Iraq Inquiry Committee

:00:00. > :00:00.go to the liaison is committee, where Jack Chilcot will givd his

:00:00. > :00:16.report. I will give you a moment to get your

:00:17. > :00:23.papers out. Thank you. Thank you very much for coming to see us this

:00:24. > :00:29.afternoon, Sir John. This is a very important subject, one of the most

:00:30. > :00:32.important, perhaps the most important inquiry that has been

:00:33. > :00:37.undertaken for a very long time in this country. It has caused great

:00:38. > :00:46.distress to families of those that were killed and wounded. Thd Iraq

:00:47. > :00:51.invasion was of great cost to the country and many feel that the cost

:00:52. > :01:01.is still being born now. It has taken a long time for you to get to,

:01:02. > :01:05.as you see it, the bottom of what happened and why. That is why we're

:01:06. > :01:08.here today. It is possible that other select committees may want to

:01:09. > :01:17.call you, subsequently. The first instance that you have here, some of

:01:18. > :01:24.the main committees for whol this is a particular interest in thd term of

:01:25. > :01:31.their chairman. I would likd to start by looking in some detail at

:01:32. > :01:36.your public statement of thd 6th of July, the time of the launch of the

:01:37. > :01:44.report, which, whatever your terms of reference may be, I thought went

:01:45. > :01:51.right to the heart of the m`tter at the start. It said, and this is the

:01:52. > :01:56.first line, that the question for the inquiry was whether it was right

:01:57. > :02:04.and necessary to invade Irap in 2003. It might be helpful if we just

:02:05. > :02:17.concentrate on the necessarx, rather than the right, as a ethical and

:02:18. > :02:26.legal aspect. In your view, did we need to go to war to protect Britain

:02:27. > :02:30.from an imminent threat? Not in March 2003, is my shortest possible

:02:31. > :02:38.answer. OK. Therefore, the next question must be, was the evidence

:02:39. > :02:46.in front of Tony Blair at that time, which should have told him he did

:02:47. > :02:49.not need to go to war at th`t time? What was, I think, clear from the

:02:50. > :02:57.evidence we have seen, the dvidence we have taken, was that, in March

:02:58. > :03:04.2003, there was no imminent threat to British citizens or, indded,

:03:05. > :03:09.Britain itself from Saddam 's regime in Iraq. Was a reasonable for Tony

:03:10. > :03:12.Blair to conclude that therd was an imminent threat? It would bd

:03:13. > :03:19.difficult to base that on h`rd evidence. It is perfectly true that

:03:20. > :03:24.he received a deal of advicd, particularly from the intelligence

:03:25. > :03:29.community, that the situation regarding Saddam's weapons of mass

:03:30. > :03:36.destruction was much more of a threat, much more imminent, much

:03:37. > :03:40.more serious than proved to be the case after the event. But you have

:03:41. > :03:46.looked at that evidence in detail, and you have just told me, H thought

:03:47. > :03:52.that you had concluded that evidence showed there was not an immhnent

:03:53. > :04:00.threat? Even put at its highest the threat could not be shown to be

:04:01. > :04:06.imminent, in the sense of ntclear, biological or chemical... In the

:04:07. > :04:17.sense that it is usually understood by the Tim, in international

:04:18. > :04:21.practice? Correct. That it hs commonly accepted in intern`tional

:04:22. > :04:28.law and studies of internathonal relations? What seems to me clear

:04:29. > :04:33.from the evidence is that any threat was in the future, not imminent and

:04:34. > :04:39.not directly against the Unhted Kingdom and its people. That is

:04:40. > :04:44.about as far as I think the evidence takes you. There are many places

:04:45. > :04:50.which may pose a threat to the UK at any time. Indeed. But those threats

:04:51. > :04:54.are not imminent, it is going on all the time? That is correct. The

:04:55. > :04:58.British government, the timd, made very clear that it regarded

:04:59. > :05:05.participating in military action against Saddam's Iraq has only a

:05:06. > :05:08.last resort measure, and only after all other options had been

:05:09. > :05:14.exhausted. The question that we have to look at in the inquiry is, was

:05:15. > :05:20.this the last resort, awkward containment have been improved,

:05:21. > :05:25.sustained -- or could contahnment have been improved and sust`ined?

:05:26. > :05:30.Hard all other options been exhausted? In other words, the

:05:31. > :05:37.inspections process, had it come to a halt because of Saddam's

:05:38. > :05:41.construction? Neither of those conditions existed in March 200 and

:05:42. > :05:48.three. You made it clear it was a last resort, in the report. You used

:05:49. > :05:52.that phrase. I notice you h`ve used it again. I would like to come back

:05:53. > :05:58.to the phrase imminent thre`t. I just want to go back to the question

:05:59. > :06:02.that I asked, the evidence hn front of Tony Blair did not support the

:06:03. > :06:09.conclusion that there was an imminent threat at the time that we

:06:10. > :06:16.went to war? Indeed, he acknowledged a year later, in 2004, that he

:06:17. > :06:21.accepted that there was not an imminent threat of the sort that he

:06:22. > :06:24.was tending to describe. Th`t was a yes to that question might Hf you

:06:25. > :06:31.wish. I don't want to put words in your mouth, I wanted to get

:06:32. > :06:34.clarification. The Prime Minister should have known that, bec`use it

:06:35. > :06:40.was the information in front of him. So, when the Prime Minister said, in

:06:41. > :06:48.his speech on the 18th of M`rch the threat is present and real, it is a

:06:49. > :06:52.real and present danger to Britain's security, I am quoting, the threat

:06:53. > :06:59.is serious and current, Saddam has to be stopped, he was not, hn fact,

:07:00. > :07:04.reflecting the advice or thd information that he had in front of

:07:05. > :07:08.him, was he? He was telling the public, by all means other than

:07:09. > :07:13.those two words, imminent threat, that there was an imminent threat?

:07:14. > :07:20.In all fairness, I have to say, and it is in the report, that I believe

:07:21. > :07:23.on the 17th of March... Sorry? On the 17th of March, Tony Blahr was

:07:24. > :07:27.advised by the chairman of joint intelligence committee that Saddam

:07:28. > :07:35.did have weapons of mass destruction, the means to ddploy

:07:36. > :07:38.them and the means to produce them. If you convert that into advice that

:07:39. > :07:45.there was an imminent threat, you could just about defend it, perhaps.

:07:46. > :07:52.Are you defending it? No. You are saying that there was no imlinent

:07:53. > :07:55.threat? By all means do comd back when I complete question, btt you

:07:56. > :08:04.are saying, just to be clear, there is no imminent threat and that Tony

:08:05. > :08:13.Blair was wrong to describe this threat, effectively, as immhnent in

:08:14. > :08:22.the House on the 18th of March? I think choosing words as cardfully

:08:23. > :08:33.and are -- as sensitively as I can, it was a description to the house in

:08:34. > :08:36.that speech, a speech was m`de, putting the best possible inflection

:08:37. > :08:43.on the description that he tsed It does not take hindsight to

:08:44. > :08:46.demonstrate two propositions. One is that the whole of the intelligence

:08:47. > :08:53.community, not only in the Tnited Kingdom, were strongly of the

:08:54. > :08:59.belief, they thought they h`d sufficient intelligence to support

:09:00. > :09:03.it, that Saddam did have we`pons of mass destruction available for use.

:09:04. > :09:11.What wasn't, I think, there, was evidence that he intended to deploy

:09:12. > :09:16.them against the United Kingdom s interests. Otherwise, perhaps, as a

:09:17. > :09:21.last resort in defence of an invasion. What you are saying, as

:09:22. > :09:24.far as you can tell, that it was not reasonable for Tony Blair to suppose

:09:25. > :09:32.that there was an imminent threat based on the information in front of

:09:33. > :09:44.him? He said, and I am now puoting from his forward for the September

:09:45. > :09:54.dossier -- for word, his belief was that it was the situation. What was

:09:55. > :09:58.not said where the qualific`tions and conditions that the varhous

:09:59. > :10:02.assessments had attached to them. It meant that statements made with

:10:03. > :10:05.certainty could not be supported by that kind of evidence. I thhnk you

:10:06. > :10:14.are saying it was unreasonable for Tony Blair? I would rather not use

:10:15. > :10:18.that particular word. You m`y not, but it seems to me it is a binary

:10:19. > :10:25.state of affairs, isn't it? Either it was reasonable or not. That is a

:10:26. > :10:34.very well understood concept in law and in : common parlance. W`s it

:10:35. > :10:40.reasonable or not? If you place yourself in a position at the time,

:10:41. > :10:44.2002-2003, there was enough advice coming forward, not perhaps to

:10:45. > :10:47.support the statement of thd threat to the United Kingdom and its people

:10:48. > :10:51.and interests was imminent, but nonetheless that a threat m`y be

:10:52. > :10:58.thought to exist. Now, therd was not such a threat, in fact, and in the

:10:59. > :11:02.event. That is not what we have been talking about at all, not in the

:11:03. > :11:07.event. We're talking about before the event. Every question I posed to

:11:08. > :11:10.you concerns only the evidence available to Tony Blair at the time

:11:11. > :11:14.he made these statements. I will just repeat the question. W`s it

:11:15. > :11:19.reasonable for Tony Blair, `t that time that he made that statdment, to

:11:20. > :11:25.suppose that there was an ilminent threat? Objectively, no.

:11:26. > :11:30.Subjectively, I cannot answdr for him. You mean that he might have had

:11:31. > :11:35.a sudden... He might have h`d a sudden rush of blood to the head or

:11:36. > :11:43.May Day misjudgement? Isn't that what subjective means in thhs

:11:44. > :11:50.context? Subjectively, he stated it was his certain belief at the time.

:11:51. > :11:53.You ask an objective question, was it reasonable to entertain that

:11:54. > :12:02.thought? I say that the evidence does not sufficiently supported I

:12:03. > :12:06.have not, actually. The well understood test of a reason`ble man.

:12:07. > :12:15.Would a reasonable man, another human being, looking at the

:12:16. > :12:19.evidence, come to that conclusion? If you are posing the questhon with

:12:20. > :12:26.regard to a statement of an imminent threat to the United Kingdol... I

:12:27. > :12:34.am. In that case, I have to say no, there was not sufficient evhdence to

:12:35. > :12:38.sustain that belief. He misled, or set aside, misled the House, or he

:12:39. > :12:46.set aside evidence in order to lead the house down the line of thought

:12:47. > :12:51.and belief with his 18th of March speech? Didn't he? Again, you force

:12:52. > :12:57.me into trying to draw a distinction between what Mr Blair, as Prime

:12:58. > :13:02.Minister, believed that the time, and sought to persuade the house and

:13:03. > :13:05.the people of... Of course, I am asking whether it was reasonable

:13:06. > :13:10.that he was doing it. As thhngs have turned out, we know it was not. As

:13:11. > :13:13.things appeared at the time, the evidence to support it was lore

:13:14. > :13:18.qualified than he, in effect, gave expression to. That is not what you

:13:19. > :13:22.have really been saying all along. It is not a question of whether it

:13:23. > :13:25.was more qualified. This is a test. It is a test of if a reason`ble man

:13:26. > :13:31.would conclude that this evhdence supported going to war.

:13:32. > :13:39.If I would say so, Mr Chairlan, it seems to be an easy question to

:13:40. > :13:44.answer, because the answer hs no. I'm going to move onto another

:13:45. > :13:48.question. I've got several colleagues wanting to chip hn, and I

:13:49. > :13:56.am concerned that we might here for a very long time, if they do, but on

:13:57. > :14:00.this occasion, to colleagues have been so insistent then I'm `llowed

:14:01. > :14:09.to bring them in. Which two you think was more at the forefront of

:14:10. > :14:14.the Prime Minister's mind? Was in two evaluate the evidence ptt in

:14:15. > :14:21.front of him, or was it to lake the case for a decision in his lind he

:14:22. > :14:27.had already made? I find th`t a very helpful question, because mx

:14:28. > :14:34.response to it is clear and unqualified. There was no attempt to

:14:35. > :14:41.challenge or seek reevaluathon of the intelligence advice. Do you

:14:42. > :14:46.think he exaggerated the certainty of his knowledge? If you had just

:14:47. > :14:53.said to the House, we don't know for certain, but there's a risk that he

:14:54. > :14:59.has this record, and then gone on to say what I remember him sayhng,

:15:00. > :15:05.mainly that the nightmare scenario oh was that Saddam Hussein, for his

:15:06. > :15:09.own purposes, would make thdse weapons available to a terrorist

:15:10. > :15:18.group with which he shared ` common enemy, would have been as rdaction

:15:19. > :15:26.of the reasonable man? It could have been, at the time. I go on to talk

:15:27. > :15:33.about nuclear weapons, rathdr than weapons of mass destruction. I think

:15:34. > :15:38.you would agree, nuclear we`pons are on a magnitude of which is lore

:15:39. > :15:46.dangerous and more serious than what has been reduced -- produced, and

:15:47. > :15:55.certainly might have been available to Saddam at that time. Frol DJ icy

:15:56. > :16:01.reports, it seems pretty cldar and it was in the dossier that ht would

:16:02. > :16:07.take five years, even if sanctions were removed, for weapons to be

:16:08. > :16:13.produced, for Saddam to produce weapons. In many ways, the sanctions

:16:14. > :16:18.were reasonably effective. There were no results of a progralme which

:16:19. > :16:27.had been closed down in the 199 s, and as you point out in your report,

:16:28. > :16:34.new US -- numerous other cotntries were well ahead, such as Ir`n, Korea

:16:35. > :16:39.and Libya, which posed diffdrent kinds of threats. In that s`me

:16:40. > :16:45.speech, the Prime Minister said that Saddam Hussein was actively trying

:16:46. > :16:51.to obtain material to in rich uranium. You said at paragr`ph 40

:16:52. > :16:56.of your summary, that there was no programme to develop nuclear

:16:57. > :17:00.weapons. Have you establishdd whether it was reasonable on the

:17:01. > :17:06.basis of the evidence that he was given at the time that Tony Blair

:17:07. > :17:14.could have asserted that Saddam Hussein could have obtained is

:17:15. > :17:20.nuclear weapons within months? No. Why not? Because there was no active

:17:21. > :17:28.programme in the sensitive installations of design mantfacture

:17:29. > :17:36.and distribution of weapons delivery systems. There haven't been since

:17:37. > :17:41.1990. There was a fear wastd on history in other places, I think,

:17:42. > :17:47.any intelligence community, not least, that from the dismissal of

:17:48. > :17:50.the inspectors in Iraq in 1898, there might have been something

:17:51. > :17:57.going on. But it was nothing more than that. So, Tony Blair shouldn't

:17:58. > :18:01.have said that I do, should he? To assert that there was a nuclear

:18:02. > :18:10.weapons programme in training base on the evidence I have seen, so

:18:11. > :18:20.therefore so therefore, to tell us we were vulnerable to a nuclear

:18:21. > :18:23.attack within months was unreasonable, wasn't it? Wotld

:18:24. > :18:36.reasonable man have been misled by that? Again, I think Leone `nswer

:18:37. > :18:46.can be no. -- I think that the only answer. A reasonable man cotld not

:18:47. > :18:54.be misled... I heard your qtestion the other way round. If he had set

:18:55. > :19:03.that there was a risk arising over the years ahead that Saddam had an

:19:04. > :19:07.intent that he would trying to carry through if... He said that he has

:19:08. > :19:12.the capacity to obtain nucldar weapons within months. That was not

:19:13. > :19:17.so at the time. And he knew it? I don't know what he based th`t

:19:18. > :19:21.statement on in terms of evhdence. Have you seen any evidence to

:19:22. > :19:26.support that statement, to justify the action of the Prime Minhster in

:19:27. > :19:34.the House that day? Not that there was a near-term prospects of Saddam

:19:35. > :19:48.acquiring and therefore being able to threaten the use of... So, that's

:19:49. > :20:01.a no? Yes. Near-term, means not imminently? Yes. There is a part of

:20:02. > :20:07.cross examination I like to touch on and that's nuclear weapons `s

:20:08. > :20:12.deterrents. Was it wrong to use the terrorist and the wider nuclear

:20:13. > :20:17.threat posed by Saddam. I fdel you answer that in your report that I

:20:18. > :20:25.want clarification. The evidence doesn't suggest that Saddam would

:20:26. > :20:29.have, even if he could have, supplied weapons of mass destruction

:20:30. > :20:36.in whatever category to terrorist organisations. At paragraph three to

:20:37. > :20:39.four, you said there was no evidence to support this in the JCI

:20:40. > :20:52.suggestions. I feel you've pretty much answered in the same w`y. In Mr

:20:53. > :20:56.Blair's speech, he said, and I quote, these are a real and present

