:00:14. > :00:17.The Irish State is being asked to explain its role in the Troubles.
:00:17. > :00:23.We certainly feel that the Irish Government could have done a lot
:00:23. > :00:26.more to stop the campaign of genocide that was happening in
:00:26. > :00:29.Fermanagh, Tyrone, South Armagh and Londonderry as well. Unionists
:00:29. > :00:34.return to this and try to claim that if it wasn't for the Irish
:00:34. > :00:38.Government there wouldn't have been the IRA campaign. I think it is
:00:38. > :00:43.what-about-ery. There is no memory whatever of collusion between the
:00:43. > :00:46.Irish State, passive or active, and the IRA. My party was totally,
:00:46. > :00:52.totally against the use of violence in achieving their political aims.
:00:52. > :00:56.Totally, 100%, 101%. Next time I'm in Dublin I certainly will be
:00:56. > :01:01.talking about these matters. issue of the Irish State's attitude
:01:01. > :01:09.and actions have also been thrown centre stage by a tribunal in
:01:09. > :01:19.Dublin investigating allegations that Gardai colluded with the IRA.
:01:19. > :01:48.
:01:48. > :01:53.Will Ireland answer a unionist call to apologise for... The British
:01:53. > :01:57.Army suffered its biggest loss of life in the Troubles when two bombs
:01:57. > :02:01.were detonated here in the North, from across the water in the south.
:02:01. > :02:07.Throughout the Troubles, questions were raised about the Irish State's
:02:07. > :02:13.role. As unionists complained the republic provided a sanctionary for
:02:13. > :02:17.on the run terrorists. As politicians contest the past, the
:02:17. > :02:21.history of the Troubles can appear an exercise in what-about-ery. To
:02:21. > :02:27.the next generation the question, what about allegations of Irish
:02:28. > :02:32.State collusion with the IRA, may come to appear it no more than the
:02:32. > :02:42.obvious rejoineder to cries of what about British collusion with
:02:42. > :02:51.
:02:51. > :02:54.It was as a result of political negotiations at Weston Park over a
:02:54. > :03:01.decade ago that a number of inquiries into alleged British and
:03:01. > :03:05.Irish collusion were set up. In Dublin, one of those inquiries, led
:03:05. > :03:10.by judge Peter Smithwick has been examining claims of gardai
:03:10. > :03:12.collusion in the IRA murder two of police officers. Chief
:03:12. > :03:17.Superintendent Harry Breen and Border Superintendent Bob Buchanan
:03:17. > :03:22.were travelling back across the border after a meeting with their
:03:22. > :03:32.Irish gardai counterparts in Dundalk on March 20, 1989. They
:03:32. > :03:42.were ambushed by a gang of IRA gunmen. What is this? Reverse,
:03:42. > :03:49.
:03:49. > :03:54.They were the two most senior policemen murdered during the
:03:54. > :03:57.Troubles. I was meant to the in the car. Harry and I were going down
:03:57. > :04:02.that morning. Alan Mains was Harry Breen's staff officer, but his
:04:02. > :04:06.place on the trip to Dundalk was taken instead by Bob Buchanan.
:04:06. > :04:12.Officers Breen and Buchanan went to Dundalk to discuss a possible
:04:12. > :04:18.operation against Thomas Slab Murphy, who they identified as IRA
:04:18. > :04:23.chief in South Armagh. Harry Breen had been worried about travelling
:04:23. > :04:27.there because he suspected some guards had links to the IRA. He had
:04:27. > :04:33.a lot of reservations about it. You know, I think it was more to do
:04:33. > :04:38.with the fact that it was Murphy and he did mention his concerns,
:04:38. > :04:44.clearly to me, at the time, about the fact that people were on, in
:04:44. > :04:47.Harry's opinion, were on the pay roll of Slab Murphy from the
:04:47. > :04:51.Guardian. Harry Breen also knew he was among the IRA's top targets,
:04:51. > :04:56.after he appeared in the media following the SAS SAS ambush at
:04:56. > :05:01.Loughall in which eight IRA men had been killed.
