UK Military Operations in Syria and Iraq Committee

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:00:17. > :00:25.We will again be having to beat a fairly speedy retreat just after a

:00:26. > :00:29.quarter past 11 because of the need for colleagues to get down to the

:00:30. > :00:40.chamber to secure their places for Prime Minister's Questions.

:00:41. > :00:46.is my pleasure to introduce this session of our enquiry into UK

:00:47. > :00:52.military operations in Syria and Iraq. We have three panellists

:00:53. > :00:56.representing a wide range of views, all from a media background and I

:00:57. > :01:00.would be grateful if you could introduce yourselves and see a

:01:01. > :01:07.sentence or two about your background and your connection with

:01:08. > :01:11.the events we will be discussing. I am Anthony Lloyd, a foreign

:01:12. > :01:15.correspondent to the Times. I have worked there for 23 years. I have

:01:16. > :01:21.reported numerous conflicts around the world. I started reporting in

:01:22. > :01:26.Syria in early 2012. I took about 15 trips to rebel held areas. I have

:01:27. > :01:35.reported extensively from Iraq since 2003 and was the last 15 months ago.

:01:36. > :01:44.Former diplomatic editor at Sky News, I have been to Iraq and Syria

:01:45. > :01:50.12 times. Currently writing books. Patrick Cockburn, I work for the

:01:51. > :01:54.Independent. I first went to Iraq in 1977 and I have been going back

:01:55. > :02:07.frequently ever since. Syria I visited frequently before and during

:02:08. > :02:14.the current conflict. I have written a book called Chaos and caliphate

:02:15. > :02:23.which is coming out. Before that I wrote a book on the rise of Islamic

:02:24. > :02:27.State. Would you say has been the impact of the UK road in the

:02:28. > :02:36.international coalition and in particular the extension of UK air

:02:37. > :02:47.strikes to Syria? I don't think a great deal, partly because British

:02:48. > :02:53.participation is militarily limited. Somewhat more extensive in Iraq and

:02:54. > :02:59.stop I think it is worth bearing in mind, whatever everyone is saying

:03:00. > :03:05.about Syria, what happens in Syria is largely determined by what

:03:06. > :03:12.happens in Iraq and vice versa. The terror strikes have had an effect.

:03:13. > :03:18.Islamic State cannot hold fixed positions against a hostile airpower

:03:19. > :03:25.overhead with partners on the ground. We saw this when Islamic

:03:26. > :03:34.State was trying to take territory from the Kurds. They lost 2000. The

:03:35. > :03:43.whole of call Barney is smashed to bits. It seemed to me about 70% of

:03:44. > :03:52.it is gone. Much of the city has gone. I don't think it is enough,

:03:53. > :04:00.and you were near enough, to do more than we can Islamic State.

:04:01. > :04:09.Because what happened in Syrian cities, you have a five story

:04:10. > :04:13.building, four stories have civilians, the first floor has

:04:14. > :04:15.Islamic State fighters, unless you are going to bring down the whole

:04:16. > :04:25.building, you will not eliminate them. So Islamic State continues, it

:04:26. > :04:34.still has a powerful military force, it still has finances. These have

:04:35. > :04:52.been weakened but they are still there. Its enemies still remain

:04:53. > :04:54.divided with differing goals. There are animated things that your power

:04:55. > :05:01.can achieve, but there are limitations to it. -- and Ahmed of

:05:02. > :05:03.things. Could I ask you to differentiate between where relevant

:05:04. > :05:07.between Iraq and Syria? Because there are clear differences in the

:05:08. > :05:15.effort being made in those countries. I think it's a limited

:05:16. > :05:22.effect militarily but important politically. I think the overall

:05:23. > :05:28.effect is the UK not to be playing that role, it diminishes the sum and

:05:29. > :05:31.it means somebody else has to take the burden. Politically it is

:05:32. > :05:36.important. We should not underestimate British expertise and

:05:37. > :05:43.the missions that have flown. There are hundreds, and they do not always

:05:44. > :05:46.end in kinetic activity, it is called. I do not think we should

:05:47. > :05:52.underestimate the importance of the British militarily and politically

:05:53. > :05:59.on a large basis. That crosses the border and I always felt it was odd

:06:00. > :06:05.that a plane had to stop militarily with an artificial border, anyway,

:06:06. > :06:12.and the world was about to placate in, apparently, the way the vote

:06:13. > :06:17.went last year and it hasn't. Air was about credibility and the

:06:18. > :06:21.problems that would have been connected to the UK not participated

:06:22. > :06:26.in air strikes, that would have been greater in terms of political

:06:27. > :06:32.credibility and the UK's role as a credible ally within the coalition.

:06:33. > :06:36.The actual minimal nature UK air strikes have not had a huge impact

:06:37. > :06:40.on the battlefield. There are periods angles to it. The presence

:06:41. > :06:46.of British special forces in Iraq has had greater coupling effect

:06:47. > :06:52.because they can call on other people's aircraft. Overall, the

:06:53. > :06:56.effects of air power on Islamic State has been very significant over

:06:57. > :07:02.the past few months and they have lost up to 40% of the territory they

:07:03. > :07:07.originally held. In which country? Over role, particularly common in

:07:08. > :07:12.Iraq. Particularly in Iraq. I do not know what the protected is in Syria

:07:13. > :07:17.but the trend is the same in Syria. -- percentage. Losing ground. That

:07:18. > :07:20.is not the solution, it is a trend. Before you come in, I want to take

:07:21. > :07:25.up something you said earlier, you said something about air power in

:07:26. > :07:30.support of forces on the ground. There are forces on the ground,

:07:31. > :07:35.quite clearly, we have identified them in Iraq and there is a big air

:07:36. > :07:38.effort by the British in support of those forces on the ground. It is

:07:39. > :07:44.harder to identify forces on the ground in Syria. Do you or your

:07:45. > :07:48.colleagues, once they have come in, do you have any evidence that the

:07:49. > :07:54.strikes that the United Kingdom has been making in Syria have been in

:07:55. > :08:00.support of identifiable formations or forces on the ground as opposed

:08:01. > :08:04.to strikes against individuals or against static storage facilities,

:08:05. > :08:10.for example. I do not know how far they are going with the ground

:08:11. > :08:20.forces fighting Islamic State in alliance, so to speak, with the US

:08:21. > :08:29.led coalition of which Britain is part, the Syrian Kurds. There have

:08:30. > :08:35.only been 232 air strikes by non-US coalition forces, minimal compared

:08:36. > :08:45.to the Americans. I think there are a few in support of the Kurds, but

:08:46. > :08:50.otherwise not. One point that Anthony was making about losing 40%,

:08:51. > :08:55.we need to bear in mind, these maps that we see in newspapers and on

:08:56. > :09:01.television, showing 40% loss or gain or something, these are countries

:09:02. > :09:06.that a large portion of them are desert or semi it doesn't make much

:09:07. > :09:12.and if you lose a percentage here or there, it is really publishing

:09:13. > :09:16.centres account. The military pressure on Islamic State is partly

:09:17. > :09:20.the Kurds, partly the Syrian army. You can see this. People were