:20:57. > :21:02.danger to Britain. He had no evidence that either, did hd? He

:21:03. > :21:08.added concept shared by othdrs in the United States, but... So it was

:21:09. > :21:15.unreasonable for him to say that either? Not at the time, I'l only

:21:16. > :21:19.applying a test that millions of people will readily underst`nd which

:21:20. > :21:30.is used in courts of law at and down the land every day. But this is not

:21:31. > :21:39.a court of law. It's a court of public opinion. Is only of the

:21:40. > :21:45.committee and the evidence of what it took from the committee. But it's

:21:46. > :21:58.important to emphasise, it was not a court. I understand. It didn't

:21:59. > :22:07.proceed as such. Your evidence has been clear, and you have given more

:22:08. > :22:12.decisive answers and you provided in your statement, particularlx in the

:22:13. > :22:16.executive summary. I want to clarify one more point before passing

:22:17. > :22:21.questioning on. You see, I haven't got the exact words in front of me,

:22:22. > :22:25.but you said trust in British politics has been eroded by events

:22:26. > :22:36.unfolding at that time, and after that time, and it's damage which

:22:37. > :22:43.lasts until this day, and I am. . Is the most damaging thing abott this

:22:44. > :22:46.whole sorry episode is that a number of things, very important things

:22:47. > :22:56.were said to the House at that time, which are reasonable man... Not be

:22:57. > :23:01.reasonably supported by the evidence that the time the statement was

:23:02. > :23:06.made, and that's what's corroded the trust? I think when a leader of the

:23:07. > :23:11.Government, or a Government presents a case with all the powers of

:23:12. > :23:18.advocacy that he or she can command, and in doing so, going on what the

:23:19. > :23:23.facts of the case and that basic analysis of the case can support

:23:24. > :23:30.then yes, I think it's will damage politics. It will take a long time

:23:31. > :23:38.to repair? I would imagine ht will. We thank you for your part hn

:23:39. > :23:44.helping to begin that repair process. If there are lessons to be

:23:45. > :23:49.learned from this, can we rdflect on your experience of the type of

:23:50. > :23:52.enquiry youth carried out. Whilst you were completing your work, the

:23:53. > :24:00.Foreign Affairs Committee w`s undertaking an enquiry into Libya,

:24:01. > :24:03.and I was conscious that we were going to wait for your publhcation

:24:04. > :24:09.of your rapport, and also rdflect some of your lessons learned in our

:24:10. > :24:15.conclusions in our report and I will come to those in a minute. But, I

:24:16. > :24:22.believe the select committed of the House with 14,000 plus words, a

:24:23. > :24:30.year's work, probably around ?1 ,000 worth of extra costs for thd travel

:24:31. > :24:38.budget to conduct our enquiries then produce something whilst not of

:24:39. > :24:46.the historic quality of 2.6 million words and the cost of the ldngth of

:24:47. > :24:50.your enquiry, I hope we've got closer and rather firmer conclusions

:24:51. > :25:00.in the report and the size `nd scope of your enquiry produced. I want

:25:01. > :25:04.your reflection on the task you were set and how fair or unfair the terms

:25:05. > :25:09.of reference were, regarding the task you were set. And perh`ps the

:25:10. > :25:17.competing utilities are the different types of enquiry `vailable

:25:18. > :25:21.to the Government, where is a judicial enquiry would have had ten

:25:22. > :25:26.times the cost and would have been significantly longer than yours if

:25:27. > :25:34.previous experience is anything to go by. I think for an enquiry into

:25:35. > :25:41.the workings of central Govdrnment in a very critical and controversial

:25:42. > :25:44.area, there is real advantage in having a committee, an independent

:25:45. > :25:48.committee of people with direct experience of the workings of

:25:49. > :25:53.Government in that way. I think it would be more difficult for a judge

:25:54. > :26:01.operating with council throtgh cross-examination to arrive at well

:26:02. > :26:05.judged conclusions in that the titular individual situation. The

:26:06. > :26:10.other particular thought th`t I have is that the willingness, indeed

:26:11. > :26:16.even the ability of Governmdnt to make available highly sensitive

:26:17. > :26:21.information to an enquiry is determined in part by the

:26:22. > :26:27.membership, the process which you will adopt. Again, Lord Hutton had

:26:28. > :26:32.no problem in getting hold of a great deal of intelligence laterial.

:26:33. > :26:36.The real difficulty for him, with his terms of reference,

:26:37. > :26:40.investigating the death of David Kelly, was to be able to relate that

:26:41. > :26:53.material to the circumstancds of the case. For our part, we had total

:26:54. > :27:01.access to little material, `nd much of the subsequent negotiation which

:27:02. > :27:05.requires argument over quitd a long period was about disclosure, the

:27:06. > :27:09.ability to publish it. I thhnk judicially led enquiry would have

:27:10. > :27:18.been less well-placed to undertake those arguments, or to fight and win

:27:19. > :27:23.our particular battles. Lord Butler's enquiry, I think it is

:27:24. > :27:30.commonly understood that he thought he'd produced a much tougher report

:27:31. > :27:34.than was actually reported, and I wonder in the reporting durhng choir

:27:35. > :27:38.re-, whether there were things that were not picked up by the mddia in

:27:39. > :27:49.the way which you would havd liked, and given proper emphasis. By

:27:50. > :27:55.pointing us to things that xou feel should have more attention, the of

:27:56. > :27:59.your work. As a brief prelilinary, I was a member of the powerful

:28:00. > :28:03.committee. The main constrahnt on us was not achieving public

:28:04. > :28:08.understanding so much as behng enforced by a very tight tiletable

:28:09. > :28:14.to report and concludes somd very keen pieces of evidence that were

:28:15. > :28:22.available. The report of thd Iraq survey group which came out only a

:28:23. > :28:30.few months before the Butler report. Some of the key intelligencd, human

:28:31. > :28:34.sources were discredited and had their intelligence set asidd.

:28:35. > :28:38.Neither of those were possible for Butler on his timetable. As to

:28:39. > :28:46.public reception, I think p`rtly a matter of narrow terms of rdference

:28:47. > :28:50.that Butler had, it was intdlligence orientated. We were asked to give a

:28:51. > :28:56.reliant -- reliable account of all that had happened in Iraq adventure,

:28:57. > :29:01.misadventure. To that extent, I think we had a ready accept`nce by

:29:02. > :29:06.public and the media when wd were finally reported, and it wotld have

:29:07. > :29:15.been the case if our terms of reference are kept our

:29:16. > :29:20.Myself, I would not say I al ever satisfied with anything, but I do

:29:21. > :29:26.think that the public understanding and acceptance, more generally, of

:29:27. > :29:34.our broad conclusions, with lessons to be learned, was demonstr`ted as a

:29:35. > :29:37.reasonably good understanding of what we found. A particular point,

:29:38. > :29:41.sorry if I am going on a bit too long, it was not the sole ptrpose of

:29:42. > :29:46.the inquiry to satisfy the bereaved families. The fact that, in the end,

:29:47. > :29:49.they have accepted the report as being an answer to the questions

:29:50. > :29:54.that they had was particularly welcome. There are no areas in this

:29:55. > :30:01.which you think have not received the attention that they desdrve In

:30:02. > :30:06.your own mind and the minds of your colleagues, there are no prhorities

:30:07. > :30:11.that have not been picked up? I suppose the best answer I c`n try to

:30:12. > :30:17.give to that is that we cannot know yet, because the real test will be

:30:18. > :30:21.the taking of the lessons that we sought to draw and others m`y indeed

:30:22. > :30:27.find. That is going to be a process, looking ahead, that will take some

:30:28. > :30:31.time. As things stand at prdsent, I am reasonably encouraged th`t the

:30:32. > :30:33.attempt is being made, systematically, in Government to

:30:34. > :30:40.address those lessons. I thhnk there is a question for the parli`ment in

:30:41. > :30:44.terms of how much they want to hold Government to account for the way

:30:45. > :30:46.does that, and gives an account to yourselves as parliamentari`ns what

:30:47. > :30:52.it has found out, what it h`s accepted and what it has ch`nged.

:30:53. > :30:54.Turning to the substance, your appearance today happily cohncides

:30:55. > :31:01.with the publication of Jerdmy Greenstock's book, which gods to

:31:02. > :31:12.reinforce the evidence you talk from Sir Christopher Maher. The

:31:13. > :31:16.conclusion I draw from it, that Tony Blair, in the conduct of his

:31:17. > :31:18.relationship with the President of the United States, really dhd not

:31:19. > :31:25.exploit the influence that the United Kingdom have at all,

:31:26. > :31:33.effectively, in bilateral interests, or in the interest of getting some

:31:34. > :31:37.average over the stabilisathon plan and once the operation to lhberate

:31:38. > :31:49.Iraq had taken place. -- leveraged. What would be your observathons on

:31:50. > :32:00.how severe one should be on that? I think it is uncontestable that Mr

:32:01. > :32:05.Blair, as Prime Minister, over estimated how much influencd he had.

:32:06. > :32:12.That is not to say that there was no influence, and in making George Bush

:32:13. > :32:18.go to the United Nations, that was exercised. Over a period, it worked.

:32:19. > :32:21.By the end of the year, 2002, President Bush had clearly concluded

:32:22. > :32:26.that the UN -based inspection system was not going to be the answer and

:32:27. > :32:31.the military timetable took control. If indeed it had not always been in

:32:32. > :32:38.control of the diplomatic noises. As to what his purpose was, he clearly

:32:39. > :32:45.sought to try to reconcile TS decisions and objectives, rdgime

:32:46. > :32:50.change, ever since the Clinton administration, with the UK

:32:51. > :32:55.objective, the disarmament of Saddam's supposed weapons of mass

:32:56. > :33:00.destruction. That coincided completely with the string of

:33:01. > :33:11.Security Council resolutions, and culminated in resolution 1441. The

:33:12. > :33:16.other strand in influencing the United States was to avoid

:33:17. > :33:23.unilateral United States military action, for a variety of re`sons,

:33:24. > :33:30.which he would explain, and has Was that attempt to exert infludnce

:33:31. > :33:39.successful in the event? Thd answer is no. Do you think he should have

:33:40. > :33:45.paid a high price for British support? The fact that it took so

:33:46. > :33:52.long for Jeremy Greenstock dven to get a hearing in Iraq, by which

:33:53. > :33:58.stage very serious mistakes have been made by the occupation forces?

:33:59. > :34:05.It is a touch too hypothetical. But it is difficult to avoid a

:34:06. > :34:11.conclusion that, and Mr Blahr stated clear conditions for partichpation

:34:12. > :34:15.in and supporting United St`tes military action, and if those

:34:16. > :34:19.conditions had been reasonable, there might have been more

:34:20. > :34:25.influence, particularly, I think, on the timing of any United St`tes led

:34:26. > :34:34.action. As it was, and it is discussed at length in the hnquiry

:34:35. > :34:38.report, Mr Blair was determhned to say that his conditions werd

:34:39. > :34:45.conditions for success, not conditions for British parthcipation

:34:46. > :34:47.and support. In 2010, the Iraqi government said at the National

:34:48. > :34:59.Security Council. The operational National Security Council w`s set up

:35:00. > :35:04.by the Foreign Affairs Commhttee, into the Libya intervention. The

:35:05. > :35:07.conclusion that we came to, we noted the Prime Minister's decisive role

:35:08. > :35:14.in the National Security Cotncil, when it discussed interventhon in

:35:15. > :35:17.Libya. We concluded that thd independent review of its operation,

:35:18. > :35:27.it marked its own homework `fter the Libya intervention, during the Libya

:35:28. > :35:31.crisis. What we recommended was that the non-ministerial members of the

:35:32. > :35:37.National Security Council, hf they disagreed with the direction of

:35:38. > :35:41.policy, they should require a prime ministerial direction in thd same

:35:42. > :35:45.way that permanent secretarhes require, as the counting officer.

:35:46. > :35:54.What is your view of that as a recommendation? In specific terms, I

:35:55. > :35:58.have not been privy to the workings of the National Security Cotncil and

:35:59. > :36:06.how it operates. In general terms, I think one of the broad lessons

:36:07. > :36:10.derived from our seven years of work looking at Government records, or

:36:11. > :36:15.the absence of Government rdcords on occasion, is that it is vit`l, not

:36:16. > :36:21.merely important, but vital for serious decisions and the rdasons

:36:22. > :36:26.behind them to be recorded hn the public archive, not for immddiate

:36:27. > :36:30.release, necessarily, but that they should be written down so, hf

:36:31. > :36:37.someone in a serious disagrdement with a decision taken collectively,

:36:38. > :36:43.the reason for that decision and the facts of it should be recorded. I

:36:44. > :36:47.think that also goes to the suggestion from the Better

:36:48. > :36:50.Government Initiative, which is similar. I would be reluctant to say

:36:51. > :36:54.it should be placed on the same footing as that which the pdrmanent

:36:55. > :37:09.secretaries, as counting officers, an, nonetheless it seems to me that

:37:10. > :37:12.if there is a guarantee in the processes of the National Sdcurity

:37:13. > :37:20.Council elsewhere, that dissent well argued, properly expressed

:37:21. > :37:25.dissent, if it is to be recorded, in itself, it is an incentive to allow

:37:26. > :37:31.challenge take place, and for different voices to be heard. I will

:37:32. > :37:40.take that as support for our committee's recommendations, so I am

:37:41. > :37:45.grateful for that. Ten to the usual stabilisation, I know there will be

:37:46. > :38:00.questions about it, you deal extensively with stabilisathon in

:38:01. > :38:05.the report. Do you share my anxiety that lessons have not been learned

:38:06. > :38:09.from the review we took of the effectiveness of the stabilhsation

:38:10. > :38:16.unit in the Libya interventhon? We were very critical of their capacity

:38:17. > :38:22.and some of the lessons that you have identified here do not appear

:38:23. > :38:25.to apply in terms of what ndeds to be prepared for in light of

:38:26. > :38:30.operations that are now takhng place around Mosul, where the leadership

:38:31. > :38:37.properly sits, the leadershhp sits with the Foreign Office, with the

:38:38. > :38:42.capacity to do anything sitting with the Ministry of Defence and the

:38:43. > :38:47.Department For International Development? The coordination that

:38:48. > :38:51.you recommend, from your experience with Government, do you belheve the

:38:52. > :38:56.Government has yet taken enough notice of the conclusions you came

:38:57. > :39:00.to? I don't have insight into where the government is placed in any

:39:01. > :39:08.detail. I would like to respond with two comments in particular. Good

:39:09. > :39:11.though it is that the Stabilisation Unit has come into existencd, and

:39:12. > :39:14.there is the fund associated with it, in terms of the order of

:39:15. > :39:19.magnitude of what is requirdd, it is nothing like sufficient in scale

:39:20. > :39:25.all, I would have thought, hn authority. The second point is that

:39:26. > :39:30.I think it is very difficult, in a specific case of security sdctor

:39:31. > :39:34.reform in Iraq for the Forehgn Office, at, admittedly, a pretty

:39:35. > :39:40.junior level, to understand and assemble the kind of not just

:39:41. > :39:45.policing effort, although that was at the core of it, but the whole

:39:46. > :39:48.range of reconstruction work of institutions, of people, thd

:39:49. > :39:55.processes that are going to be required. It is a major task of

:39:56. > :40:00.reconstruction. I think there is still a great deal for any

:40:01. > :40:05.government to do. I would add to that, actually, the United Nations,

:40:06. > :40:08.to bring together the different elements that are involved when a

:40:09. > :40:15.wrecked country has to be ptt back together. We may return to post war

:40:16. > :40:23.planning and reconstructing later on. Leader said in response to

:40:24. > :40:25.Crispin that you were not convinced that the stabilisation unit have the

:40:26. > :40:31.order of magnitude scale and authority. I'd invite you to expand

:40:32. > :40:39.upon that and say what might be done to give it the order of magnitude it

:40:40. > :40:44.deserves. There was a littld pool of money in 2003, which was trhvial and

:40:45. > :40:47.of no impact whatsoever. By 200 , when we stopped taking eviddnce

:40:48. > :40:55.there was something on an altogether larger scale. Now, I think, in terms

:40:56. > :40:59.of ?1 billion. Even that dods not stack up against the cost ilplied in

:41:00. > :41:05.a major reconstruction task across a whole country. Even one smaller than

:41:06. > :41:09.Iraq. Iraq was a seriously large country for this purpose. Does that

:41:10. > :41:13.answer your question? Your reference to scale and magnitude was `bout the

:41:14. > :41:20.resources available to the funds, rather than necessary the profile of

:41:21. > :41:23.the work within Government? Or both? The thing that, frankly, wotld

:41:24. > :41:28.defeat me, and I'm glad to have any responsibility for it any more, and

:41:29. > :41:32.I'm thinking of Ireland, is how you bring together the different arms

:41:33. > :41:38.and branches of government hn a really constructive and willing way,

:41:39. > :41:45.as opposed to protecting interests, budgets, limiting responsibhlity.

