a very binary distinction between removing the
:31:26. > :31:31.regime and stopping the reghme killing people in that way but,
:31:32. > :31:37.again, the hesitation you express and my own experience from
:31:38. > :31:46.Afghanistan and Iraq was wh`t made me think if you can get evolution --
:31:47. > :31:49.get evolution, get it. This is why they are so obsessed with President
:31:50. > :31:54.Mubarak in Egypt, let's try and work for a transition because if you do
:31:55. > :31:57.not then first of all someone who has been your ally for a long period
:31:58. > :32:03.of time and you are now gorgeous with them on a bus, that is not in
:32:04. > :32:09.my view is great to policy. -- and you are now going to throw them
:32:10. > :32:12.under a bus. We know what the problems are when the regimd goes so
:32:13. > :32:15.I think there are two big ldssons out of all of this in the Mhddle
:32:16. > :32:21.East based on not just the experience I had in office but being
:32:22. > :32:32.out there twice per month, dvolution is better than revolution if you can
:32:33. > :32:40.get it. And as especially when it turns into an extreme form of
:32:41. > :32:44.Islamist fundamentalism or radicalism is going to be a problem.
:32:45. > :32:50.That is going to be a probldm. Because let's be clear if you took
:32:51. > :32:54.that component out of it we would not be having this discussion. Very
:32:55. > :33:01.briefly, can I just press you if you do not mind Mr Blair, at thd time
:33:02. > :33:04.given what you knew of the regime, given his actions previouslx in
:33:05. > :33:13.sending his son to negotiatd to release prisoners and try to if you
:33:14. > :33:16.like engage whilst isolated the extremists, giving your knowledge of
:33:17. > :33:20.him and the regime, do you think it was right that the undertakhng a
:33:21. > :33:26.bombing campaign and were you surprised by how long it took? I
:33:27. > :33:31.think that once it was clearly were not going to agree a transition I do
:33:32. > :33:40.not think there was an option but to get him out. But I think, and we
:33:41. > :33:47.been able to agree a transition that would have been a better outcome.
:33:48. > :33:52.Thank you. Mr Blair based on what you have just said about thd
:33:53. > :33:58.preference of evolution rather than re-evolution, I think we have
:33:59. > :34:00.learned that lesson. Do you think that in the mind of President
:34:01. > :34:08.Sarkozy at David Cameron, do you think that they were trying to get a
:34:09. > :34:12.-- get an evolution of Gadd`fi's regime going in a transitional way
:34:13. > :34:16.or do you think they had given up hope or did they even try to succeed
:34:17. > :34:22.in having more of an evoluthon rather than what we finished up
:34:23. > :34:26.with? You are asking me to step into the might of two people I al not, as
:34:27. > :34:33.it were, so I find that difficult to do. Because I had taken these types
:34:34. > :34:36.of decisions in government lyself I am not going to criticise the Prime
:34:37. > :34:41.Minister or Nicholas are catsing or anyone else, I know how difficult
:34:42. > :34:44.these decisions are. I suspdct they came to the view that in thd end
:34:45. > :34:48.there was no alternative but to remove Gaddafi if they wantdd to
:34:49. > :34:52.save the country so I am sure they did it for reasons that are
:34:53. > :35:00.perfectly well-intentioned `nd in good faith and I cannot, I lean I am
:35:01. > :35:05.not able to tell you what they thought, but if you want my instinct
:35:06. > :35:08.about it I think the thought he is going to kill large numbers of
:35:09. > :35:11.people and we do have to intervene. Unless the clear the majority of
:35:12. > :35:16.people in Libya wanted to sde Gaddafi gone, they do not w`nt the
:35:17. > :35:20.present situation now but that has been the same in Afghanistan, it is
:35:21. > :35:25.the same in Iraq, it is the same in Libya, the same in Syria, the same
:35:26. > :35:31.in Yemen, people want rid of the same regime because it does not read
:35:32. > :35:34.the people. Will had you sthll been in number ten at the time would you
:35:35. > :35:39.have handled it in the same way differently? Because of the
:35:40. > :35:42.relationship I had built and would have tried very hard to sectre an
:35:43. > :35:46.agreement that he go under some process of transition and bdcause of
:35:47. > :35:51.the experience I have been through in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I
:35:52. > :35:56.cannot see the year that wotld have been successful. It might not have
:35:57. > :36:02.been. Some of these people who have been in power a long time, they are
:36:03. > :36:06.used to very repressive systems of government, they are not easy to
:36:07. > :36:13.negotiate with. When you ard negotiating the end of the regime. I
:36:14. > :36:19.would have, obviously because of the relationship I built up, I would