:09:21. > :09:26.denying the Syrian army and the Russians were fighting Islamic State

:09:27. > :09:30.but it is really, to my men, propaganda. As you can see it,

:09:31. > :09:39.Palmyra, which was recaptured not so long ago, and Alice well known place

:09:40. > :09:44.-- ate less well known airbase which Islamic State had been besieging for

:09:45. > :09:52.one year, in both cases the Syrian army was able to take these places

:09:53. > :09:55.with air support from the Russians. Russian and Syrian air power has a

:09:56. > :10:05.rather different purpose, which is to separate the civilian from the

:10:06. > :10:11.fighters. A classic counterinsurgency tactic, were you

:10:12. > :10:18.born everything. I have no evidence of the British air strikes in Syria

:10:19. > :10:22.in support of specific groups. I hear what Patrick said about a race

:10:23. > :10:25.and desert but there is no doubt about it, significant at large

:10:26. > :10:35.population centres that were held by cases are no longer in Isis's

:10:36. > :10:38.control. Just out of that, colleagues will follow up on some

:10:39. > :10:50.other strands but, from your perception, is there more that the

:10:51. > :10:53.UK should be doing? And if so, what? I think we talk about this in

:10:54. > :10:58.military terms but this is a very, located gorilla Mac political war,

:10:59. > :11:05.things that we should be doing. -- gorilla war. We need to understand

:11:06. > :11:11.what is happening there. If one is thinking how do weaken and eliminate

:11:12. > :11:18.Islamic State, I think the most important thing is to ensure it is

:11:19. > :11:22.encircled. It almost is now. With most of the circuit board are being

:11:23. > :11:31.taken by the Syrian Kurds -- Turkish border. There is quite a small gap

:11:32. > :11:35.between the river and Aleppo. I think politically, Britain should be

:11:36. > :11:41.doing everything it can, militarily, to make sure the gap is closed. That

:11:42. > :11:44.is the route that terrorists take, they're going to come here and to

:11:45. > :11:49.Europe. This is very important to clause that and it was has been

:11:50. > :11:58.important. When one looks at this whole crisis, it is insoluble, too

:11:59. > :12:00.complicated, but this prevents people of thinking of concrete

:12:01. > :12:08.solutions to concrete problems like that. I think they should increase

:12:09. > :12:13.support to the Kurds. The ivy growing forces for the Raqqa

:12:14. > :12:17.operation. The Russians, partly retaking Palmyra has made that thing

:12:18. > :12:21.come closer. Raqqa will fall at some point. The UK should be supporting

:12:22. > :12:31.the Kurds. The UK should also be doing a lot of homework. Once Isis

:12:32. > :12:41.is defeated, they will spring up elsewhere, Isis Mark two. I hope the

:12:42. > :12:45.people who look at these things are up to speed with jabba al nusra

:12:46. > :12:53.because I think they are longer threat to Syria his Isis. Jabba al

:12:54. > :12:56.nusra is a long-term entity in Syria, yes. I agree. There is

:12:57. > :13:01.opportunity for a long-term solution. It can bolster its

:13:02. > :13:06.existing support of rescue workers inside Syria. It supports and helps

:13:07. > :13:10.train and equip the guys who grub around in the rubble, barrel bomb

:13:11. > :13:20.buildings, trying to pull people out. It can offer more places to

:13:21. > :13:22.Syrian refugees. It can look at revising its special forces

:13:23. > :13:30.deployments, which so far very limited to Iraq. It should be aware

:13:31. > :13:37.that the political solution and military activity are quite out of

:13:38. > :13:43.step at the moment. I just want to ask you for your immediate reaction

:13:44. > :13:48.to the story that was in the media yesterday, the headline for the

:13:49. > :13:52.Times, for example, President Assad has been secretly collaborating with

:13:53. > :13:59.Isis, defectors tapers reveal. Patrick, you give us an example that

:14:00. > :14:07.President Assad has taken Palmyra and another town. It is suggested in

:14:08. > :14:11.these leaked, handwritten notes that in fact there was some sort of

:14:12. > :14:17.collusion between President Assad and Isis. On that manoeuvre. Do you

:14:18. > :14:20.believe that has any basis? I thought these documents and I am

:14:21. > :14:27.very dubious about it. First of all, some of them have selective quotes.

:14:28. > :14:32.Some of these documents have been released in different places.

:14:33. > :14:38.Saying, artillery has not been moved from Palmyra to other areas,

:14:39. > :14:45.omitting the bit that they have been moved to another place, near where

:14:46. > :14:50.the Government positions are. There are arguments about, yes, there is

:14:51. > :14:56.trade between the two but in all this area and Iraq and Syria, the

:14:57. > :15:01.smuggling areas of the world, yes, if you're in the Syrian Kurdish

:15:02. > :15:07.area, you find a lot of the stuff has come from Beirut because Islamic

:15:08. > :15:11.State wants to charge $300 per truck coming through, they are very short

:15:12. > :15:19.of money, so there is trade. Illicit trade. It does not mean political

:15:20. > :15:22.combination. You know, then you can produce an argument, is it an

:15:23. > :15:28.President Assad's interest to fight Islamic state? In some extent, yes,

:15:29. > :15:30.that means the rest of the world is hostile to Islamic state, the

:15:31. > :15:35.alternative to him. He did not create that situation. He is taking

:15:36. > :15:44.advantage of opportunities. I think this sort of... Basically, I think

:15:45. > :15:52.that using these documents for partisan political points, I do not

:15:53. > :16:01.think the evidence is there. If you look at where the fighting is, east

:16:02. > :16:06.of Aleppo, around Palmyra, it is privately obvious that President

:16:07. > :16:09.Assad is fighting, Syrian army is fighting Islamic State. This

:16:10. > :16:14.material is supposed to have come from the same people who supplied

:16:15. > :16:25.Sky News, your former bosses, what you make of it? I am agnostic. I

:16:26. > :16:28.remain to be convinced. It is widely believed throughout the Middle East

:16:29. > :16:34.that is the case and they do not rule it out. What is the case?

:16:35. > :16:43.Sorry, the Government has always colluded with various, including

:16:44. > :16:49.jabba al nusra, Islamic -- Islamist organisations. They said this would

:16:50. > :16:53.happen, the Islamists would come to the forefront, so it's in their

:16:54. > :17:00.interest to promulgate that. I am agnostic because I think it is

:17:01. > :17:04.plausible but I have not seen the evidence and, for example, the

:17:05. > :17:10.artillery pieces were used as evidence that when they removed them

:17:11. > :17:13.from Palmeiro, as the Syrians were advancing, -- Palmyra, it was

:17:14. > :17:19.evidence presented that they have been moved to Lee Mack told to move

:17:20. > :17:22.their artillery out of Palmyra. That sounds like common sense will stop

:17:23. > :17:27.if you are making a strategic withdrawal, they knew they were

:17:28. > :17:30.massed in formations, they did not want to get hit, of course they ran

:17:31. > :17:39.away, another word for withdrawal, as the army knows, I do not see it

:17:40. > :17:45.as proof of collusion. I only see it as potential collusion. But it is