:41:46. > :41:51.Those problems are very gre`t and really real, as we all know. I would

:41:52. > :41:55.like to bring in Northern Ireland for a brief statement. It took us a

:41:56. > :41:59.long time, 30 years, ultimately to get the whole thing right and to a

:42:00. > :42:03.good conclusion. In the course of that, we did learn, on the

:42:04. > :42:11.admittedly much smaller scale of Northern Ireland, how to brhng

:42:12. > :42:13.together military intelligence, police, security, economic

:42:14. > :42:18.reconstruction, housing was central. They were all brought together and

:42:19. > :42:20.held together within a single network of relationships of

:42:21. > :42:25.authority. If you could replicate that on a larger scale, of ` major

:42:26. > :42:34.global reconstruction effort, that would be good. I am glad it is not

:42:35. > :42:35.made that has to do it. Do xou have specific reflections on the

:42:36. > :42:39.Department for International Development and how it fits into

:42:40. > :42:45.this? In your recommendations, you tended to recommend things that had

:42:46. > :42:55.to do with other departments? I have two preface any answer and the

:42:56. > :43:01.generality of any answer, whth the specifics of the time. -- I had to.

:43:02. > :43:11.The budgetary resources that were made available, all of us. The truth

:43:12. > :43:14.of the matter is that there was between Whitehall departments, and

:43:15. > :43:19.not the Ministry of Defence departments, a wide gap. Brhdges

:43:20. > :43:25.were not constructed across that gap with any effectiveness, at least

:43:26. > :43:29.until right at the end, and never throughout our Long engagemdnt in

:43:30. > :43:35.Iraq, to a great effect. Th`t is as much as I can say.

:43:36. > :43:42.The National Security Counchl's strategies, which guide the

:43:43. > :43:46.programme which has replaced the conflict pool, these were not

:43:47. > :43:50.published. Do you think it would make sense to publish them hn order

:43:51. > :43:53.to improve accountability? H can see there is a great deal of

:43:54. > :43:55.international politics and dven diplomacy lurking behind th`t. But

:43:56. > :44:04.speaking purely for myself `s a citizen, it is extraordin`ry we

:44:05. > :44:12.don't have that kind of information publicly available. Thank you. Thank

:44:13. > :44:17.you, good afternoon Sir John. Given what you have been saying today and

:44:18. > :44:23.in the report, do you think all of that is a consequence of a sofa

:44:24. > :44:33.style of government? I understand your question, and I think ht is the

:44:34. > :44:39.concept and practice which hs part of the background but it is of

:44:40. > :44:42.course a reflection of the then Prime Minister's personal

:44:43. > :44:45.preferences. There has two B room in any system of government for a

:44:46. > :44:52.degree of flexibility as to how you go about the process of govdrnment,

:44:53. > :44:56.it cannot be confined to a rigid set of committees and minutes and

:44:57. > :45:02.processes and meetings. On the other hand, I am totally convinced that

:45:03. > :45:07.without a coherent process, however it is conducted in any sort of room,

:45:08. > :45:10.you cannot discharge the responsibility which under our

:45:11. > :45:17.Constitution is a collectivd responsibility on the Cabindt

:45:18. > :45:21.effectively. So, the system has to be flexible in order to takd into

:45:22. > :45:25.account the personal style `nd characteristic of the Prime Minister

:45:26. > :45:31.of the day, is it also a function of the consolidation of power, growing

:45:32. > :45:36.consolidation, into a singld figure, the Prime Minister of the d`y, is it

:45:37. > :45:42.almost the 21st century equhvalent of Louis XIV, I am the statd? I

:45:43. > :45:49.observe what can be describdd in that way. I think it reached a high

:45:50. > :45:59.point in Mr Blair's Prime Mhnister ship, and I have a great melory in

:46:00. > :46:03.taking evidence from his Foreign Minister, Mr Strauch and asked how

:46:04. > :46:06.it was that members of his cabinet, other than Robin Cook and to a

:46:07. > :46:12.lesser extent Clare Short, did not provide a challenge and a ddbate.

:46:13. > :46:17.They were promised it somethmes but promises were not delivered. And the

:46:18. > :46:22.answer that came back was qtite simple. That Tony Blair had, as

:46:23. > :46:31.Leader of the Opposition, rdscued his party from a very dire political

:46:32. > :46:34.predicament and he had done it again afterwards as Prime Minister. I had

:46:35. > :46:41.the sense from Mr Straw's rdaction that he had achieved a personal and

:46:42. > :46:45.political dominance which w`s itself overriding the doctrine of

:46:46. > :46:50.collective Cabinet responsibility... The power of patronage held back

:46:51. > :46:57.discussion? Perhaps can be xes, but also sheer psychological dolinance.

:46:58. > :47:01.He had been right. Was he not right this time? That was the sense I took

:47:02. > :47:07.from Mr Straw's evidence. That's very helpful. In your view then the

:47:08. > :47:12.Cabinet system throughout all of this, was it disregarded? W`s it

:47:13. > :47:16.just bypassed? What had happened? Presumably committee said this in

:47:17. > :47:19.the report, had there been affected... Challenged, mord

:47:20. > :47:25.scrutiny, perhaps some weaknesses in the evidence would have been teased

:47:26. > :47:32.out a lot more? Things were decided without reference to Cabinet. For

:47:33. > :47:37.example, the acceptance of responsibility in four provhnce

:47:38. > :47:42.south-east of Iraq. Given the decision, surely that was it? It

:47:43. > :47:48.never went near the Cabinet. More generally, the Cabinet was promised

:47:49. > :47:56.that it would have a hand in the decision on major deployments in

:47:57. > :48:00.Iraq, which never took placd. We did an analysis on all of the C`binet

:48:01. > :48:05.papers and minutes and meethngs in the relevant period and published a

:48:06. > :48:07.great deal of the material. Quite frequently, the Cabinet itsdlf was

:48:08. > :48:14.simply being given informathon updates. Not always completdly

:48:15. > :48:17.detailed or of an updated khnd. There was very little subst`ntive

:48:18. > :48:22.Cabinet discussion leading to a collective decision, which seems to

:48:23. > :48:30.me the like which is characterised certainly throughout the period from

:48:31. > :48:37.2002-2006. I understand your earlier point about it has to take hnto

:48:38. > :48:42.account the psychology and style of the elected leaders of the day. In

:48:43. > :48:48.that regard, it has two Flex. But to what extent does the civil service

:48:49. > :48:51.have to be a custodian of proper effective Cabinet responsibhlity?

:48:52. > :48:55.Lord Turnbull told you that nothing was wrong with this, there was no

:48:56. > :48:59.problem with the sofa style of government. He disregards that

:49:00. > :49:02.phrase. To what extent should the Cabinet Secretary be saying that

:49:03. > :49:08.this is wrong, Prime Ministdr, you need to do something here? The role

:49:09. > :49:15.of the Cabinet Secretary, I was in contact with all of the surviving

:49:16. > :49:20.ones and retired, as well as serving. It is to some degrde

:49:21. > :49:24.determined by his, perhaps one day her, relationship with the Prime

:49:25. > :49:30.Minister of the day and is clearly accepted by all of them, a clear

:49:31. > :49:37.responsibility for the Cabinet as a collective. I think if I were to

:49:38. > :49:43.have a purpose today it is to encourage all of my

:49:44. > :49:49.successors and colleagues at Whitewater take courage in both

:49:50. > :49:56.hands and insist on their rhght to be heard -- at Whitehall. And record

:49:57. > :50:00.what their advices even if ht is not taken. It is for ministers to decide

:50:01. > :50:03.and four senior officials, `nd I would include senior military in

:50:04. > :50:10.this, to clearly state their best advice to their masters. And I think

:50:11. > :50:14.the recording of that advicd and the recording of any discussion about it

:50:15. > :50:21.is absolutely central because that guarantees, if you like, a degree of

:50:22. > :50:30.willingness to challenge and duty to challenge, which in a sofa done

:50:31. > :50:34.setting is simply not there. It is the responsibility of the C`binet

:50:35. > :50:38.Secretary to make sure that Cabinet ministers have that opportunity and

:50:39. > :50:42.that is set down in the Cabhnet manual, isn't it? Yes... And are you

:50:43. > :50:50.saying in this case, that w`s not observed? You can't, as it were

:50:51. > :50:54.override a Prime Minister's instructions to the Cabinet

:50:55. > :50:58.Secretary or indeed a lack of instructions to a Cabinet

:50:59. > :51:02.Secretary... Should you havd taken a direction? I'm sorry? Should the

:51:03. > :51:05.Cabinet Secretary have taken a direction in that case? It would be

:51:06. > :51:07.open for a Cabinet Secretarx in dire straits to do just that. A famous

:51:08. > :51:20.example from the war when Norman Brook, the Cabinet

:51:21. > :51:25.Secretary, was ordered to ddstroy all records of dealings with the

:51:26. > :51:29.French. As a dutiful and loxal servant of the elected governor and,

:51:30. > :51:36.Norman Burke did. I wrote a minute on the file saying that I h`ve been

:51:37. > :51:39.so instructed which is open to historical enquiry. Very interesting

:51:40. > :51:46.but let me take us back to this case. Should the Cabinet Secretary

:51:47. > :51:51.have made this demand? Or only carried on under the instruction of

:51:52. > :51:57.the Prime Minister and a direction? Well, I'm not sure what the exact

:51:58. > :52:02.case is, but I can recall from the evidence that we took that on one

:52:03. > :52:09.occasion the Cabinet Secret`ry at, the overseas development Defence

:52:10. > :52:16.secretary arranged to deal with the forthcoming Iraq issue. This was

:52:17. > :52:23.perched in -- put in draft to Number tdn,

:52:24. > :52:28.before the Cabinet Secretarx even had sight of it. The

:52:29. > :52:35.Prime Minister said that thdy would not have the ministerial colmittee,

:52:36. > :52:38.or not yet. It goes back. The draft, without the ministerial comlittee

:52:39. > :52:42.proposal is put to the Cabinet Secretary to put to the Prile

:52:43. > :52:46.Minister for formal endorselent That is screwing up the proper

:52:47. > :52:50.arrangement in rather a big way in my opinion. But should they have

:52:51. > :52:56.demanded an instruction or direction before agreeing to that? Well, I

:52:57. > :53:01.don't know that he even knew. Because he was shown a draft, it had

:53:02. > :53:06.been discussed... I will brhng the questioning to Bella Jenkin now but

:53:07. > :53:10.it strikes me as a high degree of dysfunctionality at the heart of

:53:11. > :53:14.Whitehall. I agree in that particular instance. It is shocking.

:53:15. > :53:19.In that instance... We are not talking about trading in

:53:20. > :53:24.Aberystwyth... And if you would allow me, chairman, the consequences

:53:25. > :53:27.of it were the whole offici`l structure underneath that l`cked

:53:28. > :53:32.ministerial direction. Therdfore, they were not able to come to grips

:53:33. > :53:36.with some of the big issues which ought to kill it ought to h`ve been

:53:37. > :53:41.able to do? Do you find that shocking -- big issues which it

:53:42. > :53:49.ought to have been able to do. Yes. What safeguards exist to ensure that

:53:50. > :53:52.proper conduct of a Cabinet government? Firstly, the ministerial

:53:53. > :53:57.code which is the product of the Prime Minister of the day. Who

:53:58. > :54:02.adjudicates that? He enforcds and adjudicates on it. Nonetheldss it is

:54:03. > :54:06.not without substance or effect Then there is the Cabinet

:54:07. > :54:11.Secretary's manual, which is for officials and about officials and

:54:12. > :54:16.their conduct and behaviour. It cannot, as it were, overridd

:54:17. > :54:21.ministers. So, what there is not, I do have a little sympathy btt not

:54:22. > :54:28.total with the better government initiative proposal, there hs not

:54:29. > :54:32.either a statutory or convention based enforcement system to ensure

:54:33. > :54:36.compliance with proper standards and accepted rules of how government

:54:37. > :54:42.should be conducted. So, let's look at a specific instance we wdre

:54:43. > :54:46.discussing moments ago, which might have been in the Prime Minister 's

:54:47. > :54:55.mind advertising the decision to go to war was finally made. Yot

:54:56. > :54:59.uncovered the letter to the President of the United States which

:55:00. > :55:08.contained the words "We will be with you whatever". This was eight months

:55:09. > :55:15.prior to the decision. Yes. Who knew about this letter? In terms of other

:55:16. > :55:21.members of the Cabinet? At the time of its being issued, only those in

:55:22. > :55:24.number ten. Who saw it. And what advice did the Cabinet Secrdtary

:55:25. > :55:28.give the Prime Minister, or what advice did the Prime Ministdr

:55:29. > :55:31.receive that before this letter was dispatched? I don't think the

:55:32. > :55:36.Cabinet Secretary was aware of its existence at the time. Other than

:55:37. > :55:40.them, I seem to remember soleone else advised them? Jonathan Powell

:55:41. > :55:43.as chief of staff in number ten the most senior official under that

:55:44. > :55:49.arrangement, and Sir David Lanning were aware. Both tried to pdrsuade

:55:50. > :55:53.the Prime Minister not to use those words but he did. So I come back to

:55:54. > :55:58.the question, what safeguards exist to ensure the proper conduct of the

:55:59. > :56:05.machinery of government? I think you are pointing to a gap, a deficiency.

:56:06. > :56:12.The better government initi`tive actually said in its concluding

:56:13. > :56:16.paragraph that Parliament ndeds to be satisfied that the seriots

:56:17. > :56:19.weaknesses that the report identified, and all aspects of

:56:20. > :56:26.decision-making have been t`ckled. It went on to say they should be

:56:27. > :56:32.held to account in failings of the machinery of government. And their

:56:33. > :56:36.locus in decision-making nedds to be clarified and mechanisms put in

:56:37. > :56:40.place in charging their accountability, do you agred with

:56:41. > :56:45.that? As a proposal, and I have not had the chance to think abott it in

:56:46. > :56:52.any depth, I should perhaps declare that I was for a time part of the

:56:53. > :57:00.better government initiativd but I left it years ago, I was not part of

:57:01. > :57:08.this particular analysis, btt I think this is not in any sense age

:57:09. > :57:11.regularised answer but I thhnk it is, for Pollard and

:57:12. > :57:16.parliamentarians, and among them I include Cabinet ministers. ,-

:57:17. > :57:28.Parliament. To accept those conventions and rules but the rules

:57:29. > :57:33.in the case I cited were brdached. It is true they became award of the

:57:34. > :57:37.letter after it was issued, but not in a position to say, you should not

:57:38. > :57:43.say this... Or you should not write it. But, how is Parliament to know?

:57:44. > :57:48.Indeed. Unless there is somd procedure for a civil servant to

:57:49. > :57:55.notify Parliament in some form always? Which protects the public

:57:56. > :57:59.official from political bullying -- formal way.

:58:00. > :58:10.This so special and very important case of whistle-blowing if H could

:58:11. > :58:13.go off on a short tangent, H was, for a time, the so-called staff

:58:14. > :58:20.counsellor, in effect the ethics adviser to the intelligence

:58:21. > :58:27.community. The only way to satisfy someone who is in consciencd deeply

:58:28. > :58:32.dissatisfied with the institution and its workings that he or she is

:58:33. > :58:38.part of, is to talk it throtgh with the leaders of that institution It

:58:39. > :58:45.is about leadership. I think that leadership lies both in minhsters

:58:46. > :58:50.and the authority that they have, but also in senior public sdrvants

:58:51. > :58:57.of all types. Whether that hs enough to give enough route and strength to

:58:58. > :59:02.a convention that is then observed by all, I can't say. But I would

:59:03. > :59:07.hope it would move in that direction. In financial matters

:59:08. > :59:16.these letters are used very sparingly, and are regarded as the

:59:17. > :59:21.nuclear option in relationship s with ministers. Does it havd a

:59:22. > :59:24.chilling effect on the oper`tion of government? Does it have a

:59:25. > :59:31.destructive effect on relathonships between ministers and civil

:59:32. > :59:36.servants? If I am allowed to respond from personal experience, whthout

:59:37. > :59:41.detailed names or cases, it was something that I had to draw to my

:59:42. > :59:46.Secretary of State's attenthon on occasion. And what the consdquences

:59:47. > :59:52.would be, if his decision, `nd it was his to take, went in a

:59:53. > :59:58.particular way. I found, agreeably, that it never went in that way.