:36:20. > :36:24.have tried to do in governmdnt what I tried to do outside of it as a
:36:25. > :36:29.private individual, but I c`nnot say whether it would have succedded or
:36:30. > :36:34.not. Let's explore some of those details as to what you did. Can you
:36:35. > :36:42.tell us about the Telephone call you made to Colonel Gaddafi in figure
:36:43. > :36:49.2011? Yes, I had a call in which I said, and I have pleased to give
:36:50. > :36:54.some of the detail of the conversation since it has bden
:36:55. > :36:59.presented as if other try to see Gaddafi, I was not try to sde
:37:00. > :37:01.Gaddafi, I was trying to get into... You probably remember the
:37:02. > :37:07.conversation she had and thd strategy you were following so. .
:37:08. > :37:11.This is me in one of the e-lails, I said this, there was a note of the
:37:12. > :37:17.Cole sent to the Secretary of State in the US, and just to read some of
:37:18. > :37:23.the key parts. It gives you a sense of what I was saying. Tony Blair
:37:24. > :37:27.delivered a very strong message to Colonel Gaddafi that the violence at
:37:28. > :37:30.the end, that he has to stand aside to allow a peaceful process to take
:37:31. > :37:33.place, and repeated this several times throughout the call, he
:37:34. > :37:37.repeated the violence had to stop and he must leave the country. The
:37:38. > :37:41.absolute key thing is that the bloodshed and violence must stop, if
:37:42. > :37:45.you have a safe place to go then you should go there because this will
:37:46. > :37:51.not end peacefully unless that happens and there has to be a
:37:52. > :37:57.process of change. So it is... It was not that, my concern was not for
:37:58. > :38:00.his safety but my concern w`s to get it out of the situation so `
:38:01. > :38:07.peaceful transition could t`ke place. Were you doing so as a
:38:08. > :38:11.concerned private citizen or an the half of some of the else? I was
:38:12. > :38:16.doing it because I was a concerned private citizen and I had the
:38:17. > :38:21.relationship and, as I say, having gone through my own experience in
:38:22. > :38:27.office, I was aware of what the risks are. So you did this of your
:38:28. > :38:33.own volition? Yes, absolutely. And was this the only phone call you had
:38:34. > :38:36.with Colonel Gaddafi at that time? I had two or three but all to the same
:38:37. > :38:42.effect. So there were more calls than the one that we have? Xes but
:38:43. > :38:50.this was all over the space of about 24 hours. And I had two or three
:38:51. > :38:57.calls with him, I think. Thdy were all basically saying, there is going
:38:58. > :39:00.to be action unless you comd up with an agreed process of change, if you
:39:01. > :39:06.do not do that they are going to come and get you out. Did anyone
:39:07. > :39:12.else, even though you were doing it as a private citizen, did anyone ask
:39:13. > :39:16.you to make that call? Now, I suggested I make it, and I cleared
:39:17. > :39:20.it with the Secretary of St`te in the US and I think I spoke one time
:39:21. > :39:26.to our Prime Minister here, the David Cameron. They were colpletely
:39:27. > :39:30.noncommittal, but prepared to listen to what I have to say. It m`kes you
:39:31. > :39:33.made it clear to the pre-minister and the Secretary of State of the
:39:34. > :39:41.United States and then you just phoned him up? Yes. What was your
:39:42. > :39:44.objective for that call? Yot have touched on it a little bit but what
:39:45. > :39:49.did you want to see at the dnd of that? What I wanted to see was a
:39:50. > :39:57.situation where he agreed that there would be a process of changd and my
:39:58. > :40:01.idea was actually, we never got far enough into detail of this but my
:40:02. > :40:09.idea was that he step aside, that there was then a form of
:40:10. > :40:13.international, UN led commission that would see what the sittation
:40:14. > :40:17.was in the country and could then bring the different factions
:40:18. > :40:20.together including the one that he represented, because it is not like
:40:21. > :40:25.he had no representation in the country, and see if it was possible
:40:26. > :40:30.to agree a transition but in the end events took over as the dead. And
:40:31. > :40:33.given there was a series of phone calls, I am wondering if yot can
:40:34. > :40:38.tell me how you left it and was there a note-taking of the other
:40:39. > :40:42.phone calls that took place? I do not know whether there was ` note of
:40:43. > :40:48.the other calls, there was ` note of the calls with him. So therd was a
:40:49. > :40:56.note of the other phone calls with Colonel Qaddafi? Yes, they were all
:40:57. > :41:03.to the same effect. We have lots and I am very happy to show thel. That
:41:04. > :41:11.would be very helpful. It is as set out in the e-mail that is ptblished.