:17:46. > :17:52.equally likely that they withdrew tactically. There was certainly some

:17:53. > :17:57.fierce fighting around Palmyra and a bulk of the President Assad regime

:17:58. > :18:01.military power was supplied by Hezbollah and Russian special forces

:18:02. > :18:05.teams, some of whom killed Russians and Palmyra. I am not saying that is

:18:06. > :18:10.evidence against any deal but if there was a deal, there was also

:18:11. > :18:15.some very fierce fighting. As for the overall picture, both things are

:18:16. > :18:18.true. President Assad is in a fierce fight with Islamic State. The Assad

:18:19. > :18:25.regime had a long-term evidentially proven relationship with jihadi

:18:26. > :18:31.organisations that are based in Syria. As far back as 2003 and

:18:32. > :18:35.before. We are seeing most recently, couple of years ago, released by the

:18:36. > :18:39.resume that numerous Islamist prisoners from jail so that they can

:18:40. > :18:42.return to the rank of the revolution and change the shape of the

:18:43. > :18:49.revolution. It suited their resume to do that. That was one of the

:18:50. > :18:54.questions I was going to ask. Cross that one of my list of things I

:18:55. > :18:59.wanted to ask you. I wonder if you could differentiate between the

:19:00. > :19:07.future and the potential capability in terms of Iraq and Syria because I

:19:08. > :19:14.am wondering about the ability for ground forces and air power to

:19:15. > :19:20.combine to actually defeat Daesh in both countries. Is it enough? We

:19:21. > :19:25.cannot do it with air power alone but I wonder if the ground forces

:19:26. > :19:34.are also willing and are they actually able watermark?

:19:35. > :19:43.There are strong indications the Iraqi army has reconstituted itself.

:19:44. > :19:50.It has not performed well. That does not bode well for the operation on

:19:51. > :19:54.Mosul, nevertheless, in the long term, they will be successful but it

:19:55. > :20:01.will take an American air power and the Kurds coming from north. Rack, I

:20:02. > :20:09.think as a better chance of falling sooner. Again, it will not happen

:20:10. > :20:16.with the support of the UK, the USA and the coalition. It would be

:20:17. > :20:21.impossible without that as you know, it is politically impossible to get

:20:22. > :20:25.public support for ground operations, proper ground

:20:26. > :20:30.operations, by the UK, other than special forces. I do not see the two

:20:31. > :20:36.countries as separate. They are entirely connected. If you squeeze

:20:37. > :20:37.rack, people will go to Mosul, if you squeeze Mosul, people will go to

:20:38. > :20:55.rack. Iraqi special forces retake Mosul. I

:20:56. > :20:59.was up and down the front and what strikes me about military formations

:21:00. > :21:05.is that there are not many of them. The Iraqi army used to be famous for

:21:06. > :21:08.both battalions, the money goes to the Defence Ministry and the

:21:09. > :21:17.officers. I think that is certainly still happening. I know Iraq as a

:21:18. > :21:23.National Security Council, some months ago the army people came and

:21:24. > :21:29.wanted more money for salaries and they were told not another sense

:21:30. > :21:36.unless you tell us how many soldiers you have got. They were back it with

:21:37. > :21:41.better with 36,000 less soldiers. That is illustrative of the general

:21:42. > :21:47.situation. The Kurds are the same. There aren't that number on the

:21:48. > :22:00.front line. You can have a genuine injury in Ramada -- Ramadi. Most of

:22:01. > :22:06.Ramadi is in ruins. Sancha, the Kurds did the same thing. These are

:22:07. > :22:11.places where the military action is from the air. The consequence is the

:22:12. > :22:21.place is devastated. This really isn't a victory in any full sense

:22:22. > :22:25.and Islamic State is reverting to guerrilla tactics. They are now --

:22:26. > :22:32.not fighting to the last man in these places. The extent to which

:22:33. > :22:37.these victories are going to need to the collapse of the Islamic State I

:22:38. > :22:47.think has been exaggerated. We should also prepare yourselves for

:22:48. > :22:50.how bad Mosul will probably be. Stalingrad is bandied around for a

:22:51. > :22:57.much by the media and elsewhere but Mosul really has the potential to be

:22:58. > :23:02.really quite catastrophic given how the fight will go both from the

:23:03. > :23:11.defenders and the attackers. Mosul will be pretty bloody awful.

:23:12. > :23:17.Military victory is usually only possible when there is a confluence

:23:18. > :23:24.of circumstances, such as airpower. Either a concentration of a coherent

:23:25. > :23:27.group, semi-coherent group, like the Iraqi army, or an ethnic disparity

:23:28. > :23:36.between something like a Kurdish area in Syria where it is easier to

:23:37. > :23:41.drive out the Islamic State. Where are those circumstances do not make

:23:42. > :23:49.them it is far more difficult. One of the problems, I think rack is

:23:50. > :23:53.much more likely to go before Mosul. The Syrian Kurds are the most

:23:54. > :23:57.effective ground force against Islamic State in the region. The

:23:58. > :24:03.effectiveness outside Kurdish areas would be limited. In Mosul I cannot

:24:04. > :24:06.see anything happening quickly because the forces gathered around

:24:07. > :24:15.Mosul are so desperate. You have the Iraqi army. They have not performed

:24:16. > :24:19.well. You have the Kurdish Depeche Mode, the KTP and other groupings as

:24:20. > :24:26.well that answer to slightly different commanders. Then you have

:24:27. > :24:30.Shia groups, some of which are Iranian backed, some of which are

:24:31. > :24:35.not Iranian backed. There are all sorts of different foreign interests

:24:36. > :24:41.in and around Mosul and a huge population. No one is talking about

:24:42. > :24:44.what happens after the date Mosul is recaptured or how indeed Kurdish

:24:45. > :24:48.regional government could support an influx of hundreds of thousands more

:24:49. > :24:58.refugees when it cannot pay its own government workers their salaries.

:24:59. > :25:03.The political situation is so public image. From the Kurdish point of

:25:04. > :25:06.view, although they are the main ground forces against Islamic State

:25:07. > :25:13.backed by US and British airpower, they wonder what will happen

:25:14. > :25:16.supposing they defeat Islamic State because at the moment everybody

:25:17. > :25:20.loves them because they are fighting Islamic State, but if Islamic State

:25:21. > :25:27.goes down then they are vulnerable to what the Turks do to resurgent

:25:28. > :25:32.powers in Damascus and Baghdad. It isn't necessarily in their interests

:25:33. > :25:39.to take Mosul work for this war to end any time soon. Would you like to

:25:40. > :25:44.comment on that? One thing I have wondered about, you have all cited

:25:45. > :25:52.the Kurds as the fiercest and best organised fighters, but what of the

:25:53. > :26:00.long-term consequences of the backing of those Kurdish movements?