:05:01. > :05:09.NEWSREEL: The weapons are very high-powered. It's evident that not
:05:09. > :05:17.only did the terrorists intend to destroy the station, but also to
:05:17. > :05:22.kill any of the ok ue paints in the -- occupants in the station. It was
:05:22. > :05:26.a serious set back to the RUC. was a significant blow with
:05:26. > :05:31.especially Harry. He would have had tremendous knowledge as a Constable
:05:31. > :05:35.in Crossmaglen, right through to being a Chief Superintendent for
:05:35. > :05:37.the division. There was probably nothing that he didn't know in
:05:37. > :05:42.terms of personalities within the Provisional IRA. The question has
:05:42. > :05:49.always been, how did the IRA know that two policemen were on the road
:05:49. > :05:54.that day? Specifically, was there a leak from Dundalk Gardai Station?
:05:54. > :06:04.Harry Breen's staff arranged the 34509ing in Dundalk by phone only
:06:04. > :06:06.
:06:06. > :06:12.hours before took place at 2.0 Peter Mandelson --2.00pm. On the
:06:12. > :06:16.day itself between 9.00 am and 10.15 am several phone calls
:06:16. > :06:22.occurred. Firming up the arrangements. Just over an hour
:06:22. > :06:25.after these calls, around 11.30 am. It's understood that British Army
:06:25. > :06:29.listening devices in South Armagh picked up a rush of IRA
:06:29. > :06:33.communications. Was this the start of the preparation for the IRA
:06:33. > :06:37.attack? If it was, how did the IRA know to get ready when only a
:06:37. > :06:41.handful of people in Newry and Dundalk police stations say they
:06:41. > :06:46.knew about the meeting? The officers' car couldn't have been
:06:46. > :06:50.spotted before, this because they didn't leave Newry until after
:06:50. > :06:58.1.30pm. The question the tribunal is obviously addressing very
:06:58. > :07:04.directly is, whether or not the Provisional IRA had information
:07:04. > :07:10.beyond 10.10/10.15 am that the men were coming? Expert witnesses have
:07:10. > :07:15.said that to spot the officers' carat 1.30pm and mount the huge
:07:15. > :07:24.operation just after 3.30pm would surely have been impossible. The
:07:24. > :07:34.IRA was either already covering the roads or tipped off about the trip
:07:34. > :07:39.Journalists Chris Ryder, says republican terrorists viewed the
:07:39. > :07:43.South as a hiding place from security forces in Northern Ireland.
:07:43. > :07:48.Dundalk at one stage was known as Gundalk. Many people who left
:07:48. > :07:54.Northern Ireland to avoid justice went on the run and stayed on the
:07:54. > :08:00.run in the Republic of Ireland. They generally felt that it was a
:08:00. > :08:05.safe haven. It is a view shared by General Sir John Wilsey, a former
:08:05. > :08:08.head of the British Army in Northern Ireland. A successful
:08:08. > :08:12.terrorist organisation must have a safe border behind which to shelter.
:08:12. > :08:17.You must have a population or a community or an area or a base
:08:18. > :08:22.which is protected and safe. This man, known as Kevin Fulton,
:08:22. > :08:26.appeared before the Tribunal and said he was a former British Army
:08:26. > :08:31.agent. He infill straited the IRA's South Down unit. The engineering
:08:31. > :08:35.and the bomb make woog have been 99% based in the south. Had you no
:08:35. > :08:40.RUC or covert army units running around. You made bombs and they
:08:40. > :08:42.went all over Northern Ireland. They would have gone up as far ace
:08:42. > :08:47.as Derry/Londonderry, Belfast, North Down, South Down, they went
:08:47. > :08:50.everywhere, Cookstown. Kevin Fulton is significant because he has given
:08:50. > :08:53.key evidence to the Smithwick Tribunal claiming he was present
:08:53. > :08:56.when a Dundalk guard passed information to the IRA. That
:08:56. > :09:02.evidence was privotal to the inquiry being set up into the
:09:02. > :09:06.deaths of Breen and Buchanan. But it is also highly controversial.