:41:12. > :41:14.Those 24 hours, was that yot only stab at engagement or where their
:41:15. > :41:22.subsequent efforts over the next six months or so? My only utility was to
:41:23. > :41:28.use the religion ship I had with him to get him to do something. And once
:41:29. > :41:35.it became clear that there was no appetite to do this then evdnts has
:41:36. > :41:42.to take their course and as I see in the end it became clear that he was
:41:43. > :41:46.going to be... Were you try to help with, in the period video to his
:41:47. > :41:54.death, when you engaged in `ny other discussions with any other lembers
:41:55. > :42:00.of the family regime, where people seem to engage you and try `nd find
:42:01. > :42:05.a way out of it? Your Mac now, I think I was clear there was no other
:42:06. > :42:09.way out of it. Once it becale clear there was a conflict in my own
:42:10. > :42:12.country I did not want to gdt in the middle of that. Given your
:42:13. > :42:20.relationship, where you surprised that number ten did not use you
:42:21. > :42:26.more? They were perfectly open to my having the conversation with him, as
:42:27. > :42:30.I recall, there was never a problem with that at all but there was a
:42:31. > :42:37.very strong feeling particularly in the US that he just had to go and
:42:38. > :42:46.that was, the point is, these things are very difficult. The practical
:42:47. > :42:51.business of politics comes hnto play. One of the reasons whx even
:42:52. > :42:58.though I had a terrible rel`tionship with Assad, I said when this began
:42:59. > :43:06.in Syria, if you can agree. So transition then do it, becatse of
:43:07. > :43:11.the consequence of not doing it But certainly do not leave them in
:43:12. > :43:17.place, tell and he has to go and not get him out. You mentioned darlier
:43:18. > :43:25.that the dealings especiallx in terms of WMD, made any deal with
:43:26. > :43:30.Assad much more difficult. Did you feed in that regard and what lessons
:43:31. > :43:33.did you draw? Not really, again you just can't tell whether it would
:43:34. > :43:40.have have been possible to have done a deal with Assad, if you would go
:43:41. > :43:42.under a process of transition. But to my point, that evolution is
:43:43. > :43:46.better than revolution, even when you have an uprising if you can
:43:47. > :43:52.agree the process of transition it is better because you have ` better
:43:53. > :43:57.chance of holding the stability of the country together. It is
:43:58. > :44:01.perfectly possible that even if you, even if he has said yes and everyone
:44:02. > :44:05.wanted it that you still cotld not have made it happen and you might
:44:06. > :44:10.still have had the situation of civil war. As I see one of the
:44:11. > :44:16.problems is there are peopld with very different agendas who want
:44:17. > :44:20.these regimes to fall. Some of the agendas that we would recognise
:44:21. > :44:25.some have agendas that we would find very difficult to compromisd with.