:26:01. > :26:03.The genie is out of the bottle. Kurdistan National Assembly never

:26:04. > :26:11.went away but it is now back on the front burner. They will want a

:26:12. > :26:14.report after this. They are dysfunctional themselves between

:26:15. > :26:27.Iraq and the two entities within Iraq. Long-term, I am thinking a

:26:28. > :26:31.federal Syria and federal Iraq. That might not be politically so the

:26:32. > :26:36.bowl. At some point, when we play our minimal political role with the

:26:37. > :26:44.Kurds and tell them what it is that we would agreed afterwards as part

:26:45. > :26:48.of the negotiations, I think we should be rewarding them somehow I

:26:49. > :26:54.doubt it will be with the state and so managing expectations might be

:26:55. > :26:59.useful because there is a potential for, once Islamic State is speaking,

:27:00. > :27:02.there is the potential for Syria being partially back together in a

:27:03. > :27:05.federal state but the fighting could still continue because the Kurds

:27:06. > :27:09.will not get what they want from this. They stood on the sidelines

:27:10. > :27:13.for a long time seeing you guys get on with it and only when they were

:27:14. > :27:19.forced to did they move and they are not moving for a unitary Syria, they

:27:20. > :27:25.are moving for a unitary Kurdistan have some form. Again, we have to

:27:26. > :27:39.make our decisions about how far we could that. You have all pointed out

:27:40. > :27:46.the difficulties in taking Mosul, is it important in the fight against

:27:47. > :27:51.Islamic State to take Mosul? One thing the Islamic State has is that

:27:52. > :27:56.it is a state. Its ideology is we have instead. Other people have

:27:57. > :28:01.talked about a caliphate, we have established a real Islamic State.

:28:02. > :28:04.This is a big ideological blow if that state goes down. They are

:28:05. > :28:12.different from other types of organisations like Al-Qaeda.

:28:13. > :28:17.Secondly, it is important in terms of security. The terrorist attacks

:28:18. > :28:20.we have seen in Brussels, Paris, potentially here, what makes them

:28:21. > :28:26.different from terrorist attacks in the past is that they do have the

:28:27. > :28:33.resources of what is a de facto organised state behind them. Money,

:28:34. > :28:40.expertise, so forth. For both those reasons it is very important to

:28:41. > :28:44.eliminate Islamic State and the most important element in that is Mosul.

:28:45. > :28:52.That is what put them on the order stage, when they captured Mosul in

:28:53. > :28:56.2014. Troops on the ground, their capacity to take Mosul might be

:28:57. > :29:02.omitted, does that mean the West has to do more? The Americans are

:29:03. > :29:09.pushing for a quick attack on Mosul but they are finding they have been

:29:10. > :29:13.drawn in more and more because an Iraqi division has moved east of

:29:14. > :29:22.Mosul. When it came to fighting, it wasn't to be found the Americans

:29:23. > :29:28.lost one or two people and so the British official attitude as I

:29:29. > :29:32.understand it is much more cautious. Islamic State has not really been

:29:33. > :29:38.fighting, it has been fighting for Ramadi, but not to the last man like

:29:39. > :29:41.that Barney. In Mosul they will fight everywhere and they will see

:29:42. > :29:51.the city levelled before they give it up. The blow to them is equally

:29:52. > :29:58.political, militarily and psychological. They introduced a

:29:59. > :30:04.currency. When you lose that psychological idea that you are a

:30:05. > :30:09.state... I knew Hamish working quite well. He used the command a Nato

:30:10. > :30:12.brigade. He is utterly convinced there will be mass use of chemical

:30:13. > :30:19.weapons in the fight for Mosul. I don't know that. Mr Gordon believes

:30:20. > :30:28.that. You cannot just surround Islamic State and leave them alone.

:30:29. > :30:35.They are in perpetual metastases. They are treating children all the

:30:36. > :30:40.time. They grow, they expand. Mosul is the seed of the caliphate, Mosul

:30:41. > :30:44.must be retaken. There is an Armageddon scenario for Mosul, but

:30:45. > :30:50.in the Middle East, it works in a different way. Surround Mosul, you

:30:51. > :30:54.get a lot of dissatisfied local tribes, give them money and they

:30:55. > :31:02.sort out their own problems. It may well be that there are not that many

:31:03. > :31:06.Islamic State members. I don't know. You might find that if there was

:31:07. > :31:12.enough incentive, which there is not at the moment, then people in Mosul

:31:13. > :31:15.might be more inclined to take up arms themselves against Islamic

:31:16. > :31:18.State. There is not that incentive at the moment and I should think

:31:19. > :31:28.people in Mosul are very worried about what happens to them and their

:31:29. > :31:34.future after Islamic State. In Iraq, earlier this year, one thing we were

:31:35. > :31:39.talking about quite a lot was the heparin of towns that have been

:31:40. > :31:43.recaptured with IEDs and the inability of communities to return

:31:44. > :31:54.because everything was booby-trapped. His deep military and

:31:55. > :31:58.political impact of retaking towns, while I appreciate the damage that

:31:59. > :32:04.can do psychologically to Islamic State, is it mitigated if the local

:32:05. > :32:16.people cannot return because we cannot rebuild those communities?

:32:17. > :32:25.What is the impact of that? How does it impact belief in the Iraqi and

:32:26. > :32:32.Syrian states? No one expects much from the Iraqi state. These are very

:32:33. > :32:37.sectarian societies. Outside of Ramadi, there is a report yesterday,

:32:38. > :32:47.1000 young men held in a warehouse with a tiny owner without enough

:32:48. > :33:00.space to lie down or anything else. Local people are truly terrified of

:33:01. > :33:06.the Iraqi army and security forces. The problem is that none of these

:33:07. > :33:10.cities are really being recaptured. Most of them are in ruins after

:33:11. > :33:18.reds. The situation makes them completely insecure even in Syrian

:33:19. > :33:22.Kurdish held areas. I have travelled there and they are meant to be safer

:33:23. > :33:28.than other areas, this is comparative, they are still very

:33:29. > :33:34.dangerous places. He asked what we could do to help, this is something

:33:35. > :33:38.we have expertise in. As Patrick says, Iraq might not make this a

:33:39. > :33:45.priority and this is a decades long thing. The sooner you start, the

:33:46. > :33:49.better. It is easier to remove IEDs than to be built buildings. The

:33:50. > :33:55.problem is when people come home the buildings have been flattened in the

:33:56. > :33:59.fighting. I think one thing, going back to an earlier question which

:34:00. > :34:04.fits into what you asked, I think the UK could give far better help if

:34:05. > :34:09.the system of resupply and logistics was more straightforward. As it is,

:34:10. > :34:15.you are all aware, we give the Kurds 50 calibre machine guns a year and a

:34:16. > :34:20.half ago. They haven't had ammunition for months and months and

:34:21. > :34:23.months, despite repeated requests and official high-level requests

:34:24. > :34:27.because the gym of resupply goes through Baghdad and as soon as it

:34:28. > :34:31.goes to Baghdad you have a complex prism and no oversight to what

:34:32. > :34:37.happens. The same as with IEDs removal.