:09:06. > :09:12.The Tribunal has heard Kevin Fulton described as "an intelligence
:09:13. > :09:16.nuisance", and "a compulsive liar" likely to provide false information.
:09:16. > :09:21.The triebuen hall has though heard that Fulton provided good
:09:21. > :09:24.intelligence on many occasions. Whether or not Smithwick ultimately
:09:24. > :09:34.believes his story, what this inquiry has done is shine a light
:09:34. > :09:44.
:09:44. > :09:48.on the role of the Irish State and Border security was a major point
:09:48. > :09:57.of contention between Britain and Ireland. The bombing at Narrow
:09:57. > :10:01.Water in August 179 brought it into sharp focus. 18 soldiers were
:10:01. > :10:07.killed outside Warrenpoint when the IRA detonated two bombs from across
:10:07. > :10:13.the border, a short distance away. They were in the south. So they
:10:13. > :10:17.were unmolested. They knew they were completely untouched. We could
:10:17. > :10:22.do nothing about it. Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, immediately flew
:10:22. > :10:26.to Northern Ireland and began to pressure the Irish for tougher
:10:26. > :10:33.security. As part of the negotiations for the Anglo Irish
:10:33. > :10:38.Agreement in 1985, better security co-operation led to increased
:10:38. > :10:41.staffing at Dundalk Gardai station. Recently leaked American government
:10:41. > :10:46.cables reveal that Thatcher felt Dublin was still dragging it is
:10:46. > :10:51.feet on security by 1987. She even offered British funding to train
:10:51. > :10:56.Irish police and army in anti- terror tactics. An offer that Irish
:10:56. > :11:00.Justice Minister Gerry Collins says was turned down. It was our
:11:00. > :11:06.responsibility to fulfill or our constitutional obligations. That we
:11:06. > :11:12.did. About We understand that Judge Smithwick has been searching
:11:12. > :11:18.through Thatcher's and Fitzgerald briefing papers for a gardai leak.
:11:18. > :11:27.Rumours about a Dundalk mole were rife. The Tribunal heard that an
:11:27. > :11:32.RUC Special Branch document from that year named a particular guard.
:11:32. > :11:36.The INLA had a big funeral here. These rumours became known in
:11:36. > :11:41.Dundalk itself, says Dan Prenty, who was a Detective Inspector in
:11:41. > :11:46.the town during the 80s, but no-one investigated. It was going on for a
:11:46. > :11:55.long time. Really, it was not much notice was taken of it, to be
:11:55. > :12:02.honest about it. It was never as seenious -- serious enough for a
:12:02. > :12:06.major investigation to be carried out into it. A former Monaghan
:12:07. > :12:14.Chief Superintendent, Tom Curran, told Smithwick that in 197 Bob
:12:14. > :12:17.Buchanan actually asked him to raise concern at Gardai HQ. He said
:12:17. > :12:21.he went to Assistant Commissioner Eugene Crowley and told him that
:12:21. > :12:26.the RUC was concerned that a guard was associating with the IRA. He
:12:26. > :12:30.claimed that Crowley barely looked up from the flies he was reading as
:12:30. > :12:38.sur ran told Smithwick "in a very short time I got the opinion he
:12:38. > :12:43.didn't want to hear it, so I left". Curran also told the Tribunal that
:12:43. > :12:47.Bob Buchanan named the man Owen Corrigan as the guard who links to
:12:47. > :12:54.the IRA. Owen Corrigan was unavailable for this programme. But
:12:54. > :12:59.he is seen here speaking to Spotlight? South Armagh has been
:12:59. > :13:03.part of the Troubles. A unique part of the subversive activity on the
:13:03. > :13:06.border. In a statement before he died Crowley said he had never
:13:06. > :13:11.heard anything about Corrigan. Owen Corrigan is the same guard Kevin
:13:11. > :13:14.Fulton told Smithwick he witnessed passing information to the IRA.
