UK Relations with Russia Committee

:00:23. > :00:33.Order, order, welcome to this afternoon's session. Our first

:00:34. > :00:41.regarding relations with Russia. I would be grateful if you would

:00:42. > :00:52.identify yourself for the record. Lecturer in security policy at the

:00:53. > :00:58.University of Birmingham. Thank you. Thank you to both of you for coming

:00:59. > :01:05.to give evidence. This is the scene setter for our inquiry into our

:01:06. > :01:11.relations with Russia. We are planning a visit there fairly

:01:12. > :01:17.shortly so this is very helpful to others. Some questions will be

:01:18. > :01:27.general. But I will be more than delighted for you to give specifics

:01:28. > :01:35.and help educate others. If I can start with an open question, without

:01:36. > :01:43.inviting you to read a book, can you in it what are the overall goals of

:01:44. > :01:47.Russian foreign policy? I think to start off we need to take a broader

:01:48. > :01:53.look at how Russia sees the international environment. As

:01:54. > :02:01.shifting balance of global power, the Russians have talked about the

:02:02. > :02:07.ideal being a multi-border world or drug or a polycentric world order, a

:02:08. > :02:10.world order which is marked by instability or anarchy and an

:02:11. > :02:19.increasing tendency towards the use of force in international relations.

:02:20. > :02:23.In the context of the last couple of years, and global environment in

:02:24. > :02:30.which Europe in particular no longer plays a central role. In which

:02:31. > :02:35.Western norms and values are not seen as paramount, they are not seen

:02:36. > :02:41.as a reference point for Russia and have been criticised as not being

:02:42. > :02:48.legitimate by Moscow. Moscow sees state sovereignty as paramount. It

:02:49. > :02:54.supports incumbent legitimate governments, as in the case of

:02:55. > :02:59.Syria. It is against liberal intervention as a means of dealing

:03:00. > :03:09.with difficult situations with conflicts. As far as overall goals,

:03:10. > :03:16.Andrew will continue on those. In the case of the sillier conflict and

:03:17. > :03:22.perhaps Ukraine conflict, Russia sees itself as a great power once

:03:23. > :03:26.again after difficult period in the 1990s, independent of Western

:03:27. > :03:34.interest. It wants to further Eurasian integration, preventing the

:03:35. > :03:41.further encroachment of Western influence on its own sphere of

:03:42. > :03:50.privileged interests. It is trying as a result of the estrangement with

:03:51. > :04:01.Nato and the EU to develop its own non-Western lead regional

:04:02. > :04:03.integration so on a regional scale, our collective security treatment

:04:04. > :04:10.organisation and an organisation which has become increasingly

:04:11. > :04:16.important -- important, the Shanghai cooperation Organisation which has

:04:17. > :04:25.recently been joined by India and Pakistan so obviously a large

:04:26. > :04:29.grouping of states. I've already mentioned Western intervention in

:04:30. > :04:34.sovereign states, in terms of its dealings with Europe, Russia prefers

:04:35. > :04:40.to deal on a bilateral basis with the European member states rather

:04:41. > :04:46.when -- rather than with Nato and EU, organisations Russia has serious

:04:47. > :04:52.problems with. It had along time problems with Nato and since 2004,

:04:53. > :05:02.much more defensive attitude with their European union. Finally, again

:05:03. > :05:07.I alluded to this before, it wants to manage international crises where

:05:08. > :05:12.possible through the United Nations and is still a member of the

:05:13. > :05:21.permanent five so it can veto resolutions it does not like. It can

:05:22. > :05:29.change the facts on the ground and dictate the parameters of any

:05:30. > :05:36.crisis, at least in most cases. Derek has been very thorough. I

:05:37. > :05:40.would add some points. The overall drive and Russian goals on the

:05:41. > :05:46.international stage, to meet their position as the ubiquitous power,

:05:47. > :05:50.one that has Russia at the centre of the map stretching across many time

:05:51. > :05:57.zones and regions in the world. It is a ubiquitous world power and also

:05:58. > :06:04.wants to create a position for Russia as an indispensable Mark.

:06:05. > :06:07.This means they want and need to have a seat at the table otherwise

:06:08. > :06:12.they are concerned they will be on the menu. This means they see a

:06:13. > :06:18.different world to the UK on the one hand. They have drawn different

:06:19. > :06:21.conclusions from the same international developments.

:06:22. > :06:27.Different conclusions from the same body of evidence. They are working

:06:28. > :06:32.to an international environment that is dominated by regime change,

:06:33. > :06:37.current revolutions and the Arab Spring. In practical terms this

:06:38. > :06:44.means domestic politics and foreign policy are closely bound together.

:06:45. > :06:50.First, Russia is trying to be as sovereign independent state which

:06:51. > :06:55.would mean that Russia is prepared for a 21st century instability, so

:06:56. > :07:03.looking ahead into the century of instability. Secondly, and ever was

:07:04. > :07:06.international architecture where the post-2nd World War architecture,

:07:07. > :07:13.need to and the EU is no longer relevant their view. It is becoming

:07:14. > :07:16.decreasing the relevant. Third, Russian foreign policy is

:07:17. > :07:26.increasingly guided towards a counter colour revolution, putting

:07:27. > :07:34.Russia first and against regime change and diplomacy and operations,

:07:35. > :07:41.that includes Syria. Can I follow up on one of the comments. You said

:07:42. > :07:49.that the Western norms were no longer seen as a reference point.

:07:50. > :07:56.Where is that debated in Russia? They are members of the Council of

:07:57. > :08:01.Europe. Subject to the convention, the European convention. Where is

:08:02. > :08:05.the debate in Russia about asserting some kind of socially conservative

:08:06. > :08:15.different view of the world in a sense, an antithesis to liberal

:08:16. > :08:20.western Europe? Is there not a part of Russian identity which would like

:08:21. > :08:35.to be accepted and part of the values we aspire to? Does he want to

:08:36. > :08:42.commend? -- come in. Now, if you could add the question. You have

:08:43. > :08:50.raised an interesting point. For many years, there has been an

:08:51. > :08:55.ambivalence and still is. An ambivalence in Russian foreign

:08:56. > :08:59.policy between being a sovereign, tournaments global power and

:09:00. > :09:05.regional power and essentially looking after its domestic order

:09:06. > :09:10.being projected internationally and the recognition of interdependence,

:09:11. > :09:18.particularly with Europe and with other powers. This has run through

:09:19. > :09:22.the last 25 years since the break-up of the USSR.

:09:23. > :09:31.What is often forgotten is that for a long time, Russia was genuinely in

:09:32. > :09:38.my feud negotiating norms with the European Union to an extent also

:09:39. > :09:46.with Nato and trying to find some kind of accommodation. But the

:09:47. > :09:49.political class saw a series of conflicts and crisis is starting

:09:50. > :09:55.with Nato's intervention in Kosovo were Russia did not have a voice.

:09:56. > :10:03.That was a big shock for the Russian political class. We had the US-led

:10:04. > :10:06.invasion of Iraq and we had the colour revolutions in Georgia and

:10:07. > :10:13.particularly in Ukraine in 2004 and then we had the war with Georgia and

:10:14. > :10:17.South city in 2008 and end of the beer and Syria crisis and all the

:10:18. > :10:22.time, the Russians have been in their own view marginalised and

:10:23. > :10:28.sidelined and they are increasingly seen by the West, and this is a

:10:29. > :10:31.direct quote from something that President Obama said, as being on

:10:32. > :10:37.the wrong side of history and the Russians do not accept that. So

:10:38. > :10:44.now... Now you have the situation where the more conservative

:10:45. > :10:52.sovereign state trends in Russian foreign policy has leaked to the

:10:53. > :10:56.four and has monopolised not only narratives and the rhetoric that

:10:57. > :11:01.Russian foreign policy comes out with but also to a large extent, not

:11:02. > :11:08.completely, but to a large extent also a policy-making, practical

:11:09. > :11:15.policy-making. At the moment, it is becoming increasingly difficult for

:11:16. > :11:17.Western organisations and political leaders to actually go to Moscow and

:11:18. > :11:24.actually come out with anything positive. We were in Berlin three or

:11:25. > :11:31.four months ago talking to the chap who heads the Russian and you region

:11:32. > :11:41.programme in foreign relation and Germany has more or less lead to the

:11:42. > :11:45.response and he said that the foreigners to go to Moscow

:11:46. > :11:49.to bring some proposals to the table to bring some proposals to the table

:11:50. > :11:53.talks to the Foreign Minister there. talks to the Foreign Minister there.

:11:54. > :11:57.At the moment, that is causing difficulties. We could talk about

:11:58. > :12:02.the potential political military implications of that in a while.

:12:03. > :12:08.Might I add a footnote? I think it is important that it is noted here

:12:09. > :12:12.that neither at the Russian leadership nor indeed more broadly

:12:13. > :12:16.in Russian society is there an acceptance of Western values. I

:12:17. > :12:21.think we made me is that when you go to Russia. On the one hand, the

:12:22. > :12:24.Russian leadership has noted on numerous occasions that they do not

:12:25. > :12:27.want to accept our values and that Russian democracy will come in its

:12:28. > :12:33.own time and in its own way, a Russian way. On several occasions,

:12:34. > :12:38.it has been stated that we simply don't want to be embraced in those

:12:39. > :12:43.terms. We will come to it in our old course. Mr Putin himself has stated

:12:44. > :12:48.on numerous occasions that he looks at some of the developments between

:12:49. > :12:53.the European Union and liberalism there that we think of an

:12:54. > :12:56.antithetical terms of what should be happening in Russia. In terms of

:12:57. > :13:01.broader society, I think it is worth noting that when we talk about

:13:02. > :13:13.socially conservative, we are talking about socially conservatism

:13:14. > :13:19.with a small sea. A Paul recently -- a poll recently said 70% of the pop

:13:20. > :13:24.duration of Russia could be said to be socialists and of those 20% are

:13:25. > :13:30.Communist. The Communist party is always second in the elections. That

:13:31. > :13:33.is the main... It is not just a party of protest, that represents a

:13:34. > :13:38.substantial part of the population so when we talk about our values we

:13:39. > :13:44.also look at Russia asking if there are a liberal parties in protest is,

:13:45. > :13:47.unfortunately from a British perspective, and from a British

:13:48. > :13:51.parliamentarian perspective, those who would be a keen to seeing the

:13:52. > :13:56.world in the same way as us are very much in a minority. The Communist

:13:57. > :14:03.party has been all over it the place. The Communist party in

:14:04. > :14:06.Bristol whole range of points. We are talking about Russian domestic

:14:07. > :14:11.politics. They are a long way from what we would issue to be in terms

:14:12. > :14:12.of our values. They represent something rather different to a

:14:13. > :14:23.Western value, Western European Western value, Western European

:14:24. > :14:28.Union value. How long have you... ? You mentioned our values and you

:14:29. > :14:33.mentioned being on the wrong side of history that if you look at the

:14:34. > :14:37.recent Afghan war, the Russians have been saying far more sensible things

:14:38. > :14:40.than the West. They say far more sensible things about dealing with

:14:41. > :14:47.Isis than any of the Western politicians do and in Syria, the

:14:48. > :14:49.Geneva talks would not be anywhere without all that dreadful bombing

:14:50. > :14:56.recently so is there an argument there on the right side of history?