:34:38. > :34:45.When Parliament or the decision to enter into air strikes, we were told

:34:46. > :34:54.at the time about the 70,000 moderates. That were available on

:34:55. > :35:01.the ground. What is your current assessment of the situation in

:35:02. > :35:09.regard to the Syrian opposition forces? Was the 70,008 Mraz? It is

:35:10. > :35:15.impossible to tell. 70,002, if it was true, not a cohesive figure. It

:35:16. > :35:20.was a rather optimistic tally of different groups and what they may

:35:21. > :35:27.be. I challenge anybody, even the most seasoned observer, to be ill to

:35:28. > :35:33.work out on the ground in a largely Islamist rebel movement, a largely

:35:34. > :35:36.majority Islamist rebel movement, with Selassie groups among them,

:35:37. > :35:42.made actually in a post-conflict Syria, be good to men aren't these

:35:43. > :35:48.and have favourable relations with the West. -- Salafi. It may be bad

:35:49. > :35:54.to minorities and have an aggressive relationship with the West. Who

:35:55. > :35:58.would be against with Al-Qaeda. It is very difficult to work out.

:35:59. > :36:05.Suffice to say, the majority of the rebel movement is Islamist. Whatever

:36:06. > :36:09.that means. Islamist. I made myself very popular in 2012 by arguing

:36:10. > :36:14.this, in 2011 it had been taken over. Young students, the Democrats

:36:15. > :36:20.that came out, have been completely shut to one side. The opposition is

:36:21. > :36:23.Islamist. That is deadly, -- different saying the majority of

:36:24. > :36:29.non-armed opposition to Assad are Islamist. The majority of the armed

:36:30. > :36:37.opposition are Islamist. I have not been 40 Mac years, these guys have

:36:38. > :36:43.been the -- two years. I never met a moderate armed person, but I met a

:36:44. > :36:50.lot of armed groups. I find it a test of those who believe in the

:36:51. > :36:56.70,000 armed secular and non-Islamist gunmen that the people

:36:57. > :37:05.who say this never actually say that from territory held by moderate

:37:06. > :37:08.7000. -- 70,000. They must hold territory, be an important figure on

:37:09. > :37:14.the map. But reports of the existence, from Beirut, Eastern

:37:15. > :37:17.Bill, nobody actually goes their -- Istanbul. In some case academics who

:37:18. > :37:24.have not been in Syria for five years. We should be dubious about

:37:25. > :37:30.this. The Americans were recently saying moderate forces should move

:37:31. > :37:35.away from Al Misra, within Aleppo, so that it could be attacked. They

:37:36. > :37:38.cannot do that because, as my colleagues have just said, the armed

:37:39. > :37:49.opposition is dominated by extreme Islamist. They know that if they

:37:50. > :37:54.moved away, and extreme factions disappeared, they will be for the

:37:55. > :38:02.Syrian army. If there is sufficient forces to unseat Assad? Then there

:38:03. > :38:08.is an equally aggressive force waiting to replace him? Is it an

:38:09. > :38:14.equally aggressive Islamic force waiting to replace Assad? Yes, but

:38:15. > :38:19.Assad is not going to go. It is a strange aspect of this. I am not

:38:20. > :38:22.saying whether it is good or bad, since 2012 Keeble has said that he

:38:23. > :38:27.is bound to go, the opposition was pushing this idea, at that stage

:38:28. > :38:33.there were 14 provincial capitals, he has lost two. The population of

:38:34. > :38:39.Syria should be about 23 million at the moment because there are 6

:38:40. > :38:44.million refugees, 10 million of those are in Government held areas,

:38:45. > :38:49.2 million in IS held areas, 2 million Kurds, 2 million non-IS

:38:50. > :38:54.position. That is the balance of power. I do not think there is any

:38:55. > :39:00.chance Assad will go. I know we are running out of time, this was the

:39:01. > :39:05.very point I wanted to make. It was in the list of questions. May I

:39:06. > :39:10.threw this in? This was written in May of 2011, reading reports you

:39:11. > :39:13.would be forgiven for thinking Syrian people were rising up as one

:39:14. > :39:18.to overthrow a regime on its last legs. They are three main flaws in

:39:19. > :39:26.this analysis. It goes on to explain why, the demographics, the Kurds,

:39:27. > :39:32.the Christians, the analytes, when you added them all up, you realised

:39:33. > :39:35.that this was not going to fall. If idiot journalists can work this out,

:39:36. > :39:42.the political class should be able to work this out. We had Egypt, we

:39:43. > :39:46.had Libya, two leaders had gone, I think the political class would do

:39:47. > :39:49.that, grand standard left right and centre, demanded Assad should go,

:39:50. > :39:53.that that his back against the wall and give him nowhere to go and I

:39:54. > :39:59.think that was a mistake for us to be calling all the time, go, go, go,

:40:00. > :40:03.existing and we have repeated for six years and we have now got

:40:04. > :40:07.ourselves into the position where he could go sort of, bet, but not

:40:08. > :40:12.necessarily right now, as if it is a policy. Forgive me for the extended

:40:13. > :40:16.rant, but it was a political mistake that the political class needs the

:40:17. > :40:21.thing much harder about when this happened again. Do you really want

:40:22. > :40:25.to push this person into a corner? Be sure before the bridge. That

:40:26. > :40:32.statement was restated from the Dispatch Box yesterday. With the

:40:33. > :40:38.next emergency... I see what you mean, don't worry about the time, we

:40:39. > :40:44.have another 20 minutes. I want to bring in Phil and Anthony, because

:40:45. > :40:49.he was to follow up on these points. I come from a slightly different

:40:50. > :40:54.angle. There is a middle way with Assad and that is neither to make

:40:55. > :40:59.his removal a precondition, as had mistakenly been done previously, but

:41:00. > :41:03.certainly that is not to accept his long-term position of power in

:41:04. > :41:07.Syria. For a number of very good reasons. First of all, you will

:41:08. > :41:16.never have peace, nor an end to the war in Syria, with Assad, the leader

:41:17. > :41:22.of a minority group, in power. You only have extreme Islamist and

:41:23. > :41:27.Islamist groups in Syria because of Assad's behaviour. To my mind,

:41:28. > :41:29.here's the primary cancer in this. The secondary cancer may be

:41:30. > :41:36.extremely dramatic threatening and all the rest of it but it has come

:41:37. > :41:42.about because of the behaviour of that particular regime. It is

:41:43. > :41:45.nonsensical to presume and say, right, the town spread new

:41:46. > :41:50.transitional Government should be that Assad goes. Neither should he

:41:51. > :41:54.be accepted long-term because, if you do swing your support and

:41:55. > :41:58.acceptance of Assad long-term, never thinks will happen. First of all,

:41:59. > :42:03.you will get a dramatic rise in western recruits, not only to

:42:04. > :42:10.Islamic state, to other jihadi movements. Furious over its change

:42:11. > :42:15.stands when the motivation to join IS is thrown to so many recruits as

:42:16. > :42:17.being the hypocrisy of the West. And its double standards. Imagine what

:42:18. > :42:25.the invitations would be if we were to accept Assad. You would also

:42:26. > :42:32.crumble the coalition if you through your weight behind or acceptance

:42:33. > :42:38.behind Assad. You may, Qatar, Saudi, Turkey, would not accept it. More

:42:39. > :42:40.and more to me it would be obscene morally but it would also be

:42:41. > :42:46.practically absurd, it would not work. Look at the demographics in