:13:14. > :13:18.Owen Corrigan has strenuously denied all allegations against him.
:13:18. > :13:22.His solicitor points out that he has successfully sued over such
:13:22. > :13:26.allegations in the past. His record has been defended by fellow
:13:26. > :13:31.officers. He has been commended for fighting terrorism, including
:13:31. > :13:36.handing over INLA man, Dominic McGlinchey, to the RUC. His
:13:36. > :13:40.solicitor has evidence to show he was on sick leave at the time Kevin
:13:40. > :13:46.Fulton says he was passing information to the IRA. Two further
:13:46. > :13:50.guards from Dundalk station have come under suspicion too. They also
:13:50. > :13:54.dispute the allegations. The Irish authorities appear to have done
:13:54. > :13:58.very little to investigate a leak. It was only after the Breen and
:13:58. > :14:02.Buchanan murders that they launched an internal investigation. Before
:14:02. > :14:07.that began, just hours after the killings, the RUC and the guards
:14:07. > :14:14.dismissed all claims of a leak. reject any suggestion of that kind.
:14:14. > :14:21.I can say now that categorically the evidence which we have firmly
:14:21. > :14:25.confirms to us that was no mole. Can you indicate... No, not at this
:14:25. > :14:30.time. How could both men have been so sure there was no mole just
:14:30. > :14:34.hours after the murders? A former senior Special Branch officers, and
:14:34. > :14:40.an ex-kept deputy Constable, have told Spotlight, in their experience,
:14:40. > :14:45.they could not have made this call so soon. I think that they had to
:14:45. > :14:51.do that for reassurance reasons, Sir John Hermon would have been
:14:51. > :14:56.mindful of the fact that he could have triggered off a response or
:14:56. > :15:03.retaliation by loyalist elements. Indeed, created a situation where
:15:03. > :15:07.the RUC rank and file would refuse to co-operate with the Gardai.
:15:07. > :15:12.Irish Justice Minister Gerry Collins and Eugene Crowley met and
:15:12. > :15:16.Crowley sent a senior guard to investigate in Dundalk. Before he
:15:16. > :15:22.had even reached Dundalk Gardai station Eugene Crowley had given a
:15:22. > :15:26.statement to say there was no mole in Dundalk Gardai station am, how
:15:26. > :15:29.could Crowley do that? I can't answer that. If Commissioner Eugene
:15:29. > :15:32.Crowley said that, that was the belief he had at the time. Would
:15:32. > :15:38.you think it was strange to make a statement before you had the facts
:15:38. > :15:42.to hand and the report to hand? Again, I can't answer that it was
:15:42. > :15:46.an internal police decision. Smithwick has heard evidence that
:15:46. > :15:50.suggests the gardai investigation was limited in scope. Many officers
:15:50. > :15:55.on the morning shift on the day of the murders were not even
:15:55. > :16:01.questioned. None of those officers were searched down and interviewed.
:16:01. > :16:04.That, to me, would have been one of the most important lines of inquiry.
