0:00:13 > 0:00:20Thank you very much for coming. Thank you.Particularly, as you
0:00:20 > 0:00:23probably know, we were dismayed it took to set up the committee but we
0:00:23 > 0:00:28are grateful for you for coming so early in the period since we had
0:00:28 > 0:00:35been set up. We have all taken note of the fact that the Prime Minister
0:00:35 > 0:00:38has tasked you with reforms to the national security council process.
0:00:38 > 0:00:45What exactly are you considering? Thank you Madame chair, thank you
0:00:45 > 0:00:50very much for your welcome to this session. Essentially there is a
0:00:50 > 0:00:54continuous process of trying to improve the National Security
0:00:54 > 0:00:58Council. You will be aware that we have been seeking to embed the
0:00:58 > 0:01:05Chilcott reforms into the process. With my coming in, with there being
0:01:05 > 0:01:08a new parliament, she asked me to look at the process and ensure that
0:01:08 > 0:01:16it was functioning effectively. That is aside from the policy work and
0:01:16 > 0:01:20capability review. I suppose the headlines of fact is that we are
0:01:20 > 0:01:23trying to prepare meetings more thoroughly. The NSC owner, the
0:01:23 > 0:01:27officials group that meets beforehand now considers the main
0:01:27 > 0:01:32issues a few weeks ahead -- NSCO. So that we have a proper steering
0:01:32 > 0:01:36discussion to make sure that we bring issues to the council itself
0:01:36 > 0:01:40in a more strategic format. We have also made some adjustments to the
0:01:40 > 0:01:48agenda. Again, so that there is a work plan several months ahead.
0:01:48 > 0:01:51Ministers have the chance to consider issues more strategically.
0:01:51 > 0:01:55Thirdly, I can talk more about this, issues particularly concerning...
0:01:55 > 0:01:59This is the most important, actually, that we had a rigorous
0:01:59 > 0:02:03implementation process in place so that the council's decisions were
0:02:03 > 0:02:05then driven through government.
0:02:09 > 0:02:14That is helpful and interesting. As you may know, in the past, this
0:02:14 > 0:02:21committee has expressed some anxiety as to what degree the NSC was
0:02:21 > 0:02:25strategic. We were worried it was being too operational and driven by
0:02:25 > 0:02:30day-to-day events. The notion that... You are wanting to look at
0:02:30 > 0:02:33it more thoroughly and to a consistent plan, which has a
0:02:33 > 0:02:38strategic approach, is... Welcome news.
0:02:43 > 0:02:47He said you're looking carefully at how you can make the discussions
0:02:47 > 0:02:50more strategic and have more notice and prepare in greater depth. He
0:02:50 > 0:02:57also said rigorous implementation. -- you also said. Which of those do
0:02:57 > 0:03:00you think requires most attention? Probably the latter, to be candid.
0:03:00 > 0:03:05That's what I thought.There are many colleagues who have worked in
0:03:05 > 0:03:08government and as you will know, particularly when one is dealing
0:03:08 > 0:03:13with crosscutting issues, weather isn't a natural single home in a
0:03:13 > 0:03:14department, it is very straightforward if a department
0:03:14 > 0:03:18brings a proposal that is agreed or not and then they move ahead. In
0:03:18 > 0:03:23this area, of course, we are dealing with proposals that involve several
0:03:23 > 0:03:28departments, half a dozen or more. It's in those areas that
0:03:28 > 0:03:30implementation has constantly proved challenging. When you are in
0:03:30 > 0:03:36government -- when you were in government, we talked about joined
0:03:36 > 0:03:40up government. We need to bring that concept alive in the national
0:03:40 > 0:03:43security area and ensure that each department, each individual area, is
0:03:43 > 0:03:48clear about what is expected of them and what is the must direction and
0:03:48 > 0:03:52guidance.We are well understood that was part of the point of having
0:03:52 > 0:03:57the National Security Council. Am I right in thinking that you used to
0:03:57 > 0:04:05attend, previously, in your previous capacity...?When I was ambassador
0:04:05 > 0:04:08in Afghanistan, I attended and when I returned as the Foreign Office
0:04:08 > 0:04:11political director I would attend from time to time on those issues. I
0:04:11 > 0:04:14had hidden very rarely when I was permanent secretary at the Home
0:04:14 > 0:04:19Office. If the Home Office couldn't go and there wasn't a junior
0:04:19 > 0:04:27minister available.Is that a strength? Does that help to inform?
0:04:27 > 0:04:30I guess I'm the wrong person to ask, perhaps you should ask some of my
0:04:30 > 0:04:36colleagues, Madame chair. I think having that blend of experience,
0:04:36 > 0:04:39having worked overseas and of course, my predecessors were very
0:04:39 > 0:04:42experienced ambassadors. They had not won a domestic department.
0:04:42 > 0:04:48Having that blend the two has helped me. It means I probably understand
0:04:48 > 0:04:54some of the pressures in particular this intimidation question. I have a
0:04:54 > 0:04:57good appreciation of the particular domestic security agenda.Although I
0:04:57 > 0:05:02don't invite you to comment on this in case you don't want to come I do
0:05:02 > 0:05:07recall it being said, although not in public by her, that the Prime
0:05:07 > 0:05:10Minister as Home Secretary had some concerns about the degree to which
0:05:10 > 0:05:15the NSC did not consider the domestic agenda.Without commenting
0:05:15 > 0:05:20on the specific point, the general point you make is well made. We try
0:05:20 > 0:05:25to ensure there is a good blend of issues brought. We try to look at...
0:05:25 > 0:05:28Some overseas issues in geographic clusters, rather than country by
0:05:28 > 0:05:33country. That helps with a strategic discussion. In response to your
0:05:33 > 0:05:37letter to the Prime Minister, by the way, Madame chair, I will write to
0:05:37 > 0:05:44you this week with the agenda details of the NSC over the past
0:05:44 > 0:05:47couple of years so you can have a look at the issues we've been
0:05:47 > 0:05:53discussing. We tend to look now at overseas issues in clusters. We will
0:05:53 > 0:05:57look at, for example, East Asia, not just China. We look at the Matic
0:05:57 > 0:06:01issues that cut across the domestic and overseas, such as
0:06:01 > 0:06:04counterterrorism or serious organised crime.Extraordinary, that
0:06:04 > 0:06:07was about to be my next question.
0:06:08 > 0:06:13One brief business type question, in the past, your predecessors have
0:06:13 > 0:06:16given the committee information about the size and function of the
0:06:16 > 0:06:21Secretariat, which is germane, implementation. Can we write to you
0:06:21 > 0:06:25after the session with questions? I don't invite you to dwell on that
0:06:25 > 0:06:29Indy car now.Of course. The secretariat is still pretty much the
0:06:29 > 0:06:36same size as under my predecessor. -- dwell on that at the moment.I am
0:06:36 > 0:06:39happy to take any detailed questions on that after the session.OK. Mr
0:06:39 > 0:06:40Grey.
0:06:43 > 0:06:46We will move straight to the capability review. First of all,
0:06:46 > 0:06:50who's idea was it and when was it commissioned?We conducted a piece
0:06:50 > 0:06:56of work during the election campaign. My arrival coincided with
0:06:56 > 0:06:59the declaration coincidently. I've already talked to the Prime Minister
0:06:59 > 0:07:06about just doing a quick refresher of the 2015 strategy. And STS are.
0:07:06 > 0:07:12-- SDSR. Parley to deal with the evolving threat picture and the
0:07:12 > 0:07:15question of whether it was still right in all respects, given that it
0:07:15 > 0:07:19was written before the decision to leave the European Union.
0:07:19 > 0:07:24Essentially, that morphed into a preparatory work, during the
0:07:24 > 0:07:26election campaign for incoming governments. We need to be able to
0:07:26 > 0:07:30present the incoming government with a range of options on how they might
0:07:30 > 0:07:34proceed. We presented that the council after the election. It was
0:07:34 > 0:07:37as a result of that discussion that the council commissioned the
0:07:37 > 0:07:43capability review, which is in effect a refresh of the 2015 SDSR.
0:07:43 > 0:07:47The outgoing Prime Minister... Not unusual for an outgoing promised to
0:07:47 > 0:07:51construct a review of this campaign during election campaign, is that
0:07:51 > 0:07:55normal?My initial discussion with the Prime Minister was before the
0:07:55 > 0:08:00election campaign was close. I wasn't aware of it you would expect,
0:08:00 > 0:08:04just as departments have to prepare for an incoming government of
0:08:04 > 0:08:12whatever... Party or mixture of parties, in any event, would have
0:08:12 > 0:08:15had to have done some work during the election campaign to prepare for
0:08:15 > 0:08:19an incoming government. We brought the two pieces of work together. We
0:08:19 > 0:08:23would have done that whether the Prime Minister have sorted it or not
0:08:23 > 0:08:26as part of the proper work of the civil service during the election
0:08:26 > 0:08:31campaign to prepare for an incoming government.A proper review of the
0:08:31 > 0:08:34national security strategy as well, was that part of the work?The
0:08:34 > 0:08:43initial piece of work looked at the 2015 strategy. Essentially we looked
0:08:43 > 0:08:48across it to ask whether it still looked as though it was broadly
0:08:48 > 0:08:54correct in did other than 17 -- broadly speaking correct. The main
0:08:54 > 0:09:02structure and approach. -- in 2017. And the broad approach. It was
0:09:02 > 0:09:08right. It was as a result of that is that the council commissioned the
0:09:08 > 0:09:12capability review.Given the 20th 15 national security review and the
0:09:12 > 0:09:20SDSR well one document, unusually for the first time, is in this
0:09:20 > 0:09:26review, you cast and I over it, as you say, the NSS part of the
0:09:26 > 0:09:28document, what led you to the conclusion that something was to be
0:09:28 > 0:09:33changed in other parts. If the NSS was sufficient, despite the fact
0:09:33 > 0:09:36that it didn't know about Brexit, didn't know about all sorts of
0:09:36 > 0:09:41things that hadn't happened in 2015, if you concluded that the NSS was
0:09:41 > 0:09:48sufficient, white was another review needed?-- why was another review.
0:09:51 > 0:09:56You are right, the two remained together and there will be some
0:09:56 > 0:09:59changes to the first part, if you like, the strategy part of the
0:09:59 > 0:10:03document when the process is concluded. The operational
0:10:03 > 0:10:07consequences of that, the council concluded was forced to look at a
0:10:07 > 0:10:12range of capabilities. Some because it was an evolving threat picture,
0:10:12 > 0:10:15the terrorist threat picture has evolved for example. Some of them,
0:10:15 > 0:10:20global Britain, because of the decision to leave the European
0:10:20 > 0:10:24Union. We are looking at air mixture. It isn't just purely
0:10:24 > 0:10:29capability. We are looking at a mixture. -- we are looking at a
0:10:29 > 0:10:32mixture.Forgive me, I am puzzled.
0:10:34 > 0:10:39You have confused me. The national security strategy 2015 was merged
0:10:39 > 0:10:43with the NSS. The conclusions were based on that strategy. That
0:10:43 > 0:10:48strategy in 2015 did not know much about the emerging threat, Brexit,
0:10:48 > 0:10:54lots of things. Nonetheless, you concluded that it was not necessary
0:10:54 > 0:10:59to carry out another review?Sorry, I haven't been clear. We concluded
0:10:59 > 0:11:05that we did not need a full, new national security strategy and SDSR,
0:11:05 > 0:11:09that was one of the options that the council could have commissioned but
0:11:09 > 0:11:12they concluded that we did not need that, because broadly speaking, the
0:11:12 > 0:11:17structure and conclusions of the 2015 reviews were correct. A broader
0:11:17 > 0:11:21view of national security that incorporated security, economic and
0:11:21 > 0:11:27influence objectives, commitment already made in that strategy to
0:11:27 > 0:11:32deliver certain capabilities, most of which were only just starting.
0:11:32 > 0:11:37There were clearly areas where we might need a course correction.
0:11:37 > 0:11:40Essentially, that's why they commissioned a capability review,
0:11:40 > 0:11:46rather than a full SDSR. Also, the government didn't commissioned a
0:11:46 > 0:11:51spending review immediately after the election and that is the third
0:11:51 > 0:11:54component of the 2015 document. It was run alongside a full spending
0:11:54 > 0:12:02review. It was that range of factors that cause the council to conclude
0:12:02 > 0:12:10it did not need a full SDSR.What is the point of having the NSS review.
0:12:10 > 0:12:13If the budgets were precisely as they were before? How can any
0:12:13 > 0:12:17outcome of the review have been effective, because there is no more
0:12:17 > 0:12:23money?A constant challenge in government and it goes back to the
0:12:23 > 0:12:26point the chair was making at the beginning, are we spending all of
0:12:26 > 0:12:29the money we already have two best effect and in the right places.That
0:12:29 > 0:12:35is a different point.Depending on how you define it, we spent
0:12:35 > 0:12:38something like £56 billion a year on national security. It is reasonable
0:12:38 > 0:12:42or the government to want to know that is being spent, the balance is
0:12:42 > 0:12:45correct, before they consider whether that £56 billion per year is
0:12:45 > 0:12:49the right number.Hang on. You haven't answered the question.