:42:47. > :42:53.Syria. Fast majority, Sunni populace. Assad is in the white

:42:54. > :42:58.minority. You can look at the examples in Iraq or, and in

:42:59. > :43:05.Afghanistan, all the rest of it, Assad will not be able to take Syria

:43:06. > :43:10.or reinstate peace in Syria as it stands. Neither as an entity

:43:11. > :43:14.himself, because he attracts so much hostility for what he has done a

:43:15. > :43:18.practically with the forces he has got. As to his removal and long-term

:43:19. > :43:23.strength, I would say the one thing Russian intervention has proved is

:43:24. > :43:25.that Assad's survival is almost entirely dependent on Russian

:43:26. > :43:34.intervention. There is a positive and a negative to that. Can I make

:43:35. > :43:41.one point? The biggest ally of Assad is not Russia but Iran. The whole

:43:42. > :43:47.Shia and this band from Iran, Iraq, Syria, if we called the Allies as we

:43:48. > :43:51.do Shia, and Levin on, see this as an existential struggle, they are

:43:52. > :43:56.never going to let the other side win. It is often seen as the

:43:57. > :44:01.Russians are the crucial thing, this really isn't the case, it is Iran

:44:02. > :44:08.and Shia access, that brought band of territory north of Saudi Arabia

:44:09. > :44:12.and south of Turkey. The Prime Minister, in his evidence to the

:44:13. > :44:15.Liaison Committee masks himself rhetorically, is there a third way

:44:16. > :44:21.between a dash style state and President Assad the pitcher

:44:22. > :44:25.remaining in charge? My answer would be there has to be a third way, we

:44:26. > :44:32.have to find a third way -- bitch. It seems to me that what you are

:44:33. > :44:41.saying is what the theorists call a 0-sum game. You appear -- butcher.

:44:42. > :44:44.If you align with any faction in this, you are automatically making

:44:45. > :44:49.enemies of the other faction. Is that what you are telling us? I

:44:50. > :44:54.think that is true but it is the wrong approach. I think the approach

:44:55. > :45:00.should be to reduce the level of violence in the war, but the Islamic

:45:01. > :45:03.State and Assad, the extremes, benefit from war because each site

:45:04. > :45:08.think we have no alternative but the other. If we were with the education

:45:09. > :45:13.Ministry in Baghdad, they may not like Assad that must but they prefer

:45:14. > :45:16.him to the other side. They may murder you and turn you into a

:45:17. > :45:24.refugee. We need to bring down the level of violence through

:45:25. > :45:29.international cutting off of supply and money on weapons. Then you can

:45:30. > :45:32.begin... You're going to have real politics will stop the people around

:45:33. > :45:36.Assad would no longer feel so threatened by the Islamic State,

:45:37. > :45:41.that they had to stick by asset. We get away what Northern Ireland used

:45:42. > :45:45.to call the politics of the last atrocity. People are so terrified

:45:46. > :45:49.they stick to the most militant members of the faction. That is the

:45:50. > :45:53.way to go. I think otherwise the situation is, as it has been

:45:54. > :45:56.described, there is not a third way within the conflict and thinking

:45:57. > :46:02.there is is simply a way of prolonging the conflict. Any further

:46:03. > :46:06.comments? I surprise myself disagreeing with Patrick, I think

:46:07. > :46:10.there's a third way and it is the only way that you to seek otherwise

:46:11. > :46:14.there is total surrender by war and the victory of the other. That is

:46:15. > :46:17.simply impossible. I do not know what the third way is that I know

:46:18. > :46:23.that is the correct path to follow and that will require huge

:46:24. > :46:28.compromises politically with Russia and that may bring sanctions on

:46:29. > :46:31.Ukraine, thing that will be part of the price. I think there will be big

:46:32. > :46:37.combo misers to make and we should not be frightened of making them.

:46:38. > :46:43.Victory by any faction outright is impossible and not desirable. There

:46:44. > :46:50.will be a third way. A wide range of views there, I have Phil and then

:46:51. > :46:53.Richard. I think we have covered a lot of ground there but I think if

:46:54. > :46:58.we could have some kind of definitive answer to these

:46:59. > :47:01.questions. Do you think Russia's action has assured that Assad will

:47:02. > :47:07.remain in power? Shall we accept that as the new norm and accept him

:47:08. > :47:12.as being the leader? The evil genius of what Britain has done is to

:47:13. > :47:16.assure Assad cannot lose. -- Vladimir Putin. Once he cannot lose,

:47:17. > :47:21.eventually the other side, I believe, it will filter down and

:47:22. > :47:30.that means we cannot win. That leans towards the third way. I think

:47:31. > :47:38.absolutely yes -- guaranteed that they cannot lose. Yes. But I do not

:47:39. > :47:43.think... I think there is a positive to Assad's medium-term survival

:47:44. > :47:47.thanks to Russia. I think he is entirely dependent on Russia and I

:47:48. > :47:51.think, to take issue with what Patrick said earlier, there had been

:47:52. > :47:55.no shortage of Hezbollah or Iranian special forces recruits from across

:47:56. > :48:01.the world to support the regime, but they were on the back foot last

:48:02. > :48:04.autumn, they were losing ground. It was looking like there could be a

:48:05. > :48:08.tilt away from the resume and the machine heartland areas. It was not

:48:09. > :48:12.until Russian air strikes came in at the tables turned. The only positive

:48:13. > :48:17.I see out of that is that, providing you keep dialogue with Russia,

:48:18. > :48:24.providing America does, Assad, who knows his survival is dependent on

:48:25. > :48:28.Russia, if you can sway Russia, it is long-term interest with the state

:48:29. > :48:35.in Syria that they are not best vested in Assad, there is a

:48:36. > :48:40.potential positive outcome. Could one get rid of Assad but keep the

:48:41. > :48:47.resume? Would that make any difference? Is there an alternative

:48:48. > :48:52.to the regime? All this talk about there to be a third way, but nobody

:48:53. > :48:56.knows what it is, means you very rapidly get into wishful thinking.

:48:57. > :49:02.One has to take things as they are. I think they need to, as I said,

:49:03. > :49:08.reduce the level of violence and we are beginning to have that because

:49:09. > :49:14.of the US and Russia are beginning to have ceasefires with tremendous

:49:15. > :49:25.spurts of violence in between. If it goes that way, then I think that you

:49:26. > :49:30.can begin to get back into a situation where the armed opposition

:49:31. > :49:36.is dominated by extreme Salafi jihadis. Islamic state and so forth.

:49:37. > :49:41.A lesser degree of violence then we begin to have real politics

:49:42. > :49:44.happening again. I do not think Assad... People think that one side

:49:45. > :49:50.or the other is going to collapse, with my experience in Iraq and

:49:51. > :49:53.Syria, they have their constituency, they are nearly pressed back, but

:49:54. > :50:01.they will always find a way of stoning business.