:59:59. > :00:03.There are other examples, lhke the Meriden motorcycle collective, where

:00:04. > :00:06.it does lead to a rupture of relationships. But it has to be on a

:00:07. > :00:13.scale to justify that action, the threat of action. Given we `re

:00:14. > :00:17.dealing with a Cabinet secrdtary, or a very senior official at the heart

:00:18. > :00:25.of Government, I imagine we would treat this mechanism for procedural

:00:26. > :00:28.sleights of hand, it would `lso be used very sparingly. I have heard

:00:29. > :00:31.nothing from you that reallx convinces me that my committee

:00:32. > :00:35.should not recommend this. H am not trying to make an argument xou

:00:36. > :00:42.should not. I am saying I h`ve not had a chance to think it through. I

:00:43. > :00:45.have had such experiences as I have had, a statutory arrangement in the

:00:46. > :00:53.field of value for money and Finance did work. But it actually h`d become

:00:54. > :00:58.not so much a statutory for regulation, as a deep laid

:00:59. > :01:02.convention. One further question, on the question of the lack of

:01:03. > :01:05.atmosphere of challenge, thhs is something the committee I h`ve

:01:06. > :01:10.chaired has gone into quite a lot, in terms of the strategic thinking

:01:11. > :01:19.capacity at the heart of government, or the lack of it. While thd joint

:01:20. > :01:25.investigation committee has capacity for assessment, what evidence did

:01:26. > :01:28.you see in Downing Street that there was capacity for assessment of

:01:29. > :01:32.strategic options, strategic choices in foreign policy and the ddployment

:01:33. > :01:38.of military force that would similarly provide that atmosphere,

:01:39. > :01:43.albeit that it did not work well in the JIC in this instance?

:01:44. > :01:54.Tony Juniper ten, -- turning to Number 10, we have seen varhous

:01:55. > :01:58.things set out in terms of policy units, sometimes more, sometimes

:01:59. > :02:05.less, in scale capability, what there has not been is a

:02:06. > :02:13.constitutional free working of the support available to the Prhme

:02:14. > :02:16.Minister. Should the Security Council now have its own independent

:02:17. > :02:23.analysis and assessment so that various departmental papers being

:02:24. > :02:30.presented are properly assessed and integrated into a proposal, rather

:02:31. > :02:37.than being ignored by a Cabhnet committee? I suppose I had the

:02:38. > :02:40.difficulty, the National Security Council is concerned with what its

:02:41. > :02:45.title suggests, national security. If I can say so, and I mean with

:02:46. > :02:47.respect, the question you pose as much wider significance. It goes

:02:48. > :02:55.right across the business of government. The ability, thd

:02:56. > :02:58.capability to do strategic `nalysis of options and risks, beford big

:02:59. > :03:10.policy decisions are saddled is not there. -- settled. I don't know if

:03:11. > :03:13.it actually happened on a bhg scale, real cooperation between responsible

:03:14. > :03:18.departments, at every level, ministerial and official, could

:03:19. > :03:22.bring it about in the absence of a formal capability. I do agrde with

:03:23. > :03:30.the National Security Counchl, that it offers a solution in that field.

:03:31. > :03:33.Howard will work, I don't know. I think the term national sectrity is

:03:34. > :03:42.an Americanised term for evdrything that happens. That is the w`y I hear

:03:43. > :03:50.that term. Why isn't the National Security Council the umbrella under

:03:51. > :03:55.which that capability should be put? This is a machinery of government

:03:56. > :03:59.question. It is. Indeed, as a young man I did a lot of work on the

:04:00. > :04:02.machinery of government. It left me thinking that structures and

:04:03. > :04:06.institutions are all very wdll, you can get them badly wrong. Btt they

:04:07. > :04:09.are not enough. It is the pdople on the way that their work that really

:04:10. > :04:13.matters. If they work well dnough, you may not need to muck around with

:04:14. > :04:22.the structure is is disrupthve, quite often. I have seen a little,

:04:23. > :04:29.at a distance, in the working of the Iraq case of the national Sdcurity

:04:30. > :04:36.Council in the United States. It is a much more structured and powerful

:04:37. > :04:40.forum. Our Cabinet system h`s been able to replicate it at timds. It is

:04:41. > :04:43.a presidential, not prime ministerial system. Ultimatdly, it

:04:44. > :04:53.is very different. But therd could be lessons to be taken. Givdn the

:04:54. > :05:03.scale of the failures you h`ve set out in the mechanisms of government

:05:04. > :05:06.itself, in the face of some of - someone that are so psychologically

:05:07. > :05:10.dominant, do you think select committees could play a gre`ter

:05:11. > :05:16.role? Would you set out how you envisage that happening? Thdre is, I

:05:17. > :05:22.think, and I am aware of thd factual chairman has published on this

:05:23. > :05:28.theme, not least, I think there is a lot of room for Parliament, in its

:05:29. > :05:32.different ways, whether on the floor of the chamber or in select

:05:33. > :05:35.committees or other respects, to exert more influence on Govdrnment

:05:36. > :05:41.and to hold Government more effectively to account. We have

:05:42. > :05:45.seen, in my working lifetimd, remarkable progress. But I think the

:05:46. > :05:53.process is far from completd. If take one example, in the Ir`q case,

:05:54. > :05:57.had there not been a pledge by the then Labour government to h`ve an

:05:58. > :06:01.inquiry into Iraq, supposing, the time we ceased our engagement in

:06:02. > :06:06.2009, that there was to be no independent inquiry, it would have

:06:07. > :06:11.been, I think, very much a latter for Parliament to decide, wdll,

:06:12. > :06:17.we're going to have one. Do it ourselves. Whether a conventional

:06:18. > :06:21.inquiry would have the scopd, time and range, I don't know. I think the

:06:22. > :06:24.real problem would be access to highly sensitive information on a

:06:25. > :06:30.long scale. I think that is a serious question that would have to

:06:31. > :06:34.be answered. That is negoti`tion between government and parlhament.

:06:35. > :06:40.Sensitive information that lay not be possible to be shared. On the

:06:41. > :06:46.subject of the legal advice, do you think that there is a case for

:06:47. > :06:49.Parliament being given clear, open access to the legal advice? We

:06:50. > :06:56.wrestled quite long and hard with the legal aspects of Iraq. H am sure

:06:57. > :07:02.you will be familiar with the conclusion we were forced to come

:07:03. > :07:05.to, because we were not a jtdge led inquiry, let alone an

:07:06. > :07:08.internationally recognised court of law, we could not give a

:07:09. > :07:12.determinative conclusion about the legality or the rightness or not of

:07:13. > :07:18.the legal advice from the Attorney General. What we did do was analyse

:07:19. > :07:21.in depth and detail how that advice evolved. That is a polite w`y of

:07:22. > :07:28.putting it. The other word would be changed. Eventually it was taken

:07:29. > :07:33.into account, operated and communicated to Parliament. We

:07:34. > :07:41.thought all of that was open to very serious critical questions. To take

:07:42. > :07:44.your particular point, if I may I think it is clear that the

:07:45. > :07:50.convention that the Attornex General's advice to governmdnt is

:07:51. > :07:53.kept confidential must be rhght Any entity, including a central

:07:54. > :07:59.government, must be able to have access to its legal advice on a

:08:00. > :08:03.confidential footing. That hs the lawyer and client relationship.

:08:04. > :08:07.Unless the lawyer, in this case the Attorney General, exception`lly

:08:08. > :08:14.decide it's OK. Which, of course, we now know in the Iraq case that was

:08:15. > :08:17.accepted. It is, I am sure, for the Prime Minister or the departmental

:08:18. > :08:22.minister concerned to be responsible to Parliament for explaining what

:08:23. > :08:26.the legal position is. Parlhament will know that government whll have

:08:27. > :08:30.taken legal advice from the government's law officers. Ht is not

:08:31. > :08:34.the same as publishing the @ttorney General's advice in depth and

:08:35. > :08:42.detail. If I could just add a point, I think that, from our inquhry and

:08:43. > :08:50.consideration of the set of issues, the Cabinet should have had formal,

:08:51. > :08:58.written advice from the Attorney General and the opportunity to

:08:59. > :09:05.consider it around a table. You say it is OK? OK, it is OK, and move on.

:09:06. > :09:10.That did not begin come in ly view, to be an exceptional way of deciding

:09:11. > :09:15.whether or not there was a sufficient legal base for us to

:09:16. > :09:19.participate in the invasion of a sovereign country. You said earlier

:09:20. > :09:25.today that the real task will be taken the lessons learned. H think

:09:26. > :09:28.we would all agree with that. Can you identify to this committee where

:09:29. > :09:34.you are concerned that thosd lessons are not being learned? What more

:09:35. > :09:37.should be being done to look at the lessons from your inquiry. H know

:09:38. > :09:43.that evidence has been taken from the Cabinet Secretary. I have had a

:09:44. > :09:49.discussion with him myself. I am clear that, in particular

:09:50. > :09:53.departments, the Ministry of Defence not least, formal lessons ldarned

:09:54. > :10:00.and lessons to be taken frol the Iraq inquiry report are unddrway.

:10:01. > :10:06.Also, that the Cabinet Secrdtary has instituted across government, across

:10:07. > :10:11.Whitehall process, which will no doubt pick up the departmental

:10:12. > :10:17.conclusions and what to do `bout them. What I have neither the means,

:10:18. > :10:20.the time or involvement to `ssess is how quickly this will happen, how

:10:21. > :10:28.effective the process will turn out to be. I can say, and I really do

:10:29. > :10:31.mean this, even as a former mandarin official, I think it is for

:10:32. > :10:36.Parliament to insist on keeping scrutiny of this and making sure the

:10:37. > :10:40.process is brought to satisfactory outcomes. I don't think it would all

:10:41. > :10:46.happen at once, by the way. But I think it is a for Parliament to keep

:10:47. > :10:52.its close eye on. My question to you, I guess, is that we ard asking

:10:53. > :10:59.for guidance of Parliament, which areas you think need to be pursued,

:11:00. > :11:04.where are their gaps? I was answering from memories of the

:11:05. > :11:14.departmental structure withhn government. I think it is, hn a way,

:11:15. > :11:17.our intelligence community that has grown quite substantially, though

:11:18. > :11:22.still very small, we have the Intelligence and Security Committee,

:11:23. > :11:26.which is sometimes described as a Parliamentary Committee. It is

:11:27. > :11:28.actually a Prime Minister's committee, although we are

:11:29. > :11:31.parliamentarians. There is `n instrument there. It does ptblish

:11:32. > :11:40.its reports, and it has a lot of access. Otherwise, and I re`lly stop

:11:41. > :11:52.at the point where the individual departmental committees reqtire

:11:53. > :11:55.accounts to be given, where there is an instrument, an institution, a

:11:56. > :12:02.piece of machinery to bring the whole lot together, the tot`l

:12:03. > :12:07.government response, holisthc, the holistic response, I don't know I'm

:12:08. > :12:18.not sure there is such an instrument. During the condtct of

:12:19. > :12:21.the campaign, do you feel there is a greater role that can be pl`yed by

:12:22. > :12:28.Parliament in holding Government to account for their conduct dtring the

:12:29. > :12:31.period and beyond? I do think this is a very interesting and

:12:32. > :12:39.potentially very productive line of questioning. I think the role of

:12:40. > :12:42.Parliament, both on the floor of the House and in select committdes and

:12:43. > :12:50.elsewhere, perhaps, changes, in the case of a major military occupation

:12:51. > :13:00.based venture overseas, changes with time. To get involved in thd

:13:01. > :13:06.day-to-day operations, military or otherwise, would really be

:13:07. > :13:11.impossible anyway. But I thhnk Parliament should be entitldd to

:13:12. > :13:15.regular accounts of significant developments, for good or for ill,

:13:16. > :13:18.that may take place in a military campaign, and still more in a

:13:19. > :13:22.prolonged occupation and reconstruction set of events.

:13:23. > :13:30.After the whole thing is ovdr, I think it's an open question as to

:13:31. > :13:35.how best an assessment can be made. But the ultimate judgment I sparks

:13:36. > :13:41.well, the ultimate judgment lies with the electorate, but otherwise

:13:42. > :13:45.than that it lies with Parlhament. If Parliament is not satisfhed to

:13:46. > :13:50.the point that the Government cannot command a majority, in any such

:13:51. > :13:57.assessment, then it is over to the people again. That's not very..

:13:58. > :14:02.That's not flippant, but in real life a lot of this will be going on

:14:03. > :14:06.all the time. There needs to be as it were, a constant presencd of

:14:07. > :14:16.accountability and scrutiny going on. You touched earlier on the role

:14:17. > :14:21.that patronage plays sometiles in inhibiting the ability or the

:14:22. > :14:26.willingness of people to spdak truth to power, but that doesn't sometimes

:14:27. > :14:29.apply to Select Committee chairs, as we are elected. Do you think this is

:14:30. > :14:36.something that Select Committees should be playing a greater role in?

:14:37. > :14:40.I think you've taken me quite far out of my Iraqi inquiry report

:14:41. > :14:44.experience with that. Thank you I am going to adjourn the session at

:14:45. > :14:50.this point, because I'm almost certain there is about to bd a

:14:51. > :15:00.division. We'll resume at a quarter past 4, assuming there is only one

:15:01. > :15:05.division. Half past 4 if thdre is. The member has only started

:15:06. > :15:09.speaking... I think he is about to finish, so... Order. We'll `djourn

:15:10. > :16:35.and resume at a quarter past 4. An MP has just 10 minutes in the

:16:36. > :16:40.House of Commons to explain the law they would like to introducd. But

:16:41. > :16:44.just like your great ideas, they rarely succeed. The bills normally

:16:45. > :16:50.have to have at least some support from MPs in other parties. @nd if at

:16:51. > :16:54.the end of 10 minutes the idea is approved it can be considerdd many a

:16:55. > :16:59.lot more detail. What kind of bills are proposed this way? It is a turn

:17:00. > :17:05.in the road exercise. It can be almost anything. From regul`tions on

:17:06. > :17:12.driving instructors to Engl`nd having its own national anthem for

:17:13. > :17:17.sporting events. The options are God Save The Queen, Jerusalem and Land

:17:18. > :17:21.of Hope and Glory. But not only the clock ticking but the bills can be

:17:22. > :17:26.opposed. After an MP has set out their plan another MP can t`ke 0

:17:27. > :17:31.minutes to make a speech explaining why they object to it. I beg to move

:17:32. > :17:34.that leave be given to bring in a bill to provide the Secretary of

:17:35. > :17:37.State to provide for the introduction of proportional

:17:38. > :17:42.representation as a method for electing members of the House of

:17:43. > :17:44.Commons. While I acknowledgd and respect the honourable lady's

:17:45. > :17:48.commitment and zeal about this cause, I fear this bill may harm our

:17:49. > :17:53.democracy rather than helping it. The opposer can force a divhsion,

:17:54. > :17:56.meaning billings can be tord speed ode at this stage.

:17:57. > :18:00.THE SPEAKER: Order, the question is that the honourable member have

:18:01. > :18:10.leave to bring in the bill. As many as are of that opinion say `ye, of

:18:11. > :18:21.the contrary, in oe. Noe... THE SPEAKER: Division, clear the

:18:22. > :18:25.lobby. More often or not 10 min rule bills go through. The idea goes to

:18:26. > :18:29.the Commons on a Friday when bills put forward by backbench MPs are

:18:30. > :18:32.traditionally discussed. Unless the Government supports it the chances

:18:33. > :18:37.are it will be killed off. So why do it? For MPs it can be a good way to

:18:38. > :18:43.get something on the Governlent s radar. Or just talked about in

:18:44. > :18:48.public. It can raise the profile of an issue or an MP. It is not all a

:18:49. > :18:52.terrible waste of time from the Government's perspective either

:18:53. > :18:59.Just because a 10 minute rule bill fails doesn't mean the whold idea is

:19:00. > :19:03.sunk. Minister, can and do fish up good ideas which magically resurface

:19:04. > :19:08.in Government bills just a few months later. And there is `lways

:19:09. > :19:18.the hope, however small, th`t your bill might just make it. Between

:19:19. > :19:54.1983 and 2010, 12 10 minutes rule bills made into it law.

:19:55. > :19:59.100 years ago when women were battling to win the vote in the

:20:00. > :20:05.United Kingdom, this place was on the front line. Campaigners known as

:20:06. > :20:13.suffragists had been fighting for decades to secure the vote, but to

:20:14. > :20:18.no avail so. One group took direct action. The crown was led bx

:20:19. > :20:23.Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughter Christabel. Some of the womdn they

:20:24. > :20:30.inspired recalled those timds for a BBC documentary in 1968. 1968..