:14:57. > :15:04.Should I come in here? Without seeming to ingratiate myself with

:15:05. > :15:08.your good surf the Maxell, I do believe that the Russians have had a

:15:09. > :15:19.fairly strong argument for Syria. Back in 2012, we had the action

:15:20. > :15:27.group of Syrian meeting in Geneva and issued a communique in June two

:15:28. > :15:32.3012 stop roughly a year later we had a summit and again the world

:15:33. > :15:36.summers, including Putin who was part of that, this was before the

:15:37. > :15:45.Ukraine crisis, issued a communique talking about an inclusive

:15:46. > :15:48.transition. Everyone then goes home. The Western powers forget about

:15:49. > :15:53.that, the opposition comes back and says we cannot communicate with

:15:54. > :15:59.Assad. We can talk about Assad in a moment. We will not countenance any

:16:00. > :16:05.inclusive political transition. The Russian view is that you have to

:16:06. > :16:10.negotiate however bad Assad is. There are elements within the

:16:11. > :16:14.opposition. The Russian says the opposition has been infiltrated by

:16:15. > :16:18.Islamic state three or four years ago before we even talked about

:16:19. > :16:24.Islamic state. They were infiltrated by riot radical elements and there

:16:25. > :16:30.was no real opposition that could have talked with Assad. So the West

:16:31. > :16:36.and Russia on the other side, I think both sides bear responsibility

:16:37. > :16:40.for what happened and then there was a lot of drift. We had two or three

:16:41. > :16:48.years of drift. Appalling loss of life, disruption of Syria virtually

:16:49. > :16:57.putting the end to it as a court hearing state and in, as Lavrov put

:16:58. > :17:01.it quite blatantly in a meeting with Putin, to change the facts on the

:17:02. > :17:08.ground. Effectively, they wanted to allow Syrian regime, obviously with

:17:09. > :17:13.Russia behind it, to negotiate from position of strength. That is kind

:17:14. > :17:18.of free version from the principles, the original principles of what

:17:19. > :17:22.Russia sees as traditional international law to more of a power

:17:23. > :17:26.play. But nevertheless, it did change the facts on the ground and

:17:27. > :17:33.now we are coming towards peace. Not a happy piece and I am not bad

:17:34. > :17:40.classical star scholar but I think Tacitus said, they make a Desert and

:17:41. > :17:46.call it peace. No one comes out of this particularly with good

:17:47. > :17:49.credentials but the Russians did have some points which they were

:17:50. > :17:57.pushing. The traditional international law, the primary

:17:58. > :18:02.responsibility of the United Nations which actually passed to security

:18:03. > :18:08.council resolutions which backs up the action group and Syria decision

:18:09. > :18:13.was relieved just ignore it. And so, I think both sides bear... We seem

:18:14. > :18:17.to have much more of a take on reality. We saw Assad a couple of

:18:18. > :18:24.weeks ago and one of the things he said was that the Russians wouldn't

:18:25. > :18:28.let the Syrian state fall. Not soft, the Syrian state. As far as we know,

:18:29. > :18:35.they are on the right side of history. We could perhaps learn from

:18:36. > :18:41.them. Sorry Canada is finished. The problem here is that initially and

:18:42. > :18:44.even now the Russians are saying they are not supporting Assad, they

:18:45. > :18:49.are supporting the legitimate regime which was back to what I was talking

:18:50. > :18:54.about before and what was mentioned before about Noel regime change in

:18:55. > :19:01.the Western style, so there is that our principle at work there. The

:19:02. > :19:04.problem is, of course, that Assad is insisting pretty much in most of his

:19:05. > :19:11.speech is insisting that he is not speech is insisting that he is not

:19:12. > :19:14.willing to move on. I believe Assad does their on the balance of

:19:15. > :19:18.evidence responsibility for the majority of the death and

:19:19. > :19:21.destruction. The problem is that Russia might be on the right side of

:19:22. > :19:29.traditional international law, but in terms of the normative aspect,

:19:30. > :19:36.the idea of responsibility to protect populations which is not an

:19:37. > :19:39.international legal mob that is an international law which is

:19:40. > :19:42.developing, then Russian is on the wrong side of that and that is

:19:43. > :19:47.really what I think the reference to being on the wrong side of history

:19:48. > :19:52.is. But isn't this the problem? We make mistakes and see things grow

:19:53. > :19:57.much in terms of our principles which is great, but actually, it

:19:58. > :20:04.should be about interest and their analysis were now of keeping Syrian

:20:05. > :20:09.state net there is surely more sensible than most of the West.

:20:10. > :20:15.There is an argument there. I think that the Russians fail to bring up

:20:16. > :20:19.very much constructive to the table, that is the problem. They talk a lot

:20:20. > :20:27.about observing humanitarian norms but they are not always 100% behind

:20:28. > :20:30.it if it interferes with the principle, as I say, of retaining

:20:31. > :20:35.the sovereign power in Syria. There are other aspects, other normative

:20:36. > :20:38.aspects which the Russians talk about and they have engaged with the

:20:39. > :20:43.responsibilities to protect the norm. They did not veto the Nato

:20:44. > :20:48.intervention in Libya for example, but when it became the case of

:20:49. > :20:51.regime change, then that's really... What's happened in Syria is really a

:20:52. > :20:59.knock-on effect from what happened in Libya. I was going to invite

:21:00. > :21:02.Doctor Monaghan to speak. I think we need to be careful about talking

:21:03. > :21:09.about the right side of history. It is a rather Whiggish approach to

:21:10. > :21:12.history and the progressive sort of nature that revolutions will always

:21:13. > :21:15.result in a good thing and if they are successful. I do not think we

:21:16. > :21:18.should be thinking about right or wrong side of history whether they

:21:19. > :21:21.are on the wrong side or not stop the Russians do not see it in the

:21:22. > :21:24.same way. They have made it very clear that they do not see history

:21:25. > :21:28.in the same kind of progressive light of optimism at the end of the

:21:29. > :21:32.Cold War and so on. There is a long Scotian now that we could have that

:21:33. > :21:36.actually the two points that I would relate to specifically that you have

:21:37. > :21:42.said, the Afghan war, they said some sensible things. Perhaps more than

:21:43. > :21:46.us, but they did offer on numerous occasions the knowledge that they

:21:47. > :21:51.had about that. And we said, no, we do not need that. When I say we, I

:21:52. > :21:56.used to be employed by Natal but it was not just Nato, it was also at a

:21:57. > :22:02.UK level. No thanks, we are all right. Several years later, oh,

:22:03. > :22:06.you're leaving Afghanistan, we have also done that. Would you like

:22:07. > :22:11.advice? And we said no, it is all fine. So on some occasions, there

:22:12. > :22:14.are opportunities perhaps to listen to some of the things of the

:22:15. > :22:18.Russians say. That does not mean that we have to agree with it that

:22:19. > :22:25.just because we agree to be necklace and does not mean we agree. -- just

:22:26. > :22:30.because we must and does not mean we agree. From the beginning in Syria,

:22:31. > :22:33.the Russians have been sceptical of the progressive nature of the Arab

:22:34. > :22:36.Spring which was supposed to immediately bring a flowering of

:22:37. > :22:39.liberalism and democracy to north Africa and actually most of the

:22:40. > :22:44.Russian discussion has been a long lines of, that hasn't really worked,

:22:45. > :22:49.Hazard? Look at Libya and Syria. There may be other countries that we

:22:50. > :22:53.may wish to point to. But let's take those two as primary examples. There

:22:54. > :22:57.is something to the Russian argument in that sense that we are

:22:58. > :23:01.actually... When you go around creating regime change, what you do

:23:02. > :23:05.is not lead to a flourishing of democracy. This is the more Chrissy

:23:06. > :23:10.on the end of gun barrels and what that creates is a vacuum, a power

:23:11. > :23:13.vacuum, leading to wider instability. We can disagree over

:23:14. > :23:17.whether it is democracy at the end of a gun barrel or not, but that is

:23:18. > :23:26.the Russian position and actually the position in Libya is not very

:23:27. > :23:30.good. Can I just very quickly adds to something Andrew said about

:23:31. > :23:35.Russia being sceptical about the Arab Spring. Foreign Minister Lavrov

:23:36. > :23:40.has repeatedly in speeches and articles talked about the fact that

:23:41. > :23:44.this stems from Russia's own history. Concern over the fact that

:23:45. > :23:48.a sudden violent upheaval never really achieved its aims and I

:23:49. > :23:52.think, really you're talking about going back to the Bolshevik

:23:53. > :24:01.resolution which obviously set Russian backed six or seven decades.

:24:02. > :24:16.Is that position by Mr Putin? It is pretty much backed up via Mr Putin.

:24:17. > :24:21.The end of the Soviet Union was the greatest disaster of the 20th

:24:22. > :24:29.century? Now, he said it was the greatest geopolitical disaster. You

:24:30. > :24:34.have taken a phrase which is from a much longer speech, 11 years ago

:24:35. > :24:40.that was referring to several specific things about many ethnic

:24:41. > :24:47.Russians and others being left outside their country. He had a very

:24:48. > :24:55.specific meaning in mind. If you want to use Mr Putin as examples, I

:24:56. > :25:00.would point you to a speech in 2014, the March speech, also the speech

:25:01. > :25:03.after the annexation of Crimea. These more recent speeches will

:25:04. > :25:09.guide you towards Russian foreign policy. So he doesn't want to

:25:10. > :25:17.recreate a position where Russian speakers are... A greater Russian

:25:18. > :25:23.Empire? The greater Russian Empire, now but our collective Security

:25:24. > :25:29.Treaty organisation, as Eurasian economic union, creating Russia as a

:25:30. > :25:33.hub is not the same, we're not going back to some form of Soviet Union.

:25:34. > :25:40.We may be going forward to some different kind of union in the 21st

:25:41. > :25:51.century, but it's not quite the same as some kind of socket Empire. --

:25:52. > :25:55.Soviet empire. Delighted to have year, the evidence about Russia is

:25:56. > :26:01.breathtaking so it's good to have your perspective. You mentioned the

:26:02. > :26:05.European Union, in 2004 when there were 11 countries, new countries

:26:06. > :26:10.entering the European Union, Russia was consulted about this because

:26:11. > :26:15.there would be ramifications on Russia, that has not happened over

:26:16. > :26:19.Ukraine, they have been excluded but there will be an impact on Russia

:26:20. > :26:26.because that is movement agreement with Ukraine so any agreement with

:26:27. > :26:31.EU would allow EU goods to come to Russia without any customs, could

:26:32. > :26:37.you speak about that? One element I was not sure about that question,

:26:38. > :26:42.you see Ukraine will not be a member of the European union I think? The

:26:43. > :26:48.European union has had talks with the Ukraine about some sort of

:26:49. > :26:55.agreement. Russia has been excluded from the stocks yet Russia has a

:26:56. > :27:00.bilateral agreements with Ukraine for free movement of goods. If

:27:01. > :27:05.Ukraine becomes a member of the European union, we will be able to

:27:06. > :27:12.export goods... Would you mind, I did not interrupt you. Order. We

:27:13. > :27:16.could export goods to the Ukraine without tireless and then those

:27:17. > :27:24.goods could be sent to Russia without tireless because of their

:27:25. > :27:30.agreement with this EIS. In negotiating the free trade agreement

:27:31. > :27:38.with Ukraine and the other agreement which are now, as first January last

:27:39. > :27:44.year enforced, 1st of January this year it came into force. If the EU

:27:45. > :27:52.did meet with the Russians to talk about potential impact on Russia,

:27:53. > :28:00.Ukraine trade. They gave the Russians a fair hearing but in the

:28:01. > :28:05.end the EU was not prepared, it is quite strong on regulatory issues.