:50:02. > :50:12.The sheer and the rest of the region will not let us all. They think it

:50:13. > :50:15.will be them next. I think the way forward is it a degree of

:50:16. > :50:20.cooperation with Russia, try to reduce the level of violence, begin

:50:21. > :50:27.to try to get the refugees back at some stage. A big chunk of the

:50:28. > :50:39.population are in at Dublin on for Jordan were heading for Europe. I

:50:40. > :50:45.think that is the way to go to see what real measures can be done to

:50:46. > :50:54.mitigate violence and to remedy the consequences of the violence. We

:50:55. > :51:00.need to move on. Just a comment on the 70,000. I have never been of the

:51:01. > :51:06.opinion that there are people in uniforms, formed as part of that

:51:07. > :51:13.figure. 70,000 is not .32% of the pre-Civil War population. Surely it

:51:14. > :51:19.is conceivable that there are 70,000 people out there who, given the

:51:20. > :51:25.right circumstances, they just have an AK-47 under the bed but they

:51:26. > :51:37.could be convinced to work with us. Is that too ridiculous concept? How

:51:38. > :51:43.can you prove the number? Let's make it 60,000. I just do not see how it

:51:44. > :51:47.is possible to extrapolate, not being on the ground, not doing

:51:48. > :51:51.opinion polls were phoning people opt in or how many people are rebels

:51:52. > :52:00.were moderate rebels. You are better off asking the Prime Minister. There

:52:01. > :52:05.is a misconception that 70,000 guys with guns are not an army. They

:52:06. > :52:08.could be easily destroyed by any properly organised well trained

:52:09. > :52:16.armed force. Almost every young man in Iraq has begun. That is not an

:52:17. > :52:27.army. They don't really count. I think the same is true in Syria. In

:52:28. > :52:33.Syria, you find the regime in your town, your village. You might find

:52:34. > :52:37.enough angry, probably Islamist young men who have been thrown out

:52:38. > :52:41.of their area by Islamic State who, given the right motivation, might

:52:42. > :52:46.want to go back and fight Islamic State in that area. Whether or not

:52:47. > :52:50.they will be friendly to the west, to Israel, whether they would be

:52:51. > :52:54.long-term allies in the region were shared the same foreign policy as

:52:55. > :52:57.ours is rather another issue. Most rebel groups are more intent on

:52:58. > :53:10.fighting sad that they are fighting Islamic State. Can I ask about that

:53:11. > :53:17.though? It is very much in the news at the moment. In December 2012, you

:53:18. > :53:26.wrote an article, Anthony, in the times which, it has been argued

:53:27. > :53:31.changed government policy. It is depressingly similar then to what is

:53:32. > :53:35.going on now. He talked about shells exploding in streets, chopping up a

:53:36. > :53:40.group of four men in a weight so grotesque I cannot describe it here.

:53:41. > :53:44.Cries of we are hungry and give us bread stocked my journey. If that

:53:45. > :53:54.was happening then, what is happening now? Is this a policy of

:53:55. > :54:01.webinars in the migrant crisis? Is this the steel regime going to sink

:54:02. > :54:04.any lower? Is there anything worse it can do in terms of what it can

:54:05. > :54:14.inflict on the population of this city? It is very difficult to

:54:15. > :54:17.describe even having covered 15 or 20 conflicts around the world

:54:18. > :54:26.something as extreme as is happening in Aleppo. It was a good deal worse

:54:27. > :54:31.when I was last there. Admittedly I haven't been back for a year and a

:54:32. > :54:36.half. The last time I went I went to a school that had been bombed on

:54:37. > :54:42.sports day. One bomb had heard a girl against the wall and blast that

:54:43. > :54:47.are outlined in black on the wall. She was nine or ten years old. So

:54:48. > :54:55.was blasted into the corridor. That sort of stuff happens the whole

:54:56. > :54:59.time. It is a terrible vision. It is very difficult to explain to people

:55:00. > :55:11.here because it is so extreme. I don't know. But the property causes

:55:12. > :55:19.a page on the other side. We have fighter planes and helicopters that

:55:20. > :55:26.could drop humanitarian aid in an area the size of this room. We could

:55:27. > :55:31.land on a bit of rough ground so the White helmets were some organisation

:55:32. > :55:35.could get there. Is it conceivable we could negotiate with the Russians

:55:36. > :55:47.and the regime to create protections around a hospital for... He is

:55:48. > :55:52.calling for that and he is right. Would that be safe. Could there be

:55:53. > :55:58.in this lush an assurance from the regime to make sure they would be

:55:59. > :56:03.safe? I couldn't guarantee they would be shot down by the people

:56:04. > :56:14.they were trying to help. These people are very angry. Keep in mind

:56:15. > :56:18.we are intervening in the Civil War are two sides each other and have

:56:19. > :56:29.real constituencies. The people killed in Aleppo over the past

:56:30. > :56:34.couple of weeks, it was 132 killed by government barrel bombs and

:56:35. > :56:43.shelling and 84 killed by rebel shelling in government-held areas.

:56:44. > :56:47.All this is horrible, but it doesn't mean that it isn't a civil war which

:56:48. > :56:58.we should be very careful about not getting sucked into because of

:56:59. > :57:01.humanitarian, very genuine and understandable, humanitarian

:57:02. > :57:14.concerns. Most people who because of bombing or shelling, they die in

:57:15. > :57:24.battles. Is that true? Most people die through kinetic... Yes. They die

:57:25. > :57:32.on both sides in the fighting. The Syrian army have lost 80 5000. We

:57:33. > :57:42.had about 49 children killed by Russian and regime are strikes. The

:57:43. > :57:56.accurate figures stopped being counted about a year ago. I think

:57:57. > :58:00.that in Aleppo, the idea that one could suddenly intervene and start

:58:01. > :58:04.dropping humanitarian supplies, all these things bring enormous

:58:05. > :58:13.difficulties. We should be very careful before plugging into this

:58:14. > :58:17.war. I think the only way is to try to reduce the level of violence

:58:18. > :58:24.generally. Nobody is going to win this war, it will go on and on. I am

:58:25. > :58:31.conscious of the time. I just wanted to say, there are those, some on

:58:32. > :58:38.this committee who believe that the best chance of creating some form of

:58:39. > :58:47.secular, more tolerant society in Syria means that we have two be much

:58:48. > :58:55.more understanding of the regime's position. If we really do go down

:58:56. > :58:59.that route, are we not ignoring the fact that many minorities, including

:59:00. > :59:11.Christians, have been massacred as freely by his regime as his Islamic

:59:12. > :59:22.enemies such Mark minorities generally are terrified of the other

:59:23. > :59:27.side. The Islamic Army which controls eastern regions produced a

:59:28. > :59:34.video saying what they thought of a small minority group. They said they

:59:35. > :59:40.are not Islamists and we think it is OK to kill them and take them as

:59:41. > :59:44.slaves. Imagine what you feel if you come from a community like that. You

:59:45. > :59:52.might not like Assad but it is better than the other side. We

:59:53. > :59:55.should have an understanding of their position without supporting

:59:56. > :00:03.it. There are whispers you can make to them, reminding them that Russia

:00:04. > :00:08.and Iran, neither of them are signatories to the Hague Convention.