0:12:49 > 0:12:53What's the point in having a national security review and the
0:12:53 > 0:12:58defence review linked to it if the premise is there is no more money?
0:12:58 > 0:13:05No matter what you conclude... Let's imagine the NSS, they concluded
0:13:05 > 0:13:07there were vast new threats are perfectly possible, nonetheless,
0:13:07 > 0:13:13there is no more money attached to it. Therefore, what's the purpose in
0:13:13 > 0:13:15doing it?To see whether the money already allocated is allocated in
0:13:15 > 0:13:22the right way.You don't have to have a NSS review, nor SDSR to do
0:13:22 > 0:13:26that, presumably all departments do that all the time. Presumably it is
0:13:26 > 0:13:32one of the primary function is to do that. Don't you think you're
0:13:32 > 0:13:38emasculating the SDSR or the NSA review by saying that no matter what
0:13:38 > 0:13:42you conclude, the budget will remain the same?I wouldn't put it quite
0:13:42 > 0:13:47that starkly but this exercise was commissioned by the council as a
0:13:47 > 0:13:49fiscally neutral exercise. Commissioned against the background
0:13:49 > 0:13:56that we spend around £56 billion per year depending on how you define it,
0:13:56 > 0:13:59national security broadly defined. To ensure the balance of that
0:13:59 > 0:14:04expenditure across departments is allocated correctly. There are some
0:14:04 > 0:14:08constraints within that, the 2% commitment on defence. And the 0.7%
0:14:08 > 0:14:12commitment on ODA were fixed.
0:14:13 > 0:14:17There is a great deal one can do in terms of allocating resources within
0:14:17 > 0:14:21a pool that size to make sure they are being allocated correctly and
0:14:21 > 0:14:23the prioritisation is correct. Essentially that is what we are
0:14:23 > 0:14:26considering.
0:14:26 > 0:14:30When is it going to be announced.We will bring it to the national
0:14:30 > 0:14:35Security Council in the new year and it will be made public in due
0:14:35 > 0:14:41course.Rumours were it would be delayed and would in fact happen the
0:14:41 > 0:14:51same time as the funding review? Next year's Budget.There isn't a
0:14:51 > 0:14:56spending review for next autumn's Budget. No decisions have been taken
0:14:56 > 0:15:01about a full spending review. It is not being delayed. There was a tweet
0:15:01 > 0:15:04about a meeting moving, I'm not going to get into a running
0:15:04 > 0:15:09commentary on what is on their agenda, but this will be brought to
0:15:09 > 0:15:15the council in the new year and ministers will take decisions then.
0:15:15 > 0:15:21In the new year. It is scheduled to be taken in the new year. The
0:15:21 > 0:15:30schedule is for the Prime Minister. I'm going to move on to Miss Reeves.
0:15:30 > 0:15:37You mentioned that Russia and Brexit were reasons for the updates since
0:15:37 > 0:15:432015. I wonder whether those are the principal reasons, the former
0:15:43 > 0:15:47Defence Secretary said one reason for the capability review is the
0:15:47 > 0:15:53intensification of the four principal threats identified in the
0:15:53 > 0:15:592015 national security strategy. Is it the intensification of the risks,
0:15:59 > 0:16:05or is it Brexit and Russia or a combip nation that meant --
0:16:05 > 0:16:09combination meant the update was needed.The former defence Secretary
0:16:09 > 0:16:15included Russia in the threats he was talking about. The review did
0:16:15 > 0:16:19identify four threats, Russia among them, terrorism among them.How
0:16:19 > 0:16:26about Brexit.I didn't identify, that was separate. But it did
0:16:26 > 0:16:32identify those threats and it was largely based around tackling those
0:16:32 > 0:16:38threats. The threats of terrorism, as the former Defence Secretary said
0:16:38 > 0:16:42and the Russian threat have intensified. That is influencing the
0:16:42 > 0:16:46shape of the review. The original review took place before Brexit and
0:16:46 > 0:16:55of course we have to make sure that the current review is correct in the
0:16:55 > 0:17:00new circumstances.The work you have been doing, in what way is Brexit
0:17:00 > 0:17:05important for our national security? Well it affects our relationship
0:17:05 > 0:17:11with the European Union and it therefore affects our and our
0:17:11 > 0:17:17co-operation with them or will do, as you know we seek to have a deep
0:17:17 > 0:17:21and special partnership, but we have that yet to negotiate. And it
0:17:21 > 0:17:25affects our relations with the rest of the world. The Government is
0:17:25 > 0:17:32seeking to exploit the freedoms to deepen relationships with other
0:17:32 > 0:17:37countries in South Asia, in the Gulf etc. Across the economic and
0:17:37 > 0:17:42security agenda. Brexit sets a different context within which we
0:17:42 > 0:17:48are operating. The threats are independent of that.In 2015
0:17:48 > 0:17:52obviously we knew, you knew there was going to be a referendum in
0:17:52 > 0:17:592016. So had the risk of Brexit or the opportunity of Brexit however
0:17:59 > 0:18:05you might see it, had that been included in the NSS and the SDSRo
0:18:05 > 0:18:11did you have to look at this from scratch?Of course the 2015 exercise
0:18:11 > 0:18:17was conducted before I took the job. But the Government... Of course the
0:18:17 > 0:18:20Government position at the time was there would be a referendum. At the
0:18:20 > 0:18:27time of the review, I don't think the timing of that was set and the
0:18:27 > 0:18:29intention, the Government's intention was to campaign for
0:18:29 > 0:18:36remain. It was mentioned I think in the 2015 review, but it wasn't taken
0:18:36 > 0:18:41as a strategic driver of the review. We have a different context now and
0:18:41 > 0:18:47we need to make sure we are in the right shape for 2017 and beyond.It
0:18:47 > 0:18:53sounds like, it is obviously a hugely different context, I'm
0:18:53 > 0:18:59surprised when the work was done it wasn't looked at more systemically.
0:18:59 > 0:19:03Have you undertaken a new risk assessment as part of national
0:19:03 > 0:19:09security capability process?That process is under way. We have
0:19:09 > 0:19:15published within Government, there are three documents, there is a
0:19:15 > 0:19:19national risk assess. Both are confidential and there is a
0:19:19 > 0:19:24published national risk register. That is an unclassified document. We
0:19:24 > 0:19:31have... These are constantly under review. But we conducted a refresher
0:19:31 > 0:19:36of the national risk assessment this year and will conduct a refresh in
0:19:36 > 0:19:462018.Thank you.My question would be there from the work you have done
0:19:46 > 0:19:52so far, are you already seeing a significant variation between the
0:19:52 > 0:19:56four principal threats identified in their impact on the UK and the need
0:19:56 > 0:20:02to deal with them?I think perhaps the two I would focus on Lord Pole
0:20:02 > 0:20:06are Russia and the terrorist threat. We expected both, if you look back
0:20:06 > 0:20:10at the 2015 review, we expected both of those positions to become more
0:20:10 > 0:20:16troublesome and they have and they will probably become more
0:20:16 > 0:20:19troublesome faster and more broadly than was an is the painted at the
0:20:19 > 0:20:24time. They were -- anticipated at the time. But they were shaping the
0:20:24 > 0:20:29review. But clearly the Russian attitude has worsened more generally
0:20:29 > 0:20:43towards the west and that is, that seems set to continue. The terrorist
0:20:43 > 0:20:47threat has changed because of the way terrorist threat has developed
0:20:47 > 0:20:54and innovated.Would you see a significant variation in spending
0:20:54 > 0:20:59emerging from the present base?No, not necessarily. It is more about
0:20:59 > 0:21:05the balance. If you look at... There is of course some more money coming
0:21:05 > 0:21:13in. I should have made this point in answer to the earlier question, the
0:21:13 > 0:21:18Home Secretary and the Chancellor announced an extra £50 million to
0:21:18 > 0:21:21support the police and help deal with the terrorist threat and the
0:21:21 > 0:21:26Home Secretary will set out more detail later this week in the House
0:21:26 > 0:21:35of Commons. We had already agreed in the 2015SRR to expand the resources
0:21:35 > 0:21:38into counter terrorism and security and intelligence. And you will note
0:21:38 > 0:21:47from the Anderson review that has been published of the operational
0:21:47 > 0:21:52lessons learned from the terrorist attacks earlier this year that the
0:21:52 > 0:21:56main recommendations are not about additional resources or resources
0:21:56 > 0:22:01additional to those planned to come in, but about changes to the way
0:22:01 > 0:22:04information is shared, changes to the way different organisations
0:22:04 > 0:22:08operate with each other. It isn't always just about resources. A lot,
0:22:08 > 0:22:13perhaps to go back to the earlier question, is about the way we
0:22:13 > 0:22:17operate across the national security community.One last question, not
0:22:17 > 0:22:23directly related to the previous two, when you're looking at possible
0:22:23 > 0:22:27variations in the allocations of funds, are you also looking at the
0:22:27 > 0:22:31question of how our nuclear capability is funded and whether it
0:22:31 > 0:22:36should be moved back to central funded as we did in the 80s, rather
0:22:36 > 0:22:40than lumping it into the MoD budget? There is a separate discussion about
0:22:40 > 0:22:47that. I don't want to get drawn on the detail of the deterrent, but
0:22:47 > 0:22:54that particular issue has not been central to the capability review,
0:22:54 > 0:23:01although there is a separate discussion about that.Mr Jarvis.
0:23:01 > 0:23:07Can I ask about defence specific resource and capability. You will
0:23:07 > 0:23:12know perhaps better than anybody the huge range of varied threats that we
0:23:12 > 0:23:23face. Given that, is 2% of GDP sufficient to invest in our defence?
0:23:23 > 0:23:28Well, it's a political question above my pay grade. We do invest
0:23:28 > 0:23:35over 2% now. We're the biggest, we have the biggest defence budget in
0:23:35 > 0:23:38Europe, the biggest defence contributor in Europe. I tend to
0:23:38 > 0:23:47think of this in the round. We're the only western country that hints,
0:23:47 > 0:23:50exeseeds the 2% target for defence and hits the 7% target for
0:23:50 > 0:23:55development. World class security agencies and so on. When I think
0:23:55 > 0:24:00about our national security capabilities, I'm thinking of the
0:24:00 > 0:24:06whole portfolio and no country has quite that mix. Back to the chair's
0:24:06 > 0:24:12first line of questioning, part of my job is to ensure we fuse all that
0:24:12 > 0:24:16and deliver it effectively. Of course, anyone in my job would be
0:24:16 > 0:24:23delighted to have more capability, but we do have one of biggest
0:24:23 > 0:24:29defence budgets in the world. The programme will give us world class
0:24:29 > 0:24:33and modern capabilities across the piece and I think as a country we, I
0:24:33 > 0:24:38think if I look at my counter part over seas, I think they envy the
0:24:38 > 0:24:45sort of capabilities that I'm able to recommend ministers deploy.In
0:24:45 > 0:24:49terms of capabilities we can bring to bear, when with we are looking to
0:24:49 > 0:24:54develop those, it is important to think about what our allies are
0:24:54 > 0:25:00doing, can I ask you therefore, what conversations are you having or what
0:25:00 > 0:25:05work is taking place alongside our US and European partners about the
0:25:05 > 0:25:09contribution they're proposing to make in the future?This is a
0:25:09 > 0:25:14powerful point if I may. Of course, one of our capabilities and a
0:25:14 > 0:25:17capability in particular the Russians don't have is allies. If
0:25:17 > 0:25:24you look at the, if you added up the British, French and German defence
0:25:24 > 0:25:29budgets, although they don't hit the 2% target, that is double the
0:25:29 > 0:25:34Russian budget. A lot is not about expenditure, but the effectiveness
0:25:34 > 0:25:42we get. Part of NATO modernisation programme is to ensure that forces
0:25:42 > 0:25:48are genuinely more able to deploy alongside each other. As we deploy
0:25:48 > 0:25:52the carriers, we are, we will have some allied capability in the
0:25:52 > 0:25:56carrier groups and on the carriers themselves. And when I was in the
0:25:56 > 0:26:02United States last week and saw the Secretary of defence there, he was
0:26:02 > 0:26:07talking about examples of British capability that are almost defence
0:26:07 > 0:26:10capability, military capability that are almost unique that make a real
0:26:10 > 0:26:16contribution to the American view of the allied effort both within Europe
0:26:16 > 0:26:22and outside it. You're right, if one of our strengths is our alliances,
0:26:22 > 0:26:29we need to ensure we integrate and interoperate our capabilities.Do
0:26:29 > 0:26:38you want to come in on this point? The question Lord Powell raised on
0:26:38 > 0:26:43spending is surely key to your responsibility as in the flexibility
0:26:43 > 0:26:46of finances from one area of spending to another and the reality
0:26:46 > 0:26:55of the 2% which isn't after all a target, what is a targ is the
0:26:55 > 0:27:00strategic capability of the UK. That is a floor of 2%. Can you say how
0:27:00 > 0:27:09you see is threats being balanced against this floor?I think as I
0:27:09 > 0:27:14have said, perhaps I can just take the European theatre as an example,
0:27:14 > 0:27:18otherwise I could probably deliver a 20 minute answer which I suspect
0:27:18 > 0:27:23would try your patience. We know that the Russian threat is
0:27:23 > 0:27:28intensifying and diversifying, they are, they're improving the
0:27:28 > 0:27:33sophistication of their of conventional capability and in
0:27:33 > 0:27:43Norway they were show manager me the capabilities they're developing in
0:27:43 > 0:27:49the north. At the same time we saw that huge operation which was as
0:27:49 > 0:27:55much a propaganda operation as a military exercise, designed to
0:27:55 > 0:27:59unsettle our allies in eastern Europe and we are aware of the
0:27:59 > 0:28:04cyberthreat they mount. So we are seeing a diversification of the
0:28:04 > 0:28:11Russian threat. As we need to be able to deter and disrupt and defend
0:28:11 > 0:28:17ourselves against all of those threats. But we have to do it as an
0:28:17 > 0:28:23alliance. It is not just the 2%, the floor, it is I think 2.14 at the
0:28:23 > 0:28:29moment in defence fence with a growing budget. It is about that
0:28:29 > 0:28:32full mix of national security capabilities we can bring to bear
0:28:32 > 0:28:35and my job is to ensure that ministers have to opportunity to
0:28:35 > 0:28:39consider all the options available to them. They then need to decide
0:28:39 > 0:28:43what the blend of the capabilities is and there is a bigger discussion
0:28:43 > 0:28:53about the over all funding which is one for main spending reviews.It
0:28:53 > 0:29:00that is that spectrum that one sees holes appearing, such as winter
0:29:00 > 0:29:05training in Norway to defend the northern flank, it appears to be one
0:29:05 > 0:29:11of areas of strategic vacuum.I'm not an expert on the particular, I
0:29:11 > 0:29:16mean on the particular deployment you set out there. But when I was in
0:29:16 > 0:29:24Norway we had a very rich conversation about how on that
0:29:24 > 0:29:31northern flank her to Norway and other allies can deal with the
0:29:31 > 0:29:36Russian threat. I would need to come back to you on detail, having taken
0:29:36 > 0:29:45a bit more expert advice.