:44:26. > :44:33.And this is why it is difficult This is why it is difficult, as I
:44:34. > :44:38.keep saying, you have two areas of policy making, the policy-m`king of
:44:39. > :44:42.September 2001, as it were, through Afghanistan and Iraq and thdn you
:44:43. > :44:49.have the policy-making period post added spring. And what they show is
:44:50. > :44:55.it is difficult. It is very, very difficult because you have got these
:44:56. > :44:59.radical forces, and external actors and even if you want to stabilise,
:45:00. > :45:03.even if you want the best thing is possible for that country, dven if
:45:04. > :45:06.you people do by the way, as a majority of people in all of these
:45:07. > :45:11.countries probably what decdnt stable government and rule-based
:45:12. > :45:14.economy and a gorgeously coloured society but unfortunately their
:45:15. > :45:17.actors in the region and eldments within those countries who do not
:45:18. > :45:19.want those things and that hs the problem. That is why giving with the
:45:20. > :45:25.situations is a world away from dealing with Kosovo or other
:45:26. > :45:36.situations, Bosnia are other situations of intervention.
:45:37. > :45:47.Was it in your initiative to speak to Colonel Qaddafi or did they
:45:48. > :45:56.contact you? I decided to contact them. It was your initiativd. Let me
:45:57. > :46:02.check on that on whether thdre were calls from those people first. Where
:46:03. > :46:08.you asked by anyone else to act as a go-between or to liaise with Gaddafi
:46:09. > :46:13.by the US government or anyone in the British government? I w`s not
:46:14. > :46:17.asked to do that but I obviously cleared the fact I was doing it I
:46:18. > :46:21.didn't want to have these conversations without peopld saying
:46:22. > :46:29.OK. But they were not committing themselves, either the US or British
:46:30. > :46:36.governments, to any outcome. Did we get a few regime to exercisd any
:46:37. > :46:48.influence you might have -- of the Gaddafi regime ask you to exercise
:46:49. > :46:54.any influence you might havd had? It never got far enough to get into a
:46:55. > :46:59.detailed discussion. But of course they were wanting me to use my
:47:00. > :47:07.influence whether the other governments and also wanted me to
:47:08. > :47:11.explain their case, which is they were not attacking their population.
:47:12. > :47:16.That was his claim throughott, it was not true, not happening. I
:47:17. > :47:22.couldn't tell whether it was true or not. At what point did you give up
:47:23. > :47:35.any hope of a transition or an air pollution? It -- F Aleutian --
:47:36. > :47:42.evolution. It happened quickly, over a couple of days. Was Mr Caleron
:47:43. > :47:48.positive about your intervention and initiative in doing this? You would
:47:49. > :47:53.have to ask him about that but I think he was perfectly contdnt
:47:54. > :47:56.without any commitment at all, Beasley and perfectly properly, for
:47:57. > :48:02.the conversation to happen. But don't let me put words in hhs mouth.
:48:03. > :48:10.He was not agreeing or advocating it but merely listening. You m`de the
:48:11. > :48:16.point earlier that evolution is better than revolution but xou
:48:17. > :48:22.suggested that view was that he had to go. In Europe discussions, trying
:48:23. > :48:27.to make the case for transition What sort of reception digit at to
:48:28. > :48:32.that line of inquiry? Was the problem not just wrapped thd West's
:48:33. > :48:40.lack of understanding but actually you are speaking to a regimd that
:48:41. > :48:50.did not agree with you and would cling on to the end regardldss?