:16:04. > :16:08.Extraordinarily, the tribunal also heard evidence that the officers
:16:08. > :16:15.who carried outlet investigation were never ordered to investigate a
:16:15. > :16:19.leak, but instead were merely told to establish officers' movements at
:16:19. > :16:22.Dundalk Gardai Station on the day of the murders. So how then cot
:16:22. > :16:29.final report to Eugene Crowley, one month later, confidently state in
:16:29. > :16:33.its conclusion, "there is no leak in Dundalk Gardai Station"? For
:16:33. > :16:37.some it suggests that the inquiry was window dressing which allowed
:16:37. > :16:42.Gardai to say they had investigated. But any suggestion of the State
:16:42. > :16:48.avoiding the issue of a leak is hotly contestant. Do you think
:16:48. > :16:51.there would be reluctance in the Irish State to fully investigate
:16:51. > :16:56.the issue because of the potential political ramifications? No, none
:16:56. > :17:01.what so ever. The sort of innuendo in that question is that such might
:17:01. > :17:07.have existed. It did not exist. The government is bona fide and beyond
:17:07. > :17:12.question. In January 1990 a special Gardai task force planned to raid
:17:12. > :17:16.the home of IRA quartermaster, Michael McKevitt looking for a
:17:16. > :17:23.false passport. The night before the raid, Dundalk guards were told
:17:23. > :17:28.of the operation. An ex-guard, Dan Prenty, has told Smithwick that
:17:28. > :17:32.shortly after a phone call was made to Warren McKevitt. So is this
:17:32. > :17:37.definitive evidence that someone in the Dundalk guards was tipping off
:17:38. > :17:41.the IRA less than a year after the Breen and Buchanan murders.
:17:42. > :17:46.McKevitt has denied receiving such a call. Smithwick has heard his
:17:46. > :17:51.phone was tapped, so the question is is, is there a tape of this
:17:51. > :17:54.alleged tip-off and where is it? Smithwick also located Gardai
:17:54. > :17:58.intelligence documents containing claims that the IRA had friends in
:17:58. > :18:07.Dundalk's police force. Yet it seems there was still no action
:18:07. > :18:17.taken. But this idea of a soft approach is strongly rejected by
:18:17. > :18:31.
:18:31. > :18:35.ex-Dundalk detective Dan Prenty. The film taps into the belief that
:18:35. > :18:41.there were some rotten Apples in the guards. Is this there any truth
:18:41. > :18:46.in it? Sean oh Callaghan is a former IRA commander and police
:18:46. > :18:50.informer. He was invited to give evidence to Smithwick but declined.
:18:50. > :18:56.He claims the guards were not as tough on on the IRA as they could
:18:56. > :19:01.have been. I remember one occasion being arrested and this gardai
:19:01. > :19:05.detective, who had just known he me for years, there was a young gardai
:19:05. > :19:11.detective, literally new. He walks in and he says to this garda
:19:11. > :19:15.detective. He says, "you sit there, Sean is going to sit there. You ask
:19:15. > :19:22.some questions and Sean will educate you". He walked off
:19:22. > :19:25.laughing. But any idea of a soft approach is strongly rejected by
:19:25. > :19:31.ex-Dundalk detective Dan Prenty. Were you as a guard ever directed
:19:31. > :19:38.to go easy on the IRA? Never. That was never policy at all. Never. The
:19:39. > :19:45.guards at all times always at every chance confronted the IRA But Sean
:19:45. > :19:52.oh Callaghan alleges son-in-law guards were sympathetic to the IRA.
:19:52. > :19:57.He was aware of a senior IRA man, now a politician, who was handling
:19:57. > :20:01.a gardai contact in the mid 0's. That contact was paid �5,000, which
:20:01. > :20:06.I knew, for the IRA, was a huge amount of money for the IRA to pay
:20:06. > :20:11.in those circumstances. I was the OC of the IRA Southern Command, but
:20:11. > :20:21.I wasn't handling this. Or I wasn't allowed to hand this. This was
:20:21. > :20:25.being handled a pay grade above me, if you like. But it wasn't just the
:20:25. > :20:29.guards who were an issue for the British Government. General will si,
:20:29. > :20:34.who had seven tours on duet tkwri in Northern Ireland said he was
:20:34. > :20:38.frustrated that he never once was able to speak one-to-one with his
:20:38. > :20:44.Irish army counterparts. We were not to have any dealings with the
:20:44. > :20:48.British Army. Which, as far as Dublin was concerned, was an alien
:20:48. > :20:53.army, an occupying army. Dublin didn't want to have any dealings
:20:53. > :21:00.with us. What difference would co- operation with Irish arm have made?