0:29:46 > 0:29:50... Intensified, as Michael Fallon stated and as you have been
0:29:50 > 0:29:54outlining, why are cuts in defence credibility so widely being
0:29:54 > 0:30:00anticipated as a consequence of this review?There's been a great deal,
0:30:00 > 0:30:04as you have been aware, of public speculation. The former Defence
0:30:04 > 0:30:07Secretary, of course, and now the new Defence Secretary have both been
0:30:07 > 0:30:16quite clear about both the floor and growth in the defence budget.
0:30:16 > 0:30:21Obviously, they are considering it very carefully. The capabilities
0:30:21 > 0:30:25that can be developed. You have just issued a report. I haven't had a
0:30:25 > 0:30:28chance to look at all of the detail of it but I've seen a summary of the
0:30:28 > 0:30:32report you issued about the efficiency programme and so on. But
0:30:32 > 0:30:37the programme is designed to deliver joint force 2025, that is a very
0:30:37 > 0:30:40impressive set of military capabilities that would be available
0:30:40 > 0:30:46to this country in the mid 2020s. That remains the capability baseline
0:30:46 > 0:30:52that we are... That is our target. Are you saying that there are no
0:30:52 > 0:30:56chances of significant cuts in existing defence capabilities
0:30:56 > 0:30:59resulting from this review?
0:31:01 > 0:31:04It's not for me to pre-empt decisions ministers will take.I'm
0:31:04 > 0:31:08not asking you to be specific, I am asking you to be general. I'm
0:31:08 > 0:31:14saying, are you telling us that, as a result of this review, we need not
0:31:14 > 0:31:21be concerned that there will be cuts in existing capabilities, given that
0:31:21 > 0:31:24the review is supposed to be being held because the threats are getting
0:31:24 > 0:31:26worse?
0:31:27 > 0:31:30Doctor Lewis, ministers will need to have options about making
0:31:30 > 0:31:34adjustments to capabilities and to the programme. That may mean
0:31:34 > 0:31:38reducing some and increasing others. That's for ministers to decide.
0:31:38 > 0:31:42While this review is in flight I can't say much more than that.
0:31:42 > 0:31:45Didn't James Gray get to the heart of it when he asked you a question
0:31:45 > 0:31:51about this trade off between an increasing threat on one hand
0:31:51 > 0:31:56leading to a cut in the capability to meet another threat on the other
0:31:56 > 0:32:01unless you increase the overall defence budget? And wasn't the game
0:32:01 > 0:32:06given away by your answer when you said that this is meant to be "A
0:32:06 > 0:32:10fiscally neutral exercise". Are you telling us that even if the threats
0:32:10 > 0:32:17that led to the capabilities being drawn up in 2015, they may not have
0:32:17 > 0:32:23changed, but other threats may have got a lot worse. And because you're
0:32:23 > 0:32:27not willing to recommend an increase in the defence budget, indeed, you
0:32:27 > 0:32:31seem to be rather complacent about the size of the defence budget in
0:32:31 > 0:32:37what you have just been saying, but this means that we have to make cuts
0:32:37 > 0:32:41in capabilities that we really need in order to meet other threats that
0:32:41 > 0:32:45have got worse, isn't that the logical consequence of everything
0:32:45 > 0:32:51you've been telling us?I don't agree, Doctor Lewis. The 2015
0:32:51 > 0:32:57review, when I said was fiscally neutral, within a growing envelope.
0:32:57 > 0:33:00The 2015 review already has significant increases coming into a
0:33:00 > 0:33:04range of budgets. The defence budget, as you know better than I,
0:33:04 > 0:33:10has a fixed floor of 2% of national income and will grow by half a
0:33:10 > 0:33:14percent a year in real terms. There are other commitments within that.
0:33:14 > 0:33:16The defence budget is increasing. The budget available to this purity
0:33:16 > 0:33:22and intelligence agencies are increasing. Even if you take the
0:33:22 > 0:33:28hard power ended this, we have an increasing envelope. The question I
0:33:28 > 0:33:31was trying to respond to Mr grow, it is about how we balance off the
0:33:31 > 0:33:36decisions in that increasing envelope -- Mr James Gray. There is
0:33:36 > 0:33:39a question about whether that is sufficient overall. But this
0:33:39 > 0:33:44exercise looks at how to best make use of the rule sources available to
0:33:44 > 0:33:48us against the threat picture and we reached conclusions at the end.Do
0:33:48 > 0:33:54you or do you not have the ability to make a recommendation, if you
0:33:54 > 0:33:59believe that you cannot meet the new and intensifying threats without
0:33:59 > 0:34:06making cuts in capabilities which, only two years ago, we decided were
0:34:06 > 0:34:10necessary and important. Do you have the ability to say to the
0:34:10 > 0:34:16government, "We need to enlarge the financial envelope?" To use the
0:34:16 > 0:34:24jargon.Of course. If we concluded that the total set of capabilities
0:34:24 > 0:34:28optimised across that 56 billion were insufficient to meet the
0:34:28 > 0:34:33threats then, of course, we would say that to ministers. That is not a
0:34:33 > 0:34:37conclusion I expect to reach. But I have the freedom, always, to give
0:34:37 > 0:34:42ministers candid advice. As I already said, the government has
0:34:42 > 0:34:46already just announced, even in the short-term, a significant increase
0:34:46 > 0:34:50in funding for the policing. Because of the intensification of that
0:34:50 > 0:34:54threat. There are areas in which this is being considered.With
0:34:54 > 0:34:57respect, you keep lumping together, and I know that's your job, because
0:34:57 > 0:35:00you are the national security adviser and not just the Defence
0:35:00 > 0:35:05Secretary, you keep lumping together the budgets for all of these things.
0:35:05 > 0:35:09There is no doubt, because of terrorist threats in particular,
0:35:09 > 0:35:13there have been very substantial increases in budgets for things like
0:35:13 > 0:35:19the intelligence services. But the budget the defence is 36 billion.
0:35:20 > 0:35:28That is the budget that gives us our Nato comparator of 2% as a minimum.
0:35:28 > 0:35:31You said one of the main reasons that the threat has intensified has
0:35:31 > 0:35:37been a newly assertive Russia. The last time we had an assertive Russia
0:35:37 > 0:35:43was in the 1980s. We weren't spending 2% on the defence budget
0:35:43 > 0:35:51then, we were spending between 4.6%-5.1%. I beg your pardon?And
0:35:51 > 0:35:55allies were comparatively spending more as well.Thank you, Tom. And
0:35:55 > 0:36:01even after the Cold War came to an end, between 1989 and 1991, and even
0:36:01 > 0:36:08after we took the peace dividend cuts, as late as the financial year
0:36:08 > 0:36:131995-1996, we weren't spending just 2% of GDP on defence, we were
0:36:13 > 0:36:20spending 3% of GDP on defence. Given that we are -- we used to spend a
0:36:20 > 0:36:27much greater percentage of GDP on defence and have defence much higher
0:36:27 > 0:36:31in our scale of national priorities in comparison with other high
0:36:31 > 0:36:37spending departments that we do now, are you still saying to me that we
0:36:37 > 0:36:42should not be concerned about the fact that we are talking about
0:36:42 > 0:36:46deleting entire capabilities like the Royal Marines amphibious
0:36:46 > 0:36:52capability, when only in January this year, I was being assured that
0:36:52 > 0:36:59HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark were due to the service in 2033 and 2044? How
0:36:59 > 0:37:05can you tell me that we do not need an enlarged defence budget if we
0:37:05 > 0:37:09cannot deal with intensifying threats without cutting other
0:37:09 > 0:37:13capabilities that only two years ago we decided we needed?With respect
0:37:13 > 0:37:20Doctor Lewis, the direct example you gave is speculative, no decisions
0:37:20 > 0:37:25have been taken of mankind. There is a lot of speculation in the press,
0:37:25 > 0:37:29some very well sourced speculation in the press, but no decisions had
0:37:29 > 0:37:35been taken. In terms of the general point you are making, the historical
0:37:35 > 0:37:39comparison, is, of course, correct in the sense of our own expenditure.
0:37:39 > 0:37:43But let's not forget the nature of the threat we faced in the 1980s. As
0:37:43 > 0:37:47I said earlier on, I don't think the way to measure this is just through
0:37:47 > 0:37:50budgets, it is about the effect you are seeking to achieve but just
0:37:50 > 0:37:53taking that as a proxy, as I mentioned, if you put together the
0:37:53 > 0:37:57British, French and German defence budgets, even now, that's even
0:37:57 > 0:38:02before Germany and France hit the 2%, but even now, it's about twice
0:38:02 > 0:38:06the Russian defence budget. What they get for that and the way they
0:38:06 > 0:38:09deploy themselves is clearly different. You will be the first to
0:38:09 > 0:38:13tell me that is not a direct comparison. But that's my point
0:38:13 > 0:38:16about budgets, we can't just... Compare to our own historic
0:38:16 > 0:38:18experience.
0:38:19 > 0:38:23Areas in which we may decide to deal with the Russian threat because of
0:38:23 > 0:38:27the nature of that threat, the diversifying nature, they exist
0:38:27 > 0:38:31outside the defence budget. I don't dispute the basic analysis that
0:38:31 > 0:38:34you're setting out, but I think it is right in my job to think about
0:38:34 > 0:38:39the whole set of capabilities, not just the biggest one.I have to stop
0:38:39 > 0:38:45now, but can I just say that anyone who underestimates Russia's military
0:38:45 > 0:38:49potential and the size of their GDP does so at their peril. I have many
0:38:49 > 0:38:52more questions I'd like to put but I fear they'll have to wait for a
0:38:52 > 0:38:58different forum from this one.Lord King wanted to come in very briefly.
0:38:58 > 0:39:00One quick question, are you the right person that Doctor Lewis
0:39:00 > 0:39:07should be asking these questions to? Just, quite simply, do you come in a
0:39:07 > 0:39:10sense, few of the dual responsibility is to work within the
0:39:10 > 0:39:13terms of reference this may have been employed to you and perhaps
0:39:13 > 0:39:19feel that you're not in a position to actually challenge the Treasury
0:39:19 > 0:39:24had on? Is that right or wrong? Perhaps there are two passed to the
0:39:24 > 0:39:27question and answer. Of course, Doctor Lewis and I have exchanged
0:39:27 > 0:39:29some correspondence and the Prime Minister has as well. I genuinely
0:39:29 > 0:39:33think that it is the government position that questions of this
0:39:33 > 0:39:36detail should be addressed to the Defence Secretary and permit
0:39:36 > 0:39:41secretary of defence, they are responsible for this area of work.