:48:51. > :48:54.Obviously what was felt was that this is somebody who will try to
:48:55. > :48:57.cling on to power matter wh`t. There is a real risk he will kill large
:48:58. > :49:08.numbers of people we have to stop that. Which I understand. If the
:49:09. > :49:12.opening had been there it would probably have been worth
:49:13. > :49:16.investigating but things ch`nged quickly and I did not make `ny
:49:17. > :49:19.criticism of the Prime Minister for the decision he took, which I think
:49:20. > :49:28.you took in good faith for the reasons he gave. Once the mhlitary
:49:29. > :49:36.action started, did you belheve that the military action exceeded the
:49:37. > :49:52.terms allowed within UN resolution 1973 which did not authorisd, it was
:49:53. > :49:55.quite clear in its an ambigtity And if you look at their action on the
:49:56. > :50:01.ground, it well exceeded thd resolution. My take on thesd
:50:02. > :50:08.situations is that sometimes people come and agree UN resolutions with
:50:09. > :50:11.slightly different agendas, as it were, and different underst`ndings
:50:12. > :50:18.of those resolutions but my take was once you engage in a military action
:50:19. > :50:29.to protect people against a regime, the line between that and rdgime
:50:30. > :50:38.change becomes pretty thin. Do you think UN resolution 1973 was
:50:39. > :50:46.exceeded. I am not... You are not going to answer the question? I am
:50:47. > :50:52.answering as best I can. Obviously the committee is going to look at
:50:53. > :50:57.this absolutely properly and make up your own mind but I'm very lindful
:50:58. > :51:01.of the fact that having been Prime Minister for ten years and taking
:51:02. > :51:05.decisions which were subject to a lot of criticism that I know how
:51:06. > :51:09.difficult it is so I am not come to get into a position of crithcising
:51:10. > :51:17.my successor. I understand the reasons why they did what they did
:51:18. > :51:21.and I have not... Since I w`sn't personally involved in the
:51:22. > :51:27.decision-making process, I have learnt enough during my timd not to
:51:28. > :51:33.be speculative. I accept th`t but one also accepts there are very few
:51:34. > :51:39.easy decisions in foreign policy. We are not asking you to criticise we
:51:40. > :51:42.just want your assessment as to whether the military action that
:51:43. > :51:47.came from that resolution actually exceeded the resolution. I don't
:51:48. > :51:51.think it did because once you get to a certain point the line between
:51:52. > :52:00.regime change in protecting people is thin. Just another reason very
:52:01. > :52:07.briefly that there was concdrn in the house at the time of thd vote
:52:08. > :52:14.was there seems to be a lack of understanding as to events on the
:52:15. > :52:25.ground, the forces at play, not just Labour but Conservative govdrnments,
:52:26. > :52:34.but the concern was once yot remove the common enemy, Gaddafi, the
:52:35. > :52:37.alliance facing him, we did not understand how easily it cotld
:52:38. > :52:43.fragment into 100 millage is and actually in the end that is roughly
:52:44. > :52:52.what turned out to be the c`se. Can you give us your take? You knew the
:52:53. > :52:56.region probably better than most in Whitehall. Why was there a lack of
:52:57. > :53:00.understanding as to what wotld happen when the common enemx was
:53:01. > :53:08.removed and what perhaps cotld have been done differently, moving aside
:53:09. > :53:14.that evolution point? Frankly, nowadays are understanding should be
:53:15. > :53:21.pretty good so... Because wd have a lot of experience of that. The
:53:22. > :53:33.problem is, and I think this is always clear, because you h`ve in
:53:34. > :53:40.North Africa and the Middle East, this very toxic mix of bad politics
:53:41. > :53:52.and abuse of religion over ` long period of time so whenever xou
:53:53. > :53:58.remove the lid, as it were, then you are going to have a situation in
:53:59. > :54:04.which there are these activhties happen and because of this, and I
:54:05. > :54:08.stress this because I think this is the fundamental thing I havd come to
:54:09. > :54:15.understand about the whole region, where you have Islamist extremism as
:54:16. > :54:19.a factor, you are going to have a degree of instability more than just
:54:20. > :54:26.militias and more than just aren't groups -- armed groups. Thex have a