:28:06. > :28:11.It was not prepared to let Russia interfere with Ukraine's sovereign

:28:12. > :28:15.choice of specific regulatory parts they were prepared to sign up to. So

:28:16. > :28:23.the Russians were heard but in the end, pretty much all their views

:28:24. > :28:28.were not taken into consideration. My school projects that as their

:28:29. > :28:36.European union effectively taking over Ukraine's sovereignty when in

:28:37. > :28:39.fact Russia would like a voice in limiting Ukraine's sovereignty and

:28:40. > :28:45.their ability to move towards European integration so the Russians

:28:46. > :28:54.have a point that they have trade agreements with the Ukraine. I am

:28:55. > :28:55.not a great specialist in this but apparently that is not

:28:56. > :29:03.incompatibility with Ukraine associating with the association

:29:04. > :29:07.agreement for free trade agreement and some kind of free trade

:29:08. > :29:14.agreement with Russia, those two things can operate but Russia is

:29:15. > :29:22.after ultimately for Ukraine to join the Eurasian economic union. Or to

:29:23. > :29:31.remain neutral. And not to move further towards Europe. You talked

:29:32. > :29:37.about a brick wall with Sergei Lavrov, also supported by Foreign

:29:38. > :29:42.Secretary having a conversation with lover of which would not cleared up

:29:43. > :29:48.much further in the Russian position. -- Sergei Lavrov. What

:29:49. > :29:52.does Russia want out of the West? What is there that week is usefully

:29:53. > :29:59.engage with to try and meet some kind of compromise so we can give

:30:00. > :30:09.them, where Kimiko -- concede to them? Given that understanding about

:30:10. > :30:19.the position of the West. I think I am referring to a paper Andrew wrote

:30:20. > :30:27.last year. He said the problem is, this is strange and 18 Russia and

:30:28. > :30:32.Western organisations means that the dynamic is often projected as one of

:30:33. > :30:40.either confronting Moscow or appeasing Russia. There is a neat,

:30:41. > :30:48.if I am right, I think there is a need to get away from that and try

:30:49. > :30:54.to look at the roots of the problem and begin again to negotiate the

:30:55. > :31:02.fundamentals, especially on political and military security

:31:03. > :31:06.issues. There is a danger, from several reports, highlighting

:31:07. > :31:11.potential problems of an inadvertent conflict sparking a greater

:31:12. > :31:15.conflagration. Arms control agreements at the moment and

:31:16. > :31:20.concerns over hybrid warfare by Russia, all of these things, nobody

:31:21. > :31:28.talked about it three years ago and is now a big problem. Fundamentally,

:31:29. > :31:33.initially, we need to get back and even revisit the Helsinki

:31:34. > :31:37.principles, to get back to try to lay down those fundamental

:31:38. > :31:44.political, military security principles, including following up

:31:45. > :31:50.on the Vienna document on security building measures. How we go beyond

:31:51. > :31:55.that will depend on how the Ukraine crisis plays out. If the two sides

:31:56. > :32:02.can come together, the European union and Russia, or western Russia,

:32:03. > :32:10.cannot do it over the heads of Ukraine. Both Nato and EU have made

:32:11. > :32:17.this clear, it has to involve the sovereign decision of Ukraine so

:32:18. > :32:22.they have to bring PF in. The two sides have to be brought together to

:32:23. > :32:28.negotiate a settlement to the Ukraine's constitutional crisis...

:32:29. > :32:35.They have federalised. Can you talk about Ukraine? There are a number of

:32:36. > :32:40.points. We have to be careful about talking about engage or concede at

:32:41. > :32:49.the moment. Engage we talked about for a decade or more. It has not led

:32:50. > :32:54.to any specific developments. What does Russia won't? What can we do

:32:55. > :32:59.about it? The Russian position in Europe is clear, they want a new

:33:00. > :33:05.European Security Treaty. This has been advanced by numerous Russian

:33:06. > :33:13.leaderships, most recently by the presidency of 2008, it was called

:33:14. > :33:19.after the president but it had been formulated under President Putin's

:33:20. > :33:23.Administration. It is a leadership team offering this idea. This was

:33:24. > :33:33.pushed into the core food crisis, rejected by Nato. The basic idea was

:33:34. > :33:38.formulated and circulated and it was full of legal problems and in

:33:39. > :33:44.contradiction to some of the fundamental points of Atlantic

:33:45. > :33:52.security. What would we want out of this? As a foot note, although this

:33:53. > :33:57.has been moved to one side in the process, the Russians have not been

:33:58. > :34:05.given up on this. They have been perceiving this with diplomacy ever

:34:06. > :34:08.since. Can I ask, activity in Ukraine over the last couple of

:34:09. > :34:17.years, what does that tell us about their wider strategic goals? It

:34:18. > :34:21.tells us a number of points and I was focused on the Euro Atlantic

:34:22. > :34:25.architecture, that is the real problem. Ukraine is a serious

:34:26. > :34:28.problem in its own right but it means we view the European Security

:34:29. > :34:36.order very differently. We talk about interstate, the indivisibility

:34:37. > :34:40.of security in terms of the three baskets of security whereas the

:34:41. > :34:47.Russians viewed differently, to mean that you'll Atlantic security is

:34:48. > :34:54.divided. It is not indivisible. There is an eastern level with

:34:55. > :35:00.guarantees and there is a need to EU guarantee which is political and

:35:01. > :35:08.legally binding. So there's a distinction, already at two tier

:35:09. > :35:14.Atlantic security. In effect you see Russia emphasising this distinction

:35:15. > :35:19.with the Budapest Memorandum. It's not legally binding for instance,

:35:20. > :35:26.unlike if the Russians had gone to war with the Nato member state.

:35:27. > :35:32.That's the lesson from Ukraine? Yes. How about contrasting that with

:35:33. > :35:39.Syria? I would draw a significant difference with that. There are some

:35:40. > :35:45.links. The Russian leadership sees the attempt to create our regime

:35:46. > :35:52.change, a colour revolution in both states. The operation in Ukraine was

:35:53. > :35:56.to ensure that the Crimea did not fall out of Russian strategic

:35:57. > :36:02.control, hence the annexation. Second there is the possibility of

:36:03. > :36:08.creating a federalisation... Do you really think they thought they would

:36:09. > :36:12.lose the Crimea? Yes and it is understandable because the Ukrainian

:36:13. > :36:20.government was renting out the main bees to them at Sebastopol at a very

:36:21. > :36:27.high fee. It is one of their main strategic concerns that either the

:36:28. > :36:30.price would be raised yet again or indeed the deal would be cut

:36:31. > :36:37.entirely. Ukrainian government might have

:36:38. > :36:42.said, we will have Nato ships. That is less important than the base

:36:43. > :36:48.being removed from Russian control. For me, that is the primary reason

:36:49. > :36:52.for the Crimean operation. The second element is the federalisation

:36:53. > :36:58.of Ukraine which keeps a more broadly diverted sense of power

:36:59. > :37:02.within Ukraine. I would reiterate that although Ukraine is a very

:37:03. > :37:07.serious problem and serious disagreement between Russia and

:37:08. > :37:12.Nato, and the EU, the real problem that demonstrates is the flaw is

:37:13. > :37:16.that we have in terms of the Euro Atlantic architecture because

:37:17. > :37:23.similar problems we are now worried about in other regions. If I may

:37:24. > :37:26.draw the difference between Syria and Ukraine, the Russians in effect

:37:27. > :37:32.operated before the regime change could take place. So entering Syria

:37:33. > :37:40.first was anti aircraft equivalent to prevent an Anglo-Saxon lead,

:37:41. > :37:46.French led bombing campaign to remove Assad from power, that is why

:37:47. > :37:52.they went in. Secondly, propping up the power. You are seeing a series

:37:53. > :37:56.of learning and developing operations about how to prevent

:37:57. > :38:03.colour revolutions from taking place. If they had a hint or

:38:04. > :38:07.suggestion that there was a possibility of a colour revolution

:38:08. > :38:13.taking place in a former Soviet space, you would see similar

:38:14. > :38:20.operations. Very quickly, something Andrew referred to, Nato has never

:38:21. > :38:26.gone back on the pledge made at the Bucharest summit in 2008 that

:38:27. > :38:32.Ukraine and Georgia, an open door policy for them to be admitted to

:38:33. > :38:38.Nato. Most of the main member states are against that now but in the

:38:39. > :38:44.recent period it was noticeable that that pledge was reiterated in the

:38:45. > :38:48.case of Georgia but not for Ukraine. Nato is dragging its feet and they

:38:49. > :38:53.like to state this as a principle but realistically they do not want

:38:54. > :38:57.to take on the foreign policy problems that Ukraine and Georgia

:38:58. > :39:03.contain but it is something which was good looks that seriously. your

:39:04. > :39:09.second question... Actually, the first point would be, decide what we

:39:10. > :39:13.want to do. As far as I'm aware there is no clear coherent policy,

:39:14. > :39:17.either at Nato level or European Union level, or indeed at UK

:39:18. > :39:22.national level, of where we want to be with the Russians in, let's say

:39:23. > :39:26.2020, at the end of this Parliament return. There is no lengthy public

:39:27. > :39:29.discussion of that or detailed nature of that. So what we're

:39:30. > :39:35.talking about, where can we engage or concede, it often... Policy often

:39:36. > :39:39.seems to me to be very reactive, constant state of surprise. It makes

:39:40. > :39:43.the discussion of negotiations and diplomacy quite difficult. If you

:39:44. > :39:48.are constantly being surprised, we had in 2008 the then Foreign

:39:49. > :39:53.Secretary David Manor band saying the Russia- Georgia war was a rude

:39:54. > :39:58.awakening. Gretchen at the David Miliband. You can get the terms were

:39:59. > :40:01.used when Russia annexed Crimea, a rude awakening. This is because

:40:02. > :40:09.we're not paying attention to what is happening in Russia. We'll come

:40:10. > :40:16.onto British policy later. With your indulgence... It's all over to you

:40:17. > :40:21.for the next few minutes. Obviously, I get the impression that Russia

:40:22. > :40:26.wants to give as little as possible away about what its plans are

:40:27. > :40:34.politically and militarily, for obvious reasons. To link the hybrid

:40:35. > :40:42.warfare techniques that we used to get Russia into Ukraine, and into

:40:43. > :40:50.Crimea with the unexpected moves, certainly surprising moves, emerging

:40:51. > :40:56.when they started to build up in Syria... Can I ask both of the

:40:57. > :41:03.witnesses, do they feel that this is part of breaking up this sort of

:41:04. > :41:08.neighbourhood that was more or less very much under their control 20

:41:09. > :41:13.years ago, 25 years ago? And that there is a policy of now trying to

:41:14. > :41:20.create almost frozen states in many cases? As an alternative to seeing

:41:21. > :41:24.Nato move further east and the EU move further east. And, also,

:41:25. > :41:35.encroachment of its interests in the Middle East. You got one or two

:41:36. > :41:39.ideas. When you say the Russians want to give away as little as

:41:40. > :41:44.possible on plans and military developing. I disagree with you.

:41:45. > :41:47.Russian strategic planning is made explicit, the mate decrees of 2012

:41:48. > :41:55.set out a strategic agenda that is ambitious, yes, but entirely clear.