0:39:41 > 0:39:44On the broader question... -- permanent secretary of defence. Can
0:39:44 > 0:39:46I have the frank conversations with the Prime Minister and Chancellor of
0:39:46 > 0:39:52the Treasury about the overall allocation of resources? Absolutely.
0:39:52 > 0:39:57I expect to do so. But, as always, in private.I will move on to
0:39:57 > 0:40:02Baroness Fox will stop you said the large and growing diverse threat.
0:40:03 > 0:40:04Baroness Fox will stop you said the large and growing diverse threat.
0:40:05 > 0:40:08I'm interested in your view on how much has
0:40:08 > 0:40:12I'm interested in your view on how much has shifted since 2015. A lot
0:40:12 > 0:40:15has shifted since last week. How you would characterise the threats and
0:40:15 > 0:40:22plan for them?You know this area much better than I. I hope you would
0:40:22 > 0:40:27agree that the rate of change in this area, you know, both
0:40:27 > 0:40:33essentially, how individual threats have become sharper but also the
0:40:33 > 0:40:40diversification of threats. They have progressed faster than anyone
0:40:40 > 0:40:44expected two or three years ago. As you say. It's almost as if there is
0:40:44 > 0:40:50something different all of the time. The thing that has really struck me
0:40:50 > 0:40:53about the cyber threat and I dealt with this a lot at the Home Office,
0:40:53 > 0:40:58the way it cuts right across any definition of national security and
0:40:58 > 0:41:02public safety. If you are an individual small business and there
0:41:02 > 0:41:07is one near to where my flat is in Battersea, they has two crimes in
0:41:07 > 0:41:11the space of a week. One of which was to smash up their stuff outside.
0:41:11 > 0:41:16It was a florist. The other was a cyber attack on their bank account.
0:41:16 > 0:41:20The second was the much more difficult one for the police to
0:41:20 > 0:41:22address. The cyber threat is not just in national strategic threat of
0:41:22 > 0:41:29the kind we have been discussing already, where hostile state could
0:41:29 > 0:41:31achieve, through cyber activity, the same kind of effect they could
0:41:31 > 0:41:35achieve through significant military action. It's also a threat that goes
0:41:35 > 0:41:40right the way down to individual businesses, or as you know,
0:41:40 > 0:41:44individual citizens. Particularly the most vulnerable. Therefore, it's
0:41:44 > 0:41:49not one we can parcel up and put in one place. It is now essentially a
0:41:49 > 0:41:52place or battle space, one likes that language, a domain that runs
0:41:52 > 0:41:58right the way across the national security and public safety agenda.
0:41:59 > 0:42:03Again, one could talk about this at great length. Therefore, the
0:42:03 > 0:42:07approach has to be, as it is in other areas, in very generic terms,
0:42:07 > 0:42:12to tackle the threats as best we can. Reduce those, go after the
0:42:12 > 0:42:16people responsible for them. You get a blend of state and non-state,
0:42:16 > 0:42:20criminal, political, etc. It also improve resilience. This is not
0:42:20 > 0:42:23something, as you know, the government can do alone. We have to
0:42:23 > 0:42:28improve the resident resilience of citizens and government as a whole.
0:42:28 > 0:42:32I am happy to talk at length about it. Perhaps I should stop.How can
0:42:32 > 0:42:36it possibly be that 1.9 billion is even beginning to scratch the
0:42:36 > 0:42:40surface of this threat? How do you see that number in relation to the
0:42:40 > 0:42:45overall budget?1.9 billion is for the government cyber security
0:42:45 > 0:42:48programme. It is as much about societal and economic resilience,
0:42:48 > 0:42:51not just about government. That is designed to try and improve
0:42:51 > 0:42:56government activity. It is what has... Funded the National Cyber
0:42:56 > 0:43:00Security Centre, which of course, was launched since this committee
0:43:00 > 0:43:07last discussed this issue. A big part of that unit's job is to
0:43:07 > 0:43:13improve best practice in businesses, best practices amongst citizens,
0:43:13 > 0:43:17making people cyber streetwise. To improve resilience across the
0:43:17 > 0:43:20economy and across society. I don't think this is an area which is
0:43:20 > 0:43:22simply bad government spending money to change things. It's about
0:43:22 > 0:43:28changing the way that people and businesses conduct themselves.
0:43:28 > 0:43:34Online. That is something they need to build in.Can I just talk about
0:43:34 > 0:43:40the specific NHS WannaCry attack? I'm not sure if there was a
0:43:40 > 0:43:43central... Sorry, decision about the central security operations before
0:43:43 > 0:43:49that attack, whether that decision came afterwards? That the NHS have
0:43:49 > 0:43:52established a centre for security? I wondered if you could tell us about
0:43:52 > 0:43:58that. My understanding of the challenge is that it was people
0:43:58 > 0:44:01failing over a very long period of time to have consistently upgraded
0:44:01 > 0:44:07the software that they needed to. How are you approaching this as a
0:44:07 > 0:44:10challenge across all of our critical infrastructure?
0:44:12 > 0:44:15On your first question, I believe the operation existed before, but
0:44:15 > 0:44:20has been energised since. I would like to the committee. I am not
0:44:20 > 0:44:24sure. If I have a romcom I will write to the committee to correct
0:44:24 > 0:44:30that, if I may -- if I have that wrong. You are right on the second
0:44:30 > 0:44:32point. Without going into detail which exposes vulnerabilities, as
0:44:32 > 0:44:37you will be aware, some areas, but not all, where old software that is
0:44:37 > 0:44:40no longer fully supported and that hadn't been patched. The reason that
0:44:40 > 0:44:46this attack hit individual fragments, if you like, of the NHS
0:44:46 > 0:44:51was that most of the NHS systems and most other government systems hit
0:44:51 > 0:44:56Russian businesses and others, were updated and resilient to it but
0:44:56 > 0:45:02someone. That basic message, it goes back to the first question, it
0:45:02 > 0:45:06wouldn't matter what the government budget for cider is, actually, this
0:45:06 > 0:45:12is as much about IT departments is -- cyber security. And hospitals and
0:45:12 > 0:45:16elsewhere indulging in basic hygiene of updating their systems, making
0:45:16 > 0:45:19sure their software is patched.
0:45:19 > 0:45:24That won't guarantee them against all threats, but it will increase
0:45:24 > 0:45:29their resilience against this kind of threat. Some of this is about
0:45:29 > 0:45:33properly backing up data, so if there is an attack, you have only
0:45:33 > 0:45:35lost a day's work, because everything up to yesterday was
0:45:35 > 0:45:41backed up in a different system. There is a whole load of practices
0:45:41 > 0:45:48that... Good IT hygiene will make any organisation or individual less
0:45:48 > 0:45:53vulnerable.How can you influence making sure that we have the skills
0:45:53 > 0:45:59and attention paid to these issues? Well, this is and this is something,
0:45:59 > 0:46:07so in the economy as a whole, it is led by DCMC, they have the
0:46:07 > 0:46:12responsibility for trying to ensure as businesses exploit the digital
0:46:12 > 0:46:19economy, that they do that in a way that is safe. That properly protects
0:46:19 > 0:46:25them. But I think the main contribution we make out of national
0:46:25 > 0:46:31security community is the national cyber-security centre which has had
0:46:31 > 0:46:37good first few months in operation. Is supporting businesses and
0:46:37 > 0:46:42Government in dealing with cyber-attacks or dealing with them
0:46:42 > 0:46:46if they happen. That is probably the main contribution we can make more
0:46:46 > 0:46:50widely. Within the national security departments and agencies, we have to
0:46:50 > 0:46:56make sure our own systems are resilient and there are parts of our
0:46:56 > 0:47:01supply chains that we are addressing carefully.I know different
0:47:01 > 0:47:05ministers think they have different bits of this and it is a complex
0:47:05 > 0:47:09web, do you think there should be a single minister with responsibility
0:47:09 > 0:47:15for cyber-security.I don't to be honest, it is now too distributed to
0:47:15 > 0:47:21say there is a single minister for cyber. I set out in my letter where
0:47:21 > 0:47:25that responsibility now lies, we have consolidated some of it,
0:47:25 > 0:47:30compared to where we were, the responsibilities where we have DCMC
0:47:30 > 0:47:35responsible for the digital economy and ensuring h it is safe, that sits
0:47:35 > 0:47:41with their core responsibilities. The Home Secretary response Dibble
0:47:41 > 0:47:45responsible for dealing with the civil contingencies. That is within
0:47:45 > 0:47:51her core responsibilities. That is part of GCHQ and we have the first
0:47:51 > 0:47:56Secretary of State and that is a change, a senior cabinet minister in
0:47:56 > 0:48:01charge of the national cyber-security programme. That feels
0:48:01 > 0:48:04like a good mix of responsibilities to me.One short question to follow
0:48:04 > 0:48:08that. Do you feel like you can recruit the talent you need to think
0:48:08 > 0:48:16about this issue?I think, I would take people on, it is not an issue
0:48:16 > 0:48:30for me. I think if you look at QCHQ and they are able to offer something
0:48:30 > 0:48:37that to computer scientists and graduates coming out of universities
0:48:37 > 0:48:44y that the private sector can't and that is the sense of pup purpose and
0:48:44 > 0:48:48the fascination of work and they feel they have a good record of
0:48:48 > 0:48:52attracting highly skilled people. It is not like people like me, they're
0:48:52 > 0:48:58not going to spend 25 or 30 years in one organisation. They do have
0:48:58 > 0:49:02innovative programmes with scholarships and bursaries in
0:49:02 > 0:49:06university, so they're doing some creative things to attract the right
0:49:06 > 0:49:14people and I think they feel they have a good handle on that question.
0:49:14 > 0:49:24Do you really think people have yet woken up o' to is seriousness of the
0:49:24 > 0:49:30cyber situation. It seems to go right across government I'm
0:49:30 > 0:49:38surprised DCMS that isn't seen as the most heavy weight department has
0:49:38 > 0:49:44that responsibility. But looking at this and knowing that starting with
0:49:44 > 0:49:48critical national infrastructure, in the old days if you wanted to attack
0:49:48 > 0:49:54a country you bombed their airports, you damaged their railway lines and
0:49:54 > 0:50:00did those thing, now you just shut those systems down. I Aviation is
0:50:00 > 0:50:08under a major threat. Any transport system, power generation. It seems
0:50:08 > 0:50:16we haven't woken up to the enormous scale of what is going on both in
0:50:16 > 0:50:21terms hostile nations, indulged in numbers I find incredible and the
0:50:21 > 0:50:26amount of attacks that are coming from, either from hostile nations or
0:50:26 > 0:50:31enterprising young men or women who actually and I talk about putting
0:50:31 > 0:50:34people in university, I hope we are going to recruit people before they
0:50:34 > 0:50:39get to university, who are some of brightest people in this field to
0:50:39 > 0:50:44defend us. But also because a lot of people and we know this as
0:50:44 > 0:50:48businesses cover up the fact that they have been attacked, how good a
0:50:48 > 0:50:56picture do we actually have of what is really going on and are we right
0:50:56 > 0:51:01across government and suppliers to government and to the nation and the
0:51:01 > 0:51:05whole of national fabric, how good are we really doing at covering the
0:51:05 > 0:51:09whole of that waterfront.You make the point very eloquently. For the
0:51:09 > 0:51:13economy and society as a whole, I think you're right, people have not
0:51:13 > 0:51:16appreciated the seriousness of this threat. And this is something that
0:51:16 > 0:51:26one needs to think about as a parent as much as anything else, the social
0:51:26 > 0:51:30harms, cyber-bullying and revenge porn are new factors that young
0:51:30 > 0:51:34people are dealing with, right up to strategic factors. This is something
0:51:34 > 0:51:38that there is a role in schools, there is a role for business and
0:51:38 > 0:51:42you're rights we do need to recruit people out of school and put them
0:51:42 > 0:51:47through bursaries and the cyber-security centre and GCHQ are
0:51:47 > 0:51:51doing that. That is a challenging prospect for government, because
0:51:51 > 0:51:56they haven't traditionally done that. On the the broader strategic
0:51:56 > 0:52:00question about critical national infrastructure, the supply chains
0:52:00 > 0:52:05into the security capabilities, and so on, we are on top, well we are on
0:52:05 > 0:52:10this question, I wouldn't claim we are completely on top of it, there
0:52:10 > 0:52:14are vulnerabilities and there are sophisticated attacks being mounted.