:21:00. > :21:05.It could have brought the troubles to a halt, I would have thought.
:21:05. > :21:09.Kevin Myers was a Dublin journalist working in Belfast during the
:21:09. > :21:14.Troubles who later wrote an article which made allegations of Gardai
:21:14. > :21:18.collusion that played a part in the creation of the Smithwick Tribunal.
:21:18. > :21:22.Fianna Fail government ministers actively encouraged the formation
:21:22. > :21:26.of the Provisional IRA. Actively fed money, government money, to the
:21:26. > :21:30.IRA. They helped to arm the IRA. They gave moral support to the IRA.
:21:30. > :21:33.They were sympathetic to the cause of a united Ireland. That was
:21:33. > :21:37.official Irish policy. Now the Irish State couldn't engage in a
:21:37. > :21:43.war with Britain to do that. There were elements there who said, let
:21:43. > :21:49.the IRA do the dirty work. former Fianna Fail Justice Minister
:21:49. > :21:54.finds this view offensive. My party was totally, totally against the
:21:54. > :21:57.use of violence in achieving their political aims. Totally 100%, 101%.
:21:57. > :22:01.Brian Feeney argues the plot by some Irish government ministers to
:22:01. > :22:04.arm the IRA in the 70s did not have the backing of the state. That was
:22:04. > :22:09.not the Irish government. There were a couple of individuals. There
:22:09. > :22:13.is no doubt there were individuals, particularly in Fianna Fail who did
:22:13. > :22:19.want to send guns to the North. The Irish Government stamped on the
:22:19. > :22:25.plot and threw out the people who were involved and put them on trial.
:22:25. > :22:30.He also says that unionist claims the Irish State turned a blind eye
:22:30. > :22:33.or allowed the IRA to do its dirty work are "laughable". This is a
:22:33. > :22:37.familiar unionist myth that the Irish State was very worried about
:22:37. > :22:41.the role of the IRA and the prospect at certain times of IRA
:22:41. > :22:45.destabilising the Irish State. Historically, it was extradition
:22:45. > :22:54.which was the major source of contention between the British and
:22:54. > :23:00.Irish. A point which Jack Lynch felt the heat over after Narrow
:23:00. > :23:07.Water. It was the the failure of the government to extradite known
:23:07. > :23:13.IRA terrorist to the North. Any excuse was found not to do this.
:23:13. > :23:18.Until the mid 80s Irish law meant IRA members could escape
:23:18. > :23:21.extradition to the North to face terrorist charges by saying
:23:21. > :23:26.political motivation. extradition laws were difficult. In
:23:26. > :23:29.the 1980s, 30 years ago now, they wouldn't extradite people who had
:23:29. > :23:39.escaped from jail in the North because people who had escaped from
:23:39. > :23:41.
:23:41. > :23:48.prison in the Big Escape were badly beaten by prison soldiers and
:23:48. > :23:56.prison wardens. When they were brought back again so they weren't
:23:56. > :24:01.extradited because of danger of injury. Evelyn Glenholmes ended not
:24:01. > :24:05.in extradition but in farce. Figures reveal that 113 extradition
:24:05. > :24:11.requests for terrorist related offences made to the republic
:24:12. > :24:15.between 1973 and 1997, only eelgt were granted. Dan Prenty says it
:24:16. > :24:25.was not the fault of the guards, but it was the fault of the courts
:24:25. > :24:30.and the State. Every one that came to Dundalk were executed and the
:24:30. > :24:36.person taken before the district court. I felt bad about the fact I
:24:36. > :24:41.had executed the warrants, taken to court and no no progress to report.