:00:09. > :00:12.You can whisper that no one is coming after you. You absolutely

:00:13. > :00:19.need to understand that Christians, other whites, other minorities do

:00:20. > :00:31.fear Islamist 's ticking over. Baby steps all the way. I think it is

:00:32. > :00:35.worth trying to get air drops in. That is not taking sides. It is

:00:36. > :00:40.taking the side of civilians. There is a way forward you have to try.

:00:41. > :00:46.Part of that is understanding that not all of Syria was against Assad

:00:47. > :00:51.and a significant number of people in the country do not like him, but

:00:52. > :00:57.nor do they like the alternative and within that, there is some way that

:00:58. > :01:05.people like yourselves can push policies towards an endgame which is

:01:06. > :01:12.somewhat off yet. Everyone should be very clear about what it involves,

:01:13. > :01:17.understanding Assad and use words like guarantees for minorities.

:01:18. > :01:20.Remember the seas are photographs that came out of the man who

:01:21. > :01:25.documented the torture victims on behalf of the regime. This was

:01:26. > :01:32.11,000 tortured to death corpses that he was tasked with

:01:33. > :01:35.photographing in a short period. Amnesty International said that up

:01:36. > :01:41.to 65,000 people or more have been disappeared by the regime. Human

:01:42. > :01:45.rights watch studied those photographs and found them to be

:01:46. > :01:49.genuine, talked about crimes against humanity. The United Nations

:01:50. > :01:55.commission of enquiry which looked at that report said the government

:01:56. > :01:59.of Syria is responsible for acts mad to extermination and crimes against

:02:00. > :02:04.humanity. I understand people who want to understand Assad, but I am

:02:05. > :02:11.convinced that the regime is the primary cancer. It might have exist

:02:12. > :02:15.in the middle term but do not delude yourselves that by closing up to

:02:16. > :02:26.Assad we might swing round our long-term interests you. It won't

:02:27. > :02:31.work. I am addressing them not you. I want to give analysts the last

:02:32. > :02:36.word. I am conscious of Coloccini have not had a chance to ask

:02:37. > :02:40.colleagues. One or two are offering to forego that and that is

:02:41. > :02:45.appreciated. Bob and Ruth, would you very quickly like to put a final

:02:46. > :02:51.point, one after the other and we will have a final word from each.

:02:52. > :02:56.Anthony, Tim and Patrick have covered my question pretty well.

:02:57. > :03:01.Fundamentally, there are people in Syria who are frightened sick that

:03:02. > :03:05.Islamic State were murdered them and therefore they are setting with

:03:06. > :03:12.Assad. I think that is the answer I would get from all three and that

:03:13. > :03:16.would be my question is answered. I am not going to ask my question but

:03:17. > :03:24.I will ask something else. It became clear that we had shared language or

:03:25. > :03:27.understanding of history or any possible way forward for dialogue

:03:28. > :03:33.and yesterday, when the minister was talking about Aleppo and refugees he

:03:34. > :03:36.still could not give us any answers. Everyone kept saying we need to

:03:37. > :03:41.bring Russia to the table but no real mechanism of initiating that

:03:42. > :03:48.debate and discussion. Relations are at a low that, in my lifetime, are

:03:49. > :03:52.at their lowest. What way do you think we should engage with the

:03:53. > :03:54.Russians? You have all talked about it but I have no clear path for how

:03:55. > :04:08.we have those conversations? And easy question for you!

:04:09. > :04:13.Volunteers? There is a way. They have things they want. It is a

:04:14. > :04:19.compromise. I agree with the passionate icebergs to the Mac

:04:20. > :04:24.outbursts about Assad and all the crimes but I thought think, just

:04:25. > :04:29.stop it somehow. If that requires the compromises to get out of the

:04:30. > :04:33.country, to Moscow with quiet assurances, which I am allowed to

:04:34. > :04:37.say and you are not, fine. As for the Rogers, they have all sorts of

:04:38. > :04:44.things they want. It is a case of how much -- Russians. It is a case

:04:45. > :04:48.of how much you can give them. They are a player and have made

:04:49. > :04:52.themselves so. You have got to talk to them because if you do not, it

:04:53. > :04:56.does not get settled. Talk to them, find out what they want, reduce the

:04:57. > :05:07.violence, think about federal Syria, find alternative leaders and model

:05:08. > :05:15.your way for -- foreword to the next couple of years. You must keep

:05:16. > :05:18.talking to Russia. As I was saying earlier, the Russian relationship

:05:19. > :05:26.with Assad, there is a positive side to that. Russia is the persuader.

:05:27. > :05:32.What I also wanted to say is that, regardless of outside decisions and

:05:33. > :05:35.foreign policy, war is not something that is that long-term and intense

:05:36. > :05:40.that can be turned off the attack by outside powers, war is about what

:05:41. > :05:44.goes on in the street, in a village, in a valley, and the emotions in

:05:45. > :05:54.this conflict are far hotter than can be gals to buy some foreign

:05:55. > :06:04.policy decision. -- diarist. There are decisions that can be taken.

:06:05. > :06:11.They may not like what the outside powers tell them to do with money

:06:12. > :06:18.and weapons and the support. The US and ourselves and the Russians have

:06:19. > :06:22.that influence. The Turks, the Saudis, the Iranians also have

:06:23. > :06:30.influence there. There is always a danger, when this comes up, trying

:06:31. > :06:33.to explain what comes up in Syria, that explanation can look like

:06:34. > :06:38.justification, of course I am not justifying, but I cannot think of a

:06:39. > :06:43.way to solve this. We need to take the situation as it is and reduce

:06:44. > :06:48.the violence and improve it. If the other way is not there, to look for

:06:49. > :06:57.another way is an abdication of responsibility to my mind. Are the

:06:58. > :07:01.Russians going to let this regime be displaced? Are the Iranians? Nil

:07:02. > :07:07.will stop this is not going to happen. Can we mitigate what I

:07:08. > :07:11.regime does by talking to their Russians? Yes, I think we can and

:07:12. > :07:15.the Americans with some success, had been doing this, because we have had

:07:16. > :07:20.ceasefires for the first time in five years in different areas. They

:07:21. > :07:23.are like the ceasefires in the Lebanese civil war, everybody mocks

:07:24. > :07:26.them and you can see where they are not working but in many areas less

:07:27. > :07:33.people had been killed than were being killed before. This is the way

:07:34. > :07:41.to go. You cannot say to the Russians, Assad is going to go and,

:07:42. > :07:45.by the way, we want you to pressure him to not drop bombs on civilian

:07:46. > :07:53.places, to have ceasefires and so forth. I think there's a lack of

:07:54. > :07:57.realism there, in which one eventually becomes complicit in this

:07:58. > :08:01.ongoing tragedy. Thank you all very much indeed, we'd love to go on

:08:02. > :08:05.longer but we cannot. If there is the possibility of our staff

:08:06. > :08:09.submitting the few extra questions to you for replying in writing,

:08:10. > :08:13.would that be acceptable? We are very grateful and greed. We have

:08:14. > :08:21.covered a huge range of views and topics. -- grateful indeed. Session

:08:22. > :08:44.is included, order, order. -- concluded.

:08:45. > :08:49.The Palace of Westminster, with its many stone figures, is the ultimate

:08:50. > :08:50.Gothic revival