0:52:14 > 0:52:19But we are conscious of threat, whether with the private sector or
0:52:19 > 0:52:23parts of public sector, building that into our programmes is a big
0:52:23 > 0:52:29part of their work. In terms of point you made about disclosure and
0:52:29 > 0:52:36companies disclosing this kind of attack, this is an area where NCR
0:52:36 > 0:52:41SEAC is working in a sophisticated way and agreeing with companies how
0:52:41 > 0:52:45they will handle an attack, beginning with the confidential
0:52:45 > 0:52:50conversations so that companies feel they can share that vulnerability
0:52:50 > 0:52:54with the MCSC and that when that need to do after that to reassure
0:52:54 > 0:52:58their customer or shareholders that they have handled it properly. We
0:52:58 > 0:53:05have seen examples where that didn't work with NCSS they have sought to
0:53:05 > 0:53:10learn the lessons of that and help companies deal with this and not
0:53:10 > 0:53:13increase their vulnerability by going public at the wrong time,
0:53:13 > 0:53:25whilst going public at the appropriate time.
0:53:25 > 0:53:30You mentioned cyber as an electronic crime and it is a physical crime.
0:53:30 > 0:53:36Could you comment on that.The chief of defence staff spoke about this at
0:53:36 > 0:53:42some length last week. It goes to the point Lord King was making in
0:53:42 > 0:53:47the modern era, you can achieve the same effect as you used to be during
0:53:47 > 0:53:52World War two say bombing the London docks or taking out a power station,
0:53:52 > 0:53:56by going after the physical infrastructure of cyberspace and
0:53:56 > 0:54:03cables or going after the hard ware or going after the software,
0:54:03 > 0:54:08cyber-attacks that freeze or tip over systems and we have to take
0:54:08 > 0:54:17both seriously.It ever sizes the over lap on defence capability.Of
0:54:17 > 0:54:23course, I take an active interest in all of the capabilities, but in the
0:54:23 > 0:54:27end they're delivered by individual departments and what those
0:54:27 > 0:54:31departments, what those departments deliver, how effective they deliver
0:54:31 > 0:54:36it and whether they're on budget is a matter for them. My job is to try
0:54:36 > 0:54:41and help the NSC see the whole picture and play that co-ordinating
0:54:41 > 0:54:49role. I run a small secretariat and some of caricatures that I have seen
0:54:49 > 0:54:53in the press of my influence on these matters are perhaps slightly
0:54:53 > 0:54:59exaggerated.Lord Hamilton.There was a report that companies were
0:54:59 > 0:55:04accumulating bit coins so that they could pay off black mailers on the
0:55:04 > 0:55:09cybersite. Are you confident that if that happens, although it wouldn't
0:55:09 > 0:55:12be in the public domain these companies would inform you that
0:55:12 > 0:55:16happened, or is this going on without you knowing anything about
0:55:16 > 0:55:21it.That goes to the point I was making to Lord King, I can't be
0:55:21 > 0:55:25absolutely confident, but companies that indulge in that are going to
0:55:25 > 0:55:32lay themselves open to more of the same problem and part of test of
0:55:32 > 0:55:37whether our cyber-strategy as a whole across the economy, and the
0:55:37 > 0:55:40cyber-resilience is whether companies feel they need to ensure
0:55:40 > 0:55:45themselves through that kind of mechanism. I can assure you that
0:55:45 > 0:55:51companies that face this kind of vulnerability or have an incident
0:55:51 > 0:55:58can go to NCSC in confidence and NSCS will help them manage the
0:55:58 > 0:56:03public disclosure of it in an appropriate way.Thank you.I would
0:56:03 > 0:56:10like to move on to counter terrorism and March the previous committee
0:56:10 > 0:56:17heard from the Home Secretary and asked about what was happening on
0:56:17 > 0:56:26contest and the publication of document that's referred to as
0:56:26 > 0:56:30contest 2.0and she said it was running late and stressed the
0:56:30 > 0:56:34importance of getting it done. That was overtaken by events clearly, but
0:56:34 > 0:56:43I think it would be useful to hear from you how the sort of shift from
0:56:43 > 0:56:47contest 2.0to 3.0has affected your thinking, why was there not a case
0:56:47 > 0:56:53for pressing ahead with the publication of contest document, the
0:56:53 > 0:57:03review that was expected even with, even in t expectation of work being
0:57:03 > 0:57:06done on the new review that was announced after the general
0:57:06 > 0:57:11election?The question of publication is a very one for the
0:57:11 > 0:57:16Home Secretary and for ministers. I think they felt that given the
0:57:16 > 0:57:20nature of nose attacks and the fact that we needed to take another look
0:57:20 > 0:57:25at this, there was this operational review conducted with David
0:57:25 > 0:57:29Anderson's assurance that it didn't make sense to put out one document
0:57:29 > 0:57:33that at the time we wouldn't have known there was significant changes
0:57:33 > 0:57:39and it would have... It could have been, could have caused confusion is
0:57:39 > 0:57:50guess. But I was n't involved in the decision. In terms of work since the
0:57:50 > 0:57:54election it is broad-ranging, so there has been as you know the
0:57:54 > 0:57:59operational reviews and those have reached significant lessons learned
0:57:59 > 0:58:06about how the operational mechanism, the case work mechanisms need to
0:58:06 > 0:58:11change, more data sharing and engagement with mainstream policings
0:58:11 > 0:58:18and more broadly as the threat has diversify and defused and we have
0:58:18 > 0:58:22seen people being radicalised online at much greater speed than was the
0:58:22 > 0:58:27case even a few years ago. I was struck about that at the Home
0:58:27 > 0:58:36Office. We need to put in place a broader structure that deals with
0:58:36 > 0:58:44that more defuse threat and which people can use every day implements
0:58:44 > 0:58:53to launch attacks. So that review is in progress, contest 3.0as you refer
0:58:53 > 0:58:59to it. It is part of capability review portfolio and will be again
0:58:59 > 0:59:04as the capability review as a whole will be published in due course.I
0:59:04 > 0:59:10appreciate it is an awkward question when a publication has yet to take
0:59:10 > 0:59:15place, but would envisage there being a significant difference of
0:59:15 > 0:59:21emphasis following on from the sort of low tech, lone actor attacks that
0:59:21 > 0:59:28occurred earlier this year. Is that going to have a big impact on the
0:59:28 > 0:59:35thrust of the next part of programme.We were already seeking
0:59:35 > 0:59:42to deal with that. That is a threat that had already emerge. As the
0:59:42 > 0:59:47Anderson review sets out, the case work model that was in place, which
0:59:47 > 0:59:54is focussed on a intense focus on a relatively small number of high
0:59:54 > 0:59:58threat cases needs to be complemented with a broader picture
0:59:58 > 1:00:04of as they are called in the trade, closed SOIs, people who have been on
1:00:04 > 1:00:10the list of threats and have been taken off it and of trying to
1:00:10 > 1:00:16identify new and emerging threats. That is a complex business and does
1:00:16 > 1:00:22involve some of the more intrusive powers of online surveillance that
1:00:22 > 1:00:25Parliament granted in the legislation in the legislation last
1:00:25 > 1:00:32year. But fundamentally it is a question about data-sharing, making
1:00:32 > 1:00:38sure that we understand, we have the whole picture of all the government
1:00:38 > 1:00:45data on individuals and can assess risk and applying algorithms to
1:00:45 > 1:00:51enable the experts to make risk judgments in a more sophisticated
1:00:51 > 1:00:59and time sensitive way and about engaging that wider set of stake
1:00:59 > 1:01:04holders. That is a challenging prospect and taking security into
1:01:04 > 1:01:08areas that are they are no traditionally comfortable with
1:01:08 > 1:01:16security and so there are cultural questions there. We will want to
1:01:16 > 1:01:22pilot some of things and those will the the main changes and that came
1:01:22 > 1:01:32out of the Anderson review.
1:01:32 > 1:01:36As part 06 of that could it strengthen neighbourhood policing
1:01:36 > 1:01:42so, those officers who are sort of embedded in communities can sort of
1:01:42 > 1:01:45help provide the early warning of individuals at risk to
1:01:45 > 1:01:49radicalisation? Is there going to be something in the new contest review,
1:01:49 > 1:01:56which might give us a fresh perspective on how we utilise those
1:01:56 > 1:01:59tremendously important aspects more effectively in encounting terrorism?
1:01:59 > 1:02:03Without prejudging the final review, because it has not yet been to
1:02:03 > 1:02:08ministers for decision. I think the basic point you made is correct and
1:02:08 > 1:02:14came out of the Anderson review, engaging those local neighbourhood
1:02:14 > 1:02:18policing but also others to ensure they can do their job effectively
1:02:18 > 1:02:23about this set of threats, as they do about gangs, other social
1:02:23 > 1:02:27problems and so on is one of the conclusions of the Anderson review
1:02:27 > 1:02:33and doubtless will then be followed through in the broader review that I
1:02:33 > 1:02:41presume the Home Secretary will want to announce in the New Year.Shall I
1:02:41 > 1:02:52go on to 13?Yes.