:20:31. > :20:39.About the only things a girl could do were to become a nurse or a

:20:40. > :20:44.governess. I was an arts sttdent and in South Kensington and Clapham Road

:20:45. > :20:48.art school. I enjoyed art vdry much but what I was really interdsted in

:20:49. > :20:53.was changing social conditions. I realised that couldn't be done until

:20:54. > :20:56.women had the vote. I was vdry annoyed about the whole poshtion,

:20:57. > :21:02.the difference between a box and a girl. Everybody wanted a box. It's a

:21:03. > :21:07.boy! And all that sort of stuff It irritated me enormously. And when

:21:08. > :21:12.one grew up and saw the differences in the opportunities that boys had

:21:13. > :21:17.and men had and those that women and girls had, that increased that

:21:18. > :21:19.feeling. To publicise their cause the women staged demonstrathons

:21:20. > :21:24.smashed windows and chained themselves to railings. The Daily

:21:25. > :21:28.Mail dubbed them the suffragettes. A term of abuse which later c`me to

:21:29. > :21:34.define the campaign. The wolen went to work and if the man was out of

:21:35. > :21:39.work, he could come outside that factory, take her money, spdnd it

:21:40. > :21:43.and she couldn't do anything. I was just gone 30 and they said, there's

:21:44. > :21:47.a suffragette round the concern speaking. I went round the corner

:21:48. > :21:52.and I thought to myself, thhs woman's talking sense. When I

:21:53. > :22:00.actually joined I happened to meet an open air meeting and heard the

:22:01. > :22:07.speaker say, lunatics, crimhnals, paupers and women may not vote. I

:22:08. > :22:14.hadn't joined before then. @ll my instincts were there... There was a

:22:15. > :22:22.tremendous force around us for good. Some people couldn't take it. I

:22:23. > :22:29.remember going on poster parades and they were charming women who were in

:22:30. > :22:33.it. They absolutely were smothered with eggs, rotten tomatoes. You

:22:34. > :22:38.never saw anything like what we looked like at the end. The Palace

:22:39. > :22:41.of Westminster was a place of huge symbolism for the suffragettes. They

:22:42. > :22:45.had been denied the vote, so they were going to take their fight into

:22:46. > :22:48.the heart of Parliament. Inhtially women would come into Parli`ment, as

:22:49. > :22:53.indeed everybody was allowed to do, and ask to see an MP. They would be

:22:54. > :22:59.shown into Central Lobby. When they were sitting waiting they would

:23:00. > :23:05.often leap up on to the seats and shout votes for women and blow

:23:06. > :23:11.whistles. It became such a state that women were banned from Central

:23:12. > :23:16.Lobby. By 1908 the women were attracting the huge numbers but

:23:17. > :23:19.Asquith was unmoved. So the selfra jets planned to rush Parlialent

:23:20. > :23:23.There had been a massive demonstration. A 250,000 people

:23:24. > :23:27.gathered and we didn't have any movement on the right to vote. They

:23:28. > :23:35.decided to organise this rush on Parliament. We think about 60,0 0

:23:36. > :23:38.people were on this rush. Indeed, it has been commemorated recently the

:23:39. > :23:41.environmental movement, a climate change rush on part. It was a

:23:42. > :23:46.historical precedent for other issues as well. Some women did

:23:47. > :23:52.manage to break through the police lines. Lines. One even made it on to

:23:53. > :23:56.the floor of the Commons ch`mber. Emmeline Pankhurst was jaildd for

:23:57. > :24:00.her part in inciting the rush. On her release her colleagues `warded

:24:01. > :24:05.her this med A it is now owned by the House of Commons sand in the

:24:06. > :24:07.Central Lobby Having the exhibition in the heart of the Houses of

:24:08. > :24:11.Parliament is very important. This is the place the public can come and

:24:12. > :24:14.where we want to be able to talk to people about the importance of the

:24:15. > :24:19.right to vote. What women and others went through to get the right to

:24:20. > :24:25.vote. And to encourage them to exercise that right democratically.

:24:26. > :24:29.It is very, very important. In November 190 suffragettes would

:24:30. > :24:36.again try to rush Parliament but were forced back by police. The

:24:37. > :24:43.violence of the day caused the women to name it Black Friday. Thd Black

:24:44. > :24:47.Friday deputation was the most extraordinary thing and most of us

:24:48. > :24:52.seem to be unable to remembdr the treatment we received. I myself was

:24:53. > :25:00.arrested twice on Black Friday. I can't remember one time at `ll. The

:25:01. > :25:07.other time I remembered that we were smashed against a wall and we were

:25:08. > :25:11.arrested. But some people h`d the most ghastly treatment. Havhng been

:25:12. > :25:15.banned from Central Lobby the suffragettes had switched their

:25:16. > :25:22.attentions to the hall linkhng it to one of the main entrances. Hn May

:25:23. > :25:26.1909 a group of people, two men and four women, entered St Stephen's and

:25:27. > :25:31.the men asked to see their lembers of Parliament and were allowed into

:25:32. > :25:36.Central Lobby, but the women because they were banned waiting on the

:25:37. > :25:39.seats. Of a few minutes thex jumped up and had padlocks and chahns

:25:40. > :25:46.hidden around their clothing and chained themselves to four of the

:25:47. > :25:54.statues in St Stephen's. It was protest to advertise a forthcoming

:25:55. > :25:59.rally. But the statue of Falkland was damaged and the spur was knocked

:26:00. > :26:08.off. It is still missing from the statue. Emily Wilding David son was

:26:09. > :26:12.one of the protesters. She hid in the cupboard. When asked her

:26:13. > :26:18.address, she could reply, the House of Commons. Two years later she died

:26:19. > :26:23.when she was hit by the King's horse at the Derby while protesting. The

:26:24. > :26:29.scarf she was wearing that day is on loan to the Commons exhibithon.

:26:30. > :26:35.Whether direct action proved more decisive in winning the votd than

:26:36. > :26:38.peaceful campaigning is deb`table. The campaign for suffrage hdre and

:26:39. > :26:41.in the United States was connected with the campaign for working rights

:26:42. > :26:45.for women. So you have a whole range of different things going on.

:26:46. > :26:48.Undoubtedly the militant action also played its part. Very to sax I don't

:26:49. > :26:52.know whether I would have bden as brave as they were in some of the

:26:53. > :26:57.action that they took. It is hard to put yourself back in that position

:26:58. > :27:00.but I wonder what would I h`ve done? I hope I would have been on the

:27:01. > :27:06.demonstration. Whether I wotld have chained myself to the railings or

:27:07. > :27:12.thrown stones, been on hungdr strike and force Ed fed in prison, I'm not

:27:13. > :27:17.sure. Public pressure grew. Suffragettes in prison, it was a

:27:18. > :27:22.hugely unpopular policy. In the First World War the women took up

:27:23. > :27:27.the jobs the men left behind. Their war effort was recognised whth the

:27:28. > :27:32.Representation of the Peopld Act. In 1918 women over 30 were givdn the

:27:33. > :27:39.right to vote. They finally got the right to vote at the same age as men

:27:40. > :27:44.in 1958. Nine years of militancy done as much good as what the 5

:27:45. > :27:48.previous years did, but it was the 194 war and all the angle t`kes from

:27:49. > :27:53.it that brought the vote, in my opinion. Emmeline Pankhurst died a

:27:54. > :27:58.month before the 1928 Act bdcame law. This statue to her was unveiled

:27:59. > :28:02.two years later. I stands in Victoria gardens close to the

:28:03. > :31:24.Parliament she had fought so hard to influence.

:31:25. > :31:46.Order, order. I am going to bring in Andrew at this moment. Thank you,

:31:47. > :31:52.chairman. Sir John, in your view, was the invasion of Iraq legal? We

:31:53. > :32:00.thought about a carefully contrived and view of words. We thought it was

:32:01. > :32:06.unsatisfactory and deficient, in more than a few respects. That did

:32:07. > :32:15.not enable us to come to thd conclusion that the war unl`wful,

:32:16. > :32:20.neither did we endorse that of race and that is as far as I can to get.

:32:21. > :32:28.I can't expand one more sentence if you wish. If you had a judgd led

:32:29. > :32:31.enquired, from what I have seen that would not have made it posshble for

:32:32. > :32:39.the judge to get to that vidw either, because it is decishve or

:32:40. > :32:44.simply an opinion. And we wdre not in a position to want to offer that

:32:45. > :32:49.opinion. I know that some of us have, at the Netherlands for example

:32:50. > :32:54.but it has no effect. The point was to get the lesson about leg`l advice

:32:55. > :33:01.on such a critical issue and how it is developed, endorsed and

:33:02. > :33:05.understood, frankly, by the Cabinet. And in our view that did not happen

:33:06. > :33:14.in this case. I am going to try to use the chairman's example, would

:33:15. > :33:17.you understand, if a reason`ble person could come to the conclusion

:33:18. > :33:24.after what you have said today that it was in fact an illegal w`r? I

:33:25. > :33:33.think that reasonable person would have to be brave as well as

:33:34. > :33:37.reasonable. The follow-throtgh, so what, no resolution for the United

:33:38. > :33:47.Nations and that is the onlx body that could issue a decisive

:33:48. > :33:51.conclusion. O jurisdiction of which I am aware that can be brought into

:33:52. > :33:59.play. It is an opinion. I would almost say, so what? What h`ppened

:34:00. > :34:02.happened. The basis of the legal advice was highly unsatisfactory but

:34:03. > :34:13.that is not the same as sayhng it was illegal, and therefore something

:34:14. > :34:19.should follow. I cannot say that. Do you feel Sir John, that Tonx Blair

:34:20. > :34:26.or anybody else giving eviddnce or having access to your original

:34:27. > :34:30.report either delayed or diluted or took away from the original report?

:34:31. > :34:39.I think you are asking me about the nature of the process. For ly

:34:40. > :34:48.part... It was essential for us to get for witnesses, and give them the

:34:49. > :34:52.chance to see and comment on analysis, and see where it was

:34:53. > :34:58.critical of them. Also, bec`use evidence that they had not seen

:34:59. > :35:04.before could imply criticisl of them. They should have the chance to

:35:05. > :35:12.see that. Despite holding 130 sessions, 150 witnesses... The huge

:35:13. > :35:21.amount of evidence, it is in the archive. And most of that w`s not

:35:22. > :35:25.available at the time, or sden and read necessarily by all the

:35:26. > :35:35.witnesses. We had to these relevant passages in draft under

:35:36. > :35:40.confidentiality. And I think in the pursuit of fairness, but also the

:35:41. > :35:46.pursuit of getting the best possible quality of report, far from holding

:35:47. > :35:52.up the show actually improvdd the eventual outcome. For example, our

:35:53. > :35:56.attention was brought to documents that had not been disclosed or

:35:57. > :36:01.discovered in the course of other evidence taking that was relevant.

:36:02. > :36:05.And you get to individual perspectives on the same pohnt, not

:36:06. > :36:12.be seen, it is helpful to know that. I got to come to a conclusion, or as

:36:13. > :36:19.we did in one case, simply point to the class of evidence that could not

:36:20. > :36:25.be resolved. And all of that lies behind the Maxwell process. But what

:36:26. > :36:40.is not widely understood, this could send offensive, is that the Maxwell

:36:41. > :36:47.process was essential but dhd not hold up the rest of the work. We had

:36:48. > :36:50.draft text out for comment, doing other work to finalise the report.

:36:51. > :36:56.But what we could not do was start the Maxwell process until the

:36:57. > :37:10.agreement from government to publish sensitive material. That

:37:11. > :37:21.directly unfair. Sensitive documents, that would have been

:37:22. > :37:29.unfair. We had to hold the start of the the Maxwell process, not only

:37:30. > :37:37.Cabinet ministers, what the -- but the Blair Bush exchanges. There it

:37:38. > :37:41.is. I think myself that it did in the end prove a constructivd

:37:42. > :37:52.dimension to the work of thd enquiry. On the whole, witndsses who

:37:53. > :37:55.were shown text under the M`xwell procedure complied with

:37:56. > :38:02.confidentiality for the most part. And with a reasonable timet`ble One

:38:03. > :38:06.or two cases, a request for more time. And looking at the sc`le of

:38:07. > :38:14.what we had to assure them that was never unreasonable. One last

:38:15. > :38:21.question. How many witnesses subject to the Maxwell process? I would be

:38:22. > :38:27.reluctant to give a number, for fear of breaching the confidenti`lity

:38:28. > :38:39.agreement because by using the numbers... No-one who did not give

:38:40. > :38:42.evidence as a witness was involved in the Maxwell process. And the

:38:43. > :38:47.number was not to the total of those who gave evidence. I am sorry not to

:38:48. > :38:54.be able to help you more. Btt I cannot. I think you are takhng one

:38:55. > :39:02.step further. Because these are your personal views. The conclushons of

:39:03. > :39:07.the report, going to point that the public are to feel more sathsfied

:39:08. > :39:15.that you have got to the bottom of it. We are very grateful. Going to

:39:16. > :39:20.beekeeping many people busy for perhaps a generation. Certahnly some

:39:21. > :39:28.academics. I just want to come back to one point that you made, correct

:39:29. > :39:37.me if I am wrong but I think you said that what happened did not

:39:38. > :39:43.begin to be an acceptable w`y to examine the legal advice. I think

:39:44. > :39:52.that was your phrase. And the examination consideration of that at

:39:53. > :40:00.Cabinet level was defunct? H want to ask your question about that. Yes.

:40:01. > :40:05.The Attorney General was ultimately responsible for this advice. He is a

:40:06. > :40:14.Legal adviser to the governlent and Parliament. He also has a role in

:40:15. > :40:22.the Crown Prosecution Service. Among others. He has trebling of jobs

:40:23. > :40:32.Some have argued that creatds a conflict of interest. And it was

:40:33. > :40:36.evidenced in this case? You have just been telling us that the

:40:37. > :40:38.government was selective with advice. You have told us th`t things

:40:39. > :40:44.went wrong. What is the recommendation for how to ptt this

:40:45. > :40:55.right? I think part of the `nswer lies with Cabinet ministers, testing

:40:56. > :41:01.the strength of the legal c`se when the legal basis is crucial to

:41:02. > :41:06.military and security decishon. That is part of the answer. And `nother,

:41:07. > :41:13.I think it is a legitimate dnquired into any Attorney General who has

:41:14. > :41:20.asked to advise on something outside of his own legal specialism and

:41:21. > :41:26.experience, as to what expert assistance he may want or t`ke. Not

:41:27. > :41:32.necessarily naming lawyers, but we do know one of the distinguhshed

:41:33. > :41:41.names. More than that, I thhnk you pose the question should thd three

:41:42. > :41:46.separate roles of the Attorney General be separated, and not killed

:41:47. > :41:52.by one -- held by one person? My only experience is not in this

:41:53. > :42:00.jurisdiction but the Republhc of Ireland, many years ago one of the

:42:01. > :42:06.seven Attorney General 's -, serving Attorney General found himsdlf

:42:07. > :42:17.sharing a flat with someone facing a murder charge! That was not

:42:18. > :42:23.particularly easy given the charges. With phrases like that, language

:42:24. > :42:34.like brave... We have been remaindered of --

:42:35. > :42:43.reminded of Sir Humphrey. Good. You also said you were going to declare

:42:44. > :42:48.interest. I thought you said you were going to declare yoursdlf as

:42:49. > :42:49.part of the trade union. I have interrupted. What is the answer to

:42:50. > :42:53.the question? . This statue to her was unveiled

:42:54. > :42:55.two years later. I stands in Victoria gardens close to the

:42:56. > :42:58.Parliament she had fought so hard to influence. I really have no direct

:42:59. > :43:02.experience or experience from the Iraq inquiry but from the gdneral

:43:03. > :43:08.machinery of Government background it is perfectly OK to duplicate

:43:09. > :43:11.roles providing they are not capable of conflicting with each other.

:43:12. > :43:14.Where you can see a demonstration of possible conflict you must separate

:43:15. > :43:21.them or the holders of the two roles. And now apply that clear

:43:22. > :43:26.doctrine, what conclusion dhd you come to? I don't see a conflict in

:43:27. > :43:29.the Iraq case between what the Attorney General had to advhse on

:43:30. > :43:36.and his other responsibilithes. I think the real question is the

:43:37. > :43:42.process by which he was enabled to reach his eventual advice and the

:43:43. > :43:50.treatment of that advice by the users, the clients, the Cabhnet

:43:51. > :43:55.What do you mean by enailed? Bernard, ask your question. Sir

:43:56. > :44:01.John, what do you mean by enabled. By what respect was the Attorney

:44:02. > :44:07.General enabled to come to `n opinion, because he did change his

:44:08. > :44:13.view. Oh yes, but the questhon goes back in time to whether he was

:44:14. > :44:19.sufficiently involved in 2002 in the developing Government policx towards

:44:20. > :44:29.Iraq. He was quite clear until February 2003 that an authorising

:44:30. > :44:32.resolution from the United Nations explicitly authorising military

:44:33. > :44:37.intervention would be required. He wasn't directly involved in the

:44:38. > :44:43.drafting and negotiation of Security Council Resolution 1441. Pivotal to

:44:44. > :44:46.that is, did it by itself, without a second resolution, give sufficient

:44:47. > :44:52.authority? He was not involved much in that. He saw some of the papers.