:41:56. > :41:58.-- May decrees. As far as its military plans, yes, and please do

:41:59. > :42:01.come back on me if you find this interesting, the Russian system

:42:02. > :42:07.doesn't work well. It acknowledged by its leadership to do so so they

:42:08. > :42:12.are putting it under intense pressure to build it into a capable

:42:13. > :42:16.system. It is tantamount to state mobilisation. This is all made for

:42:17. > :42:22.the public, this is discussed. Wasn't it UK where they denied

:42:23. > :42:25.point-blank... Ireland having lunch with the ambassador at his residence

:42:26. > :42:28.in London with the then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the

:42:29. > :42:33.Russian ambassador said to me, point-blank, Russian troops weren't

:42:34. > :42:38.in Ukraine. Two weeks later it was out that they were there and he was

:42:39. > :42:43.on TV explaining the fact. They were in Russian uniforms without Russian

:42:44. > :42:46.insignia. They didn't make it plain what their intentions were, they

:42:47. > :42:50.just went in. There are two separate questions going on here. When we

:42:51. > :42:55.talk about their strategic agenda and operational agenda, it stated

:42:56. > :42:57.extremely clearly, published in our foreign policy concept, national

:42:58. > :43:03.security strategies. Before you are asking is, are there special

:43:04. > :43:08.operations forces operations secret? Yes, of course they are. It was a

:43:09. > :43:10.surprise for some people that special operations forces went in

:43:11. > :43:15.and did what they did. For those watching specifically, and I know

:43:16. > :43:18.this was the case, people were being briefed here, people were briefing,

:43:19. > :43:23.saying, actually, this is going to happen. There was evidence already

:43:24. > :43:30.this is the case. Satellite evidence and they still denied it. It will

:43:31. > :43:34.certainly taking place within the MoD and I know there were at least

:43:35. > :43:39.some in the think tank community who were saying, watch out, something's

:43:40. > :43:43.coming. There were a series of measures indicated a meeting of the

:43:44. > :43:46.Security Council... Can you say any more about the sources? There's a

:43:47. > :43:49.question we've got dressed as a committee about whether the Foreign

:43:50. > :43:52.Office has the capacity to understand Russia properly. And you

:43:53. > :43:57.are beginning to develop quite a strong critique. That from what I'm

:43:58. > :44:08.reading of it, actually our capacity to understand Russia is woeful. Now,

:44:09. > :44:10.I want you to challenge that, did our own intelligence services tell

:44:11. > :44:15.us this, was it think tank is, does the government understand this? If I

:44:16. > :44:18.may, there are two questions to this. I'm keen to provide a

:44:19. > :44:23.secondary answer. This is a very important question because first of

:44:24. > :44:26.all there are serious limitations to Russian capacity in the UK and

:44:27. > :44:30.throughout Western Europe at the moment, and the US. That's because

:44:31. > :44:33.for the last 25 years Russia hasn't been a priority. So resources have

:44:34. > :44:38.been wound down on it. What resources there are, there are still

:44:39. > :44:41.some, generally focused on civil society and democracy, because that

:44:42. > :44:46.is where the funding has been. There are very few people who are experts

:44:47. > :44:50.on the Russian economy. And even fewer expert on the Russian

:44:51. > :44:53.military. Even fewer still, we can count on one hand, who are real

:44:54. > :45:01.experts on the Russian security system. Would it be correct to

:45:02. > :45:03.characterise the system as... Varies you, knowledgeable authority, nobody

:45:04. > :45:09.in the Foreign Office to read what you are writing? Not quite. In a

:45:10. > :45:16.nutshell... You said it was common knowledge who knew... There are now

:45:17. > :45:21.3-4 balls in the airfield. The capacity to understand what you

:45:22. > :45:27.know... Are so limited, so stretched inside the office, and have ditched

:45:28. > :45:32.all the expertise they have. There are some people there in an eastern

:45:33. > :45:34.research group, within the system, there are new people in the embassy

:45:35. > :45:39.learning very quickly, also in the MoD, people. It's not only the

:45:40. > :45:42.number. It's a very important point had like to make, it's not only the

:45:43. > :45:46.number of expertise, because people are sending the information up, but

:45:47. > :45:51.it hits the glass ceiling. Very senior level decision-making. We

:45:52. > :45:58.wouldn't do that, so the Russians would do it. It's what I would call

:45:59. > :46:04.unknown millions, if you will. In terms of varied expertise. --

:46:05. > :46:08.unknown knowns. When there is information that doesn't chime with

:46:09. > :46:15.our own understanding of the world, it's rejected. I can perhaps offer

:46:16. > :46:18.some specifics in a different environment, but I would be hesitant

:46:19. > :46:31.to name names as to how I know this was taken. Clearly, Ukraine was

:46:32. > :46:38.still a big issue while the Syria war was developing. Again, out of

:46:39. > :46:42.the blue. Satellites saw it, American intelligence knew about it

:46:43. > :46:47.probably before anybody else did it. Again, we saw the troop build-up

:46:48. > :46:57.from the air. But again, talking up the blue, no discussion about

:46:58. > :47:00.stopping bloodshed in Syria. I thought if there is any way of

:47:01. > :47:04.deflecting attention away from Ukraine, that is certainly a great

:47:05. > :47:08.way to do it. That would have been the main objective but I'm sure it

:47:09. > :47:16.took a lot of attention away from Russian activity. Andrew already

:47:17. > :47:24.referred to the fact some fundamental principles, such as

:47:25. > :47:28.trying to avoid regime change etc... Are two things are... It's a

:47:29. > :47:31.tactical move as well as strategic. Sending troops into Syria is the

:47:32. > :47:37.best way to take attention away from Ukraine. He gave an hour-long

:47:38. > :47:42.interview on American TV saying what we're going to do before he went to

:47:43. > :47:46.New York. Richie McCaw Mr Putin gave an hour-long interview. It was an

:47:47. > :47:49.English yet people were still surprised when they did it. You have

:47:50. > :47:52.to be a little careful here about what we're talking. The Russians

:47:53. > :47:58.have been talking about Syria since 2011. So if we're a bit surprised

:47:59. > :48:04.about what they say, and what they do, and I don't here include special

:48:05. > :48:08.operations forces, because it tends to be surprising, as I hope ours

:48:09. > :48:16.are, to. We've only got ourselves to blame. Because we're not listening.

:48:17. > :48:21.One thing I would say, if you want to make a link between Ukraine and

:48:22. > :48:24.Syria, Nato was very surprised, I talk to people in nature 18 months

:48:25. > :48:31.ago, who were surprised Russia now has the capacity to move something

:48:32. > :48:35.like 50,000 men and a relatively rapid reaction force, up and down

:48:36. > :48:38.borders, and to do the kind of things they did in Ukraine, as well

:48:39. > :48:43.as being backed up by if not the absolute top of the range, then some

:48:44. > :48:53.very decent military kit. In terms of anti-aircraft missiles, the temp

:48:54. > :49:00.three macro. Russia's and defensive capabilities. -- the S400. There has

:49:01. > :49:05.been an increase in state procurement of modern weapon

:49:06. > :49:12.systems. So they have financial difficulties, it's sad to continue

:49:13. > :49:15.until 2020. The State Department programme until 2020. Correction

:49:16. > :49:19.macro state armament. We need people who are looking at this and taking

:49:20. > :49:26.the decision. If I can get two examples in response to the

:49:27. > :49:31.question, I'll be able to absorb the knowledge they have? -- are we able

:49:32. > :49:34.to absorb the knowledge? The research group, staffed by excellent

:49:35. > :49:37.people who stay in the group for many years, tremendous amount of

:49:38. > :49:41.knowledge on an academic level about Russia. Something like five or six

:49:42. > :49:48.of them dealing with the entire post-Soviet space less Dick states,

:49:49. > :49:58.looking at politics, security etc. -- plus Baltic states. They try

:49:59. > :50:01.their best. It is laughable, really. In the Ministry of Defence, I was

:50:02. > :50:06.there with a couple of colleagues to or three years ago talking to the

:50:07. > :50:12.defence economics Department. And a chap there had been there 25 years.

:50:13. > :50:17.He joined at a time when there was something like two dozen people

:50:18. > :50:19.looking at the Soviet defence industry, defence capabilities and

:50:20. > :50:25.economy. He was the last one working full-time on it and he's since

:50:26. > :50:27.retired to write the good beer guide, apparently. The Ministry of

:50:28. > :50:32.Defence is now up as well. Seriously understaffed. You are talking about

:50:33. > :50:37.Russia, still the biggest manufacturer and biggest exporter of

:50:38. > :50:42.armaments. And you tell me the MoD has no real capacity to look at

:50:43. > :50:46.that. Academia can maybe make up some of the shortfall, Chatham House

:50:47. > :50:50.can make up some of the shortfall. If Russia is important, and I

:50:51. > :50:53.believe it is important once again, it's never really went away but it

:50:54. > :50:57.has certainly come back, the committee might... I shouldn't tell

:50:58. > :51:02.you what to write but the committee might make that point to the

:51:03. > :51:09.government. And what we need to do in the future. It comes to, right

:51:10. > :51:12.down to, something the LSE commission wrote a report on quite

:51:13. > :51:17.recently. I would advise you to have a look at it, really very

:51:18. > :51:20.interesting, saying the kind of multidisciplinary knowledge Andrew

:51:21. > :51:24.referred to, the language knowledge, Russian language, other minority

:51:25. > :51:30.languages, you know, we need to pay attention to that. Obviously we

:51:31. > :51:33.can't influence the education, Secretary of State for Education,

:51:34. > :51:35.but it's something which is referred to time and again and something the

:51:36. > :51:40.country never seems to do anything about. We are pressed for time and

:51:41. > :51:45.have to move on to counterterrorism. Sergey Lavrov says if it moves like

:51:46. > :51:48.a terrorist and looks like a terrorist, it is a terrorist.

:51:49. > :51:52.Clearly there was a difference between what Russia believes a

:51:53. > :51:57.terrorist is and what we believe are terrorists. As Russia have a clear

:51:58. > :52:03.policy on counterterrorism? Yes. What is it then? It's differs from

:52:04. > :52:10.ours, yeah. Do you want to go first was to mark I was going to say, I

:52:11. > :52:12.organised... It was the third week of November 2013, I remember the

:52:13. > :52:15.date very well because the week after that Mr yellow coverage

:52:16. > :52:22.decided not to sign the association agreement and everything kicked off

:52:23. > :52:31.so there was no further cooperation. -- news to wit Mr Yanukovic. We

:52:32. > :52:36.talked about counterterrorism. There was a lot to talk about, the fact

:52:37. > :52:40.that between Nato and Russia there were some positive movements in

:52:41. > :52:48.terms of joint threat assessments, looking at how we might deal with

:52:49. > :52:54.terrorism together. The findings of that particular workshop were that

:52:55. > :52:59.the views on how to deal with terrorism differ. The Russians think

:53:00. > :53:04.the European Union and Nato are not the best organisations to deal with

:53:05. > :53:08.it. And that it needs to be dealt with in wider international

:53:09. > :53:13.organisations. The fine thing was that it is not something that can

:53:14. > :53:18.kick-start the relationship. There was a lot of talk after 2001, after

:53:19. > :53:22.9/11 that Putin effectively said to George Bush, we can work together to

:53:23. > :53:28.defeat terrorism. I think that kind of idea is completely gone now. It's

:53:29. > :53:36.not something which can really lay the basis for a really kind of deep

:53:37. > :53:37.cooperative relationship. It's important to contextualise this in

:53:38. > :53:45.the longer relationship. The Russians define terrorism

:53:46. > :53:50.differently to us, they define the solution Sir Freddie to us, and the

:53:51. > :53:57.outcome differently to us, in Syria. -- the solutions frankly to us.