1:02:54 > 1:03:04It will be use tofl get -- to get your thoughts on the statement by
1:03:04 > 1:03:08MI5 on the uplift in threat of the terrorist threat in the United
1:03:08 > 1:03:12Kingdom. He's clearly spoken out in the strongest terms and it would be
1:03:12 > 1:03:21useful to hear your thoughts on what the main drivers for this very
1:03:21 > 1:03:27significant change in the level of activity and threat that we face?Of
1:03:27 > 1:03:31course, I entirely agree, this is a subject the Director-General and I
1:03:31 > 1:03:35have discussed a lot over the last few years, when I was doing my
1:03:35 > 1:03:39previous job as well. We're still, I think all of us, seem to understand
1:03:39 > 1:03:44better and better what has really driven this. There are a number of
1:03:44 > 1:03:54factors that we can see evidence of, as I said - online radicalism of
1:03:54 > 1:04:00people based in ra qua until recently of people in the UK. Often
1:04:00 > 1:04:03impressionable youngsters. There have been trends, if you look at the
1:04:03 > 1:04:07average of the people who are under scrutiny, the average age has come
1:04:07 > 1:04:11down, there are more women than would have been the case a few years
1:04:11 > 1:04:16ago. Quite why that is, what has driven those individuals into that
1:04:16 > 1:04:19situation, obviously there'll be individual cases and as the Prime
1:04:19 > 1:04:23Minister has pointed out on occasions, there is a high
1:04:23 > 1:04:28propensity of people who have had mental health problems in this
1:04:28 > 1:04:32co-hort, whom these people are exploiting and exploiting that
1:04:32 > 1:04:38particular vulnerability. I don't want to characterure that - it is
1:04:38 > 1:04:43not the case across the bored, but there are factors of that kind. The
1:04:43 > 1:04:47nature of the radicalising threat is more sophisticated and goes to the
1:04:47 > 1:04:54point that was made earlier about a cyber threat. Adversaries who are
1:04:54 > 1:04:57targeting these individuals have become more sophisticated - the
1:04:57 > 1:05:03tools and techniques they are using are more sophisticated. And of
1:05:03 > 1:05:10course we need to be alert to the effect as people who have been in
1:05:10 > 1:05:14Syria return to the UK, although we will try and manage that as
1:05:14 > 1:05:19effectively as we can. We need to be alert to that possibility as well. I
1:05:19 > 1:05:24think we understand some of the trends and therefore can probably
1:05:24 > 1:05:29give a pretty good answer to the what. It is harder to give an answer
1:05:29 > 1:05:35to the why, I think. And that's probably a matter for as much
1:05:35 > 1:05:41academic research as our own analysis.You have slightly
1:05:41 > 1:05:44anticipated my next question - something which has come across from
1:05:44 > 1:05:49a number of your answers today is one of the things has changed is
1:05:49 > 1:05:53people are becoming radicalised more quickly than has previously been the
1:05:53 > 1:05:57case, so it would be really useful to understand what you and your team
1:05:57 > 1:06:01in the Government are doing to try and understand that, to obviously,
1:06:01 > 1:06:05as means to try and counter it in the future.We are trying to
1:06:05 > 1:06:10understand that. If I can give you an example, you will review the very
1:06:10 > 1:06:14high profile case of the schoolgirls from Bethnal Green who went out to
1:06:14 > 1:06:19Syria. These were young women who had shown no evidence to close
1:06:19 > 1:06:22friends or family of being radicalised and suddenly off they
1:06:22 > 1:06:28went. It turned out, in essentially a private space they had been
1:06:28 > 1:06:32radicalised and were able to conceal it from people who knew them, school
1:06:32 > 1:06:41friends and so on. And that was a new phenomenon. And we have been
1:06:41 > 1:06:47working to understand that. It was partly that that led to the prevent
1:06:47 > 1:06:53duty and you will review that was a piece of controversial legislation
1:06:53 > 1:06:57which extended to several million public servants t duty to report, as
1:06:57 > 1:07:02they would report another kind of vulnerability if they believed a
1:07:02 > 1:07:06child was being subject to physical or sexual abuse in the home, it
1:07:06 > 1:07:12extended that duty to this area. And requires teachers, for example, to
1:07:12 > 1:07:18report, if they observe the kind of behaviour that would lead them to
1:07:18 > 1:07:23believe that a vulnerable young person is at risk of being
1:07:23 > 1:07:27radicalised F I think quite a lot of the prevent case work, I have been
1:07:27 > 1:07:30out on the channel programme, for example, some people will be
1:07:30 > 1:07:35familiar with, I have been out and seen that in operation. If it often
1:07:35 > 1:07:40focussed on young people and from third sector, charities, etc, in
1:07:40 > 1:07:44order to try and deal with that threat. What we are trying to do is
1:07:44 > 1:07:49ensure those programmes are triggered as early as possible and
1:07:49 > 1:07:53indeed learn from the experience of others. It is an area I wouldn't
1:07:53 > 1:07:57wish to characterise it as me and my team, except in the national
1:07:57 > 1:08:04security community as a whole is there. This is an area that Home
1:08:04 > 1:08:07Office, DCLG, devolved administrations and the police are
1:08:07 > 1:08:11looking very, very carefully at. Thank you. Moving on to my last
1:08:11 > 1:08:17question. Now Daesh has lost most of its territory, which do you believe
1:08:17 > 1:08:22is the greater threat? Is it returning fighters or people who
1:08:22 > 1:08:29have stayed at home but find themselves inspired by Daesh
1:08:29 > 1:08:34propaganda online?To be honest, I am not sure I would want to say
1:08:34 > 1:08:39which one is greater. Both are a threat. We have more, we probably
1:08:39 > 1:08:41have more control points over returning fighters. Many would come
1:08:41 > 1:08:45through Turkey. We have got a very strong relationship with the Turkish
1:08:45 > 1:08:53authorities and have been able to bring people f they have to come
1:08:53 > 1:08:57home, bring people under control. If they have a dual nationality we
1:08:57 > 1:09:01might remove that. We probably have more control points, including our
1:09:01 > 1:09:04own borders, on people returning home, as long as we have
1:09:04 > 1:09:11intelligence about them. I think the nature of the sort of, the domestic
1:09:11 > 1:09:14radicalisation on people who are radicalised online for the reasons
1:09:14 > 1:09:17we see. I recommend the Anderson report, it is not a very long
1:09:17 > 1:09:22report, to those who have not read it. That report sets out just how it
1:09:22 > 1:09:27is possible for people to hide in plain sight, having been radicalised
1:09:27 > 1:09:33online. And therefore, it is even more challenging for the police and
1:09:33 > 1:09:36other authorities to understand, to be aware of that threat and then
1:09:36 > 1:09:40take the right, put the right sort of interventions in place and the
1:09:40 > 1:09:44kind of changesvy talked about are de-- changes I have talked about,
1:09:44 > 1:09:49like the prevent duty, but those which are coming in as we approach
1:09:49 > 1:09:52the Anderson review, are redinned to deal with them.And -- designed to
1:09:52 > 1:09:56deal with them. And the Defence Secretary's statements about what
1:09:56 > 1:10:02our approach should be in response to returning fighters - does that
1:10:02 > 1:10:06signal a formal change of approach in the Government's policy, or is
1:10:06 > 1:10:10that more general commentary?It doesn't signal a formal change of
1:10:10 > 1:10:15approach. There have been occasions, which you are aware, on which we
1:10:15 > 1:10:20have had to takeleten strikes in theatre, that has been the
1:10:20 > 1:10:24appropriate thing to do. If people have dual nationality we will seek
1:10:24 > 1:10:27to remove that so they cannot return and pose a threat. Other people we
1:10:27 > 1:10:34will bring back under control and if they either then face a criminal
1:10:34 > 1:10:40justice prol success or potentially other kinds of executive measures of
1:10:40 > 1:10:45that kind, depending on which is appropriate to the individual case.
1:10:45 > 1:10:52It is that fuel intervention. Among those interventions is and remains
1:10:52 > 1:10:57lethal strikes when this is necessary.It is not envisaged that
1:10:57 > 1:11:03the Defence Secretary statement's envisaged a greater use of drone
1:11:03 > 1:11:11strikes than previously...They are used when appropriate.
1:11:11 > 1:11:16From the 2017 attacks and how is the capability review taking into
1:11:16 > 1:11:22account the recommendations recently identified by MI5 and CT policing
1:11:22 > 1:11:26for improving counter-terrorism operations is that also prevent part
1:11:26 > 1:11:33of that strategy?Thank you, so this is one of the dozen or so projects
1:11:33 > 1:11:37within the capability review and essentially, as we were just
1:11:37 > 1:11:43discussing, it is the, this will be, these lessons will be accounted for
1:11:43 > 1:11:48in the counter-terrorism project or the contest 3.0 project, as we were
1:11:48 > 1:11:53just discussing.And will the capability review be delayed as a
1:11:53 > 1:12:00result of having to do so?I don't anticipate that, no. The work is in
1:12:00 > 1:12:13hand. The work is on-going. But there's no delay.And the money that
1:12:13 > 1:12:17you mentioned which has just been announced, this additional £50
1:12:17 > 1:12:22million, this is to assist this process?So the Home Secretary will
1:12:22 > 1:12:27set out more detail about that on the floor of the House, in the House
1:12:27 > 1:12:30of Commons when she announces the police funding settlement, which I
1:12:30 > 1:12:33believe she's doing tomorrow or Wednesday. I am not sure. Anyway,
1:12:33 > 1:12:41this week. The actual £50 million she and the Chancellor set out at
1:12:41 > 1:12:45the weekend is to deal with the capacity issue that the police have
1:12:45 > 1:12:54faced this year and next year in dealing the increase in operation,
1:12:54 > 1:12:59removing the immediate threat. That is related to, but somewhat separate
1:12:59 > 1:13:07from, the changes in process, the broadening out of the involvement of
1:13:07 > 1:13:11other parts of Government that will come through as a result of the
1:13:11 > 1:13:18Anderson review and as part of the overall contest, 3.0.Do you see one
1:13:18 > 1:13:22of your main responsibilities as ensuring better co-ordination
1:13:22 > 1:13:27between these different groups? That's one of the lessons?It is
1:13:27 > 1:13:31essentially, that is a function I would say is my responsibility when
1:13:31 > 1:13:35I was at the Home Office and it was to pull together all the homeland
1:13:35 > 1:13:40security factors. But I think again if I compare us to other countries,
1:13:40 > 1:13:44the co-operation we see between our intelligence agencies, between the
1:13:44 > 1:13:50intelligence agencies and the police and indeed increasingly between
1:13:50 > 1:13:55those security actors and the wider social policy community stands in
1:13:55 > 1:13:58comparison with anyone. I think most countries would look to us,
1:13:58 > 1:14:04particularly if you think of prevent programme, the involvement of
1:14:04 > 1:14:10schools, of social security, of other social policy in our
1:14:10 > 1:14:14counter-terrorism work. Most others have nothing comparable to the type
1:14:14 > 1:14:20of liaison we have. We can work on improving that. Make sure the data
1:14:20 > 1:14:27flows t expertise are at the opt mum level. That is part of what the
1:14:27 > 1:14:30Anderson review talks about. Thank you.
1:14:34 > 1:14:41You said that the threat that we face has intensified and diversified
1:14:41 > 1:14:47and I would like to refer you to the threat from Russia, which the
1:14:47 > 1:14:52Foreign Secretary recently said was now at a higher level than had been
1:14:52 > 1:15:00the case for decades. I wonder if you could talk about that and this
1:15:00 > 1:15:07phrase modern deterrence and to what extent is it involved an
1:15:07 > 1:15:11intensification and diversification of our own efforts and draw your
1:15:11 > 1:15:18attention to what Lord Hanagan said, that the United Kingdom has
1:15:18 > 1:15:23underestimated Russia's ability and intent to use unconventional
1:15:23 > 1:15:30methods.Thank you, Lord Trimble, this is something that I think all
1:15:30 > 1:15:36western democracies have faced. We saw a mixture of propaganda and
1:15:36 > 1:15:40cyber-attacks in the French election. There are other high
1:15:40 > 1:15:45profile cases of that case. If we take that as an example, it was
1:15:45 > 1:15:51clear it was not aimed to change the result, there is no way outside
1:15:51 > 1:15:57intervention could have shifted the result of a two to one election
1:15:57 > 1:16:01victory, but it was designed to undermine the citizens' trust in the
1:16:01 > 1:16:08systems. So we have fake news to use the fashionable term, but propaganda
1:16:08 > 1:16:14to use an old fashioned one, seeking to undermine public support in the
1:16:14 > 1:16:18Baltics for the enhanced forward presence, including the British
1:16:18 > 1:16:25presence. Stories about the conduct of soldiers that are untrue and they
1:16:25 > 1:16:30are clearly on this agenda. As I was saying earlier, while we recognise
1:16:30 > 1:16:37in 2015 the nature of that threat it has intensified at pace and at a
1:16:37 > 1:16:41greater pace than was anticipated there. In terms of modern deterrence
1:16:41 > 1:16:45we are working on this, this is one of areas of capability review that
1:16:45 > 1:16:53we are looking at and the general approach we take to being able to
1:16:53 > 1:16:56employ our capabilities to exploit threats and opportunities. If we any
1:16:56 > 1:17:07about the Russian example f we are, let's say we're hit with a cyber-or
1:17:07 > 1:17:13propaganda attack, probably a deniable one, who they will disavow
1:17:13 > 1:17:17knowledge of. The correct response might not be in the same area of
1:17:17 > 1:17:23operation. The correct response might be to... To push back or
1:17:23 > 1:17:27disrupt in a different area, where we are exploiting our strengths and
1:17:27 > 1:17:33their weaknesses. You will understand I don't want to go into
1:17:33 > 1:17:41detail in that a public session. But you choose to fight on your ground
1:17:41 > 1:17:51of strength. It is employing different capabilities that exploit
1:17:51 > 1:17:54oured opponents vulnerabilities.One of the things we want to do is
1:17:54 > 1:18:02minimise our own vulnerabilities and to use an old fashioned term, sub
1:18:02 > 1:18:09version, are we looking to see what extent foreign state actor,
1:18:09 > 1:18:13particular ly Russian or others are trying to subvert our way of doing
1:18:13 > 1:18:21thing?Yes we have a strategy that sits under the rub rick of the
1:18:21 > 1:18:27national state security for hostile state activity and cyber and it is
1:18:27 > 1:18:31designed to do just that.On this question of sub version, I don't
1:18:31 > 1:18:37know if you read the works of people like Luke Harding from the Guardian
1:18:37 > 1:18:43on elements of state corruption of British institutions or state
1:18:43 > 1:18:48sponsored corruption of British institutions, including finances and
1:18:48 > 1:18:55economic output, we are seeing a notable increase in such levels of
1:18:55 > 1:19:01corruption of British organisations, not exclusive to economic output,
1:19:01 > 1:19:06including things like political parties. Are you, have you diverted
1:19:06 > 1:19:14resources away from other elements of MI5s responsibilities to what
1:19:14 > 1:19:18might be seen as more fundamental part of British state security.You
1:19:18 > 1:19:23understand I'm not going to comment on the allocation of MI5 resources.
1:19:23 > 1:19:29You know the reasons for that. But I probably can say that they are well
1:19:29 > 1:19:39aware of that risk and act accordingly.Can I ask about, it is
1:19:39 > 1:19:44a bit old fashioned, but about expertise, during the Cold War in
1:19:44 > 1:19:49Britain we had a lot of expertise in relation to Russia and that was the
1:19:49 > 1:19:54case I think until quite recently, there is a sense, I have a sense
1:19:54 > 1:19:58that that expertise has been lost and now we seem to have a much
1:19:58 > 1:20:02dimmer view of what is happening in Russia. Would you agree with that.