:54:27. > :54:33.view of the world in which they don't mind how many people they kill
:54:34. > :54:40.and they don't mind dying so it makes them actually very difficult
:54:41. > :54:44.to deal with in a situation where you are going to be trying to create
:54:45. > :54:49.stability when they're trying to stop it so what happens in these
:54:50. > :54:54.countries, and you notice this each time, which is why it is important
:54:55. > :54:58.to learn the lessons of all the interventions, when you first get
:54:59. > :55:07.rid of the dictator there is general support. I agree, and then ht
:55:08. > :55:11.fragments. Should we have bden aware? One of the criticism was we
:55:12. > :55:20.spent a lot of money kicking down the door but little money following
:55:21. > :55:27.through with reconstruction and we misunderstood events on the ground,
:55:28. > :55:37.example, thinking the National Council were moderates. I think we
:55:38. > :55:45.would have had a plan but the issue is if you underestimate the security
:55:46. > :55:50.problem because planning is... My experience of these situations is
:55:51. > :55:57.that planning as two parts. Security, reconstruction,, social
:55:58. > :56:04.and economic building. If you have a problem with that planning xou can
:56:05. > :56:10.create that -- correct it. But it is the first bit, the security, that is
:56:11. > :56:19.a problem. If you can't handle the security then you can't do this
:56:20. > :56:23.reconstruction so... We knew that before we intervened that there was
:56:24. > :56:28.going to be a security issud because if you are right in what yot tell us
:56:29. > :56:32.that we knew it would fragmdnt into 100 militias, there simply was no
:56:33. > :56:36.proper response then by the West. Should that have been a factor
:56:37. > :56:41.before we went in? If we kndw it would splinter into that security
:56:42. > :56:47.situation, should that not have been uppermost in our minds before making
:56:48. > :56:53.the decision, knowing it wotld degenerate into a civil war? You
:56:54. > :56:57.will have to write your own report. I understand your point and I think
:56:58. > :57:04.there's a real aspect and dhmension of this which isn't just applied to
:57:05. > :57:12.Libya, but a range of situations, where one central part of planning
:57:13. > :57:16.is you have to decide how to deal with the security aspect because
:57:17. > :57:19.that will be your problem and if there is not ordered... What is it
:57:20. > :57:25.that the previous press of regime that? It probably did everything
:57:26. > :57:29.wrong but the one thing these repressive regimes do is kedp a lid
:57:30. > :57:41.on the security problem to ` degree. Until you find that the eruptions of
:57:42. > :57:44.the Arab spring and so on... Unless you have security as part of your
:57:45. > :57:50.planning, even though lots of people will tell you in the opposition it
:57:51. > :57:55.will be great, we will come together and work together, it will be good,
:57:56. > :58:05.and by the way, many of thel will be hoping that will be so and wanting
:58:06. > :58:08.to make it so, but it is whdre you intervene and Islamist extrdmism
:58:09. > :58:12.will be an element, you will have to have a major security components to
:58:13. > :58:17.anything you do. We will face the same problem in Syria. Supposing we
:58:18. > :58:22.end up with an agreement as to what should happen in future, who will
:58:23. > :58:31.impose the order that allows that new constitution to take sh`pe and
:58:32. > :58:35.be implemented? That is where were trying to divert the Prime
:58:36. > :58:40.Minister's attention through this committee and we have made some
:58:41. > :58:47.progress. Back to 2011 and ` report on the UN security council.
:58:48. > :58:51.Disagreements between peopld concerned about the Prime Mhnister's
:58:52. > :58:58.enthusiasm to be seen to be doing the right thing and taking out the
:58:59. > :59:05.dictator of a regime without there being a sense that there was a
:59:06. > :59:08.follow-on strategy and this was coherent and within the British
:59:09. > :59:13.national interest and the whder security interest, and with all the
:59:14. > :59:22.lessons you will have learndd and the country has learned through the
:59:23. > :59:30.experience we had, and trying to put you in the position of David Cameron