:53:58. > :54:02.Shortly put, the aim is to defeat terrorism any measure possible. Mr

:54:03. > :54:06.Putin has implement it a series of robust measures within Russia that

:54:07. > :54:11.I'm sure you are familiar with. Objection in the North Caucasus.

:54:12. > :54:17.People speak of Mr Medvedev of being more liberal, being a more posts

:54:18. > :54:22.offer Soviet -- post-Soviet individual. He has said, I'm

:54:23. > :54:27.president, we must root this out. Even the cleanest and even those who

:54:28. > :54:33.cook for them, will face the full brunt of Russian power. Anybody

:54:34. > :54:38.against the regime. Amazing that the definition? No, people who take up

:54:39. > :54:42.arms against the state within the regime is defined as a terrorist. Do

:54:43. > :54:49.they define terrorist in Syria similarly? They would define Islamic

:54:50. > :54:53.State and other organisations as being terrorist. The difference with

:54:54. > :54:59.us is that they don't see a distinction between extremists are

:55:00. > :55:05.moderates. You may remember in 2013 when someone was released, a video

:55:06. > :55:09.from one of the organisations we supported, didn't view as

:55:10. > :55:11.terrorists, Mr Putin pointed out the individuals were indulging in

:55:12. > :55:16.cannibalism. They have a very different view of what terrorist

:55:17. > :55:25.organisations are and do, they are much more robust about it than we

:55:26. > :55:31.are. I think it's worth pointing out that the example about how we differ

:55:32. > :55:34.is Chechnya. How for instance the Russians adopted a very robust

:55:35. > :55:41.series of measures, went to war in Chechnya twice, then have flooded it

:55:42. > :55:46.with money. This undermines the UK- Russia relationship, but there is of

:55:47. > :55:53.it. Because we provided asylum for a number of Chechens, individuals. The

:55:54. > :55:57.Russians have said, how can you be against terrorism if you provide a

:55:58. > :56:01.sign for these individuals? So, often what you find is a set of

:56:02. > :56:08.concerns in Russia that the UK indulges in double standards. I have

:56:09. > :56:12.literally two words to that. It's a problem of the whole of the North

:56:13. > :56:20.Caucasus now. There are fewer problems in Chechnya at the moment,

:56:21. > :56:24.far more problems in Dagestan. It's across the North Caucasus. Something

:56:25. > :56:27.you might explore when you go to Moscow is how Russia plans to deal

:56:28. > :56:32.with the return of foreign fighters who have been in Syria. That is

:56:33. > :56:36.something which is very much on the European radar over the last couple

:56:37. > :56:43.of years. To try to get some sense of what both sides might agree on in

:56:44. > :56:46.that respect. And I ask you both, sounds like you are more or less

:56:47. > :56:54.agree on, the likelihood of their being some sort of consensus between

:56:55. > :56:56.the West and Russia over visible cooperation on radical Islamic

:56:57. > :57:03.terrorism or which groups are terrorists and which not, is pretty

:57:04. > :57:06.nigh in possible. If there are joint threat assessments, that the two

:57:07. > :57:11.sides can agree on, maybe the experience of the last two or three

:57:12. > :57:15.years that Europe has had might be something worth revisiting. At the

:57:16. > :57:19.moment I don't really think... There isn't that kind of solid basis for a

:57:20. > :57:26.far-reaching, you know, shared policy.

:57:27. > :57:35.More broadly than Islamic State, a realistic discussion of real

:57:36. > :57:39.consensus, shared interests about identifying who these people are and

:57:40. > :57:44.how we will deal with them will be very difficult to achieve. The

:57:45. > :57:54.Russians think about 4500 people from the former Sword Beach union

:57:55. > :57:58.have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq and yes that is the concern that

:57:59. > :58:07.they will go home. Therefore measures are being taken to enhance

:58:08. > :58:13.security. I think they will be more robust in Russia potentially than

:58:14. > :58:19.hear. There are domestic approaches. Do Russia regard Hezbollah as

:58:20. > :58:27.terrorists, given the our allies of Assad? What is their attitude to

:58:28. > :58:35.Hamas? Good question. Moscow has actually talk to Hezbollah and Hamas

:58:36. > :58:42.in the past. Beneath the, I wouldn't like to say I can give an

:58:43. > :58:47.authoritative and so but they might see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

:58:48. > :58:53.as something separate in terms of reference to what is happening in

:58:54. > :58:58.Syria and elsewhere now. Moscow wants to be seen to be brokering

:58:59. > :59:02.some kind of... It doesn't have as much influence as America's... They

:59:03. > :59:11.have signed up to the principles which includes things Hamas have not

:59:12. > :59:17.accepted. The point about tactics, terrorism is a form of tactic used

:59:18. > :59:23.by some political movements, given the Russian position in Chechnya and

:59:24. > :59:30.elsewhere, presumably they are against the use of violent means?

:59:31. > :59:36.The Russians are also prepared to do in certain cases, which includes

:59:37. > :59:42.Hamas and Hezbollah, is to try and find elements which are not overt

:59:43. > :59:47.lead Jihadist but two are perhaps fighting for self determination and

:59:48. > :59:55.get some inclusive political dialogue under way. The difference

:59:56. > :00:01.between Islamic State... I am looking for what specifically they

:00:02. > :00:07.define as terrorism. A conference was held last week in Moscow in

:00:08. > :00:14.which all of the senior military turned up and many defence ministers

:00:15. > :00:22.from around the world. It was held to discuss, global terrorism and

:00:23. > :00:27.colour revolutions. There was an interesting link made between these

:00:28. > :00:30.two. I think it is well worth the time of the committee finding some

:00:31. > :00:37.of the speeches which were made and will be online. I am not sure they

:00:38. > :00:41.will be in English, but the speeches, certainly by Foreign

:00:42. > :00:45.Minister Sergei Lavrov will be translated into English and these

:00:46. > :00:49.will guide you into a clearer indication of some of the

:00:50. > :00:53.ambiguities that there are in these questions. It is interesting from my

:00:54. > :00:57.point of view as a British researcher to see how they link

:00:58. > :01:02.terrorism and colour revolutions together and that is what they see

:01:03. > :01:11.happening in Syria. Can we to sanctions. Thank you very much. --

:01:12. > :01:20.turn to. I am sure you know that at the French National Assembly and

:01:21. > :01:24.motion was put forward last week, a non-binding resolution, urging the

:01:25. > :01:27.government to lift economic sanctions and other retaliation

:01:28. > :01:32.measures imposed on Russia by the European Union. Although it is a

:01:33. > :01:39.non-binding article in the French parliament, the former Prime

:01:40. > :01:43.Minister welcomed the vote. There is a general consensus is it me put

:01:44. > :01:49.pressure on the government ahead of the next revision of sanctions in

:01:50. > :01:55.July 20 16. Bearing that in mind, do you think we also should call for a

:01:56. > :02:10.recession of sanctions against Russia? It has been notable,

:02:11. > :02:19.probably testament to the shock that the Ukraine crisis had in Europe,

:02:20. > :02:24.that actually the sanctions line has held quite well. Even in Germany,

:02:25. > :02:31.where obviously Germany has the greatest share of trade of EU member

:02:32. > :02:37.states with Russia, even the business constituencies, they might

:02:38. > :02:44.crumble but they more or less support that kind of line. It is

:02:45. > :02:47.held throughout Europe. How long it can last without some kind of

:02:48. > :02:57.resolution of the Ukraine conflict is open to question. The problem I

:02:58. > :03:01.think is less to do with appeasing Russia and more to do with what

:03:02. > :03:09.actually sanctions are doing to the Russian economy. A colleague of mine

:03:10. > :03:13.has written about this, they are pushing the Russians into a more

:03:14. > :03:22.state-controlled state directed economy. They are looking about

:03:23. > :03:28.mobilisation of national subsidies, import solutions, greater state

:03:29. > :03:35.support to enterprises to make up for sanctions. This is a problem

:03:36. > :03:38.because it tends to separate the Russian political economy from the

:03:39. > :03:45.European political economy in a big way so that the EU idea of

:03:46. > :03:49.constructive relationship with Moscow, which would create

:03:50. > :03:57.stability, security and prosperity between the borders is really pretty

:03:58. > :04:01.much content end now. That is not an argument for getting rid of

:04:02. > :04:07.sanctions immediately. It is an argument for the EU and Russia,

:04:08. > :04:16.Western member states as well, to sit down and tried to see what can

:04:17. > :04:21.we do year? Ultimately, we need to come back to the fact that there

:04:22. > :04:25.seems to be nobody to talk to in Moscow. They have to try to find

:04:26. > :04:32.somebody. If the Russians are unwilling to talk, there may have to

:04:33. > :04:35.prolong the sanctions. It is not the politicians who suffer, it is the

:04:36. > :04:41.producers hear it in the United Kingdom. I could give you a lot of

:04:42. > :04:47.examples, from Shropshire, we have taken a lot of delegations to Russia

:04:48. > :04:51.in the past and built-up relationships with daily products,

:04:52. > :04:57.all of that has been washed down the drain. The dairy industry is in

:04:58. > :05:02.crisis at the moment. Can be compartmentalised this between

:05:03. > :05:07.implementation of the agreement and the separate issue which is crime

:05:08. > :05:13.year? I have been to Crimea on a number of occasions and can tell you

:05:14. > :05:19.without fear of contradiction, I do not believe the Russians will ever

:05:20. > :05:24.give up Crimea. I agree. The purpose of sanctions is to do something

:05:25. > :05:32.tangible. The Russians are never going to give up Crimea so what is

:05:33. > :05:37.the point of having sanctions. I take your point. I agree with that.

:05:38. > :05:41.Even if we disregard their nationalist narrative, the Russians

:05:42. > :05:47.have annexed Crimea and there is nothing we can do about it. Whether

:05:48. > :05:58.there can be a longer term agreement on how to Ukraine and Russia could,

:05:59. > :06:04.if you like, revive some kind of approach to Crimea which will allow

:06:05. > :06:11.some kind of shared influence. I cannot actually see a wee out of it.

:06:12. > :06:15.If Europe is going to link the end of sanctions exclusively to the

:06:16. > :06:24.Crimean situation, we are in prolong hole. I cannot see a wee out of it.

:06:25. > :06:30.At the time of the Crimea crisis, we warned about this issue and I am

:06:31. > :06:33.glad you agree with me that the prospect of convincing the Russians

:06:34. > :06:40.to change their policy on Crimea is futile. I will give way.