1:20:02 > 1:20:07If we have lost expertise and I have a sense not just with Russia, but
1:20:07 > 1:20:16with other country, what are we doing to try and build it back up.I
1:20:16 > 1:20:21don't know that's right. We often hear it. But we have for example if
1:20:21 > 1:20:25I look at the run of ambassadors in Russia, we have real deep Russia
1:20:25 > 1:20:30experts who have done that job one after the other and I use that as a
1:20:30 > 1:20:37proxy for it. I suppose there is clearly an over all capacity issue
1:20:37 > 1:20:43that when we faced essentially a single threat during the Cold War we
1:20:43 > 1:20:49had a great deal of expertise in that and the internal threat was
1:20:49 > 1:20:52from Northern Ireland, Republican terrorism. And those, so therefore
1:20:52 > 1:21:00we had a lot of resources devoted to both of those. We now have a lot of
1:21:00 > 1:21:03resources dealing with terrorism, international terrorism, of the time
1:21:03 > 1:21:10we have difference cussed. I think that has -- discussed. I think that
1:21:10 > 1:21:13has sometimes been exaggerated we have a balance across the agency and
1:21:13 > 1:21:22they have sought to maintain that diverse expertise. There is always
1:21:22 > 1:21:30an adjustment between different areas.Given your position as
1:21:30 > 1:21:37principal adviceor, where do you see the greatest threat, is it from
1:21:37 > 1:21:42terrorism or sub version of... Led by state actors.I don't think it is
1:21:42 > 1:21:50an either or.But what is greater. It is a threat, it is a threat to
1:21:50 > 1:21:59what I guess would be... Of course Russia and a strategic threat from a
1:21:59 > 1:22:04nuclear state presents a significant strategic effect to us. But given
1:22:04 > 1:22:12the capabilities we are and our allies have it is unlike will I ly
1:22:12 > 1:22:16that threat will manifest itself except in the ways we see. But we
1:22:16 > 1:22:22face an acute threat that is killing British citizens from terrorists. I
1:22:22 > 1:22:26just don't think... One can say one is more than the other. They're
1:22:26 > 1:22:31different. We need to address both. Can I press you? The reason I ask
1:22:31 > 1:22:36you on the threat to the nation state is because we are seeing
1:22:36 > 1:22:41through sub version and through what you referred to as propaganda, we
1:22:41 > 1:22:48are seeing institutions that we have grown to trust for our security like
1:22:48 > 1:22:52NATO become undermined by organisations that we see being
1:22:52 > 1:22:57attacked by state actors. I therefore question are we seeing the
1:22:57 > 1:23:01nation state, the British nation state, the United Kingdom and Great
1:23:01 > 1:23:05Britain and Northern Ireland being undermined by sub version by foreign
1:23:05 > 1:23:11state powers and is that a greater threat to us as a nation than
1:23:11 > 1:23:15damaging though it and painful though it and awful though it is,
1:23:15 > 1:23:22terrorism.I wouldn't characterise it that way. To put it simply if you
1:23:22 > 1:23:27think of risk, it is threat minus resilience. So if I think about the
1:23:27 > 1:23:32risk to this country and the risk to the citizen and the country, we have
1:23:32 > 1:23:37to take into account not only the nature of the threat, but the nature
1:23:37 > 1:23:40of the country's resilience against that threat. So yes you're right,
1:23:40 > 1:23:49there are efforts to undermine NATO and to sew dissent and undermain
1:23:49 > 1:23:55mine the confidence of the citizen, but we should have competence in our
1:23:55 > 1:23:58resilience against those threats. They haven't really worked and we
1:23:58 > 1:24:04are seeking to strongen that resilience. Whether through making
1:24:04 > 1:24:06ourselves stronger against cyber-attacks and ensuring that
1:24:06 > 1:24:12people understand that fake news is fake news. So I just don't think one
1:24:12 > 1:24:18should try and look at this in a binary way. They're different kinds
1:24:18 > 1:24:21of threat and they're both national security threats and there are
1:24:21 > 1:24:29others and we have to wrap the right capabilities against both.Lord
1:24:29 > 1:24:37Brennan and Dr Lewis.Listening carefully to your answers gives an
1:24:37 > 1:24:42impression of a role for analysis, assessment and co-ordination. But
1:24:42 > 1:24:48here we are talking about a threat to the state from other states. Who
1:24:48 > 1:24:57is to give direction and leadership to counter such a threat - you, the
1:24:57 > 1:25:00council, if not who?The national Security Council is the short answer
1:25:00 > 1:25:06and we bring those issues to the council. Because it does require
1:25:06 > 1:25:10collective effort and the council will give direction and then part of
1:25:10 > 1:25:13my job is to ensure that the council's direction is implemented
1:25:13 > 1:25:21across government.Dr Lewis.We heard a story in the media today
1:25:21 > 1:25:29about the CIA having assisted Russia to thwart an Islamist attack. Can we
1:25:29 > 1:25:33take it for granted that despite our relationship with Russia at the
1:25:33 > 1:25:40moment that, if we had similar information that we would do
1:25:40 > 1:25:46likewise and does that not open up possibilities for co-operation with
1:25:46 > 1:25:50countries that we may have to stand up to in one theatre, but where we
1:25:50 > 1:25:57may have a common interest in another?The short answer is yes to
1:25:57 > 1:26:04both. We... You will be aware of Alexander Litvinenko measures we put
1:26:04 > 1:26:10in place, but we carved out an area of operational liaison with the
1:26:10 > 1:26:15Russians in the run up to the Sochi Olympics. In order to ensure not
1:26:15 > 1:26:19only that we would pass them information against a threat to
1:26:19 > 1:26:25their own citizens, but a threat to ours as well. And so you are right
1:26:25 > 1:26:29there is, there are limited exchanges on this. We would expect
1:26:29 > 1:26:34them to do the same as well. Whether that leads to broader co-operation I
1:26:34 > 1:26:38think goes to the whole question as you will be aware the Foreign
1:26:38 > 1:26:43Secretary is going to Russia and goes to the question of the over all
1:26:43 > 1:26:48stance, which to choose, use the Prime Minister's words is engage and
1:26:48 > 1:26:52be ware. We have to be aware of Alexander Litvinenko measures, we
1:26:52 > 1:27:02are not returning to business as as usual with Russia. But there are
1:27:02 > 1:27:11areas that are to be pursued. You have mice highlighted an important
1:27:11 > 1:27:23one.On Brexit what does the Government need to do to assure
1:27:23 > 1:27:26people that Britain is interested in common security.The simplest point
1:27:26 > 1:27:31is we have done so but it is because it is in our national security
1:27:31 > 1:27:39interest. Forgive me nor for a sporting defence, goal line defence
1:27:39 > 1:27:45is not what we need. There is spill overs from conflict and instability
1:27:45 > 1:27:54to Europe's south. An adversary in Russia to Europe's east. Those
1:27:54 > 1:27:58threats of course spill into our domestic security space as well.
1:27:58 > 1:28:03That is true of all of us and it is in our interests that European, that
1:28:03 > 1:28:08security and defence in the European continent is as effective as
1:28:08 > 1:28:13possible. The Prime Minister has spoken about a deep and special
1:28:13 > 1:28:16partnership, that includes a security partnership with the EU and
1:28:16 > 1:28:21we set out in papers in September on internal and external security,
1:28:21 > 1:28:26saying the British vision for that and we will now work those up into
1:28:26 > 1:28:32proposals for the next phase of the negotiations. The final point is it
1:28:32 > 1:28:39is important to remember defence is not just about co-operation with the
1:28:39 > 1:28:47EU. NATO is the other main pillar. There is a range of multinational
1:28:47 > 1:28:56things we support that exist between the two institutions or on their
1:28:56 > 1:29:00baselines and bilateral relations, notably with France, where we have
1:29:00 > 1:29:04deepened our defence co-operation with France.So could you say what
1:29:04 > 1:29:10the top priorities are in the next few months?Essentially it is what
1:29:10 > 1:29:18we have been discussing, these are common threats we face, we ha
1:29:18 > 1:29:26intense co-operational co-operation and we have supported them to defeat
1:29:26 > 1:29:30terrorist threats in their own territory, because of information we
1:29:30 > 1:29:36have and we will want to continue to do that and through NATO but not
1:29:36 > 1:29:42exclusively, then it is important we continue to modernise nay NATO and
1:29:42 > 1:29:47its ability to deal with the state-based threat and Russia. In
1:29:47 > 1:29:50terms of the nature of the co-operation, particularly in the
1:29:50 > 1:29:56EU, there will be elements which we set out in our paper that will want
1:29:56 > 1:30:03to find ways of continuing, whether data-sharing, operational
1:30:03 > 1:30:09co-operation and our vision of that is of a very close partnership on
1:30:09 > 1:30:12security in particular, but also on defence and foreign policy once we
1:30:12 > 1:30:15have left.
1:30:17 > 1:30:21Obviously, one has to wait and see how that works out. That feeds into
1:30:21 > 1:30:27my next question - how many of the capabilities are likely to be
1:30:27 > 1:30:31provisional until one knows the withdrawal from the EU?I would hope
1:30:31 > 1:30:36not, because I hope that the position that we set out, our
1:30:36 > 1:30:41proposition, if you like, to our EU friends and partners, set out in
1:30:41 > 1:30:48those two security papers that we published, internal-external that we
1:30:48 > 1:30:52published in the early autumn will be accepted and form the basis of
1:30:52 > 1:30:56the future partnership. It is on that basis that we have proceeding.
1:30:56 > 1:31:00I think we have good grounds to believe that is the case. They were
1:31:00 > 1:31:04both well received, even at the time, they were both well received.
1:31:04 > 1:31:09When I talk to my European counterparts or when I used to, what
1:31:09 > 1:31:12they would call the Interior Ministry I had exactly the same
1:31:12 > 1:31:19response. We have to find a way through this and ensure that we
1:31:19 > 1:31:24maintain those channels of operational channels that are
1:31:24 > 1:31:29essential. We don't know how the negotiations will go. There will be
1:31:29 > 1:31:32significant challenges along the way - nobody is underestimating that.
1:31:32 > 1:31:36There is a strong desire, not only this side, but the other side of the
1:31:36 > 1:31:42channel to see this area of work come toal productive conclusion. As
1:31:42 > 1:31:46the Prime Minister has been in the House talking about the European
1:31:46 > 1:31:49Council just this afternoon, of course that has been central to her
1:31:49 > 1:32:05vision of the future partnership since we first decided to leave.
1:32:05 > 1:32:10Lord Hamilton?I have been on this committee for quite a bit of the
1:32:10 > 1:32:13last Parliament. Rather late in the day I discovered we were answerable
1:32:13 > 1:32:21to Parliament for the whole of this conflict stability fund. If you are
1:32:21 > 1:32:27answerable to Parliament for money being spent, you have to, as a
1:32:27 > 1:32:30committee, have some idea how it is being spent. So we started at the
1:32:30 > 1:32:33thin end and said, perhaps you could possibly tell us which countries it
1:32:33 > 1:32:38was being spent in. No, was the answer, that's a se cesmt
1:32:38 > 1:32:42We might upset some of the countries where it's being spent if it was
1:32:42 > 1:32:47known it was being spent there. There might be other countries that
1:32:47 > 1:32:51we upset that weren't having money spent on them. So we don't even know
1:32:51 > 1:32:54officially which countries they are being spent N let's be honest, a
1:32:54 > 1:33:00large number of the countries are in the public domain anyway.
1:33:00 > 1:33:05So, we then said, can we be told how it is spent. That was a bigger
1:33:05 > 1:33:09secret than where it was being spent. How can we be answerable to
1:33:09 > 1:33:13Parliament for the spending of all this money if we have absolutely no
1:33:13 > 1:33:19idea where it is being spent or how it is being spent.So the answerable
1:33:19 > 1:33:23to Parliament point I am confused about. I feel you are Parliament and
1:33:23 > 1:33:27I'm answerable to you, but there is a whole range of parliamentary etty
1:33:27 > 1:33:31quit which is perhaps out of my area of knowledge. In terms of the
1:33:31 > 1:33:35substance that you ask, because it is clearly right on whatever basis,
1:33:35 > 1:33:40that you have the right insight into the cross-Government funds, in this
1:33:40 > 1:33:45case the CSFF, in order for you to be able to hold me and others
1:33:45 > 1:33:51responsible for the expenditure. We have just published the first annual
1:33:51 > 1:33:55report into the CSFF, and there is a great deal of material in there,
1:33:55 > 1:33:59including some of the questions you raised Lord Hamilton. There are some
1:33:59 > 1:34:02questions not mentioned in that report, which we are keeping secret.
1:34:02 > 1:34:07That is not the vast majority, but there are some areas which we think
1:34:07 > 1:34:11should remain secret. I think we can find our way, it has been done in
1:34:11 > 1:34:16the past and other areas of providing a briefing in camera, in
1:34:16 > 1:34:22some way to help you understand some of those. But, as I say, we just
1:34:22 > 1:34:26published an annual review and it has a lot more material is now in
1:34:26 > 1:34:30the public domain about those funds than was the case before.
1:34:30 > 1:34:35Surely we should be security clear, so we can give rather more of this
1:34:35 > 1:34:41information that we get now?I think at least if we're operating in
1:34:41 > 1:34:46private, then there is a great deal of information that we can share
1:34:46 > 1:34:50with you. I don't, I'm not aware that the levels of clearance of
1:34:50 > 1:34:53individual members has been an issue, but I better take that away
1:34:53 > 1:35:00if it has.We did go for a briefing in the Cabinet Office.Yes.Through
1:35:00 > 1:35:03the usual two levels of security, through the system. When we got
1:35:03 > 1:35:07there, we said, what is the classification for this committee?