:44:53. > :44:56.Telegrams were exchanged, btt not the whole stream. And so he wasn't

:44:57. > :45:00.in a position to say other than that up until February, I think ht was,

:45:01. > :45:06.he did not believe it gave sufficient authority on it own. Now,

:45:07. > :45:12.he wasn't enabled by being close enough to the policy process, I

:45:13. > :45:16.think, to reach a firm, a fhnal conclusion sufficiently early. You

:45:17. > :45:22.may say, and I think it'd bd a perfectly good argument, th`t as the

:45:23. > :45:29.diplomatic and military str`nds developed, and to some degrde were

:45:30. > :45:33.intertwined, the point when a final firm conclusion on the legality of

:45:34. > :45:39.involvement could be receivdd was late, in the spring of 2003. But he

:45:40. > :45:45.would have been spared the awkwardness of frankly change his

:45:46. > :45:50.view right round 180 degrees if he had more involvement more closely

:45:51. > :45:55.much earlier. So you find nothing suspicious about the change? Not

:45:56. > :46:00.fishy, no. Bernard had one other question. Unless there was some

:46:01. > :46:06.partner qualification you w`nt to make to that. I want to pick up on

:46:07. > :46:12.the word you used, chairman, perfunctory. Key to the attorney's

:46:13. > :46:18.final advice was that the Prime Minister should certify that Saddam

:46:19. > :46:23.Hussein continued in breach of Security Council resolutions. And

:46:24. > :46:26.the Prime Minister turned that round in 24 hours without asking `nybody

:46:27. > :46:32.what the basis for confirming it was. What the attorney did not ask

:46:33. > :46:37.him was, on what legal basis is I open to a Prime Minister, one

:46:38. > :46:41.representing one member of the Security Council to reach that

:46:42. > :46:45.conclusion and operate on the basis of it when the majority of the

:46:46. > :46:50.Security Council took the opposite view? And your answer to th`t is?

:46:51. > :46:56.That question was not put. OK, but your answer to the we could have

:46:57. > :47:01.been, no basis at all, by the sounds that you are putting it. I can't

:47:02. > :47:03.answer it as a legal question but politically in terms of

:47:04. > :47:10.international politics, if the majority of the Security Cotncil,

:47:11. > :47:18.are against something, how can you as an individual certify th`t

:47:19. > :47:24.nonetheless the Security Cotncil has by itself prior resolutions

:47:25. > :47:28.authorised in this case a mhlitary invasion? But the Prime Minhster did

:47:29. > :47:33.the wrong thing to turn this round in 24 hours? He was asked the

:47:34. > :47:36.question and help answered ht. But whether he answered it

:47:37. > :47:41.satisfactorily is what we criticised. You are saying he did

:47:42. > :47:46.not do that in the right wax, but in the wrong way? He should have sought

:47:47. > :47:49.carefully thought through and argued and fact-based advice and h`d that

:47:50. > :47:57.discussed collectively and `greed before being able to sign, hf you

:47:58. > :48:04.like, a ser ir Kate that in his view Saddam Hussein was the breach of the

:48:05. > :48:10.Security Council resolution. We all know the time the inquiry took was

:48:11. > :48:15.much longer than we had hopdd and it caused a great deal of distress to

:48:16. > :48:19.servicemen and their familids. What lesson do you draw from that and

:48:20. > :48:25.what lessons for future inqtiries? And could you say as well...

:48:26. > :48:28.Briefly. While you had a long task, whether capacity issues outside your

:48:29. > :48:35.control, say, in the Governlent that also held up your inquhry?

:48:36. > :48:39.Thank you. I do feel and felt throughout a continuing sense of

:48:40. > :48:42.concern for and sympathy with the bereaved families. We were of course

:48:43. > :48:48.in running touch with them, if you can put it that way. In the outcome

:48:49. > :48:57.they say that they are more than satisfied, despite the length of

:48:58. > :49:01.time. I always try to avoid the word delay, because that implies

:49:02. > :49:04.avoidable delay. Had their been more resources available to the

:49:05. > :49:09.Government or the inquiry, would it have shortened time span? I do

:49:10. > :49:15.accept if right at the start I won't say we had a much larger st`ff but a

:49:16. > :49:18.significantly bigger one we could have processed the original material

:49:19. > :49:23.more quickly perhaps. I don't think it is a matter of saving ye`rs, or

:49:24. > :49:28.anything neither, and with hindsight we would have asked for mord

:49:29. > :49:31.resource at the outset. But the second part of your point, what

:49:32. > :49:35.about resources in Government? I think those resources in terms of

:49:36. > :49:43.finding archive material for many years and across a lot of

:49:44. > :49:51.departments imposed an extrdme strain on departments. Thosd that

:49:52. > :49:55.had already dig tied their `rchives were in a much better place. Those

:49:56. > :50:01.in the middle of a changeovdr found it very difficult. As much `s I can

:50:02. > :50:06.say. That's very helpful, thank you. Sarah Wollaston wanted to ask a

:50:07. > :50:12.question. You've made it cldar the cabinet should have had accdss to

:50:13. > :50:19.the full legal advice. Wherd they cabinet members themselves negligent

:50:20. > :50:23.or calf leer in not insisting on it or were they obstructed? I don't

:50:24. > :50:29.think they were obstructed hn an active sense. Robin Cook fotght his

:50:30. > :50:33.corner valiantly and with hhndsight he was right. Not least on

:50:34. > :50:39.intelligence. He wasn't opposed to the invasion on principle btt he

:50:40. > :50:45.correctly said before his s`d demise that you can read the intelligence

:50:46. > :50:50.in different ways. The way he read it turned out to be the right way.

:50:51. > :50:59.Deliberate obstruction, no. Passivity? Yes. Do you feel they

:51:00. > :51:06.were negligent. That again... Too strong do you feel? Feel?. Sir

:51:07. > :51:14.Humphrey might not have said negligent but passive. You've been

:51:15. > :51:18.relieved of your Sir Humphrdy sense built. What does Sir John Chilcot

:51:19. > :51:22.think? The Cabinet Minister in the modern age, with so much washing

:51:23. > :51:26.over you, if you are not directly engaged in the Iraq thing, hf you

:51:27. > :51:29.are not the Defence Secretary or the Foreign Secretary for International

:51:30. > :51:33.Development Secretary, you `re not being negligent. Surely this is the

:51:34. > :51:45.most extraordinary decision that they will have made that ye`r. Yes.

:51:46. > :51:48.Or in that period since Suez. To feel that that's somebody else's

:51:49. > :51:51.responsibility when you are a cabinet member responsibility for

:51:52. > :51:54.decision making and you are not going to take the trouble the look

:51:55. > :51:58.at advice that could have bden available to you, isn't that a

:51:59. > :52:07.staggering dereliction of your responsibility? I'm trying to avoid,

:52:08. > :52:11.trying to find word of my own rather than staggering, dereliction and

:52:12. > :52:14.negligent. It was not the w`y Cabinet members should have, not the

:52:15. > :52:17.approach they should have t`ken to the seriousness of the legal

:52:18. > :52:25.question. About the invasion of Iraq. Thank you. Would you `ccept

:52:26. > :52:29.pusillanimous in the face of an overmighty PM?

:52:30. > :52:33.LAUGHTER. I think the origin of the word pusillanimous has something to

:52:34. > :52:42.do with fleas. It is no good changing the subject like that.

:52:43. > :52:48.Well, no, can I, at the risk of .. I think you will find that's the word

:52:49. > :52:52.used by Nigel Lawson to describe his attempt to mobilise opposithon to

:52:53. > :52:59.the poll tax in the mid 1980s from cabinet colleagues. Yes. I think I

:53:00. > :53:06.cited Mr Straw's answer to ` question we put to him in oral test

:53:07. > :53:13.money. It was about the domhnance and authority Mr Blair had `cquired

:53:14. > :53:19.by his political success in '97 and again in '91. That didn't mdan that

:53:20. > :53:25.they were pusillanimous necdssarily, but they, I think, had a fahth in

:53:26. > :53:30.his being right. It was not for them to say, no, Tony, you're wrong. Only

:53:31. > :53:38.Robin Cook and a bit of Clare shot did. OK. Thank you chairman. How do

:53:39. > :53:43.you respond, Sir John, to the criticism that's been levelled

:53:44. > :53:47.against your report, that this is a report that Sir Humphrey wotld be

:53:48. > :53:51.pleased with? Senior politicians have been put under the spotlight.

:53:52. > :53:56.There's criticism of Tony Blair and some military chiefs but not really

:53:57. > :54:01.any criticism of the Civil Service? If one goes through the 12 volumes

:54:02. > :54:10.with care and in detail, yot will find a large number of references

:54:11. > :54:16.which are far from complimentary. You want a distillation? In the

:54:17. > :54:21.distillation process or the double distillation process the

:54:22. > :54:25.deficiencies are well exposdd in the way that machinery was established

:54:26. > :54:31.or not established. The way that processes were conducted. And for

:54:32. > :54:36.that, the Cabinet Secretary of the time, set secretaries of thd time,

:54:37. > :54:44.and senior officials as well as military leaders must take some

:54:45. > :54:50.responsibility. We point th`t out. I don't myself think that ex-coriating

:54:51. > :54:57.a particular individual by name for something which was essenti`lly a

:54:58. > :55:01.matter of pure judgment and under political direction would h`ve been

:55:02. > :55:06.entirely fair. What I do thhnk is that senior officials as well as

:55:07. > :55:10.others do have responsibilities to and about their staff. You lentioned

:55:11. > :55:16.the military. The fact that there was no set of rules of engagement

:55:17. > :55:22.when we launched in May, in March 2003. Soldier it's not know, who can

:55:23. > :55:27.I shoot and who can I not shoot and in what situation? That was a

:55:28. > :55:31.deficiency not of the polithcians or Ministers' making but of thdir

:55:32. > :55:36.seniors. When officials propose pieces of machinery to enable the

:55:37. > :55:40.run-up to a war to be well conducted, their advice is turned

:55:41. > :55:45.down, that is not their fault. But it may be that their leaders should

:55:46. > :55:49.have insisted more strongly. Understand didn't happen, and we say

:55:50. > :55:52.that. But from the point of view of officials, because there ard plenty

:55:53. > :55:57.of politicians and their ard military people that you nale. You

:55:58. > :56:03.say if we good through carefully all of the volumes of your report we

:56:04. > :56:15.might be able to identify the civil servants. Who are they and what was

:56:16. > :56:22.the central role they played in this fiasco? All I can do is rettrn to

:56:23. > :56:29.the narrative in the run-up to the invasion and then the occup`tion and

:56:30. > :56:36.the security role we Nelson Mandela the security role we held in the

:56:37. > :56:43.south-east. Many actors are named. Where you want to find a sufficient

:56:44. > :56:50.failure of duty or of judgmdnt, then we do point it out. You will find it

:56:51. > :56:56.there. Without wishing to phck on an individual, which I am about to do,

:56:57. > :57:01.is it fair the say, look at somebody like David Manning. Manning. One of

:57:02. > :57:04.the closest advisers on fordign policy metres the Prime Minhster

:57:05. > :57:06.throughout this time. What responsibility should someone like

:57:07. > :57:08.that play for the advice thd Prime Minister receives and therefore the

:57:09. > :57:16.shaping of the Prime Ministdr's views? I mentioned already hn this

:57:17. > :57:21.session that both he and Jonathan Powell, his superior, did sdek to

:57:22. > :57:25.persuade Tony Blair not to put those fateful words, I will be with you

:57:26. > :57:29.whatever. They did their duty in that respect. But they didn't advise

:57:30. > :57:32.him to take anything else ott of that letter. But that was not their

:57:33. > :57:34.fault. It with as the Prime Minister's decision.

:57:35. > :57:38.Constitutionally it was his authority, not theirs. If you give

:57:39. > :57:44.your advice and it is rejected, you have a choice of two things: You

:57:45. > :57:49.accept it or you resign. With respect, Sir John, it seems a thin

:57:50. > :57:55.defence for Jonathan Powell and David Manning that in one instant

:57:56. > :58:01.they required the extraction of a few words, nothing else. Thd reason

:58:02. > :58:05.I'm about themle if a Prime Minister seeks to run a sofa style of the

:58:06. > :58:09.Government they require the help and support of others who deterline what

:58:10. > :58:12.briefing papers they will sde, which advisers they see. Those two

:58:13. > :58:14.gentlemen in this case would probably have been central to the

:58:15. > :58:26.operation. Yes. That is perfectly true. And on

:58:27. > :58:30.the committee, we found deficiencies, arrangements when the

:58:31. > :58:41.Prime Minister's policy advhser at Number ten, also held the role of

:58:42. > :58:48.overseas assessments in the Cabinet. That shifted the balance, the tip

:58:49. > :58:54.and of that dual role to thd Number ten responsibility, and too far away

:58:55. > :59:01.from the responsibility to the Cabinet. Can you criticise the

:59:02. > :59:08.individual, for not saying H won't accept both? I think that is going a

:59:09. > :59:14.bit far. But the exercise of both of those roles is difficult and should

:59:15. > :59:19.not be replicated. Implicathon is that you have not been as

:59:20. > :59:31.challenging, but not any crhticism of those officials? I did not

:59:32. > :59:34.feel... None of those involved, are part of my own generation, bar one

:59:35. > :59:41.slight overlap. We have takdn all the evidence that we could `nd

:59:42. > :59:55.published. It is for you and others to endorse or find fault. For our

:59:56. > :00:00.part, my part and another former diplomat, one or two historhans and

:00:01. > :00:04.our public servant not that Whitehall. We agreed this w`s

:00:05. > :00:09.unanimous. Either way it is was drawing the attention because

:00:10. > :00:19.covering that degree of controversy it could have lead to minorhty

:00:20. > :00:25.views, but none. One final puestion. You accused Tony Blair of bding

:00:26. > :00:29.unreasonable in his assessmdnt of the evidence and the decisions made,

:00:30. > :00:35.at the beginning of this session, do you think other unreasonabld people

:00:36. > :00:37.at Downing Street, who drew similar conclusions and encouraged the Prime

:00:38. > :00:46.Minister on the course of action that he was taking? In the British

:00:47. > :00:55.system, I do not think I can point to a particular individual who I

:00:56. > :01:04.could demonstrate had given unreasonable advice, in supporting

:01:05. > :01:10.the Iraq misadventure. It is difficult to answer, becausd so

:01:11. > :01:20.many, so much multiple dialogue going on. You cannot be surd from

:01:21. > :01:29.the surviving documentary archive, vast though it is, who said what to

:01:30. > :01:32.who, to what effect. All we can do is read what we've read, publish

:01:33. > :01:40.what we have published, all of it that is relevant. If you can't. .

:01:41. > :01:48.Who else could? You have sahd that one man is unreasonable, but you

:01:49. > :01:53.cannot say any others were? It was the chairman's wording, not mine.

:01:54. > :02:03.But I accepted the line of questioning. Do I place othdrs in

:02:04. > :02:06.the same position? I think that the Foreign Secretary faced an

:02:07. > :02:13.extraordinarily difficult t`sk, the formal objective of British policy

:02:14. > :02:21.was to disarm Saddam, and the instrument chosen as a mattdr of

:02:22. > :02:30.policy was for a long time containment, but then becamd chorus

:02:31. > :02:35.of diplomacy. That can end tp in two places. Jack Straw was award of

:02:36. > :02:38.that. And it fails. Sunk into military expedition. You always knew

:02:39. > :02:44.that your major partner was going to do that anyway. It is a tough

:02:45. > :02:54.situation to be in. But it was a matter of choosing to be in. Thank

:02:55. > :02:59.you. We have talked a lot about the weapons of mass destruction. I

:03:00. > :03:09.remember, a dossier, one of the documents put out by the government

:03:10. > :03:12.and it made horrendous readhng about how Saddam treated his own citizens,

:03:13. > :03:19.and by way of background I saw some things that made me shamed, how we

:03:20. > :03:30.had not intervened to prevent that slaughter of human beings. How much

:03:31. > :03:35.did you consider that regimd was worthy of some kind of action from

:03:36. > :03:37.the international community? The underlying justification for any

:03:38. > :03:48.action on those grounds, humanitarian grounds, would have

:03:49. > :03:55.defied international law. Kosovo is the interesting case, and it was

:03:56. > :04:03.referred to by the PM and others. But didn't arise. Because the United

:04:04. > :04:08.Nations Security Council had the threat of a Russian veto, and the

:04:09. > :04:14.collective view that somethhng had to be done to deal with the

:04:15. > :04:21.disasters at Kosovo. No objdction to that. When you come to Iraq, you

:04:22. > :04:25.have up until the day of thd invasion, a majority of the members

:04:26. > :04:37.of the security Council, eldcted and unelected, opposed to taking action.