:06:41. > :06:49.That is confirmation that Russia is basically torn up the Helsinki

:06:50. > :06:54.agreements that Russia believes enforceable change to the borders of

:06:55. > :06:58.Europe because of that is the position, what is the point of

:06:59. > :07:06.having agreements of any kind with Russia if Russia breaches? The

:07:07. > :07:11.Russians have come out with quasi legal arguments. Fundamentally the

:07:12. > :07:21.region who the borders. They would refer back to Kosovo. The UK did not

:07:22. > :07:25.accept the annexation by the Soviet Union of Estonia, Latvia and

:07:26. > :07:33.Lithuania. We still had embassies in London. Why should we accept the

:07:34. > :07:38.annexation of Crimea? It may take 100 years but ultimately the

:07:39. > :07:44.Estonians and Latvians are now independent. I am not suggesting we

:07:45. > :07:48.should accept it but I am suggesting if we use this as a primary

:07:49. > :07:54.instrument to try and change Russian minds... I ensure Russian minds will

:07:55. > :07:59.not be changed now. There might be a completely different regime in 50

:08:00. > :08:03.years' time and then people can have self-determination rather than being

:08:04. > :08:11.taken over. Which is really what I was trying to say... We need to keep

:08:12. > :08:20.on talking about it and trying to find ways to share this. We are

:08:21. > :08:29.meant to be taking evidence... Can I get back to the question? On the

:08:30. > :08:34.issue of sanctions, is it your understanding and I have been

:08:35. > :08:37.hearing anecdotal evidence of polling by Western organisations in

:08:38. > :08:42.crime year but is it your understanding that although they did

:08:43. > :08:46.their referendum differently to the way we would've done it, that the

:08:47. > :08:53.people of Crimea consider themselves to be part of Russia and under

:08:54. > :08:58.normal circumstances, conducting a referendum as we would do it, is it

:08:59. > :09:05.your analysis that they would vote to remain part of Russia, yes or no?

:09:06. > :09:10.I think the problem is you have a lot of minorities. You might get a

:09:11. > :09:14.majority vote in a free and fair referendum but that could be seen in

:09:15. > :09:21.the immediate reform era of rejoining Russia. Crimea is not in

:09:22. > :09:27.the greatest economic sheep. What will Russia do in the future then?

:09:28. > :09:33.-- economic sheep. Can Russia continue to subsidise another drain

:09:34. > :09:42.on the Russian economy? We have a similar situation in another region

:09:43. > :09:50.were Russia now has these strategic treaties with these two regions

:09:51. > :09:57.which ties them into subsidising, to effectively making them part, like a

:09:58. > :10:02.creeping annexation and making them part of Russia. Russia has a

:10:03. > :10:06.responsibility for the regions now. Russia cannot do that kind of thing

:10:07. > :10:09.in Death Valley especially if you get a situation where the economy

:10:10. > :10:18.really does begin to suffer. In four years' time we might be

:10:19. > :10:24.having a different conversation. Maybe Crimea suffers... If the

:10:25. > :10:28.situation changed, as I think it may well do in the next two, three, four

:10:29. > :10:37.years and Russia was prepared to come back and talk with Europe.,

:10:38. > :10:43.Moore constructively about European security, the memorandum on conflict

:10:44. > :10:47.resolution and other security and trade issues, we might in three or

:10:48. > :10:54.four years' time be looking at a different situation. I think it is

:10:55. > :11:03.in Russia's interests to again begin to engage with Europe. I'm probably

:11:04. > :11:07.against 98% of expert opinion... CROSSTALK.

:11:08. > :11:14.The title is the United Kingdom relations with Russia. I suspect I

:11:15. > :11:18.will trespass on the patient of my colleagues if I continue to tap your

:11:19. > :11:20.enthusiasm, we could go on all night. The session has been

:11:21. > :11:25.fascinating in terms of setting out the background. I want to turn

:11:26. > :11:33.attention to British Russian relations. Doctor Monaghan, I can

:11:34. > :11:37.see... A small footnote. We should be careful about assuming there

:11:38. > :11:39.might be a self-determination referendum in Bynea, not every

:11:40. > :11:44.government is given to holding regular referenda. It would be very

:11:45. > :11:51.unlikely that the Russian leadership at the moment which decided to offer

:11:52. > :11:56.a referendum on that in the Crimea. It is worth pointing out, since you

:11:57. > :11:59.asked the question about sanctions, first, I think there is ample

:12:00. > :12:03.evidence to suggest they are being circumvented by second, ample

:12:04. > :12:06.evidence to suggest import substitution is taking place,

:12:07. > :12:08.therefore, it is weakening the impact for future potential

:12:09. > :12:13.sanctions and therefore the tools for dealing with Russia perhaps.

:12:14. > :12:16.Third, it is viewed in Moscow as part of economic warfare. I'm sure

:12:17. > :12:22.you are all aware we are at economic war with Russia: that is what Moscow

:12:23. > :12:27.thinks. It's worth bearing in mind, what is it we want to achieve with

:12:28. > :12:29.sanctions? Is it to reverse Russian policy in Ukraine, punish them for

:12:30. > :12:36.it, deter them from doing anything else? It is somewhat unclear to me.

:12:37. > :12:40.Finally it's worth planning, I think, for a post sections era,

:12:41. > :12:47.because I think unity across Europe has been impressive, has been

:12:48. > :12:50.probably beyond many people's expectations, but it is also clear,

:12:51. > :12:55.as you've indicated, there are plenty of people across Europe, not

:12:56. > :12:59.only fans, but other member states of the European Union, not happy

:13:00. > :13:04.with the sanctions regime. Even if it's not this year, next year, maybe

:13:05. > :13:10.we'll see something else. It's worth starting to think about what a

:13:11. > :13:14.post-sanctions environment would be like, over in the European Union and

:13:15. > :13:18.for the UK nationally because I think that is where we'll be in a

:13:19. > :13:21.couple of years' time. Already starting to think in those times

:13:22. > :13:26.will begin to shift where we are going, which hopefully leads us on

:13:27. > :13:27.to the boys about UK- Russia relations. Thank you for your

:13:28. > :13:40.indulgence. A few quick questions. I'm happy to

:13:41. > :13:48.be here most of the evening, this session is fascinating. Honestly, I

:13:49. > :13:52.promise not to take long. Seeking clarification. Can I just start by

:13:53. > :13:59.saying I agree with virtually everything you've said, I think that

:14:00. > :14:05.myself... We can express our opinions in the report we write.

:14:06. > :14:09.It's the opinions of the witnesses we are seeking. I have three quick

:14:10. > :14:17.questions, the chair asked a question about the fact that the

:14:18. > :14:24.Russians are not sharing some of our norms... You gave an explanation as

:14:25. > :14:27.to how that happened. The opinion that you tell us what is happening

:14:28. > :14:34.in Russia, are the ordinary people in Russia acting with their

:14:35. > :14:36.government's policy on these issues or is there variation between what

:14:37. > :14:42.the political classes and the ruling classes think about how we approach

:14:43. > :14:48.international affairs, and different to what the ordinary people

:14:49. > :14:55.approach? Are they synced or is their separation of opinion? I think

:14:56. > :15:00.Putin has pretty much broad support. Whenever there are elections people

:15:01. > :15:07.say elections are not free and fair. There is monopolisation of the media

:15:08. > :15:12.etc, it's a problem, if not, outright gerrymandering. Putin would

:15:13. > :15:20.have a pretty healthy majority. He has been seen as delivering on two

:15:21. > :15:26.key things that a government has to deliver on, security and welfare.

:15:27. > :15:31.The emphasis more on security at the moment. Even their welfare is taking

:15:32. > :15:34.a knock because of low oil prices, which, by the way, are much more

:15:35. > :15:40.detrimental to the Russian economy than sanctions... But the twin

:15:41. > :15:43.impact of low oil prices and sanctions, there is still a

:15:44. > :15:54.reasonable amount of support. Some of that is perhaps artificially, if

:15:55. > :15:58.you like, supported or... By the government, in the sense that the

:15:59. > :16:02.government does obviously have a lot of influence over the media. Without

:16:03. > :16:04.a doubt thereof edgily no independent newspapers, television

:16:05. > :16:17.is just a kind of drip feed of atrial text of. -- of patriotic

:16:18. > :16:21.stuff. The low socio- economic groups... Compares with the 1880s

:16:22. > :16:25.and 1990s, this is still a very stable period for them. Among

:16:26. > :16:29.younger people, we were chatting about this before we came in, the

:16:30. > :16:33.thought might be that the younger generation would be, you know, more

:16:34. > :16:36.liberal and open. It's not necessarily the case, the younger

:16:37. > :16:43.generation probably does understand more about the outside world and

:16:44. > :16:48.Europe, but there is still a strong patriotically among them. They

:16:49. > :16:54.believe in Russia. If the West continues to query the Ligist Missy

:16:55. > :17:01.of Putin, I mean, for me it's always the wrong thing to do, Putin is a

:17:02. > :17:10.popular leader. Second question... On British - Russian relations?

:17:11. > :17:17.Yeah. Can I? Can I add a footnote? The next question I wanted to ask

:17:18. > :17:21.is, this is just too... From what you've said... It's not the case

:17:22. > :17:26.that our Foreign Office or senior politicians in the UK or the rest of

:17:27. > :17:29.the world... It's not the case they don't know, it's just they are not

:17:30. > :17:32.interested in knowing because they have their own policies that they

:17:33. > :17:41.want to pursue? We're covering that later. This deliberate invading

:17:42. > :17:44.of... Not recognising that information, about it being passed

:17:45. > :17:49.up, but people at the top are rejecting it? There is a strong

:17:50. > :17:52.degree of mirror imaging, the British leadership and many others

:17:53. > :17:56.in Western Europe and the United States perhaps as well, think, we

:17:57. > :18:00.wouldn't do that, therefore the Russians won't do that. The fact

:18:01. > :18:03.they've come to the decision with different evidence, different

:18:04. > :18:08.understanding of the evidence, means we tend to get it wrong. If I might

:18:09. > :18:14.answer your first point, three points I would make quite quickly,

:18:15. > :18:18.first, Putin tends to work very hard on acknowledging what it is the

:18:19. > :18:20.Russian population wants and responding to the Russian

:18:21. > :18:24.population. A very good example is the direct line twice a year when he

:18:25. > :18:28.holds an afternoon session and people can call in. Yes, we can say

:18:29. > :18:32.it's stage-managed, but actually things happen as a result. Even

:18:33. > :18:34.during the conversation we have people being arrested and so on this

:18:35. > :18:40.year, things being fixed, implementation. He does focus on

:18:41. > :18:47.what the population wants. Second, he tends to work in terms of

:18:48. > :18:50.specific concrete ideas such as financial support from economic

:18:51. > :18:54.questions, that kind of thing, whereas the opposition tends to work

:18:55. > :18:59.in terms of human rights and values, that's not what gains a lot of

:19:00. > :19:02.traction. Third, Mr Putin is supported but he is also busy

:19:03. > :19:10.learning how to mobilise his own population in support of him. Ever

:19:11. > :19:13.since the 2004-2005, the Russian leadership is learning how to put

:19:14. > :19:16.people on the street and it's worth noting the largest demonstration

:19:17. > :19:21.since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been pro-Putin once.