1:35:07 > 1:35:11And we were told it was below secret.Right.So the difference
1:35:11 > 1:35:17seemed to be a lot of point in being there than going to all these
1:35:17 > 1:35:21lengths than finding our way to the Cabinet when the people briefing us
1:35:21 > 1:35:27could have come here and told us all these ben Nile things which were
1:35:27 > 1:35:34there anyway.Was that feedback on the last two hours?No.I hope not.
1:35:34 > 1:35:38I take the point, entirely. I think we need to find ways of being able
1:35:38 > 1:35:42to brief you in confidence in this forum, but without the cameras on so
1:35:42 > 1:35:46we're not in public and there will be some element where it may be
1:35:46 > 1:35:51appropriate to be able to brief you in the Cabinet Office or in a more
1:35:51 > 1:35:54secure environment, but I'm not familiar with the exact sequence of
1:35:54 > 1:35:58events you mentioned. Let me take it away and I will come back to you and
1:35:58 > 1:36:06perhaps we can talk to the Clarks and madam chair to work it out.A
1:36:06 > 1:36:16very final question. - what does global Britain mean to you?Three
1:36:16 > 1:36:21things, I thismt first investing or reinvesting in some, how can I put
1:36:21 > 1:36:23it, big partnerships, big relationships around the world as we
1:36:23 > 1:36:27try and make the most of the opportunities of Brexit and those
1:36:27 > 1:36:37are core allies, old friends in place. I think, second is
1:36:37 > 1:36:42strengthening our support for the rules-based international system. It
1:36:42 > 1:36:46has worked extremely well in our favour and I don't just mean the
1:36:46 > 1:36:50defence side but it has worked well in our favour over the past 70 years
1:36:50 > 1:36:55and will probably become more important in the 21st century as the
1:36:55 > 1:36:57ge yo politics becomes contested. And we have a significant role to
1:36:57 > 1:37:07play in that. I think, third, it's about our image, our influence. I
1:37:07 > 1:37:10think the Foreign Secretary sometimes used the word, our soft
1:37:10 > 1:37:14power around the world, the great campaign, the fact that one of the
1:37:14 > 1:37:19assets we should think about, even if it is not a deployable national
1:37:19 > 1:37:25security asset are, for example, some of the remarkable NGOs we have
1:37:25 > 1:37:30based here, Oxfam, Save the Children, the Halo Trust, etc. A
1:37:30 > 1:37:35sense of connection with these country, the British Council, World
1:37:35 > 1:37:38Service, would be others. Personally that is the way I would characterise
1:37:38 > 1:37:44it. I expect the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary will characterise
1:37:44 > 1:37:49it differently, hopefully not so differently that it is incompatible
1:37:49 > 1:37:54with what I just said.The three points you gave, none of them could
1:37:54 > 1:38:00you do more for less?I think it's, no, I wouldn't say that, actually. I
1:38:00 > 1:38:03think we can have higher impact than we have now without necessarily
1:38:03 > 1:38:07being a resource question. I know it has been a thread to our
1:38:07 > 1:38:11conversation today, but I do think, having run a big department and
1:38:11 > 1:38:14having dealt with an awful lot of budgetary pressures in that
1:38:14 > 1:38:18department and I didn't get 0.5% real in that department over the
1:38:18 > 1:38:23time I was there. I think there is a great deal Government can do. It is
1:38:23 > 1:38:26not just about constituencies to achieve greater impact with the
1:38:26 > 1:38:29funds we have available to us, particularly if we pool them
1:38:29 > 1:38:34together and use them in a coherent way. I think if you are in my job or
1:38:34 > 1:38:39in a job running a department we have to make the best use of every
1:38:39 > 1:38:44pound of the taxpayers' money.The thing you have not mentioned is the
1:38:44 > 1:38:47Commonwealth and the intelligence which is something which should be
1:38:47 > 1:38:51mentioned in terms of our position in the world.I mean I agree with
1:38:51 > 1:38:54that ep tirely. I could have, I felt I would be trying the patience of
1:38:54 > 1:38:59the committee if I went further. I was trying to identify this in some
1:38:59 > 1:39:02fairly big handfuls. You are right, the Commonwealth summit next year is
1:39:02 > 1:39:05a very important opportunity for us. It goes to that question of
1:39:05 > 1:39:12influence and our image in the world. It shows that we are an
1:39:12 > 1:39:15outward-facing nation and some of the characterures of the decision to
1:39:15 > 1:39:20leave the EU out there are wrong. And I would, I would put that into
1:39:20 > 1:39:24that second basket of our commitment to international institutions.
1:39:24 > 1:39:28Another minute or two left. I will squeeze in a couple of brief ones
1:39:28 > 1:39:31out of the long list of the questions I had. Have you met with
1:39:31 > 1:39:38the service chiefs to discuss their review? What defence expert tease to
1:39:38 > 1:39:43you have within the national security secretariat and given that
1:39:43 > 1:39:51out of, I believe, 12 strands in the review, at least four, defence,
1:39:51 > 1:39:56modern deterrents, proliferation, nuclear proliferation and strategic
1:39:56 > 1:40:02communications are strongly defence-related. Why have you stated
1:40:02 > 1:40:06previously in our correspondence that because the main decisions on
1:40:06 > 1:40:11defence were taken in 2015 this review is not defence focussed?
1:40:11 > 1:40:14Surely this review has huge implications for defence?The point
1:40:14 > 1:40:19I was trying to make is it was a broad-based review looking at a
1:40:19 > 1:40:24whole range of different capabilities across defence but the
1:40:24 > 1:40:26Foreign Office, development, the security and intelligence agencies
1:40:26 > 1:40:30and as you rightly say strategic communications. By the way nuclear
1:40:30 > 1:40:35proliferation is not one of the dozen projects separately, but we
1:40:35 > 1:40:48will report on the list as we report on the review itself. I can't
1:40:48 > 1:40:52remember, but a large number offings with the -- number of meetings with
1:40:52 > 1:40:58the top of the MoD. Those are in different formats. I've had
1:40:58 > 1:41:01one-to-ones with several of the service chiefs. I got a couple more
1:41:01 > 1:41:08to come. As I said to you before, Dr Lewis, the defence project within
1:41:08 > 1:41:15the review is being led by the MoD and our job is to try and pull that
1:41:15 > 1:41:18together in the overall capabilities to make sure all the various pieces
1:41:18 > 1:41:22fit together. I do have exper tease. It is a small team but I have
1:41:22 > 1:41:25expertise including people from the Ministry of Defence working on this
1:41:25 > 1:41:32for me. In several MPs. Including the MoD have ser conned people into
1:41:32 > 1:41:39the review team to ensure we have the right connections.I have both
1:41:39 > 1:41:45Mr Gray and Lord Hamilton and we have about three minutes left.
1:41:45 > 1:41:53Should not one of our post Brexit ambitions be to lead European Nato?
1:41:53 > 1:41:59I think actually we probably do that already, Lord Hamilton. I think that
1:41:59 > 1:42:13is a good objective for us to have. Of course in securing sir peach, the
1:42:13 > 1:42:17chairman of the military of Nato, I think we have been able to show we
1:42:17 > 1:42:20have a leadership role within the alliance. It is more than jobs. It
1:42:20 > 1:42:27is about the agenda. We've led the 2% campaign within Europe. That was
1:42:27 > 1:42:30a commitment made at the Wales summit and it is one that we
1:42:30 > 1:42:34continue to press on in the Nato country to fulfil. We generate a
1:42:34 > 1:42:39great deal of thinking about the modernisation agenda, balancing the
1:42:39 > 1:42:43southern and eastern flanks, if you like, whereas other countries are
1:42:43 > 1:42:47more focussed on one rather than the other. We are in a good position to
1:42:47 > 1:42:50lead on Nato. That is something we should stretch our ambitions on in
1:42:50 > 1:42:58the future.I entirely take your point about your job, about the
1:42:58 > 1:43:02whole security. You do make a very good point that defence is an
1:43:02 > 1:43:06extremely important part of what you do. Is it not therefore a strong
1:43:06 > 1:43:09argument that in addition to this committee you ought to make an
1:43:09 > 1:43:12appearance in front of the Defence Select Committee, because surely
1:43:12 > 1:43:16they would have a keen interest in what you have to say about the risks
1:43:16 > 1:43:21and about the changes. Surely an appearance in front of the Select
1:43:21 > 1:43:24Committee would make a great deal of sense?I was hoping I wouldn't have
1:43:24 > 1:43:29to answer that question.It is why I asked it.I know it. Maybe I can
1:43:29 > 1:43:34make two points. I know time is short, madam Chair. Please do
1:43:34 > 1:43:39accept, this is not about my personal willingness about appearing
1:43:39 > 1:43:43before parliamentary committees. I appeared a lot in my last job. I
1:43:43 > 1:43:48used to appear about three times a year. I am happy if to do that if it
1:43:48 > 1:43:54would suit your needs and I would go at shorter notice if there was an
1:43:54 > 1:43:58emerging issue and the Prime Minister felt it should be me to
1:43:58 > 1:44:04appear. Please, it is not about my personal appetite for appearing
1:44:04 > 1:44:07before the defence committee. The Prime Minister set out the position
1:44:07 > 1:44:13I think in a letter to Dr Lewis, and it relates to the rules. As an
1:44:13 > 1:44:18official I appear in front of ministers, except for accounting
1:44:18 > 1:44:23officers of the, appear in front of ministers and with their content. As
1:44:23 > 1:44:25a Cabinet minister office my minister is the Prime Minister. In
1:44:25 > 1:44:31her view and in the Government's view the appropriate to appear
1:44:31 > 1:44:34before committees are mostly those from the committees themselves.
1:44:34 > 1:44:40There are precedents, as Dr Lewis will no doubt point out where my
1:44:40 > 1:44:45predecessors have appeared before the committee. There are those where
1:44:45 > 1:44:48they have reviewed national security advisers to appear before
1:44:48 > 1:44:53committees. In the end it is the decision that ministers take when
1:44:53 > 1:44:56and whether and when officials appear before departmental
1:44:56 > 1:45:00committees. But my own view, and I think the Prime Minister's view, is
1:45:00 > 1:45:04that because my job is cross-cutting, a cross-cutting
1:45:04 > 1:45:07committee feels that is the natural point for scrutiny.
1:45:12 > 1:45:15So if the Prime Minister took a different view in front of the
1:45:15 > 1:45:18liaison committee, you would be quite content to appear before the
1:45:18 > 1:45:27Defence Commitee?Just to be clear, this is a government position. Those
1:45:27 > 1:45:31rules were carefully negotiated. It is a government position that
1:45:31 > 1:45:36officials appear on behalf of ministers and with their consent.
1:45:36 > 1:45:41Departmental ministers and their parliamentary secretaries are the
1:45:41 > 1:45:43appropriate people to appear before select committees in those
1:45:43 > 1:45:49circumstances.Thank you very much. We have come to the end of our time.
1:45:49 > 1:45:53Thank you very much indeed for the time you spent with us and the
1:45:53 > 1:45:58answers you have given. Could I also say to you, something Lord Hamilton
1:45:58 > 1:46:07touched on, one of the things that has been... And I understand
1:46:07 > 1:46:09completely. The creative tension between select committees and
1:46:09 > 1:46:14government. But it has been a long-running concern of this
1:46:14 > 1:46:20committee ever since it was first set up that there is insufficient
1:46:20 > 1:46:26access and insufficient mutual confidence. I am very mindful of the
1:46:26 > 1:46:30way the IFC started off under Lord King and where it is now. My
1:46:30 > 1:46:37ambition for this committee is that we should and up not in the same
1:46:37 > 1:46:40place as the ISC, which is different, but in a position where
1:46:40 > 1:46:43there is more sharing of information and much more mutual confidence than
1:46:43 > 1:46:47there is now. I am grateful for your remarks about being prepared to
1:46:47 > 1:46:56consider some of that. We would like you to do so. There was concern
1:46:56 > 1:47:00because the secretary couldn't tell us what areas of policy were covered
1:47:00 > 1:47:03under the capability review. There are constant little pin pricks like
1:47:03 > 1:47:08that where there is a feeling of, we don't intend to share that with you,
1:47:08 > 1:47:12we don't intend to tell you anything. And as I say, I think it
1:47:12 > 1:47:15is to our mutual benefit if we look afresh at all of this and see what
1:47:15 > 1:47:19we can do in terms of working together in the future. So I leave
1:47:19 > 1:47:25that helpful thought with you. And thank you very much for coming.
1:47:25 > 1:47:29Madam chair, thank you very much. Thank you for the session. I remain
1:47:29 > 1:47:35at your disposal and I will pick that point up before my next
1:47:35 > 1:47:40hearing. Thank you.