:04:38. > :04:40.In the face of that... Nobody was making a humanitarian argumdnt,

:04:41. > :04:44.notwithstanding that we could not justify on the grounds, we better

:04:45. > :04:49.save Iraqi people from this dictator. That was never a that was

:04:50. > :04:56.running. It may not have bedn a United Nations level, but I remember

:04:57. > :05:03.reading that dossier, and I thought I wish I could share this whth my

:05:04. > :05:09.constituents. It is horrendous. They could then understand why I was

:05:10. > :05:18.voting. Not the only reason. I just wish I could have shared it with

:05:19. > :05:29.those holding me to account. I know the galaxies, but how much ,-

:05:30. > :05:37.legalities, but how much did you consider that? Short of milhtary

:05:38. > :05:47.invasion, yes. That was the policy of this government and most are

:05:48. > :05:50.responsible governments. Action short of the invasion and occupation

:05:51. > :06:02.of a sovereign country on humanitarian grounds. I can

:06:03. > :06:07.understand entirely as we h`ve said that the area 's points and in my

:06:08. > :06:16.introduction, the nature of Saddam was barbaric, and beyond anx

:06:17. > :06:18.defence, but that did not alount in international law or policy meeting,

:06:19. > :06:27.sufficient grounds for the hnvasion of a sovereign country. We had not

:06:28. > :06:35.been in that business since 194 . Given that the Prime Ministdr has

:06:36. > :06:38.the prerogative, and can go to war without consulting, if Tony Blair

:06:39. > :06:48.had done that, would we be sitting here today? Asked to look into it in

:06:49. > :06:51.such great detail? If you h`d no consultation from Parliament, we

:06:52. > :06:57.would not be sitting in the same seats today. That is not a flippant

:06:58. > :07:05.response. Why do you say th`t? Because Tony Blair consulted

:07:06. > :07:12.Parliament, before... But if he had not... Standard procedure. People

:07:13. > :07:16.would not have said he should have gone to Parliament. Correct me if I

:07:17. > :07:27.am wrong. It had not been done to that extent before. I am under the

:07:28. > :07:31.impression that the conventhon, short of existential crisis,

:07:32. > :07:39.Parliament would be consultdd. That convention is now surely dolinant.

:07:40. > :07:53.You mention that politics h`s been damaged by this affair. Has it been

:07:54. > :07:56.damaged by your findings? Not black and white? To be fair to

:07:57. > :08:01.politicians, you have had sdven years to look at this, we h`d seven

:08:02. > :08:10.days. You have had the benefit of hindsight. We did not have those at

:08:11. > :08:14.all. I am chair of the Northern Ireland and quietly, I have seen the

:08:15. > :08:21.Saville and quietly take 12 years and people have questioned what it

:08:22. > :08:25.has achieved. Was this worthwhile? It has come on board with internal

:08:26. > :08:30.conversations about the Irap Inquiry. When we were finished and

:08:31. > :08:40.in the position to publish we were confident that the range and scope

:08:41. > :08:48.of the lessons we wanted attention to be drawn to justify the dffort. I

:08:49. > :08:54.do not think comparisons with cost to other enquiries gets us far,

:08:55. > :09:04.because they tend to be specific. Usually costing more. But that is by

:09:05. > :09:08.the way. I think if you havd an enquiry, the key thing is it should

:09:09. > :09:20.carry confidence for those ht is eventually going to look at. The

:09:21. > :09:24.headlines, what is the single most important lesson, suggestion,

:09:25. > :09:35.finding, you reached? What hs that? Telling factor? You will not mind...

:09:36. > :09:38.When I get that question, frequently, like on the Tod`y

:09:39. > :09:43.Programme, it is not one single thing. It is a host of things. We

:09:44. > :09:59.were asked to look effectivdly name yours of the government and you

:10:00. > :10:05.cannot pick out just one message, below which others sit. If xou press

:10:06. > :10:08.me hard, a failure to exert an exercise, collective responsibility

:10:09. > :10:17.for such a big decision and then to supervise the conduct. Thank you.

:10:18. > :10:25.One quick question. The parliamentary vote. The Turkish

:10:26. > :10:29.Parliament six weeks before said no. Saw the operation had to cole from

:10:30. > :10:38.the south. There's Parliament was given the vote, within 24 hours

:10:39. > :10:40.That is a sub. One third of the startline. Former colleagues in

:10:41. > :10:45.final battle preparation and Parliament is thinking it is going

:10:46. > :10:56.to make a decision. It is practically absurd. Pull thd plug at

:10:57. > :11:00.that moment. In military terms, it seemed ridiculous for Parli`ment to

:11:01. > :11:11.be consulted. I can only agree with you wholeheartedly. Julian Lewis.

:11:12. > :11:21.Thank you very much. It has been a long session and I am going to have

:11:22. > :11:33.two look at what I was going to ask you. As an MP, who spoke in 200 ,

:11:34. > :11:37.spoke in favour of removing Saddam. What Prim Arab League do yot blame

:11:38. > :11:47.Tony Blair for the way in which she took the country to war, and from

:11:48. > :11:52.what do you absolve him? I `bsolve him from personable decision to

:11:53. > :12:00.deceive Parliament and the public. The state falsehoods, knowing them

:12:01. > :12:06.to be false. I think he shotld be absolved from that. However, he

:12:07. > :12:17.exercised his considerable powers of advocacy and persuasion rather than

:12:18. > :12:24.laying the real issues to b`ck analysis for the public. It was an

:12:25. > :12:29.exercise, not in sharing crtcial judgments. One of the most hmportant

:12:30. > :12:37.since 1945. Who do you think should have stood up to him, in respect of

:12:38. > :12:43.those aspects that you find him blameworthy? Who should havd stood

:12:44. > :12:53.up to him, so that he did not do what he did? I suppose my short

:12:54. > :12:59.answer is that Cabinet ministers, and they are not naming indhviduals,

:13:00. > :13:03.were given promises by him hn Cabinet that they would havd the

:13:04. > :13:16.opportunity to consider and reflect and therefore decide on a ntmber of

:13:17. > :13:19.big decisions in the course of the Iraq case. He did not give them the

:13:20. > :13:28.opportunity, and that I think is a failing. Who else out of thhs big

:13:29. > :13:37.cast of characters do you shngle out for blame, other than Tony Blair? It

:13:38. > :13:41.is inescapable key that minhsters, along with the Prime Ministdr

:13:42. > :13:46.involved what the Foreign Sdcretary and the Defence Secretary. To a

:13:47. > :13:55.lesser extent, the Internathonal Home Secretary. I think the crucial

:13:56. > :14:03.triangle was clearly the Prhme Minister, foreign affairs, `nd

:14:04. > :14:12.defence. And of those, the Prime Minister and Mr Straw Ardmore

:14:13. > :14:24.signora T -- seniority, and I believe you stated that she found no

:14:25. > :14:28.evidence. How can Tony Blair's I will be with you whatever mdssage be

:14:29. > :14:38.interpreted any other way? He interpreted that in the sense of, Mr

:14:39. > :14:41.Bush's mind, he could trust the British for the support. Not

:14:42. > :14:46.necessarily for the militarx adventure, but generally. In other

:14:47. > :14:49.words, an exercise in persu`sion and relationship management.

:14:50. > :14:57.Do you accept that explanathon by Mr Blair? I think, respectfullx, how

:14:58. > :15:01.did Mr Bush take it is the hard question, and he would have taken

:15:02. > :15:05.it, I think, as an uncondithonal commitment. And so going back to the

:15:06. > :15:10.chairman's initial approach to these matters, would you not say that any

:15:11. > :15:15.reasonable recipient of such a message would have taken it as an

:15:16. > :15:22.unconditional commitment, and therefore it was really a sdcret

:15:23. > :15:25.commitment to him? I think can accept the first part withott

:15:26. > :15:30.quibbling. I think the third part, which hasn't been put, is what were

:15:31. > :15:33.the effect on American policy and decisions have been if therd had

:15:34. > :15:37.been either a doubt or indedd a refusal on the part of the British

:15:38. > :15:41.to support an invasion? Would it have delayed them? Would it have

:15:42. > :15:49.actually discouraged them completely, or would it havd had no

:15:50. > :15:53.effect at all? And that was my next but one question. What is your

:15:54. > :15:57.answer to it? Depending when conditions had been tabled by the

:15:58. > :16:01.British side to the American President, if it had happendd early

:16:02. > :16:08.enough in the course of 2002, it might well have had the effdct of

:16:09. > :16:12.delaying the date of an inv`sion until perhaps the autumn of 200 . If

:16:13. > :16:17.it was going to happen at all, it would've been a much better time,

:16:18. > :16:23.for all sorts of reasons, climate and the rest of it, preparations and

:16:24. > :16:27.so on. And it would have ch`nged, this is speculation, the internal

:16:28. > :16:31.dynamics of the Security Cotncil. Colin Powell may have found himself

:16:32. > :16:37.back in a state of more ascdndancy. Thank you. Was Mr Blair's ddcision

:16:38. > :16:46.based then more on solidarity than on strategy? I think, if I lay say

:16:47. > :16:52.so, that's an admirably con size statement which I really... Thank

:16:53. > :16:58.you. Now, is it true to say that Saddam Hussein behaved as though he

:16:59. > :17:02.still had chemical and biological weapons, and if chemical and

:17:03. > :17:07.biological weapons had been found in any significant quantities, would we

:17:08. > :17:12.be judging Mr Blair very differently now? I find that one very dhfficult

:17:13. > :17:18.to answer. Partly because it is hypothetical and also because it was

:17:19. > :17:21.pretty clear from the intelligence assessments that the suspichon as it

:17:22. > :17:26.turned out to be pretty unfounded was that he did have chemic`l and

:17:27. > :17:29.biological weapons, but that they were battlefield use. These weren't

:17:30. > :17:32.strategic weapons that. Changes the whole nature of the analysis as to

:17:33. > :17:38.whether or not invasion shotld take place. As to Saddam Hussein, he was

:17:39. > :17:42.playing all three ends against the middle all the time. For obvious

:17:43. > :17:47.reasons that we all know. And part of his plan was deception. Part of

:17:48. > :17:53.it was to parade his Iranian enemy and the gulf states that he did

:17:54. > :17:56.possibly have something or other and they had better be careful. Because

:17:57. > :18:01.they wanted to defend themsdlves. Themselves.. And sustain a balance

:18:02. > :18:08.of power in the region. Thank you. Now, looking at some of the original

:18:09. > :18:14.documentation reproduced and disclosed by your inquiry, we know

:18:15. > :18:19.from documents from the Joint Intelligence Committee in J`nuary

:18:20. > :18:26.2003, the one entitled Iraq, The Emerging View from Baghdad. And from

:18:27. > :18:33.another document drawn up after a discussion at the JIC on 19th March

:18:34. > :18:38.2003 by the assessment staff entitled dam, the Beginning of the

:18:39. > :18:45.End that the intelligence sdrvices judged that Iraq had a usable CBW

:18:46. > :18:51.strategy, so I think it is probably true to say that this clearly shows

:18:52. > :18:57.that the intelligence services believed and Mr Blair had rdason to

:18:58. > :19:04.believe that such a capabilhty existed. Is there any possibility

:19:05. > :19:09.that the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessments werd right

:19:10. > :19:14.and that, as is still allegdd from time to time, his chemical `nd

:19:15. > :19:18.biological arsenal was moved to somewhere such as Syria? And if

:19:19. > :19:26.that's not believed to be the case, when and how would you belidve that

:19:27. > :19:31.Saddam Hussein destroyed his stocks? Well, on the butler committde we

:19:32. > :19:38.discussed quite long and quhte hard whether we could say firmly that no

:19:39. > :19:42.weapons of mass destruction, whether tactical or strategic were found. We

:19:43. > :19:46.were not able to do it in the 2 04. I think now with the passagd of time

:19:47. > :19:51.and events in the recently ht is quite extraordinary, follow on as we

:19:52. > :19:54.do of course the Iraq survex reports and works, be quite extraordinary if

:19:55. > :20:01.something was discovered on any scale at all. The odd hollowed out

:20:02. > :20:05.shell that once held mustard is one thing, but a systemic set of

:20:06. > :20:09.deployable battlefield weapons. . Studio do you this I he destroyed

:20:10. > :20:13.them or gave them to somebody else? I don't believe for one momdnt they

:20:14. > :20:14.were passed held mustard is one thing, but a systemic set of

:20:15. > :20:17.deployable battlefield weapons. . Studio do you this I he destroyed

:20:18. > :20:20.them or gave them to somebody else? I don't believe for one momdnt they

:20:21. > :20:23.were passed on to anybody else. # You don't? It would be ag`inst his

:20:24. > :20:32.interest. Syria? While the Ba'athist regime is a sad regime in Sxria it

:20:33. > :20:36.is at odds with Saddam's form of Ba'athism. But what happened to them

:20:37. > :20:41.is this that's the fair question. I think the answer for a long time has

:20:42. > :20:50.been quite easy to get to. H think the Iraq survey group does, which is

:20:51. > :20:52.that undocumented dispatch of materials and destruction of

:20:53. > :20:56.materials took place on a considerable scale after thd first

:20:57. > :21:03.Gulf War and before the inspectors got back in. I think, if I lay just

:21:04. > :21:16.as an important corollary to that, it is important, and I think some

:21:17. > :21:20.people were misled in the 2000 to 2003 period, the so-called laterial

:21:21. > :21:26.balance between what he was known to have had and what was discovered and

:21:27. > :21:32.documented who've been destroyed represented a hidden arsenal when it

:21:33. > :21:38.was nothing of the sort. It was an account option. Thank you. When I

:21:39. > :21:43.intervened near the beginning of this session, we seem to be willing

:21:44. > :21:50.to acquit Mr Blair about lyhng about his belief in WMD or at least

:21:51. > :21:54.chemical and biological weapons But convict him of exaggerating the

:21:55. > :22:00.certainty of the basis for that belief. I just want to check with

:22:01. > :22:06.that then that it is correct to say that that is your conclusion and

:22:07. > :22:12.that, as I asked you earlier on if he had actually been more open and

:22:13. > :22:18.disclosed to Parliament the uncertainty of the basis of his

:22:19. > :22:23.belief, that argued that we could not take the risk that he, that

:22:24. > :22:27.Saddam Hussein might still have this arsenal and might for reasons of his

:22:28. > :22:33.own make them available to ` terrorist group, which is what Mr

:22:34. > :22:37.Blair I remember hearing hil say to us described as his nightmare

:22:38. > :22:43.scenario, we would not again be judging him so harshly if hd hadn't

:22:44. > :22:46.exaggerated the certainty. Exaggeration, placing more weight on

:22:47. > :22:51.the intelligence than it cotld possibly bear is a conclusion that

:22:52. > :22:55.we reached on the Butler Colmittee and reached with even more dvidence

:22:56. > :23:01.in the Iraq Inquiry. On the other hand, I don't know that in putting

:23:02. > :23:06.forward the fusion argument Mr Blair related it very directly and

:23:07. > :23:09.specifically to Saddam Hussdin passing terrorist weapons to

:23:10. > :23:13.terrorist... Passing weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups The

:23:14. > :23:18.intelligence analysis say that if the regime collapsed in ruins there

:23:19. > :23:22.might be a risk of the spillage of any remaining weapons. That was a

:23:23. > :23:27.different thing. But the fusion case as made by Mr Blair was not about

:23:28. > :23:31.Iraq. I do remember him sayhng that if by some means these weapons were

:23:32. > :23:35.to be passed to terrorist groups, that would be his nightmare

:23:36. > :23:40.scenario, but the regime was hardly likely to collapse if we didn't

:23:41. > :23:43.overthrow him. It steamed bd an argument that he was using this as

:23:44. > :23:47.an argument that Saddam Hussein might pass these weapons to such a

:23:48. > :23:55.group. That was a telling argument made on the floor of the Hotse of

:23:56. > :24:03.Commons. Yes. OK. Was the procurement of protective epuipment

:24:04. > :24:07.for the troops in particular against IED it's, improvised exploshve

:24:08. > :24:11.devices, delayed as a result of the Prime Minister wishing to kdep

:24:12. > :24:16.private his early decision to go to war? I don't believe the two things

:24:17. > :24:23.can be put together. I think there's a criticism to be made of holding up

:24:24. > :24:28.the some of the preparations, particularly with industry for

:24:29. > :24:33.equipment in the latter part of 2002 in order to preserve the diplomatic

:24:34. > :24:36.strand and not giving the global community the sense that military

:24:37. > :24:41.action was inevitable. I thhnk there was a delay there. That didn't go

:24:42. > :24:48.directly to the IED and protective patrol vehicle questions. Those I

:24:49. > :24:54.think arise later. And finally, but this is a big one, in my ophnion

:24:55. > :25:01.anyway. The issue for which many of us, including me, were culp`ble at

:25:02. > :25:06.that time for voting as we did was a naive belief that if the

:25:07. > :25:10.dictatorship were removed, some form of democracy might emerge in Iraq.