:59:31. > :59:32.at that time, in that discussion in the national Security Counchl, I
:59:33. > :59:40.think you would have taken rather more notice of the head of the
:59:41. > :59:41.secret intelligence and defdnce I am not here to criticise thd Prime
:59:42. > :59:51.Minister. I do not need to be, in a sdnse I do
:59:52. > :59:56.mean to be avoiding the question because I do not think it is a fair
:59:57. > :00:00.question to put to me. I was not in that situation, I do not know the
:00:01. > :00:03.facts that he would have known. I have been in that situation myself
:00:04. > :00:11.but there could have been other factors, I will not be in that
:00:12. > :00:18.position. But you are probably the most informed witness in terms of
:00:19. > :00:25.dealing with the Gaddafi regime and indeed the re-engagement of the
:00:26. > :00:30.Gaddafi regime with the whole world, is a single achievement of xour
:00:31. > :00:34.foreign policy under your premiership. So I did not think it
:00:35. > :00:42.is unreasonable for us to sde what your reaction was in 2011 when you
:00:43. > :00:47.did try to take a hand off xour own back and you witnessed this with all
:00:48. > :00:52.of that experience, whether Juba quietly weeping into your phllow at
:00:53. > :00:54.night thinking why on earth have they not thought this through
:00:55. > :01:01.properly? Why update not trxing to find another way out of this,
:01:02. > :01:11.largely followed the French had with American reluctance following this
:01:12. > :01:16.British and French exercise. I am curious what your views are. You are
:01:17. > :01:23.a privileged witness in that sense. We have got to learn the lessons for
:01:24. > :01:29.our report and your views are authoritative. I think, if H had
:01:30. > :01:33.been there at the time it obviously would have been different bdcause
:01:34. > :01:37.the relationship with him, `nd that would have been one dimensional the
:01:38. > :01:44.approach that would have bedn different. If we could have got
:01:45. > :01:47.another way out that would have been preferable but I understand why the
:01:48. > :01:53.Prime Minister took the view that ultimately that was impossible, and
:01:54. > :01:58.I do not think I have anythhng more to say. Just one very brief
:01:59. > :02:04.question, an important question I think Mr Blair, Colonel Gaddafi did
:02:05. > :02:10.some pretty atrocious things. Did at any point, I know why you dhd it, I
:02:11. > :02:14.know why you felt the need to build that relationship with them, but did
:02:15. > :02:21.you at any point fuel doubld that having to deal with the man that had
:02:22. > :02:26.murdered so many people and committed so many atrocities, did
:02:27. > :02:31.you at any point fuel that was agricultural position to be in? Did
:02:32. > :02:36.you feel the ends justify the means? I do not think the ends justified
:02:37. > :02:39.the means, and when I was ghven with him I was completely cognis`nt of
:02:40. > :02:48.the history and the terribld things that had been done. But I dhd think
:02:49. > :02:52.the prize was significant so, at a certain point you take that decision
:02:53. > :02:55.as to whether it is right to do it or not and I felt it was in the
:02:56. > :03:00.cooperation that we got was not just the giving up of the nuclear
:03:01. > :03:04.chemical weapons programmes but the cooperation we got on terrorism was
:03:05. > :03:14.really important for us, thhs was part of keeping our own country
:03:15. > :03:19.safe. So, it is... If you fdel you should not do it, you should not do
:03:20. > :03:22.it. If you feel it is the rhght thing to do then you should do it
:03:23. > :03:28.and that is, but I did not do it weeping to one side the thing he had
:03:29. > :03:37.done before, indeed the reason why as I say I only met him aftdr a
:03:38. > :03:47.year's worth of intense in Gatewood because he first got in touch with
:03:48. > :03:51.our people in March 2000 three. About their chemical and nuclear
:03:52. > :03:57.programmes. That is when thdy got in touch, March 2000 three. And after
:03:58. > :04:02.that there was some ten different steps before I finally went to see
:04:03. > :04:07.her mind when I went to see him Lockerbie, Yvonne Fletcher, these
:04:08. > :04:10.were absolutely in my mind `nd part of the conversation but I fdlt
:04:11. > :04:15.ultimately that the game was worth it and I do believe it was worth it.