:19:22. > :19:25.There is an election later this year, it's worth pointing out there

:19:26. > :19:29.is a distinction between Mr Putin, who is popular, and the United

:19:30. > :19:35.Russia party, the main parliamentary party, which is substantially less

:19:36. > :19:38.popular. And I think it's a point you could explore. If you push this

:19:39. > :19:44.point of the gap between the leadership on the relation it would

:19:45. > :19:48.be understanding in Russian terms as the British, talking about the

:19:49. > :19:52.possibility for regime change in Russia. It's a reasonable question,

:19:53. > :19:55.sitting in London, but the signal received in Moscow would be, they

:19:56. > :20:01.are looking for a gap between the leadership and the population. Be

:20:02. > :20:10.aware of the translation of the signal. On the Litvinenko report,

:20:11. > :20:19.what has been the impact of the Litvinenko affair and the report on

:20:20. > :20:23.UK- Russia relations? I think Andrew would probably be the better want to

:20:24. > :20:29.talk about this at great length, but it didn't do us any favours, put it

:20:30. > :20:33.that way. Particularly, I mean, it took along time for the final to

:20:34. > :20:42.come out, particularly I think those last 18 little words in which the

:20:43. > :20:47.view of the writer of the report was that Putin probably knew about and

:20:48. > :20:54.approved the killing of Litvinenko. It's a serious thing, for a

:20:55. > :20:57.government to execute foreign nationals, effectively, on the

:20:58. > :21:02.streets of foreign country, is something which I don't think we can

:21:03. > :21:07.in anyway... We have to talk to them about that. Inevitably, eventually,

:21:08. > :21:16.we'll have too... Do you agree with the common? -- koruna. Sir Robert

:21:17. > :21:22.Owen? I've got a lot of the questions about the whole Litvinenko

:21:23. > :21:28.affair. -- with the coroner. Why did he meet these two characters twice

:21:29. > :21:33.cost what were they talking about? Do you think his basic conclusion

:21:34. > :21:37.was correct, the coroner? I'm not 100% sure. The right of the report

:21:38. > :21:45.was careful 100% sure that Putin sat down and

:21:46. > :21:48.signed a thing stating, we will eliminate Litvinenko. The reason I

:21:49. > :21:54.say that is because the FSB has become a kind of almost law unto

:21:55. > :22:03.itself, semi-privatised party of the security agencies, slightly out of

:22:04. > :22:09.control. Plenty of people will disagree with that. Really? The

:22:10. > :22:13.security services are out of control? I don't think necessarily

:22:14. > :22:19.some of the things that go on, some of the score settling that takes

:22:20. > :22:23.place in current and former FSB, is all sentient by the leadership. I

:22:24. > :22:29.probably will be in a minority and I will like you completely trashed...

:22:30. > :22:33.Not at all. It's worth remembering this is a decade-old question, he

:22:34. > :22:38.was murdered in 2006 so all the responses you see now, don't forget

:22:39. > :22:42.what took place in 2006-2007, the end of the partnership in certain

:22:43. > :22:45.areas that was quite successful, intelligence and Security particular

:22:46. > :22:50.are the very good example, once the murder took place and there was this

:22:51. > :22:54.flawed co-operation if one can call it that, the contention between the

:22:55. > :22:59.sides, actually the British response was forthright. Yes, one can

:23:00. > :23:05.criticise it from outside. If the more we can say not enough was done.

:23:06. > :23:12.But there were attempts to try to address the relationship. The

:23:13. > :23:16.relationship has never recovered since. The Litvinenko affair has

:23:17. > :23:19.been a repeating iceberg for the relationship whereby each time we've

:23:20. > :23:24.tried to resuscitate the relationship it has hit the

:23:25. > :23:28.Litvinenko iceberg and sank. The relationship has worked

:23:29. > :23:33.economically, but politically has hardly got off the ground again

:23:34. > :23:38.since 2006-7. I would say that is a substantial effect and it keeps

:23:39. > :23:43.coming back to affect policy and attempt to revitalise the

:23:44. > :23:45.relationship. Do you think it was because our government responded

:23:46. > :23:49.appropriately and therefore the Russians didn't like that or is it

:23:50. > :23:52.that we didn't respond appropriately? Do you think what we

:23:53. > :23:53.did was appropriate and, if not, could it have done things

:23:54. > :24:03.differently? Teams went to Russia to purse to the

:24:04. > :24:08.evidence and other actions and policies were put into play. There

:24:09. > :24:14.are limitations to what can be done, the Russians would not extradite him

:24:15. > :24:21.and sent back so the UK government could continue to demand and it

:24:22. > :24:25.would be rejected. Subsequently, there have been difficulties in

:24:26. > :24:30.establishing quite what has taken place in public. You ask but not all

:24:31. > :24:37.of the evidence was made public so it is difficult to see whether one

:24:38. > :24:42.agrees with the coroner or not because we no decisions were taken

:24:43. > :24:47.in private. I have read the report and looks convincing, it is a shame

:24:48. > :24:56.the word probably was used because it became politically chalked right

:24:57. > :25:00.away by the Russians. Probably, what does this mean was the

:25:01. > :25:06.counterattack. There are things which could have been done better in

:25:07. > :25:13.delivering the message. After that there were also cases where the

:25:14. > :25:18.British ambassador and UK journalists have been harassed in

:25:19. > :25:24.Moscow. There has been a little bit of a campaign against UK figures. I

:25:25. > :25:31.do not know how far that has gone but certainly it has left a very

:25:32. > :25:38.unpleasant taste in the mouth as filers UK- Russia relations are

:25:39. > :25:43.concerned. If I understand correctly, their harassment of

:25:44. > :25:48.Ambassador Brenton, I do not wish to overstate it was due to him turning

:25:49. > :25:53.up to opposition meetings. But a lot of this became bound up in the

:25:54. > :25:58.relationship, there was a spy scandal, concern about the British

:25:59. > :26:02.Council, pressure on the British Council and pressure on Ambassador

:26:03. > :26:07.Brenton, disagreement over governance of Chechnya and many

:26:08. > :26:11.other issues. In many ways, the murder of Litvinenko was part of a

:26:12. > :26:19.fairly substantial collapse in relations between early 2006 and

:26:20. > :26:28.although we to the rational Georgian conflict. I was working with

:26:29. > :26:31.Margaret Beckett in the Foreign Office when she was Foreign

:26:32. > :26:38.Secretary when this happened, but certainly I agree with Dr Mona

:26:39. > :26:46.El-Farra on these matters. The thing which struck me on that point was

:26:47. > :26:52.how long it has taken for this report to finally come out. That is

:26:53. > :27:01.my first concern. When it finally did come out, the timing was

:27:02. > :27:11.interesting I thought. Secondly, you mentioned the harassment of someone

:27:12. > :27:17.at the British Council, rather than show any form of contrition or

:27:18. > :27:21.regret, even if not accepting responsibility, the Russian state

:27:22. > :27:27.went in the opposite direction and try to cause problems. Do you not

:27:28. > :27:32.feel the Russian government could handle this differently and the

:27:33. > :27:38.situation of coldness between us would not be as bad as it is? I

:27:39. > :27:44.think both sides could have handled it differently with the benefit of

:27:45. > :27:48.hindsight. I am not sure that necessarily it would be wise to have

:27:49. > :27:55.expected the Russians to have acted differently or more sympathetically.

:27:56. > :28:01.I would not as soon that they will necessarily handle similar instances

:28:02. > :28:06.sympathetically in the future. -- assurance. It would be nice to

:28:07. > :28:17.assure them that both governments would go back that the deterioration

:28:18. > :28:22.of relations would be avoided. Pressure on the British Council and

:28:23. > :28:26.Ambassador Brenton, the spy scandal, this all happened together, within

:28:27. > :28:33.the space of a year or two, plus the disagreement about governance of

:28:34. > :28:41.check year and so on. This was not just about Litvinenko. In how many

:28:42. > :28:47.countries do you think Russia has allegedly carried out an operation

:28:48. > :28:52.similar to the Litvinenko exercise, where they eliminated their

:28:53. > :28:57.perceived opponents? I think there have been several cases in Europe.

:28:58. > :29:01.In the Gulf. It is not entirely certain where the Russian

:29:02. > :29:06.government's actions begin. Some of them have been a result of the

:29:07. > :29:09.Chechen president. It is a marquee areas. Somebody is probably written

:29:10. > :29:15.something interesting about it, I am not sure. How exceptional was

:29:16. > :29:20.Litvinenko? That up obviously been accusations other opponents have

:29:21. > :29:27.copped it. There was the killing of Mr Yandarbiyev in the Gulf. People

:29:28. > :29:32.were arrested and imprisoned for that. I would also see Kata Mara, at

:29:33. > :29:38.a guess but I would have to look that up. Russian Mr Yandarbiyev

:29:39. > :29:42.agents were arrested for the killing of. There have also been killing in

:29:43. > :29:48.other European states such as Austria. This is all alleged,

:29:49. > :29:56.naturally, and subject to process of court. Also these things are

:29:57. > :30:01.sometimes quite difficult to prove. How many other towns have any of

:30:02. > :30:09.these people been given immunity by being put on Putin's party's list

:30:10. > :30:21.and elected to the Duma? Please do proceed a case of -- do follow the

:30:22. > :30:24.case of Mr Yandarbiyev. I think you'll find it informative because

:30:25. > :30:29.my understanding is that the Russian leadership lobbied for the release

:30:30. > :30:35.of the two agency wearing prison and allegedly, they were decorated when

:30:36. > :30:43.they returned. So he was promoted to the Duma, that is the point I'm

:30:44. > :30:48.making. It is kind of thumbing their noses, I think. Can I get you back

:30:49. > :30:51.to your earlier and sewers to the chairman about the lack of

:30:52. > :30:55.understanding year of Russia's internal position? What is your

:30:56. > :30:59.assessment of the vulnerability of the Russian economy and the Russian

:31:00. > :31:05.State? Do you think your assessment would be shared by the foreign and

:31:06. > :31:13.Commonwealth office? I think they probably would. Some of the best

:31:14. > :31:18.political economists, including a former colleague of mine, Phil

:31:19. > :31:24.Hansen, has written a series of papers. A current colleague, Richard

:31:25. > :31:30.Connelly, I would recommend you read his papers as well. They seem to be

:31:31. > :31:35.united in the opinion that the Russian economy can continue for

:31:36. > :31:41.quite a long period, it will not completely implode, but as time goes

:31:42. > :31:53.on, the potential for modernisation and re-injecting dynamism into the

:31:54. > :32:01.economy is receding. Be specific on this. Given the fall in the gas and

:32:02. > :32:06.oil prices, in the revenue of the state and in the GDP, and the

:32:07. > :32:10.abysmal public health and declining population or at least lowlife

:32:11. > :32:16.expectancy, young people trying to call, and all the elite putting

:32:17. > :32:22.their assets into properties in London and elsewhere, is this kind

:32:23. > :32:30.of colony going to have any future except as a producer of raw

:32:31. > :32:34.materials for China? I think it is something the Putin government is

:32:35. > :32:39.well aware of, structural reform is needed. They have liberal

:32:40. > :32:43.economists. The former finance minister is now putting together

:32:44. > :32:47.some kind of strategic economic plan and he is well-known as a liberal

:32:48. > :32:51.economist. The problem is fundamentally political and that is

:32:52. > :32:55.whether Putin and the people who really make the decisions are

:32:56. > :33:03.prepared to tinker with the system of political economy which is beset

:33:04. > :33:08.by corruption and inefficiency. I be prepared to do something fundamental

:33:09. > :33:13.to change that? Resigns to date are that they talk about it a lot and

:33:14. > :33:17.tinker around the edges, but there is not the will to take it all in.

:33:18. > :33:22.There is potential for some kind of reform but at the moment, the

:33:23. > :33:29.current governing elite is not prepared to go down that route. I

:33:30. > :33:34.would only partly agree. My first question would be, vulnerability to

:33:35. > :33:39.what, if I was Russian I would ask, what vulnerability and to whom? You

:33:40. > :33:46.mention the fall in goal and gas prices. Generally they are using

:33:47. > :33:51.their way up. We do not know what the situation will be an 18 month.