:24:41. > :24:45.Gerry Collins seems reluctant to get into this thorny issue? Were we
:24:45. > :24:54.any different from any other country at the time? I know the
:24:54. > :25:04.French you couldn't extradite a fly out of France.. Leave that question
:25:04. > :25:05.
:25:05. > :25:08.for someone else. OK? The Dublin Government is now await Smithwick's
:25:08. > :25:15.findings. The hearings will run until at least Easter and a final
:25:15. > :25:19.report is expected later this year. With the clock ticking, the Breen
:25:19. > :25:22.family solicitor says the tribunal may set up a videolink in Northern
:25:22. > :25:27.Ireland to encourage witnesses who have yet to come forward. Of those,
:25:27. > :25:30.of whom I know, there would be four Ministry of Defence witnesses which
:25:30. > :25:35.would include, for example, a soldier who was present on the
:25:35. > :25:39.ground at the relevant periods of time. Getting to the truth though
:25:40. > :25:43.is a long and difficult process. The Secretary of State is currently
:25:43. > :25:46.holding talks with the Stormont political parties in an effort to
:25:46. > :25:50.find a process to deal with the legacy of the Troubles. In recent
:25:51. > :25:55.months, like the Irish government, he too has been made fully aware
:25:55. > :26:00.that the past remains a toxic issue. I was so angry with the Prime
:26:00. > :26:08.Minister that I actually -- called a halt to the meeting. Days after
:26:08. > :26:18.David Cameron told the family of Pat Finucane they would not get a
:26:18. > :26:25.
:26:25. > :26:28.full public inquiry. Enda Kenny said he would raise their case in
:26:29. > :26:35.London, Europe and Washington. response from the Irish government
:26:35. > :26:38.has been non-co-operation in terms of meeting to discuss these issues.
:26:38. > :26:43.Enda Kenny and his government can't have it both ways. He can't travel
:26:43. > :26:47.around the world saying, I want to know the truth, I want a public
:26:47. > :26:53.inquiry. In the Finucane case and at the same time deny hundreds of
:26:53. > :26:58.people the right to question the Irish government on their role.
:26:58. > :27:03.Danny Kennedy says he's tried for nearly nine months to get a full
:27:03. > :27:08.meeting with the Taoiseach but only managed to get a chat at a North-
:27:08. > :27:15.South Ministerial Council meeting in Armagh. I presented Enda Kenny
:27:15. > :27:21.with a dossier detailing the murders of 159 members of the
:27:21. > :27:25.forces or individuals at the hands of South Armagh republicans wo who
:27:25. > :27:30.had operated from his jurisdiction. They have to stand up and say it
:27:30. > :27:35.was wrong and they have to apologise. Spotlight has also the
:27:35. > :27:38.Taoiseach and the Tanaiste and the Foreign Minister to talk about
:27:38. > :27:44.these issues. No-one at Leinster House was available for interview.
:27:44. > :27:51.It was the same response from the Gardai. For some, chasing down
:27:51. > :27:56.either government is a game of sectarian what-about-ery. I think
:27:56. > :27:58.in both cases you have a political agenda going on there. When
:27:58. > :28:04.republicans seek apologies from the British government what they are
:28:04. > :28:09.out to show is that it was all the British government fault. And on
:28:09. > :28:13.the unionist side there is also a political agenda to try and
:28:13. > :28:18.demonstrate that it wasn't an insurrection it was some outside
:28:18. > :28:24.force that destabilised Northern Ireland which was a great wee place
:28:24. > :28:29.before 69. For Jeffrey Donaldson and other unionists this is not
:28:30. > :28:34.what-about-ery, but a demand for parity for unionist concerns and
:28:34. > :28:41.he's adamant that they -- there can be no greed mechanism for dealing
:28:41. > :28:49.with the past until this issue is addressed. They they want to be
:28:49. > :28:54.included in the future they have to be accountable for the past.