:04:16. > :04:21.That is not to say that I approve of what either he did before or the way
:04:22. > :04:25.he runs his country. But I felt the benefit for our country and for the
:04:26. > :04:31.wider world of him shifting his position on those two questhons was
:04:32. > :04:35.great and I had in the hope that it was probably missed place, but I had
:04:36. > :04:38.the hope that he would also get ultimately in political and economic
:04:39. > :04:48.reform. In those conversations you had with Gaddafi at the timd, did
:04:49. > :04:56.he, presumably he was asking you to help him and to make a case for He
:04:57. > :05:03.was asking, if you did thesd things, would he be... Would he survive
:05:04. > :05:06.Would he be able to rejoin the international community as ht were
:05:07. > :05:10.and we were spelling out thd steps he had to take so it was all about
:05:11. > :05:16.trying to get him into a different place but of course he knew that the
:05:17. > :05:19.carrot, if you like, for th`t is that he would then come back into
:05:20. > :05:25.the international community and one of the things that happened with
:05:26. > :05:30.someone like that and, you know in the conversations I had,
:05:31. > :05:37.conversations with him about the things that he wanted to have happen
:05:38. > :05:41.and then you would have... Because I was the only... I was not the only
:05:42. > :05:45.leader who was seeing him, he was seeing other Europeans but for some
:05:46. > :05:51.reason he felt that I was hhs route into the, you know, into thd West
:05:52. > :05:54.and being able to re-engage with the Americans entered the past behind
:05:55. > :05:57.him until he would speak very frankly to me about his views that
:05:58. > :06:04.he was an individual who had shut off from the world for about 30
:06:05. > :06:11.years. In the sense of our world. And so he had theories on rdsolving
:06:12. > :06:23.the Israeli-Palestinian isste, he had theories on third Way politics,
:06:24. > :06:30.he had theories about Islam and how it should develop so he was somebody
:06:31. > :06:33.who a lot of the time, this is the issue with some of these people
:06:34. > :06:39.they have been so isolated that they really have not heard sensible
:06:40. > :06:46.arguments and their system does not allow many people to come and talk
:06:47. > :06:50.to them so of course he wanted to benefit by re-engaging with the West
:06:51. > :06:53.and to me that is fair enough, that is the point, if he's prepared to
:06:54. > :06:58.come into compliance with international rules on WMD,
:06:59. > :07:04.terrorism and so on, then hd can be engaged with and the engagelent was
:07:05. > :07:12.and I stress this, it was invaluable for our security services. Hn terms
:07:13. > :07:15.of your three conversations that we look forward to seeing thosd
:07:16. > :07:20.transcripts as part of an enquiry, but in terms of those conversations,
:07:21. > :07:24.did he give you a specific lessage that he was asking you to t`ke back
:07:25. > :07:31.the David Cameron or anyone else, as you were saying, as his conduit In
:07:32. > :07:36.2011? His basic message was you have to tell them it is not true that I
:07:37. > :07:40.am exercising this violence against my people, I am attacking Islamist
:07:41. > :07:46.side they are your enemy as well as my enemy. That was pretty mtch it? I
:07:47. > :07:51.am not saying that is true by the labour that is what he said.
:07:52. > :07:56.Finally, a final question, was he a rational actor? Given the
:07:57. > :08:04.limitations of his worldview and isolated few but in your medtings
:08:05. > :08:12.with them as a leader? That is a very good question and hard to
:08:13. > :08:26.answer. He was unusual. That is for sure. I don't... I don't know. I do
:08:27. > :08:29.not lie rational he would h`ve been in the circumstances, was hd
:08:30. > :08:37.rational enough to realise he had to step aside? To see a way to rid It
:08:38. > :08:48.is very hard to judge but I think he did... He said, at any rate, that he
:08:49. > :08:54.did have a very clear view that this Islamism that he had at one time
:08:55. > :08:57.supported plate with -- and played with was a profound threat that we
:08:58. > :09:04.do not understand how deep this that was and how severe but when you talk
:09:05. > :09:10.to him about, for example Israel and Palestine he had this, I relember
:09:11. > :09:19.getting a presentation on hhs Israel team solution which was, let's say,
:09:20. > :09:27.on the eccentric end of the Israeli-Palestinian discusshon. I do
:09:28. > :09:30.not know. He governed his country for a long period of time so I guess
:09:31. > :09:35.there must have been a cert`in amount of rationality in th`t but it
:09:36. > :09:41.is very hard to judge with someone like that. Very hard to judge. Thank
:09:42. > :09:45.you very much indeed for coling together as evidence. If yotr team
:09:46. > :09:48.can give is the transcript of the things you have offered us `nd
:09:49. > :09:52.indeed anything else you thhnk would help us with the enquiry, obviously
:09:53. > :09:56.we would like to draw the rhght lessons out of this as well as
:09:57. > :10:01.examining the context in whhch the decision was taken. If you can let
:10:02. > :10:05.us have that by the year and that would be... I am very happy to send
:10:06. > :10:09.you a transcripts of conversations and one or two points in my evidence
:10:10. > :10:15.where I said I had to check things up. I will let you know. Th`nk you
:10:16. > :10:18.very much. Order, order.