:33:52. > :33:55.You mention the decline in population, that is true but has

:33:56. > :34:00.stabilised in the last three up to four years. It will decline in the

:34:01. > :34:03.next decade or so but behind the United States, Russia is the second

:34:04. > :34:10.highest immigration state in the world. Do not forget 5 million

:34:11. > :34:14.ethnic Russians have migrated to Russia from Ukraine saw the

:34:15. > :34:17.population has stabilised. I offer this as Food For Thought, no one is

:34:18. > :34:24.saying the Russian economy is in rude health. There is obsolescence

:34:25. > :34:28.throughout industry, serious problems, decrepit infrastructure

:34:29. > :34:33.and so on but do not bank on the economy just continuing in decline.

:34:34. > :34:41.It may be the case but if the oil price goes up, it will be refloated.

:34:42. > :34:45.What we see is that the Russian leadership understands the problems

:34:46. > :34:50.in the Russian state rather well. It may not see reforms in the same way

:34:51. > :34:57.as we do, implementing liberal reform, but we what we do see is

:34:58. > :35:01.emergency measures to improve efficiency, salt filings of quite

:35:02. > :35:10.senior people because they have not been effective in their positions,

:35:11. > :35:15.attempts to conduct waste management because there are issues raised in

:35:16. > :35:19.the Russian economy, to try and find extra money and a little bit of

:35:20. > :35:26.sequestration which is taking place in the military also. There is a

:35:27. > :35:29.series effort at the moment to put the economy on a mobilisation

:35:30. > :35:34.fitting, which is tantamount to providing serious support for the

:35:35. > :35:39.hydrocarbon sector but also using the defence industry as a locomotive

:35:40. > :35:45.for growth. That is not the kind of reform we would call capital are

:35:46. > :35:56.reform but it is still our version of small reforms.

:35:57. > :36:04.So that is the old Leninist model? I would agree with that. It is not a

:36:05. > :36:09.Soviet economy but it is not centralised in the same way. It uses

:36:10. > :36:16.the defence industry as a locomotive which is stated policy, import

:36:17. > :36:20.subsidisation and that kind of thing. This is a country that is

:36:21. > :36:26.moving to protect its economy and to be able to conduct an independent

:36:27. > :36:32.and stable policy. We are just add... Now, we have to try and get

:36:33. > :36:36.through this. I have given myself an artificial target of seven o'clock

:36:37. > :36:49.otherwise I'm going to lose the patience of my colleagues. To pick

:36:50. > :36:52.up on your view of whether the UK has the right to take a relatively

:36:53. > :36:56.tough stance towards Russia, there was an interview with the top

:36:57. > :37:01.commander of US and allied forces in Europe in which he talked about the

:37:02. > :37:04.intelligence being effectively affixed commodity and Fred time the

:37:05. > :37:11.tactical focus was on the Middle East, Iraq one and two, Afghanistan

:37:12. > :37:16.and terrorism and counterterrorism and only really strategically on

:37:17. > :37:20.Russia, namely the nuclear issue. He talked about Russia moving on from

:37:21. > :37:25.not accepting the hand of partnership towards that the legend

:37:26. > :37:31.stands so my question is, is the refocusing of intelligence assets

:37:32. > :37:36.beginning to deliver? The general still thinks there is a way to go,

:37:37. > :37:41.but there has been a re-focusing. Have we refocused our own

:37:42. > :37:45.intelligence assets well enough to begin to understand better and

:37:46. > :37:55.analyse what is happening, and what could happen in Russia? Is the

:37:56. > :37:59.language of belligerence the right language, and I are right to take

:38:00. > :38:08.this relatively tough stance towards Russia? Was the commander talking

:38:09. > :38:17.about US intelligence or... ? He was talking as commander. Use the deputy

:38:18. > :38:23.commander of Nato. He is not the deputy. If the refocusing beginning

:38:24. > :38:28.to deliver? I am slightly sceptical. From my position, there are certain

:38:29. > :38:33.boxes being ticked but I do not see any great shift of resources

:38:34. > :38:37.dedicated to this question. Yes, it is taking place somewhat invariable

:38:38. > :38:43.terms but in terms of real financial resources or equipment resources, it

:38:44. > :38:50.is not. There is a certain danger about refocusing. Having not paid

:38:51. > :38:54.attention for the last 25 years, we are now over reacting to a surprise

:38:55. > :38:59.which I think makes a very open to confusion. People are now talking

:39:00. > :39:02.about only specific aspects of Russia. On the language of

:39:03. > :39:08.belligerence and toss stands, if you want your belligerent language from

:39:09. > :39:11.the Russians, please feel free to use belligerent language because the

:39:12. > :39:15.Russians will not step back and return to the sympathetic response

:39:16. > :39:19.we mentioned earlier. Tough language will be met with tough language. As

:39:20. > :39:23.we build towards Warsaw I think you will see plenty of that coming

:39:24. > :39:30.through. If Nato says they are going to enlarge the Alliance Colin --

:39:31. > :39:34.Alliance, develop the rapid readiness action plan and so on, the

:39:35. > :39:39.Russians will reciprocate. They will remind us that Russia is a nuclear

:39:40. > :39:48.state as they have done in the past. The question is not about the

:39:49. > :39:51.language of belligerence and toss stands, it is working out where we

:39:52. > :39:55.want to go with the Russians and then starting to admit a policy that

:39:56. > :40:01.will lead us to that. If we see the Russians are not being nice and we

:40:02. > :40:05.disagree with them, good luck, that will not take us anywhere. It will

:40:06. > :40:08.leave us in an unprepared position for dealing with some of the

:40:09. > :40:10.challenges and disagreements we undoubtably have with the Russians

:40:11. > :40:37.both at European I see you. I will take as support.

:40:38. > :40:40.Despite all of the rhetoric following Ukraine and the Syrian

:40:41. > :40:43.crisis, I do not get the sense that the US, the UK and they some of the

:40:44. > :40:48.big European powers actually have Russia at the top of the agenda

:40:49. > :40:52.again yet. I do not get that sense. If you'd read the US national

:40:53. > :40:57.security strategy is very little on Russia. They are concerned about the

:40:58. > :41:02.middle East and Asia Pacific is potential for a lot of instability.

:41:03. > :41:07.From that that point of view, the language of belligerence, it seems

:41:08. > :41:12.to be the most baleful result of the UK and crisis has been this

:41:13. > :41:18.information war. It is not just the grandstanding of politicians, it is

:41:19. > :41:23.becoming ingrained in exchanges at the United Nations, in the OSCE

:41:24. > :41:30.where you have the Americans on one side in the OSCE supporting the

:41:31. > :41:40.Ukraine. It is mudslinging all the time. The United Kingdom were not

:41:41. > :41:46.part of the Memphis talks, we are not part of the Normandy for and yet

:41:47. > :41:53.people are telling us and I believe that the United Kingdom is the most

:41:54. > :41:57.vocal critical country of Russia and hostile with them. The Foreign

:41:58. > :42:02.Secretary was challenged on this by the MP for Birmingham when she asked

:42:03. > :42:08.are you going to be talking to Mr lover of on the phone and he said

:42:09. > :42:14.there is not much point because my conversations with them are never

:42:15. > :42:16.very fruitful. Do you think that our own Foreign Secretary and our own

:42:17. > :42:20.Prime Minister ought to be doing more to engage with the Russian

:42:21. > :42:29.government, such as the Germans are doing? We have lost something over

:42:30. > :42:34.the last ten or 15 years. It is important for Britain in the same

:42:35. > :42:42.way it is for us to Act with Russia's international institutions.

:42:43. > :42:49.There is still no real substitute for the those kind of political

:42:50. > :42:53.bilateral relationships which can sometimes come if not lead to a

:42:54. > :43:05.complete meeting of minds, that is how diplomacy is done, then I think

:43:06. > :43:12.the UK, we have had problems with trade and the Litvinenko situation,

:43:13. > :43:15.probably nothing that other countries have experienced. We have

:43:16. > :43:20.lost sight of Russia. Russia has been weighed down the policy agenda

:43:21. > :43:30.for Britain over the last 15 or 20 years. How we recover that is

:43:31. > :43:33.difficult. You need a senior member of the diplomatic corps could be in

:43:34. > :43:44.Russia. Someone who understands the country. We need to continue to put

:43:45. > :43:51.that effort in. To do more to engage with the Russians, I am not sure the

:43:52. > :43:54.comparisons with the Germans is necessarily right. The Germans had a

:43:55. > :44:00.much larger relationship with the Russians than we did until the

:44:01. > :44:05.sanctions. German business dealing in Russia was a very substantial.

:44:06. > :44:09.Before we start to engage with the Russians, we have to work out what

:44:10. > :44:14.we want from the Russians and what the Russians might want from us.

:44:15. > :44:23.There is no point in going to Moscow saying we want this review

:44:24. > :44:26.the Russians will say we want back. What do Russian policymakers, how

:44:27. > :44:36.did they proceed Britain and our policies? I think, I have read some

:44:37. > :44:42.stuff from the Russian Academy of sciences Institute of Europe, the

:44:43. > :44:47.British experts there, including a senior figure who has had a lot to

:44:48. > :44:53.do with Nato and the peace and security committee, they seem to see

:44:54. > :44:58.the UK not entirely verily, but there is something in there. They

:44:59. > :45:01.see us as an extension of the US. The US and UK positions are very

:45:02. > :45:08.close and the US, despite everything, is still probably, the

:45:09. > :45:13.Russian attitude to them is more negative than European countries.

:45:14. > :45:20.From that point of view, we are not seeing... We are seen as a country

:45:21. > :45:24.like the US. We were always prone to come if not bellicose rhetoric

:45:25. > :45:31.toward Russia, then a critical attitude, for reasons we have

:45:32. > :45:39.explored. Britain is not seen as a likely serious primary partner for

:45:40. > :45:43.Russia. That is the feeling I get. We are seen in the Russian

:45:44. > :45:47.Federation as part of the Anglo-Saxon world and therefore part

:45:48. > :45:53.of a warned that is in decline, in strategic decline. At the same time

:45:54. > :45:59.there are surprises when the UK cut back its military forces as it did

:46:00. > :46:06.after 2010. There is astonishment at this. Why would we do that? Again,

:46:07. > :46:11.it is worth emphasising that the Russians often point to the British

:46:12. > :46:17.when it comes to questions of regime change and the use of soft power and

:46:18. > :46:22.colour revolutions. That is one element. There is an ambiguity to be

:46:23. > :46:27.stated here. It returns to the question of state and official

:46:28. > :46:32.policy, which is outlined in those terms, but in the population there

:46:33. > :46:35.is an ambiguity to this. There is sympathy for British culture,

:46:36. > :46:42.literature, the British way of doing things at a societal level. That

:46:43. > :46:47.doesn't mean they want to be like us, that doesn't mean they want to

:46:48. > :46:51.do what we want them to do, it just means there are certain affinities,

:46:52. > :46:56.cultural affinities, personal affinities, that kind of thing, as

:46:57. > :47:01.well as business affinities. There are certain things that happened

:47:02. > :47:05.beyond the state relationship stop the state relationship is a cautious

:47:06. > :47:11.one from Moscow. Cautious and not very favourable. It has been a

:47:12. > :47:17.really excellent session. Thank you very much. The meeting is now