:25:11. > :25:15.And that, above all, is the reason in the light of what happendd that I

:25:16. > :25:21.and I'm sure many others ch`nged their minds. Yes. In relation to

:25:22. > :25:29.subsequent conflicts. Now, H would like you to tell us to what extent

:25:30. > :25:33.Mr Blair was warned of the danger that far from democracy emerging,

:25:34. > :25:38.Sunni-Shia religious strife would follow the removal of the sdcular

:25:39. > :25:44.dictator? Who gave these warnings and how and why were they ignored?

:25:45. > :25:52.And in particular, I would just quote back to you a briefing note

:25:53. > :25:56.from your report which Mr Blair himself sent in January 2003 to

:25:57. > :26:02.President Bush. And the then Prime Minister wrote, and I quote, the

:26:03. > :26:07.biggest risk we face is intdrnecine fighting between all the rival

:26:08. > :26:12.groups, ridges, tribes et cdtera in Iraq when the military strike

:26:13. > :26:18.destabilises the regime. Thdy are perfectly capable on previots form

:26:19. > :26:27.of killing each other in large numbers. Now, Mr Blair knew that and

:26:28. > :26:33.he said it to President Bush. So, why did he ignore that terrhble

:26:34. > :26:37.possibility that he himself apparently recognised? I cannot give

:26:38. > :26:43.you the answer as to why. Would have to ask him. But, what is cldar, from

:26:44. > :26:50.all the evidence we've colldcted, is that this risk and other associated

:26:51. > :26:54.risks of instability and collapse were clearly identified and

:26:55. > :26:58.available to Ministers and to Mr Blair before the invasion. H can

:26:59. > :27:03.cite all sorts of point but you won't want me to go into th`t detail

:27:04. > :27:07.now. It's in the report. Thdre are other signals too from other

:27:08. > :27:13.quarters. Our ambassador in Cairo for example was able to report that

:27:14. > :27:19.the Egyptian President had said Iraq was at risk of and was populated by

:27:20. > :27:29.people who were extremely fond of killing each other. Destabilisation

:27:30. > :27:35.would bring that about. Mr Blair said and has said on other

:27:36. > :27:40.occasions that it would havd taken hindsight to understand the risks.

:27:41. > :27:45.That set of risks. We concltded that it would not take hindsight because

:27:46. > :27:49.preinvasion evidence is cle`r that this advice was available to him.

:27:50. > :27:54.And that he got the advice `nd that he even passed that advice to

:27:55. > :28:00.President Bush himself. Indded. So isn't this in a way far worse than

:28:01. > :28:05.the exaggeration of the certainty about the chemical and biological

:28:06. > :28:09.weapons was the fact that in the full knowledge that the likdlihood

:28:10. > :28:16.would be that if you removed the dictatorship of Saddam Hussdin, you

:28:17. > :28:19.would have the 1,000-year-old Shia Sunni hatred reemerging and mass

:28:20. > :28:26.killings of these communitids by each other. Mr Blair nevertheless

:28:27. > :28:32.went ahead. The appalling and tragic contemporary history suggests that

:28:33. > :28:37.what was foreseeable and advised did indeed happen and, arguably, could

:28:38. > :28:43.and should have been avoided. It enables me, if I'm loud bridfly to

:28:44. > :28:49.make a more general point, which is we, the United Kingdom, had in our

:28:50. > :28:53.intelligence, diplomatic and other communities, a great deal of deep

:28:54. > :29:00.knowledge about Iraq, its population, its strains and stresses

:29:01. > :29:04.as well as its history. Was that expertise brought to bear on the

:29:05. > :29:12.decision making process and the answer is clearly not. But should

:29:13. > :29:17.have been and was available. I think that is a tragic aspect.

:29:18. > :29:24.Surely it was brought to be`r but it was ignored? If you like. It was not

:29:25. > :29:29.brought to bear in any effective sense. Who is responsible for that.

:29:30. > :29:32.I don't think you can pin that on a single person more a single

:29:33. > :29:37.structure but if you considdr for example, it is not a phrase used

:29:38. > :29:41.with anything like great respect but the camel corps in the diplomatic

:29:42. > :29:46.service, those with great experience in the Arab speaking world, and

:29:47. > :29:53.there are many of them with a lot of expertise, one of them, then in

:29:54. > :29:59.Cairo, sent a memo around to fellow ambassadors expressing some of these

:30:00. > :30:07.judgments, and was told to shut up and keep quiet. By Number Tdn. So

:30:08. > :30:12.when you say Number Ten, yot mean the Prime Minister? I don't know

:30:13. > :30:18.whether I mean the Prime Minister or not. Have you asked? Why did you not

:30:19. > :30:24.ask? Because we know who gave the instruction. And it was Jon`than

:30:25. > :30:30.Powell, as chief of staff. Now we have found no evidence of written

:30:31. > :30:33.instruction but then there were no written instructions from the Prime

:30:34. > :30:38.Minister to Jonathan Powell except occasionally scribbles on bhts of

:30:39. > :30:44.paper. Could you have asked Tony Blair? Well, we did not. It seems to

:30:45. > :30:47.me that the post war reconstruction issue and the issue of what the

:30:48. > :30:56.effect would be of an invashon is the most catastrophic aspect of all

:30:57. > :30:58.of this. Judging by your report I think although one needs to draw

:30:59. > :31:06.together several different paragraphs and places, that is

:31:07. > :31:09.pretty clear. You make clear that at no stage did ministers or sdnior

:31:10. > :31:12.officials commissioned the systematic evaluation of different

:31:13. > :31:16.options incorporating detailed analysis of risk or capabilhties and

:31:17. > :31:24.so on, but whose responsibility was it to commission that? Ultilately.

:31:25. > :31:27.Ultimately it must come back to the centre and head of government. Which

:31:28. > :31:32.is the Prime Minister? Ultilately the Prime Minister. The thing that I

:31:33. > :31:37.think has surprised so many people about this report in so manx places

:31:38. > :31:41.is that this last sentence has not been made clear, because thhs looks

:31:42. > :31:50.like a war that was pushed through to a large degree by one man and

:31:51. > :31:52.that therefore you need, whdre appropriate, to apportion this

:31:53. > :31:57.possibility for the feelings that led up to it and the feelings that

:31:58. > :32:03.flow from it. Although that has not been done. It is a central criticism

:32:04. > :32:07.that has been made. So is its Tony Blair who is responsible for that

:32:08. > :32:11.feeling in paragraph 617 whhch you are very familiar with, I al sure?

:32:12. > :32:19.Is this in the executive sulmary. Yes. May I look at up to relind

:32:20. > :32:27.myself? Yes, of course. -- look it up. We say that at no stage did

:32:28. > :32:30.ministers or senior officials commissioned a systematic evaluation

:32:31. > :32:36.of the risks and options. I am asking who is really responsible. I

:32:37. > :32:41.think you would say all of those involved but ultimately it has to

:32:42. > :32:46.be... You were telling me that some of these officials were told to shut

:32:47. > :32:57.up? I was reporting what is on the record that the ambassador hn Cairo

:32:58. > :32:59.sent a telegram to the centre of Whitehall and various of his

:33:00. > :33:03.colleagues who were relevant and was told for reasons of securitx and

:33:04. > :33:05.sensitivity, rather than because he was wholly wrong and what hd said,

:33:06. > :33:11.that he should not do that `gain under any such -- and that `ny such

:33:12. > :33:14.messages should go direct from the concerned ambassador to the head of

:33:15. > :33:21.the diplomatic service personally. That was what happened. But as to

:33:22. > :33:27.the commissioning of a revidw, you can blame, if you wish, all of those

:33:28. > :33:31.who failed to initiate such a review, but the fact is that it

:33:32. > :33:34.should have happened and it did not happen and the consequences of it

:33:35. > :33:43.not happening are there and plain for all to see. If I am allowed

:33:44. > :33:48.another moment on this, it hs that for me, personally, given mx own

:33:49. > :33:51.history, the failure of the security sector was one of the very worst

:33:52. > :34:00.aspects of the whole field enterprise. If security could have

:34:01. > :34:02.been and arguably might havd been with greater exertion of effort and

:34:03. > :34:07.planning and preparation, if security could have been put in

:34:08. > :34:11.place either in the south-e`st, in our area, let alone more generally

:34:12. > :34:18.across Iraq, then the whole process of reconstruction, making of new

:34:19. > :34:24.institutions rather than, they never had them before, but putting new and

:34:25. > :34:29.better government institutions in place, it might have had a chance.

:34:30. > :34:41.Can I take you over the pagd from 617 to 623, to which has already

:34:42. > :34:48.been alluded, which says th`t Tony Blair, with hindsight, we sde that

:34:49. > :34:50.the campaign to remove Sadd`m Hussein was relatively easy but the

:34:51. > :34:54.aftermath was very hard and at the time we could not know that because

:34:55. > :35:01.the prime focus was the milhtary campaign. Your conclusion is

:35:02. > :35:05.decisive, the -- that the conclusion reached by Mr Blair did not require

:35:06. > :35:09.the benefit of hindsight. That is the point and I have spelt that out

:35:10. > :35:13.because I think it is so cldar. If you will allow me a half sentence, I

:35:14. > :35:18.know time is tight but I have read read the report by Lord Franks when

:35:19. > :35:23.he said that we were careful not to apply hindsight to any of otr

:35:24. > :35:28.judgments about the Argentinian defence. We on the a ruck enquiry

:35:29. > :35:33.made the same pledge to ourselves. We were very determined not to use

:35:34. > :35:40.hindsight to reach judgments, but to take the contemporary best dvidence

:35:41. > :35:46.at the time. -- the a ruck dnquiry. I have one last question about that

:35:47. > :35:49.crucial paragraph. Why, givdn that you are stating that the Prhme

:35:50. > :35:58.Minister did know what he ndeded to know about that aftermath, why do

:35:59. > :36:07.you think that the Prime Minister pushed on regardless? What did he

:36:08. > :36:12.tell you? Only that he insisted that he could not have been award without

:36:13. > :36:18.hindsight of those particul`r risks. So he denied your conclusion? Well

:36:19. > :36:29.he resisted our conclusion. What I would like to say is that in the

:36:30. > :36:33.context of the exercise of hindsight, we were scrupulots to

:36:34. > :36:40.look at contemporary evidence at the time, and to recite it in the full

:36:41. > :36:45.body of the report. I think you would have to look inside Mr Blair's

:36:46. > :36:53.mind and heart to know what he felt, but at the time. -- thought at the

:36:54. > :36:56.time. It goes to a quite large question and a possible lesson that

:36:57. > :37:02.we do draw attention to witches can a modern British Prime Minister

:37:03. > :37:05.with a 24-hour day, seven d`ys a week pressure coming in frol all

:37:06. > :37:13.sides, be expected to retain a running consciousness of very

:37:14. > :37:16.important but nonetheless ddtailed, about one thing, along with

:37:17. > :37:21.everything else at the same time? We came quite close to saying that you

:37:22. > :37:25.really should have a senior nodded and will minister working to the

:37:26. > :37:32.Prime Minister with nothing else to distract, on an enterprise of the

:37:33. > :37:35.scale. And the rather old and admittedly nonetheless succdssful...

:37:36. > :37:38.Is that not what the Foreign Secretary should be doing? He is

:37:39. > :37:43.travelling a great deal, and has many other things to do. It is an

:37:44. > :37:47.example of the resident Minhster in the middle East in 1940s, and that

:37:48. > :37:53.worked. Because those basic conditions were satisfied. Do you

:37:54. > :37:58.think that the Prime Ministdr's setting aside of whatever w`s

:37:59. > :38:05.working and going along in his mind, do you think that it was reckless to

:38:06. > :38:08.set aside the information that he was provided with, which showed him

:38:09. > :38:20.that the aftermath would be gruesome? I think he came, on his

:38:21. > :38:24.own admission, quite late to realising the absolutely crtcial

:38:25. > :38:29.nature of security and achidving security in Iraq after an invasion.

:38:30. > :38:37.He says it in one of those notes to Mr Bush, which by the way, never

:38:38. > :38:43.received a written reply, so we know from written telephone records that

:38:44. > :38:47.heat they discussed them but Mr Bush never put his name to a written

:38:48. > :38:49.response, but Tony Blair cale to a realisation in 2003 that security

:38:50. > :38:56.was the basis for everything else and without nothing could stcceed.

:38:57. > :39:00.And it was not secured. My puestion was, though, do you think it was

:39:01. > :39:05.reckless to go ahead, even `t that late stage, once he had in front of

:39:06. > :39:07.them information that he nedded to know, what the aftermath cotld or

:39:08. > :39:14.would be like telling that likely to be? I am always easy about `ccepting

:39:15. > :39:23.a word that has come naturally to my own mind because would Preshdent

:39:24. > :39:27.Bush have gone ahead anyway? We have bashed that around a bit today.

:39:28. > :39:31.We're talking about UK involvement. We cannot control everything but we

:39:32. > :39:35.can control that. If there was going to be an American invasion, with or

:39:36. > :39:40.without sufficient global or UN backing, could it have been reckless

:39:41. > :39:44.to associate the United Kingdom with that, knowing that there were risks,

:39:45. > :39:48.which he had pointed out at one point to Mr Bush? In the belief and

:39:49. > :39:56.I think this is important, that somehow or other American scale

:39:57. > :40:01.might and resources would overcome these resources. I do think that the

:40:02. > :40:09.failure to fully plan and prepare in London before the invasion was based

:40:10. > :40:11.first on the realisation th`t the State Department's consider`ble

:40:12. > :40:15.planning effort had been ditched, but nonetheless when it camd to the

:40:16. > :40:19.action, the Americans would provide an supply all the resources that

:40:20. > :40:23.would be needed. Thank you very much for given evidence to us thhs

:40:24. > :40:31.afternoon. We are very gratdful for the outstanding... Excuse md, Mr

:40:32. > :40:37.Chairman. Mr Chairman, may H ask another question? I really think

:40:38. > :40:41.that we have taxed Sir John enough. I think he has been extremely

:40:42. > :40:47.helpful but just coming back to 617, it is just a question, I me`n I

:40:48. > :40:53.fully accept everything that you say about the willingness of ministers

:40:54. > :40:59.to challenge and having the right relationships in place. There is no

:41:00. > :41:02.substitute for that but what machine 80 -- machinery was there that could

:41:03. > :41:08.have provided that? It does not exist. We do not go to war dvery

:41:09. > :41:13.decade. It doesn't exist. So what procedural machinery should be put

:41:14. > :41:17.in place? At least something for the system to bump against. A brief

:41:18. > :41:20.reply, if you would. Both the permanent secretaries of thd

:41:21. > :41:23.department for international that element and the Ministry of Defence

:41:24. > :41:28.made urgent requests for such machinery to be put in placd. A

:41:29. > :41:31.draft was proposed and went up to Number Ten and came back without the

:41:32. > :41:38.crucial element, namely an oversight committee of ministers. Thex give

:41:39. > :41:41.very much, Sir John. I am not sure you're thanks should be dirdcted

:41:42. > :41:46.towards me but I am directing my thanks to what you for coming in and

:41:47. > :41:49.giving us such a thorough and detailed reply to a number of

:41:50. > :41:53.questions that take further what we understand to be your concltsions

:41:54. > :41:57.from this extremely thorough piece of work that you have done over the

:41:58. > :42:01.last seven years and on beh`lf of Parliament, we are grateful to you

:42:02. > :42:01.for having done the job. Th`nk you very much indeed, chairman. Thank

:42:02. > :42:28.you. Giving people space to grieve and

:42:29. > :42:34.mourn together was a kindness appreciated by all of this house and

:42:35. > :42:36.beyond. I'm honoured to havd the opportunity to do my bit and